THE DARŚANAMĀRGĀ SECTION OF THE ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA
AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY TIBETAN COMMENTATORS
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BU STON RIN CHEN GRUB)

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1.

The Path of Vision (or Insight) (darśanamārga, mthoṅ lam)¹ is the
first immediate and truly adequate full comprehension of Truth by a giv-
en person, or arising in a given stream of personality. It is the phase
which for the first time eradicates Defilements (kleśa, ṭhon moṅs),² or
Obstacles (āvaraṇa, sgrīb pa),³ though, it is true, not yet all of them.
But even the further stages of (at least the Supramundane) Path largely
consist in a kind of repetition of the darśanamārga.⁴ The latter may
thus well be called the decisive stage of the Buddhist Path to Salvation.

While investigating a certain line of thought in the Yogācāra treat-
ment of the darśanamārga,⁵ I had to deal with the exposition of this
subject in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (mṇon pa kun btus = AS)⁶ ascribed to
Asaṅga. In addition to the Indian commentary, viz. the Abhidharmasamuccaya-

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¹ Cp., e.g., E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. 3. Aufl. Berlin 1969, 127
and 331; Abhidharma-Studien III. WZKS 15, 1971, 83f. and 86ff.: H.V. Guenther, Phi-
L. Schmithausen, Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus.
Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Hrsg. v. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1978,
104ff. and 110ff.

² E.g. AS 66,15f.


⁴ See references in n.1.

⁵ A detailed exposition of the result of this investigation will be presented in a
later publication which is still in progress.

⁶ AS 66,3-68,2; AS, 110b1 - 111b5. The Sanskrit text of the passage is not preserved in
manuscript form; what we find in Pradhan's edition is only the editor's reconstruction,
mainly from the Chinese, with the help of the pratikas included in the ASBh. Additional
help for - at least approximately - restoring the original wording is offered by a
quasi-quotations in AAA 347,1-5, 7-14, and 20ff. - AS 67,5-13 does not form part of
the text of the AS but belongs to the ASBh (see n.52).
bhāṣya ascribed to one Jinaputra by the Tibetan tradition, there are several autochthonous Tibetan commentaries on the AS. So far, I have examined five Tibetan commentaries, viz. those written by Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), Bo don pañ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451), gSer mdo pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507), and Mi pham 'Jam dbyaṅs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912). As for the passage concerned, Bo don's commentary is by far the most detailed one; next in length and substance are the commentaries of Bu ston and Śākya mchog ldan, whereas rGyal tshab rje's is significantly shorter and less substantial. Mi pham's commentary to the passage is hardly more than excerpts from AS and ASBh.

In the present paper, I shall limit myself to a discussion of Bu ston's commentary on the passage, and to a provisional one at that. The other Tibetan commentaries will be referred to only occasionally. In order to understand and evaluate Bu ston's explanations it is, however, necessary to see how the topic of darśanamārga is treated in the basic text itself as well as in the Indian commentary which is of course authoritative for the Tibetans. This means that I have to begin with an outline of the darśanamārga section of the AS and the ASBh.

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6 The paragraph on darśanamārga is explained in ASBh 76,19-78,22 (= § 85); Peking Tanjur, Sems tsam, Ši, 69a3ff. and 259a4ff.

6a For other ascriptions see J.W.de Jong, in: TP LIX, 340f. (= Buddhist Studies by J.W. de Jong, ed. G.Schopen, Berkeley 1979, 602ff.).

7 Chos mgon pa kun las btus kyi tīk rnam bṣad Ši ma'i 'od zer (The Collected Works of Bu ston. Ed. Lokesh Chandra, vol.20 (VA), New Delhi 1971, 79ff.).


11 mGon pa kun btus kyi rnam graṅs sna tshogs bṣad pa. Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho. Vol.70, Gangtok 1975, 401ff.

12 Bo don 658,6-699,5. As also indicated in the edition, a piece of text reaching from 692,4 to 696,6 is misplaced (it has to be inserted in 701,2) and belongs to the section of the bhāvanāmārga.

13 Bu ston 578,4-585,1.

14 Šākya 220,5-227,1.

15 rGyal tshab 154b3-156b1.

16 Mi pham 466,2-468,5.
The Abhidharmasamuccaya offers four definitions, or characterizations, of the \textit{darśanamārga}, three being styled a "summary" (samāsataḥ,\textsuperscript{17} mdor bsdu na), the fourth being "detailed" (prabhedaṭaḥ,\textsuperscript{18} rab tu dbye na). All these definitions can be traced back to other, mostly clearly older, sources, though to this a proviso applies in the fourth case.

The first definition characterizes the \textit{darśanamārga} as "a concentrative absorption and comprehension ... consisting in non-perception, or non-apprehension" (anupalambhaḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ..., mi ēmigs pa'i tiṅ he 'dzin daṅ ʿes rab ...),\textsuperscript{19} i.e., as another passage of the \textit{AS}\textsuperscript{20} makes clear, non-perception of [the dichotomy of] what is apprehended and what apprehends (grāhya and grāhaka, gzun ba and 'dzin pa), i.e. of object and subject imagined as separate entities.

This definition of the \textit{darśanamārga} as "non-perception" or "non-apprehension" (anupalambha), reminiscent of the terminology of the Prajñāpāramitā,\textsuperscript{21} closely resembles the characterization of the \textit{darśana-mārga} found in the Yogācāra works ascribed to Maitreya(nātha)\textsuperscript{22} and especially in some verse fragments closely related to these, one of which is actually quoted in the \textit{AS} as stemming from a Sūtra.\textsuperscript{23} According to the Maitreya texts, "non-perception" does not mean complete cessation of all experience but only cessation of ordinary experience, viz. experience dichotomized into object and subject, this cessation resulting at the same time in the manifestation of non-dichotomic absolute reality (dharmadhātu, chos dbyiṅs).\textsuperscript{24}

The second definition of the \textit{AS} describes the \textit{darśanamārga} as a comprehension in which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{AS} 66,3 = \textit{AA} 347,1.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{AS} 66,6 = \textit{AA} 347,2; \textit{ASBh} 77,1 has prabhedaṭaḥ.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{AS} 66,3f.; cp.\textit{AA} 347,2.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{AS} 82,18.


\textsuperscript{22} Cp., e.g., Mahāyānasūtra-laṅkārā XI.47d; Madhyāntavibhāga (ed. Nagao) I.7-8; Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (ed.Nozawa) 15,8-10 (+ 48,21ff.) und 17,7ff.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{AS} 82,23; in Mahāyānasārgagraha (ed.Lamotte) III.17 the same verse is traced to a Yogāvibhāga which is ascribed to Maitreya by Kuei-chi (cp. R.Yūki, Yuishiki-gaku Tenseki-shi. Tokyo 1962, 60). Another pertinent verse is quoted, without indication of its source, in Triṃśikābhasya (ed. Lévi) 42,5-8.

\textsuperscript{24} Cp., e.g., Mahāyānasūtra-laṅkārā XIV.23ff. and VI.7-8; Dharmadharmatāvibhāga 15,9f. (+ 49,2f.).
the same, or alike (samasamālambyālambakajñāna).\textsuperscript{25}

This expression stems from the Śrāvakabhūmi\textsuperscript{26} where it is, however, not applied to the darśanamārga but to the consummation of a certain stage of the Preparatory Path, a stage at which the mental activity which investigates the four Noble Truths makes itself its object and, starting from the perception of its own impermanence, comprehends the four Noble Truths as bearing also on itself, or, to look at it from another point of view, comprehends even itself as also being characterized by these Truths.\textsuperscript{27} In the Mahāyānasamgraha,\textsuperscript{28} as in the AS, the same expression is used but now, in contradistinction to the Śrāvakabhūmi, applied to comprehension free from imaginative and conceptualizing activity (nirvikalpa-jñāna), i.e. to the darśanamārga. In this case, the expression should mean, in analogy to its usage in the Śrāvakabhūmi, that the nirvikalpa-jñāna, the true essence of which is True Reality (tathatā, de bzin ŋid), comprehends this tathatā as its own essence, or comprehends itself as being, on the absolute level, nothing but this tathatā.

There can be no doubt that this definition, like the preceding one, is, in spite of its terminological roots in the Śrāvakabhūmi, essentially Mahāyānist. But it is expressed in positive terms, in contrast to the first which is negative.

The third definition of the AS\textsuperscript{29} characterizes the darśanamārga as comprehension cognizing dharma:

1) in the case of one's own person, without applying the conventional notion of "living being" (sattva);
2) again in the case of one's own person, without applying the conventional notion of "dharma";
3) in the case of everybody and everything, without applying either notion.

\textsuperscript{25} AS 66,4 = ASBh 76,20 (-ālambana- has to be changed into -ālambaka-: cp. the following note and Triṃśikābhāṣya 43,18 where we should of course read samasamālambyālambakam). AS\textsubscript{t} 110b2 renders the compound by dmigs par bya ba dañ dmigs par byed pa mnyam pas mnyam par šes pa, possibly implying an interpretation similar to that of the ASBh (76,20ff.; cp.n.50).

\textsuperscript{26} Ed. Shukla (Patna 1973), 499,7f. and 13.

\textsuperscript{27} Ib. 498,2ff.

\textsuperscript{28} III.9 (p.53,6ff.).

\textsuperscript{29} AS 66,5 (= ASBh 76,21f.): prayātman-apanītasattvasaṃketa-dharmaśaṃketa-sarvato-'panītobhayasaṃketa-lambanadharmaṃjñānam api tat. AS\textsubscript{t} 110b2f.: so so rañ la sems can gyi brda dañ | chos kyi brda bsal ba dañ | thams cad du ghi ga'i brda bsal ba la dmigs pa'i chos šes pa'añ de yin no ||.
This definition, almost unintelligible in the wording of the AS, is taken from the Viniścayamārgaṇī section of the Yogācārabhūmi\(^{30}\) where it is found in a more extended form. It analyzes the darśanamārga into three successive comprehensions the first two of which, to say it in other words, cognize the constituents of one's own person under the aspect of "Essencelessness of Person" (pudgalanairātmya, gañ zag gi bdag med) and under the aspect of the "Essencelessness of dharmas" (chos kyi bdag med), respectively, whereas the third moment extends this two-fold insight to all dharmas. This definition can be characterized as a kind of combination of a typically (though not exclusively) "Hīnayāninist" and a specifically Mahāyānist element, and as using, though still rather economically, an analytical pattern.

The fourth and most detailed characterization\(^{31}\) looks purely "Hīnayāninist" and describes the darśanamārga as a process of sixteen moments, the number sixteen resulting from the fact that it is now the traditional four Noble Truths that are regarded to be its object and to be cognized successively, each of them, again, requiring a set of four cognitive phases. Structurally and also terminologically, this description agrees with the darśanamārga theory of the Vaibhāṣikas.\(^{32}\) But the concrete interpretation\(^{33}\) of the functions of the four phases, actually given for one but valid for all four Truths, is, in the AS, highly artificial and completely different from the more natural one offered by the Vaibhāṣikas, and it is not known to me from any source prior to the AS.

According to the AS, the first phase, viz. the dharmajñānakṣaṇī (chos 'ses pa'i bzhod pa), is an undefiled immediately perceiving comprehension of the respective Noble Truth itself.\(^{34}\) Through it one abandons the Defilements to be abandoned by the [first] vision of that Truth.\(^{35}\) The second phase (dharmajñāna, chos 'ses pa) is an immediately perceiving comprehension of the Liberation from Defilements effectuated by the first phase.\(^{36}\)

\(^{30}\) Yt. Zi 72b3ff.

\(^{31}\) AS 66,6-10; cp. AAĀ 347,2-4.


\(^{33}\) AS 66,12ff.; cp. AAĀ 347,7ff. and ASBh 77,2ff.

\(^{34}\) AS 66,15 = AS\(_t\) 111a1: sduŋ bsal gyi bden pa mthon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i 'ses rab ∼ duḥkhasaty(apratyakṣ)ānubhāving anāsravā prajñā (cp. AAĀ 347,8 and ASBh 77,3f.).

\(^{35}\) AS 66,15f. = AS\(_t\) 111a1: gañ gi< > sduŋ bsal mthon ba pha bya ba'i hton moṅs pa spoṅ ba ste ∼ yāya duḥkharādanaḥnātāvyaṃ klesaṃ praṇahāti (cp. AAĀ 347,8f. and ASBh 77,4f.).

\(^{36}\) AS 66,17f. = AAĀ 347,9f.: yena jñānena kṣaṇyantarāṃ vimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroṭi.
The third phase (anvayajñānakṣānti, rjes su rtogs pa' i bsod pa) cognizes the first two phases, and the fourth phase (anvayajñāna, rjes su rtogs pa'i sles pa) confirms the third. Thus, the first two phases comprehend an object (grāhyā, gzūṅ ba, viz. the respective Truth and Liberation), the last two comprehend the subject (grāhaka, 'dzin pa, i.e. comprehension itself).

There can hardly be any doubt that these four definitions or descriptions of the darśanamārga offered by the AS are heterogeneous, both historically and from the point of view of content. Some even seem to be contradictory, esp. the first definition which has to be understood, in the light of its sources as well as of the AS itself, as defining the darśanamārga as non-perception or non-apprehension of grāhyā and grāhaka, and the fourth which expressly declares the darśanamārga to consist in comprehensions of grāhyā and of grāhaka, respectively. It seems that the author of the AS has simply juxtaposed several heterogeneous definitions of darśanamārga he had found in his sources (perhaps reinterpreting the last one for reasons I could specify only hypothetically). In juxtaposing these heterogeneous definitions, the author of the AS has, however, quite apparently arranged them according to a deliberate principle, proceeding from the apophatic and unitary to the cataphatic and analytical, and at the same time from the purely Mahāyānaist to the mixed and finally to the essentially "Hinayānist" characterization. But beyond this attempt at systematically arranging the materials, there does not seem to be any attempt at uniting the heterogeneous elements into a philosophically or doctrinally coherent system.

Several patterns by means of which this could have been achieved had already been developed in different passages of the Yogācārabhūmi. One of these patterns was the distribution of different descriptions of the darśanamārga to different Paths of Salvation: to that of the Śrāvakas (and Pratyekabuddhas) on the one hand, and to that of the Bodhisattvas on the other. In the AS, too, there are, indeed, one or two pas-

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37 AS 66,19f. = AS³ 111a3f.: ... sdu gbsnal la chos sles pa'i bsod pa dañ | sdu gbsnal la chos sles pa ... mthon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i sles rab = duñkhe dharma- jñānakṣāntau duñkhe dharma jñāne ca ... pratyakṣānubhāvīny anāsravā prajñā (cp. AAA 347,10ff. and ASBh 77,10).

38 AS 66,22 = AAA 347,12: yena jñānena tām anvayajñānakṣāntim avadhārayati.

39 AS 67,1f. (read dharma jñānakṣāntijñānair with ASBh 77,13f. and AS³ 111a5 <chos> sles pa'i bsod pa dañ sles pa rnam s kyis).

40 For this I have to refer to the study in progress mentioned in n.4a.

41 E.g. Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. Dutt, Patna 1966) 25,22ff. - For a detailed exposition and discussion of this and the following theories and passages, I must, once more,
sages favouring such an interpretation, but they are just another heterogeneous element not applicable to the present passage which by choosing the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" seems to preclude any material distinction.

According to another model, the darśanamārga proper consists in the Mahāyānist uniform awareness of True Reality (tathatā, de bāin ūid), and the "Hīnayānist" type of darśanamārga is nothing but a subsequent analytical conceptualization. This model, too, is hardly applicable to the AS because in another passage of this text it is clearly stated that not only this subsequent conceptualization but also the darśanamārga proper consists of 16 moments.

A further model tries to cope with the difficulties by distributing the different characterizations of the darśanamārga to different levels of establishing Truth. But this model, too, can hardly be intended by the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" definitions in the AS. This distinction leaves us with the result that the author of the AS has, at least in the present context and perhaps with the exception of the reinterpretation of the "Hīnayānist" detailed description, confined himself to collecting and arranging heterogeneous traditional materials without achieving, or even attempting, doctrinal consistency. This task was, as it were, left to the commentators.

3.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya abhasya (AS Bh), goes beyond the AS mainly in two ways:

Firstly, it shows a tendency towards assimilating the content of the four characterizations to one another. Of primary importance in this context is its interpretation of the fourth description, i.e. of the darśanamārga in 16 moments: The AS Bh takes the first moment of each set of four as a perceptual comprehension not of the respective Truth itself refer the reader to the prospective publication announced in n.4a.

42 Cp. esp. AS 94,7ff. (1.8: prativedhaviśeṣaḥ!).
43 E.g. Yt Zi 302b4ff.; 'i 15a5ff.; cp. also Zi 73a5ff.
44 AS 93,9ff. = AS t 131a5ff.: tattvābhisamaṇḍaḥ katamaḥ | gañ mthoṅ ba'i lam gyi sems kyi skad cig bcu drug po dag thob pa'o (= yañ śoḍāsadarśanamārgacittakṣaṇapratilambhaḥ) | mthoṅ ba'i lam la ni satavyavasthāpanāḥ abhisamayāntikāni sambhījñānāni pratilabhate, na tu sāṃmukhikarotī (cp. AS Bh 122,18ff.).
45 Yt Zi 123b6 (ff.); cp. Bu ston 578,6ff.
in the concrete-collective sense of all individual factors as characterized by that Truth, but as a comprehension of the uniform true essence (tathatā, de bzin ūnid) of that Truth.⁴⁶ And the second moment of each set is understood as referring to the "transformation of the basis" (āśrayaparivṛtti, gnas gyur pa)⁴⁷ which, as another passage⁴⁸ suggests, is to be understood as that same tathatā, although now freed from the respective Defilements.

In this way at least these two phases have become, to a certain extent, compatible with the first three definitions of the AS. As to these, the ASBh does not seem conscious of any incompatibility between them. On the contrary, it suggests that they are to be understood to refer to different aspects of one and the same experience. The first definition is interpreted as intending what I would call the formal aspect of the darśanamārga, viz. its being a synthesis of mental calmness (śamatha, ži gnas) and clear insight (vipaśyanā, lhag mthoṅ) free from imaginative, conceptualizing and reflecting activity (vikalpa, rnam par rtog pa).⁴⁹ The explanation of the second definition can be understood as clarifying what is the content of the darśanamārga, viz. tathatā, this time, it is true, characterized by the non-existence of grāhya and grāhaka,⁵⁰ whereas the third definition seems to be interpreted as stressing what is not the content of the darśanamārga, viz. the nimittas (mtshan ma),⁵¹ i.e. the pseudo-objective correlates of vikalpa.

Thus to the ASBh the main difference between the definitions would lie in their indicating different aspects of the darśanamārga, and, of course, in the different degree of their analytical elaboration. The

⁴⁶ ASBh 77,2ff.: tatra duḥkhe dharmaṃvānākṣāntiḥ ... duḥkhhasatiye tattathatā-pratyakṣānu-bhāvinī ... prajñā.
⁴⁷ ASBh 77,6ff.: taṅyā kṣāntyā ... parivartita āśraye tadanantaram yena jñānena tām āśrayaparivṛttiṃ pratyānubhavati, tad "duḥkhe dharmaṃvānām" ity ucyate; cp. also 78,13.
⁴⁸ Cp. ASBh 77,12f. saying that the [Supramundane] Path, insofar as it belongs to the dharmaṃvāna group (i.e. the first and second moment of each set), has tathatā for its object (dharmaṃvānapakṣasya mārgasya tathatā viṣayāḥ); cp. also Bu ston 581,6: rnam grol te bden pa'i de bzin ūnid gnas gyur de (text: te) Šākya 225,7f.: "dharmaṃvānā (= tathatā) is twofold: purely by nature and pure in the sense of being freed from [accidental] impurities; insight into it is [accordingly] also twofold: dharma[mānā]kṣānti and dharmaṃvāna" (chos ūnid la gnis te | raṅ bzin rnam dag gi dāṅ | glo (text: blo) bur rnam dag gi'o || de šes pa la yaṅ gnis te | chos bzod pa dāṅ | chos šes so ||).
⁴⁹ ASBh 76,19f.
⁵⁰ ASBh 76,20f.: tena grāhyagrāhakābhāvatathatāprativedhā.
⁵¹ ASBh 76,21-26.
secondary importance of such differences in the view of the ASbh - and this leads us to the second important contribution of the ASbh going beyond the AS itself - is evinced by its assertion that the whole prolix treatment of the darśanamārga in the AS is only a makeshift (vyavasthānamātra) for the sake of instruction and preparation, the real nature of the supramundane state of the darśanamārga being accessible to personal experience only.  

Inspite of these important contributions to a doctrinally consistent interpretation of the AS, the ASbh does not, at this point, discuss the question whether there is any difference between the darśanamārga experience of the Bodhisattvas and that of the Śrāvakas (as one would be inclined to assume on the basis of other passages) and in what relation the definitions of the AS stand to this difference.

4.

This problem leads me to Bu ston.

The first thing to state is that Bu ston makes ample use of the explanations of the ASbh, sometimes rendering them more explicit, as, e.g., in the case of the first definition where he expressly states that nirvikalpa in the ASbh corresponds to anupalambha in the AS.

Sometimes Bu ston supplies additional word-explanations, as, e.g., when analysing the compounds duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣaṇī, etc. Such explanations are usually helpful but occasionally questionable, e.g. when he understands the last words of the third definition as a separate, positive element, interpreting the word chos (dharma) as referring to

52 ASbh 77,23ff. (= § 85C which, although it has somehow crept into the Chinese version, has to be included from the text of the AS on the basis of AS7).
53 E.g. ASbh 123,5-7.
54 Bu ston 580,4: ... rham par mi rtog pa dmigs pa'i rnam rtog gi gñen por gyur pas mi dmigs pa ... 
55 Bu ston 581,2f.; of the two analyses of the compound dharmajñānakṣaṇī, it is obviously the second one ((chos) sves pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas sdug bden la bzod pa) which suits the peculiar interpretation of this term given in the AS (AS 66,13ff.: dharmajñānam katamat | prayogamārga ... dharmavicāraṇājñānam | kṣaṇīḥ katamā | pūrvavicāraṇādhipatīṃ kṛtva ... duḥkhasatyapratyakteṣāmubhāvini ... prajñā | ; text changed acc. to AS7 and AAA 347,7f.); the first analysis (chos kyi de kho na ŋid sves pa'i phyur bzod pa), on the other hand, agrees, at least structurally, with the analysis of the term given in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 350,5 (dharmajñānārtham kṣaṇīḥ).
56 See n.29.
the tathātā.\textsuperscript{57} Such an interpretation is hardly justified, neither by the wording of the AS nor by that of its source, the Viniścayasamgraha-ṇī.\textsuperscript{58} Another example is Bu ston's explanation of the word dharma in the expression duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti, where he takes it to indicate the specific and common features [of the entities included in the Truth of Suffering] expounded in the Sūtras, viz. impermanence, etc.\textsuperscript{59} This interpretation, though reconcilable with the Tibetan text of the AS,\textsuperscript{60} is at variance with the interpretation of the AS Bh,\textsuperscript{61} which is almost certainly right in understanding dharma in this passage as "doctrinal texts (dealing with the Truth of Suffering)".

It is, however, other aspects of Bu ston's commentary which are more interesting.

Although Bu ston reproduces,\textsuperscript{62} almost literally, the remarks of the AS Bh on the makeshift character of all analytical treatment of the darśanamārga, he himself seems to take the analytical description in the AS much more seriously:

When explaining the detailed analysis (=fourth definition) of the darśanamārga, Bu ston points out that the statement of the AS\textsuperscript{63} that the first two phases of each set comprehend the object, i.e. the tathātā,\textsuperscript{64} whilst the last two phases comprehend the subject, i.e. [the respectively preceding phases of] correct comprehension (yaḥ dag paʾi ye śes, samyag-jñāna)\textsuperscript{64} [itself], excludes [by its wording] both the theory that the darśanamārga does not have any finite entity as its object\textsuperscript{65} as also the view of Abhyākaragupta (Abhayākaragupta) who explains this statement of the AS in the sense of [comprehension of] the Essenceness of

\textsuperscript{57} Bu ston 580,6ff.: ... brda ste | 'du śes bsal ba ste | ma dmigs par gtogs (read rtogs) pa daṅ (t) | de bāṅ gšegs paʾi chos de bāṅ hīd śes paʾo ||.
\textsuperscript{58} See n.30.
\textsuperscript{59} Bu ston 581,3: deʾi dbaṅ du byas paʾi chos mi rtag pa la sog mdo sde las bstan pa raṅ mtshan spyi mtshan rnams so ||.
\textsuperscript{60} AS 110b7: sdug bsal gyi bden paʾi dbaṅ du byas paʾi chos bstan pa rnams so ||.
\textsuperscript{61} AS Bh 77,2: duḥkhasatyādhiḥkārikas uṭrādīdharmam; cp. also the Tibetan translation (Śi 69a8): sdug bsal gyi[s] bden paʾi dban du byas paʾ mdo la sog paʾi chos ... .
\textsuperscript{62} Bu ston 583,3ff.
\textsuperscript{63} AS 67,1ff. (see n.39).
\textsuperscript{64} Cp. AS Bh 77,12ff.
\textsuperscript{65} Bu ston 582,3ff.: 'dis mthoṅ lam chos can yul du mi byed zer ba bsal žiṅ | ... according to my colleague Tszltrim Phuntsog, chos can means kun rdzob bden pa (which would, in the present context, especially consist of samyagjñāna in opposition to tathātā = chos hīd).
both object and subject.\footnote{Bu ston 582,4: ... A bhya | gzuṅ 'dzin raṅ bzin med pa la 'chod pa'ah bsal lo |]. Cp. Abhayākaragupta, Munimatālaṅkāra (Peking-Tanjur, dBu ma, Ha), 243a8ff., where the passage under discussion (viz. AS 67,1f.) is explained as expressing that "in the [darśanamārga] object and subject are comprehended to be without essence (niḥsvabhāva)" (b2: 'dir gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa dag raṅ bzin med pa ẖid du rtoogs so |]). The position of Abhayākaragupta seems to have been accepted by Bo don, who glosses the passage AS 67,1f. accordingly (697,2): ... chos bzhod daṅ chos śes kuiś bzhū | ba raṅ bzin med par rtoogs la | tles bzhod rjes śes kyis | 'dzin pa raṅ bzin med par rtoogs so |]. Cp. also Bo don 689,5 stating that anupalambha (AS 66,3) does not mean not perceiving anything at all but means comprehension of object and subject as lacking essence: ... mi dmigs pa śes pa yah ci yah mi dmigs pa min gyi |>| bzhū (read: gzuṅ) 'dzin raṅ bzin med par ... śes pa yin la | ... .}

Moreover, Bu ston precedes the presentation of his own interpretation of the wording of the AS with a section where he refutes other theories of how to understand the purport of the darśanamārga section of the AS, discarding, in favour of the 16 moments theory, the opinions that the darśanamārga consists of one,\footnote{Bu ston 579,1-4; cp. also 578,4ff. referring to statements on the darśanamārga occurring in other texts/systems (gzuṅ gžan).} two, or four moments only.\footnote{Bo don 662,5ff., adding (665,2ff.) a theory according to which the darśanamārga consists of eight moments.} Bu ston does not specify these theories; they are, however, more extensively described and discussed in the commentaries of Bo don and Śākya mchog ldan,\footnote{Śākya 224,5ff. (one moment); 225,4f. (two moments); 226,4f. (four moments).} but a detailed investigation of this matter would exceed the limits of this paper.

Finally, at the end of his commentary on the darśanamārga, Bu ston adds a paragraph\footnote{Bu ston 584,6-585,1.} in which a theory suggested by a passage of the Viṁścayasamgrahaṇī\footnote{Vt Zi 134a1.} (and there connected with the theory of the darśanamārga as consisting in three successive phases) - viz. the theory that the four groups of Defilements (kleśa, ūn moṅs) to be removed by the first Insight into the four Noble Truths, respectively, are removed simultaneously - is refuted in favour of the 16 moments theory which asserts their gradual elimination.

On the other hand, the analysis of the Vaibhāṣikas, which agrees with the fourth theory of the AS in acknowledging 16 moments (though limiting the darśanamārga to the first fifteen moments and grouping the sixteenth
with the bhāvanāmārga\textsuperscript{72} and in using for them the same terms, is grouped by Bu ston under the heading of "positions to be established or affirmed" (gṣag), along with the exposition of the AS itself but expressly set off from it as not forming part of the AS's own system.\textsuperscript{73} In another passage,\textsuperscript{74} by the way, Bu ston states that the system of the Śrāvakas, though not primarily and clearly set forth in the AS, is largely in agreement with [the doctrine of] this text.

The three "summary" definitions of the AS are regarded by Bu ston as describing the nature (ho bo) of the darśanamārga\textsuperscript{75} (i.e. of the darśanamārga as a whole, and therefore of any of its moments), thus not at all as alternatives to the 16 moments theory.

For the third theory of the AS, this seems to imply that Bu ston understands it as not referring to three successive moments but to three aspects of the darśanamārga which would be included in each of the 16 moments.

Let me now return to the question which could not be answered in the case of the ASbh, viz. the question whether this harmonized structure is meant to describe the darśanamārga of Śrāvakas, or Bodhisattvas, or both. Fortunately, Bu ston's commentary contains some pertinent remarks which suggest at least a tendency to consider the exposition of the darśanamārga in the AS as valid for all vehicles, though Bu ston is obviously aware of the fact that the wording of most of the different elements of that exposition seems to fit one vehicle better than the others.

E.g., the wording of the 16 moments theory is, it is true, primarily Śrāvakayānist, but Bu ston\textsuperscript{76} asserts that it is also valid for the darśanamārga of Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, provided that it is given some additional qualification: The AS does not, admittedly, mention any removal of the respective Obstacle to [knowing all] that has to be known (jñeyāvaraṇa, śes sgrib) but only speaks of the removal of the respective [Obstacle consisting in] Defilements

\textsuperscript{72} Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Patna 1967) 352,19ff.; cp. Bu ston 579,6 and 585,1; Bo doṅ 660,6ff.

\textsuperscript{73} Bu ston 579,1 + 579,4: dgag gṣag spaṅ gsum gyi ... gños pa la | mdoṅ daṅ raṅ lugs gños ...

\textsuperscript{74} Bu ston 570,5: gūṅ 'dir dchos su gsal bar mi 'byuṅ yaṅ ēnan thos kyi rnam gṣag phal cher de daṅ mthun te |. Cp. also D.Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatatagarbha et du gotra. Paris 1969, 69, n.2.

\textsuperscript{75} Bu ston 580,3ff.

\textsuperscript{76} Cp. also Śākya 222,5f.
(kleśa, ḍon moṁs); yet a removal of the jñeyāvaraṇa, too, has, according to Bu ston, to be considered as being implied with regard to Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, the former being freed from the concept of object to be apprehended (gzuṅ rtog, grahyavikalpa) but not from the concept of an apprehending subject (grāhavikalpa), whereas the Bodhisattva is freed from both. 77 However, such a doctrine with regard to the Pratyekabuddha, especially, is alien to the AS and, as far as I can see, to the older Yogācāra school as a whole. It rather belongs to the tradition of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, 78 a text which, as is well known, has been very influential in Tibetan Buddhism and has been commented upon by many Tibetan scholars, 79 including Bu ston himself. 80 

This connection with the Abhisamayālaṅkāra tradition is also confirmed by another passage 81 where Bu ston says that according to the method [of describing and practising the darśanamārga insofar as it is] common [to all Vehicles, i.e. as it is practised also by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas], [the darśanamārga forms, to be sure,] an uninterrupted series of "equiposed" (māṃ bzung, samāhita, i.e. non-conceptualizing) mental phases, whereas in the specific practice of Bodhisattvas it is said to be interspersed with "subsequent" (rjes thob, pṛṣṭhalabdha, i.e. conceptualizing) mental phases as, e.g., cultivating the Unlimited [Meditations] (tshad med, apramāṇa, viz. friendliness, compassion, etc.) or urging other persons to perform good deeds or praising them [for performing them on their own account]. That this view, too, stems from the Abhisamayālaṅkāra tradition is shown by a quotation from the Ni khrisnaḥ ba, i.e. Āryavimuktisena's Abhisamayālaṅkārarvṛtti, 82 adduced by Bu ston in another place. 83 This passage points out that for a Bodhisattva

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77 Bu ston 581,5f.: 'dir mthoṅ sphaṅ śes sgrib spoṅ ba ma smos kyaṅ raṅ rgyal gys gzun rtoṅ daṅ | byaṅ sems kyis gphis ka spoṅ ba don gys thob bo ||

78 Cp. esp. AA II.8 (grāhyārthakalpanaḥ anād grāhakasyāprahāṇataḥ ... vijñeyah khaḍga-mārgasya samgrahah); AAA 345,14-16: tatra grāhyavikalpaprahaṇena pratyekabuddhā-dhigamaṃ śrāvakebhyo viśiṇaṭṭi, grāhavikalpaprahaṇābhāvena ca pratyekabuddhebhyyo 'nuttarabuddhādhigamam; cp. also AAA 403,25ff.


80 The Luṅ gi sṇe ma (Collected Works, pt.18).

81 Bu ston 583,2f.: thun mohn gi lugs kyis | māṃ bzung phreṅ (Text: breṅ?) gcig yin la | phar phyuṅ pas tshad med sgom pa daṅ | jān dge ba la 'god ciṅ bṣagṣ pa brjod pa sogs rjes rgyaṅ bar bar du bṣad do ||

82 Cp. E. Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu ston, II,155.

83 Bu ston 579,3f.; the passage is found in Peking-Tanjur, Śer phyuṅ, Ka, 114b6-8; see also AAA 354,16f.: ata evoktama āryavimuktisenena: aṣṭama hi darśanamārgakṣaṇe prayaṇaṃ bodhisattvasyāpramāṇaḥ; itaratha ha navame kṣaṇe sattvadhātunirapekṣa nirodhe prapatet iti.
it is necessary to interrupt the series of the constitutive phases of the darśanamārga after the eight moment by an exercise of friendliness, etc., in order to avoid becoming, for want of concern for other living beings, inclined to premature Nirvāṇa when subsequently comprehending the Truth of Cessation. Encouraging and praise of other persons are attributed to the 15th phase of the darśanamārga in Haribhadra's Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā.  

Bu ston thus, at least in the case of the darśanamārga, systematically supplements the exposition of the AS by materials stemming from the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-tradition. The way for such a fusion had already been paved by Haribhadra who in his Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā uses, though without any explanations, the darśanamārga exposition of the AS, especially the detailed analysis into 16 moments, in order to concretize the darśanamārga of the Bodhisattvas (1).

Bu ston, we saw, supplements the fourth definition of the AS to make it applicable to the darśanamārga of not only the Śrāvakas but also the Pratyekabuddhas and the Bodhisattvas; similarly, he renders the third definition, too, suitable for not only the Bodhisattvas but also the Śrāvakas. For it includes a comprehension free from the conventional notion of dharmas, which obviously implies a comprehension of the Essencelessness of dharmas accessible to Bodhisattvas only. Bu ston, however, remarks that even Śrāvakas, though, it is true, they cannot directly perceive dharmānairātmya, do not actually apprehend the conceptual-imaginary mark of an Essence (bdag gi mtshan ma) of dharmas either, during the darśanamārga, and that this is considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the definition which is, in fact, a negative one.

A problem is posed, however, by the second definition of the AS—the darśanamārga as comprehension in which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely the same (or alike). This is interpreted by the ASBh as comprehension of True Reality as [characterized by] the non-existence of the [imaginary dichotomy of] object and subject (grāhyagrāhakābhāvatathatā). This explanation, which is essentially adopted also

84 AAĀ 357,16ff., esp. 18.
85 AAĀ 347,1ff.; cp. also Bo doṅ 667,4ff.
86 Bu ston 581,1: 'dir ḥan thos kyis chos kyi bdag med ḥos su mi mthoṅ yan chos bdag gi mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa'i phyir de skad bṣad zer ro || Cp. Sākya 221,3: dman pa'i mthoṅ lam gyis chos kyi bdag med ma rtogs kyaṅ chos kyi bdag tu mi 'dzin pa la bsams pa yin no ||.
87 ASBh 76,20f. (see n.50).
by Bu ston,\(^{88}\) seems to preclude an application to the *darśanamārga* of the Śrāvakas, and in fact Bu ston himself, in a later passage,\(^{89}\) makes use of it in order to characterize the Full Comprehension (*abhisamaya*, *mḥon rtogs*) of the Bodhisattvas as distinct from that of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. But he is silent in the present passage. rGyal tshab rje,\(^{90}\) on the other hand, expressly states that this definition is specific (*thun mōṅ ma yin pa*), i.e. refers to Bodhisattvas only. A similar view is indicated by Bo doṅ,\(^{91}\) whereas Śākya mchog ldam\(^{92}\) tries to render this definition, too, applicable to both vehicles by distinguishing two sets of imagined object and subject – one referring to persons and the other to dharmas – and by assigning insight into the non-existence of the first set to the Hinayānist *darśanamārga*, while insight into the non-existence of the second set is achieved [only] by the Mahāyānist *darśanamārga*.

5.

I hope it has become clear from my exposition how the commentaries – Indian as well as Tibetan – try to draw doctrinal consistency out of the heterogeneous materials merely juxtaposed in the *AS*. One could perhaps say that they explicitly and legitimately accomplish a task necessarily arising out of that very juxtaposition. But it would be more risky to assert that also the specific form of their solutions is already implied in the basic text. Especially, the elements from the tradition of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* brought into play by Bu ston are definitely alien to the basic text and its tradition. But this does not, of course, mean that his attempt at doctrinal harmonization of the *AS* material (with itself but also with another tradition) is not highly interesting in its own

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\(^{88}\) Bu ston 580,5: *dmigs bya gzuṅ ba daṅ dmigs byed 'dzin pa mod par mḥam paṅ de bzin
hid daṅ mḥam par šes pa'ṅ de yin te*.

\(^{89}\) Bu ston 691,3f.: *sa rab dga' (read: dgar?)* ... *dmigs bya dmigs byed mḥam ṭid du šes pa'i ye šes thob ste*.

\(^{90}\) rGyal tshab 154b5: *thun mōṅ min pa'i dbaṅ du byas na | gzuṅ 'dzin rdzas tha dad kyis
stoh par rtogs pa'i bden pa mḥon par rtogs pa'o*.

\(^{91}\) Bo doṅ 662,2f.: *ḥan thos pa* ... *dmigs bya dmigs byed mḥam ṭid du šes pa'i šes rab ... med pa'i phyir ... *Read la.*

\(^{92}\) Śākya 220,7f.: *gzuṅ 'dzin kun brtags la'āṅ gḥis gḥis te | gḥa zāg gi dbaṅ du byas
pa'i gzuṅ 'dzin daṅ | chos kyi dbaṅ du byas pa'i gzuṅ 'dzin no || dman pa'i mṭhoṅ lam
gḥis daṅ po gḥis daṅ | they chen mṭhoṅ lam gḥis phyi ma gḥis med par mṭhoṅ ba'O*.
right. Moreover, Bu ston is, from the historical point of view, obviously right in giving so much weight to the fourth, highly analytical characterization of darśanamārga in the AS, and also in taking comparatively seriously the "Śrāvakayānīst" character of much of the materials contained in the AS as a whole.

Abbreviations

AA Abhisamayālaṅkāra
AS Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. P.Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950
ASBh Abhidharmasamuccayabḥṣya, ed. N.Tatia, Patna 1976.
Bo doṅ see n.9
Bu ston see n.7
Mi pham see n.11
rGyal tshab see n.8
Śākya see n.10

<> in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be added
[ ] a) in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be deleted
   b) in translations = added by the translator

In quotations from the Tibetan commentaries, simple underlining means that a word or passage corresponds to the wording of the ASBh, whereas double underlining marks correspondence to the wording of the AS.
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