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# Concept of Paryāya in Jain Philosophy

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## Publisher's Note

Indian Council of Philosophical Research has organised a National Seminar on *Paryāya* in Jain Religion long back. Many Scholars on this subject have presented their learned papers in Hindi and English Languages. The Papers in Hindi Language has been published by L. D. Institute of Indology in its publication Series No. 169 (2017) viz. जैन धर्म में पर्याय की अवधारणा. Now we are pleased to publish the Papers of English Language in the form of present book. Both Hindi and English publications have different set of papers by different scholars. Those who know the both languages may read both the books necessarily.

There is a unique theory of *Dravya* in Jain Religion. Thinking on *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Paryāya* was started in very early times of Jain Religions. Defining *Sat*, it is said that it contains *Guṇa* and *Paryāya*. *Paryāya* is more discussed and mentioned than *Guṇa*. Various states of *Dravya* is *Paryāya*. These *Paryāyas* always change in their forms and they come in existence and also become vanished. This happens in a part of a moment. Here the Scholars have discussed analytical studies and presented their papers. We hope that this book also may be useful for the Students and Scholars of Indology.

I am thankful and obliged to honourable Prof. S. R. Bhatt, Chairman, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi for his generous support for publishing this volume. I also express thanks all who are related to this wonderful publication in present form.

25 June, 2018  
Ahmedabad

Dr. Jitendra B. Shah  
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# Introduction :

## The Concept of *Paryāya*

(A singular Contribution of Jainism to World Philosophy)

S. R. Bhatt

The concept of *dravya* (substance) is the crux of the Jaina metaphysics. It stands for the totality of things. It is the locus of *guṇas* (attributes) and *paryāyas* (modifications). The *guṇas* constitute the essential nature of *dravya*. A *dravya* possesses multiple *guṇas*. *Paryāya* stands for the mode in which a *dravya* and its *guṇas* appear. The most significant and singular contribution of the Jain School in the field of metaphysics is introducing the concept of *Paryāya*. Though the Reality has substantial and adjectival aspects, both substances and attributes exist in a particular form or mode at a particular place and time under particular conditions. This conditioned mode of existence of substance and attributes is known as *Paryāya*. The point is that substances and attributes are conceived to exist not in an absolute or isolated way but in relation to other *reals*. So this non absolutistic or relativistic view of Reality leads the Jain Thinkers to postulate *Paryāya*.

This rich concept of *Paryāya* is a unique contribution which is highly valuable in the spheres of thought and action. It provides a strong base for relativism, perspectivalism and situationalism which are needed for pluralistic worldly life. It helps in avoiding the pitfalls of absolutism, dogmatism, obscurantism, ego-centricity and narrowness of all types. This type of understanding leads to mutual complementarities, mutual cooperation, mutual trust, coexistence and above all to *ahimsā* which is the highest truth. It provides foundation to *Anekāntavāda* as a theory of Reality and *ahimsā* (non-violence) as a way of life. It alone can ensure a participatory, conciliatory and democratic mode of life which is the aspiration of humankind. Thus, we find that the introduction of the concept of *Paryāya* brings about a tremendous modification in the Jain metaphysics, ethics, logic and epistemology, the like of



which we do not find in the metaphysics of other schools. The implications of this concept are deep and far-reaching in the fields of mathematics, statistics and linguistic analysis. Its tremendous implications are yet to be brought to the fore by the Saints and Scholars. Many of such elements have been worked out and developed by the Jain Scholars, but many more are yet to be brought out. For example, the qualitative dimension of the theory of the probability as a foundation of theory of *karma* and rebirth and emergence of infinite plurality of beings and things is a unique idea of Jainism which is only in an embryonic form and if its details are fully worked out, it is sure to result in a Copernican revolution in the methodology of natural and social sciences. It is a challenging task for the scholars of Jainology which, I think, should be highlighted and earnestly taken up. Whatever literature exists in this respect should be made available in a language intelligible. This can be achieved if interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches are made as a team work to these areas of potential studies and whatever literature exists in this area is made available in a language familiar to modern mind. It requires a team work of knowledgeable scholars of different fields to work on the implications of the concept of *Paryāya* and on Jain mathematical models to explain the operation of *karma*. Prof. L. C. Jain, Professor of Mathematics, has done some pioneering work but that needs to be carried forward. Late Acharya H.H. Shri Mahapragyaji also in his book '*Anekāntavāda*' endorses this need. Prof. Mahalanobis and Prof. J. B. S. Haldane found in *Syādvāda* a close relevance to the concepts of probability. Prof. D. S. Kothari has also dwelt on this point.

According to the Jain Thinkers, thus, no Reality, whether in the form of substance or in the form of attribute, exists as such but only in a specific mode of existence. There are infinite ways or modes in which *reals* can exist and this idea paves the way for the advocacy of *Anekāntvāda*, the central thesis of Jainism. Likewise, in the field of knowledge, to know a thing is to know its substantial and adjectival aspects in a particular mode or form. A particular mode appears only in a particular set of conditions. With the changed conditions there will be another mode of existence of that thing. So, all our knowledge of a thing at a particular spatiotemporal locus is conditional and relative to the circumstances. Of course, the possibility of absolute knowledge is all the while there. *Naya* has double function. It is experience of object in a particular mode and its verbal expression in that mode. This is the *Nayavāda* or the relativistic theory of knowledge and language. Since all knowledge is relative, the judgmental and linguistic expression of it has also to contain the relations and the conditions which characterize such knowledge. This is the

theory of *Syādvāda* which means that every judgment is based on four types of *apekṣās* (perspectives) of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* ((place), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (nature). This theory is further formalized in the form of *Sapta-bhaṅgī*, a doctrine of seven-fold predication.

The theory of *Anekānta* is the corner stone of Jain view of Reality and life. It is described as heart of Jainism. It is a direct corollary of *śamatva*. It is rather application of *śamatva*. It is a dynamics of thought which ensures conciliation, concord, harmony and synthesis. It stands for catholicity of outlook and accommodation of different viewpoints in the holistic understanding. It is *organismic* view of life and Reality. It takes into account both the whole (*sakala*) and the parts (*vikala*). In the field of knowledge therefore, it draws a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *naya* to bring home this truth.

Jain concepts of infinities of *pradeśa* (space), *śamaya* (time), *jīva*, *ajīva* and *gati* (motion) and various types of bios (*pariṇāms*) are helpful in overcoming shortcomings of modern set theories. They can help in avoiding paradoxes and contradictions of infinities found in mathematical operations. The concept of *Paryāya* as a basis of *syādvāda* gives a mechanism to eliminate inconsistencies and contradictions.

Omniscience in this model can be understood as a supreme but adaptable set of indivisible corresponding sections (*avibhaṅgī praticchada*) of all fluents (*dravyas*) supposed to exist through their controls (*guṇas*) and own events (*Paryāyas*) from *ab- eterno* to *ad- eterno*. The controversy raised by the school of Srimat Kanji Swami can be approached from this point of view.

The mathematical knowledge was evolved and developed to account for the operation of karma system and variety of association between *jīvas* and *ajīvas*. The fundamental word for set in Jaina texts is *rashi* with its synonyms *samūha*, *ogha*, *punja*, *vrnda*, *śamapta*, *śamudaya*, *piṇḍa*, *avaśeṣa*, *abhinna*, *sāmānya* etc as found in Dhavala texts. The sets have been classified as *varga*, *vargaṇā*, *spardhak*, *guṇa hāni*, etc. The analytical methods are those of *pramāṇa*, *kāraṇa*, *nirukti*, *vikalpa*, *khaṇḍita*, *bhājita*, *virālana* and *apahṛita*. There are various types of sets of *karma* under *alpabahutva*. Concepts of cardinality and ordinality of sets are found

Logarithms have been developed to explain topological sequences.

The *Karma* group of texts classified as *Dravyanuyoga* and *Karaṇānuyoga* admit of Systems theoretic approach.

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2. Mahābandha
3. Kaṣāyapāhuḍa
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5. Dhavala and Jayadhavalā
6. Gommaṭasāra and Labdhisāra (along with kshapaṇasāra) of Nemichandra
7. Works of Madhavachandra and Chamundrai
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12. Gaṇitasārasaṁgraha

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# Index

Introduction : The Concept of Paryāya	S. R. Bhatt	v
1. Paryāya in Jain Philosophy	Acharya Mahaprajna	1
2. Wide Implications of the Concept of Paryāya	Samani Chaitany Pragya	5
3. The Concept of Paryāya – A Vedic Perspective	Dayanand Bhargava	12
4. The concept of Paryāya : Its Ethico-Spiritual Significance	Kokila H. Shah	21
5. Spiritual and Material Significance of the Concept of Paryāya	Priya Jain	30
6. Jaina Concept of Paryāya as an Alternative to the Concept of God as a Creator	Pradumna Shah	38
7. The Concept of Paryāya and Jaina Way of Life	Jagdish Prasad Jain “Sadhak”	41
8. Paryāya : A Doctrine of Pariṇāma	Rajjan Kumar	60
9. The Concept of Paryāya – Mode	Rashmibhai Zaveri	71
10. The Concept of <i>Sat</i> in Jaina Darśana	Bijayananda Kar	86
11. Paryāya (Mode, Modification or Manifestation)	Shugan C. Jain	93
12. Kundakunda on the Modifications (Paryāyas) of Self and their Ethico - Spiritual Implications	Kamal Chand Sogani	104
13. Some problems regarding the concept of Paryāya	Lopamudra Bhattacharyya	111





# 1.

## *Paryāya* in Jain Philosophy

Acharya Mahaprajna

The definition of *sat* (reality) given by Umasvati is based on the trinity of utpād (creation), vyaya (cessation) and dhrauvya (persistence)<sup>1</sup>. The *sat* is neither absolutely permanent or absolutely eternal (*kutastha nitya*) nor absolutely transitory or absolutely changing (*utpād-vyayātmaka*).

In the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*<sup>2</sup>, we get the explanation of *sat* through two terms viz., *sthira* and *asthira*. According to this, that part which is *asthira* (transitory) undergoes change, or is amenable to change; that part which is *sthira* (permanent) does not undergo change, or is not amenable to change; that is it remains unchanged.

This concept of *sat* gives rise to the doctrine of eternal-cum-non-eternal *sat*, which propounds that the substance is neither absolutely permanent, nor absolutely impermanent, but it is permanent-cum-impermanent.

*Paryāya* (mode) is not entirely different from the substance (*dravya*); at the same time it is not entirely identical with it. Hence, the *sat* is defined by a couple of terms – *dravya* and *paryāya*.

There are two types of change that take place in the *dravya* – innate (*svābhāvika*) and *vaibhāvika* (extraneous). The *svābhāvika* changes are subtle; they are compared with the waves in ocean as follows:

Anādinidhane dravye, saparyāya pratikṣaṇam  
Utpādyante vipadyante, jalakallolavat jale.

Mathematically, such change is explained through 12 expressions–



1. Anantabhaga – vṛddhi
2. Asamkhyāt-bhāga – vṛddhi
3. Samkhyāta-bhāga – vṛddhi
4. Samkhyāta-guṇa – vṛddhi
5. Asamkhyata-guṇa – vṛddhi
6. Ananta-guṇa – vṛddhi
7. Ananta-bhāga-hāni
8. Asamkhyāta-bhāga – hāni
9. Samkhyāta-bhāga – hāni
10. Samkhyāta-guṇa – hāni
11. Asamkhyāta-guṇa – hāni
12. Ananta-guṇa-hāni

The *svābhāvika* changes are perceptible only through extra-sensory consciousness. Such change takes place continuously in all *dravyas*. On the other hand, the *vaibhāvika* change takes only in the embodied *jīves* and the *pudgala* (physical substance).

When the question was asked – ‘Is the *jīva* eternal or non-internal?’, the answer to it was given through *anekānta* (non-absolutistic) *dṛṣṭi* (view) as follows:

The structure of *dravya* is two fold –

1. *Dravya rāśi* or *pradeśa-rāśi* (the total number of *pradeśas* i.e., the ultimate units)
2. *bhāva* (state or *paryāya* (mode)).

The *dravya-rāśi* or the *pradeśa-rāśi* of a *dravya* is always constant – not a single *pradeśa* or a *paramāṇu* from the total number either increases or decreases. Whatever amount was there in the past remains in the present and will remain in the future – not a single unit can be added to it nor a single unit can be subtracted from it. With respect to this ‘*pradeśa-rāśi*’, the *jīva* is eternal. At the same time, every *dravya* undergoes transformation or change in its *bhāva*; with respect to this, it is non-eternal.

Alike the *jīva*, the *paramāṇu* is also both eternal and non-eternal. With respect to the substance, the *paramāṇu* is eternally permanent and its existence is not temporal; its substance hood (*dravyatva*) never perishes. Its colour, smell, taste and touch go on changing; therefore, with respect to the mode, it is non-eternal<sup>4</sup>.

Both *jīva* and *pudgal* (matter or physical) substances are directly associated with the changes that take place in the universe. Both thus can be considered as the fundamental constituents of the universe. Both are amenable to both kinds of changes – *svābhāvika* and *vaibhāvika*.

The *paryāyas* that take place in the *jīva dravya* on account of its association with karma are *vaibhāvika paryāyas*. Re-birth is one of such *paryāyas*, because that takes place due to karma (bound by the *jīva*). Also, the *vaibhāvika paryāyas* take place in *pudgala dravya*; they are on account of the effect of time (*kāla*). A *paramāṇu* may remain in the state of *paramāṇu* as well as it may change into the state of *skandha* (aggregate of atoms) by uniting with other *paramāṇu* or *paramāṇus* – Such kind of association or dissociation of *paramāṇus* go on occurring in accordance with the universal laws on account of the effect of time on *paramāṇus*.

One meaning of the term *paryāya* is *Kriyā* i.e. action. When the *jīva* undertakes an action, there occurs *vibhāva paryāya* during that period, as a result of which it experiences the states such as birth, death and the like.

In the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*<sup>5</sup>, the various states of *kriyā* of *jīva* are described by some technical words like *ejana* (vibration), *vyejana* (different kinds of vibration), *calana* (motion), *spandana* (minute vibration), *ghattana* (friction), *kṣobhana* (disturbance in the present state) and *udīraṇa* (pre-mature rise of karma). The *jīva* undergoes transformation in various forms through all these *kriyās*. So long as this cycle of *kriyās* goes on, *antakriyā* (attainment of liberation) of *jīva* is not possible even at the end of life. There must occur a state of “*akriyā*” (non-action) in between the state of *kriyā* and *antakriyā*. In other words, liberation (*mokṣa*) can take place only if there occurs a state of *akriyā* (prior to *antakriyā*). After attaining the state of liberation, the *jīva* ceases from *kriyā* (which was *vaibhāvika*). *Svābhāvika Kriyā* however takes place in the state of *mokṣa*.

Some *paryāyas* are explicit (*vyakta*), while some are only implicit (*avyakta*). There are again some *paryāyas* which are perceptible through

sense-organs, while there are others which are not perceptible through sense-organs. Thus the cycle of transformation ever goes on continuously; no existence or *dravya* can remain free from it. The *svābhāvika* transformation is called *artha-paryāya* (non-manifest mode), which is very subtle. It is through this transformation that a substance maintains its own existence while passing from one instant to another one. It is not perceptible through senses.

Another kind of *paryāya*, which is called *vyañjana paryāya* (explicit or manifest mode), is a gross one. Some forms of them are perceptible through sense organs. Human form (of a *jīva*) is only a *paryāya* and not the fundamental substance (*dravya*). It is an explicit *paryāya* which we can know (through sense-organ). But the soul itself is a subtle substance; we cannot know it (through sense-organ).

We may conclude by saying that all our knowledge (which is sensory) is limited to know only the *paryāyas*; we cannot know directly the *dravya* itself; we can know it only through the *paryāyas*.

#### Foot-Notes :

1. Tattvārtha Sūtra, 5/29 – utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyatmakam sã.
2. Bhagavai, 1/440
3. Ibid., 1/440
4. Ibid., 14/49-50
5. Ibid., 3/143-148





## 2. Wide Implications of the Concept of *Paryāya*

Samani Chaitany Pragya

The concept of *paryāya* (mode) is related to the concept of change. Substance and mode are the issues which have been widely discussed in the field of philosophy under the names of being and becoming, permanence and impermanence, identity and difference and *last but not least the universal and the particular. More or less all of them* have emerged out of the same problem i.e. the problem of change-cum-eternity.

According to Bhagavatī Sūtra and Pannavaṇā substance is being, permanent, identical and universal and mode is becoming impermanent, different and particular. Bhagavatī Sūtra mentions that reality manifests in two forms i.e. substance and mode. It does not mean that reality is divided. It is, in fact, one but observer can see it in two forms. Siddhasena Gani supporting the scriptural view in his commentary on Tattvārtha Sūtra says :

“Ontologically substance and mode are inseparable. The distinction of the two is only the mental projection.”<sup>1</sup>

In such a situation the absolutist view about the substance and the mode in the reality can not be reasonable, as both are interconnected. To regard one as true and another as untrue is as meaningless as to breathe without air. Substance is the uniting force through which paradoxical nature of the reality merges into unity. Contrary to it, mode is the dividing force through which unity of reality is changed into diversity. If it were not so, why everything is not coming out of everything ? This is the

ground on which Sāṃkhya Philosophy accepts that only the apt effect emerges out of the apt cause.

The interdependence and co-existence of substance and mode imply that mode is nothing but the changing property of a substance. When a substance passes through one condition to another and from one moment to another without losing its essence it is recognised as mode.<sup>2</sup>

Change can occur in the both substance and attribute.<sup>3</sup> Scriptures like *Bhagavatī Sūtra* and *Pannavaṇā* deal with both the types of change. The remarkable thing in them is that change takes place at two levels, viz., micro and macro technically known as '*pariṇāma*'<sup>4</sup> and '*paryāya*'<sup>5</sup> respectively. The former is recognized as mutation and the latter as mode. The former stands for internal change and the latter for the external. In the absence of the former the latter can not take place. Thus, mode is always preceded by mutation. There is cause-effect relationship between the two.

To explain internal change both the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* and *Pannavaṇā* have mentioned two types of mutation occurring in the world of consciousness and that of non-conscious respectively.<sup>6</sup> Each of them is further classified in 10 types. The mutations related to the conscious world are such as, mutation related to next birth, development of sense-organs, passions, psychic colours, mental, physical and vocal activities, application of knowledge, power of knowledge, power of intuition, self-restraint and sexual tendency. Likewise, the mutations related to non-conscious world are also of 10 types, such as, the unity of matter, movement of material entity, structure of material body, separation of material objects, colour, taste, touch, smell, weightlessness and sound property of non-physical element. Each of the ten is further divided into many according to possible alternatives.<sup>7</sup> For example, senses are five. Mutation of one is almost different from that of the other. In this way change multiplies in mathematical proportion passing through the three periods of time.

### Wide Implications

The concept of *paryāy* referred to in the canons can be the concrete base to the following theories that are of universal application. In brief, the theories are as follows:

1. Objectivity of causal-efficiency
2. Notion of possibility and probability
3. Multiformality of the universe
4. Objectivity of relativity
5. Individuality of any object

The explicit order of the universe is fundamentally dependent on the theory of change. If there were not potency of change there would have not been the causal-efficiency or cause-effect relationship among the objects. Causal-efficiency is the essential characteristic of an object.<sup>8</sup> All the schools of thought are unanimous about the fact that in the absence of the causal-efficiency nothing can exist.<sup>9</sup> Many of the scientific researches and experiments are based on the cause-effect principle. The philosophy that does not believe in the reality of modification has no answer to the problem that how is the whole universe coming out of one absolute static reality ? This has really been a great problem before Vedantins. This may be a reason for which they have to accept an extra element named as *Maya* to answer the problem. Accordingly, it is *Maya* with the help of which change takes place.

The upshot is that to deny modification as real means to deny the causal-efficiency and thereby to deny the existence of the whole world of being.

The whole world of being is passing through the threefold change, viz. natural, by conscious exertion and by both.<sup>10</sup> The change that occurs without conscious exertion is natural. e.g. the change of colour, taste, touch, smell, structure, motion, etc. of a material body.<sup>11</sup> The change which involves the conscious exertion, such as, the matter converted in the form of body, sense-organ, physical properties like colour, touch, size, etc. by the living being itself<sup>12</sup> is of the second type. The change, which starts with the help of consciousness but later on continues in its natural way<sup>13</sup>, is of the third type. For example, house, table, etc. once having made by conscious being sustain and decay in their own way.

Sometimes it happens that object is changing even though there is no effect of the change on that object. In fact, change is twofold, viz.; similar and dissimilar, technically known as '*sadrsa*' and '*visadrsa pariṇamana*' respectively.<sup>14</sup> The former is implicit, subtle and

instantaneous. The latter is explicit, gross, lasting for some time and amenable to verbal expression.<sup>15</sup> In other words, what occurs independently is the similar change. What depends for its occurrence on conditions that are external is called dissimilar.<sup>16</sup> The noticeable thing here is that the former is too subtle to be recognized. This is the reason an object, after having changed, does not appear to be so. In the case of the liberated self, the medium of motion, the medium of rest and the change is always similar. Apart from these all other objects have both similar and dissimilar change.

The conceptions of probability and possibility are of paramount importance in modern science. By accepting reality as multifaceted the Jain philosophy has provided grounds for their scientific principles. In the context of change, Acharya Shree Mahapragyaji has beautifully presented the scientific outlook of the Jain Thinkers in the following manner:

“The subtle modifications can not be known through the senses. They are the object of super-consciousness. The visible modifications are gross. They are manifest and, therefore, can be known through the senses also. It is in the case of these gross modifications that we can think of both, the possible and the probable. Every modification has the possibility of changing into any other mode. A colour can change into another colour, a smell into another smell, a taste into another taste, and a touch into another touch. Yati Bhoja has described two types of potentialities, viz.; the potentiality that can be actualized at a distant time (*oghaśakti*) and potentiality that can be immediately actualized (*samucitaśakti*). The former is the mediate cause, while the latter is the immediate cause of change. Grass has the potentiality of becoming ghee at a distant future. Curd can change into ghee immediately. The potentialities are too many to be enumerated. Theoretically, it could be said that potentialities of an object are innumerable as far as the mediate form of potentiality is concerned. A scientist through his research can know a few of these. A person, with the power of super-sensuous knowledge can know them through super-sensuous knowledge. An ordinary man can, however, know only the immediate cause or the visible modifications. We, therefore, can not put any limitation on the possibilities or probabilities.”<sup>17</sup>

Multiformity of the universe depends upon the multiformity of relationship among the fundamental realities. The fundamental realities postulated by all the philosophical schools are limited in number. For

example, Sāṃkhya system believes in maximum 24 and minimum 2 elements. Yoga system believes in maximum 25 and minimum 2. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika believe in 16 and 7 basic elements respectively. Likewise, Vedānta system considers only one reality while Buddhist and Jaina consider 5 and 2 fundamental realities respectively. This is really a great wonder how infinite objects are coming out of finite realities. Without accepting the modification in the basic elements the multiformity of objects can not come into being.

Fusion and fission, number, configuration, conjunction, disjunction, etc. are the distinct modifications<sup>18</sup> happening through out the world causing variations in it. In modern science also, fusion and fission are regarded essential to generate energy and sub-atomic particles.

Moreover, the concept of modification also provides concrete ground to the theory of relativity. Unless we accept that one reality undergoes many changes relativity can not work. In modern science, the Theory of Relativity has been formulated on the base of the speed of light that is constant or rather absolute. In this reference, the question raised by some scholars is, if everything, which is empirical, is relative then what is absolute according to the Jaina view ? Without absolute nothing can be relative. So far as the concept of mode is concerned it appears from scriptures that substance is an absolute reality.<sup>19</sup> It is the constancy of substance on the basis of which relativity of modes can be justifiable whether they are successive or simultaneous.

Similarly, the individuality of any object can be maintained only on account of modification. It is in the sense that modification does not mean only mode but qualities also. Special quality of an object alone fixes the identity of the object. For example, consciousness is the only quality by which a sentient is known as sentient. If we overlook the quality there would be no difference between the sentient and insentient elements, as Acharya Akalanka has remarked in the context of Non-absolutism:

"Except consciousness in all other regards, the soul can be identical with the non-soul."<sup>20</sup>

So does the Vedānta system. Overlooking all the differences it sees oneness of the whole world of being. So far as Jaina view is concerned it believes in oneness of the world<sup>21</sup> but at the same time it emphasizes the individuality or difference of the entity constituting the world.

Bhagavatī Sūtras and Pannavaṇā deal with such differences pertaining to the living and non-living entities. How one atom and the living being differ from another of the same category, of being similar in many respect, has been shown in them with the help of higher mathematics technically known as *chatthanavadiya* (six-fold gradation).<sup>22</sup>

One more astonishing factor referred to in Nayachakra is this that apart from the mode *Agarūlaghū* there is one quality also named *Aguru-laghū* in each substance.<sup>23</sup> It is only the quality that helps substance to maintain its identity in the eternal flow of time. Due to this attribute animate always remains animate and inanimate always remains inanimate. Otherwise nothing could stay in its nature. Thus, the attribute *Aguru-laghu* plays an important role to reserve the nature of basic elements.

Looking at the discussion of mode cultivated in the Jaina canonical and the philosophical texts it appears that sharp and scientific vision is necessary to penetrate into the deeper levels of the concept.

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### 3.

## The Concept of *Paryāya* : A Vedic Perspective

Dayanand Bhargava

#### The Jaina Position

The word *paryāya* is generally translated as “mode”. In a substance, one *paryāya* vanishes and another *paryāya* emerges, though the substance remains the same. There is no substance without the modes, nor are there modes without substance. There is no origination without destruction and no destruction without origination, while neither origination nor destruction is possible without a permanent substance. Thus origination, permanence and destruction – these three constitute a substance. This, in short, is the *Jaina* view.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Etymology

As origination and destruction rotate one after the other, they are therefore, called *paryāya* which literally means to go in rotation (*pari+i*). The Sanskrit word for change, *parivartana*, also means the same thing (*pari+vrt*). We can, therefore, conclude that the *paryāya* indicates the phenomena of change which is described sometimes as destruction (*mṛtyu*)<sup>2</sup>, sometimes as destruction-cum-origination, (*utpāda-vyaya*)<sup>3</sup>, sometimes as origination-cum-permanence-cum-destruction (*utpatti-sthiti-pralaya*)<sup>4</sup> and sometimes as origination, existence, growth, change, decay and destruction (*jāyate, asti, vardhate, vipariṇamate, apakṣīyate, naśyati*)<sup>5</sup>. In contradiction to change, permanence is called immortality (*amṛta*) or stability (*dhrauvya*).



## The Status of Change

The most important question is whether the phenomena of change is also a part of reality (*sat*), as the *Jainas* would make us believe or, as the Vedantist would insist that, only permanence constitutes reality and the change is only apparent which can neither be described as existence nor as nonexistence (*sadasad vilakṣaṇa*). There has been a long debate on this point.

According to Satkari Mookerjee the difference among philosophers (on this point) is a matter of conviction deeper than reason can probe<sup>6</sup>. We, therefore, refrain from entering into this controversy in the present article. Our aim at the moment is to show how the pre-Mahāvīra Vedic literature deals with the concept of change (and permanence) so as to trace its origin in Indian Literature and also to show that this problem has engaged the Indian mind right from the Ṛgvedic times. As we shall confine ourselves only to pre-Mahāvīra literature we may refer to the classical orthodox (or Vedic) systems of Philosophy only in a casual way.

## Being and Becoming

Coming to the Vedas, the famous *Nāsadiya Sūkta* of the Ṛgveda refers to one term *ābhu*<sup>7</sup> which is supplemented by another term *abhva* by the *Brāhmaṇa*-texts<sup>8</sup>. These two terms, *ābhu* and *abhva* can be translated as ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ respectively. Literally *ābhu* means comprehensive existence (*ā=samanatād bhavati*) and *abhva* means ‘though it exists and yet it does not exist’ (*bhutvāpi na bhavati*).

In the Ṛgveda itself, *ābhu* is said to have been covered by *tucchya* which has been explained by *Sāyaṇācārya* as different from both, existence and non-existence (*sadasad vilakṣaṇa*), which is reminder of this term used as an epithet of *māyā* by the later Vedantists. In any case, we can safely conclude that the Vedic seers were not only conscious of the problem of permanence and change, but were deeply concerned as to how the two seemingly contradictory attributes can be reconciled. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* says that we know the object by its name and form (*abhva*) which are changeable, the unchangeable remains unknown – *Katham nvimāṃllokānpratyaveyāmiti ?*

*Tad dvābhyāmeva pratyavad rūpeṇa caiva namnā ca... haite Brāhmaṇo mahat O'bhve... Te haite Brāhmaṇo mahati yakṣe*<sup>9</sup>.

What is termed here as *yakṣa* (=wonderful) is termed elsewhere as *māyā* (inexplicable).

What is remarkable is this that even though the later *Vedantists* speak of name and form (i.e. the changeable aspect) to be *mithyā* or illusory, the *Śruti* accepts them to be *satya* or true – *nāmarupe satyam*<sup>10</sup>.

Actually the treatment of the concept of change is spread over whole of the Vedic literature. The *Yajurveda*, for example, declares in a mystical language that the unborn is hidden in the womb, which when born becomes many – *prajāpatiścarati garbhe antarajayamāno bahudhā vijāyate*<sup>11</sup>. It implies that the unchangeable is one, it becomes many through the process of change. On the basis of such *Śrutis*, different schools of orthodox Vedic systems of philosophy attribute different status to the phenomena of change. In Jaina terminology, the substance is one which does not change but its modes are many which continuously undergo change. The *Śruti*, quoted above, which declares name and form to be true, comes nearer to the *Jaina* concept which accepts modes to be real.

### The concept of change as Māyā

Literally *māyā* means limitation. We can only know the limited; the unlimited remains unknown. Also the limited only can be expressed, though both, the explicable and the inexplicable, the limited and the unlimited, are two dimensions of the creator – *Ubhayam vā etat prajāpatir niruktañcāniruktañca parimitañcāparimitañca*<sup>12</sup>.

### How change takes place

The *Rgveda* further says that here is unity at the level of unlimited, diversity comes through limitation – *Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate*<sup>13</sup>. Here is a scientific explanation of how a change occurs. It is clear that every change implies some movement. Movement, again, is either centrifugal or centripetal which are caused by *Indra* and *Viṣṇu* (also known as *Upendra*) respectively. The centrifugal movement of *Indra*, which is a psychic energy, creates expansion (= *prāsāraṇa*) through heat (*Agni*), the centripetal movement of *Viṣṇu*, which is also a psychic energy, creates contraction (*ākuñcana*) through coolness (*Soma*). The whole universe (known as *jagat* = ever changing) is constituted of these two, the heat and the coolness *agniṣomātmakam jagat*<sup>14</sup> and there is no third element.

Expansion weakens the object whereas contraction strengthens it. The process of weakening leads to destruction and the process of strengthening leads to creation. In Vedic terminology we say : *Viṣṇu* nourishes and *Indra* destroys. Both of them rival with each other, but none can overcome the other in absolute sense :

*Ubhā jigyathurna parā jayethe na parā jigye katarascanainoḥ  
Indraśca viṣṇo yadapaspr̥dhethām tre dhā sahasram vi  
tadairayethām*<sup>15</sup>

### The Concept of *Yajña*

As the centripetal movement nourishes through *soma* and centrifugal movement destroys through *agni*, the *soma* becomes an oblation in *agni*. This is the perpetual *yajña* going on in the nature. There is an inter-mixing (= *saṃgatikaraṇa*) of the two movements – centripetal and centrifugal – all over the world. Centripetal movement is checked by the centrifugal movement at its climax where centrifugal movement itself is converted into centripetal movement. In other words, *agni* consumes *soma* unto a point where *agni* itself changes into *soma*. That is to say, power of destruction can destroy only up to a point after which it transforms itself into constructive process and vice-versa. If it were not so, either there would have been only creation all along or only destruction. The power of creation and destruction are, therefore, friends. The *R̥gveda* says: -

*Agnirjāgara tamayam soma āha tavāhamasmi sakhye nyokāḥ*<sup>16</sup>

### Change of non-Violence

In *Jaina* terminology we can say that origination leads to destruction and destruction leads to origination.<sup>17</sup> Whatever is weak is consumed by the strong. But this does not mean violence, this is rather mutual cooperation. Without this cooperation nobody can survive. From negative point of view, we can say – *jīvo jīvasya bhojanam*. But from positive point of view it is *parasparopagraho jīvānām*. In mutual help, one offers the help, the other receives it, but the receiver has also to offer in return. This offering in return to the *nature, animal kingdom, men, gods* and sages is called five-fold *Mahayajña* which makes the sacrifice of the giver non-violent –

*Vaidīkī himsā himsā na bhavati and yajñāśiṣṭāṣinaḥ santo  
mucayante sarvakilbiṣaiḥ*.<sup>18</sup>

In simple words, taking (*vyaya*) is not a sin, if it is followed by giving (*utpāda*). This is how the society works – *Dadāti pratigrhāti eṣa dharmāḥ sanātanaḥ*. This is the social implication of the philosophy of change-cum-continuity; give-and-take (i.e. ex-change) makes the continuity of society possible.

There is also a limit to what one can take from the other. Whatever one takes, he absorbs only a part of it, which is known as *brahmaudana*<sup>19</sup>, the other part, which remains, is left over by it and is, therefore, known as *pravargya* (= left over)<sup>20</sup>. It is this *pravargya* that we can take from the other. If we try to take his *brahmaudana*, it is exploitation or violence. Here we can think of the famous example of six persons, trying to get benefit from a tree. In a tree, there are leaves and fruits which may fall down of their own. They are *pravargya* and we can partake of them. Some may, however, try to pluck the flowers or fruits or the leaves and branches, or may even cut down the very trunk of the tree. All of such attempts are attempts at snatching away the *brahmaudana* of the tree and, hence sinful. This is how by partaking of only the *pravargya* we can sustain ourselves and still remain free from the sin of violence.

### The question of equality

Another question is that of equality. When there are two, the giver and the taker, one of them, the giver, is generally supposed to be greater than the taker. There are two aspects of this problem. In the first place, none of us is absolutely giver or absolutely taker, all of us are giver and taker both; we take from one and give to the other. Hence there is no inequality. Secondly the giver and taker are not in fact greater or smaller but complimentary. Therefore, both of them are equal. For example, at one time, the son, when he is small, is the taker, and father is the giver when he is young. But the father becomes taker when he grows old and the son becomes the giver when he grows young. Therefore, there is no inequality but only complimentary-ness.

### Knowledge and Action

Similar is the question of knowledge and action. Change is brought about by action, which falls within the domain of *yajña*<sup>21</sup>, whereas knowledge falls within the domain of unchangeable i.e. *Brahman*. Knowledge without action is lame and action without knowledge is blind; a combination of the two alone can deliver the goods:

*Vidyāñcāvidyāñca, yastadvedobhayam saha  
Avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyāyāmṛtamaśnute*<sup>22</sup>

### The Concept of Permanence

As explained above, the change takes place because of inter-action of centrifugal and centripetal movements whereas the permanency comes from the controlling power of these two movements. Whereas centrifugal movement is *Indra* resulting into the consuming force, *Agni* and the centripetal movement is *Viṣṇu* resulting into the consumable *soma*, the controlling power of these two movements is *Brahma*, having faces on all the four directions and, therefore, moving in neither direction. All the three, the actions of taking, giving and controlling form the heart, as it were, of each object. The Sanskrit word for heart, (*hṛdayam*), represents all the three actions, *hṛ* is taking (*hṛ=harati*), *da* is giving (*dā=dadāti*) and *yam* is controlling (*yam=yamyati*). Here is the text from the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* :-

*Eṣa prajāpatiryaḍ hṛdayam. Etad Brahmaitatsarvam  
tadetattrayakṣaram hṛdayamiti hṛ etyekamakṣaramabhiharant-  
yasmai svāścānye ca ya evam veda da etye kamakṣaram  
dadantyasmai...*<sup>23</sup>

There is another way of understanding stability. When the movement is so fast that an object is able to be present at two distant points at the same time, the object is said to be stable. That is the meaning of 'it moves and it moves not' – *Tadejati tannaijati*.<sup>24</sup>

### The stable and the six phases of change

The two phenomena of origination and destruction are further elaborated into six, known as *rajamsi* which are sustained by one, known as *aṇa*:-

*Vi yastastambha salīmā rajānjasyajasya rupe kimapi svidekam*<sup>25</sup>

The *aṇa* or immovable is so fast that it surpasses all movables, though in itself it is stable — *Tathāvato'nyānatyeti tiṣṭhat*<sup>26</sup>. As already stated, the six modifications according to *Yāskacārya* are origination, existence, growth, change, decay and destruction.<sup>24</sup> These are the six *rajāmsi* or forms of change. Here origination and destruction have been expanded into six modifications.

### Change in seasons and equanimity

It is clear from what has been said above that the basic cause of change is duality of *Agni* and *Soma* which represent heat and coolness respectively. The rise (*udgrabha*) and fall (*nigrabha*) of *Agni* in *Soma* cause seasons as follows:-

*Some vasan Agniḥ = Griṣmaḥ*

*Some urūḥ Agniḥ = Varṣā*

*Some śīrṇo'gniḥ = Śarat*

*Some hino'gniḥ = Hemantaḥ*

*Some śayāno'gniḥ = Śiṣiraḥ*

These seasons represents change at macro level. In this connection, there is a significant statement that gods created men out of one season which means that men remain stable in all circumstances where as animals are born of many seasons i.e. they are opportunist changing according to the season. Therefore, animals can be controlled by men:-

*Rituneti vai devāḥ manuṣyānasrjanta, ṛtubhiriti paśūn. Tasmādime paśava ubhayataḥ parigrhitāḥ vaśamupetā manuṣyāṇām.*<sup>28</sup> The message is clear. The nature changes and animals follow nature, but men have the capability to rise above nature and stand still. Such statement might have been the origin of the concept of immobility of *Puruṣa* in *Sāṃkhya* system. The idea is beautifully carried out in the *sthitaprajña* concept of the *Gītā*.

The *Jainas* have also a concept of *śaileṣī* situation of the liberated soul, which do have modification but no change. It is known as similar modification (*sadrśa-pariṇamana*).

That the man should remain unperturbed through thick and thin is repeatedly said in the Vedic literature. The Vedic seers knew that actually the sun does not rise or set, similarly the aspirant should realise that he neither goes up nor does he fall down – *Sa va eṣa (ādityaḥ) na kadācanāstameti nodeti... Sa va eṣa na kadācana nimnocati*<sup>29</sup> Thus Vedic literature teaches stability in ups and downs of life. This message of equanimity forms the central theme of Jainism also.

## Conclusion

Actually the *Śrutis* have been interpreted differently by later Philosophical system and it is not our purpose to show which one of them is the correct interpretation. In any case, just as the Vedic systems understood the phenomena differently in their own way, the Jainas interpreted it in their own way. Y. S. Padmrajai in his excellent thesis on '*A Comparative Study of Jaina Theory of Knowledge and Reality*' has classified such theories into five categories on the basis of difference and unity, difference representing change and unity representing stability. He opines as follows:-

- (1) Change is real, stability is an illusion. This is the view of the Buddhist.
- (2) Stability is real, change is an illusion. This is the view of the Vedantist.
- (3) Both stability and change are real but stability is predominant. Under this category falls the *Sāṃkhya* system.
- (4) Both stability and change are real but change is predominant, this is the view of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*.
- (5) Both stability and change are equally important. This is the view of the Jainas.

As far as the Vedic literature is concerned, all of these five groups of philosophers can find one or the other statement in their support. If *Sāṃkhya* can quote in their support, the Buddhists can quote *Sato'bhya sajjajāna*<sup>30</sup> in their support, the Buddhists can quote *asadit te vibhu*<sup>31</sup> in their support. Similarly the Jainas could quote *asacca sacca parame vyoman*<sup>32</sup> and *sataśca yonimasataśca vivaḥ*<sup>33</sup>. It is another story that the Buddhist or the Jainas do not care for Vedic testimony for their views. But those who wish to make a historical study of a philosophical concept cannot overlook the Vedic texts which deal with the concepts of change and stability and their relationship in great details.

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## 4. The concept of *Paryāya* : Its Ethico-Spiritual Significance

Kokila H. Shah

Jainism is a system of thought built on the strong foundations of Metaphysics. It is one of the oldest religious traditions of India. 'Its rationalistic metaphysics and value-oriented ethics are intrinsically connected. To a seeker after truth, Jaina philosophy offers a satisfactory solution to many problems.

The concept of *Paryāya* is peculiar to Jainism. *Paryāya* in Jainism is a technical term which means mode of existence or modification of substance. Appearance, disappearance, origination and decay, becoming or difference can be said to be equivalents of the term *Paryāya*. The problem of substance has long fascinated scholars of Philosophy. Substance is a dynamic entity which possesses qualities and modes according to Jaina metaphysics.

The doctrine of reality and substance leads to the consideration of the concept of *Paryāya* which has special significance in Jaina thought. The term *dravya* according to the Jaina Metaphysics denotes any real that is changing though persistent. *Dravya* is dynamic having 'permanent substantiality' which manifests itself though change of appearance and disappearance. The thing itself has enduring character in spite of changes. It is said that "reality or existence possesses origination, decay and permanence."<sup>1</sup> *Paryāya* implies change. The trinity of origination; cessation and permanence are the fundamental basis of the Real. This subtle concept of *Paryāya* must be understood in the context of the concept of substance.

The term *Dravya* denotes any existent which has the important characteristic of 'Persistence' through change. In the Jain text it is said "A substance is that which maintains its identity while manifesting its various qualities and modifications and which is not different from existence."<sup>2</sup> The point worth noting is that a substance is never devoid of modification and a mode is never without a substance. "A substance undergoes constant modifications."<sup>3</sup> These aspects and descriptions of things are fully significant and absolutely logical. Thus two aspects of permanence and change are reconciled in the notion of substance "It is the most accurate description of reality of the actual states of things."<sup>4</sup>

Existent is defined as follows. "Existent is endowed with origin, decay and persistence."<sup>5</sup> Existence comprises both substance and modes. They are real. The notion of modes is inseparable from that of substance. Modes indicate changes in the persistent substance. "A real, consists of substance and its modes."<sup>6</sup> "The central thesis of the Jainism is that there is not only diversity of Reals, but each real is equally diversified".<sup>7</sup> "The conclusion is legitimate that each real is possessed of an infinite number of modes at every moment."<sup>8</sup> Ontological and phenomenological designs cannot be bifurcated. Perhaps, existentialism echoes the same concept.

The analysis of notion substance reveals that Reality is permanency in change. It may be noted that Jaina Concept in certain important respects bears a striking resemblance to Hegelian view of Reality in western thought. According to whitehead also Reality is synthesis of change and permanency. A substance undergoes changes and yet maintains its identity. Both Being and Becoming are real as both are the aspects of Substance. Though substance is undergoing modifications, essentially, substance does not change. Modifications occur only with reference to attributes. Birth and decay means a new condition is born or comes into existence and the old one goes out of existence.

The philosophical traditions of India offer different models for the analysis of existents. Jaina position is realistic and non - absolutistic. Ontologically, Jain position can be best described as reality is identity in difference. Shankara's Vedanta represents the philosophy of Identity or permanence which is antithesis to Buddhist view of flux. Buddhism upholds the doctrine of total impermanence or change without continuity. Jain view is synthesis of these two contradictory positions according to which both continuity and change are real. In other words

Jainism subscribes to the view of the co-ordinate existence of substance and its modes. It is rather a balanced view of reality in which the elements of permanence and change find their due place. The possibility of permanence and change is grounded in Jain concept of substance. It takes changes as real and productive of a manifestation that is *Paryāya*. What Jainism proclaims is that substance is, always connected not only with qualities but *Paryāya* - modification. In other words, substance is always associated with certain intrinsic qualities which are inalienable. Further substance with its quality must exist in some form or state. This form or state is its mode of existence called *Paryāya*.

*Paryāya* is subject to change but substance is eternal. Thus it is clear that everything in the nature is of the nature of being. Unity duality and plurality are inseparably connected in the structure of reality. Being is permanent through its changing modes known as *Paryāyas*.

The Jaina view of the real as combination of the unity of a substance with the diversity of the states and the co-existence of unity and diversity is not logically absurd. It is pertinent to note that epistemologically the complex nature of reality can be viewed from different standpoints. From the standpoint of substance everything is permanent and from the standpoint of modification, everything is changing. What undergoes modifications is substance. In fact, unity of change and permanence of a real is consistently maintained in Jainism. Perhaps, one may agree with the view that "Jainism is the most consistent form of realism as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus into theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge." With this unique Jaina concept of *Paryāya*, Jaina philosophy ends neither into skepticism nor into agnosticism. It believes that the things can be known. It must be emphasized that Jain view is not paradoxical.

Change is not appearance. But change means cessation of a previous mode and coming into being of a new mode. Reality of change and Identity cannot be questioned. Identity is accepted to be true in the midst of all varying modes or differences and a thing never becomes unsubstantial in spite of varying modes. Reality of relation is recognized.

Focus on the changing aspect of reality has far-reaching philosophical implications. Substance is that in which there are

origination, destruction and permanence<sup>10</sup>. Again, 'modes are subject to appearance and disappearance, the qualities remain permanent.'<sup>11</sup> The difference between quality and mode is stated as follows: "A quality is the distinguishing characters of one substance from another. The modifications of these qualities are called modes such as anger, pride in soul..."<sup>12</sup> It is clear that both qualities and modes are real. Much of the mystery will be solved if we understand modifications with reference to the notion of relativity not in the sense of skepticism or idealism but in the sense of realism. Jaina realism implies knowableness of the nature of reality. Thus pragmatic value of the concept of *Paryāya* must be emphasized.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, we may enquire further as to what is the importance of the changing aspect of reality. The subtle concept of *Paryāya* may be expounded philosophically to make it more intelligible. It has profound implications for ethics and spirituality.

Jaina ethics has for its aim, realisation of soul. In its ethical dimension, the concept of *Paryāya* is highly instructive and optimistic. It has axiological significance. It enlightens man on his condition now and suggests that it is possible for him to surpass his suffering by metamorphosing himself into God or super-soul. The implication is man has to lift his soul to its original supreme position by his actions. Thus, understanding the nature of reals may pave the way for realizing the goal.

As it is already mentioned, Jainism does not subscribe to the absolutist approach to Reality. Before proceeding further it should be stressed that absolutism in philosophy is based on trend of thought which is not based on facts of experience. In this connection it is rightly observed that "the conception of bondage and liberation, virtue and vice lose all their relevance if either permanency exclusively or change is recognized as constituting the nature of substance."<sup>13</sup> '*Paryāya*' indicates becoming aspect of reality. The origination and destruction are applicable to '*Paryāya*'.

It is said "Mode of existence and mutability constitute the meanings of *Paryāya*."<sup>14</sup> In relation to the soul mode of existence refers to transmigratory existence of soul into four kinds of states, namely, human, hellish, celestial and sub-human. These are extrinsic modifications of soul. The birth in these different states depends upon the Karmas of the soul. *Paryāyas* may be essential or pure modifications and non-essential or impure modifications. Both persistence and change of the soul are

asserted without contradiction. “There is no origin without destruction nor is there any destruction without origin and neither destruction nor origin is possible without what continues to be.”<sup>15</sup> The intricate notion of *Paryāya* provides foundation to ethics. A real changes and change means emergence of modes which were not in evidence before. With change a thing becomes different from what it is. There is coming into being of a new mode and yet a thing substantially remains the same. The changes assume a particular shape depending upon presence of certain operative factors.

As applied to the soul substance, this means that every soul is the cause of its own change. Hence morality has meaning as virtues are rewarded. Spiritually, soul can evolve to its inherent perfection. The concept of *Paryāya* may help the soul in highlighting the intrinsic nature of consciousness.

In Jainism the key concept is spiritual substance- the soul. Which is different from matter. Existence of soul is one of the presuppositions of Jain metaphysics. Soul is essentially pure. The intrinsic nature of soul is pure Consciousness, Passions, Attachment, Aversion etc. are modifications of soul and as such transitory. In the Jaina text it is said “soul is essentially conscious and it undergoes modifications is a doer of acts and is the direct enjoyer of the fruits of acts.”<sup>16</sup> From empirical point of view soul is wandering in the cycle of birth and death in the four states of existence.

Soul can realise its pure nature by its own efforts in the human state of existence and the intrinsic nature of the soul is not actualized in the person having impurities. The result is suffering, though the essential quality of the soul is infinite bliss. The impurities can be removed by following moral code of conduct and avoiding sinful acts.

**According to Jainism, all our endeavours should be to overcome passions which are obstacles in our way to achieve ultimate goal namely liberation.** There is the three - fold path to salvation which consists of right Conduct characterised by right knowledge and right faith. Souls purified by following the path of religion and morality finally achieve liberation. Religion protects the soul from falling into miseries of world. The true self is realised by following the path of Right Conduct endowed with equanimity within the self obtained by freedom from all passions. The soul can resume its pure state by

removing karma impurities by self-development. Soul can thus become God.

Jainism maintains intrinsic identify between worldly soul and super soul. Intrinsically there is no difference between worldly soul and liberated soul. Soul's mode of existence as a particular organism, that is a particular mode of existence for certain duration of time is transitory. The defilement of soul is its non-natural mode of existence due to its interaction with non-self. As a conscious substance, the soul may evolve into its qualities and modifications into various forms of beings. Its complete existence can be realised through them. The soul evolves; it grows by action and reincarnation. The growth, development or rather unfolding of the soul has significance. The soul can rebuild his life. In human state of existence following the path of righteousness soul can attain emancipation from the bondage.

According to Jainism one has to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual development before one reaches the final goal. Jaina Philosophers emphatically assert that every soul is potentially divine. Each soul can be transformed into God which is the highest state of spiritual evolution. Perfection lies inherent in man to be made manifest. The entire emphasis is on ethical life and conscious personal efforts in order to destroy the various adverse influences in the struggle for self-realisation. Soul can evolve and get established in its nature by right conduct along with knowledge and vision and that leads to liberation, that is, the state of knower- the pure consciousness.

Thus the intricate concept of *Paryāya* has spiritual significance. The religious and ethical frame work will be meaningful and not just superfluous if both change and permanence are accepted as real. World is as real as liberation. In the state of liberation soul retains its identity, only its state or form is changed Soul's capacity for modifications accounts for Reality of Pure Self. It is in this sense that we can appreciate the utility of ethics and religions. It gives meaning to ethical responsibility. If reality is either unchanging permanency or if change alone is real then moral conduct and its evolution would become meaningless.

Actualization of inherent divinity of soul depends upon change. Man is the only saviour of himself. The worldly souls pass through several types of spiritual manifestations. They are always defiled by the karmas. The manifestations in the case of such souls are determined by

the operation of the karmas. The natural manifestations of the souls are determined by the nature of the soul itself. Such manifestations lead to Liberation of the soul.

Soul experiences happiness and misery as a consequences of it's activity. From transcendental point of view soul has consciousness and it enjoys eternal bliss. Pañcāstikāyasāra describes soul as the agent of its own manifestations.<sup>17</sup> Consciousness manifests itself in various mental states. It would not be out of place to mention that the Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as Bahirātman, Antarātman and Paramatman.<sup>18</sup> "The first state is external self when it is identified with body or external belongings. The identification is due to ignorance. The same soul when is free from all senses of otherness is characterised by pure consciousness. It is turning inward of the soul. This is due to discriminative knowledge. This is the higher state of development the pure perfect self, free from all the impurities is realised in the third state, which is the supreme state of the soul. It is termed as Godhood.

Jaina Philosophy of consciousness is unique. Pure and perfect souls are liberated and they live in eternal bliss without losing their identity. By eradicating all passions souls can create new dispositions. The Jaina view of reality cannot be divorced from Jaina way of life, Man's existence has a goal, his struggle has a meaning one has to overcome passions and delusion. The quint essence of the Jaina Doctrine consists in achievement of self realisation which is manifestation of natural qualities of the soul. The soul is pure consciousness, knowledge the knower. Self realisation means soul realises itself as pure knowledge that it is by nature and is manifested as the knower of reality. In this connection it is pertinent to note that a soul meditating on itself attains its identity. Spiritually a soul should turn inward so that manifestation of pure self emerges. Modifications of the soul in the four states of existence are caused by the operation of the not - self. Contemplation can eliminate these modifications. The result is knowledge of the self par excellence.

We may consider the concept of *Paryāya* against the background of the fundamental concept of the Jain faith namely anuprekṣhā or stereological reflection that is, contemplations on transitory nature of things. It is known as Anitya- Bhavanā which is one of the important themes of contemplation. According to it, everything in the world is

transitory It is a fact of life and experience. Reflection on it may enable one to develop a sense of detachment and equanimity. The Law of flux and transformation governs the world. Among all the transient things the only thing that is constant is our soul.

The spiritual outcome of the study of the concept of *Parayāya* is thus complete understanding of the nature of existence. All that originates is invariably destroyed. Hence an enlightened person should not be attached to worldly objects. It helps us to accept all changes. Its true application leads to the development of philosophical attitude towards everything. When one is impressed by the transient nature of worldly objects, one directs one's attention from outward to inward which finally culminates into spirituality. "Soul is to be engaged in the practice of achieving self hood so that it attains absorption in the pure soul..."<sup>19</sup> Spiritually, we must have cognition of permanence in what is transient. The essence of spiritualism consists in knowledge of discrimination between the eternal and transitory.

To sum up, it is obvious that Jaina philosophers have accorded an important place to the concept of *Paryāya* in the theory of reality. Reality of change and identity cannot be questioned. Jaina attitude is not logically absurd or self contradictory. It eliminates illusionism and agnosticism. It signifies that complex nature of reality is understandable in terms of the concepts of persistence and change. The general nature of a thing is its permanent nature while its particular nature is temporary but all the same it is a part or aspect of the real nature of a thing. As regards its relation to the concept of soul, soul can cease to be its old self, that is, it can undergo change or become different from what it is and yet it persists. It gives meaning to causal efficacy.

In the end, it is important to note that it suggests significance of ethics for emancipation so far as it transforms man by bringing about ethical change. It is indicative of the potential of human soul. Perhaps, pessimism is alien to the spirit of Jainism. The evolutionary nature of human soul indicates that soul can resume its pristine glory. As regards the change it has been rightly pointed out that "Dynamism of reality is the very backbone of existence, existence thrives through change. It is an unavoidable law of Nature. The attribute of *dravytva* is responsible for the movement of a substance from one mode to another."<sup>20</sup>

To conclude, the concept of *Paryāya* is unique in Jaina thought. It



substantially contributes to the understanding of nature of Reality and Existence. It provides the basis for self realisation and enables the soul to establish itself in its natural state of bliss. In this way it is basic to the structure of Jaina metaphysics. Jaina non-absolutism lays special emphasis on this concept. We have to reorient our logical attitude and accept the unification of both permanence and change as the true measure of reality. It gives spiritual solution to every problem. It is the key to unlock the mystery of paradoxical reality. It may enable one to follow the path of spiritualism leading to salvation. Its contribution to Indian thought is undeniable.

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## 5. Spiritual and Material Significance of the Concept of *Paryāya*

Priya Jain

Man is a rational animal and co-exists with other creatures sometimes in harmony and at most times in disharmony. When he follows his instincts blindly, he falls in the pitfalls created by him, laid in the form of ignorance, delusion, passion, etc. and finds himself trapped in the wheel of transmigration undergoing endless trials and causing tumults and tribulations in his surroundings. But again it has been proved that who-so-ever used the gift of his superior intellect and wisdom realised the multi-faceted reality and translated it to mankind in different places and contexts. The seer and the knower rationalized his ephemeral conditioning and sought the instruments of significant and worthy living.

One branch of this significant search gave birth to 'Philosophy' which in its etymological sense means 'love of knowledge', knowledge not for money, fame, power or for the transient pleasures but knowledge for knowledge's sake and for self-realisation and spiritual perfection, which is and should be the ultimate aim of all kinds of study. But somewhere in the course of journey, man loses sight of this ultimate truth and continues to gather and reserve the information, just as artificial intelligence is stored in great magnitude in the computers of today. Just as the computer cannot benefit from the knowledge stored within it, man also is least able to help himself with the knowledge propounded by the wise and the virtuous if he continues to be allured by the fleeting, ephemeral carnal pleasures of the material world (*para-paryāya*).

Philosophy and philosophical speculation of the ancient and modern Thinkers come to his rescue and enable him to understand that Reality is one, but when viewed in different contexts it means different things. A true aspirant or a genuine seeker tries to synthesize the diverse concepts to understand Reality, hence the importance of the concept of *paryāya* i.e. mode.

*Paryāya* i.e. mode/modification spells out the internal constitution of all substances. *Guṇa* i.e. attribute and *paryāya* i.e. mode are the fundamental characteristics of all Reals.<sup>4</sup> All substances are permanent from the substance point or view and ever changing from the *paryāya* point of view. Thus the *dravyārthika naya* and *paryāyārthika naya* sum up the theory of Non-absolutism. All Reals (or Reality) is characterised by *utpāda* (origination) of *paryāya* in a substance, *vyaya* (change) of *paryāya* in a substance, and *dhrauvya* i.e. permanence of the substance. Thus Reality is permanent in midst of change, identity in the midst of diversity and unity in the midst of multiplicity. This can be illustrated with the help of examples:

1) A human being undergoes various changes (beginning from birth) in the form of childhood, youth, old age, and terminates his journey in death. These changes or modes are the natural modifications of the body, but throughout the person remains the same. That is to say, X is born, X is young, X is old and X is dead. But the same X which experiences and knows these changes is undergoing changes at other levels of personality be it spiritual, psychical, mental, kārmic, etc. The internal *paryāyas* of X are the cause of the external *paryāyas* i.e. modes at different levels. This suggests that there are two types of *paryāyas*, viz.. *svabhāvi* (i.e. essential and *vikāri* (i.e. deformed) of a substance.<sup>5</sup>

As Satkari Mukherjee remarks, “A real is undergoing change for all time and change connotes these three characteristics. If a real is not amenable to change, it would not be a real. Reality is changing as well as unchanging. It is neither unity alone nor diversity alone, but when viewed together they sum up the nature of Reality. Unity is not exclusive of diversity and vice versa.”<sup>6</sup> There is a definite relation of *bhedābheda*, i.e., identity-cum-difference between a substance and a quality, and between a substance and its modes; the substance is the substratum of qualities and manifests through different modes.<sup>7</sup>

The qualities and the modes cannot exist independently of and

apart from a substance to which they belong. A mode which is not a mode of anything and a quality which is not a quality of anything is neither a mode nor a quality. If modes and qualities are unreal, substance too cannot be real. So *paryāya* is as much real as a substance and substance can be known or comprehended only through the *paryāyas*. Hence the central thesis of Jaina thought is that there is not only a diversity of reals, but each real is also equally diversified. Thus each real is possessed of or characterised by infinite number of modes at any given moment and each mode or *paryāya* is complete in itself and not dependant on the preceding and succeeding modes.<sup>8</sup> The *paryāyas* of the reals became the paradigm for the Buddhists<sup>9</sup> and the uniformity of the substance became the basic contention of monism of the

Each philosophy/philosopher stopped at one *paryāya* or mode and formulated a certain concept and feinted to look at other sides of Reality. Only if they understood the concept of *paryāya* they would not have debated with each other like the six blind men who debated over their understanding of an elephant.

The Jaina philosophers through the concept of *paryāya* tried to give a comprehensive view of Reality. When the Vedantin spoke of unitary consciousness as the only Reality they failed to acknowledge the modes and attributes and when the Buddhist idealists expressed their belief in the multiplicity and fleeting nature of consciousness units they did not recognize the substratum of every unit where the changes took place.

Theories like *anekāntavāda* and sevenfold *syādvāda* too cannot enable us to simultaneously express all the diversified aspects of all reals. Such is the dynamics of change/modes. So what is permanent in this changing world ? Only change is permanent. Statements like that of a being as it is (*asti*) from *sva-dravya*, *kṣhetra*, *kāla*, and *bhāva* and non-being as it is not (*nāsti*) from *para-dravya*, *kṣhetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* spell out the dynamics of change, i.e., a thing *is* as well as *it is not*. We can understand/comprehend Reality only through its modes and changes. Thus the concept of *paryāya* cannot be studied in isolation of *dravya*, i.e., substance. It is the right understanding of the modes/*paryāya* that makes the right understanding of substance possible.<sup>11</sup>

The Encyclopedia Britannica<sup>12</sup> remarks that change is so elementary and so comprehensive a concept that it is difficult to define it.

All changes take place in time and space. They are thus events in substances. It is the condition of the very existence. If matter and soul are wholly changeless, that is unable to change or initiate change, the cosmos will remain in a given condition, but this is not so. The changes involved in each substance are so complicated as to suggest intelligence as well as an internal agency. Thus the concept of *paryāya* and its study aims at the recognition and realisation of the superior intelligence which operates through different modes in different places and contexts.

### Spiritual Significance

The spiritual significance of the concept of *paryāya* is the realisation that “I am the pure conscious soul and infinite are my essential attributes and my *paryāya* cannot be that of delusion, attachment, aversion, passions, karmas, human form, senses, etc.”, as these are the modes caused by the so-called association of karmas. In bondage one does not know his real *paryāya* that his pure untainted *paryāya* of being all-knowing and all-seeing is his very own essence and nothing else other than this can be his essence. Infinite knowledge, infinite vision, infinite power and infinite bliss – the essential attributes of the real manifest completely in one *paryāya* when the realisation of the pure self dawns.<sup>13</sup>

The concept of *paryāya* enables us to understand that we live from moment to moment and this realisation should be moment to moment. Each *paryāya* is independent of the other, and had it not been so one would be a cause and the other effect. Thus spiritual journey sets in with a right understanding of the *svaparyāya* whereby the *svadṛavya* manifests in all its glory and luster through the *svaguṇas* and *svaparyāyas*. The *paryāyas* here cannot be other than that of the *dravya* itself. All other *paryāyas* or modifications of kārmic conditioning cannot be *svaparyāya* in the real sense of the consciousness. All the ephemeral adjuncts of name, form, birth and death are of *pudgalas* acquired due to ignorance of the *sadbhāva rūpa svabhāvi paryāyas*. In the state of *mukti*, *arhatatva* and *siddhatva* there is perfect and eternal manifestation of the *svabhavi paryāyas*.

The *vikāri* or the deformed *paryāyas* condition the soul and make it undergo different existences i.e. *gatis*. Hence the saying goes, “Forsake your ignorance and live in reality, in the real you, in the real *paryāya* of the self and this practice alone will slowly and steadily unfold the millions of secrets lying in the *dravya* i.e. the self. Hence when one is

known all is known and when all is known one is known”<sup>14</sup>. When one *paryāya* is known in its entirety the complete *dravya* is known and all other *dravyas* are also known.

As Paul Brunton<sup>15</sup> puts it, “How little at any immature state of seeking amid externals do men know that the treasures of bliss, satisfaction and possession are really all in themselves ? They are seeking its stable satisfaction in different transient means and ways. Very few comprehend that their need of the divine self is a permanent one .” This realisation comes in the self through the proper knowing and discriminating the self from the non-self. Only when all the deformed *paryāyas* of *bhāva karma* and *dravya karmas* get extinct then immortality manifests. This means that the *svaparyāyas* of the *dravya* are manifested in completeness. In the perfection of the *svaparyāya ananta catuṣṭayas* are manifested.

The spiritual significance of *paryāya* can further be studied through different *anuyogas*.

(1) The *dravyanuyoga* introduces the self to the self and inspires it to give up the foreign and alien *paryāyas* like *raga*, *dvesha*, etc.

(2) The *karaṇanuyoga* reveals the play of *karmas*. Not understanding the *svaparyāyas* and meddling with and indulging in external *paryāyas* causes transmigration, frustration and all tensions of the physique, mind and spirit. Ignorance of *paryāya* is at the root of the worldly-sojourn.

(3) The *caraṇānuyoga* lays stress on the renunciation of all that is not one’s own. When one knows that only the *svaparyāyas* of knowing and seeing are one’s own, he is not prepared to accept anything other than his own self. In other words, he is a Yogi and is contented in being in his own self, and so in *caraṇānuyoga* too the *paryāya* of knowledge, knowing oneself, is termed as renunciation.

From the *prathanānuyoga* or *dharmakathānuyoga* he is happy to know that since beginning-less time infinite selves have known their true selves only through their true *paryāyas*. It is rightly said, ‘Change your attitude and the world changes.’ We are the architects of our own *paryāyas* and our own life. So it is important that we exert to make our knowledge and knowing right in our *paryāya*, through our *paryāya*. As

Milton said, “Mind in its own place, makes a hell out of heaven and a heaven out of hell”.<sup>16</sup> The variegated moods of one person are due to the variegated modes of *paryāyas* that operate consistently throughout – during birth and death and beyond it.

Much water has flown down the bridge, time has slipped underneath our feet, but still enlightenment or self-realisation has not dawned and we continue to make tall claims of our material achievements, once again falling prey to the anti-essential i.e. deformed *paryāyas*. The Fata-Morgan of these *paryāyas* is so powerful that they manifest in so many ways and that the *vibhāva* appears as *svabhāva*. But the real self is devoid of all appellations and so the ancient seekers went on saying ‘*Neti-Neti-Neti*’, for the true self along with its *paryāyas* is not a subject of intellection but that of experience.

An understanding of the concept of *paryāya* alone makes *ahimsā*, *anekānta* and *aparigraha* possible. What is *Ahimsā* ? It is that state where there is no spiritual inertia in thought, word and deed, and the self is absorbed in infinity. It is a state in which the self is in *samabhāva*, *svaparyāya*, *śuddhopayoga*.. *Anekānta* enables one to understand the multi-faceted Reality inclusive of all its *paryāyas* and attributes. As Schopenhauer puts it, “ To see things purely as objects of understanding is to rise to freedom.”<sup>17</sup> The concept of *paryāya* enables us to accept our limitations and make our approach objective and synthetic, thus enhancing the landscape of our reflections. As A. N. Upadhye says, ‘The Jaina logician is a realist working with sound common sense; he is neither a skeptic nor agnostic. He does not want to ignore the relative or conditional character of the judgment arising out of the very nature of the object of knowledge.’<sup>18</sup> *Aparigraha* means non-attachment or non-possession of the *para-paryāyas*. By *parigraha* Lord Mahāvīra never meant the external possessions but inertia<sup>19</sup> and deformed *paryāyas* towards anything other than one’s own.. Through the concept of *paryāya* the way of the soul and the way of the world can be understood. From the above description we understand that the stoppage of influx of deformed *paryāyas* is *saṃvara* and this is possible when the false identification of the *jīvātman* with *para-paryāyas* is terminated. As Hermes states, “for all that is born is corrupted to be born again,”<sup>20</sup> whether it is *aśubha* or *śubha*. But *śuddha* is self-born and so is pure, uncorrupted and blemishless. *Nirjarā* is caused through identification of *asava* with *svaparyāyas*: and to remain

absorbed in ones own self in one's *paryāyas* is *mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* is nothing but the permanent emergence of *svaparyāyas*, and termination of *para-paryāyas*.

### Material Significance

(1) But for *paryāya* all things will remain static and life will be monotonous. The world will forever remain in one state in the absence of the modes through which change operates. It is in fact the charm of life. - is for spiritualists and *paraparyāya* is for the materialists.

(2) For a comfortable journey and tension free life man has to overlook the changes and change with time.

(3) When we acknowledge the significance of *paryāya* we acknowledge the views of others and thus create a harmonious world for ourselves and for our immediate surroundings and for the entire cosmos at large.

(4) *Anekanta* through *paryāya* enables us to bridge all misunderstandings however broad they may be as *paryāya* enables us to understand that it is only a *paryāya* and not the ultimate or the end of the world.

(5) *Paryāya* gives us that intuitional insight which enables us to sans all dogmatism and build a harmonious life free from violence, internal and external, thus enabling us to withstand and provide solutions to the ills and evils of modern times.

(6) If the scientists and the technologists understood the concept of *paryāya* they will use the tools of science and technology to build a harmonious world and not water the roots of war and terror.

(7) Where the concept of *paryāya* is alive that society vibrant with joy and celebration.

(8) It is only *paryāya* that is the yardstick of violence (*dravya* and *bhāva himsā*), *karma* (*dravya* and *bhāva karma*), and bondage (*dravya* and *bhāva bandha*) self-restraint (*dravya* and *bhāva samyama*) and ultimately *mokṣa* (*dravya mokṣa* and *bhāva mokṣa*) In fact, *mokṣa* is also a *paryāya* of the pure self. Since it is eternal and blissful it is worth it, otherwise it is sufficient, that the *Sva* i.e. the self is in its *paryāya* .



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## 6.

# Jaina Concept of *Paryāya* as an Alternative to the Concept of God as a Creator

Pradumna Shah

A substance may exist but the question has always baffled the thinkers as to how does it change. In fact, the question has been so baffling that a number of philosophers viz. some of the followers of Vedanta have denied the very existence of change labeling all change as mere illusion. You cannot ask how and why of an illusion. All illusions are but products of ignorance. What could be explanation for what appears to be a snake though it is really a rope except that snake does not exist at all but appears because of ignorance. The question as to what makes that snake is absurd. This is the position of an idealistic Vedantin. So he is not obliged to answer the question as to why change takes place.

But all philosophers are not idealists. There are Naiyayikas, for example, who will not deny reality of change. The basic concept is that objects are static by nature. Then why do they move or in other words why to they change; because movement and change are invariably concomitant – there cannot be movement without change and no change is possible without movement.

Suppose I move the book from one place to other place. Then the question arises who moves me.

The answer could be that I being a conscious entity need no mover and can move myself. Even then the question remains who makes movement at sub-atomic level. The answer according to Naiyayikas is that the God is the primary mover.<sup>3</sup>

All change is, therefore, brought about by God. In other words he creates, sustains and destroys. The objection to this view is that who moves God. If God moves himself, why not all the objects can move themselves. Western Philosophers have called God un-moving mover i.e. he himself does not move but he can make move others. This appears to be illogical. How can God move others without making himself a movement ? This brings us to the position of Vedantins that nothing really moves or changes.

Within these two views lie a third view that every object has the capacity to change; we do not necessarily need an outside agent like God to make things move. This capacity to change is inherent in the existence. The Sāṃkhya school, for example, would attribute the capacity to change to the three ingredients of *Prakṛti*: the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The change in fact is brought by *rajas* which has the capacity to move, but when change is bifurcated into creation and destruction then *rajas* is held responsible for creation and *tamas* is held responsible for destruction, *sattva* being responsible for sustenance. This is clear from the below given first line of *Mangalācaraṇa* of Kāmdambarī :

***Rajojuṣe janmani, sattvavṛttaye sthitaū,  
prajānām pralaye tamaḥ sprśe***

Now in this statement of the Sāṃkhya view it is clear that change has been accepted only in *Prakṛti* which has three *guṇas* as its ingredients, but not in *Purusa* which has no *guṇas*. We may say that it accepts change in a part of existence. In any case it has replaces God by three *guṇas* as harbinger of Reality. Also it accepts that *Prakṛti* has the inherent capacity to change and needs no outside help for undergoing any change.

The Jainas go a step further. For them change is a universal phenomenon; nothing can escape from change not even the soul. Some of the changes, of course, are brought about automatically and others are brought by an outside agency (*prāyogika*). But to say that an outside agency is necessarily needed is wrong. This theory, therefore, completely refutes the necessity to accept a God as a creator or as destroyer. Creation (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vyaya*) are inherent in the nature of existence.

Acharya Kunkunda in this respect goes a step further by laying emphasis on the fact that in all changes brought about by the object, whether conscious or unconscious, outside agent may serve only an

instrumental cause but the efficient cause is the object itself. This is a still stronger rebuttal to the theory that God can do anything to anything; thus making change a phenomenon wholly dependent on the inner capacity of object and denying any role of an outsider agency.

Thus we find that the concept of *paryāya* which accounts for change is an alternative answer to the theory of a creator God. The moral value of this theory lies in the freedom of will. If others can bring about any change in me, I am not free to change myself to that extent. The Jainas give this freedom not only to the conscious being but to an atom also. Of course, in this struggle the Naiyayikas were isolated as the exponent of God, the creator. Neither the Mīmāṃsakas, nor the Sāṃkhya nor the Buddhist accepted God. Vedānta accepted God but only as *māyopahita caitanya*, and as such can be termed as semi-theists.



## 7. The Concept of *Paryāya* and Jaina Way of Life

Jagdish Prasad Jain “Sadhak”

The world consists of things or substances. These have distinguishing qualities, which are peculiar to the nature of the thing. We may say that the distinguishing features of a substance are its qualities, which are peculiar to the nature of that substance, while the distinguishing structure of a thing is its Form, as Aristotle called it. The form, it is said, is the sum-total of the distinguishing characteristics of the thing at a particular stage of organisation or development which it has reached. The form, that is to say, at the stage in question, is the last determination of the thing in virtue of which it has reached that stage. But at that same stage, we are also entitled to think of the thing as substance, in respect of the next phase of organisation or development, which it may still have to undergo, i.e. a new Form, which it may assume by undergoing further changes and modifications; this new Form is super-induced upon or developed in a substance, which is already itself a combination of substance, qualities and Form,<sup>1</sup> i.e. *paryāya* (mode or modification) in Jain terminology.

Before discussing the Jaina concept of *paryāya*, mode or change or how change takes place in a substance and in what sense, a new form originates or is created, it is necessary to describe in brief the problem of change, i.e. whether change or modification does, in fact, take place in reality or that change is unreal, i.e. there is no change at all.

We commonly think of the world as consisting of changing things which somehow remain the same things throughout and in spite of the changes that happen to them, so that we can say, “*This* is the thing which

yesterday was so-and-so and is to-day something else.” But this conception that the thing or substance itself has changed, C. E. M. Joad says, will not stand critical examination. Strip away from a so-called changing thing all the changes which occur in and to it, as we strip away its qualities from the chocolate, and what is left ? Presumably, a core of changeless stuff.

But we never in fact find such a core. Everything we know, and every part of everything we know, seems to be in a continual state of change or flux. For example, it occupies at any given moment a new point in time, and is therefore, older than it was at the preceding moment. But if everything is changing all the time, and changing in respect of every part of itself, then in what sense can *it* be said to be the same thing which somehow persists through the changes that occur to *it* ? Yet if *it* is not in some sense the same thing persisting through the changes, we are not entitled to say that *this* is the thing which was so-and-so and is now something else, and the conception of a world composed of things which change, but which, nevertheless, remain somehow the same though change, must be abandoned.

Considerations of this kind have led philosophers to propound different theories of change. These are very numerous, ranging from a denial of the existence of change to the affirmation of change as the sole reality. They are, however, unanimous in rejecting the commonsense notion of the world as composed of changing things<sup>2</sup> or substances. As Greek philosopher Permenides (about 500 B.C.) points out *ex nihilo nihil fit* (out of nothing, there comes nothing). The same idea is contained in Jaina texts and in *Bhagvad Gita*. The sense underlying Permenides statement is that completely new thing or successive new creations do not originate out of nothing; that change or modification does not take place in vacuum; it requires a continuing substance, in which modifications take place.

Substance is something which both changes and remains the same. For instance, a person grows from childhood to adulthood and from adulthood to old age. The person is the same; what has changed are its external forms. Take another case of a leaf which is green in spring and yellow in autumn. What precisely is it that has changed ? The substance of the leaf has not changed, since if it had, the leaf would not be the same leaf. The shape, size or form of the leaf has also not changed. However,

the quality of greenness, which the leaf earlier had, has been succeeded, superceded or replaced by the yellowness. The instance free us from the necessity of postulating a changing thing, because there *thing* has not changed. All that has happened is that one Form has substituted itself for another or the quality of a substance has undergone modification in an unchanging subject-matter, i.e. substance.

According to this analysis, then, all cases of change in things or substances are really cases of replacement of one Form by another or the modification of the condition or state of quality in the same unchanging subject-matter, viz. substance. This conclusion, therefore, suggests that change, at any rate in the commonsense acceptance of the term which entails the notion of *things* that change is illusory. Things or substances don't change; either its qualities or its material, structural forms undergo modifications.

Modifications (*paryāya*) in the condition or state of quality of a substance are called *guṇa paryāya* (modification in an attribute) of a substance while the modifications in the material, structural forms are called *dravya paryāya* (modifications in the physical forms) of a thing or just *paryāya* (mode or modification), though the substance remains the same. One form, condition, or mode is extinguished or destroyed and it is succeeded or replaced by another form, condition or mode; in this way new modes, i.e. new forms, conditions and states of a substance or its qualities originate.

After considering various arguments of different philosophers, which showed that change is unreal and also that change is the only reality, C. E. M. Joad observes: "Both sets of arguments are destructive of the commonsense notion of the world as composed of things which persist through change." He then states: "The question may be asked, 'can no philosopher be found to defend the commonsense notion ?' and adds: "Strictly speaking, the answer is that there cannot." Even Aristotle's doctrine of potentiality and actuality, Joad points out, only affords "some concession to commonsense notion" because, strictly speaking, the question which it seeks to answer is not "What is the nature of change ?" but "How do things come to be what they are ?"<sup>3</sup> Jainism not only defends the commonsense notion that things persist through change in categorical terms, but also offers a systematic explanation of the concept of substance (*dravya* in Jaina terminology), which is said to be characterised by continuity and change.

Substance is suggestive of something unchanging behind the changes and yet it is characterised by both continuity and change. The substance is endowed with attributes or qualities, which are permanent or unchanging and always reside in the substance, and accompanied by change or modifications. A quality is (actually) the distinguishing character of one substance from another, while the modifications of such qualities are called modes (*paryāya*).

The modes too reside, though *not always*, in a substance; they are subject to origination and destruction and are temporary. “The object [of knowledge] indeed, consists of substance, the substances are said to have their essence in qualities. And through these are the modifications.”<sup>4</sup> The very term “*dravya*” signifies *dravyatva*, i.e. “that which by nature, flows towards its modes”.

Substance is defined as follows: “That which, whilst it does not forsake its innate nature, is connected with [characterised by] origination, annihilation and stability [continuity or permanence] and which possesses qualities and modifications.”<sup>5</sup> In other words, apart from preserving its innate nature (*svabhāva* or *svarūpa*), which is unchanging or indestructible, the existent or substance is said to possess qualities or attributes (*guṇa*) and modes or modifications (*paryāya*) (*guṇaparyāyavad drvyam*)<sup>6</sup> and which is endowed with the triple character : origination, destruction, and stability (persistence) (*utpād, vyaya, dhrauvya, yuktamsat*).<sup>7</sup>

The three (origination, destruction and stability or continuity) are inextricably linked so much so that there is no coming-into-existence (origination or creation) without destruction; no destruction devoid of origination; neither origination nor destruction without permanence, stability or what continues to be; and no permanence or continuance without creation and destruction. Thus, Acharya Kundakunda confirms the necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of origination, annihilation, and stability.<sup>8</sup>

The inseparability of these three terms is further clarified as follows : “There is without substance no quality whatever, no modification.”<sup>9</sup> In other words, in the absence of substance, there can be neither quality nor modification. There is also no substance without the mode and no mode without the substance. This point is put forward more forcefully by Siddhasen Divakara in the following words :



There is no substance that is devoid of modification, nor is there any modification without an abiding something, a substance. For, origin, decay and continuance are the three constituents of a substance<sup>10</sup>

Though inseparable (*apṛathak*), the substance and the quality are nonetheless distinct (*anya*). This is clearly asserted in these words : “The substance is not the quality, and the quality is not the substance, indeed; for ... this *a-tad-bhāva* (non-identity or notion-of-otherness, i.e. *anyatva*) is not non-existence as such.”<sup>11</sup> Thus, in *anyatva* (otherness) there is no differentiation of place or location while in *prathakatva* (separateness) there is differentiation of place or location. The use of these terms helps to avoid the confusion between *bhedābheda* (differentiation and non-differentiation).

Although *paryāya* is not mentioned in this discussion of substance and quality specifically, it may be assumed that it is also a distinct aspect. However, the distinctness of these terms does not imply that they are exclusive of one another. Substance or reality is a multifaceted complexity. It is endowed with many qualities or attributes which, in turn, undergo modifications, i.e. origination and destruction, with the substratum remaining intact. Such a complex reality, viewed in itself and with reference to time and place, can be understood properly and thoroughly from different standpoints (*nayas*). That everything that exists is permanent or continuing is true from the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika naya*); that it is ever changing is true from the point of view of modification (*paryāyarthika naya*). In fact, it is the *substance* which undergoes modifications.

The above explains the genesis of the theory of multifaceted nature of reality, i.e. *anekāntavāda*. According to this doctrine, the same object can have a plurality of attributes, viz. non-eternal and eternal, etc. In other words, the same object can apparently have contradictory properties depending upon the perspective from which it is viewed. This is because reality is perceived to be manifold, “and each entity has a manifold nature”, consisting of “diverse forms and modes, of innumerable aspects.”<sup>12</sup>

There are, according to B. K. Matilal, two compatible notions of substance, viz. substance as the core of change or flux, and substance as the substratum of attributes.<sup>13</sup> Acharya Kundakunda combines these two notions in the following words :

That which whilst it does not forsake its innate nature, is connected with origination, annihilation, and stability and which possesses qualities and modifications they call a substance.

Existence is the innate nature of a substance, (connected as this is) with qualities and various modifications of its own, with origination, annihilation and stability at all times.<sup>14</sup>

Now the question arises how does change take place or what makes the change possible ? A thing can be changed only in one or other of the two ways. Either the change is effected by some external agency or it is self-originated, springing up, as it were, spontaneously within the thing.<sup>15</sup> There are misconceptions in regard to each of these two ways. If substance is all that there is, as the Greek Philosopher Parmenides pointed out, it cannot be changed by some external agency, since there can be no such agency. While external agency by itself cannot be the direct cause of changes or modifications in another substance, it can yet act as a helping, contributing, subsidiary or auxiliary, external cause (*nimitta*) in the modifications of that substance. Thus, even though water is liquid and coolness is its intrinsic nature, the fire can cause it not only to become hot (a change in the condition or state of its quality) but also transform or change it into steam or gas, i.e. a change in its form.

And, according to Spinoza, the substance cannot be changed from within, since, if it were, one state of Substance would be different from the another, and we should no longer be able to define as Substance as that which is “conceived through itself,” since it would now have to be conceived as that which is “potentially liable to become ‘that other’.”<sup>16</sup> The misconception in this case is that “that other,” to which condition, form, or mode it is now changed, is only a change or modification in the external form or in the state or condition of an attribute of that substance, though the substance itself remains the same.

The substance persists through change; only the potentiality, which was already latent in the substance or the organism, has now become the actuality, and that is a kind of change, which we know as growth or development. Such kind of changes are latent or in-built in the substances. They become so and so, Aristotle stated, “because they *are* so and so, for the process of Becoming or development attends upon Being and is for the sake of Being, not *vice versa*.”<sup>17</sup>

According to Jainism, the nature of reality is dynamic and therefore the substance must evolve into qualities (*guṇas*) and modifications (*paryāyas*) and must constantly undergo the three stages of origination, annihilation, and permanence or stability. In fact, the entire dynamic process of development is due to mutual action and reaction between the soul (the self or *jīva*) and the non-soul, (*ajīva* or unconscious matter), because of their evolutionary (*pariṇāmī*) nature. This *pariṇāmī* or evolutionary nature endows them with the characteristics of both *bhāva pariṇāma* and *parispanda* or *kriyā pariṇāma*, i.e. evolutions into being and evolutions into action. Space and Time, however, are endowed only with *bhāva pariṇāmas*.<sup>18</sup> It follows then that full completeness of existence is not realised either in a substance or a quality or a modification taken singly or separately but only in these taken together. Such separateness would suggest a cleavage between the evolutes and the evolving reality reducing each of them in their separation to non-existence.

Jainism makes its position clear by citing the example of gold. Just as gold realises its own nature as an existence through its qualities like yellowness, malleability, etc. and through its modifications or changes of form like ear-ring, bangle, etc., which all proceed from gold as a substance. Even then any substance realises its complete existence only in and through its qualities and modifications varying under variable circumstances. Existence is, thus, in the complete sense of the term, to be equated with a substance with all its qualities and changes of form which are themselves real. And this holds good of the conscious substance as well as of the unconscious.

In order to obviate the difficulties inherent in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *ārambhāvāda* or the theory of emergence (*ārambha*) of something new, so that the quality or modification which is *ārabhyate* (emerges) must be something new and different from the consequent causes, Jainism postulates the principle of *pariṇāma* according to which the qualities and modifications are the self-evolutions of the substance having an identity of essence with it.

Moreover, Jainism points out that in spite of this metaphysical or real identity between the *dravya* and *guṇas* and *paryāyas*, there is a logical and conceptual distinction between them. "The qualities and modifications," Kalipada Mitra states, "are both *bhinna* or distinct as well

as *abhinna* or not distinct from the *dravya*. Metaphysically, they are non-distinct from or identical with the *dravya* but logically they are distinct from it for without this logical distinction there is no other way of apprehending the *dravya* as *dravya*, *guṇa* as such and *paryāya per se*.”<sup>19</sup>

Jainism conceives of substance as being not only existent, but evolutionary as well. Its very existence consists in a dynamic process resulting in the evolution of qualities and modifications coupled with the three stages of origination, annihilation, and stability. The whole world with its principal contents of the soul and the non-soul has to obey this law of change, process, or movement. The important point to note here, observes Kalipada Mitra, is that “the stages of origination and annihilation are like the thesis and anti-thesis of Hegel having a tendency towards stability which means nothing other than synthesis at a particular stage of the continuous developmental process ready to make room for a fresh origination or a new stage.”<sup>20</sup>

This, however, has again to pass over into the stage of annihilation which along with the previous stage jointly acquires a momentum urging the reality attain a fresh synthesis and so on. The qualities which originate at a certain stage, Mitra adds, “carry with them their death signal and the influx of fresh qualities ensures synthesis and stability” of the substance. Like other hypotheses, the Jaina hypothesis of evolution, is an attempt to conceive of substance as it presents itself to common observation. It seems at once both emergent and creative. “It is emergent,” Kalipada Mitra explains, “in so far as it supplies us with the detailed links of connection between one stage and another which is the main character of the hypothesis of Emergence as pointed out by Lloyd Morgan. It is creative in so far as we do not miss in it the creation of a new feature as indicated by the new synthesis which is attained at every third stage.”<sup>21</sup>

Consciousness or soul, though essentially immaterial or non-corporeal (*amūrta*) substance, is found associated with kārmiic matter in its worldly existence and since consciousness is put into action through mind into the senses, which are material (*paudgalika*) vehicle or support for consciousness, the embodied self is also considered to have material form (*mūrta* or *mūrtatva*). And, like any other substance, the conscious substance, i.e. soul or consciousness, evolves into or undergoes changes or modifications in its qualities and forms. The modifications or changes, as already pointed out, are two-fold or of two kinds : (1) modifications in

the attributes of substance (*guṇa paryāya*), and (2) modifications in its physical or material forms (*dravya paryāya*). And these modifications occur in one or other of the two ways: either self-originated or effected by some external agency or in which other substance has a role to play.

The self-originated modification is natural modification in which potentiality becomes actuality and the substance, in this case self, realises its intrinsic nature. Thus, an oak seed or acorn will grow into an oak and not any other kind of tree. As Aristotle says, “Although it is not yet *actually* an oak, nevertheless it is so *potentially*,” that is to say, it will in due course, become an oak, if it is not interfered with<sup>22</sup> by external forces or environmental influences or internal distortions or perversions consequent upon or resulting there from.

In other words, modification or rather any kind of change, which we know as growth, is the development of the potentiality already latent in the organism, the result being that what was potential becomes actual, i.e. it *becomes* so and so because it is so and so, “for the process of Becoming or development,” Aristotle points out, “attends upon Being and is for the sake of Being, not *vice versa*.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, enlightened vision, knowledge and conduct, representing the three aspects (feeling, thought and volition) of Being or consciousness, leads to the fullest development of the personality, when unconditioned by passions arising out of association of material karma. This formula of potentiality becoming actuality is not limited to the growth of natural organisms alone.

The realisation of the intrinsic nature of the self is not to be confused with the “initial nature” of the child in this life because the child is born in the world with his or her kārmic baggage from his previous lives. As this kārmic association of self is beginning-less, it is not possible to find the initial beginning. According to Jainism, intrinsic nature of self is pure and is imbued with peace and happiness. Accordingly, Jainism has positive outlook about human nature. The intrinsic nature of the self is, thus, equated with the fullest development of all the faculties and powers, physical, mental and spiritual, inherent in him. The process of development comes to an end when the highest point of its development is realised. The nature of the process of change or growth is what takes place when an unfinished or growing thing becomes finished or mature.

The modifications or changes which are effected in a substance by some external agency are unnatural modifications in which the qualities

or attributes and the forms are different from the intrinsic qualities and forms of the substance. They are called *vibhāva pariṇati*, i.e. distortions, deviations or perversions of the intrinsic nature of a thing or substance. In the case of the conscious substance, kārmic matter (external material particles) is the cause of modifications in the psychic dispositions or mental states of the self.

The significant point worth noting here is that external, material karmas are not the primary, direct or substantial cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the modifications in psychic states but an external, subsidiary, secondary or auxiliary cause (*nimitta karana*) of those modifications.<sup>24</sup> The self, as a matter of fact, is the substantial cause of its own mental states, while karma is the modification or transformation of the material objects, in which case psychical states act as subsidiary cause (*nimitta karana*) thereof.

The psychical states and material *kārma*, thus, act as subsidiary cause of one another. One psychical state is produced by and immediately preceding psychical state, and conditioned externally by material karma. In like manner, one karma state is determined by immediately preceding material karma state and yet conditioned externally by a psychic state. In other words, kārmic matter brings about its own changes, while *Jīva* (self or consciousness), through its own impure ways of thoughts, that are conditioned by kārmic matter, brings about its own thought changes. The two series, though independent of each other, are causally interrelated to each other.

There are two ways or modes of explanation for the modifications or changes taking place in the substances. One way is the value-free, purely descriptive conception of science. This scientific approach is, in essence, mechanistic. It holds that every event or phenomena is and must be determined by an immediately preceding event or phenomena, as, for example, in a machine. Given the appropriate preceding event, the subsequent events must be what they are, and cannot be otherwise than they are. Questions of “improving” are confined to technological improvements or the improvements of means without regard to ends. Thus, a mechanistic treatment of self in terms of causation or modification by “what went before” leads to a deterministic conclusion, even though the immediately determining agents may be our own psychological states.<sup>25</sup>

In coming to deterministic conclusion, the mechanistic approach ignores the fact that consciousness is an independent entity. Though liable to be conditioned by preceding mental states arising out of *kārmic* association, the self, i.e. consciousness, inclined as it is towards intrinsic nature and achieving the purpose of self-realisation, can never be determined either by its heredity, or by its environment, or by its own past deeds. All these “may influence and bias the self, but they never completely determine it. They incline its desires without necessitating them, predisposing it to follow courses which it is nevertheless free to avoid, and to shun ends which it is nevertheless free to pursue... The Self is free, free at any rate to act morally [and spiritually] in spite of the accumulated influence of heredity, environment, disposition, past habits and the rest.”<sup>26</sup>

In contrast to the mechanistic mode of interpretation or explanation of things, this approach of laying emphasis on independence of soul or consciousness may be termed subjective or axiological (*mulyātmaka*, i.e. value-based, as compared to merely descriptive consciousness) approach, which involves the ethical and spiritual criterion of *heya* (what is undesirable or rejectable) and *upādeya* (what is desirable, acceptable and to be realised or achieved).

The Greeks call this axiological view of things as the teleological view of the Self. “Teleological” is derived from the Greek word “telos”, meaning end, goal or purpose, the effort and growth being inspired by the purpose of achieving it. Aristotle in particular tended to think of the end as an actually existing something, lying out there, as it were, in front of a developing thing, and determining the direction of development towards the thing’s achievement of the end.<sup>27</sup> Thus, teleology emphasizes the concept of purpose, and presupposes the reality of free will. Since consciousness alone can conceive of purposes and be focused on achieving ends, teleological view or axiological approach also affirms independence of consciousness or soul and its causal efficiency.

Because of its evolving (*pariṇāmī*) nature, the self takes the form of cause and effect of its modes, i.e. a particular state or mode of the soul (consciousness or knowledge) becomes the cause of its later state which is the result of the former state. Such a mode can be said to be the cause with respect to the subsequent mode and as an effect with respect to the mode preceding it.<sup>28</sup> There is, thus, a necessary concomitance between

cause and effect. Thus, the negation of cause leads to the inference of the negation of effect. This refutes the Buddhist contention that our cognitions are momentary, that the effect is independent of the cause, and that the cause and effect are absolutely distinct.

According to Akalanka, an effect is nothing but a new modification occurring in a pre-existing and continuing substance and this substance is the cause of the modification. All momentary change is possible only in an entity that is somehow abiding. Change is not possible in things that are destroyed completely the moment they are born without leaving any trace behind just as it is not possible in a non-entity like sky flower.<sup>29</sup> Modifications are absent in those which have not yet originated and those which after existence have disappeared.<sup>30</sup> If there is no permanence there cannot be any change, or fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change.

In this context, Harisatya Bhattacharya rightly points out:

Evolution does not mean continuous and successive new creations out of nothing; it always implies a development or amplification of what already is – may be, as potentiality or implicit possibility; evolution thus signifies a constitutive permanent element and a contingent element of change as well.<sup>31</sup>

According to Jainism, the cognition, the cognizer (the cognizing agent) and the cognized content are three distinct facts inseparably rolled into one.<sup>32</sup> Nathmal Tatia observes :

The Jaina philosopher [Vidyānanda] does not find any difficulty in admitting the same self running through different modes and preserving its identity. He likens this vertical identity to the unity of a cognition which has a variety of colours and form, spread in space as its content. Even as a single cognition can cognize a number of forms and colours in one sweep and be one unitary fact, so does a substance remain one while passing through different modes in succession. Moreover, if causal efficiency is the criterion of reality, the real should be admitted as permanent and transitory both. The momentary is not capable of exercising causal efficiency either in succession or in non-succession and as such cannot be real. The same is the case with an absolutely permanent entity. The Jaina accepts causal efficiency as the criterion of reality, which, according to him, presupposes that the real should be both



permanent and transitory.

The Buddhist denies a permanent self underlying the course of psychical events which happen in different times. What exists and is possible is only the present momentary unit. The past is defunct, and the present is lost after its turn. This makes the continuity of personal life impossible, and consequently the continuity of present life into the future and the necessity of the law of *karma* that the performer of good or bad act will have to bear the consequences become impossible of explanation.<sup>33</sup>

The Jaina holds that causal efficiency is not consistent with the principle of momentariness (*Kṣaṇikavāda*) – although the Buddhist himself treats causal efficiency as the very essence of his principle. Causal efficiency, according to Jaina view, cannot function successively owing to the fact that the momentary existence (*kṣaṇas*) lacks an abiding nature and hence can have neither spatial nor temporal duration. Succession – spatial or temporal – involves the notions of “before” and “after” which are absent from the moment.<sup>34</sup>

Unwilling to admit this reality of any eternal soul substance, the Buddhists and David Hume interpreted consciousness as consisting of only discrete impressions, ideas or experiences which would be ‘fleeting’ without any abiding substratum. Such an approach naturally gives rise to the problem of self-identity since there is nothing in common between the discrete sensations or experiences. In fact, both Buddhism and David Hume attempted to account for self-identity on the basis of the rapidity of the succeeding impressions or sensations. For instance, David Hume says: “The self is an ensemble of feelings, perceptions, dispositions and awareness that serves as the vehicle for *Kāрма*.”<sup>35</sup> He further states: “The self is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, succeeding each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement.” Buddha’s attempt to improve upon Hume by stating that these different perceptions, dispositions, etc. are “internally related phenomena” and “interdependent” also did not solve the problem of self-identity.

These attempts to account for self-identity are not satisfactory, since the impressions being basically disconnected and lacking any abiding agency of the Self as substratum cannot account for ‘real’ self-identity, whatever be the rapidity of their succession. Accordingly, any

feeling of self-identity on the basis of such explanations becomes “fictitious,”<sup>36</sup> as Hume was frank enough to admit. In this regard, G. Srinivasan points out that this problem of self-identity however comes to be solved with the introduction of the notion of pure consciousness. For, it is shown that pure consciousness is not only immanent to each discrete experience but is also transcendent and common to all such experiences. Being ‘common’ to all the multiple discrete experiences, it makes possible memory and also accounts for the sense of self-identity.<sup>37</sup>

As a conscious substance, the soul evolves into or undergoes modifications in its qualities viz. thinking, feelings and conations and into the various forms of living beings. It realises its complete existence or purpose through them. This account of reality and existence, Kalipada Mitra points out, “at once marks the Jaina position out from that of the Buddhist who disintegrates reality into shreds of qualities and modifications and from that of the *advaitist* whose reality swallows up all qualities and modifications.”<sup>38</sup>

The significance of the Jaina view of reality will be obvious when we examine the extreme views of Advaitins and the Buddhism. At the one extreme, there is the Vedanta school, especially the Advaitins, who as Matilal observes, hold that “if something exists, it should exist always. And since only *Brahman* is the existent, it is eternal, ever lasting and unchanging. Hence, change has to be ruled out as only appearance.”<sup>39</sup> At the other extreme are the Buddhists (especially perhaps the Sautrāntikas) who completely deny that there is a substantial (i.e. permanent) aspect of reality – existence is pure process or becoming. Thus, both the Vedantin and the Buddhist concepts of reality, as Sri Aurobindo remarks, are incomplete and partial aspects of reality or “half-truths.”<sup>40</sup>

The Jaina doctrine of *anekānta* synthesizes in a unique way the seeming differences between the viewpoints of both being (substantial) and becoming (modification). According to the *dravyārthika naya*, the “substance exists” standpoint, i.e. in terms of being or continuity or permanence, the soul (*jīva*) is eternal (unchanging). But according to the *paryāyārthika naya*, the “modification exists” standpoint, i.e. in terms of becoming and change, it (*jīva*) is non-eternal (everchanging). “The permanence of the *jīva* makes liberation and omniscience possible, its mutability or capacity for modification accounts for the reality of *Kārmic* bondage.”<sup>41</sup>

If as is claimed by the Vedantin, reality is an unchanging permanency there is no scope for life, no scope for *saṃsāra*, no necessity for *mokṣā*, or *mokṣā-mārga* either. The whole religious framework will thus appear to be superfluous and useless, as it is based upon unreality. Change must be accepted as real, if life is to be real and if *saṃsāra* is accepted to be as real. It is only then that we can appreciate the utility of piety or *dharma*, and religious doctrines contributing to the salvation of the soul.

Similarly, the Buddhistic emphasis of change alone being real is also one-sided. The Buddhist doctrines of *kṣaṇik-vāda* (momentariness of reality, which denies the permanent underlying reality of the Self or non-Self) and *anātmavāda* (denial of the existence of a substantial Self or *ātman*), are also lacking in a complete comprehension of reality. Since there is no permanent Self, there is no responsible person who can be taken to be author of his conduct. "Moral conduct and its evolution would become meaningless. The person who did the act passes away and a different person comes to enjoy the fruits thereof. There is no justification why a different personality should enjoy the fruits of the *karma* by another distinct personality. Ethical responsibility loses its meaning and value in this *anātmavāda*."<sup>42</sup>

Jaina philosophy combines both aspects of continuity and change in its system when it describes reality as ever changing while retaining its sub-stratum or permanence which forms the foundation, the basis or the core of change or flux. The Self, according to Jainism, is thus a reality which maintains its stability through a continuous process of change.

The Jaina view of Reality is intimately connected to the Jaina way of life. A substance does develop derivative characters (*vibhāvas*). However, amidst derivative characters of a substance we do not miss the innate nature of its existence, which is its *svabhāva* or *svarūpa*. *Tadbhāvavyayam nityam*<sup>43</sup>, i.e. a *dravya* never leaves or gives up its *svabhāva* (nature) and gets transformed into something else. Thus, while some of the destructive karmas can create hindrance to the power of knowledge and intuition, cause limitation and distortion of the faculties and capacities of the soul, and may even be completely obscuring (*sarvaghātin*), they are not able to destroy the basic capacity or essential characteristics of the Self completely or totally. Hence the conscious being cannot be reduced to an unconscious entity. The analogy of the sun

and cloud is useful here. As there is always some light, though the sun is covered with the dense veil of clouds so the Self retains some fragment of its intrinsic purity and enlightened knowledge, though it is covered with the dirt of *karma*.<sup>44</sup>

The intrinsic nature of substance or *jīva* is its *dharma* (*dhammo vatthu sahavo*, i.e. *svabhāva*); it is permanently fixed and is an inalienable part of *dravya*. Any *vibhāva paryāya* is deviation, distortion, limitation, or modification of the innate nature (*svabhāva*) of the Self and as such it is adventitious, transitory or impermanent. Such deviation can be understood as *jīva* not being established in its nature and signifies distortion of its *guṇas* (qualities), viz. *darśana* (indeterminate intuition or *nirākāra upayoga*) and *jñāna* (determinate knowledge or *sākāra upayoga*). *Upayoga* may be said to be attentiveness, manifestation, function or operation of consciousness or consciousness in action.

The passions, attachments, aversions, etc. are modifications, distortions, or impurities of *svabhāva*. This signifies that the innate nature and qualities of the conscious Self, or the spiritual magnificence and glory of the essentially self-luminous reality, i.e. the soul, is not actualized or present in the person having impure dispositions. In other words, the Self is not established in its own intrinsic nature, i.e. *svabhāva*.

A person who is ignorant of the true nature of the Self, because of his erroneous identification with an alien substance, i.e. body and the senses, develops impure dispositions. He is always prone to mental tensions, which are the result of his passions, desires, likes and dislikes, attachments and aversions. Such a person lacks discriminative insight or an enlightened view (*samyagdarśana*) and, as Acarya Samantabhadra states, is never at peace with himself and always miserable due to “*bhaya-kāma-vaśyo*”.<sup>45</sup> In other words, he is enmeshed in two contradictory thought processes, fear and the desire or lust – fear of death and desire of seeking his well-being in gratification of the senses. He is unnecessarily afraid of death, when there is no escaping from it, while he endlessly and mistakenly strives to seek his well-being in enslaving desires, sensual pleasures and passions, etc.<sup>46</sup> Awareness of the transitory character of passions and attachments, etc. enables one not to cling to objects of transitory nature and impels him to practice equanimity, self-control, etc., and thereby to realise the goal of peace, happiness, freedom and self-realisation.

How *paryāya* (change or modifications) in the material objects affects the *bhāva* (psychic dispositions) or the attitudes of persons because of their intense attachment to them is aptly described by Acarya Samantabhadra in these words: “Persons desirous of a pot, a crown and gold become sad, happy and indifferent at the destruction (of the pot) origination (of the crown) and persistence (of gold) on account of their causes.”<sup>47</sup> The psychological states of sadness and happiness and indifference though generated in the Self have their causes in the material object existing in the external world. Thus, the process of origination, destruction, and continuity in material objects causes changes in the psychic states or dispositions as well.

*Paryāya* or the transitory-ness of things is an important concept in Jaina Philosophy. *Anitya* (transitory-ness) is considered to be the foremost amongst the twelve contemplations (*bhāvanā*) which are prescribed for Jainas as a desirable religious practice. *Anitya* means transient, ever changing, transitory, and impermanent. Change is one of the few constants in life; or rather the only constant in life is change. Everything is in the process of change and evolution. To stop change is to cease living. Without change, there is no growth. Change adds to newness and freshness in life. Without change, life will be dull and monotonous. In fact, one can neither know nor realise the value of health unless one falls sick and one does not really experience happiness unless one has gone through hardships and misery.

Contemplation of *anitya bhāvanā* instills in us a sense of detachment, equanimity, self-reliance (*puruṣārtha*), self-restraint (*samyam*), and control of passions (*kasaya*), and emotions. Contemplation on the impermanence of things makes us reflect on our inner Self, to search for the changeless reality behind the ever-changing, the quest for seeing and experiencing the real “I”, which is different from the “I” of body and senses.

The concept of *paryāya* is extremely important. Firstly, it helps in understanding the real nature of existence, Secondly, it forms the basis of the dynamic process of development and evolution, Thirdly, it makes possible growth and adds newness to life, Fourthly, it forms the genesis of the Jaina doctrine of *anekanta* which reconciles the apparent contradictions between continuity and change, one and many, unity and diversity, etc. Fifthly, it signifies that the conscious substance (*jīva*) may

and does develop *vibhāva paryāyas* while retaining its innate nature (*svarūpa*) of intrinsic purity, thereby providing the basis for self-realisation, i.e. re-gaining the *svabhāva* or the state of pure consciousness. Finally, it instills a sense of non-attachment, calmness in adverse circumstances, equanimity, self-restraint and control of desires, acquisitions and passions.

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## 8.

### *Paryāya : A Doctrine of Pariṇāma*

Rajjan Kumar

In Jain metaphysics *paryāya* is considered as a very important concept. It defines the condition or state or mode of a substance. It is also regarded as peculiarity or particularity of state in which a substance exists. Generally *paryāya* means *pariṇāma*. *Paryāya* is an integral part of Reality ( *Sat*). In Prakrit language *paryāya* is written as “*pajjāva*”.

#### *Dravya and Paryāya*

In Jainism *dravya* is accepted in the sense of fundamental entities or reals or reality. Reality has been conceived as all inclusive substance (*dravya*) possessive infinite qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*). That which contains, and is the basis of qualities and modifications, is called *dravya* (substance)<sup>1</sup>. *Dravyas* are six in numbers<sup>2</sup> – *Jīva* (soul), *Pudgala* (matter), *Dharma* (medium of motion), *Adharma* (medium of rest), *Kāla* (time) and *Akāśa* (space). *Dravya* is that which keeping intact its essential nature gets changed into various beings and situations, moulds itself in various modifications.

A thing is not absolutely permanent, nor is it absolutely momentary, nor is it set in eternity, but it is only a changing continuing being (*pariṇāmī nitya*). *Dravya* or reality neither gets produced nor does it meet with destruction. Productions and destructions are themselves the modification as seen in the universe at different levels. Whenever there is modification there is *dravya* or Reality and whenever there is a *dravya* there is a modification. *Dravya* or Reality, thus, at one and the same time is having production (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and continuous existence (*dhrauvya*).<sup>3</sup>



*Dravya* is endowed with the quality of *sat* and is characterised by the three potent factors – origination, destruction and permanence and is the substratum of qualities and modes<sup>4</sup>. *Dravya* is not absolutely changeless and its *paryāyas* are not discrete. There is a series of *paryāyas* in a *dravya* having a relation of relative identity between the previous *paryāya* and the posterior *paryāya* like the relation of cause continuum and effect- continuum<sup>5</sup>. *Dravya* retains its essential nature in the midst of series of changes which take place in it. Therefore reality (*dravya*) is dynamic in nature and does always undergo transformation without giving up its essential nature<sup>6</sup>. In this way it is conceived that *dravya* is characterised by the process of transformation<sup>7</sup>.

Acarya Kundkunda explains that *dravya* is the inherent essence of all things, manifesting itself in and through infinite modifications, and is endowed with *guṇas* and it reveals permanence and change in it to be real<sup>8</sup>. And *dravya* is endowed with its unchanging nature of existence<sup>9</sup>. Acarya Puṇyapada defines *dravya* as that which undergoes modification. As for example take a piece of gold. When an ornament is made out of it, the original lump of gold undergoes modification having its original form destroyed (*vyaya*) and a new form born or produced (*utpāda*) but the substance of gold continues or persists (*dhrauvya*) in this process of change. Every substance necessarily possesses the quality of permanency together with origination and decay as modifications of itself<sup>10</sup>.

Akalanka explains that *utpāda* is the modification of a substance without giving up its own essence, *vyaya* is the disappearance of its forms and *dhrauvya* consists in the persistence of its fundamental characteristics throughout its various modifications<sup>11</sup>. On the basis of above discussion the concept of *dravya* has been taken as the dynamic reality. Prof. Chakravarti rightly said that it is an identity expressing through difference, a permanency continuing through change.<sup>12</sup>

### ***Guṇa and paryāya***

*Guṇa* is the inseparable property of a *dravya*. It denotes the capacity or quality of a *dravya*<sup>13</sup>. In the Uttarādhyayansūtra it is said that *dravya* is the substratum of *guṇas* and the characteristic of *guṇa* is inherent in a *dravya*<sup>14</sup>. Umaswati elucidates the definition of *guṇa* by saying that *guṇas* are inherent in *dravya* and they are themselves attributes<sup>15</sup>. Acarya Kundakunda explains that the condition (capacity), which, in fact, forms the nature of *dravya* is *guṇa* which is non-different

from its initial existence and that existing entity established in its nature is *dravya*<sup>16</sup>. That to say, the nature (*svabhāva*) stands for transformation (*pariṇāma*) and the nature which is thus the form of *pariṇāma* is *guṇa* which in turn, is both different and non-different from *dravya*<sup>17</sup>. The *guṇas* are classified into *murta* (corporeal) and *amūrta* (non-corporeal). *Murta* is concrete while *amurta* is non-concrete.

'*Dravyasraya nirguṇa guṇah*'<sup>18</sup> has been explained by Jainacaryas explains in many ways but the basic idea is the same. Pujypada clarifies that *guṇa* are eternal and permanent while *paryāya* cannot continue to exist permanently in a *dravya* as *guṇas* exist. The view of Vidyananda is also the same. This is the basic and fundamental difference between *guṇa* and *paryāya*. They are respectively essential and accidental characters or potentiality and actuality in *dravya*.

### ***Paryāya and Pariṇāma***

In Jainism *paryāya* is defined as *bhāva* (condition). The properties (*dharmas*) having origination and destruction or emergence and disappearance or peculiarities or particularities or states, which exist in a substance, are known to be *paryāya* or modes or *pariṇāma*. The derivative meaning of *paryāya* is *kramavartina* (that which undergoes successive change) or *kramikaparivartana* (change into another state in succession-spatial and temporal). In the series of substance the newer and newer modes rise up and disappear according to the change in space and time<sup>19</sup>.

In view of the Jaina's *paryāya* inheres in both *dravya* and *guṇa*, qualities and their substratum-substance<sup>20</sup> and it denotes states, particularities, change or mutation etc. They are not permanent in substance and quality. Oneness, separateness, number, figure, conjunction, and disjunction are characteristics of *paryāyas*<sup>21</sup>. In auto-commentary of Tattvārthādhigamsūtra it is explained that *paryāya* signifies another state of an object and another name attributed to an object. This is known as *bhāvāntaram* and *sanjñāntaram* respectively<sup>22</sup>. It denotes different states and different names attributed to one and the same object. It means that a particular name always bears a corresponding particular state of an object.

In Pañcāstatikāyasamayāsāra, Acharya Kundakunda says that *paryāya* is the mode of existence of *dravya* through which its triple nature

origination, destruction and permanence is manifested<sup>23</sup>. Gold exists as *dravya* but the ornaments and other things which are made of gold are *paryāyas* of the same thing i.e. gold. These may change; an ornament of gold may be melted and a new one may be constructed from it. The appearance of the new one is *utpāda* while the disappearance of the previous one is *vyaya* and yet all the same gold persists through the change, this persistence is *dhrauvya*<sup>24</sup>. *Dravya* has thus both the aspects-permanence and change; it is permanent as *dravya* and changing as *paryāya*. Puṇyapada explains it by saying that those which are not always associated with *dravya* are *paryāyas*<sup>25</sup>. The modification of a substance is called a mode<sup>26</sup>. It means *paryāyas* are different forms of changes or states of a substance.

Akalanka explains that *dravya* has got two natures, viz. *sāmānya* (general) and *viśeṣa* (particular)<sup>27</sup>. The general nature is *guṇa*, the particular one is *paryāya*. That is, change or transformation of a *dravya* is *paryāya*<sup>28</sup>. Vidyananda explains that many *guṇas* can exist in a *dravya* simultaneously, while many *paryāyas* exist in a *dravya* successively<sup>29</sup>. That is why *dravya* has been defined as *guṇaparyāyavaddravyam*<sup>30</sup>. So it is clear that each *dravya* is undergoing changes into different forms in accordance with the cause as a result of its own changing nature, attains various transformations. The capacity of changing or transformation (*pariṇāma*) or change in a *dravya* is called *guṇa* and the transformation due to *guṇa* is known to be *paryāya* (mode), or *bhāva* (state or condition)<sup>31</sup>.

*Paryāya* is of two kinds from the point of view of common state<sup>32</sup>. *Arthaparyāya* and *Vyañjanaparyāya*. *Artha* denotes effect and *vyañjana* is that which becomes manifest. On this etymology *arthaparyāya* is defined as the continuous change while the *vyañjanaparyāya* denotes some particular change. Both the types of *paryāyas* have been explained as follows – the continuous flow of the real runs parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time, and this intrinsic change of substance is called *arthaparyāya*. The *vyañjanaparyāya* is not merely the cross-section in continuous flow of *dravya*, but it has a pretty fixed duration of existence<sup>33</sup>. It is further discussed that there is an *ekasamayavarti Arthaparyāya* (intrinsic mode of substance occurring for one moment) which takes place in all the six fundamental substances due to the general changing state of substance. Origination and destruction of it occur on accounts of the change that all substances undergo.

An object may have a particular mode of existence for certain duration of time e.g. a pot has got such one form for a certain period of time in addition to the molecular integration and disintegration taking place in the physical object (earth) every moment<sup>34</sup>. This *paryāya* of a pot is known to be *vyañjanaparyāya* (manifested mode) of *pudgala*. Similarly, the continuous change taking place in consciousness is *arthaparyāya* of *jīva*, while its existence as a particular organism as a man or a *deva* with a determinate age is the *vyañjanaparyāya* of *jīva*<sup>35</sup>.

*Vyañjanaparyāya*, which is of two kinds, viz. *svabhāva* (natural state) and *vibhāva* (particular state), takes place in *jīva* and *pudgala*, whereas only *arthaparyāya* operates in all the other four *dravyas* viz. *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*<sup>36</sup>. *Vyañjanaparyāya* occurs due to the cause of particular changing state and vibration of the worldly souls and matters. The activity of origination and destruction of these *vyañjanaparyāyas* sometimes take place and sometimes do not. There is no rule that it should occur every moment; it may happen and may not happen at every moment<sup>37</sup>.

In addition to these two kinds of *paryāyas* there are two other kinds of *paryāyas* viz. *jīvaparyāya* and *ajīvaparyāya*<sup>38</sup>. With regards to substance and qualities, *paryāya* is of infinite kinds from various aspects.

### Interrelation of *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Paryāya*

The Jains believe that *dravya* is endowed with *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The inherent qualities in substance and their *traikālika* modes are infinite<sup>39</sup> in number. A substance and its inherent qualities are permanent owing to its non-origination and non-destruction<sup>40</sup>. On the other hand, all modes because of their origination and destruction at every moment are individually non-permanent<sup>41</sup>. But they are also beginning-less and permanent or eternal from the point of view of series (*pravāha*) of infinities modes.

The series of *traikālika* modes also i.e. modes of the past, present and future times, takes place due to one causative capacity (*kāraṇabhūtāsakti*) inherent in a substance. The series of infinite modes caused by infinite capacity in a substance are moving together (i.e. taking place together). Modes of different class (*vijātiya*) caused by various capacities or qualities can be found in a substance at a time<sup>42</sup>. There take place in soul-substance and matter-substance various infinite modes like

modes of consciousness, such as those of knowledge, self-awareness, etc. in the former and those of color, such as blue, yellow etc. in the latter respectively<sup>43</sup>. Soul undergoes transformation by its capacity of sentiency (*cetanāśakti*) into various forms of consciousness (*upayoga*) like modes of knowledge, self-awareness, etc. while matter undergoes transformation by its capacity of color (*rūpaśakti*) into various forms of color like blue, yellow etc. The capacity of sentiency cannot be separated from soul-substance and other capacities which are inherent in it. Similarly, the capacity of color (*rūpaśakti*) cannot be thought of apart from matter-substance and other capacities which are inherent in it<sup>44</sup>.

Various forms of consciousness of different times like *traikalika* series of knowledge, self-awareness, etc. have got one capacity of sentiency (*cetana*) and the series of effective modes (*kāryabhūtaparyāya*) of that capacity (*śakti*) are associated with consciousness (*upayogātmaka*). In matter also the series of various modes of color like blue, yellow etc. are the effects of one causative capacity of color (*kāraṇabhūtarūpaśakti*)<sup>45</sup>.

Like the series of consciousness in soul, there are continuing together i.e. taking place together in it the series of feelings, such as happiness, sorrow, etc. the series of desires, etc. For this reason, infinite capacities of qualities are comprehended by taking into account each individual causative capacity or quality inherent in it – capacity like, sentiency, the causative joy, energy etc. of the series of infinite modes like the modes of color, smell, taste, touch etc. take place. For this reason infinite capacities or qualities are cognized by admitting each individual causative capacity or quality of individual causative capacity or quality of individual series like that of the capacity of color, that of smell that of taste, that of touch<sup>46</sup>.

Various modes of capacities like sentiency, joy, energy, etc. can be found to operate in soul, but modes of different consciousness of capacity of sentiency or those of feelings of one capacity of bliss (*ānandaśakti*) cannot be experienced to function at the same time, i.e. simultaneously; for only one mode of an individual capacity is manifested at a time. Similarly, in matter also various capacities or qualities like color, smell etc. take place at a time, but different modes like blue, yellow etc. of one capacity or quality of color (*rūpaśakti*) do not take place in it simultaneously<sup>47</sup>.

As soul-substance and matter-substance are permanent, so their respective inherent capacities or qualities like sentiency, etc. are also permanent. But modes of consciousness born of the capacity of sentiency of modes like blue, yellow etc., born of the capacity of color (*rūpaśakti*) are not permanent. They, being always subject to origination and destruction, are individually permanent and the series of modes of consciousness in soul and those of color in matter are permanent because of being *trailkalika* of the past, present and future times<sup>48</sup>.

The undivided whole of infinite qualities only is substance. That is to say, the collective whole or aggregate of each individual causative capacity (*kārāṇabhūtaśakti*) of each individual mode and of such infinite capacities or qualities is substance from the point of view of difference among them. But *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are different from one another from the subjective point of view or in thought, but they are non-different from one another from the objective point of view<sup>49</sup>.

### Universe, Reality and Paryāya

Universe, Reality and *Paryāya*, according to Jainism are interrelated terms. To understand universe one must have to know the concepts of Reality and *paryāya*. In the Jaina philosophical conception Reality is treated as permanence-in-change, and not as *kuṭasthanitya* (absolutely permanent) nor as *nityānitya* (absolutely impermanent). Here Reality has been conceived as permanent, all inclusive substance (*dravya*) possessing infinite qualities and modes (*guṇa* and *paryāya*). That which contains and is the basis of qualities and modifications (*guṇa* and *paryāya*) is a *dravya* (substance)<sup>50</sup>. In Jainism Reality, *dravya* and substance are considered synonyms.

This entire universe consists of *dravyas*, *dravyas* are six in numbers, viz<sup>51</sup>. *jīva* (conscious), *puḍgala* (matter), *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *kāla* (time) and *ākāśa* (space). Out of these six *dravyas* *kāla* is *anastikāya* and rest five, i.e., *jīva*, *puḍgala*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* are regarded as *astikāya*. *Astikāya* and *anāstikāya* are two forms of *dravya* and *dravya* is that which keeping intact its essential nature gets changed into various beings and situations, moulds itself in various modifications. We cannot think of a substance without modifications and modifications without a substance.

Further, a *dravya* is qualified; it provides room to qualities and is

thus a basis of them. The various moulds it gets into are in its modifications. There cannot be a quality without a substance and no substance without qualities. *Dravya* is thus ever connected with qualities and modifications. It is the one that is productive (*utpādayukta*) and expanding (*vyayaśīla*) but yet ever continuous. In everything, its production (*utpatti*), stability (*sthiti*) and destruction (*vināśa*) exist all-together. A thing is not absolutely permanent (*ekānta-nitya*), nor is it absolutely momentary (*ekānta-kṣaṇika*), nor is it set in eternity (*kuṭastha-nitya*) but it is only a changing continuing being (*pariṇāmī-nitya*).

In one and the same thing there is a difference of conditions, as for example a mango fruit in its unripe stage is of green color at one time but later it gets to be of yellow color, when ripe, but it remains still a mango. Like this the different forms of jewelry, the shape and uses of course have changed but the material is same in different levels. *Dravya* or Reality neither gets produced nor does it meet with destruction. Production and destruction are themselves the modification as seen in the universe at different levels. Whenever, there is modification there is *dravya* or Reality, and thus at one and the same time there is production, destruction and continuous existence. Likewise, all the three situations are found in the universe, because universe is composition of six kinds of real as stated above.

Regarding the foundation of the universe Jainas say that there are only two types of entity-conscious (*cetana* or *jīva*) and the unconscious (*acetana* or *ajīva*). They do not agree with the idea that unconscious is born out of the conscious or that the conscious has evolved out of the unconscious. These two are the only fundamentals and are beginning-less as well as independent. These two fundamentals have been elaborated into the seven (somewhere nine) fundamentals<sup>52</sup> – 1 *jīva*, 2 *ajīva*, 3 *āsrava*, 4 *bandha*, 5 *saṃvara*, 6 *nirjarā*, 7. *mokṣa*. Everything which exists in the universe is to be conceived as a modification or particular differentiation of either *jīva* or *ajīva* (*jīvaparyāya* or *ajīvaparyāya*).

The modes of Reality or *dravya* which seem essential to the constitution of these two infinite and eternal attributes must themselves be infinite and eternal; they are distinguished by the Jainas as the immediate, infinite and eternal modes, as necessary and universal feature of the universe on the one hand and on the other hand descending to the finite modes, which are limited, perishing and transitory differentiations of

*dravya*. The transitory finite modes can only be understood and their essence or nature is deduced as effects of the infinite and eternal modes. They are in this sense dependent on the modes of higher order<sup>53</sup>.

The Jaina seers are deducing the necessity of motion and rest as primary characteristics of the extended world and the world of thought with reference to *dharma* and *adharma*. They are appealing only to the strictly logical notion of a self-creating *dravya* conceived as an extended substance. They conceived the whole of *dravya* as one individual, the parts of which, (that is, all bodies) change in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual. In this highest order the individual covers the face of the whole universe and non-universe (*Lokāloka*).

In the hierarchy of their system of modes it has the title of a mediate infinite (*ananta*) and eternal (*śāsvata*) mode under the attribute of extension (*āstikāya*). It has mediate because it is logically dependent on the immediate mode of motion and rest, which is the primary or logically prior feature of extension. It is infinite and eternal because of the fact that *dravya* as a whole conceived as a special system remains thus self-identical. This follows directly from the conception of motion and rest as the necessary feature of the extended world.

These are the co-relations among universe, Reality, *dravya* and *paryāya*, but again the question has been raised that in the universe there are particular things and they all are interacting among one another; there are living and non-living, they have differences and how these all sublimate, so that the relationship between universe, Reality, *dravya* and *paryāya* may be smooth. They all may be collectively or one by one understood as follows – each particular thing interacting with other particular things within the common order of Nature, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and to preservation of its identity, a striving (*conatus*), so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in its own being.

Particular things, being dependent modes and substances, are constantly under going changes of state as the effects of causes other than themselves, as they are not self-determining substances, their successive states cannot be deduced from their own essence alone, but must be explained partly by reference to the action upon them of other particular things. In the natural philosophy the differences between the living and



non-living, and between conscious and unconscious things, are both represented as differences of degrees of structural complications.

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## 9.

# The Concept of *Paryāya* – Mode

Rashmibhai Zaveri

### 1 *Paryāya* Defined

1.1 While discussing the nature of *paryāya* one must study about substance (*dravya*), its existence (*sat*), its attributes (*guṇa*) and its relation with modes (*paryāyas*). Ganadhipati Tulsi has defined *paryāya* in “Illuminator of Jain Tenets” (II edition – 1995) as:- <sup>1</sup>

**“Purvottarakara parityāgādanam paryāyaḥ (I-40)”**

Mode means forfeiture of the precedent (state) and appropriation of the succeeding state. This definition of *paryāya* must be read in context with that of substance (*dravya*).

1.2 Uttarādhyayana Sūtra defines *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* in the sixth śloka of the twenty – eighth chapter called ‘mokkhamaggagai’ as follows:-

**“guṇanamasao davvam egadvassiya guṇa, lakṣhaṇam pajjāvanam tu ubhao assiya bhavē.”**

That which is the substratum of attributes (*guṇa*) is called substance (*dravya*). That which are resting on (only) one substance are called attributes or qualities (*guṇas*). The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of a mode (*paryāya*) is that it rests both on substance as well as attribute or quality.

Jaina Scholars have drawn heavily from this canonical pronouncement. In “Uttarajjhayanani”<sup>2</sup> editor and annotator Acharya

Mahaprajna has compared the Jaina concepts of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* with other Indian and western philosophies. He has stated that : “it is believed that in the ancient era, only two concepts were in vogue – *dravya* and *paryāya*. It seems that the concept of *guṇa* was introduced later during the logic era to distinguish it from ‘*paryāya*’. But ‘*guṇa*’ is also a category of *paryāya*.

Substance (*dravya*) has two characters – *sahabhāvi* and *kramabhavi*. The concomitant (*sahadhavi*) characteristic is called ‘*guṇa*’ (quality), because it can subsist only by depending upon its locus (*gunin*) and, therefore, it is concomitant with the substance. *Paryāya*, on the other hand, is dependent on both substance (*dravya*) and quality (*guṇa*). It is also known as ‘*kramabhavi*’ characteristic of a substance so as distinguish it from *guṇa*, which is *sahabhavi* (concomitant). Here *kramabhavi* means incessant origination and destruction in a definite order.

1.3 Umaswati defines the nature of substance in Tattvārtha Sūtra in 5.37:- “**Guṇa – paryāyavad dravyam**”.

That which possesses qualities and modes is a substance. In 5.2, he states that there are five substances, viz. the media of motion (*dharmāstikāya*), the media of rest (*adharmāstikāya*), space (*akāśa*), matter (*pudgala*) and souls (*jīvas*).

A substance (*dravya*) is never devoid of qualities (*guṇas*) and modes (*paryāyas*), their association being natural and eternal. Qualities (*guṇas*) are persistent attributes of substances, while modes (*paryāyas*) are evanescent phases of those substances and their qualities. A substance is partially identical with and partially different from its qualities and modes. It does not comprise of its qualities and modes only, but something more that integrates them.

1.4 While describing the *lakṣaṇa* of substance, he stated in 5.29 (SS) –

“**Sad dravyalakṣṇam**”.

“The existence” is the characteristic of substance.

“Existence is not substance exclusively. Existence comprises both substance and modes. Existence and reality are interchangeable terms”.

1.5 The next Sūtra defines *sat* as under:-

**“*utpād – vyaya – dhrauvyayuktam sat*” (5.30)**

Origination, cessation and persistence constitute existence.

What appear and disappear are modes. What persists is substance. The modes are impermanent, but the substance is permanent. Existence is the combination of impermanence and permanence, modes and substance”. There is always continuity between origination, cessation and persistence, between modes and substance. In the cessation of one mode there is the origination of another and through this, substance persists.

1.6 All substances are real as they have existence. But what is existence ? It is a combination of origination or appearance (*utpāda*), cessation or disappearance (*vyaya*) and persistence or continuity or permanence (*dhrauvya*). A substance endures through its different transformations and transmutations. It is thus an entitative whole that changes as well as endures.

1.7 The introduction by Dr. Nathma Tatia and Prof. Muni Mahendra Kumar to “Illuminator or Jaina tenants”<sup>1</sup> (second Ed.) by Ganadhipati Tulsi is really illuminating the subject of substance (*dravya*), qualities or attributes (*guṇa*) and modes (*parayāyas*). The same two authors have translated Tattvārtha Sūtra in English. “That which is”<sup>3</sup>. They have stated, “a substance has been defined as the substratum of qualities and modes (*paryāyas*). The qualities and modes cannot be imagined as attributes without any support. Such support is the substance. The qualities are the attributes that are the permanent features of a substance (Sahabhāvi dharmogūṇaḥ); whereas the modes (*paryāyas*) are the passing features of it”.

1.8 The distinction between *dravya* and *paryāya* is ultimately only an intelligent device for enlightenment of the tyro. In fact, the substance is also liable to change, though not to absolute cessation and disappearance like the modes.

**1.9 Relationship of substance, quality and mode.**

The reality of relation is a fundamental concept of Jains. A “*dravya*” is the identity of an infinite multiplicity of modes. It is a unity and diversity in one, and the relation involved is neither one of absolute identity nor one of absolute otherness, but something different from both. It is *sui generis* which does not permit of being determined by absolute

criteria. A substance exists 'in' and 'through' its attributes, and the latter, related and organized, constitute a 'substance'. In simple language, quality (**guṇa**) and mode (**paryāya**) cannot be absolutely different from the substance nor can they be absolutely identical with it. The difference is only that of reference and not that of existence. (Microcosmology-P.74)<sup>4</sup>.

### 1.10 Qualities and Modes.

Thus, the dynamic substance i.e. '**dravya**' is always associated with certain intrinsic and unalienable attributes called **guṇas** (qualities). A substance does not exist without qualities because nothing can be (or exist) with being in some determinate way and the possession of qualities by substance means its existence in a determinate way. One cannot divorce the existence of a 'real' from its determinate mode of being. Again, a substance and its quality must exist in some state or form, and so each one of them is a substratum for infinite modes called *paryāya*. *Paryāya*, like *guṇa*, is another technical term demanding careful understanding. The modes subsist in both substance and quality. They are infinite in number and transitional in nature. In other words, cessation of the precedent mode is followed by the origination of the succeeding one. (Microsmology – P. 72)<sup>4</sup>

## 2 Classification of Paryāyas

2.1 *Paryāya* can be classified into two types : *vyañjana* (explicit) and *artha* (implicit).

2.2 *Vyañjan paryāya* is defined in I.J.T. as "*sthūla kālāntarasthāyī śabdānām sanketviśayo vyañjana paryāyah* (1.42).

The explicit mode is gross, lasting for some time and amenable to verbal expression.

2.3 *Artha paryāya* is defined as "*sukṣmo vartamānāvarty artha – pariṇāmaḥ arthaparyāyah*." (1.43).

The subtle and instantaneous modification of the object is the implicit (*artha*) mode.

2.4 Sidhhasena Diwaker has explained these two types of parayas in 'Sanmatitarka prakaraṇa (1/30-35).

2.5 Now let us see the main features of both these types of paryāyas.

a) *Vyañjan paryāya* is gross, lasting, expressible in words, and capable of articulation. That is why its area is limited to perceptible *dravya*, viz. matter (*pudgala*) and mundane souls only. A physical object may have a particular mode – say, a table – for a certain duration of time. This state of table is *vyañjana paryāya* of *pudgala*. Similarly, a mundane soul's existence as a particular form of life, say, a horse, is its *vyañjana paryāya*.

b) *Artha paryāya* on the other hand is subtle, fleeting, evanescent and ephemeral. It continues without any external influence. It lasts only for one 'samaya' and therefore cannot be expressed in words. But it is found in all substances – whether perceptible or not and whether gross or subtle. Thus, molecular disintegration and aggregation that occur every moment in a physical object is its intrinsic mode. Similarly the continuous change that takes place in consciousness of a soul is its *artha paryāya*.

c) Let us compare these two types of *paryāyas* in the light of *syadvada* i.e. doctrine of conditional dialectics. The science of logic causality is applicable only to the gross world. The cause and effect relationship is applicable only to *vyañjana paryāya*. The subtle or micro-cosmic world is governed by its own rules when the cause – effect relationship becomes too thin to be recognized. In *artha paryāya*, the changes are spontaneous and intrinsic and hence principle of causality is not applicable to it. According to Jaina ontology, the colour of an atom is bound to change after a lapse of certain period, the cause of such change being undefined. This is *artha paryāya* of the atom. The instantaneous modality (*artha paryāya*) of an atom is beyond the range of the principle of causality. The *artha paryāya* is aptly described this :-

***Anādinidhane loke, svaparyāyaḥ – pratikṣaṇam,  
Utpadyante vipadyante, - jalakallolavajjale.***

In the substance, which is without beginning and without end, the modes arise and vanish by themselves every moment like the waves that emerge and merge in the ocean without interruption.

2.6 Acharya Kundakunda has classified *paryāya* into two categories – 'svabhāva' and 'vibhāva'. Swami Kumar has discussed these types in his popular treatise "KATTIGEYANUPPEKKHA"<sup>5</sup> in the "Lokānuprekṣa." Writes SUBHACANDRA in his commentary – "there are ten universal or

common or general (*sāmanya*) attributes or qualities of substances. Viz (1) being or existence (*astitva*) (2) entityhood (*vastutva*). (3) substancehood (*dravyatva*) (4) objectivity (*Pramcyatva*) (5) possession of space – points (*pradeśavatva*). (6) steadfastness or “neither-heavy-nor-light” (*agurulaghutva*) (7) sentience (*cetanatva*), (8) non – sentience (*acetanatva*), (9) perceivable (by sense organs) (*mūrtatva*) and (10) non-perceivable (*amūrtatva*). Out of these the qualities, each of the five substances has eight universal qualities. The first six are common to all substances, while each will have two out of the remaining four which are *sāmanya* as well as vises (exclusive or specific). In fact, I.J.T. mentions only first six as the universal qualities (1.38).

(1) "Being" means continuous duration (by reason of which an entity maintains its existence and never meets extinction (*vidyamānatā*). (2) Entityhood means causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritvam*). (3) Substancehood means the characteristic of being a substratum of qualities and modes. (*guṇa paryāya-dhāratvam*). (4) Objectivity means the possibility of becoming an object of knowledge (*pramāṇaviṣayatā*). (5) 'Possession of space – points is that quality which makes measurement of parts feasible (*avayavaparimānatā*). (6) 'Neither-heavy-nor-light' means steadfastness or constant in its own nature (*svasvarūpavicalanatvam*). This last quality (*agurulaghutva*) prevents a substance from surrendering its substancehood. Similarly, it prevents a quality (*guṇa*) from abandoning its qualityhood. It ensures the uniformity and continuity of an entity in respect of its distinctive character as substance for quality.

2.7(a) Shubhchandra states in his commentary that the vikār or variety of this *agurulaghu* quality is called *svabhāva paryāya*. There are two main types of *svabhāva paryāya* viz., *vridhhirūpa* (expanding type) and *hanirup* (diminishing type). Each of these two types is sub-divided into six further categories making in all twelve categories of *svabhāva paryāya*.

(b) According to Kundakun, a *paryāya* which is independent of other causes is called 'svabhāva'. For instance, *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaastikāya*, *ākāśastikāya* and liberated souls have only *svabhāva paryāyas*. The classic example of *svabhāva paryāya* is the changes due to *agurulaghutva* quality of a substance.

(c) On the other hand, '*vibhāva*' *paryāya* is always dependent upon



other factors. It is also called ‘*sva-para – sāpekṣa*’ *paryāya* as it depends upon its own (*sva*) or outside (*para*) factors. This is mainly found in matter (*pudgala*) and mundane souls. The different forms of matter e.g. chair, table, etc. and different forms of life spans of a soul are the examples of *vibhāva paryāya*.

(d) I.J.T. defines *vibhāva paryāya* as “*paranimittāpekṣo vibhāva paryāyah*”. (1.45) What depends for its occurrence on conditions which are external is called extrinsic mode. Next *sūtra* describes its *lakṣana* – distinguishing characteristics, ‘*ekatva – prthaktva-sāmkhyā-samsthāna – samyoga – vibhagas tallaksanam*’ (1.46).

Unity, separateness, number, configuration, conjunction and disconnection are the distinguishing characteristics of modes.

### 3. Practical Utility of the Concept of *Paryāya*

3.1. Even births and deaths are mere modes. Birth of a living being does not mean that a new life (soul) has come into existence. Nor does death mean the end of annihilation of a soul. Both birth and death are nothing but modes of eternal chain of a *sansāri* – mundane soul.

3.2. This is a very important phenomenon that teaches us not to grieve death. As Bhagavad Gita says :-

For that which is born, death is certain.

Therefore, grieve not over that which is unavoidable. (II.27)

Here again, Jaina Philosophy says that though *paryāya* changes, the original substance (soul) remains immortal. The soul leaves one body to be reborn in another form of life. Thus birth (origination) and death (cessation) are two modes and soul is the permanent substance. Hence one should not be afraid of death, in fact, it should be accepted as an inevitable event.

3.3. Swami Vivekanand has said – “We can accept the inevitable (death) with wisdom and courage only if we are firmly rooted in the truth or the permanent reality which is totally unaffected by these passing phenomena”.

3.4. Thus the concept of *paryāya* helps us in accepting all changes, as everything in this world is transitory. Even the worst kind of calamities and disasters and their effects are also transitory. When one appreciates

this concept, one can have a philosophical view of disasters like the recent earthquake and take spiritual solace by contemplating ‘*anitya anuprekṣā*’ (reflection of impermanence).

3.5. The spiritual outcome of the study of *paryāya* is thus complete understanding of this ‘*anicchābhāva*’, as mentioned in *Marāṇasamādhi*. When the worldly objects are realised to be transitory and all relations temporary, there develops a philosophical yearning to solve the problem of life and death. It inculcates ‘*varirāgya*’ or the spirit of detachment and renunciation. This *bhāvanā* makes it very clear that in this world the position and self, contacts and co-residence, physical gifts and worldly accessories are all transitory (574-77).

3.6. This concept of ever – changing *paryāya* can be very useful in understanding the ‘*anitya*’ nature of human body. It is composed of trillions of microscopic cells. Writes ELSPEETH RENSHAW in ‘Your amazing body’<sup>6</sup>, “300 million cells die in the body every minute, but the number of cells remain fairly constant – throughout our life. Dead cells are replaced immediately. All cells are constantly moving, pulsating and dividing”. It is now known that the human body is completely transformed every 7 years. This gives us a graphic picture of ever-changing *paryāyas* of our body.

3.7. The writer on this paper was down with malignant lymphoma in March, 2000. At that time I studied how cells became malignant. I came to know that cancer occurs when malformed malignant cells are produced in the system. They are also called ‘confused cells’. Fortunately, they are weaker cells and chemotherapy treatment destroys these cells (along with healthy ones). When I was undergoing this treatment, I was fortunate in getting blessings from Acharya Shri Mahapragyaji and Prof. Muni Shri Mahendra Kumarji in the form of this message.

Everything in this world is transitory. The disease is also transitory. So do not get upset or be afraid of it. Face the crisis with courage and faith – faith in your own power. Contemplate “*anitya bhāvanā*”. This type of contemplation is the direct result of the ever – changing nature of *paryāya*. This, therefore, is the most important practical utility of the concept of *paryāya*.

#### 4. The Concept of Paryāya and Non-absolutism.

4.1 Jaina logic asserts that both the substance (*dravya*) as well as

the modes (*paryāya*) are ultimately true. This is in direct contrast with the Vedic and Buddhist logic; while the former considers only the substance as ultimate truth, the latter treats the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of modes only. But Jaina logic is based on *anekāntvāda*. It appropriates both the above logics partially. According to Jaina logic, “when the substance hidden under the waves of modes has no appeal, the modes come up permanently at the cost of substance which lies submerged under them. When the modes, like waves, lose their identity in the calmness of the unfathomed ocean of substance, the later alone appears to be ultimately real”.

4.2. Acharya Mahapragya has laid down several axioms of non-absolutism. The first one is concomitance of the universal and particular. The one without the other is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without substance is as impossible as a substance without a mode.

4.3. The second axiom of non absolutism, he asserts, is the concomitance of permanent (*śāśvata*) and impermanent (*aśāśvata*). All substances are permanent with reference to their *dravyatva*. But from the point of view of *paryāyas* (modes), all substances are impermanent.

4.4. The dialogues in the form of questions and answers between Gautama and Mahāvīra as well as between Manditputra and Mahāvīra explain this axiom.

A substance is the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence. This is explained in the following dialogue between Manditaputra and Mahāvīra.

Manditputra : “Is it true, O Bhagwan ! That the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it passes through various states ?”

Mahāvīra : ‘Yes, Manditaputra ! This is true.

The same has been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity in Jainism.

4.5. The permanence of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while its impermanence is due

to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is manifest from the following dialogue:-

Gautama: “Is the soul permanent or impermanent ?”

Mahāvīra: “The soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in another respect. It is permanent in respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes which originate and vanish”.

This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor absolutely impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.

4.6. Sanmatiprakarṇa discusses the concomitance of identity (*ekatva*) and difference (*anyatva*) in 3.52. The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water, before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally different from earth. A pot is a product and earth is its material cause, in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity-cum-difference.

4.7. In fact, the whole concept of *anekāntavāda* is the result of the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality. The Jaina view is realist and pluralist; it has given the important concepts of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *pariyāya* and it concludes with the eternal trinity of *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dharuvya*.

4.8. Let us end this chapter with the canonical pronouncement in Bhagavatī Sūtra defining substance: Bhagavatī defines substance as “*uppannē vā, vigame vā, dhuve vā*”. A substance (*dravya*) is that which is capable of eternal continues existence through infinite succession of origination and cessation. It is real (*sat*). It is a dynamic reality through this trinity of *utpāda*, (origination), *vyaya* (cessation) and *dharuvya* (permanence).

## 5. The Concept of *Paryāya* and the Universe

5.1. Prof. Stephen Hawkins, in his famous book, “A Brief History of Time,”<sup>8</sup> starts with and concludes with the eternal question – “what do we

know about the universe, and how do we know it ? Where did the universe come from, and where it is going ? Did the universe have a beginning, and if so, what happened before then ? What is the nature of time ? Will it ever come to an end ? Can we go back in time ? (p. 1).

And in the last chapter the ‘conclusion’, he says – “We find ourselves in a bewildering world. We want to make sense of what we see around us and ask: What is the nature of the universe ? What is our place in it and where did it and we come from ? Why is it the way its is ?” (p. 187).

5.2. He has explained various theories about the universe – right from the Greek philosopher Aristotle (340 B.C), Hellenistic (Greek) astronomer, mathematician and geographer Ptolemy (127-151 A.D.), Polish priest Nicholas Copernicus (1514), German astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571 – 1630), Italian astronomer Galileo Galilee (1632), Sir Isaac Newton (1687), German Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781) to the twentieth century celebrities like Albert Einstein and Alexander Friedman.

5.3. He has considered the early Biblical theory of how God created the universe, or an infinite tower of tortoises supporting the flat earth, or Edwin Hubbell’s observation (1929) that the universe is expanding (suggesting that there was a time called Big Bang, when the universe was infinitesimally small and dense). According to Prof. Hawkins, “Einstein’s general theory of relativity implied that the universe must have a beginning and possibly and end (p. 35).

5.4. He has then explained his heterotic string theory which he considers “as one of the complete unified theories that are self-consistent and allow the existence of structures as complicated as human beings who can investigate the laws of universe and ask about the nature of God.” (p. 190).

5.5. But it appears that he does not claim this theory to be final and conclusive. For he asks, “Is the unified theory so compelling that it brings about its own existence ? Or does it need a creator, and, if so, does he have any other effect on the universe ?

And finally he asks a very pertinent question:-

“AND WHO CREATED HIM (GOD) ?

5.6. This brings us to the Jaina theory of universe ‘LOKA’. Loka is

defined in the Illuminator of Jaina tenets” (I.J.T.) by Ganadhipati Tulsi as ‘*Śaddravyātmako lokaḥ*’. (1.8).

That (space) which comprises (and accommodates) the six substances is called ‘*loka*’ (cosmos). These six substances are:-

(1) Dharmastikaya – the auxiliary cause of motion, (2) *adharmāstikāya* – the auxiliary cause of rest, (3) *ākāśastikāya* – space, (4) *pudgālastikāya* – matter (5) *jīvāstikāya* – souls and (6) *kāla* – time.

5.7. The Jaina canons have described in detail the structure, the shape, the measurement and the contents of *loka*. Jaina Philosophy firmly believes that *loka* has neither beginning nor end; it is infinite (*śāśvata*). It is not created by any agency such as God or anybody else. It is there. If it were created by God or any such agency, then the question will arise – who created God or that agency? If some other entity were responsible for the creation of that agency who created God, then who created that entity? This will lead to absurd logic (*ad absurdum*) or to *ad infinitum*.

5.8. According to Jaina cosmology, space or *ākāśa* is divided into two categories – *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. *Lokākāśa* (cosmic) is eternal and finite having definite shape and size and consists of all the six substances (including space). *Alokākāśa* (supra-cosmic) is infinite; it is that void or blank space where there are no other living or non – living substances.

5.9. Let us compare the Jaina view with that of some well – known scientific theories.

5.9.1. First Let us see whether the universe is changing or unchanging. “The laws of gravity are incompatible with the view that the universe is unchanging, because the fact that gravity is always attractive implies that the universe must be either expanding or contracting. According to the general theory of relativity, there must have been a state of infinite density in the past, the big bang, which would have been an effective beginning of time. Even if the whole universe did not recollapse, there would be singularities in any localized regions that collapsed to form black holes. These singularities would be an end of time for anyone who fell into the black hole”. (A brief history of time p. 189).

5.9.2. The Jaina definition of *dravya*, i.e. substance, makes it liable to-change-through-persistence. We have seen that the three essential characteristics of a substance is *utpād* (creation), *vyaya* (destruction) and

*dhrauvya* (persistence). We have also seen that *lokākāśa* consists of all the six substances that change continuously from the stand point of *paryāya* i.e. mode. So from this point of view, the universe is ever changing. And yet, it preserves its existence, shape, size etc. through the characteristic of *dharuvya*. Thus the theory of relativity, viewed in the context of ‘*syadvad*’, can be applied to this phenomenon of change.

5.10. The Jaina philosophy also lays down the rule of gradual but definite deterioration and improvement in certain area of *loka* such as ‘*Bharatakhanda*’ which comprises a small portion of *loka*. The cycle of time called ‘*kālacakra*’ consists of six periods in the deterioration (*avasarpinī*) phase and six period in the improvement (*utsarpinī*) phase. We are now living in this *Bharatakhanda* in the fifth phase of deterioration called ‘*duśama*’ i.e. difficult or painful era. The sixth and the last phase is called ‘*duśama – duśama*’ i.e. extremely difficult or painful era. At the end of this last phase, there will be almost total destruction of civilization, leaving a very few survivors. This phenomenon can be compared to what Prof. Hawkins said – “even if the whole universe did not recollapse, there would be singularities in any localized regions that collapsed...” (p.189).

5.11. Jaina scriptures declare that: (1) *Loka* is eternal in the sense that it has no beginning and no end. (2) It is ever changing from the point of view of various types of modes (*paryāyas*). (3) It was not created by any agency such as God. (4) It comprises of all the six substances (*dravyas*). (5) It is finite and is a small portion of *alokākāśa* which is infinite and devoid of any life. (6) All the souls and matter are localized in the *loka* only. (7) It has definite shape and size and its area is measurable.

5.12. As per Prof. Hawkins, in the string theories, the basic objects are not particles, which occupy a single point of space, but things that have length but no other dimensions, like an infinitely thin piece of string. (p. 174). In string theories, what were previously thought of as particles are now pictured as waves traveling down the string. The emission or absorption of one particle by another corresponds to the dividing or joining together of strings. He then goes on to ask, “why do we see only three space dimensions and one time dimension ?” (pp. 179). (*dravya*, *kṣetra*, *bhāva* + *kāla*).

5.13. His conclusion at the end of his book brings out the need

for philosophy and science to come together to solve this problem about universe. He writes –

“Up to now, most scientists have been too occupied with the development of new theories that describe what the universe is to ask the question why. On the other hand, the people whose business it is to ask why, the philosophers, have not been able to keep up with the advance of scientific theories. In the eighteenth century, philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science, to be their field and discussed questions such as: did the universe have a beginning ? However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein the most famous philosopher of this century, said, “The sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language.” What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant !

However, if we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. We find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then we would know the mind of God.” (pp. 190-191).

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## 10. The Concept of Sat in Jaina Darśana

Bijayananda Kar

In Jaina *darśana* (Philosophy) the concept of *sat* (real) is found to be somewhat distinct and original. Amidst the Vedantic and the Buddhistic account of real, the Jaina view offers a standpoint which appears to be (at least initially) based on common experience; but it is (as will be discussed here) quite different from the common-sensical notion too. The great Vedantin : Shankaracharya offers a criterion of real according to which what is not contradicted or sublated is real (*yat viśaya buddhi na vyabhicarati tat sat*). In other words, real is unchanging (*apariṇāmī*) and eternal (*śāśvata*). The Buddhist philosophy, at least in its early phase, is radically opposed to the Vedanta standpoint and it offers the view that change alone is real (*yat kṣaṇikam tat sat*). Nothing is permanent . There is no substance which changes. Rather change as such is real. The logical consequence of this view-point is momentarism (*kṣaṇabhangavāda*) and the different moments are viewed to be unrelated bare particulars. While the Vedantic standpoint appears to be leading towards some form of absolutism or wholism (*pūrṇavāda*), the Buddhist point of view seems to be opting for some sort of unrelated inessentiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) having its culmination in nihilism (*śūnyavāda*).

### I

The Jaina philosophy offers a concept of real which is neither absolutistic nor nihilistic as referred to here. It presents a criterion according to which neither exclusive sameness or identity (*tādātmya*) nor exclusive difference or unrelatedness or pure flux (*prabahā*) can be the mark of real. According to it, real is manifold (*vividha*). It is existent and

is also changeable. Whatever has birth, death and endurance or persistence is real (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat*)<sup>1</sup> It is true that nothing remains permanent; but there must be something which remains to be changed so that one cannot affirm change alone as real. From one standpoint, it is the same Bijay who was once a child, and was a youth and now is an old man. There is conspicuous difference between the child and the old. In other words, changes do take place; but amidst changes one has to accept the persistence of individual or thing for that matter. There is birth as well as death of the individual; but amidst both birth and death, there is the persistence of the individual that cannot be denied. Real is said to have constant modification (*paryāya*), but amidst modification, there is the same real stuff which remains and undergoes change. This account, according to the Jainas, is confirmed by experience<sup>2</sup>. The Jaina standpoint has been exposed as offering the manifold nature of real (*ananta dharmakam vastu*)<sup>3</sup> which accommodates both pluralism and relativism. It admits infinite entities and also such entities as being related with each other.

According to the Jaina *darśana*, reality consists of infinite *jīvas* as well as infinite *ajīvas*. The word: *ajīva* has a negative import, that is, other than *jīva*. Some scholars view this position of Jainism as having more leaning towards *jīva*. That means, *jīva* is primary and *ajīva* is secondary<sup>4</sup>. But such a rendering of the Jaina position is not well authenticated. However, it is held that *ajīva*, though infinite, is of five different types, viz; time (*kāla*), space (*ākāśa*), motion (*dharmā*), rest (*adharma*) and matter (*pudgala*).

*Jīva*, in Jaina *darśana*, is not same as that of the Vedānta. Here *jīva* is viewed as both an enjoyer or experient (*bhoktā*) and an agent (*kartā*). Etymologically it means that “what lives or is animate”. In other words, it stands for the vital principle (*prāṇa*). It is infinite and each *jīva* intrinsically does not have qualitative difference from the other. But extrinsically, in its worldly (*sāṃsāric*) form, *jīva* is classified into several varieties. Though intrinsically each *jīva* is perfect and infinitely intelligent, extrinsically it is bound and ignorant due to its being obscured by the *kārmic* particles. It is notable that *karma*, in Jaina *darśana*, is not simply the action of the *jīva*, it is also construed as material particles (*karma-pudgala*). It is not simply because of *avidyā* or ignorance, but because of the influx of *kārmic* particles, *jīva* is not in its purest form and becomes the victim of bondage.

*Ajīva* is classified into five types as already stated. Time is held to be infinite but has two cycles, of equal duration, i.e. descending era (*avasarpinī*) in which virtue is degraded and ascending era (*utsarpinī*) in which virtue is upgraded. Similarly space is regarded as infinite and also it is said to have two parts, i.e. *lokākāśa* (where movement is possible and where the *mukta jīvas* have their abode) and *alokākāśa* (where there is no movement and *jīvas* are bound or baddha). Peculiarly, in Jaina *darśana*, *dharma* and *adharma* do not signify merit or demerit respectively, but refer to the principles of motion and stability. *Pudgala* possesses touch (*sparsā*), flavour (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*) and colour (*varṇa*)<sup>5</sup>. *Jīva* in its sāmānīk setting, resides in *pudgala* (i.e., composition of material atoms). It is held that not only men, animals and plants but also the elements of *pudgala* (i.e., earth, water, fire and air) are endowed with *jīva*. It is evident that such a conception of *jīva* is strikingly different from the usual conception of disembodied spirit or soul (*aśarīra ātmā*). While *kāla* is said to be having no parts (an eternal entity), all the other four types of *ajīvas* are existent (*asti*) and possess constituent parts (*kāya*)<sup>6</sup>.

*Pudgala* is viewed as atomic; but atom does not mean material in the usual sense of the term. Here *aṇus* are all alike (having no qualitative difference), though those can give rise to infinite variety of things, so that *pudgala* is conceived to be of an infinite nature. The four-fold division, i.e. earth, water, fire and air is conceived to be derivative and that is why those are not treated as eternal. *Pudgala-aṇus* develop the characteristics of *sparsā*, *rasa*, *gandha* etc. and those become differentiated, though in themselves those are indistinguishable from one another. Thus *pudgala* has two forms, viz; simple (atomic) and compound (*skandha*). Qualitative difference originates only at the level of compound structure, though at the simple level, the *pudgala-aṇus* are infinite.<sup>7</sup>

## II

After this brief expository note on the Jaina conception of real, let us have a critical evaluation of the Jaina point of view. The Jaina conception of real as “one- in-many”<sup>8</sup> seems to be at least not quite sound. How can both identity and difference be attributed to the same stuff ? This violates the fundamental principle of logic. One cannot be conceived as both A and not-A. But, then, it may be argued that such contradiction results only when one’s process of reasoning rests upon two-valued logic of utter exclusiveness. And this is precisely what the Jaina *darśana* avoids

from the very beginning. Instead of depending upon the two-valued logical operation, it strives to introduce a multi-valued form of reasoning in which opposite entities can equally be placed under the common abode of real. Though *jīvas* and *ajīvas* are opposed to each other, they can also be treated as being related to the other having the basis on the same stuff of real. And that is why real is said to be not unfold but manifold.

In this context, the Jaina *darśana* formulates the well known doctrine of *anekāntavāda*. The doctrine points out that *sat* is manifold. Explaining this point, by way of referring to one analogy from the concrete experiential source, it is argued that the same elephant is viewed differently by six blind men, touching different physical portion of the body of the elephant and none of the accounts presented by each blind man is either fully right or is fully wrong. Each presentation is partially correct in so far as it belongs to the elephant in the sense, it is descriptive of some portion of the body of the elephant. So also the real has infinite presentation. And, while trying to comprehend the conception of real either as one or as many, each of such comprehensions is neither totally right nor is it totally wrong. It is partially true as it does refer to the same stuff of real in some sense or the other. It is said here, in this connection, that though lamp is one, its light occupies different amount of space depending upon the situation. If it is in a very small chamber, its light pervades the whole chamber; but if it is placed in a big hall, its light pervades the big hall also without any obstacle.

Even then, the explanation stated here is not so simple as it appears to be. Both elephant and the lamp are finite objective entities. They occupy definite amount of space. And, their descriptions are also finite, though one may not be interested to count all such actual and possible form of descriptions. But in case of *sat*, it is explicitly held to be *ananta* (unending or infinite) and, again, it is astonishingly supposed to have two types of entities, viz; *jīva* and *ajīva*. Each of them again is supposed to be infinite. But the point to be noted here is that the terms like infinite, unlimited etc. are contrast terms in the discourse to serve the purpose of limiting character of conceptualization. Those are not descriptive in the sense, finite terms pointing to finite objects and entities are descriptive. Any classification of one to several types is comprehensible only when one is a finite numbered object / entity and it is sub-divided into different finite types.

Now, the real being infinite cannot be viewed as one : for that, being one, must belong to the finite number series. If the nature of real is treated as multi-faceted, then it can also be said that such characterisation of real reduces it to the finite level. Because many implies more than half and thus it is within the finite numerical frame. It is held that the implication of *sat* as *aneka dharmakam* virtually is nothing but treating *sat* as infinite or *ananta*. And once this rendering is taken up, there is no scope for presenting the Jaina position as “one- in- many”. Because one- in- many is intelligible within the finite framework.

However, the classification of *sat* into *jīvas* and *ajīvas* creates further problems. Infinite is classified into two types that are in themselves again infinite. What is the indication that is flashed out of such saying that infinite *sat* is divided into infinite *jīvas* and infinite *ajīvas* ? If all the *jīvas* are qualitatively alike, then what has led them to be numerically different is difficult to comprehend. If each *jīva* is quantitatively different from the other *jīva*, then they are finite and, in that sense, the saying that they are intrinsically perfect having infinite peace, faith, power and intelligence is not plausible. Further, if the *jīvas* are intrinsically perfect, then in what way are they related with the *ajīvas* which are opposed to them ? And, if their relation is somehow accepted, then their separation requires further explanation. Moreover, relatedness as well as unrelatedness can be made plausible between two finite entities. How is that possible amongst infinite entities of opposite nature?

It is said that *jīva* is bound in the *sāṃsāric* frame because of the influx of *kārmic* particles. But, if the *jīva* is intrinsically perfect and infinitely intelligent, then how can *jīva* be impeded with *kārmic* obscurities ? This needs clarification. What are the *kārmic* particles ? Are they finite or infinite ? If finite, those can never affect the infinite *jīvas*. If infinite, those can never be fully controlled or avoided.

The conceptual difficulty of infinite having finite classification is not only traced in case of *jīva* and *ajīva*, but is also traceable *mutatis mutandis* in respect of *kāla* and *ākāśa*. *Kāla*, being infinite, cannot plausibly be divided into two cycles of virtue and vice . It is said that in the *utsarpini* cycle, virtue increases and in the *avasarpinī* cycle it decreases. But it requires explanation as to how *kāla* that is *ajīva* (which lacks life and consciousness) is linked with the sense of value, i.e virtue.

It is held that in *lokākāśa*, movement is possible and *jīva*, attaining

freedom from bondage has its eternal abode in *lokākāśā*<sup>9</sup>. In *alokākāśā*, there is no movement and *jīva* is there bound. But, in that case, the *sāṃsāric form of existence* with all its mobility and dynamicity is not accounted. The ordinary experience that there is both existence and change does not necessitate the metaphysical presupposition of *jīvas* and *ajīvas*. True, in common experience, one finds the continuity of individual amidst the childhood state, the youth state and the old age. But the continuity is only in terms of psycho-physical continuity within the empirical framework. It does not necessarily warrant the acceptance of a transcendental *jīva* having its eternal abode in *lokākāśā*. This does not seem to have any empirical significance (*pratiyamana siddhānta*). In other words, the metaphysical construction advanced by the Jainas, seems to have been loosely knitted and its rational edifice does not appear to be convincing.

One word more, before I close. The critical remarks that are advanced here against the Jaina conception of real and its metaphysical doctrine of *anekāntavāda* do not suggest that the Vedantin's or the Buddhist's account of real in the metaphysical sense, for that reason, is unquestionable. Such issue is not discussed here as that is beyond the scope of present discussion. The other important point to be noted is that at a general level, it seems that the Jaina approach is more reconciliatory and compromising in so far as it neither moves for radical unchangeability nor for extreme view of pure changeability. It tries to resolve the paradox of extremity by taking recourse to a middle point of reconciliation. This point of Jaina *darśana* resembles the Vedānta notion of balanced outlook (*samabhāva* or *amatva*) and the Buddhist notion of middle path (*madhyama pratipat*) which are, of course, advanced in different contexts.

Radicalism is not, however, operative both in theoretical and practical front. And, in that way, the Jaina move for combining the extreme views to a moderate reconciliation is commonsensically not that unsound. But, the difficulty starts when this temper of reconciliation is given transcendental ultimate status, bringing thereby conceptual difficulties. The experiential confirmability of the persistence of the individual amidst birth and death is at the empirical stage when the issue is concerning one individual in the finite setting. And, that again, is from a particular perspective. The suggestion that what is true of finite must be true of infinite is surely an unwarranted move, being contrary to rational conviction.

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# 11.

## Paryāya

(Mode, Modification or Manifestation)

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### 1. Preamble :

World or universe is existent. *Sat* / existent / real is basically considered in four different ways by various Indian philosophies as follows:

i. Absolute is only real, eternal and one. Everything else is its manifestation and unreal (*mithyā*).

ii. Change is real and momentary. There is nothing permanent or eternal.

iii. There are some entities which are eternal and others changing.

iv. Substance (*dravya*) is real. Substance is with origination and destruction and is permanent or eternal simultaneously.

Jain philosophy subscribes to the fourth viewpoint of real or existent.

In Bhagwati we find that Gautama asks Bhagwana Mahāvīra, “What is *Tattva* ?” and Bhagwana Mahāvīra replies, “ *Tattva* is an entity which originates, decays and is permanent.” *Tattva* here is considered to represent an absolute entity as well as an existent thing. But *āgamas* don’t use *dravya* as a synonym of *tattva* or *sat*. Uttarādhyana first describes *dravya* as a collection / basis of attributes.

In the philosophical era, Kundakunda in Pravacanasāra and

Pañcāstikāyasāra<sup>1</sup> and later Umaswati in Tattvārathasūtra correlate *sat* and *dravya*. Kundakunda<sup>2</sup> says, “What flows, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modes, and what is not different from existent (*sattā*) or substance, that is called *dravya*”. Later on he describes<sup>3</sup> the concept in details as follows:

Substance is one (as a class)<sup>4</sup>. It is the inherent essence of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of origination, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities (i.e. can be described in each case by the opposite attribute) i.e. from the class view as well as from the individual view . This is in conformity with *Anekānta* doctrine.

What flows<sup>5</sup>, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modes, and what is not different from existent (*sattā*) or substance, that is called *dravya*. The three qualities of *dravya* are existence or *sat*, permanence through birth and death and substratum of attributes and modes/conditions.

Later on he<sup>6</sup> says that *dravya* is existent only where there is coherence of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The three qualities of *dravya* are existence or *sat*, permanence through birth and death and substratum of attributes and modes/conditions.

Akalaṅka<sup>7</sup> first describes substance as the base of attributes and later he also considers substance as the base of modes also (*paryāyaiduryante dravanti vā tāni eti dravyāṇi*). Jinabhadragani in Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (*gāthā* 28) says,” *Dravya* is an entity which accepts its modes and gets itself free from them; the entity which is owned by its modes, which is either a part or its *vikāra*, which is an amalgam of forms and other attributes and which is able to have the past and the future modes”.

Umaswati<sup>8</sup> has defined *dravya* in two ways, namely : *Dravya* is *sat* which is with origination, destruction and permanence and *dravya* is an entity, which is with attributes and modes..

- *Sat dravya lakṣṇam*
- *Utpāda vyaya dhrauvya yukta sat.*
- *Guṇaparyāyavat dravyam*

Substance is said to be real. Substance is with origination, destruction and permanence simultaneously i.e. an entity that is persistent (or existent) and is accompanied with change. Substance is an amalgam of attributes/qualities and modes/modifications. Jain philosophy accordingly defines substance as having both generic (representing permanence) and specific (representing originating and destruction or change) attributes. Attributes are like extension or width and are always existent with the substance, e.g. *siddhātmā*.

Generic attributes are existence (*astitva*), enjoy-ability or functionality (*vastutva*), substantiveness or fluency or persistence (*dravyatva*), know-ability or measurability (*prameyatva*), occupying space or some sort of form (*pradeśatva*) and identity or essence or invariance (*agurulaghutva*) and these invariably exist in all substances all the times. These are always co-existent (*sahabhāvi*) with the substance.

Specific attributes are the ones, which change continuously (like the colour, touch, taste, smell etc.). This change occurs serially and continuously (*krambhāvi*). Mode is like length and has serial existence over time. Mode can be of attribute as well as of substance. Modes enable us to identify different classes of substances as well as different individuals in the same class of substance.

To understand the concept of substance, Jain literature looks at it from two different aspects namely spiritual and worldly. When we talk in spiritual context, we talk of nine *padārthas* and when we talk of worldly context, we talk of six *dravyas*. Accordingly we find the use of words like *sat*, *sattva*, *tattva*, *tattvārtha*, *artha*, *padārtha* and *dravya* interchangeably in the Jain literature.

From the worldly view, there are two main groups of substances namely *jīva* or sentient and *ajīva* or non-sentient. *Jīva* are further sub-classified as pure (*mukta*) or empirical (*sāñsari* and bonded with *kārmika* impurities). *Ajīva* are further sub classified as matter (*Pudgala*), principle of motion (*dharma*), principle of rest (*adharma*), Space (*ākāśa*) and Time (*kāla*). *Jīva* and matter are active and the remaining four are inactive and support the activities of *jīva* and *pudgala*.

The six *dravyas* (PK 7) though mutually interpenetrating (i.e. cohabiting the same space points), and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up in view of occupying the same space points, yet

they always maintain their identity and nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as specific. The six *dravyas* are classified into three kinds namely :

– *Sakriyā* or active i.e. they are capable of moving and being the efficient cause. *Jīva* and *pudgala* are of this type.

– *Sakriyā-nīṣkriyā* or active-inactive i.e. they condition movement of others without themselves undergoing movement or change themselves. *Dharma* and *adharma* belong to this category.

– *Nīṣkriyā* or inactive i.e. they are neither the direct nor the indirect condition of movement. Space and time belong to this category.

From the spiritual view, there are two primary *tattvas*, namely, *jīva* and *ajīva* and other seven *tattvas* (Influx, bondage, stopping the influx/bondage, dissociation, liberation, merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) are just the additional states of *jīva* acquired by it due to its own efforts and the impact of *ajīva* (mainly *pudgala* or matter) on it.

## 2. Definition : Paryāya : Mode, Modification, Result or Manifestation or State

*Paryāya* looks like a definitive word, coined by Jainas, to indicate the momentary state of a substance and its attributes, be the substance living or non-living. These can be physical or conceptual. Thus *pariyāya* means a part of an entity, which is eternal and called substance. As per the definition of substance it is continuously transforming due to its own nature as well as under the influence of external entities called *Nimitta* or efficient cause in Jaina philosophy. The momentary result of each transformation is called the *pariyāya*.

A substance can have two types of parts, namely, always coexistent (*sahabhāvi*) with it and concurrent/occurring sequentially but continuously existing with it (*krambhāvi*). Coexistent parts of the whole are called the attributes and the ones which are concurrent/sequentially existing with it are called the mode or *pariyāya*. However from substance viewpoint, both coexistent and concurrent parts are called the modes and only traditionally the latter i.e. the concurrent ones are called the modes. Thus both generic and specific attributes that identify substance go through transformation resulting in *pariyāya*. *Paryāya* is thus the result of transformation of attributes but it can also be the transformation of the substance as it is considered as an amalgam of both generic and specifics<sup>9</sup>.

Some definitions of *paryāya* as given by various *Acharyas* are as follows :

– Different states of the substance which is due to its own nature or due to supportive or opposing attributes acting as causative entities (*naimattika*) from all angles is mode<sup>10</sup>.

– That which transforms / moves in a natural or unnatural manner is mode. Generic and specific attributes define a substance and their transformation results in modes every moment<sup>11</sup>.

– Different states of the real from the beginning occurring every moment are called modes<sup>12</sup>.

– Transformation results in different states of the attributes. These momentary states of the attributes are called modes<sup>13</sup>.

*Paryāya*, *paryāya* and *paryava* are synonyms<sup>14</sup>. Similarly *vyavahāra*, *vikalpa*, *bheda* and *paryāya* are synonyms<sup>15</sup>.

### 3. Discussions

#### 3.1 Substance, Mode and Attributes-Are they Identical or Different

*Dravya*<sup>15</sup> in reality can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance. According to substance viewpoint, gold can neither be created nor destroyed. It exists and that is all. But ornaments and other things made out of gold are its modes. These may change i.e. one ornament may be melted and converted to other one. Thus it also stands that there is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. Ornament is different than gold in name or significance or utility etc., but still there can be no ornament apart from gold and gold apart from some form or mode of it.

This also implies that there can be no destruction of things that neither exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. Coming into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because of their attributes and modes. *Jīva* or *ātmā* is real and existent. The qualities of *jīva* are consciousness (*cetana*) and its manifestation (*upayoga* i.e. perception and knowledge), which are manifold. The soul manifests in different forms as heavenly or human or sub-human or hellish beings. Having a particular *gati* and the duration in that *gati* by the *jīva* is

determined by the *nāmagatikarma* and the *jīva* just moves from one *gati* to other (leaving the old body and acquiring the new one). This movement in different *gatis* by the *jīva* is due to the extreme bondage of different types of *karmas* to it. When the *karmas* are destroyed completely, *jīva* becomes pure *ātmā* (*siddha*) and becomes pure self and enjoys its inherent attributes of infinite perception, knowledge, bliss and energy. In this state also, the pure *ātmā* goes through transformations continuously and acquires modes of just knowledge and perception simultaneously.

The above discussions of substance, modes and attributes bring forth the question as to what is the relationship between

- Substance and attributes
- Substance and modes
- Attributes and Modes.

Let us analyze the above alternatives keeping the Jaina concept of difference- in- identity (*bhedābheda*), i.e. substance, attributes and modes are considered as identical as well as different from different aspects / viewpoints.

Vaiśeṣika considers substance as without attributes and it acquires them due to *samavāya*. Akalaṅka<sup>18</sup> first supports this view due to the differences in their indications (substance is the base of attributes while attributes exist in the substance; and attribute itself is without attributes of its own), experience i.e. attributes can be experienced by one or more senses while substance can be experienced usually with the assistance of mind. Abhayadeva and Yashovijaya also mention this fact and say that some Digambara *Acharyas* say so. This analysis however is not completely true as indicated by Kundakunda, Umaswati, Siddhasena etc and Akalanka himself later on. Kundakunda says, "When we talk of many substances, then criterion like attributes etc. indicate differences in them but when we talk of one substance only, the same indicate their identity with the substance". To prove identity of attributes and substance, he<sup>17</sup> says that knowledge, which is an attribute of soul is equal to soul itself in size, i.e. the same space points, else parts of soul will become without knowledge which is contrary to the basic hypothesis. Similarly Siddhasena<sup>19</sup> refutes Vaisheshika view of *samavāya* and says that there is a concomitance between substance and attributes.

Similarly we can analyze substance and mode, as both cannot exist without each other. However, due to differences in their names, quantities a substance can have one, many, countless and infinite modes; modes representing the origination and destruction while substance representing the permanence; and so they are considered different but due to their coexistence and not being able to exist alone, they are said to be identical i.e. we cannot comprehend a mode without the substance and vice versa. Hence substance and modes are both identical and different also.

Coming to mode and attributes, Siddhasena in Sanmati Sūtra raises this question and says that modes and attributes are the same, else why Bhagwana Mahāvīra would talk about substance and modification view points only and not substance, modifications and attributes (*guṇārthika*) view point also. However, Kundakunda says that mode can be of substance as well as of its attributes also and they are different also. Further the fact that all *Acharyas* say that substance is an amalgam of modes and attributes, it is clear that attributes and modes are different also by name, indication etc.

**Hence modes, attributes and substance are both different as well as identical.**

### 3.2 Types of Modes / Paryāya

*Paryāya* can be classified in two types primarily, namely *sahabhāvi* and *kramabhāvi*; *artha* and *vyanjan*; *svabhāva* and *vibhāva* or *dravya paryāya* and *guṇaparyāya* depending on the way we wish to look at them<sup>20</sup>.

#### 3.2.1 Sahabhāvi and Krambhāvi

A substance can have two types of parts namely: those always coexistent (*sahabhāvi*) with it and those, which are concurrent or occurring sequentially but continuously with it (*kramabhāvi*). *Sahabhāvi* represent the generic attributes, which are representative of the substantiality (e.g. *vastutva*, *astitva*, *prameyatva*, *agurulaghulatva*, *dravyatva*) while *kramabhāvi* represents the modifications / changes taking place in the specific attributes (e.g. knowledge and its manifestation in *jīva* and fusion and fission or colours/smells etc. of the matter). The other four substance types, namely principles of motion and rest, space and time, being inactive, have just the *Sahabhāvi paryāyas*

only. Thus this classification of modes is primarily for the attributes.

### 3.2.2 Artha and Vyañjana

*Artha paryāya* is the momentary and subtle transformation-taking place in all substances, while *Vyañjana paryāya* is, generally the transformation of amalgams of *Jīva* and *Pudgala* or just the lumps of *pudgala*. Thus *artha paryāya* refers to the conceptual transformation-taking place in the substances every moment while *Vyañjana paryāya* refers to the transformation-taking place in the space points of the substance and can be experienced. Some *Acharyas* describe *Vyañjana paryāyas* as a series of *artha paryāyas* also such that they can be perceived by senses also. This is a limited differentiation of the two types as the pure soul has continuous transformations going on but these cannot be perceived by the senses (also like the transformation taking place in the four inactive substances). This classification of modes is general and applied to both substance and attributes. Therefore both *artha* and *vyañjana paryāyas* are further sub classified as *Svabhāva* and *Vibhāva* also.

### 3.2.3 Svabhāva and Vibhāva

Modes of pure substances and their attributes are called natural / *Svabhāva paryāyas* while the modes of impure or empirical *Jīva* and amalgams (lumps) of *pudgala* are unnatural and called *Vibhāva paryāyas*. These two types of modes i.e. *Svabhāva* occurs when the substance is just enjoying its own nature without concern to anything else and *Vibhāva* occurs when the substance is under the influence of something else. On the other hand, the remaining four substance types, namely principles of motion and rest, space and time, being unaffected by other substances even though they cohabit with *Jīva* and *pudgala*, have only *Svabhāva paryāyas* only.

### 3.2.4 Substance and Attributes

This classification of modes is to explain the class and individual identity of substances as perceived by the senses. For example when we go to forest we see lots of trees and we call them all trees representing trees in general because they all have essential features of a tree. When we go further inside the forest, we start differentiating the trees as of mangos, sandalwood, *pipal* etc as we start seeing the differences in different groups of trees. Further analysis of the features relating to size,



height and other characteristics will enable us to identify a specific tree as different from other trees of the same class.

#### 4.0 Discussion : Paryāya as discussed by other Philosophies

Since *paryāya* is a definitive word and concept of Jain philosophy, its comparison with other philosophies cannot be made on one to one basis. Discussions in this section are therefore very approximate as different Indian and Western Philosophies have fundamental differences with Jains in the definition of REAL (*sat*) itself, which forms the basis of in the definition of *paryāya*.

##### 4.1 Paryāya as Discussed in other Indian Philosophies

*Buddhists: Being a believer of multiple forms of substance elements existing and the change (continuous origination and decay being the real), as per paryāya's definition in section 2.0 earlier, we can surmise that they consider paryāya as independent of substance and real as against Jains who consider both substance and its modes as real.*

*Vedant : They consider only Brahma as real, inert and this world as an amalgam of māyā with local Brahma with no attributes.*

*Sāṃkhya : They believe in two basic constituents of this world namely puruṣa (sentient and without any other attributes) and prakṛti (insentient), which is the cause of this entire perceptible world. Amalgam of puruṣa and prakṛti is this universe. Prakṛti is active and goes through transformation continuously (25 types or stages identified). As per the definition of paryāya in section 2.0 the 25 variations of prakṛti may be approximated to paryāya.*

##### 4.2. Paryāya as discussed by Western Philosophers<sup>21</sup>

*Aristotle talks of substance (form) and matter or potential. According to him, even though the substance is inert, eternal, still it is the basis / foundation of all transformations / results. So he talks of form/ substance and matter where primary is the distinction between form and matter, which is present throughout the world. When something stands to something else as the more perfect, the former is called for and the latter is called matter. Thus substance is the pre stage and matter is the post stage after change. Hence everything in this universe is both the substance at one point of time and the matter at next moment. Substance can become matter*

*and then matter becomes the substance for the next matter until only matter of matters or the ultimate potential is left which is God. Thus he talks of total transformation of substance into matter (paryāya as per Jains), inseparability of substance and matter, substance is without attributes / qualities and matter is with qualities, substance is the present and matter the potential until it becomes potential of all potentials i.e. God. Thus matter of Aristotle is a distant equivalent of paryāya having more differences than similarities except the result of transformation.*

*Later on other western philosophers, like Des Cartes (three types of substance namely God, sentient and insentient) and Spinoza (one type namely God) talk of independent existence of substance, while Leibnitz (infinite monads which are all sentient) talks of independent power and not existence as the key attribute of the substance. Both Des Cartes and Spinoza accept the substance as the foundation of attributes and modes*

Liebnitz talks of monad, the development of which is related in a series of five development stages. Each stage is not reversible, the first is the most undeveloped state like unconscious while the fifth is the super consciousness called Monad of all monads i.e. God.

## 5. Conclusions

As seen above, the concept of *paryāya* is an important contribution of Jain philosophy in enabling us to:

- Understand the constituents of this universe and the changes taking place continuously.
- Understand changes taking place in the pure substance, its attributes and finally the impure substance also.
- Devise ways and means to affect the changes to achieve the desired state of the substance and attributes.

## References :

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2. Pañcāstikāyasāra, *gatha* 7
3. Pañcāstikāyasāra, *gathas* 8 to 10

4. Pañcāstikāyasāra, *gatha* 8
5. Pañcāstikāyasāra, *gatha* 9
6. Pañcāstikāyasāra, *gatha* 10
7. Tattvaratha Rājavārtika by Akalañka. chapter 5 Sūtras 1,2
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9. Jainenandra Siddhanta Shaabdlkosha part 3 page 33
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14. Syādvāda Manjari 23/272.
15. Gommatasāra Jivakānda by Nemi Candra 57/1016
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17. Pravacanasāra by Kundakunda, I/ 27
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## 12.

# Kundakunda on the Modifications (Paryāyas) of Self and their Ethico-Spiritual Implications

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It can not be gain said that Kundakunda, the great philosopher of the I<sup>st</sup> Century A.D. stands for the ethico-spiritual transformation of the individual and society. He bases his doctrine of transformation on the *paryāyas* (modifications) of self. According to Kundakunda, the self, as an ontologically un-derived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else<sup>1</sup>. It is styled '*Mahatha*'<sup>2</sup> (a great objectivity).

In consonance with the definition of substance adopted by Kundakunda in conformity with the Jaina tradition, self is the repository of qualities (*guṇas*) and modifications (*paryāyas*) and is characterised by simultaneous origination of new mode, cessation of old mode and continuance of quality as such along with the substance self<sup>3</sup>. On this basis it may be said that it is a synthesis of permanence and flowing-ness. Permanence refers to qualities and flowing-ness refers to modifications.

According to Kundakunda, consciousness is the essential quality of the self<sup>4</sup>. Its flowing character manifests itself at the mundane stage of existence in auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions<sup>5</sup>. Whenever the auspicious mode of kindness originates, inauspicious mode of cruelty ceases and the quality of consciousness continues simultaneously. Thus, self as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. In the

present paper, I intend to discuss the modifications of self and their ethico-spiritual implications.

Kundakunda speaks of essential modifications (*svabhāva paryāyas*) and non-essential modifications<sup>6</sup> (*vibhāva paryāyas*) and accepts that the empirical self has been associated with the non-essential modifications (*vibhāva paryāyas*). Since an indeterminable past and thereby it has identified itself with attachment and aversion, the consequence of which is that it is the doer of right and wrong actions and the enjoyer of their results<sup>8</sup>.

We may point out in passing that the transcendental self occupies itself with essential modifications (*svabhāva paryāyas*) and goes beyond the duality of attachment and aversion and is the doer of detached actions and the enjoyer of pure knowledge and bliss. It may be noted here that the relation between the empirical self and the transcendental one is one of identity-cum-difference; i.e., there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and transcendental) of the same self<sup>9</sup>, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of the *vibhāvas* which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentially transcendental<sup>10</sup>, though this transcendental state of existence is not actualized at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.

Now the empirical self with non-essential modifications (*vibhāva paryāyas*) from beginning-less past is given to us in the mundane form. These selves (*jīvas*) are infinite in number. Kundakunda classifies empirical selves into five kinds, one sensed to five sensed *jīvas* (living beings)<sup>11</sup>.

The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sense *jīvas*. These one-sensed *jīvas* admit of five-fold classification, namely, the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and, lastly, vegetable-bodied selves<sup>12</sup>. These *jīvas* possess only pleasure-pain consciousness<sup>13</sup>. Two sensed to five-sensed *jīvas* possess end-consciousness<sup>14</sup>. These living beings are constantly engaged in action, which is by its very nature directed to some end, conscious or unconscious. In other words, every action is impregnated with some conscious or unconscious end. It follows from this that actions with unconscious end are absolutely determined having no choice, whereas the actions with conscious end involve freedom of choice.

The former are excluded from the scope of ethics, since they are non-moral actions, but the latter are the subject of ethical enquiry, since they are either moral or immoral. It has been very well recognized that non-human actions are unconscious, and therefore instinctive, and the human actions which are conscious are deliberative. It is with human actions that we are concerned here. Human beings are behaving with other human beings and with other non-human beings either morally or immorally. Now the question is: what end does make human actions moral ? And what end does make human actions immoral ? The Jinist may answer : If the end is good (*śubha*) the action that is directed towards it will be called moral action or right action, and if the end is bad (*aśubha*), the action that is directed towards it will be called immoral action or wrong action.

According to Kundakunda *śubha bhāva* is good and *asubha bhāva* is bad. The examples of *śubha bhāva* are : (1) Devotion to *Arhanta*, *Siddha*, *Sadhu* and to moral values, respect for the persons to be revered<sup>15</sup>. (2) Compassionateness towards those who are in distress and are thirsty and hungry<sup>16</sup>. (3) Charity and a state of mind bereft of anger, pride, deceit and greed<sup>18</sup>. The examples of *aśubha bhāva*<sup>19</sup> are: (1) conduct mixed with excessive sluggishness, (2) mental states infected with anger, pride, deceit and greed (3) sensual indulgence (4) belittlement of others. (5) affliction caused to others. (6) employment of knowledge in unworthy and base object (7) cruelty and immoral inclinations.

The above discussions take us to the view that the worldly human beings who have identified themselves with the non-essential modifications (*vibhāva paryāyas*) from beginning-less past are capable of leading an ethical life in society. They are no doubt useful for society and its development. Though they are dedicated to multi-dimensional social progress, yet they are not completely free from mental tensions in observing moral prescriptions.

Kundakunda seems to be aware of this limitation of socio-ethical life. In his view it is all due to the fact that the self has identified itself with the non-essential modifications (*vibhāva paryāyas*) which manifest themselves in *śubha* and *aśubha bhāvas* or the moral and immoral observances. Kundakunda therefore draws our attention to the essential modifications (*svabhāva paryāyas*) of self. He expresses grief that people at large have not only listened and are not only intensely familiar with

the dualities of life, but also they have expressed them a great deal<sup>20</sup>. No doubt we are in the empirical form of existence from beginning-less past, but his theory of *svabhāva paryāya* reminds us of our spiritual heritage. It endeavours to infuse and instill into our minds the imperativeness of *śuddha bhāvas* after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of *śubha* and *aśubha bhāvas* that bind the self to merely socio-ethical living. The doctrine of *svabhāva paryāya* does not assert that the self is at present perfect but simply affirm that the self ought to attain the height illumined by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but the force is valid for empirical selves having *vibhāva-paryāyas*.

Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of the doctrine of *svabhāva paryāya*, has bequeathed to us the philosophy of the doer and the deed. He proclaims that in whatever deeds the empirical self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendental nature. The empirical self with the emergence of *svabhāva paryāyas* is the doer of its own pure states of existence<sup>21</sup>.

The empirical self having *vibhāva-paryāya* is the doer of impure dispositions. No substance is capable of doing a thing foreign to its nature. And since these impure dispositions do not pertain to the self in its original nature, the transcendental self is denied the agency even of these impure dispositions. The denial of the authorship of auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions points to the super mundane, uncontaminated state of the self.

There is no denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an indeterminable past; so it is the author of these dispositions. If this is not granted, it will make the position of the Jaina indistinguishable from the position of the Sāṃkhya which imputes all actions to the material *buddhi*, and regards the principle of consciousness as immutable. When the Jaina says that the empirical self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply persuades the empirical self to look to *svabhāva paryāya*. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self in its pure nature.

The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the pure modes (*svabhāva paryāyas*) and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its

erroneous identification with the alien nature develops impure dispositions, and thereby it is called their agent<sup>22</sup>. Just as from gold only golden things can be produced, and from iron only iron things, so the enlightened self produces impure modifications (*svabhāva paryāyas*) and the ignorant self produces impure ones (*vibhāva paryāyas*)<sup>23</sup>. When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any incongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its own states and not the doer of anything else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychical dispositions. But if we advance a step further and reflect transcendently, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical dispositions because they are foreign to its nature. Thus the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental *bhāvas*. Besides, it is also their enjoyer<sup>24</sup>.

It has been said that consciousness is the essential characteristic of the self. It manifests itself in psychical dispositions which follow from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The psychical dispositions are of three kinds, namely, *śubha* (auspicious), *aśubha* (inauspicious) and *śuddha* (pure)<sup>25</sup>.

The self is said to possess auspicious psychical dispositions when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral nature<sup>26</sup>. Besides, when the self entangles itself in de-meritorious actions of violence, sensual pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious psychical disposition<sup>27</sup>. Both these auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions continue to captivate the self in the never-ending tensions of misery. Kundakunda, therefore, makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is mated with these two types of psychical dispositions, it will be un-fruitfully dissipating its energies in pursuit of vain mirages. But as soon as the self parts company with these auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions it joins hands with *śuddha* (Pure) psychical dispositions<sup>28</sup>. In other words, the experience of *śuddha* (Pure) psychical disposition automatically obliges the *aśuddha* psychical dispositions (*śubha* and *aśubha*) to disappear.

The inauspicious psychical dispositions should by all means be disapproved, in as much as they will bring about thousands of heartrending tensions. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the impure psychical dispositions associated with the empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happiness as is transcendental, born of the



self, super-sensuous, incomparable, infinite and indestructibly<sup>29</sup>. This transcendental self may be designated as *Sayambhu* (*Svayambhu*)<sup>30</sup>. To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement; it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements, and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests its original nature by transforming itself into six cases; it is at once the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the dative, the ablative, and the locative case respectively<sup>31</sup>.

Kundakunda regards the attainment of *svabhāva paryāya* as the attainment of knowledge-consciousness (*jñāna cetana*) which is the full-fledged and legitimate manifestation of consciousness<sup>32</sup>. The *arhat* or *siddha* state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss<sup>33</sup>.

When the self identifies itself with *vibhāva paryāya* Kundakunda calls it *bahirātman*. When it turns to the significance of *svabhāva paryāya* it is styled *antarātman* and with the emergence and realisation of *svabhāva paryāya* it is designated as *paramātman*<sup>34</sup>.

Kundakunda's doctrine of *svabhāva paryāya* and *vibhāva paryāya* pertaining to self is identical with *svasamaya* and *parasamaya* respectively. In *parasamaya* the self identifies itself with the body and the foreign psychical states of attachment and aversion and the like and in *svasamaya* the self is established in one's own self<sup>35</sup>. The *parasamaya* individual is either moral or immoral; whereas the *svasamaya* individual is out and out spiritual with morality as its social manifestation.

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# 13.

## Some problems regarding the concept of Paryāya

Lopamudra Bhattacharyya

The truth of a beginning is always accompanied with an end. These two are the ultimate phenomena amongst the different conditions on which the life span of a thing is based. Of being different in nature and in timing they both compliment each other in terms of defining the feature of the subject they are contained within, to be of a common existence. With this see-saw like activity they balance up their worth. It unfolds the facts of the struggle for their dependent existence on each other behind their apparent independent existence. So they need to be defined as the two ends of a common thread which indicates the establishment of the concept of the continuous process which consists of the beginning and the end and a strong relationship between them that touches both the end. Thus this concept originates the exchange-based condition like the ‘beginning’ starts its journey to reach to the ‘end’ through the continued medium between and vice-versa. It is a continuous process itself contained within a stage, that is, how a *paryāya* (mode) is to be defined.

The parallel ideas were found in other Philosophical schools. Among them Vedantins and Buddhists are to be named profoundly. *Pariṇāmavāda* and *kṣaṇikavāda* represent Vedanta and Buddhist Philosophies respectively to show the similar idea of modes of the Jainas, although the objectives were different behind the inventions of these ideas. With the help of the idea of ‘mode’ Jainas have shown their favour for the idea of continuity. Jainas neither submit any law of origination nor

the law of cessation in defining the order of the universe, rather they define the order of the universe as it had no beginning and it has no end. In other words, it is existing without any origination and cessation. So it is ever moving; it is ever living. But the idea of cessation in a mode could be questioned. The answer would be thus- the 'mode' is defined in the sense of 'change' and a change approaches to the next stage, so cessation means a new beginning. Thus the order would be seen in the following manner ? From the beginning to the end makes a mode, mode is a stage which follows a new stage or a mode and this order is defined as the change<sup>3</sup>.

The idea of 'mode' has very important place in Jaina Philosophy. Without mode, nothing could be explained and so it seems that it should have been placed within the series of substances as one of the elements. Mode has no self-existence without substance. In the style of deduction it could be said - where there is a substance there is mode ? And if there is no substance there is no mode, so it is not countable to be one of the substances. In the course of explanation of the treatise, Tattvārthasūtra 5.37, Sukhlal Sanghvi refers to 'mode' as an effect of an attribute. Therefore, being an effect of an attribute, mode is described to be devoid of any other attribute. A similar idea has been put forth in the explanation given by Phoolchandra Shastri in Tattvārsūtra 5.41.

Substances are of six kinds. They are ākaśa, dharma, adharma, kāla, pudgala and atmā. Every substance has its own mode of existence, which is specially termed as paryāya in Jaina philosophy. That is why the definition of substance always contains paryāya<sup>4,5,6,7</sup> in it. The number of paryāya is infinite. Pudgala produces paryāya by the assemblage and dissolution within itself and the resultants are varied from the most subtle stage (*skandha*) to the extreme gross stage (*mahāskandha*) and also varied in respect of their powers - such as, assemblage of same undividable powers (*varga*) that is a microbe of the same class in reference to their power (*vargaṇā*) and the other assemblage of different powered microbes of different classes (*vargaṇā*) organizing a newer class (*spardhaka*). Every six stages of *utsarpini* and *avasarpini* are the modes of time. Every smallest unit of time is related with the modes of other substances like *pudgala* and *atmā* so that these are the sign of different modes of time.

But the same way does not set the account of *dharma*, *adharma*

and *ākāśa* and thus, the reverse order can explain well that the cause finding out the way through its effect. By this logical manner of explanation it is seen that every kind of motion is the effect of well coordination between the *dharmāstikāya* and the object which is initiated into motion. Parallely *adharmāstikāya* is obtained through its effect, that is, rest within objects. So here different kind of motions can be the different modes of *dharmāstikāya* for an effect carries over the characteristic features of its causes. Hence in the same way the modes of *dharmāstikāya* are reflected over various kinds of motions. So the back calculation shows the modes are there in *dharmāstikāya* but no such event can be submitted in favour of *dharmāstikāya* except the fashion one object obtains rest. Although motion is dependent on the modes of *kāla*, so apparently it could be assumed as a mode of time. But motion is different from time and here time has only purpose to maintain the account of motion whether *dharmāstikāya* is the auxiliary cause of motion in an object.<sup>9</sup>

The theory of karma is the basis of Jaina philosophy. On the basis of different modes of human life *guṇasthānas* are determined, which are of fourteen kinds. These spiritual stages are dependent on the ten kinds of condition of karma. These are - *bandha*, *sattā*, *udaya*, *udīraṇā*, *utkarṣaṇa*, *apakarṣaṇa*, *saṃkramaṇa*, *upaśama*, *nidhatti* and *nikācana*. Human motives are responsible for the bondage of karma and afflictions are produced by karma. Human motives are the resultant of ignorance. So ignorance is the cause and the bondage of karma stands as the effect of that cause. The different stages of *guṇasthānas* perform as the scales to assess the quality of knowledge. *Guṇasthānas* are the different modes of spiritualistic nature of a human being. Thus, in this way different moods and motives cause bondages. Moods and motives are nothing but the endless modes of human nature.

The relation between the modes and the karma is that of the cause and effect. Emancipation or final liberation is the highest state of a soul. Being one of the six substances soul is endowed with modes<sup>10</sup>. The state of emancipation is the final mode of a soul. As per the characteristics of the modes every mode has its origination and cessation. And that is how one mode always follows the other mode while the other follows the next one. So a substance contains endless modes in it. Also in the state of emancipation this rule has no exception. Here only thing noticeable in

the commentaries of the Philosophical treatises is that, the final mode, that is, emancipation has its origination but no cessation.<sup>11,12</sup>

Thus, on the whole, it is found that there are bondage and liberation, the two different modes in a same soul. But there are some vital steps in between these two. They could be arranged in following manner to better explain the relation between the theory of karma and the modes. There is final liberation because there is enjoyment of afflictions. There are afflictions because there is bondage. There is bondage because there is karma. There is karma because there is ignorance. There are so many species other than human being according to their level of ignorance. Ignorance is a mode itself. A being is under the process of rotation in reincarnations. Different modes are considered there and that is how the concept of reincarnation is relevant. Reincarnations are there. That is how the enjoyment of the fruits are considered to be extended from the previous to the next birth. As the different modes of a soul, every incarnation in a specific category of a species is the indication of fruition of a karma carried over from the previous birth.

The innate knowledge and the knowledge about the former lives have very important place in the context of knowledge. Knowledge is an essential quality of a soul. But the order of regression and development in the level of knowledge occur due to the modes. There are modes and they are needed to be explained. Without karma it is difficult to show the variation in the cause behind the different kinds of modes. Such variation occurs due to the different levels and different qualities of knowledge starting from the lowest level which is called falsehood (*mithyatva*). Thus the modes nicely define the significance of knowledge. Concern of knowledge in defining the condition of karma.

In the chapter on *pramāṇa*, *anumāna* is one of the most important method of obtaining right knowledge. But the process through which one obtains *anumiti* is complex in nature. Here *paryāya* plays an important role in obtaining *anumiti*. Ascertainment of *sādhya* with the help of *hetu* is *anumāna*. As the act of ascertainment is based on the relationship between the *sādhya* and *hetu*, *sādhya* stands for the effect whereas *hetu* stands for the cause behind the effect. Cause and effect always are parts of one subject hence they are the successive stages of one subject which is nothing but the different modes of a subject. So the *anumāna* stands

for the collection of different modes and *anumiti* is confirmation of a subject in its one particular mode. So without the concept of mode there would have never been the concept of *anumāna*. The order of cause and effect is changeable in accordance with situation in which a deduction can be made. Thus the same *hetu* (argument) plays the role of cause at times and also as an effect sometimes.

*Anekānta* (non-absolutism) is one of the best way to define a subject by completion of different aspect of it positively. Different facets are nothing but different characters of a subject. Different characters are originated from the different modes. Thus *anekānta* focuses on the various modes of single subject. *Dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* have been discussed earlier. Their attributes such as *gati* (motion) and *sthiti* (rest) will be discussed here. Motion means the order of succession or progression and hence succession itself is the proof of precedence. So it has been found that precedence has been the cause to the effect, that is, succession. For motion it needs a perfect order of cause and effect which is an order of modes. This order also shows the fact that an effect can play the role of cause to the next effect. So when motion is referred to, every cause can be an effect and vice-versa. So motion means accumulation of various modes together. The concept of rest could be defined with the help of the concept of motion. The change of modes is motion. Motionlessness is rest. Rest comes from *adharmāstikāya*. By the method of *anumāna*, *adharmāstikāya* is ascertained from its effect ? Motionlessness. *Adharmāstikāya* is an instrumental cause for motionlessness. Noticeable point is that every effect possesses companionship of its causes and thus characteristics of its causes. However, modes regulate motion and motionlessness both by their own existences. Without changes in modes there is no motion. Changes from one mode to the next produce motion. So motion is the resultant of modes in every substance. Where there is motion there is *dharmāstikāya*. Thus the presence of *dharmāstikāya* within every substance is inferred. But to set *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* up together in a single receptacle is quite impossible because of their contending nature. Thus modes in substance indicate their applicability.

Motion is the presage of life. Every species of flora and fauna reveals endless forms of single corporeal. It occurs due to bondage of karma. The source of bondage is falsehood. Falsehood brings other substances in touch with soul and make them to affect it. This function

continues till the soul does not get emancipated. This is a great journey of a corporeal from falsehood to the ultimate truth. This journey needs every substance to participate according to their responsibilities. Thus each of them is activated towards one objective. This is what makes this world full of motion, full of life and ever-cycling. So every performance of this world and existence of five fold inanimate substances are explained well because of mode.

According to the Jaina theory one mode may contain other modes in it. The example is as follows : the age of a human being is defined by the different modes ? Like childhood, youth and old age etc. and human being itself is a mode of a corporeal. So being a human being itself is a collective mode of multiple number of various modes. From the above example two types of modes are depicted here. The corporeal itself is a mode of a soul for which the time of its origin is beyond to be known. On the other side human being and its different states are the examples of such modes for which the time of their origin could be known<sup>13</sup>. This order shows existence of modes under another modes<sup>14</sup>.

In the definition of the presage of the sixfold substances, two essential characteristics have been considered ? One of which is mode. From the main part of the discussion it is well understood that mode is the source of every kind of changes and thus it regulates motion, rest and as well as continuity simultaneously. According to the theory ? mode means a particular condition which has a certain life-span with a beginning and an end<sup>15,16,17</sup>. A soul travels a long way through modes from one incarnation to another till it does not get emancipated. Perversity has two classes according to their origination, one of which is originated and the other is characterised as originless, that has no beginning. The state of perversity is one of the several modes that a soul assumes in its journey in the world of birth and death. This originless perversity seems to be an exception to the rule of being a mode as it has no beginning.

Emancipation is the final state of a pure being. This state is devoid of any kind of time limit. By this rule cessation of this mode has been prevented. Though the process of cessation of the previous mode has been considered as necessary in the state of emancipation<sup>18</sup>.

The journey of spiritual development starts from the state of perversity due to *anādi mithyātva* and achieves completion within the state of emancipation for ever without cessation of the time limit.



Achievement of final liberation from the afflictions is a common interest of every philosophical thought. The path of final liberation is bestowed with the glory of its hardship and it needs the balance between right knowledge and perfect conduct. The word hardship represents a little of the reality experienced in the path of final liberation. This is why the final liberation is most precious for. The mode of emancipation is cessationless.

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