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**CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY:
A NOTE ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA I 337. 24-27
(STUDIES IN PATAÑJAL'S MAHĀBHĀṢYA III)**

1.

By a foot-note (on p. 652) Pdt. Sukhlal Sanghvi and Pdt. Bechardas Doshi—in the marvellous edition of Siddhasena Divākara's *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* together with Abhayadevasūri's *Tattvabodhavidhāyini*¹ we owe to them—my attention was recently drawn to a passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* (=Bh.) which seems to call for a closer study. Its significance does not, however, lie in the field of grammar itself, but—as in quite a number of similar instances too²—in something which is only implied or simply presupposed by Patañjali when giving an example for the operation of a certain grammatical rule. As for the present case, it is in connection with the view, discussed in the *Tattvabodhavidhāyini*, that *vanaspati-s*³ are *cetana*⁴ that the learned editors refer their readers to the Bh. (and a number of related texts);⁵ and the passage which they also quote, though only in part, is indeed likely to testify to the fact that Patañjali shared the view of the 'animateness of plants'; but this has to be

clarified by closer inspection, and it is this that I propose to do in the present note.

What I am going to offer is hence merely a very small piece of a large mosaic, and even one I did not discover myself, yet a piece which is easily overlooked by scholars who might wish to deal in a comprehensive manner with the Indian ideas about and attitudes towards vegetal life, a subject of utmost importance when the disastrous and global havoc provoked by 'progressive' Western ideas everywhere is considered. And, to be sure, such a comprehensive study could be undertaken more easily, and with much better results, if the various relevant pieces of information were collected and studied separately.

2.

The passage in question is found in the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 — a sūtra which is traditionally taken to form a restriction⁶ of 1. 4. 49, i.e. the definition of the *kāraka*-category *karman* — which reads thus: *gatibuddhi-pratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakāṇām aṇikartā sa nau*. According to this rule the technical term *karman* is applicable also to that which forms the agent of a non-causal action, expressed by a verb containing the causative suffix *ni(c)*, if this suffix is added to the verb, i.e. a corresponding causative is formed, provided the action is one denoted by verbs denoting movement (*gati*), cognition (*buddhi*), consuming (*pratyavasāna*); or the action is one of which the object is a sound (*śabda-karma*) or one which does not have an object (*akarmaka*).

To quote the example given in the *Kāśikā*: *gacchati māṇavako grāmam* versus *gamayati māṇavakam grāmam*, the counter example being: *pacaty odanam devadattaḥ* versus *pācayaty odanam devadattena*.

In his 7th vārttika on this sūtra Kātyāyana states (I 337. 24⁷): *bhakṣer ahimsārthasya* to which, however, the word *pratiśedhaḥ*, mentioned in vārtt. 5, has to be supplemented, as correctly noted by Nāgeśa.⁸ Patañjali evidently regarded the *anuvṛtti* of this expression as a matter of course, not calling for any explanation; for he confines himself to simply paraphrasing the vārtt. as (I 337. 25): *bhakṣer ahimsārthasyeti vaktavyam*. Nevertheless what he says has to be taken to mean: 'It must be explicitly taught that Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 does not apply to the agent of the verb *bhakṣayati* if the action denoted by it is that of *ahimsā*'; or to say it more simply, 'that this sūtra of Pāṇini's applies to the agent of this particular verb only if the action denoted is that of *himsā*'.

This is made clear also by what Patañjali regards as a proper illustration of this vārttika, viz. (I 337. 25 f.): *bhakṣayati piṇḍim devadattaḥ | bhakṣayati piṇḍim devadattena ||*, 'Devadatta eats a ball [of rice, etc.]'.⁹ '[X] makes Devadatta eat a ball [of rice etc.] (i.e. gives Devadatta ... to eat / entertains D. to...)'.¹⁰

Continuing his explanation of the vārtt. Patañjali himself asks about the cause of the restriction regarding the meaning of *bhakṣayati* (I 337.26: *ahimsārthasyeti kimartham*), but only to answer this question with his usual brevity, namely by adducing a relevant counter example: *bhakṣayanti yavān balivardāḥ | bhakṣayanti balivardān*

yavān // 'the oxen eat (the) barley [in the field]', '[X] make / let the oxen eat (the) barley [plants] (i.e. graze in a barley field.)'.¹⁰

2. 1.

As for the grammatical or technical problems involved, they are conveniently explained by the commentators. Thus Kaiyata states (*Pradīpa* II 275 a 20-21):¹¹ *bhakṣer iti | anikarteti hetumaṇṇico niṣedhāc curādiṇyanto 'py nyanta eveti prāptih||*. 'Of the verb *bhakṣayati*: Since by [the expression] 'agent of a noncausal action, expressed by a verb not containing the suffix *ni(c)*' [in Pāṇ. 4. 1. 52], what is excluded are [only verbs containing that suffix] *nic* [which in accordance with Pāṇ. 2. 1. 26 is added to denote] an action the agent of which is [in accordance with Pāṇ. 1. 4. 55] technically called *hetu* (i.e. a causal action) [and not just any verb ending in this suffix], [therefore] a verb ending in *ni(c)* in so far as it belongs to the group of *cur* etc. (i.e. the tenth class) in accordance with Pāṇ. 2. 1. 25, too, is indeed a verb not ending in *ni(c)*, (i.e. does form part of the group of verbs referred to by the expression *anikartā*); this is why [the verb *bhakṣayati*] would be subject to Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 [and this it is that prompted Kātyāyana to teach his vārtt. 7 in order to prevent this *anīṣṭa* application].¹² What all this ultimately amounts to is the statement, at once both simple and convincing, that unless vārtt. 7 is really taught one might indeed apply this rule of Pāṇini's wrongly to *bhakṣayati*, too, because and in so far as it forms part of the tenth class. As regards the semantic aspect,

it is hardly necessary to state explicitly with Nāgeśa¹² that *bhakṣayati* is subsumed under the group of verbs denoting 'consuming' (*pratyavasāna*),¹³ and that Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 could hence be applied to it.

2. 2.

However, the grammatical description cannot in this case be confined to exempting the verb *bhakṣayati* as such from being subject to Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52, as the usage of the object language clearly attests that, quite on the contrary, the agent of the noncausal action denoted by this verb sometimes becomes the object of the action if *bhakṣayati* is used as a causative. Kātyāyana was evidently of the opinion that the condition under which this other construction is found in speech can be exactly described, viz. in terms of semantics: Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 has all the same to be applied to *bhakṣayati* if, but only if, the action denoted by this verb represents an act of *himsā*.

Yet, what precisely does he mean by *himsā*? As the semantic area of this word is comparatively broad, an answer to this question would be highly welcome. In order to try to find it, there are two paths we are methodically bound to take, viz. to check whether this expression occurs in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* itself or in the Vārttika at other places and, if so, to see if its meaning can be determined more precisely. I do not, however, want to try the reader's patience and therefore content myself with stating the result of such an examination: *himsā* is used with reference to actions of wiping out, exterminating¹⁴ or of mauling,¹⁵ but also to actions of

striking and injuring.¹⁶ That is to say, the range of meaning this expression has with Pāṇini and Kātyāyana is practically identical with what our dictionaries list in their entries.

2. 3.

The exegete who wishes to arrive at a precise understanding of the counter examples given by Patañjali and its implications continues to be puzzled by the fact that the commentators of the Bh. and in general later Pāṇiniya-s from Kaiyaṭa onwards seem not seldom to be at a loss to definitely decide between two alternative interpretations as regards the object of the act of *himsā* committed by the oxen.

Thus Kaiyaṭa simply says (II 275 a 21-25:) *bhakṣayanti yavān iti | kṣetrasthānām praroḥaṇādyavasthāyām yavānām bhakṣaṇād dhimsā bhavati | tadavasthāyām kaiścid caitanyasyābhyupagamāt | parakīyayavabhakṣaṇe vā paro himsito bhavati | himsāṅge bhakṣaṇe atra bhakṣir vartate||*. '[The oxen] eat (the) barley [in the field]: On account of the fact that the barley [plants] in the field while they are in the stage of shooting forth etc. are eaten, injury is committed, because certain people are of the opinion that in this stage they are sentient [and like every other sentient being should not be injured, not to speak of being killed]. Or else, if it is the barley belonging to somebody else that is eaten, [this] other person is harmed. [In any case] the verb *bhakṣayati* is used here to denote the action of eating a constituent part of which is doing harm.'

At first sight it is perhaps not even clear if what

Kaiyaṭa aims at is to point out two mutually exclusive interpretations of the sentences forming the counter example or rather to indicate that what Patañjali says can be accounted for equally by both assumptions, i.e. by assuming that of course injury is done to the plants if the oxen belong to the owner of the field, but no less by assuming that if the field happens to be the property of somebody else, it is this person to whom harm is done. On second thoughts, however, it cannot but be realized that Kaiyaṭa in fact gives here two interpretations of which only one at a time can apply; for otherwise one would rather expect him to have at least hinted at the fact that, as for the first interpretation, he has in view a situation, one easily imaginable, that oxen eat the barley plants of their owner. Yet, which of the two possible interpretations he himself considered to be the more plausible one remains an open question. For what Helarāja says about the expression *keṣāmcit* used by Bhartṛhari in Kārikā 52 of the Sādhanaśamuddeśa of the VP, viz. (271. 3f.)¹⁷: *etac ca nā sāstrakārasya matam | keṣāmcid ity anyamatatvenopanyāsāt*, cannot, even if it were true for all occurrences of this indefinite pronoun in the VP,¹⁸ be simply generalized and then applied also to this passage of Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*.¹⁹

And the sequence in which the two alternatives—henceforth referred to as the first and the second one—are brought forward is hardly more conclusive than the particle *vā* itself. As a last resort one might look into the subcommentaries. In none of them, however, is

found an explicit statement about Kaiyaṭa's own preference. But since one of them contains a statement which can at least be taken as indicative in this respect and since the author of another is quite outspoken, though on his own part and with reference to the Bh. alone, it will not be out of place to take notice of them in *in toto*.

2. 4.

Annambhaṭṭa in his *Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyotana* remarks (IV. 325. 11- 13)²⁰: *acetanānām yavānām katham hiṃsā, ata āha—kṣetrasthānām iti / caitanyānabhyupagantīrmaṭe 'py āha—parakīyēti / hiṃsāṅge hiṃsārthasyety atrārthasābdah prajayanavāci / hiṃsāprajayanakabhinnārthe vartamānasyeti vivakṣitam iti bhāvaḥ* /. '[Kaiyaṭa] says On account of the fact...because [one might ask] how nonsentient barley [plants could] be injured. By Or else if it is the barley belonging to somebody else...he explains [the examples] also with regard to the opinion of those who do not accept that [plants] are sentient [beings]...'. The manner in which Annambhaṭṭa expresses himself in the second sentence is such that one is given the impression that he took the first alternative to represent Kaiyaṭa's own true conviction to which the other alternative was only added in order to offer a plausible explanation for those, too, who do not share his opinion—and that there were in fact such people he thought he could hardly ignore.

Nāgeśa, on the other hand, gives the following explanation in his *Uddyota* (II 275 a 29-36): *piṇḍyā aprāṇitvād udāharaṇe bhakṣer ahimsārthatvam || nanu yavānām apy acetanatvāt tadviśayasyāpi katham hiṃsārthatvam ata āha—*

kṣetrasthānām iti / idam upalakṣaṇam bijāvasthānām api bhakṣaṇe hiṃsāsattvāt || hiṃsāṅge iti / idam ubhayasādhāraṇam / tatrādye yavān hiṃsan bhakṣayatīty arthaḥ, dvitīye tu parān ity adhyāhāryam / parān hiṃsan yavān bhakṣayatīty arthaḥ / atrādyam eva yuktaṃ bhāṣyasvarasād ity āhuḥ || udāharaṇakakṣāyām bhakṣayantīti bahuvacanapāṭhe tatsvāmīna iti śeṣaḥ ||.

'The verb *bhakṣayati* does not in the example ['Devadatta eats a ball of rice etc.'] denote an act of *hiṃsā* because a ball of rice etc. is not a living being. [Kaiyaṭa] says— On account of the fact...because [one might ask] how [the verb *bhakṣayati*] can denote an act of *hiṃsā* also if [the action denoted by it] refers to barley plants as these too are nonsentient [beings]. [What Kaiyaṭa says, viz. that an act of *hiṃsā* is committed if barley plants in the field are eaten while they are in the stage of shooting forth etc.] implies something he does not state explicitly, viz. that injury is in fact done also when barley which is still in the stage of grains is eaten...the verb *bhakṣayati* is used...: This holds equally good for both [alternatives, for] as for the first of them, what is meant is that [an ox] by eating them injures the barley plants; in the second case, however, the word 'others' has to be supplemented, [for,] what is [then] meant is that [an ox] by eating the barley plants does harm to others (i.e. other people). And it is said, of these two [alternatives] the first one alone is correct because it is in agreement with the intention of the Bhāṣya. If [in the second example] the plural form *bhakṣayanti* is read and if [thus both] the examples are paralleled, then [the subject] 'their owners' has to be supplied'.²¹

Although the identity of those who decidedly voted in favour of the first interpretation is not clarified by Nāgeśa and even a pronominal expression like *kecit* or *pare* is absent—which would clearly point in the one direction or the other, as shown by Thieme²²—the reason adduced, viz. *bhāsyasvarasāt*, is of such a kind that no doubt is left as to Nāgeśa's own position: In case he did not agree with these unnamed scholars, he could hardly have let pass their argument unchallenged! Less clear, however, is what exactly is meant by *svarasa*. This expression—as well as its derivation *svārasya*—would no doubt deserve a thorough examination, especially with regard to the *Uddyota* (and other works of Nāgeśa's). But such an investigation cannot be undertaken here, nor would it seem to be absolutely necessary; for, whatever its result may be, this much is clear even now: the reason is not a particular one, does not refer concretely and directly to the problem at issue, viz. the meaning of the examples given in the Bh.

There is another Pāṇiniya who, though commenting on the Bh. itself, voices his opinion without any ifs and buts, viz. Śivarāmendrasarasvatī, for what he says is (*Mahābhāsyasiddhāntaratnāprakāśa* 326. 26 f.)²³: *bhakṣayanti yavān iti / kṣetrasthānām aṅkurādyavasthānām yavānām bhakṣanād dhīmsā bhavati, teṣām api cetanatvāt /*. According to him there is hence only one possibility to interpret the example: By eating the barley plants, still in the state of sprouts, an act of *hīmsā* is committed because they are sentient beings. The only problem posed by his

explanation is the motive for his adding *api*. Did he think—like Nāgeśa—of the grains of barley or else of men and animals as a group the *cetanatva* of which is a matter of course? I find it difficult to arrive at a decision. The real importance of this passage of the *Ratnāprakāśa* lies anyway in that its author shows himself so firmly convinced as regards the central problem, viz. in what the act of *hīmsā* essentially consists. But with all due deference to him, one cannot but ask: Why should we fall in with his opinion, especially as that of other Pāṇiniya-s differs from his?

2. 5.

Besides, there are still other Pāṇiniya-s whose testimony should likewise be taken, and one should definitely not make an arbitrary choice and summon only the commentators on the Bh. or those who wrote subcommentaries on their works.

2. 5. 1.

From the *Kāśikā* not much is to be learnt, except perhaps for the fact that it shows that vārtt. 7 on Pāṇ. 1.4.52 was—together with many others on this sūtra—regarded as a necessary, indispensable addition by the Pāṇinian tradition, obviously from the times of Patañjali onwards. Another point worth noticing is that in the relevant counter examples the expression *yavān* is replaced by *sasyam*—a feature the *Kāśikā* has in common e.g. with the grammar of Candragomin²⁴—for no apparent reason; for, it is by no means plain

that much is gained if 'barley [plants]' is changed into 'corn'.²⁵

Haradatta's comment on the second example, however, is instructive at least in so far as it shows that it was not Kaiyaṭa alone among the Pāṇiniya-s who decided to give two alternative interpretations and to leave the matter at that; for it reads thus (I 579. 16-18)²⁶: *bhakṣayati*²⁷ *balivardān sasyam iti | kṣetrasthānām yavānām bhakṣyamāṇānām hiṃsā bhavati, tasyām avasthāyām kaiścic caitanyābhyupagamāt | svāmīno vā hiṃsā draṣṭavyā*.²⁸ In substance, this is exactly the same explanation as that given by Kaiyaṭa.

2. 5. 2.

Jinendrabuddhi, however, differs remarkably (I 579. 29-37): *bhakṣir atra hiṃsārthaḥ | 'sarve sacetanā bhāvāḥ' ity asmin darśane hiṃsitaṃ sasyam iti sasyasya*²⁹ *bhakṣaṇena devadatto hiṃsito bhavati | yasya hi tat sasyam tasya hiṃsā gamyate* /. 'The verb *bhakṣayati* denotes here an act of *hiṃsā*. In accordance with the doctrine that all things existent are living, the corn [which is eaten by the oxen] is injured, and this means that by eating the corn [ultimately] Devadatta is done harm; for what is understood [by this sentence] is that harm is done to that person to whom the corn belongs.' This is apparently an attempt to amalgamate the two alternative interpretations which consists in simply combining the two different forms of *hiṃsā*, in such a manner that the first, i.e. the destruction of the crop, leads to the second, i.e. the loss caused to the owner

of the field. Though this interpretation might command our respect to some extent at least, it is by no means likely to convince anybody, since Jinendra-buddhi's motives are easily seen through: If instead of deciding in favour of one of the alternatives one contends that both are simultaneously correct, this is ultimately nothing but an all too easy way to avoid having to put one's cards on the table.

2. 5. 3.

As regards Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, in his *Siddhāntakaumudī* he is, not unexpectedly, too brief to reveal his opinion. Yet in his own commentary on it, i.e. the *Praudhamanoramā*, he gives his view on the meaning of the example *bhakṣayati*³⁰ *balivardān sasyam* so clearly that he leaves nothing to be desired; for what he says there by way of explanation is (666. 6-7)³¹: *sasyam iti | kṣetrasthānām yavānām bhakṣyamāṇānām hiṃsā draṣṭavyā | tasyām avasthāyām teṣām cetanatvāt*/. 'The injury has to be recognized as being done to the barley plants in the field in so far as they are eaten, because at that stage they are sentient beings'. A similar, almost completely identical statement is met with also in the author's *Śabdakoustubha*.³² Vāsudevadīkṣita is therefore quite right when he remarks in his *Bāṣamanoramā* commentary on the *Siddhāntakaumudī* (420. 28-30)³³: *bhakṣayati balivardān sasyam iti | kṣetre prarūḍham alūnam sasyam iha vivakṣitam | tasya tadānīm antaḥprajñajīvāt*³⁴ *tadbhakṣaṇam hiṃsaiveti bhāvāḥ*. '[X] makes / lets the oxen eat the crop: What is intended here is the crop grown on the field, [but] not yet reaped.

Since it is at that time a living being with [some] internal awareness, eating it definitely [constitutes] an act of *himsā*,—this it is what is ultimately meant’.

2. 5. 4.

It is hence with no little surprise that one notices the divergent explanation given by Nāgeśa in his *Laghuśabden-
duśekhara*; for there he says—in contradiction not only to Bhaṭṭojidikṣita’s own clarifications, but also to what is stated in his own *Uddyota* (cf. above § 2. 4)—(678. 1-2)³⁵: *parakīyasasyabhakṣaṇe paro himsīto bhavātīti tatsvāmīno ’tra himsā draṣṭavyā* /, i.e. he proceeds as though no other interpretation than the second alternative is possible at all. It is true that in his *Bṛhacchabdendūśekhara* he mentions the first alternative too, viz. adds it to a sentence verbatim corresponding to that quoted just now from the LŚŚ, for he says (II 851. 7)³⁶: *kṣetrasthānāṃ sasyānāṃ bhakṣyamānānāṃ vā himsā draṣṭavyā / tadavasthāyāṃ teṣāṃ cetanatvāt*/. The author apart, it is no real wonder to meet again, after consulting so many different sources, the two alternatives simply put side by side and connected only by a *vā*;³⁷ but the disappointment which may nevertheless spring up is perhaps not really justified; in any case it is, I think, fully compensated for by the fact, remarkable as it is, that the idea of the plants, *cetanatva* has been alive for so long a time in India, ‘alive’ at least in the sense of still being known.

2. 5. 5.

As far as I can see, there is one author only who draws out of the line as it were in every regard, and this

is Rāmacandra who in his *Prakriyākaumudī* gives the following example for the verb *bhakṣayati* denoting an act of *himsā* (I 394. 4).³⁸: *bhakṣayaty amātyam arin rājā*, ‘the king makes his minister eat, i.e. eliminate, his enemies’. Whatever may have prompted him to thus radically change the example, the annoyance created by the lack of unequivocalness of Patañjali’s example or the wish to go on his part back to the object language itself, etc., there can hardly be any doubt that Kātyāyana, not to speak of Patañjali, did not think of such a metaphorical use of *bhakṣayati*.³⁹

But it is not even necessary to enter into a discussion with Rāmacandra or to insist that he has gone off the track. For, after all, what this study is exclusively concerned with is the examples as given by Patañjali on vārtt. 7 on Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 and their interpretation, and not the question, legitimate or not, if these examples meet in fact Kātyāyana’s intention. And as to the examples, it should by now be clear that there are only two interpretations which are at all worthy of consideration, namely those two given already by Kaiyaṭa.

3.

Even a reader who does not at all keep a look-out for passages attesting the doctrine of the animateness of plants, will most probably tend to the opinion that the first of these two interpretations should be clearly given preference as unveiling what Patañjali had in mind when formulating these examples. One of the reasons is, of course, that only if they are understood in this way the

grammatical object of the action of eating is at the same time also that which is in fact harmed. This is (deliberately?) made particularly clear by Nāgeśa by thus explaining the second interpretation (cf. § 2. 4 above): *parān hiṃsan yavān bhakṣayati*.

However the question is whether this argument is by itself strong enough to allow a final decision. If the problem could be solved so easily, one would have to wonder why the second interpretation continued to appeal to quite a few Pāṇinīya-s who after all were no fools either. Therefore it is advisable, to say the least, to take a closer look at the second interpretation and to see what it is ultimately about.

3. 1.

According to this interpretation it is the eating of the barley plants that causes *hiṃsā* to the proprietor of the field (*tatsvāmin*). That is to say, what Kaiyaṭa and the other Pāṇinīya-s are here talking about is damage to crops, and this was—quite understandably—a legal area in India, too. Together with related problems it is usually dealt with in Dharmaśāstra texts, if they arrange their materials at all systematically, under the heading *svāmipālavivāda* and thus in the wider context of what is technically called *vyavahāra*.⁴⁰ The relevant ideas and regulations are summarized by P. V. Kane,⁴¹ but those reading German should not by any means miss the corresponding pages in J. J. Meyer's *Über das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften*. . . .⁴² which make much better and decidedly more entertaining reading in many

respects. For the present purpose it will, however, suffice to have a brief look at some of the verses in the *Manu-smṛti*, quoted here in their most recent translation, viz. that of Derrett.⁴³

8. 238: 'If cattle damage unfenced crops there the king shall not inflict punishment for that on their keepers.'

8. 239: 'One should set up a fence such as a camel cannot see over, and stop up every hole that a dog or a boar could push his head through.'

8. 240: 'If cattle are on a road,⁴⁴ in a unfenced field,⁴⁵ or in the village, he, the keeper, deserves to be fined too; one may drive off cattle without a keeper.'

8. 241: 'In the case of other fields the cattle should pay a *paṇa* and a quarter a head, everywhere the harvest must be made good to the owner of the field: this is the settled rule.'

8. 242: 'Manu has said that these are not punishable: a cow within ten days of calving, a bull, cattle belonging to gods, whether or not they are accompanied by keepers.'⁴⁶

There is no need to go into details here in a comprehensive and systematic manner. But attention must nevertheless be drawn to the expressions used by Manu—and the authors of some other Sūtra and Smṛti texts as well as their commentators—when they come to speak of the 'damage to crops'. These are:⁴⁷ *vi-hiṃs*

(M. 8. 238), echoed by *tadbhakṣaṇa* in Bhāruci's commentary and paraphrased similarly by *bhakṣ* in Kullūka's *Manvarthamuktāvalī*;⁴⁸ (*sasya*-)*upaghāta* (Bhāruci on M. 8. 239 and 241; cf. Haradatta on Gaut. 12. 19 and Vijñāneśvara on Y. 2. 160); (*sasya*-)*ghāta* (Vi. 2. 159); *piḍ* (Gaut. 12. 19=2. 3. 16; Haradatta on 12. 21 and 23); (*sarva*-)*vināśa* (Gaut. 12. 26=2. 3. 23); (*sasya*-)*nāśa* (Vi. 5. 140; cf. 5. 146 and Nandapaṇḍita on Vi. 5. 140 ff.; Y. 2. 161 and Vijñāneśvara on this and the following verses); *aparādha* (e.g. Maskari on Gaut. 12. 23; Vijñāneśvara in Y. 2. 160) *ādin* (Āp. 2. 28. 5., explained by Haradatta to be equivalent to *sasyāder bhakṣayitr*), etc. etc.

What is noteworthy in the first place is the interchangeability of *vi-hims* and *bhakṣ*. That the action denoted by *bhakṣ* does not, however, necessarily imply complete destruction is indicated by Nandapaṇḍita on Vi. 5. 147 in drawing a corresponding distinction (... *yasya kṣetre yāvat sasyaṃ paśavo bhakṣayanti nāśayanti vā*...); and it is clearly what Haradatta had in mind when in explaining the expression *sarvavināśe* of Gaut. 12. 26 he says: *yathā punahpraroḥo na bhavati tathā (sarvavināśe)*, i.e. when he makes clear that 'complete destruction' is meant; still more explicit seems to be Vijñāneśvara's remark, made with reference to Nār. 11. 31, viz. that this *sūtra* is *punahprarohayogyamūlāvaśeṣabhakṣaṇaviśaya*, though a reader familiar with agriculture might wonder where on earth a member of the bovine species could eat more than the epigeous parts of a plant and what value e.g. barley plants should have once they have been

eaten bare to the roots, even if the sprouted again.⁴⁹ Yet, be that as it may,⁵⁰ by the two expressions in question and the others also quoted above one may indeed be given the idea that it is this type of damage to crops that Patañjali had in mind with his example. And the subject of the Dharmaśāstra texts drawn upon is in fact the damage caused by cattle to the crops belonging to somebody else, as is also made clear, though rather superfluously, by the commentators, e.g. Vijñāneśvara on Y. II 159 by adding *para-* in paraphrasing *sasyaghātasya kārīṇī*⁵¹ of the verse, or by Nandapaṇḍita when introducing his explanations on Vi. 5. 141 ff. by the general remark: *paśubhiḥ parasasyanāśe daṇḍam āha*, etc.⁵²

3. 2.

However, good care has, of course, to be taken not to draw premature conclusions from such similarities in expressions. For what is exactly meant by a particular expression like *upa-han*, *piḍ* etc. in each case is clearly determined, if not totally, then at least to a large extent, by the wider content in which it stands and how the section in which it is found is systematically organized. And regarding the Dharmaśāstra passages referred to above nobody will fail to realize, even when only starting to go through them, that their authors were interested in but one thing, viz. in the material damage caused by cattle; the questions of guilt and penalty for the material loss; the owner's title to compensation which cannot be denied (in certain cases); and specifically the role the

king is to play, and this not as an impartial judge, but significantly enough as the head of the state who himself and for his own benefit takes a vital interest in the crop yield.⁵³ The idea that plants are sentient beings or could be regarded as such is not only mentioned nowhere in these passages, but the sources referred to also breathe a quite different spirit which would make it appear impossible that an idea like that of the *cetanatva* of plants could have noticeably impressed their authors.⁵⁴ This is definitely not what they are concerned with, and they are not even worried about the freedom from injury of men and animals; on the contrary, doing bodily harm to beings whose *cetanatva* is a commonly accepted fact is even one of the punishments they prescribe or recommend.⁵⁵

On the other hand, so it might be objected and rightly at that, the Dharmaśāstra material drawn upon just now is evidence of the fact that the eating of crops by cattle was in fact considered a damage in India, most probably since of old, and even if *vi-hims* were not attested in M. 8. 238 in such a context, there can hardly be any doubt that damage (to crops) is covered by the expression *himsā*, too.⁵⁶ Therefore, if it is because of the existence of this legal area that Kaiyaṭa and other Pāṇinīya-s allow for the second interpretation of Patañjali's examples—and to be sure it cannot be disputed that this is in fact the main reason—the striking difference of the second from the first interpretation in terms of its conceptual, intellectual and ethical ambience—though it was legitimate, even necessary to observe it—

does not in the least help to solve the problem at issue, viz. a substantiated option between these two alternative and mutually exclusive interpretations. On the contrary, now that the implications and the background of the second interpretation have been understood, it appears to be even more difficult than before to advance reasons against its not also being what Patañjali actually had in mind.

4.

There is at least one passage in the Bh. regarding which there cannot be the least doubt that it has to do with the problem of the damage caused by cattle to crops, and it will certainly be useful to examine it, too. It is found at the very beginning of the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 27 (*vāraṇārthānām īpsitāḥ*) according to which 'in the case of actions denoted by verbs meaning "ward off" [that too is technically called *apādāna*] which [an agent] wishes to reach / obtain'. The question about an example for the operation of this rule—and hence about the necessity of teaching it—with which the discussion starts (I 328. 10: *kim udāharaṇam*) is answered by adducing the sentence *māṣebhyo gā vārayati*, 'he keeps the cows away from the beans [in the field]'; the discussion is then continued thus (I 328. 10-12): *bhaved yasya māṣa na gāvas tasya māṣa īpsitāḥ syuḥ | yasya tu khalu gāvo na māṣa katham tasya māṣa īpsitāḥ syuḥ | tasyāpi māṣa evepsitāḥ | ātaś cepsitā yad ebhyo gā vārayati ||*.⁵⁷ It may be that for the person who owns the beans, but not the cows, the beans [in the field] are something which

he wishes to obtain. But as for the person who owns the cows and not the beans, how/ why should the beans be for him something which he wishes to obtain?'⁵⁷—'For him also the beans are doubtless⁵⁸ something which he wishes to obtain (i.e. to preserve), and to be more precise, they are something which he wishes to obtain (i.e. which he does not wish to be destroyed) because he keeps the cows away from them.'⁵⁹

Though this counter argument is valid, it is not on the level of the Bh. alone absolutely clear why the herdsman or the owner of the cattle keeps them away from the beans: Because he does not want the beans to be injured since they are living beings or because he is afraid of the legal consequences of his cattle causing damage to the beans belonging to somebody else? In this case, however, the commentators do not entertain any doubts, but are unanimously of the opinion that it is only the latter reason which can be meant here. Thus Kaiyaṭa explains the question following immediately upon the Bh. passage quoted above viz. *iha kūpād andhaṃ vārayatīti kūpe 'pādānaṣaṃjñā na prāpnoti...* (I 328. 12 ff.) by explicitly stating (Pradīpa II 251 b 16 f.) *kūpād iti/ andhasaṃbandhe kūpasya na vināśo nāpi rājabhayaṃ iti praśnaḥ* || 'this question arises because in connection with a blind man [to be kept away from a well] neither can [that from which he is kept away, i.e.] the well, be destroyed nor [is there any reason] to be afraid of the king.' The implication, of course, is that it is these very reasons which make the herdsman keep his cows away from the beans.⁶⁰ And statements to the same

effect are found in the works of other commentators too.⁶¹

Yet, in the present case one is fortunately not at all dependent on the help of the commentators, for Patañjali himself leaves his readers in no doubt about the correct interpretation of the example he has given at the very outset of his discussion of Pāṇ 4.1.27. For, after having discussed this and some more examples he finally voices the opinion that this sūtra of Pāṇini's—like others following upon 1. 4. 24—need not be taught at all (I 328.21: *ayam api yogaḥ śakyo 'vaktum*); this contention quite naturally provokes the question: *kathaṃ māṣebhyo gā vārayatīti*, i.e. how the use of the ablative in this and similar sentences can then be accounted for. The answer to it runs thus (I 328. 21-24): *paśyaty ayam yadīmā gāvas tatra gacchanti dhruvaṃ sasyavināśaḥ sasyavināśe 'dharmaś caiva rājabhayaṃ ca/ sa ca buddhyā saṃprāpya nivartayati | tatra dhruvaṃ apāye 'pādānaṃ* [Pāṇ 1. 4. 24] *ity eva siddham*||. 'He (i.e. the herdsman who keeps the cows away) sees (i.e. considers⁶²) that, if these cows do get there (i.e. into the field), the crop will be certainly destroyed, and if the crops is destroyed this means a breach of the prescribed conduct as well as that he [must] fear [punishment] by the king. [Thus] he turns [his cows] away [from the field which they have not actually reached, but which] he has made them reach in his mind (i.e. which he conceives them to have reached).⁶³ This being so, the correct result [viz. the application of the term *apādāna* to the word denoting 'beans in the field'] is simply achieved by Pāṇ. 1.4.24.'

It is hence clear not only why the commentators are not at all uncertain as to the meaning of the passage I 328. 10-12, but also that Patañjali indeed thinks here of the material loss the cows may cause and of what such a *sasyavināśa* would entail, viz. that a particular prescription of *dharma* is not followed and that the king may in accordance with the law punish the *adhārmika* herdsman. It is beyond all doubt that the *rājabhaya* is caused by the breach of the prescribed conduct, but we must not lose sight of the fact that this relation is not expressed by Patañjali who instead connected the two corresponding expressions by *caiva...ca*. Therefore what was evidently of primary importance to him was to state that being responsible for a *sasyavināśa* has bad consequences in two respects, viz. in that apart from the eventual punishment (whether it be a fine or a corporal punishment) by the king, one is also defiled by *adharma* substance. Neither Patañjali himself nor his commentators has anything to say about the expression *adharma* used here, and indeed it does not seem to pose any difficulties: It is most naturally understood to denote the 'metaphysical' consequence any action has by which a prescription of the *dharma* is offended against, and the Dharmaśāstra material referred to above admits of no doubt that the prevention of damage to crops was in fact considered to be an element of *dharma*. There is hence no need to suspect that the expression *adharma* perhaps refers to the injuring of the beans conceived of as living beings. On the other hand it is equally patent that what is meant by *sasyavināśa* here

at least includes the eating of the beans in the field, only that it is viewed in this case exclusively under the aspect whether or not it is in accordance with *dharma*, i.e. the prescribed rules of conduct.

5.

Yet, so it has to be asked, what are the conclusions that may be drawn from this passage of the Bh. with regard to the problems of interpretation posed by Bh. I 337. 24-27 discussed earlier?

(1) It bears evidence of Patañjali's being familiar, at least in substance, with what is taught in Dharmaśāstra texts about 'damage to crops'; there is hence not even the slightest chance of arguing against the second interpretation of the example given in the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 by contending that Patañjali cannot have had in mind the material loss because he did not know the relevant rules of Dharmaśāstra.

(2) On the other hand, the concept of *himsā*, taken to mean injury done to a living being (and to be sure this is in fact the implication of the first interpretation), is conspicuously absent here, i.e. in the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 27: It is not only not mentioned, but also not even hinted at or presupposed. But what does this prove? Admittedly it does not prove anything, but it no doubt considerably adds to the impression which one cannot but gather when comparing these two passages as wholes, viz. that in the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 27 Patañjali is only interested in the material loss whereas in the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52 what is of primary

importance to him is the injury done to the plants considered as living beings; or to say it in other words, that one and the same situation of everyday life in a largely agricultural society based on keeping cattle as well as on cultivation of the soil,⁶⁴ viz. damage to crops caused by cattle, is viewed in the former under its legal aspect only, whereas in the latter attention is focused solely on its ethical dimension. But it cannot be denied that this is again but an impression, and that therefore not much progress is achieved as against the stage that was reached already earlier in the course of the present study, viz. in § 3.2.

6.

On the other hand, some side issues could nevertheless be clarified, and the prospect is hence less gloomy than it might appear now that the discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52, i.e. to be more precise the passage I 337. 25-27, is taken up again for a renewed examination; for that it is here and only here that the solution has to be sought, if it can be found at all, has in the meantime become too clear to allow anybody to still cherish illusions to the contrary.

6. 1.

In returning to this passage, it is not, however, as though we would have to simply repeat what was already stated above (§ 3), viz. that it is the first interpretation alone which allows of taking the grammatical object of the action of eating to denote at the same time that also which is actually injured; fortunately, we do

not have to content ourselves with just this argument. There are some further ones: If what Patañjali wanted to say by *bhakṣayanti yavān balivardāḥ* were that the oxen by eating the barley in the field commit an act of *himsā* to another person, i.e. cause a material loss to the owner of the field—and likewise to the king, too,—one could not but express one's astonishment at the absence of an expression denoting this person. It would be very strange indeed if Patañjali had decided in favour of giving an example in which the real victim of the act of *himsā* is not mentioned at all! This leads to a further observation of like importance, viz. that if this interpretation were correct, the difference drawn between the constructions of the verb *bhakṣayati* if used *ahimsārtha* on the one hand and *himsārtha* on the other, would become quite unintelligible; for one can harm somebody also by eating a ball of rice, provided it is his or meant for him etc.!

What all these arguments amount to is that the opposition in which the first two examples stand to the following ones becomes perfectly intelligible and at the same time plausible only if the correctness of the first interpretation is accepted. And it is then only that still another element of this opposition reveals itself, viz. that Patañjali deliberately chose examples belonging to the same sphere, i.e. that of cereal plants and certain products made of their grain; for he was thus able to bring out as clearly as possible what is of central importance for an action's falling under the category of *ahimsā* or that of *himsā*, viz. whether its object is a dead thing

or a living being. For there cannot be the least doubt that with regard to this important distinction a *piṇḍī* is considered to be a dead thing as this expression whatever may be its precise meaning denotes in any case a variety of food which is prepared by cooking,⁶⁵ i.e. by killing the seeds if this was not already done even earlier.⁶⁶ In contradistinction to a *piṇḍī* the young green barley plants in the field are evidently considered as living beings to eat which⁶⁷ constitutes an act of *himsā* in that it causes their separation from life (*prāṇaviyoga*).

6. 2.

It seems advisable to dwell a little longer on the concept of *himsā* as implied here. For, it has clearly two aspects which have to be distinguished, though ultimately they can not be separated from each other, either doctrinally or historically. On the one hand it is the consumption of seeds capable of germination which is considered as *himsā*, on the other an act of *himsā* is taken to be committed by eating plants in the field. Many of the grammatical authors quoted above contribute considerably to the clarification of this latter idea by their explanations of the expression *kṣetrastha* etc.; yet in that they think of the cereal plants only, although with explicit reference to the various stages of growth, beginning with sprouting, they pass through, one might gather the impression that is only these plants themselves which are regarded as living beings by them. Nāgeśa, however, expressly states (v. § 2. 4. above) that the idea of *caitanya* likewise includes the

seeds (*bīja*), and, I think, he is right, and this not only as far as Kaiyaṭa is concerned: None of the other grammarians would have denied that seeds are equally living beings, and the explanation given by Vāsudeva-dikṣita, viz *kṣetre prarūḍham alūnam sasyam iha vivakṣitam*, (cf. § 2. 5. 3 above) has accordingly to be taken to imply that even if the plants have been killed by reaping them after ripening, the seeds they yield are in their turn something living. That is to say, vegetal life is seen under two aspects in accordance with essential biological processes, particularly clearly observable in annual economic plants; any seed capable of germination is a living being because the fact that it contains life becomes manifest by the very process of sprouting, and the plants betray their animateness by the very process of growing out of such seeds and continuing to grow until they die or are killed.

There can hence be no doubt that the basis of all this is but one idea of animateness. This is strikingly confirmed by the material studied by H.-P. Schmidt⁶⁸: Both the aspects mentioned above are attested in his sources, too; yet, as most convincingly shown by him, they are but facets of one basic idea which he traces back to the expressed animism of Vedic times. This 'archaic' animism was in India, as is well known, best preserved, i.e. almost unaltered, in Jainism 'according to which the whole world is animated—not only animals and plants but also the elements earth, fire, water, and air consist in atomic individual souls'.⁶⁹ And evidently it is this their doctrine to which Jinendrabuddhi refers

when he speaks of the view that '*sarve sacetanā bhāvāḥ*' (cf. § 2. 5. 2 above). Indeed, it is perfectly understandable that in later times it was either Jainism or perhaps still Sāṃkhya⁷⁰ also which came to an Indian's mind when the idea was spoken of or seemed to be alluded to that the whole world or at least not only animals, but plants too are animate.⁷¹ It is therefore no wonder at all that already Kaiyaṭa thought it necessary to point out that the *caitanya* of plants is not commonly accepted, but forms part of the doctrine of 'some' or 'certain' people (... *kaiścic caitanyasyābhyupagamāt*;/ cf. § 2. 3 above). On the other hand, this remark is quite interesting for two more reasons:

6. 3.

Thanks to it, it becomes now clear that apart from, or rather in addition to, the reason adduced above (§ 3. 2) for so many Pāṇiniya-s being unable to decide in favour of one interpretation only, a historical factor has to be taken into account too, viz. that at their time it was a particular group of people only which was associated with such a view of animateness and hence also of *hiṃsā*, a group with which it is rather difficult to imagine that Patañjali was in sympathy as to its doctrines. And indeed, the reluctance of Kaiyaṭa and his 'followers' to content themselves with the first interpretation is not only understandable, but also justified at least in so far as a particular grammatical phenomenon of the Sanskrit language as the medium of communication of *all* (educated) people can in fact not be accounted for by

taking recourse to the doctrine of a group which forms but a small and rather peripheral minority among those speaking Sanskrit. At the latest it is at this point of our deliberations that it becomes evident that Kaiyaṭa's first interpretation has for this very reason to be accepted as the only correct one, i.e. as that which alone meets Patañjali's intention. Kaiyaṭa's main weakness is that he lacks sensibility to historical changes. Not even the suspicion could thus have arisen in him that at the time of Patañjali himself the situation might have been still a different one! This is why he was unable to arrive at the conclusion we on our part cannot but finally draw, viz. that at the time when the distinction between the two constructions of the causative verb *bhakṣayati* actually developed in Sanskrit it was still common belief that plants and seeds are living beings, perhaps even that 'the whole world is animate'.

Whether Kātyāyana and Patañjali were still familiar with this view as such cannot be decided with absolute certainty,⁷² but for all we know about their respective dates and about the origin and historical development of the *ahiṃsā* doctrine, there is every likelihood that at their time the consumption not only of seeds capable of germination, but also of plants was widely considered as *hiṃsā*, 'injury to living beings'.

The highly interesting material which Schmithausen has recently collected from Buddhist texts and discussed in some detail,⁷³ cannot be used as a comparison in the present article. Yet there is one point to which attention has nevertheless to be drawn in this connection, and it

is this : The prohibition to damage or injure plants, etc., to be observed by the Buddhist monks and nuns, is several times accounted for by pointing out that people regard plants as living beings, and might therefore take offence at such damage, and turn away from the Buddha's teaching.⁷⁴

In another and in some regard more detailed version of his article which has, however, not yet been published, Schmithausen draws on a passage of the *Vinayapīṭaka*⁷⁵ according to which the monks and nuns are prohibited from wandering during the rainy season, and the reason given for this well-known restriction is quite interestingly that otherwise small animals and green plants, which latter appear in large numbers only at this time of the year, could be trampled to death. Schmithausen quite understandably takes this to be another piece of evidence for the early Buddhists' sharing or at least taking into account the common belief that plants, too, are living beings,⁷⁶ or perhaps still behaving according to it; and I do not at all want to contradict him, especially in view of the fact that small animals are included here. But I think it is very instructive to note—and not only with regard to the problem of interpretation with which I have struggled in the preceding pages, but also in terms of its general importance—that the Dharmaśāstra texts referred to above—and the Arthaśāstra is no exception—regard the pressing down (*mardana*) etc. of plants in a field as also coming within the terms of 'damage to crops'. However, it should be repeated that what their authors are concerned about—just

like a modern European farmer who does not want strollers or holidaymakers to trespass on his green meadow (in reality nowadays rather an area of land on which grass and nothing else is cultivated)—is exclusively the material loss; this is evident even in a seemingly generous exception to the general rules like that ascribed by Nandapaṇḍita⁷⁷ to *Śāṅkhalikhitau* according to which 'there is no punishment if only a mouthful [of whatever grows on the field is eaten by cattle]' (*grāse tv adaṇḍaḥ*). Nevertheless, in individual cases it may be quite difficult to decide whether a statement in a text is based on such economic considerations or rather on (ultimately) ethical ones, and the absence or otherwise of expressions like (a)*himsā* does not by itself render much assistance in solving the problem one is then faced with.

In the present case, too, it might be still objected that the oxen like any other member of the bovine species, etc., in so far as they are by nature herbivores, can hardly avoid injuring plants—unless they feed only on dried, i.e. already dead, plants or hay. This is not only true, but it would also be futile to search for an invalidation of this argument by assuming that what is decisive in this regard is the difference between economic plants on the one hand which yield a harvest in form of grains, etc., and those, on the other, which are themselves directly used as fodder. For, there is, if I am not mistaken, evidence in the Bh. also for the fact that as for their animateness Patañjali expectedly did not distinguish between various types of plants, or,

to be more precise, that what alone counted with regard to an action's falling under *himsā* or *ahimsā* was according to him nothing but the question whether the plant forming its object is still alive or already dead: What I have in mind is the passage II 176. 7f. where it is asked with regard to vārtt. 2 on Pāṇ. 3. 4. 37: *asti punar ayaṃ kvacid dhantir ahimsārthaḥ yadārtho vidhiḥ syāt*], 'but is this [root] *han* ever used as denoting non-injury so that a prescription is needed for it (i.e. to safeguard the formation of the absolutive in -am)?'; and the answer is: *astity āha | pāṇyupaghātam vedim hanti*, 'I say yes, it is in fact [used in this sense, too, e.g. if it is said] "He strikes the *vedi* (i.e. he makes it flat and firm) by striking with the hand upon it"'. The editors of the NSP edition of the Bh. are perfectly right in explaining in a foot-note (III 266 b) *prāṇaviyogānukūlavāpāro hi himsā, sā ca vedyām nāstīti bhāvah*; but they could have added that the action denoted by *han* does not, in the present case, constitute an act of *himsā* because the Kuśa grass which is strewn over the *vedi* is already dead since it was plucked, and this action of injury is over.⁷⁸

As for the counter example given by Patañjali in his discussion of Pāṇ. 1. 4. 52, it cannot but be realized that the fact that eating is an act of *himsā*, has nothing to do with its particular object, the barley plants. However, one should also not lose sight of the fact that the question of the ethical evaluation of this act of *himsā* does not arise at all, or rather is by no means in the foreground. What Patañjali wanted to do was to adduce convincing and clear examples for the use of the

causative verb *bhakṣayati* when used *ahimsārtha* in contradistinction to its being used *himsārtha*; and it cannot, I think, be disputed that he did achieve his aim. However, whether by giving precisely these and no other examples and counter examples he wanted to intimate in addition that men, or at least certain people, are able strictly to avoid any *himsā* (by leaving the unavoidable killing to others), whereas for cattle the very process of living means continuously committing injury to other living beings or whether Patañjali at least thought of this distinction, will most probably remain a question which can never be answered.

NOTES

¹ *Ācāryasīrisiddhasenadivākaraṇaṇītaṃ Saṃmatitarkaṇaṇītaṃ, Jainasvetāmbara - rājagacchīyapradymnasūriśiṣya - tarkapañcānanasīmad - Abhayadevasūrinirmīṭayā Tattvabōdhavidhāyinyā vyākhyayā vibhūṣitam . . . pāthāntara-tippanyādibhiḥ pariṣkṛtya samsodhītam*, Gujarāṭa-purātattvamandira, Amadābād, samvat 1980-1985. Reprinted Kyoto 1984.—I am not sure whether it is this edition which is referred to as no. 2294 in Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Bibliography* (Revised Edition), Delhi 1983.

² What I have in view here is, of course, in the first place, H. Lüders' famous article 'Die Śaumbhikas. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des indischen Dramas', originally published in: BSB 1916, pp. 698-737 and reprinted in: *Philologica Indica*, Göttingen 1940, pp. 391-428.

³ This expression is clearly used here in the general meaning of 'plant' and not as a technical term by which the Indian 'botanists' etc. distinguish 'trees which bear fruit without having flowered' from 'trees which bear fruits after having flowered', 'creepers' and 'shrubs'; cf. e.g. Manu 1. 47 f.

⁴ I am aware of the fact that this expression refers to certain intellectual faculties (e.g. faculty of perception, viz. *ekendriyatva* etc.) rather than to the mere fact of belonging to the class of living beings. But since the distinction between these two aspects does not play any role in the material drawn upon by me, it is totally neglected in the present article.—Cf. however p. 316 (=377) and fn. 5 in P. Thieme's article 'Beseelung in Sprache, Dichtung und Religion' in: *Paideuma*, Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, VII (1960), pp. 313-24=*Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1971 (reprinted 1984), pp. 374-85.

⁵ These include also e.g. the *Jainendra-vyākaraṇa* and Hemacandra's *Śabdānuśāsana*; but I thought it advisable to keep my own investigation within the limits of the Pāṇiniyan tradition only.

⁶ On this interpretation and that of the *navīnas* cf. e.g. Gokulānātha Upādhyāya's *Padavākhyaratnākara* (ed. together with Yadunātha Miśra's *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* by Nandinātha Miśra, Sarāsvatī Bhavāna Granthamala, Vol. 88, Varanasi 1960), pp. 597 ff.

⁷ Reference is, of course, to the edition of F. Kielhorn (Poona 1962³).

⁸ Uddyota II 275 a 29 (the edition I use is that of the NS Press): *vārttike pratīṣedha iti śeṣaḥ* ||.

⁹ Yudhiṣṭhir Mīmāṃsak (*Patañjali-viracitaṃ Mahābhāṣyam Hindī-vyākhyayā sahitaṃ*, dvitīya bhāgaḥ, Dillī, vi. saṃ 2029, p. 504) takes *piṇḍī* to denote a particular sweet dish (*piṇḍī*=*pinnī miṣṭāṇna viśeṣaḥ*); yet, the problematic derivation of Hindī *pinnī* apart, there is, as far as I can see, no evidence whatsoever that this word is used here in a meaning different from that listed in our dictionaries, viz. 'ball of rice' or even more generally 'lump of food.'

¹⁰ The opinion of the authors of the *Petrograd Dictionary*, viz. that *yava* denoted 'in the earliest times probably any grain or corn yielding flour or meal', if acceptable at all, is definitely not valid for the time of Patañjali. Cf. also fn. 65.

¹¹ Reference is, of course, also to the NS Press edition.

¹² Uddyota II 275 a 28f.: *bhākṣeḥ pratyavasānārthatvāt prāptiḥ* |.

¹³ cf. also the *Pāṇiniya-Dhātupāṭha* 10. 22 *bhākṣa adane* (which is identical with 1. 941, but it is, of course, the root *bhākṣ* as forming its present stem by adding *-aya-*, that is used by Patañjali).

¹⁴ cf. Pāṇ. 2. 3. 56 and *Candra-vṛtti* on 2. 1. 95 as well as Pāṇ. 6. 1. 141 (together with *Śiṣupālavadha* 1.47).

¹⁵ cf. vārtt. 2 on Pāṇ. 1. 3. 15.

¹⁶ cf. Pāṇ. 3. 4. 48 and *Candra* 1. 3. 140 as well as vārtt. 2 on Pāṇ. 3. 4. 37.

¹⁷ The edition referred to is K.A. Subramania Iyer's *Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helarāja*, Kāṇḍa III, Part 1, (Deccan College Monograph Series 21), Poona 1963.

¹⁸ Which, of course, it is not, as becomes obvious already by the fact that Helarāja thought it necessary to explain just this occurrence of a form of *kaścit*.

¹⁹ This holds good likewise for the observations made by Thieme with reference to Nāgeśa; cf. his article 'The Interpretation of the Learned' in: *Felicitation Volume presented to S. K. Belvalkar*, Benares 1957, p. 50 fn. 2=*Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1971, (reprinted 1984), p. 599 fn. 2.

²⁰ I quote from M. S. Narasimhacharya (ed.), *Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa Vyākhyānāni IV, Adhyāya 1 Pāda 2-4*, Pondichéry 1977.

²¹ Nāgeśa seems to have given preference to the reading *bhākṣayati* while Kielhorn places it in the critical apparatus attached to his edition. The fact that most of the later Pāṇiniya-s obviously knew this reading only, does not help much to solve this textcritical problem.

²² cf. the article mentioned in fn. 13.

²³ As for the edition used see fn. 20.

²⁴ As in many other cases, the fact that a particular vārtt. of Kātyāyana's is not refuted by Patañjali is here also taken into account by Candragomin by introducing a corresponding sūtra into his own grammar. This is 2. 1. 49 *bhākṣer ahiṃsāyām* which is explained in his *Vṛtti* thus (ed. B. Liebich, Leipzig 1918, p. 104 f.): *bhākṣer ahiṃsārthasya prayojye kartari dvitīyā na bhavati. bhākṣayati piṇḍīm Devadattena. ahiṃsāyām iti kim? bhākṣayati balivardān sasyam...*

²⁵ Or is this replacement perhaps due to the wish to avoid the misunderstanding that the act of *hiṃsā* has something to do with the particular variety of cereal plants, viz. barley, mentioned by Patañjali? Or was it one of the interpreters concerned first of all only with the legal aspect (see below § 3) who deemed it better to

have a more general statement corresponding to the topic of *sasya-nāśa*, *-vināśa*, *-upaghāta*, etc.?

²⁶ Reference is to the edition of the *Padamañjari* contained in: *The Kāśikāvṛtti*. . . Pt. I, critically edited by Swami Dwarika Das Shastri and Pt. Kalika Prasad Shukla, Varanasi 1965.

²⁷ cf. fn. 21.

²⁸ cf. also Viśveśvarasūri's *Vyākaraṇasiddhāntasudhānidhi*, Benares 1924, 861. 25 f.: *yavabhakṣaṇe tatsvāmīno vā himsā* |.

²⁹ The edition has in both cases *śasya*°.

³⁰ cf. fn. 21.

³¹ I quote from the edition of Dr. Sitarama Shastri, *Praṇḍhamanoramā of Śrī Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita together with Bṛhacchabdaratna, an unpublished commentary of Śrī Hari Dikṣita, and Laghuśabdaratna of Śrī Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa*, 1st Vol., Varanasi 1964.

³² viz. in the edition of Pdt. Gopal Shastri Nene, Benares 1929, 138. 1-3. Cf. also Jñānendra Sarasvatī's *Tattvabodhini*, and *Siddhāntakaumudī* 1. c.

³³ I quote from *Ma. Ma. Śrībhaṭṭojidikṣitaviracitā Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī Śrīvāsudevadikṣitakṛta-Bālaṃmanoramā-vyākhyāsahitā . . . Paṇḍita-Śrīgopālasāstrinene-sampādītā* . . . , prathamā bhāgaḥ, Vārāṇasī 1958.

³⁴ Instead of the expression *antaḥprajña*-, known from *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 4 and 7, I would have rather expected *antaḥsamjña*- which seems to have been a Sāṃkhya term, attested in certain Purāṇic passages and the *Manusmṛti* (1.49), among others; I intend to deal with it on another occasion.

³⁵ Reference is to the edition by Pt. Nandkishore Shastri (*Shri Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala* No. 14) with Rare Commentaries . . . , Benares 1936. —In order to enable the reader to locate this (and other quotations) in editions other than those used by me, I should like to mention here that the *prakaraṇa* is, of course, that about the 'dvitīyākāraka', in the *Siddhāntakaumudī* and the texts depending on it directly or indirectly.

³⁶ The edition from which I quote is: *Nāgeśabhaṭṭaviracitāḥ Bṛhacchabdenduśekharaḥ (dvitīyo bhāgaḥ), sampādakāḥ Dā. Śrīśītā-rāmaśāstrī* (*Sarasvatibhavana-Granthamālā* 87), Vārāṇasī 1960.

³⁷ It may be noted here that Haridikṣita, too, in his *Bṛhacchabdaratna* (p. 666. 14; as for the edition see fn. 31) considers it necessary to add to what is said in the *Praṇḍhamanoramā*: *sva*- (read: *tat*-) *svāmīno vā himsā draṣṭavyā*.

³⁸ Reference is to K.P. Trivedi's edition, Part 1, (*Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series* No. 78), Poona 1925.

³⁹ Brought into relief by Viṭṭhala in his commentary on the *Prakriyākaumudī* by explaining: *bhakṣayaty amātyam iti: himsayatīty arthaḥ* |. —Note that a similar phrase is found in the *Varaṇanīnī*, a subcommentary on the *Laghuśabdenduśekhara*, where it is however only adduced as a secondary example; for what Guruprasāda Śāstrī says is (677. 32-33; cf. fn. 35): *himsāṅgeti | himsā=duḥkhajanako vyāpāraḥ, āṅgam=phalaṃ yasyety arthaḥ | himsāphalake iti yāvat | yathā 'manuṣyaṃ bhakṣayati' iti | paraḥ=kṛṣṇvalādīḥ* [cf. the passage of the LŚS quoted above in § 2. 5. 4, which is preceded by the statement: *himsāṅge bhakṣaṇe bhakṣer vṛttih*, going back to Kaiyaṇa (cf. § 2. 1. above)]; see also fn. 67.

⁴⁰ On this term cf. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. III, Poona 1973^a, pp. 245-248 as well as J.D.M. Derrett, *Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law*, Vol. I, Leiden 1976, p. 81 fn. 2 and Vol. IV, Leiden 1978, p. 399 f. As a separate 'vyavahārapada' the *svāmpālāvivāda* is mentioned e.g. in Manu 8.5 and, of course in later works like e.g. Nīlakaṇṭha's *Vyavahāramayūkha*.

⁴¹ o.c., Vol. III, pp. 497-501.

⁴² und ihr Verhältnis zueinander und zu Kauṭilya, Leipzig 1927, pp. 120-128.

⁴³ Bhāruci's *Commentary on the Manusmṛti*, (*The Manu-Śāstra-Vivaraṇa*, Books 6-12) Text, Translation and Notes. Vol. I: *The Text*, Vol. II: *The Translation and Notes*, Wiesbaden 1975. (The quotation is found there on p. 166 f.).

⁴⁴ I fail to understand why Derrett takes the locative *pathi* in the verse to be on a par with *kṣetre*, whereas he renders the phrase... *kiṃ pathi kṣetram anāvṛtam*... of the commentary by '... that the field alongside the path was unfenced'. In as much as all the commentators on this verse of Manu's and its parallels in other Dharmasāstra texts as well as their translators etc. are, as far as I can see, unanimously of the opinion that 'a field that is near a

public way' (Kane, o.c., p. 500) is meant, one would have liked to know the reasons for D.'s differing from the *opinio communis* (which I still find much more convincing).

⁴⁵ In fn. 2 on p. 129 of his edition Derrett justly points out that what J.J. Meyer (o.c., p. 127) considered to be the correct reading here, viz. *parivṛte*, is actually found in his manuscript and is confirmed also by Bhārucci on his part (cf. the passage quoted in fn. 44).

⁴⁶ The text—as given by Derrett, o.c., Pt. I, p. 129—reads thus:

tatrāparivṛtaṃ dhānyam vihiṃsyuḥ paśavo yadi |
na tatra prañayed daṇḍaṃ nṛpatiḥ paśu-rakṣiṇām || 238
vṛtim tatra tu kuroṣta yām uṣṭro nāvalokayet |
chidraṃ cāvārayet sarvaṃ śva-sūkara-mukhānugam || 239
pathi kṣetre 'parivṛte grāmāntiye 'thavā punaḥ |
sa pālāḥ śata-daṇḍārho vipālāṃ vārayet paśum || 240
kṣetreṣu anyeṣu tu paśuḥ sapādaṃ paṇam arhati |
sarvatra tu śato deyaḥ kṣetrikasyeti dhārāṇā || 241
anirdaśāhām gām sutām vṛṣān deva-paśūṃs tathā |
sapālān vā 'py apālān vā na daṇḍyān Manur abravīt || 242

In this connection I cannot help remembering an observation I made in Nepal in 1972 which spotlights the consequences the rule (given in the last of these verses) may have in reality. Among the various and quite impressive 'holy' bulls which at that time used to stroll in the streets of Kathmandu, but which one could also meet in the already rural outskirts of the city, there was a dappled one of which I was particularly fond. One day—the rainy season had already started a couple of weeks earlier and the valley had turned almost totally into a paddy field—I met him again in the bazar, but one of his hind quarters was nothing but a continuous stretch of almost raw flesh. Upon inquiry I was told that he had obviously been sprinkled with kerosene—which had then, of course, been set on fire—in order to drive him once and for ever away from the paddy fields where he had been caught grazing. Ruthless cruelty to animals including members of the bovine species is unfortunately not so rare a phenomenon in India (and

adjacent countries) as Neohinduism would like us to believe; cf. e.g. J.L. Kipling, *Beast and Man in India*, London 1891 (in particular pp. 119f., 126f., 142 ff.); N.S. Ramaswamy, *The Management of Animal Energy Resources and the Modernization of the Bullock-Cart System*, Bangalore 1979 (sec. ed) (in particular the photographs at the end) and J. H. Lensch, *Probleme und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Rinder- und Büffelhaltung in Indien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 'Heiligen Kühe'—eine interdisziplinäre Betrachtung*, (Dissertation) Göttingen 1985, pp. 100 ff.

⁴⁷ I do not strive for completeness here.

⁴⁸ cf. also this commentary on M. 8. 240-241.

⁴⁹ That members of the bovine species may destroy also the roots of plants by their hoofs, e.g. by repeatedly treading on the same path or by pawing the ground, is a quite different phenomenon. —Corn if it grew again after having been eaten bare to the roots could, of course, be used as green fodder; but evidently this is not what it was grown for in India; it is also hardly probable that ratoon cropping was of any importance. See also §§ 6.3 and 6.4.

⁵⁰ Vijñāneśvara's motive is, of course, the avoidance of any disagreement between the Smṛti texts.

⁵¹ cf. also Aparārka's explanation: *bhakṣaṇamardanābhyām parasasyopaghātini mahiṣi mahiṣo vā* Nārada (XI 28 and 29) in that he confronts the herdsman (*pāla*) with the owner of the land (*tatśvāmin*), aims at the same clarification.

⁵² By setting up a fence and taking similar measures, what one wants to achieve (apart from following the rules of *dharma*) is to protect one's fields against the cattle belonging to others, and, of course, also against such wild animals as might cause equal danger; cf. e.g. the verse ascribed by Aparārka (on Y. 2. 162) to Kātyāyana (cf. *Kātyāyana-mata-Saṃgraha* .. by N. C. Bandopadhyaya, Calcutta 1927, p. 50): *ajāteṣu eva saṣyeṣu kuryād āvaraṇam mahat | duḥkheṇa hi nivāryante labdhasvādurasā mṛgāḥ ||*, as well as Patañjali's (Bh. I 100.1) *na ca mṛgāḥ santīti yavā nopyante* (where the damage to crops caused by forest animals is, however, looked upon as something one sometimes has to reckon with).

⁵³ This interest of the king is expressly stated e.g. in Nārada XI 42 and 43:

*grhākṣetre ca dr̥ṣṭe due vāsahetū kuṭumbinām /
tasmāt te notkṣipet rājā tad dhi mūlaṃ kuṭumbinām //*

*vṛddhe janapade rājño dharmah kośaś ca vardhate //
hiyate hiyamāne ca vṛddhihetum atah śrayet //*

It is, of course, also the reason for the Kauṭīliya *Arthasāstra*'s containing a section on 'Damage to fields and roads' (*kṣetra pathahimsā*), viz. 3.10.1 ff.

⁵⁴ This statement refers, of course, to this particular subject or 'chapter' only in the Dharmaśāstra texts under discussion, but not to these texts taken as wholes.

⁵⁵ According to Bühler's translation of *Āp. Dh. S. 2. 11. 28. 5*, cattle themselves are punished, though of course, only physically (any fine being impossible as rightly observed e.g. by Kullūka on M. 8. 240 and Aparārka on Y II 159), in that the owner of the crops which they have eaten up is permitted 'to make them lean [by impounding them]'. J. J. Meyer (*Das altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben...*, Leipzig 1926 p. 728), however says that instead of *karṣayet* (*paśūn*) one should read *karṣayet*, which he renders by 'rounding up'. To support his argument he refers to *Mbh. III 58.244** and *Baudh Dh. S. I. 5. 84 (=I 10.29)=M. 3. 66*, i.e. to the fact that *karṣayati/ karṣati* occurs there too, viz, in the syntagmas *phalamūlāni karṣayan* and *karṣanti ca mahad yaśaḥ*, where it indeed seems to have the meaning of 'bringing together, collecting'.—Less problematic, however, are the passages in which a corporal punishment, i.e. being beaten with a stick, is prescribed for a servant in tillage and especially a herdsman when he is negligent in his duties: e.g. *Āp. Dh. S. II 11. 28.2 and 3*, Nārada XI 29 and Y. II. 161; cf. also the verse quoted from Bṛhaspati by Nandapaṇḍita on Viṣṇu 5. 141 (ed. by Pt. V. Krishnamacharya, Madras 1964, Vol. I. p. 125).

⁵⁶ It is in fact used in this sense in the *Arthasāstra*; see fn. 53.

⁵⁷ cf. Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* II 251 a 25f.: *yasya tv iti / yasyātmīyā gāvaḥ parakiyās tu māśas tasya na ta īpsitāḥ //*

⁵⁸ cf. Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* II 251 a 31 f.: *māśā eveti / evakāro bhinnakramah / īpsitā evety arthah //*

⁵⁹ cf. Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* II 251 a 33-36: *tasyāpiti / īpsitāśabdaḥ kriyāśabda āsriyate na tu rūdhīśabdaḥ / tatra vāraṇakriyayā parakiyā api māśā vārayitur āptum iṣṭā bhavanti mā nāśann ete ity etebhyo 'sau gā vārayati //*; and Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* II 251 a 38-b 6: *āptum iṣṭā iti vāraṇam [=] pravṛttivighātah / sa ca tadvyāpārajanyatatphalābhāva-prayojako bhakṣaṇādījanakavyāpārābhāvānukūlo vyāpārah kvacit (viz. agner mānavakam vārayatity atra) tadvyāpārajanyatatphalābhāvaprayojakah samyogānukūlavvyāpārābhāvānukūlavvyāpārah //* evam ca taddhātvarthaphalena vyāptum iṣṭā ity arthah / nāśābhāvaś ca bhakṣaṇābhāvaparyavasannas tasya tasya ca phalasya dhātvarthatvaparyantaṃ nāgrahaḥ / māśanāśe hi sati rājabhayam adharmaś ca syād iti bhāvaḥ //

⁶⁰ cf. Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* II 251 b 19f.: *nanu pūrvodāharanād asya ko viśeṣa ity āha—andheti //*

⁶¹ cf. Śivarāmeṇdrasarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* IV 259. 21 f.: *na hi kūpasyāndhapatanena nāśo bhavati nāpi tena rājabhayam iti bhāvaḥ /*; cf. also Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* II 251 b 33 ff.

⁶² cf. Nāgeśa's explication (*Uddyota* II 252 b 20): *bhāsyē paśiyaty ayam iti / vicārayatity arthah //*

⁶³ cf. the *Ratnaprakāśa* on the expression *samprāpya* of the Bh. (IV 296.4): *samprāptām* (read: °ptāḥ) *jñātvety arthah //*

⁶⁴ In this connection it may be noted that the idea is repeatedly expressed in the Bh. that a region *yasmin gāvaḥ sasyāni ca vartante* is called a *bhogavān* (II 340.12), *guṇavān* (II 367.4) or *arthavān deśaḥ* (II 401.11). The remark which J. Jolly makes on Nārada XI 42 (quoted fn. 53) in his translation, viz. that 'this maxim shows that the compiler of the *Nārada-smṛti* wrote for an essentially agricultural people', holds hence good for the Bh. too.

⁶⁵ In this connection, but also with regard to the replacement of *yavān* by *sasyam* discussed above (§ 2.5.1), Peri Venkateswara Sastri says in his commentary on the passage of the *Laghuśabdendusekhara* quoted above (§ 2.5.4), viz. (*Andhra University Series* No. 26, Kumbakonam 1941, p. 1291. 10 ff.): ... *bhāsyē yavaśabdasya sādharmaṇatvenānyatra sthītānām bijāvasthāpannānām bharjitānām vā bhakṣaṇe teṣāṃ himsā na bhavatiti tadāśayaḥ* (viz. of the second alternative) /

vastutas tu prarohāvasthānukūlyāpānam yavādikam eva bhāṣyakāriya-pratyudāharaṇasthitayavaśabdena grhyate/ata eva mūle (i.e. in the Siddhāntakaumudī) prarohānukūlyadyotanārthaṃ bhārjīlavayāvṛttaye tatkārya-sasyapadopādānam saṃgacchate | tatra sasyapadena tadānukūlyam yavānām dyotyate | tādrśānām caitanyam abhyupagatam iti tadbhākṣaṇe 'nkrurādīrūpeṇa pravṛddhyabhāvarūpahiṃsā teṣāṃ eva bhavati | evaṃ ca sasye parakiyatvaviśeṣaṇam anupādeyam eva | sasyānām api hiṃsāyā darśitatvāt | ata eva bhāṣye udāharaṇe vinaṣṭaprarohāvasthābodhakapiṇḍipadopādānam, pratyudāharaṇe ca prarohāvasthānukūlabijāsādharanayavapadopādānam ca svarasata upapadyate | bhāṣyasvaraso 'py ādyavyākhyāyām eveli vadatā Uddyotakṛtāpy ayam arthaḥ sphuṭīkṛta iti bodhyam |.

⁶⁶ See fn. 68.

⁶⁷ cf. Bhāgavata Hari Śāstri's explanation of the expression hiṃsāṅge (*Chūtraṣṭhā. A Commentary of Haridikṣhita's Laghuśabdaratna*, ed. by Tātā Subbarāya Śāstri, Waltair 1932, p. 391, 22 f.): prānaviyogaphalake galādhodeśasamyogānukūlavayāpāre ity arthaḥ ||. In reality, however, the injurious act of eating starts with the tearing off of the barley plants from the lower part of the halm.

⁶⁸ 'The Origin of *ahiṃsā*' in: *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris 1968, p. 625-655.—'Seeds capable of germination' etc. in particular are referred to at pp. 626, 635, 638, 648. At p. 635 Schmidt refers to *Baudh. Dh. S. 3.2.13* (*tuṣavihināms taṇḍulān icchati sajjanebhyo bijāni vā*) quoted by him in fn. 5 and commented upon by the remark: '*tuṣavihina* refers probably to *bijāni*, too.' The sūtra together with this remark made me realize that I was not at all well up in the relevant botanical facts. It was not easy to get the necessary information, but by consulting various botanists I think I got a clearer picture: Rice is in India not only traditionally stored in the form of paddy, i.e. rice in the husk, (cf. e.g. *The Wealth of India, Raw Materials, Vol. VII: N-Po*, New Delhi 1966, p. 164), but it is the unhusked rice which is also sown. This is, unfortunately, in the dictionary just referred to nowhere stated explicitly, but clearly implied e.g. by a statement like that at p. 139 that some varieties of rice 'finish germination by 2-3 days after sowing while others take about a week, the rapidity of germination being probably related to the thickness and hairiness of the husk'. Indeed, mechanically removing the husk of rice grains

almost inevitably leads to injuring the embryo and has thus the consequence that the seeds are no longer viable. This holds good for some other cereals, too, e.g. barley and oats, but by no means for all of them (e.g. wheat and rye), and surely not for all 'seeds' which were—and still are—grown as food in India. This latter type of seeds, i.e. which do not lose the capacity of germination when they are husked, are in their turn, of course, 'killed' e.g. when they are crushed in a mortar, and it is noteworthy that this it is of which Haradatta is thinking in connection with Gaut. 1.3.22 (*varjayed bijavatham*). As regards Baudh. Dh. S. 3. 2. 13, there are in fact only three possibilities of interpreting the sūtra since we have no reason to assume that its statement is based upon a botanical error: (1) that *tuṣavihina* indeed refers to *bijāni*, too, and is meant to express that only such seeds are to be collected which are 'killed' by being husked, and only if they have already been husked, or (2) that though referring to *taṇḍulān* alone what is implied by it is that *bijas* also should only be accepted if they have been 'killed', by whatever means, or (3) that the capacity of germination and hence the animateness of seeds does not form part of the purpose of the rule.

⁶⁹ Quoted from H.-P. Schmidt's article, p. 625.

⁷⁰ See fn. 34. With the relevant material found in the Mokṣadharma, quoted also by the editors of the *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* (cf. fn. 1 above), I intend to deal in a separate article.

⁷¹ A good example for the fact that at least some of the traditional Pandits are rather in a state of helplessness when confronted with this view, is the note of Śivadatta Shastri—on the expression *tasyām avasthāyām* (*teṣāṃ cetanatvāt*) in the *Tattvabodhini* on the *Siddhāntakaumudī* (cf. § 2.5.3.)—which reads thus (*The Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Deekshit* . . . , printed and published by Khemraj Shri Krishnadas, Bombay 1959, p. 165 fn. 9): *sasyāvasthāyām 'āpoma-yah prāṇaḥ'* [Ch. U. 6. 6. 5; cf. 6. 7. 1 and 6] *iti śruteḥ adbhira vinā glāyamānatvarūpaprāṇatvasattoena prānaviyogānukūlavayāpārasyaiva* (cf. fn. 67) *sattvena hiṃsātvāvyāghātāt || 'cetanatvāt' iti tu na samyak stutinin-dābhāyām harṣaśokānubhavāt 'cetanam sendriyam dravyam nirindriyam acetanam' iti carakāc ca* [viz. *Sūtrasthāna* 1.48, which, however, runs: *sendriyam cetanam dravyam*] *anubhūtenendriyānām teṣāṃ cetanatvānabhyūpa-*

gamāt / yadvā 'dravyaṃ bahiṣcarāḥ prāṇāḥ' iti smaraṇāt sasya-bhakṣaṇena sasyasvāmīno hiṃsā bhavatīti bodhyam ||.

⁷³ But vārtt. 15 on Pāṇ. 3.1.7 (*sarvasya vā cetanavāt*) and the Bh. on it may also be taken as strong evidence for this assumption—in spite of Kaiyaṣa who (*Pradīpa* III 29 b 8) refers to the *ātmādvaita-darśana* as the alleged doctrinal basis of this vārtt. and in spite of Thieme (cf. his article mentioned in fn. 4, pp. 141 ff. = 380 ff.) whose verdict that this statement of Kātyāyana's is 'naïve' is likewise unsatisfactory (though one will with less reluctance subscribe to Thieme's opinion that 'the use of an expression like *kūlaṃ pipatīṣati* is in no way calculated to suggest that the speaker adheres to an (animistic) world view'). It is, of course, true, as shown by Thieme, that Kātyāyana and Patañjali do indeed distinguish between *cetana* and *acetana*, but this does not affect the importance vārtt. 15 on Pāṇ. 3.1.7 has if it is placed in the wider context of the history of the conception of animateness in India.

⁷³ 'Buddhismus und Natur' in: *Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus*, ed. by Raimundo Panikkar and Walter Strolz, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1985, pp. 100-133.

⁷⁴ cf. l. c., p. 123.—It is quite important to note here that the observation made by Schmithausen with regard to the Buddhist tradition, viz. that the idea of the animateness of plants became quite insignificant in the course of time, is not only confirmed by the grammatical texts, at least in so far as they are drawn upon in the present paper, and by the study of H.-P. Schmidt's already referred to, but also most strikingly (though, of course, not in its diachronical dimension) by a remark of Cakrapāṇidatta's (to which my attention was kindly drawn by Dr. R.P. Das, a former student of mine); for while commenting on Caraka, Sūtrasthāna 27.3... *annapānaṃ prāṇināṃ prāṇisaṃjñakānāṃ prāṇam ācakṣate kuśalāḥ*, he says: *prāṇināṃ ity anenaiva labdhe 'pi 'prāṇisaṃjñakānāṃ' iti vacanaṃ, sthāvarapraṇi-pratiṣedhārtham; vṛkṣādayo hi vanaspatīṣattvānukāropadeśāc chāstre prāṇina uktāḥ; na tu loke prāṇisaṃjñakāḥ, kiṃ tarhi jaṅgamā eva*. Cf. also fn. 68.

⁷⁵ viz. I 137.

⁷⁶ A similar idea is found expressed in a long excursus in the *Jñāneśvari* on *ahiṃsā* (which for many reasons would deserve a

thorough study) which was kindly pointed out to me by Dr. C. Kiehnle. In Pradhan's translation (ed. by H. M. Lambert, Bombay 1948, p. 45) the verse (13. 285) reads thus: 'He does not walk over a blade of grass, as there is life within it...'.
⁷⁷ o.c. (cf. fn. 55), p. 127.

⁷⁸ It is admittedly not possible to rule out in the present case with absolute certitude that what Patañjali refers to is the *vedī* on which no *barhis* has yet been spread. In fact what Sāyaṇa on ŚPB 1. 2. 5. 18 calls *vedimārjana* might consist in or comprise a *pānyupa-ghāta*. On the other hand, if Patañjali's example were taken in this sense, one would have to make the assumption, not unproblematic in itself, that Patañjali did not regard the element earth as animate, i.e. did not even in a ritual context keep to the ancient view (which is variously attested to among others in the passage of the ŚPB just mentioned (see e.g. 1.2. 5. 10 and 23 ff.)). As for the different types of *vedī-s* etc., cf. now H. Krick, *Das Ritual der Feuergründung (Agnyādheya)* ed. by G. Oberhammer, Wien 1982, pp. 109 ff.