

übrigen keine Bibliographie, sondern alle Angaben in den Fussnoten, was in einer editorischen Anmerkung vermerkt wird (S.64). Ein Desideratum des Buches bleibt eine Vorstellung der Autoren sowie eine Indizierung, wie im vorausgegangenen Band 11 der Reihe. Nur bei der Namensnennung von Kulkarni ist eine Angabe in Klammern vermerkt: "(Hyderabad)". Bei den übrigen finden sich überhaupt keine Angaben. Neben diesen editorischen Kritikpunkten sind noch einige leicht korrigierbare Lektoratsfehler als formale Schwächen an dieser Stelle zu nennen.

Die Beiträge liefern interessante Aufschlüsse für einzelne Bereiche im riesigen Corpus der Literatur in neuindischen Sprachen. Die "transkreative" Bezugnahme auf Themen und Charaktere aus der religiösen Überlieferung spielt in den modernen indischen Literaturen Indiens eine kaum zu unterschätzende Rolle. Es kommt darauf an, eine für den indischen Kontext passende Typologie der Formen dieser Bezugnahme und ihrer Funktionen im literarischen Kunstwerk zu entwickeln, wofür sich aus dem vorliegenden Band wichtige Hinweise entnehmen lassen.

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CLAUDIUS NENNINGER: *Aus gutem Grund. Praśastapādas anumāna-Lehre und die drei Bedingungen des logischen Grundes*. Reinbek: Inge Wezler, Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1992. viii + 169 pp [Philosophia Indica: Einsichten - Ansichten, Band 1].

In the introduction to this book (p. 9) the author gives a simple example of a conclusion by analogy (*Analogieschluss*):

- Occidental logic is concerned with formal conclusiveness.
- Therefore the Indian theory of *anumāna*, too, is concerned with formal conclusiveness.

The plausibility of conclusions by analogy, he points out, depends on the extent to which the analogy concerns essential features. The question whether the analogy between occidental and Indian logic is close enough to justify the above conclusion is said to become clear later on in the book.

The last pages of the book (p. 156 f.) provide the answer to the question raised in its beginning. Two of the three conditions of the inferential sign are meant to secure inductively that the sign is inseparately connected with the property to be inferred. It follows that Indian logic is not primarily deductive logic, as it has so often been maintained.

Between the beginning and the end the book contains a translation and analysis of the section of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* that deals with *anumāna*,

followed by an discussion of the precise interpretation of the three conditions of the inferential sign. In the analysis and discussion, the passage concerned is dissected with the greatest possible care, and the arguments represented with the help of formal logic. Not infrequently the words of *Praśastapāda* allow of different formalisations. In such cases the different possibilities are considered, and more than once other parts of the section permit a reduction of the number of possible, or likely, interpretations.

A particularly interesting part of the book is the section on method (p. 12-20). Here Nenninger makes a number of observations on the significance of analysing the words of an ancient Indian author with the help of formal logic. Such an analysis does not necessarily lead to a more precise understanding of what the author had in mind. On the contrary, it may happen that our formal analysis introduces distinctions which the author was not aware of. Nenninger is equally interesting when he talks about the possibility of understanding another culture. It is not possible to criticize the postulate of a shared core of rationality for being Eurocentric. Such an assumption is rather essential for any form of dialogue between equal partners. Nenninger's observations are all the more to be appreciated against the background of the current tendency to question the possibility of trans-cultural understanding.⁴

This book is about Indian logic as it finds expression in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Nenninger has chosen this text because it contains a particularly clear and coherent section on *anumāna*, not because he is much interested in *Vaiśeṣika*. This latter circumstance is no doubt responsible for the following mistake, which, it seems, Western scholars of *Vaiśeṣika* are apt to make. Nenninger seems to think that every expression ending in the suffix *-tva* refers to an object belonging to the category 'universal' (*sāmānya*). He claims, e.g. (p. 29), that *prayatnāntarīyakatva* "das Unmittelbar-auf-Bemühung-folgend-Sein"⁵ belongs to this category. And on pp. 11 and 112 he speaks about the universals "Mit-Rauch-versehen-Sein" (*dhūmavattva*) and "Mit-Feuer-versehen-sein" (*agnivattva*). But this is, of course, not correct. For universals reside in substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) or movements (*karman*), and there only. For

4 For those with an interest in 'Postmodernism' in anthropology, Ernest Gellner's *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (Routledge, London and New York, 1992) should be essential reading.

5 Nenninger writes, no doubt by mistake, "das Unmittelbar-auf-Berührung-folgend-Sein."

prayatnāntarīyatva to be a universal, *prayatnāntarīyaka* must be a substance, a quality, or a movement. But the substances, qualities and movements are enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika system, and *prayatnāntarīyaka* does not figure among them (nor do *dhūmavat* and *agnivat*). The fact that Vaiśeṣika accepted the category of universals, did not bar them from using the suffix *-tva*, like everyone else, in less ontologically burdensome ways.

Nenninger's book is the work of a philosophical, not a philological interpreter (p. 12). He yet offers a philological analysis (pp. 52 ff.) of the first lines of the section studied, which deserves our attention. This passage enumerates the three conditions of the *liṅga* 'Beweismerkmal' '[inferential] sign'. The passage is remarkable in that it contains a kind of definition of the correct [inferential] sign, which is presented in two different forms: first in verse, next in prose. Nenninger thinks there are reasons to believe that the two verses here presented were quoted from another work, whereas the prose paraphrases were written by Praśastapāda himself. Let us consider his reasons.

I am not sure whether Nenninger has succeeded in showing that the paraphrase assigns two different meanings to the one word *anumeya* in the first verse.⁶ But I think there can be no doubt that he is right in his view that the verse (originally, or even as understood by Praśastapāda) uses the word *anumeya* in the sense *anumeyadharma* 'property to be inferred', and defines the *liṅga* in these terms, whereas the paraphrase uses this term in the sense *pratipipādayiṣitadharmaviśiṣṭa dharmin* "Beschaffenheitsträger, welcher ausgezeichnet ist durch die Beschaffenheit, von der man wünscht, sie erkennen zu lassen" (tr. Nenninger p. 38); in English: 'property-possessor characterized by the property which one wishes to make known'. If we think of the common example "the hill has fire, because it has smoke" - where, of course, the *liṅga* is smoke -, the *anumeya* is fire in the verse, whereas the paraphrase considers 'the hill as characterized by fire' to be the *anumeya*.

This difference between verse and paraphrase gains interest in view of the fact that Dignāga, in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, discusses the question what exactly is to be inferred: the property-possessor (*dharmin*; in our example the hill), the property (*dharma*; fire), or a combination of the two. Dignāga himself holds that what is to be inferred is the property-possessor characterized by the property (*dharmaviśiṣṭa dharmin*), and he calls it

6 He does not discuss the fact that the verse uses the verbal form *sambaddham*, whereas the paraphrase has *sahacaritam*. We may have to read the paraphrase as one concerning the whole first line, not each individual word.

anumeya.⁷ It would seem, therefore, that Praśastapāda gave an 'improved' interpretation of a traditional verse, improved in the sense that it followed the suggestions made by Dignāga.

This conclusion is strengthened by another consideration as well. The first line of the verse (*yad anumeyena sambaddham*) is unmetrical: it has one syllable too many.⁸ This, as I have argued elsewhere, is most easily explained by the assumption that originally this line did not have *anumeya*, but rather *sādhya* (perhaps: *yat tu sādhyena sambaddham*). It is known that *sādhya* was used in earlier Vaiśeṣika works, and it is again Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* which criticizes the use of this word.⁹ One gains the impression that Praśastapāda did not only reinterpret the verse under consideration, but that he changed (at least) one of its words as well; both these activities were influenced by Dignāga's discussion in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

In the earlier publication referred to above, I argued that the two verses together with their paraphrases might constitute an unacknowledged quotation from the *Kaṭandī*, which seems to have exerted a major influence on Praśastapāda. In view of Nenninger's observations, this position will have to be adjusted. The verses now appear as quotations in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, their paraphrases, to all appearances, are the work of Praśastapāda himself.

It is, of course, still possible to maintain that Praśastapāda quoted these verses from the *Kaṭandī*. The evidence in support of this position, it must however be admitted, has now lost some of its force. For one of the main arguments in its favour - the Vārttika style of part of the *Kaṭandī* - does not apply to the two verses and their paraphrases, once we admit that the paraphrases in this case have a different author. However, not all of the *Kaṭandī* was written in this style. And the influence of the *Kaṭandī* on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* appears to have been very strong; it is, in fact, the only text (besides the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*) which we have reason to believe was actually cited by its author.

7 See Nenninger p. 162; Hattori, 1972:172-73.

8 Note that K. Rüping (1991: 320) "corrects" the text into *yad anumeyasambaddham*, without the slightest textual support.

9 See Bronkhorst, 1993: 158 ff.

To conclude this review, *Aus gutem Grund* breaks new ground in the interpretation of early Indian logic, and has something to offer to those primarily interested in early Vaiśeṣika as well.

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