

CANDRAGOMIN'S SYNTACTIC RULES, SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

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1. In their introduction to the translation of the *Kāṛakāhnika* section of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen have presented a comparison of Pāṇini's syntactic rules with those of Candragomin, the author of the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*. Useful as this introduction is to a student of Pāṇini in particular and Sanskrit grammar in general, it contains certain misconceptions about Candragomin's syntactic rules and their operation. The purpose of this paper is to present Candragomin's syntactic conceptions as they are actually seen in his *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa* and his own commentary, *Vṛtti*, on this grammar, and to set the record straight.

2. Joshi and Roodbergen rightly point out : "Pāṇini has ... defined the syntactic meanings called *apādāna*, etc. with the help of non-linguistic features, and that these features are indirectly connected with case-endings, namely, through the intermediary of the names, *apādāna*, etc. Candragomin, on the other hand, does not provide further definitions. He links syntactic meanings, and, in some instances, non-linguistic features directly with case-endings" (*Kāṛakāhnika*, Intro., p. xvi). However, in regard to his *Kāṛaka* section, they say : "In this section, ... the *abhihita* / *anabhihita*-device which ensures a uniform treatment of passive construction and the nominative endings is lost" (*Kāṛakāhnika*, Intro., p. xvi). As we shall see, this is a wrong statement concerning Candragomin's syntactic rules. They also claim that Candragomin leaves his entire application of *Kāṛaka* rules subject to *vivakṣā* "the wish of the speaker", instead of having principles such as the *ekasaṃjñā*-rule (P. 1. 4. 1) in Pāṇini's grammar. Candragomin's syntactic rules are actually by no means as loosely defined as they are made out to be by Joshi and Roodbergen. Below we shall go into some of the details of Candragomin's syntactic rules.

3. What is the *abhihita* / *anabhihita* principle in Pāṇini? Having defined various *kāṛakas* such as *kartṛ* "agent", *karman* "object" etc., Pāṇini proceeds to the assignment of various case endings. This particular section in Pāṇini's grammar is headed by rule P. 2. 3. 1 (*anabhihite*) : "If not expressed (already)". This expression continues into the following rules. For instance, with the addition of *anabhihite*, P. 2. 3. 2. (*karmaṇi dvitīyā*) comes to mean : "The second triplet of case endings is added to a nominal denoting the object, if the notion of objecthood has not already been

expressed otherwise.” Thus for instance, in the sentence *rāmaḥ odanam pacati* “Rāma cooks rice”, the syntax of cases works as follows. The active voice affix *-ti* in the verb *pacati* denotes agent (*kartr*) according to Pāṇini (ref: P. 3. 4.69 (*12ḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyah*) and P. 1. 3.73 (*Śeṣāt kartari parasmaipadam*)). Since the affix *-ti* denotes agent, the meaning “object” remains unexpressed. Thus by P.2.3.2 (*karmaṇi dvitīyā*) governed by the *anabhihita* “unexpressed” condition, we get the accusative case ending for the object *odana*. P. 2. 3. 46 (*prātipadikārtha.... prathamā*) says, beside other matters, that the nominative case endings are added to a nominal merely to denote the meaning of the nominal itself, i. e. when no additional syntactic meaning such as “agent”, “object” etc. needs to be or remains to be denoted. In the above given example, the affix *-ti* denotes the agent, and hence this particular meaning does not need to be nor remains to be denoted. Therefore, by P. 2. 3. 46, we get the residual nominative case for the agent *rāma*. This briefly illustrates the functioning of the *anabhihita-anabhihita* “expressed / unexpressed” device in Pāṇini’s rules.

4. Joshi and Roodbergen claim that no such regulating device exists in the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*. As I shall show below, this is not true. The particular device exists in Candragomin’s grammar as much as it exists in Pāṇini’s grammar. However, following the argument of Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya* that such an explicit statement is not required and that one could simply get by with the generally accepted maxim *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* “no linguistic item is used to denote something which is already otherwise denoted”, Candragomin does not state this principle in the form of an explicit rule. However, there is explicit evidence in his rules and in his commentary to show that this principle exists in his system. The maxim *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* is included in his *Paribhāṣā-sūtras*.¹ This maxim has the same regulating function which is accomplished by P.2.3.1 (*anabhihite*), except that this maxim has a much wider scope than the particular rule in Pāṇini. Also see the *Vṛtti* on C. 1. 4. 50., Vol. I., p. 139.

5. Candragomin’s rule C.2.1.93 (*artha-mātre prathamā*) says that the nominative case endings are added to a word when only its own meaning, and nothing more, is to be denoted. The implication of this rule is that if a syntactic meaning such as “agent” has not been otherwise denoted and thus remains to be and needs to be denoted, one cannot use the nominative case. This implication is explicitly supported by Candragomin’s own statements on C. 2. 1. 43 (*kriyāpye dvitīyā*). This rule says that the accusative case is used to denote that which is desired to be encompassed by the particular action. Candragomin’s examples on this rule are: *kaṭam karoti* “(He) makes a mat”, *odanam pacati* “(He) cooks rice”, and *ādityam paśyati* “(He) sees the sun”. In all these cases, the affix *-ti*, according to

Candragomin's own conceptions, denotes "agent", and hence to denote the unexpressed object, one can have the accusative case endings for the words *kaṭa*, *odana* and *āditya*. Candragomin, like Pāṇini, uses the symbol *L* for verbal inflections in general, and says clearly in several places that certain verbal inflections, substitutes for the original *L*, denote "agent".

- (1) *yadā tu kartari lakāras tadā, akṛta kaṭaḥ svayam eva* / "When the verbal inflection (i. e. *L*) denotes "agent", we have the usage : *akṛta kaṭaḥ svayam eva* 'The mat made itself'." *Vṛtti* on C. 1. 1. 78, Vol. I., p. 34.
- (2) *atapta tapas tāpasa iti kartary eva lakārah* / "In the usage *atapta tapas tāpasaḥ*, the verbal ending (i. e. *L*) denotes only "agent". " *Vṛtti* on C. 1. 1. 78, Vol. I., p. 34.
- (3) C. 1. 1. 82 (*kartari śap*) says that the affix *ŚaP* is introduced after a verb root, if that verb root is followed by an active verbal inflection (*tiN̄*) or an affix marked with *Ś* denoting agent (*kartari*). This rule does not mean that, for Candragomin, *ŚaP* denotes agent.

6. There is a passage in Candragomin's *Vṛtti* which absolutely shows that he does have the *abhihita* / *anabhihita* principle governing his case syntax. On C. 2. 1. 43 (*kriyāpye dvitīyā*), Candragomin gives a usage where the word denoting object takes the nominative case ending, because the verb is passive. Candragomin says :

odanaḥ pacyate ity odana-śabdād vyāpyatā na gamyate / *kim tarhi ? tinantāt* / *Vṛtti* on C. 2. 1. 43, Vol. I., p. 168. "In the usage *odanaḥ pacyate* 'rice is cooked', the object-ness of rice is not understood from the word *odanaḥ*. What then ? (it is understood) from the word (*pacyate*) which ends in the verbal inflection (*tiN̄*, in this case *-te*)."

Thus Candragomin very clearly uses the *abhihita* / *anabhihita* principle to determine assignment of case endings in his grammatical system. Here, in the above discussion, the point made by Candragomin is that the affix *-te* in the passive verb *pacyate* denotes the object, and hence by C. 2. 1. 93 (*artha-mātre prathamā*) we get the nominative case ending for the word *odanaḥ* to denote "merely the meaning of the nominal stem", and no other syntactic meaning. Thus Joshi and Roodbergen have missed the inner working of Candragomin's syntactic rules, which once understood as shown above, is not terribly different from Pāṇini's system.

7. Joshi and Roodbergen say : "Candragomin provides for passive constructions by C.1.1.80, which introduces the suffix *yak* in the meanings

ings in the same meanings. The trick is simply to replace the word *karman* in Pāṇini's rules (P. 3. 1. 67 and P. 1. 3. 13) by *āpya* " (*Kāṛakāhnikā*, Intro., p. xix, fn. 57). This statement which talks about Candragomin's " tricks " itself contains several problems of its own. Candragomin's rule C. 1. 4. 47 (*bhāvāpyayoh*, *tañ-ānā* from C.1.4.46) says that middle endings (*tañ*) and the affix *āna* denote *bhāva* " action " and *āpya* " object ". Rule C. 1.1.80 *tiñ-siti yag a-liḍ-āsīrlīni*), with the continuation of the word *bhāvāpyayoh* from C.1.1.78, has been totally misunderstood by Joshi and Roodbergen. They claim that this rule prescribes the use of *yaK* to denote *bhāva* " action " and *āpya* " object ". This simply is not the case. If *yaK* were to denote these two meanings, then in forms such as *pac-ya-te*, there would be two elements *ya* and *te* denoting exactly the same meaning. Could this be a " trick " played by Candragomin ? That does not seem to be the case. Let us take a closer look at C. 1. 1. 80. This rule is an exact equivalent of P. 3.1. 67 (*sārvadhātuke yak*). The term *sārvadhātuka* is defined by Pāṇini as referring to *tiñ* affixes and affixes marked by *Ś* (ref : P 3. 4. 113) (*tiñ-sit sārvadhātukam*). P. 3.4.114 (*ārdhadhātukam sesah*) says that rest of the affixes prescribed after verb roots are *ārdhadhātuka* affixes. But P. 3.4.115 (*liṭ ca*) and P. 3.4.116 (*liñ āśīṣi*) say that past perfect affixes (*liṭ*) and benedictive optative affixes (*āśīṣi*), though they are substitutes for *tiñ* affixes, are *ārdhadhātuka* affixes, and are not *sārvadhātuka*. Thus if we look at the resulting scope of the Pāṇinian term *sārvadhātuka*, it is identical with Candragomin's *tiñ-sit ā-liḍ-āsīrlīni*. Just as in the case of P. 3.1.67 (*sārvadhātuke yak*), there is an *anuvṛtti* " continuation " of the words *bhāva-karmanoh* from P. 3.1.66 (*clñ bhāvakarmanoh*), in the same manner, in the case of C. 1.1.80 (*tiñ-siti yag a-liḍ-āsīrlīni*), there is the continuation of *bhāvāpyayoh* from C. 1.1.78. Thus despite the difference of terminology, Candragomin's rules are exactly identical with those of Pāṇini. P. 3.1.67 (*sārvadhātuke yak*), says that the affix *yaK* is added after a verb root, if the verb root is followed by a *sārvadhātuka* affix denoting either *bhāva* " action " or *karman* " object ". This rule does not mean, " add the affix *yaK* after a verb root to denote *bhāva* or *karman*, if that verb root is followed by a *sārvadhātuka* affix ". The same is true of Candragomin's rules, and we cannot claim that, for him, the affix *yaK* denotes these meanings.

8. In fact, the *abhihita / anabhihita* principle plays a very significant role in Candragomin's grammar. In particular I shall discuss Candragomin's explanation of an infinitive usage. I have discussed the evolution of the syntactic theory in the works of the Sanskrit grammarians, particularly as it concerns the infinitive *-tum*, in my forthcoming monograph *Syntax of the Sanskrit Infinitive*. Here I shall only deal with a particular explanation in Candragomin's *Vṛtti*.

samartho bhoktum ... iti bhavateḥ sarvatra sambhavāt siddham | ... uccāraṇam tu vaktur āyattam |, *Vṛtti* on C. 1. 3. 150, Vol. I., p. 130.

"The usage *samartho bhoktum* is established because the verb "to be" (*bhavati*) occurs everywhere. Its actual pronunciation depends on the speaker."

This simple looking statement requires the full use of the *abhihita / anabhihita* device. If C. 2.1.93 (*artha-mātre prathamā*) were an uncontrolled rule prescribing the use of the nominative case, without regard to the *abhihita / anabhihita* principle, there would be no problem in this example. However, Candragomin rightly sees a problem, and provides a workable solution. What is the problem ?

In *samartho gantum* "(He is) able to go", the syntactic meaning of the infinitive affix *-tum* is *bhāva* "action" according to Candragomin's rule C. 1. 3. 6 (*tumun bhāve kriyāyām tadarthāyām*). Since the affix *-tum* denotes "action", the meanings "agent" etc. remain unexpressed. The word *samartha* "capable" is an adjective and refers to the agent of *gantum*. Since the meaning "agent" has not been denoted by *-tum*, it would have to be denoted by the case ending to be added to the word *samartha*. In this case, we would have to have the instrumental case by C. 2.1.62 (*kartari tṛtīyā*), and we cannot get the desired nominative by C. 2. 1. 93 (*artha-mātre prathamā*), since the meaning that needs to be denoted includes "agent", and hence it is not merely the meaning of the nominal stem (*artha-mātra*). Thus, we would get the undesired sentence **samarthena gantum*, and cannot explain *samartho gantum*.

Given this problem, Candragomin solves it by assuming a deleted finite verb *bhavati* "is" in the sentence, making the underlying sentence *samartho gantum bhavati*. This suggestion is based on Kātyāyana's *vārttika* (*astir bhavanti paraḥ prathama-puruṣaḥ aprayuḥ samāno'py asti*, vt. 8 on P. 2.3.1). Once we accept this deleted verb *bhavati*, the syntactic problems are solved, since the affix *-ti* denotes agent, and hence for this otherwise denoted agent we can have a nominative case ending.

9. The above discussion not only tells us explicitly that Candragomin used the *abhihita / anabhihita* principle, but a deeper analysis of this explanation implies a syntactic principle, which is unknown to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and appears explicitly only in the work of Candragomin's grand-disciple, Bhartṛhari, for the first time. We may briefly discuss this question here. I have discussed this fully in my forthcoming monograph *Syntax of the Sanskrit Infinitive*.

10. How to deal with the case-syntax of an item which is simultaneously linked to two different actions? For example, in the sentence *bhoktum*

samartho bhavati, the referent of the word *samartha* is simultaneously linked to both *gantum* and *bhavati*. While the affix *-tum* for Candragomin denotes *bhāva* "action", the affix *-ti* denotes "agent". Thus the syntactic meaning "agent" is left unexpressed by *-tum*, but it is expressed by *-ti*. Thus it is simultaneously both *abhihita* "expressed" and *anabhihita* "un-expressed". Given such a situation, how should one deal with the syntax of *samartha*? The principle used in such cases by Kātyāyana is that as long as a *kāraka* is *anabhihita* "unexpressed" by one affix, the particular *vibhakti* "case ending" rule based on this factor will apply, and the fact that the same *kāraka* is *abhihita* "expressed" by another affix at the same time does not matter.² This principle is accepted by Patañjali to be valid³, though it finally lands him into problems from which he has been unable to come out.⁴ Joshi and Roodbergen discuss this principle in their *Anabhihitāhnikā* volume, but do not evaluate it, nor point out that it ultimately fails.⁵ For instance, this principle cannot explain the syntax of *gantum samartho bhavati*. Since the meaning "agent" is left unexpressed by *-tum*, even though it is expressed by *-ti*, we would have to have the instrumental case for the word *samartha* by P. 2.3.18 (*kartr-karāṇayos ṛtīyā*) or C. 2.1.62 (*kartari ṛtīyā*). This would result in the undesired sentence **samarthena gantum bhavati*. However, Candragomin says that the assumption of the deleted verb *bhavati* solves the problems in this example. (Note Candragomin's words: *bhavateḥ sarvatra sambhavāt siddham, Vṛtti*, Vol. I., p. 130.)

11. What could be the syntactic explanation which would solve this problem? The best solution is to say that when one *kāraka* is shared by two hierarchically related actions, it is the main action that determines the surface syntax of that shared *kāraka*. This is precisely the principle enunciated by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* (III. 7. 81-2). I have attempted to show in my forthcoming *Syntax of the Sanskrit Infinitive* that this principle was implicitly present in Pāṇini's own rules, but that it was unknown to both Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Where did Bhartṛhari derive this principle from? It is possible that he thought of it himself, but it is perhaps quite likely that he learned it from his teacher Vasurāta who was Candragomin's disciple.⁶ From what we know about the history of the transmission of the *Mahābhāṣya*, it appears that Candragomin revived the study of this work which had fallen into disuse.⁷ Since this particular principle of syntax was unknown to Patañjali, and since the study of his work was almost discontinued by the time of Candragomin, the circumstantial evidence may point to Candragomin as the source of this principle. Thus we must revise the negative evaluation of Candragomin's syntactic rules given by Joshi and Roodbergen, and should recognize Candragomin's contribution as possessing greater merit than has been accorded to it by its critics.

12. We may also briefly look at Joshi and Rodbergen's criticism of Candragomin's grammar concerning the fact that it does not contain rules

such as P. 1.4.1 (*ā kaḍārād ekā saṁjñā*) and P. 1.4.2 (*vipratīṣedhe paraṁ kāryam*). They remark, "Moreover, since Candragomin leaves the syntactic meanings undefined, and relates the use of case-endings to *vivakṣā*: 'the wish of the speaker (to present items in language as he likes)', it relieves him of problems such as rule-ordering, conflict-procedure, and adjustments due to the definitions. In fact, part of the grammatical burden has been shifted to *vivakṣā*" (*Kārakāhnikā*, Intro., pp. xvi-xvii). In a footnote to this statement, they state: "One effect of the *ekasaṁjñā*-rule (P. 1.4.1) in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, as far as the *kāraka*-designations are concerned, is that it checks the *vivakṣā*, and that standard usage is imposed" (*Ibid.*, p. xvii). This criticism is also unfair to Candragomin, and as we shall see, there are principles such as rule-ordering, conflict-procedure etc. in the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*, and that the notion of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire" does not play the kind of rampant role it has been ascribed by these two scholars.

13. In the first place, we must note very clearly that Candragomin does indeed have rule-ordering and a conflict-procedure in his grammar. Rule C. 1.1.16 (*vipratīṣedhe*), read along with Candragomin's *Vṛtti* (*dvayoh sāvakāśayor ekaṭra prasāṅge yat paraṁ tad bhavati*) says that of two conflicting rules, which have otherwise non-conflicting independent domains, the latter rule prevails. In contrast with P. 1.4.2 (*vipratīṣedhe paraṁ kāryam*), which is historically speaking a rule limited to some sections,⁸ Candragomin's rule is applicable throughout his grammar. Here Candragomin is clearly following Patañjali's interpretation of P. 1.4.2.⁹ Thus this rule applies to Candragomin's rules regarding case endings, compounds, as well as to other parts of his grammar¹⁰. Once we recognize this factor, it would appear necessary that there should be a specific pattern of rule-ordering in his grammar, without which this principle would not make sense. A close look at Candragomin's case ending rules shows this significant rule-ordering. Let us look at the order of some of the major rules of Candragomin.

- C. 2.1.43 (*kriyāpye dvitīyā*)
- C. 2.1.62 (*kartari tṛtīyā*)
- C. 2.1.63 (*karāṇe*)
- C. 2.1.73 (*saṁpradāne caturthī*)
- C. 2.1.81 (*avadheḥ pañcāmī*)
- C. 2.1.88 (*saptamy ādhāre*)
- C. 2.1.93 (*artha-mātre prathamā*)
- C. 2.1.95 (*ṣaṣṭhī sambandhe*)

Joshi and Roodbergen have quoted and translated these rules in this order (*Kārakāhnikā*, Intro., p. xvii) without realizing the function of the order

of these rules. There is no *ekasamjñā* rule in Candragomin to be sure, and yet it is the order of the above rules which takes care of the resulting problems. For instance, in the case of causative usages such as *devadatto yajñadattaṁ grāmaṁ gamayati* "Devadatta makes Yajñadatta go to the village", according to Candragomin's statements, Yajñadatta is both the *prayojya-kartṛ* "agent, being instigated" as well as the *vyāpya* "object" of the causative action (*prayojaka vyāpāra*).¹¹ This being the case, both C. 2.1.43 (*kriyāpye dvitīyā*) and C. 2.1.62 (*kartari tṛtīyā*) would conflict in this case, since Yajñadatta is both *kriyāpya* and *kartṛ*. Since there is a conflict, by C. 1.1.16 (*vipratīśedhe*), the latter rule would have to apply and this would create the unacceptable sentence: **devadatto yajñadattena grāmaṁ gamayati*. To avoid this kind of instrumental case in the case of particular verbs, Candragomin makes the following exception rule: C. 2.1.44 (*gati-bodhāhāra-sabdārthānāpyānam prayojye*). This rule, as an exception rule, lays down that the accusative case is used after a nominal to denote the agent, being instigated, of verbs meaning going, knowing, eating etc. However, in a sentence such as *devadatto yajñadattena odanaṁ pācayati* "Devadatta makes Yajñadatta cook rice", Yajñadatta is both the agent of the action of cooking and the object of the causative action, and here, according to Candragomin's system, we get the desired instrumental case by C. 2.1.62 (*kartari tṛtīyā*), which being a later rule supersedes the earlier rule C. 2.1.43 (*kriyāpye dvitīyā*). Thus it is the rule-ordering that is crucial in Candragomin's system in enabling us in deriving the proper forms. This is done by Candragomin without taking recourse to *ekasamjñā* "only one designation at a time" as is done by Pāṇini.

14. We will briefly contrast Pāṇini's handling of such usages as given above. Pāṇini's rules assigning *kāraka* designations are headed by P. 1.4.1 (*ā kaṭārād ekā samjñā*) and P. 1.4.2 (*vipratīśedhe param kāryam*). While the first rule says that in the following sections, an item can have only one designation at a time, the latter rule says that in the case of a conflict, the latter of the two conflicting rules prevails. Thus if two designations obtain for one item, then the designation obtained by a later rule will apply, and not the designation obtained by a previous rule. Given this framework, we can see what happens in the case of a causative sentence. Let us look at the example: *devadattaḥ yajñadattena odanaṁ pācayati* "Devadatta makes Yajñadatta cook rice". Here Yajñadatta is *kartṛ* "agent" of the action of cooking by P. 1.4.54 (*svatantraḥ kartā*), and is the *karman* "object" of the action of instigating denoted by the causative affix by P. 1.4.49 (*kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma*). However, both of these designations cannot be operative simultaneously due to P. 1.4.1., and hence by P. 1.4.2. the latter designation, i. e. *kartṛ* "agent" is retained. Since the affix *-ti* in *pācayati* denotes the agent of the causative action, the agent of the instigated action

remains unexpressed (*anabhihita*). Therefore, by P. 2. 3. 18 (*kartṛ-karaṇayos tṛtīyā*) we get the desired instrumental case for the unexpressed agent *Yajñadatta*. In the example *devadattaḥ yajñadattaṁ grāmaṁ gamayati* "Devadatta makes Yajñadatta go to the village", the same procedure applies first, and we obtain the designation *kartṛ* "agent" for Yajñadatta, which in turn would lead to an instrumental case ending for the word *yajñadatta*. However, in this instance the correct usage requires an accusative affix for the word *yajñadatta*. This is achieved by Pāṇini by rule P. 1. 4. 52 (*gati-buddhi-pratyayasānārtha-sabda-karmāḥ karmakāṇām aṇi kartā sa nau, karma*). This exception rule says : "That which is the agent of verbs of going etc. in the pre-causative (*aṇi*) becomes the object (*karman*) in the causative (*nau*). " Thus, in the case of the particular verbs, this exception rule in effect reverses the operation of P. 1. 4. 2 (*vipratishedhe paraṁ kāryam*). Since Yajñadatta now holds the only designation, i. e. "object", we get the accusative case ending for the word *yajñadatta* by P. 2. 3. 2 (*karmaṇi dvitīyā*) to denote its otherwise unexpressed objecthood.

The above comparison of Pāṇini's procedure with that of Candragomin makes it quite clear that Candragomin does have the principle of rule-ordering and devices to resolve conflicts as much as Pāṇini. However, as shown above, Pāṇini takes care of the conflicting possibilities at the stage of applying the *kāraka* designations, by means of P. 1. 4. 1. and P. 1. 4. 2 (i. e. *ekasamjñādhikāra* and *vipratishedha*). Candragomin, on the other hand, has no independent *kāraka* designations, and hence he takes care of resolving conflicting possibilities at the only stage available to him, i. e. his *vibhakti* "case ending" rules. Thus, rule-ordering is more significant for Pāṇini's rules assigning the *kāraka* designations, while it becomes more significant for Candragomin's *vibhakti*-rules.

15. Thus we must clearly reject the notion upheld by Joshi and Roodbergen that Candragomin's syntactic rules are mainly guided by *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire", and that there are no internal mechanisms such as the *abhihita* / *anabhihita* device, rule-ordering and procedures to resolve conflicts. Candragomin has all the above features, though some of these operate somewhat differently from Pāṇini's procedures. Candragomin does use the concept of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire" where there are, in his view, true options. Here his interpretation of options is often different from that of Pāṇini, but that would simply mean that the particular usages mean something different to Candragomin than what they possibly meant to Pāṇini. For instance, P. 2. 3. 7 (*saptamī pañcamyau kāraka-madhye*) says that when there is an item denoting time or space which occurs between two actions of the same *kāraka*, that word may take either a locative or an ablative case ending. For instance : *adya bhuktvā devadatto dvyahe* / *dvyahāḍ vā bhoktā* "Having eaten to day, Devadatta will eat after two days".¹² What this rule implies is that despite the difference of case endings in *dvyahe* /

that a verbal inflection may express agent, object or action (ref : P. 3.4.69) who is to decide whether the grammar should produce *rāmo gacchati* or *rāmeṇa gamyate*? The fact is that in Pāṇini's grammar certain operations are involuntary and do not require any input from the "user", while there are a great deal of operations which tacitly require the voluntary decision and choice by the "user". For instance, one can either say *agnir vṛkṣam dahati* "Fire burns the tree" or *aham agninā vṛkṣam dahāmi* "I burn the tree with fire". In the first sentence, *agni* "Fire" is the agent, while in the second sentence it is the instrument. There is nothing in Pāṇini's grammar, like the device or "raising" in modern generative grammar, which would provide us any systematic linking of these two sentences. The only explanation is *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire". Patañjali uses the notion of *vivakṣā* in this sense, and Candragomin's usage is in large measure derived from that of Patañjali.¹⁴ Thus the well-known grammatical maxim *vivakṣātaḥ kārakāṇi bhavanti* "the *kārakas* are dependent on the speaker's desire" is not meant to replace the automatic operations in Pāṇini's grammar, but to indicate the source of input for the voluntary operations. The use of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire" in Candragomin's grammar is not different from its use in Pāṇini's grammar in principle, but only in details. It is not a stylistic concept, but a grammatical concept referring to necessary voluntary input without which the involuntary operations of a grammar cannot function. A great deal of this *vivakṣā*, though not all of it, can be formalized in terms of pragmatic constraints and discourse structure and strategies, but the Sanskrit grammarians relegated such considerations to the concept of *vivakṣā*. In doing this, Pāṇini and Candragomin do not differ substantially from each other.

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NOTES

1. *Mahābhāṣya* on P.2.3.1., Vol. I., pt. II., pp. 476-482. Also see: *Anabhihitāhnikā*, Intro., pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Patañjali discusses two possibilities. The case endings may be said to denote either (A) *kārakas*, or (B) number. Joshi and Roodbergen rightly say: "In view (A), P.2.3.1. is not required, because we can manage by the principle *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*", *Anabhihitāhnikā*, Intro., p. xxxvi. Candragomin's *Vṛtti* on C.2.1.1. (Vol. I, p. 161) says: *ete ca (svādayaḥ) sāmāthyād ekatvādimad-artha-vācinaḥ śabdāt pare bhavanti*. This means to say that case endings (singular etc. in each triplet) occur after words which denote entities possessed of singularity etc. Thus, it appears that, according to Candragomin, the case ending itself does not denote number, but that it denotes the syntactic meanings such as agent and object. This is also clear from the *Vṛtti* on C.2.1.87. This provides us the reason why Candragomin did not explicitly state a rule such as P.2.3.1. (*anabhihite*). The maxim *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* is included in Candragomin's *Paribhāṣāsūtras*, see: *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*, Vol. II., p. 396. This is the most direct evidence against the criticisms levelled by Joshi and Roodbergen. Also: *Paribhāṣasaṅgraha*, ed. by K.V. Abhyankar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1968, p. 47.
2. *Vārttikas* 5-6 on P.2.3.1., (*dvayoḥ kriyayoḥ kārake anyatareṇābhīhite vibhakty-abhāva-prasaṅgaḥ, na vā anyatareṇānabhidhānāt, anabhihite hi vidhānam*). Also see: *Anabhihitāhnikā*, Intro., pp. xxxvii and 37ff.
3. *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I., pt. II. pp. 483-4; Vol. II., pp. 251-253.
4. *Mahābhāṣya* on P.3.4.26, Vol. II., pp. 251-3. Also see: Madhav Deshpande (Forthcoming-A).
5. *Anabhihitāhnikā*, Intro., pp. xxxvii-xxxviii, and pp. 37ff. Also see: Madhav Deshpande (Forthcoming-B).
6. Puṣyarāja's commentary on *Vākyapadīya*, II. 484. (*nyāya-prasthāna ... etc.*) I must note here that my inferred principle is not the only possible way of explaining Candragomin's handling of the sentence *gantum samartho bhavati*. There are a few other possible explanations, though not necessarily better ones. I can think of two possible alternatives. [A] Unlike Kātyāyana's assumption, one may assume that if a *kāraka* related to two actions is at the same time expressed (*abhihita, ukta*) by one affix and not expressed (*anabhihita, anukta*) by another affix, it would be considered expressed

(*abhihita, ukta*). This would allow the use of the nominative case ending for the word *samartha*.

[B] One may take recourse to the notion of *vipratishedha* as defined by C.1.1.16. Since *gantum* does not express agent, we obtain the instrumental case by C.2.1.62 (*kartari tṛtīyā*). However, the affix-*ti* in *bhavati* denotes agent, and hence we obtain the nominative case by C.2.1.93 (*ārtha-mātre prathamā*). Since C.2.1.93 is the later (*para*) rule, it prevails, and this would allow the nominative case for the word *samartha*.

Easier and attractive as these alternatives may seem, they create problems, or rather do not solve problems in many other complex sentences. For instance, both of these alternatives fail to explain the syntax of the word *devadattam* in a sentence such as: *devadattam gacchantam paśyati yajñadattaḥ*, while the principle suggested by me above explains its accusative case. It will be unfair to Candragomin to ascribe to him an assumption which causes more problems, particularly when he explicitly says that the assumption of the form *bhavati* solves problems in *samartho gantum*.

7. *Vākya-padīya*, II. 479-483; George Cardona (1978).
8. Historically speaking, P.1.4.2. extends only up to P.2.3.38 (*kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*). For a historical discussion, see: George Cardona, "Some Principles of Pāṇini's Grammar", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, 1970, pp. 40-74.
9. *Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.4.2., Vol. I., pt. II., pp. 204ff. Once P. 1.4.2. is extended to cover the whole of the grammar, occasionally the previous rule needs to apply in preference to a later rule. To get over this problem, Patañjali proposes to interpret the word *para* in this rule to mean *iṣṭa* "desirable". Thus the rule is, occasionally, interpreted to mean: Of two conflicting rules, the desired rule supersedes the other. *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I., pt. I., p. 123, and pt. II., p. 207. Candragomin also accepts this interpretation of the word *para*. See the *Vṛtti* on C.1.1.16, Vol. I., p. 13.
10. *Vṛtti* on C.1.1.16, Vol. I., p.13. There are indeed a number of *paribhāṣās* "maxims" in Candragomin's system dealing with various conflict-procedures. See: *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*, Vol. II., pp. 396-398, and *Paribhāṣāsaṅgraha*, ed. by K. V. Abhyankar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1968, pp. 47-48.
11. *Vṛtti* on C.2.1.44., Vol. I., p. 169.
12. For these examples and various interpretations, see: *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I., pt. II., p. 492.
13. *Vṛtti* on C.2.1.51., Vol. I., p. 172.
14. *Vṛtti* on C.1.3.150., Vol. I., p. 130.
15. *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I., pt. II., pp. 241 and 249.

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dvyahād there was no semantic or syntactic difference according to Pāṇini. This reflects Pāṇini's interpretation of such usages. According to Candragomin's own perception and interpretation, these usages meant different things. The use of the form *dvyahē* meant that the particular time was the location (*ādhāra*), while *dvyahād* meant something like "since two days".¹³ Pāṇini and Candragomin differ on the meaning of various infinitive constructions. For instance, a construction such as *rāmaḥ bhoktum odanam pacati* "Rama cooks rice to eat (it)" is derived by P. 3.3.10 (*tumun-ṇvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām*) which says that the affixes *tumUN* and *ṇvUL* may be used after a verb root, if the action denoted by that verb root is the future purpose of another action denoted by a verb used in the same construction. However, Pāṇini feels that constructions like *rāmaḥ gantum saknoti* "Rama is able to go" do not express the same kind of semantic relationship between two actions, and hence he makes a separate rule to derive these kinds of constructions, i. e. P. 3.4.65 (*śaka-dhr̥sa tumun*). However, Candragomin's semantic perception is different from that of Pāṇini and he explicitly says that both the above types of usages have one action for the sake of another action.¹⁴ Thus the notion of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire" as used by Candragomin has indeed a more substantive significance, than what is recognized by Joshi and Roodbergen.

16. Explaining their conception of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire", Joshi and Roodbergen say: "We could say that by making *vivakṣā* responsible for the variety of syntactic construction Candragomin has introduced the symbol CONSULT THE SPEAKER in the program of his machine. That is to say, the mechanical progress of the machine is interfered with every now and then. Pāṇini, on the other hand, by means of his definitions has specified conditions under which an item is supposed to be *vyāpya*, or *ādhāra*, or *sambandha* in Candragomin's terminology. Therefore his machine, being provided with a more explicit program, works better. Or, to put it differently, *vivakṣā* is not a grammatical concept, but a stylistic one. It merely says that out of a number of modes of expression the speaker may select any particular one" (*Kāraṇāhnika*, Intro., p. xviii). I find it difficult to agree with this formulation. The analogy of Pāṇini's grammar to a machine, derived from early conceptions of Noam Chomsky, has been carried too far by Joshi and Roodbergen. In my review of Roodbergen's *Bahuvrīhi-Dvandvāhnika* (appearing in *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*), I have pointed out to what extent this analogy is misleading. Here I shall only deal with the concept of *vivakṣā*.

In the first place, as I have shown, *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire" is not a selection principle in Candragomin's system. Secondly, even Pāṇini's grammar presupposes a certain concept of *vivakṣā* "speaker's desire", and it is not an automaton which can produce a text on its own. Who should decide whether the grammar should produce *gantum icchati* or *jigamiṣati*? Given the rule