Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition: On the Precarious Position of Early Nyāya

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Already in the Vedic period the Indian intellectual tradition displays an unusually high capacity for systematic and analytical thinking which it applies to various areas of human concern. It suffices to mention two prominent examples in core areas of interest: in the religious sphere, the so-called speculations of the Brāhmaṇa-s which, following OLDENBERG's designation,1 deserve to be styled a “pre-scientific science,” and in the linguistic sphere, initially subservient to religious and ritual purposes, the sophisticated analysis of the Sanskrit language as we encounter it in full bloom in Pāṇini’s famous grammar, where analysis is augmented by the achievement of the creation of an artificial language2. Also reaching back to the Vedic period is the practice of public or semi-public debate on initially only religious, later also philosophical and other topics, a practice which led to the development of special eristic and dialectical traditions; this development in turn was closely interwoven with the development of the systematic philosophical traditions of the classical period. As these traditions evolved in mutual dialectical interaction, their epistemology and logic being continuously refined in the course of philosophical analysis, reason and religious tradition assumed a relationship of actual or potential confrontation, at times even one of opposition, or at least such was supposed by some.

The “orthodox” brahmanical tradition now had to react to this situation and first of all define its attitude towards the employment of the various refined instruments and methods of reasoning as well as towards those who employed them — “orthodox” being used here as a convenient abbreviation to differentiate from the so-called heterodox traditions, i.e., the Buddhist and Jain traditions. The thinkers of the

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1 I am indebted to Eli Franco for his careful reading of this paper and his valuable constructive criticism, and to Anne MacDonald for her insightful remarks.
2 Cf. OLDENBERG 1919.

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 221-251
philosophical traditions, for their part, especially those who considered themselves followers of the “orthodox” tradition in general, had to reflect on their respective school’s relationship to tradition and to determine the role of reason, in the sense of their specific methods of reasoning and analysis, in this light. As can be expected, the position of the orthodox tradition varies considerably, not only for the different schools but in some cases also for the different historical stages of a given school, as does the more specific understanding of the nature of tradition itself; the intensity of reflection on the relation between tradition and reason, on the other hand, reflects the degree of importance of the tradition for a specific school, be it the importance of the tradition as such for the school’s doctrinal self-understanding, as exemplified at a high degree in classical Vedānta, or its importance as the focal point and decisive factor in the attempt to locate the school safely in the “orthodox,” in the wider sense of the dominant and prestigious cultural milieu shaped by it.

The classical philosophical tradition of Nyāya provides a prominent example for vigorous reflection on the role of reason and its own methods of reasoning vis-à-vis the orthodox tradition, belonging to the second type just outlined. Of fundamental importance in this connection is the famous exposition by Pāṇinī’s disciple Vātsyāyana, the earliest Nyāya author whose work has come down to us in its entirety, in his commentary on the programmatic first sūtra of the Nyāyasūtra, an exposition which has been treated by a number of Indian and Western scholars not only in the present context, but also in the related context of the question about the ancient Indian term for philosophy and about the Indian notion of philosophical thinking. In the following I want to indicate just the most important names in chronological order.

The first substantial treatment was undertaken in 1911 by Hermann JACOBI in his well-known article on the early history of Indian philosophy which was translated into English by his Indian student V.A. SUKTHANKAR and published in the Indian Antiquary in 1918. On the Indian side, Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana, two years later, in his then pioneering and fundamental History of Indian Logic which was published posthumously, utilized Vātsyāyana’s statements, obviously unaware of Jacobi’s contribution, for his idiosyncratic, but interesting reconstruction of the early history of Indian philosophy and logic as well as the early history of the Nyāya school. He was almost immediately followed in 1922 by his countryman and fellow native of Navadwipa, Surendranath Dasgupta, in his still widely read History of Indian Philosophy, who rightly criticizes aspects of Jacobi’s interpretation of Vātsyāyana’s statements concerning the self-understanding of Nyāya, but does not touch upon the main problem of Jacobi’s article. His own interpretation, although disputable from the point of view of the history of the Nyāya school proper, brings us closer to an understanding of Vātsyāyana’s historical and hermeneutic situation. Essential progress in this respect was made by Paul Hacker in his 1958 article on Anvikṣikī, in which he also engaged in extensive criticism of Jacobi’s central claim. Wilhelm Halbfass, for his part, continued Hacker’s criticism and provided, in his characteristic and erudite way, Vātsyāyana’s exposition with the hermeneutic perspective of Nyāya self-understanding in a much more comprehensive manner by addressing the general issue of the opposition of reason and tradition as evidenced in Indian intellectual history; he also placed the discussion in the philosophical context of the question about the very nature of philosophy. In my following brief analysis and interpretation I will confine myself to the most essential features of Vātsyāyana’s self-representation of his school, not without deviating from the earlier interpretations in my understanding of details and emphases.

3 Cf. Jacobi 111, 734-746, 741.
4 Cf. Jacobi 1918. Although it could be suspected that V.A. Sukthankar, at the time writing from Indore, is identical with the famous V.S. Sukthankar, and although the information provided by S.M. Katre in the latter’s obituary on his stay in Germany and subsequent return to India (cf. Katre 1943, 129-131) would allow for a brief period of study also with Jacobi at Bonn, all the more conceivable because of Jacobi’s involvement, together with Heinrich Lüders, in Moritz Winternitz’s project to critically edit the Mahābhārata presented to the International Association of Academies and Learned Societies around the turn of the century, Helmut von Glasenapp’s obituary for Jacobi mentions a doctoral student of Jacobi’s named Vasudev A. Sukthankar who must be the translator in question (cf. von Glasenapp 1938, 6). I am indebted to my colleague Chlodwig H. Werba for the reference to the obituary by Katre.
5 Vidyabhushana died suddenly before he had seen all of the book through the press; cf. the Preface by I.J.S. Taraporewala in Vidyabhushana 1920, xi.
6 Cf. Vidyabhushana 1920, 5; 40.
7 There is no need to comment further on Dasgupta’s otherwise superficial and slightly confused treatment.
8 Cf. Dasgupta 1922, 277-278.
11 Among further, more extensive treatments one may mention Oerhammer 1964, 308-310; 316-317 and 1992, 246-252; Narain 1983, 72-81; Matilal 1986, 70-73 (who, despite his “Western” context and orientation, is unfortunately unaware of Jacobi’s and Hacker’s contributions); Perry 1997, 450-452. Briefer references are to be found, e.g., in Keith 1919, 12;
Vâtsyâyana’s assertions in his Nâtyâbhidâya are introduced and motivated by a reproof formulated by a real or imaginary opponent; the latter criticizes the composition of Nyâyasûtra (NS) 1.1.12 inasmuch as the separate enumeration of the dialectical–eristic items or relevant topics (padârthâ), that is, doubt, etc., next to the initial mention of means and objects of valid cognition (pramâna, prameya) is useless because the former are included in the latter.14 Vâtsyâyana concedes this point, but continues that the four sciences (vidyâ), among which the examining or investigative science (ânvîkṣikâ), the science of Nyâya, counts as the fourth,15 are taught for the sake of living beings16 inasmuch as they, that is, the sciences, proceed in different ways. To the science of Nyâya belong doubt, etc., inasmuch as it has its separate procedure (prasthâna)17 in this way18; without the explicit mention of these relevant topics it would be a mere science concerned with the Self (adhyâtmavidyâdâra), as are the Upaniṣads. Therefore it is set into motion, i.e., propagated by its founder, with doubt, etc., as its special method.19 In his following remarks, too, Vâtsyâyana aims at the identification of the Nyâya with ânvîkṣikâ, the investigative science, this time in an argumentative way. First he defines Nyâya as “the examination of things by means of the means of valid cognition.” Here20 he refers obviously to the school’s characteristic mode of proceeding as the definiendum, that is, not to the school or tradition called Nyâya, but to a specific method (nyâya), namely, that of inquisitive thinking, or, already more specifically in view of the immediate context, to methodical thinking or reasoning, also called nyâya.21 This nyâya is further determined as the act of inferring, literally: “subsequent judging” or “measuring” (anumâna)22, based

1957, s.v., 6: method,” and Jûnakar 1978, 114; 456: “method of treatment.” HACKER’S (unjustifi-
ed) translation and interpretation of prasthâna as “Gegensatz” (cf. Hacker 1958, 65; 73, and already Jacob 1911, 734; see also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309: “formal object,” “object,” corrected to “methodological Vorzeichen” and “methodisches Element” [to relate prthakprasthâda, as a karma-
darshya-compound, meaningfully to the plural padârthâ] in OBERHAMMER 1992, 248; MATILÁ 1986, 71: “subject matter”) is mainly responsible for his not very favourable judgment on Vâtsyâyana’s statements; as well as the polemic criticism in HALBFASS 1988, 275, DASGUPTA (1922, 277) speaks of doubt, etc., as the “separate branches” of the Nyâyatvâdâs, PERRY (1998, 451) of “basis.”

13 Compare NM p. 23, 1-2: samâdyâyana tu padârthâh . nyâsapravrtthi-tvârth prthak upa-
dityane.


15 In the Nyâyasûtra itself the term padârthâ is not used in this sense; cf. also HALBFASS 1992, 85 (n. 29).


17 Compare NM p. 9, 7: ityan evânvîkṣikâ catasarhmond vidyâ-din madhye nyâyatvâda ganyate ...
on sense perception and tradition which thus necessarily precede this activity in their respectively different ways. This "subsequent judging" or "measuring," however, is an investigation, literally: "a subsequent viewing" (ānvikṣanā, ānvikṣikā) of what has already been seen by means of sense perception and tradition.23 By means of this very activity proceeds the investigative science (ānvikṣikī). Thus, ānvikṣikī is nothing but the science of methodical thinking (nyāyavidyā) as, of course, represented by the Nyāya school — which has not only specifically adopted this procedure but also made it an essential concern; and it is nothing but the teaching of methodical thinking (nyāyadāstra), "teaching" in the sense of a doctrinal corpus, i.e., the whole of the tenets of the Nyāya school as laid down in its basic treatise.24

Vātsyāyana’s concluding remarks to his brief exposition of the sixteen relevant topics of Nyāya make it sufficiently clear in this context of defining the identity of his own philosophical school by way of its method and position he accommodates it within the framework of the four sciences which are mentioned in the introductory part of Kauṭilya’s or Kautalya’s25 Arthaśāstra; as is well known since Jacob’s seminal article was published, in these concluding remarks Vātsyāyana also integrates a slightly modified version of a verse which occurs — probably taken from an older source — in the very same context in the Arthaśāstra26. He states that the investigative science — that is, the science of nyēya or Nyāya, as his commentator Udyotakara

which could also explain Vātsyāyana’s pramāṇa. In this case, he would after all have understood pramāṇa and anumāna as referring to a "(subsequent) measuring," as has traditionally been assumed in modern scholarship.

23 Compare NM p. 9,9-10: pratyakṣo vāgāmadhyam ikṣitasādyānvikṣanam anvikṣāṃ cānūnām ity arthaḥ. nyāyaprakāśakām tāstram anvikṣiki. Cf. also Kṣirasvāmin on Amaraśāla 1.6.5 as quoted in HACKET 1958, 77.


26 Cf. Arthaśāstra (AS) 1.2.12. According to Scharfe 1968, 4, both texts may quote from a third source. Ruben, on the other hand, seems to assume that Vātsyāyana himself would have quoted the verse correctly and therefore concludes that he must have taken the already changed verse from some “metrical excerpt” (cf. RUBEN 1926, 354). Matilal has not noticed the deviation at all (cf. MATILAL 1986, 72; similarly DASGUPTA 1922, 278).

and much later the Nāṭivāyika Bhāṣārvajña add here27 — inasmuch as it is being differentiated by its special relevant topics, pramāṇa, etc., from all other sciences,28 “has been examined”29 in the instruction on the sciences30 as the lamp of all sciences,

27 Cf. the quotation of the introductory sentence to the verse (cf. the text given in n. 31 below) in Nyāyabhāṣana (NBh) p. 71,12-14. The addition of nyāyavidyā, which once more clarifies Vātsyāyana’s identification, also occurs in the Nyāyavārttika on this passage (cf. NV p. 21,1) and may have crept, in the course of transmission, into the quote in the Nyāyabhāṣana; the opposite scenario, the loss of this clarification in the course of time, is not so easily explained. Vāsastri Miśra clearly understands nyāyavidyā as part of the explanatory sentence in the Vārṣikī (n. NVT p. 67,8). The addition is also lacking in the corresponding quotation in Cakrādhara’s Nyāyamāhāyatā-granṭhâbhâṅgakā (NMGBh) p. 6,3-4. — The supplement vidyā found in the Sarvadarsanaskaraḥgraha (SDS) p. 245,1 is in any case secondary.

28 Here I follow the variant pravāhyamānaḥ (as opposed to vibhāvyamānaḥ) as found in NBh p. 71,12, NMGBh p. 6,4 and SDS p. 245,2, which would exclude an interpretation of the phrase to the effect that a “division” of the science “by means of,” i.e., “into” the relevant topics was intended (cf. e.g., HACKET 1958, 71), an interpretation which seems less plausible in the present context. Also the remarks which follow the quotation of this introductory phrase in the Nyāyavārttika point to the understanding adopted by me: the means of valid cognition, etc., are not found in the other sciences, namely, inasmuch as these sciences do not make them their special topics: Cf. also the corresponding interpretation by Phaniyusana TARKAVAGī as reported in CHATTOPADHYAY and GANGOPADHYAY 1967, 28.

29 With some hesitation I adopt the reading partikāta, reported by THAKUR as preserved in ms. J, which is also found in a number of quotations of this verse from the Nyāyabhāṣyā, namely, in NM p. 28,14-15, NBh p. 71,13-14 and SDS p. 94,4-5; it is confirmed in NMGBh p. 6,6 and Śrīkṛṣṇaprapatasūnaṇa (SKPS) 65,32. As opposed to the reading prakāśitā (but well attested) “examined” in the entire relevant section in the Arthaśāstra, where śāṅkikī is indeed — although only briefly — examined (cf. AS p. 4,8-10), more specific; assuming that Vātsyāyana modified the verse himself, it would also imply his superimposition of his notion of the three śāstra-prajātis employed in the Nyāya (cf. the introduction of the Nyāyabhāṣyā to NS 1.1.3) because in the Arthaśāstra itself the subsection is designated śāṅkikītīhāṇḍaḥ. The reading prakāśitā (“examined”) would correspond better to the wording in the concluding verse as given in the Arthaśāstra by offering some kind of equivalent to śāstraḥ mani (“always considered”). However, I think it highly implausible that the predicate “praised” would have been replaced by the less laudatory (but well attested) “examined” in the course of the tradition. — In Sivaprasad BHATTACHARYYA’s quotation of the verse āyastā is to be found at this place, a variant not known to me from other sources: cf. BHATTACHARYYA 1956, 50 (n. 6). Matilal’s translation is obviously based on Vātsyāyana’s version of the verse but does not take either reading into account (“It is thus enumerated in [the list of] the branches of learning”) (Matilal 1986, 73). Similarly, Thakur’s comment that Vātsyāyana was “mentioning the fact that they (i.e., the first three feet) are taken from the Vidyoddēla section of the Arthaśāstra of Kautalya” (cf. Thakur 1975, 41) does not point towards a decision for either variant.

30 In the Arthaśāstra, the section is called vidyāsāramaddeśa, not vidyoddēla. This change had to be introduced here probably metri causa unless Vātsyāyana did not modify the verse as found in the Arthaśāstra himself, but quoted it from an original context where it was connected with a vidyoddēla (cf. n. 26 above).
as an aid for all undertakings, as the foundation of all norms."\(^{31}\)

The other three sciences are, according to the Arthaśāstra, the Vedic science, the science of material acquisition and the science of government.\(^{32}\) In this way, the author of the Nyāyabhāṣya equates his philosophical tradition with one of the four royal sciences of the Arthaśāstra, namely, the science – or rather methodology – which

“investigating the strength and weakness of these [three sciences] by means of reasons (hetu), assists the sentient world, strengthens the intellect in distress and in good fortune, and causes confidence in [one’s own] understanding, speech and action.”\(^{33}\)

This amounts to the establishment of the Nyāya in the framework of a scheme which may not be an orthodox brahmanical scheme, but which nevertheless can be assumed to have been generally accepted in the dominant cultural milieu of Vatsyāyana’s time and place, and to have carried with it considerable prestige.

However, Vatsyāyana adds to his modified quotation of the verse that adequate understanding (tattvajñāna) and the attainment of the highest good\(^{34}\) have to be understood according to the specific science. For the science of Nyāya, inasmuch as it is

\[^{31}\] Cf. NBh p. 5,14-17: seyam anvikeśitā pramāṇādibhiḥ pravibhajyaṁ nāṁ pradīpaṁ sarvāvidyānāṁ updyāṁ sarvakarmanāṁ / dīraṁ sarvādharanāṁ vidyoddhaṁ parākṣitaḥ // iti.

The text as given by THAKUR has vībhajyānāṁ and prakṛtītā; cf. sn. 28 and 29 for an explanation of my preference for the above readings. – The last pāda reads differently in the Arthaśāstra: svadā anvikeśitā maññi.

\[^{32}\] Cf. AS I 2.1:1: anvikeśitā troyā vartāt dāṇḍaññi teti vidyāḥ.

\[^{33}\] Cf. AS I 2.1.11: ... bālābale caitasānām hetubhir anvikeśitāṁ lokasopakaroti, vyasaṇe bāhuyate ca buddhiṁ avadhanajñāṇīyaṁ prajñāvadyavartiyāvaśrādayaṁ ca karoti. On the pronounced neutral aspect of the anvikeśitā in Kautilya’s presentation, evident especially in this passage, cf. HALBFASS 1988, 278, 254; PERRY 1997, 451, with n. 16.

\[^{34}\] The reading found in NBh (CalSS), nihṣreyasādhiṣṭaṁ, instead of nihṣreyasādhipiṣṭaṁ ca, is also found in the editions of the text in VSS, ASS and SS (vol. 10, with Sadarāṅkaṭya’s Prasannapadā, ed. Dwarkā Daś Shastri, Varanasi 1986) and solves the problem that veditavyam (n. nom. sg.) (cf. the text as quoted in n. 37) seemingly has to be construed with tatrāvidyānam (n.) and nihṣreyasādhiṣṭaṁ (m.). However, it is also possible to take sad idam as the subject of the sentence, veditavyam as its nominal predicate, and the two problematic nouns as appositions placed after the subject: “The following, namely, ... and ... is to be understood ...”. The reading chosen by THAKUR, which is also accepted in the KSS edition of the Nyāyabhāṣya, is confirmed by NV p. 21,9f. and NVT p. 68,9.

a science concerned with the Self (adhyātmaṁvidyā)\(^{35}\), adequate understanding consists in the understanding of the soteriologically relevant objects of cognition, among which the Self figures prominently,\(^{36}\) whereas the attainment of the highest good consists in the attainment of liberation.\(^{37}\) Thus, after Vatsyāyana has first distinguished the science of Nyāya from a mere science concerned with the Self, such as the Upaniṣads, on the basis of its specific procedure, that is, its method, he now affirms and stresses that the Nyāya is indeed an adhyātmaṁvidyā as regards its content, as well as its final aim and purpose. Concerning the content of the science or its central objects of understanding, Vatsyāyana, as already earlier on in his commentary,\(^{38}\) brushes aside the fact that there are, next to the objects of valid cognition, after all 15 additional relevant topics mentioned in the programmatic first śūtra as objects of adequate understanding, an understanding which is claimed there to lead to the attainment of the highest good. Although all of these topics constitute the special method of the Nyāya and thus – according to Vatsyāyana – account for its nature as the investigative science par excellence, and although their adequate understanding is indeed of importance for the adequate understanding of the Self, etc., Vatsyāyana probably does not mention them here explicitly as the content of the science because they do not have direct metaphysical and soteriological significance, and are thus devoid of the status of real objects of adequate knowledge;\(^{39}\) without them the agreement of the Nyāya with tradition in content as well as in final aim can be presented more convincingly. As regards the agreement in content, it has been referred to by Vatsyāyana already in the preceding, with a brief sentence complementing his identification of the Nyāya with the investigative science by way of its characteristic procedure of inference; in this connection he added that an inference which stands in contradiction to sense perception and tradition just seems to be an instance of the application of the outlined method of inquisitive thinking, is only an apparent instance

\[^{31}\] H.N. RANDLE states that Vatsyāyana defines the Nyāya as an ādānta; however, as he refers to the VSS edition of the text which reads, as all other editions available to me, adhyātmaṁvidyā, this must have been a slip of pen (cf. RANDLE 1930, 11 [n. 2, continuing from p. 10]).

\[^{32}\] The text of the Nyāyabhāṣya according to ASS, KSS, VSS and SS reads dāṁḍāsvarājñānam, instead of dāṁḍāsvarājan, which, however, is contradicted by NV p. 21,17.

\[^{33}\] Cf. NBh p. 5,18-20: tad idam tatrāvidyānam nihṣreyasādhiṣṭaṁ ca yathāvadyaṁ veditaṁ. Iha tv adhyātmaṁvidyāyaṁ dāṁḍāsvarājñānam tatrāvidyānam, nihṣreyasādhiṣṭaṁ ca pavaṁgāpāpātāti iti. Cf. also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309; PERRY 1997, 452.

\[^{34}\] Cf. NBh p. 2,9: dāṁḍāh khalu prameyasya tatrāvidyānam nihṣreyasādhiṣṭaṁ.
of methodical thinking or reasoning (nyāya-bhāsa). It is implied there that such a procedure does not have its place in the science of Nyāya.45

We can thus observe that Vātsyāyana, next to anchoring his philosophical tradition in a prestigious secular classification of science and in the most excellent position to boot, is concerned to accommodate it with the established religious tradition and place it, so to say, in line with the Upaniṣads. The Nyāyasūtra itself does not address the topic specifically and explicitly; the only source which may tell us something about its compilers' attitude, or about the attitude of one of its compilers, as regards the position of the Nyāya vis-à-vis the science concerning the Self, are the concluding sūtra-s of the fourth book of the Nyāyasūtra, starting with sūtra 4.2.38. The whole section, reaching up to 4.2.50 and thus comprising 13 sūtra-s,41 begins rather abruptly with an argumentative reference to the continuous repetition or practice of a specific concentration (samādhi),42 that is, to a yogic exercise, an interpretation corroborated by NS 4.2.41, a sūtra following upon two objections, which speaks of the practice of yoga (yogābhyāsa) in the wilderness, in caves, on sandbanks or islets, etc.43 One would not originally connect yogic practices with a philosophical school that developed out of a tradition of debate, but even if the compositional history of the sequence of sūtra-s concerned has still to be studied in detail,44 it is clear that in both cases we are dealing with siddhāntasūtra-s. This is also the case with NS 4.2.45 which not only strengthens the connection to yogic practices because

45 Cf. NBh p. 3, 8: yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgamaviruddham nyāya-bhāsāh sa iti. This sentence is quoted in NM p. 293,15. Cf. also HALBFASS 1988, 277 (with reference merely to kudaratanka in n. 62, i.e., to NM p. 9,13); MATIAL 1990, 24.
46 RUBEN rightly suggests that two sub-sections have to be assumed here, consisting of sūtra-s 38-45 (i) and 46-50 (k): cf. RUBEN 1928, 125-128. See also, from the point of view of stratification of the Nyāyasūtra as a whole, MEUTHRAH 1996, 196-203; MEUTHRAH speaks of two independent sub-sections, one on meditation, the other on the "code of conduct for Nyāyāikas," which have most probably been joined together by the redactor of NS 4.2 who was also responsible for linking the other originally independent sub-sections of NS 4.2.
47 Cf. NS 4.2.38: samādhi-viśeṣāḥbhyāṣāḥ.
48 Cf. NS 4.2.41: aranyayugāpāddhānānyogābhydopadesāḥ.
49 A first, not yet detailed and sufficiently argued attempt has been presented in MEUTHRAH 1996, 199; MEUTHRAH considers 38 and 45 to be the oldest sūtra-s of this sub-section, and the intervening objections, replies and explanations to be later accretions. For a possible grouping together of 38-40 and 45 see below, n. 46. Individual sūtra-s, together with Vātsyāyana's comments, have been treated, from the perspective of hermeneutics of religion, in OBERHAMMER 1984; cf. pp. 8-9, 24-25 and 55-56 on NS/NBH 4.2.38, p. 20 on NBh 4.2.41, p. 24 on NS/NBH 4.2.42, pp. 21, 23-24 and 30 on NS/NBH 4.2.45, pp. 56-57 and 123 on NS/NBH 4.2.46.

of the employment of the terms yama and niyama,45 but also puts the Self explicitly at the centre of the activities mentioned and, one can assume, recommended:

"For this purpose (i.e., for the purpose of release) the Self (ātman) is prepared with [general] restraint and [specific] discipline, and [also] on account of yoga with means [prescribed] for the practice concerning the Self (adhyaṭamavidiḥ)."47

After the discussion concluded with sūtra 45, a discussion which evidently touches upon aspects of the Nyāya which could corroborate its designation as an adhyaṭamavidiḥ, there follows a sequence of five siddhāntasūtra-s which, within the

45 Cf. also JACOB 1929, 163.
46 The reference of the anaphoric pronoun tad- is anything but settled. RUBEN (cf. RUBEN 1928, 127) supplies three referents in his translation, i.e., concentration, true cognition and release, obviously, because he could not reach a decision among the three contextually justifiable possibilities. As she considers 38-45 to constitute an originally independent (although composite) sub-section on the topic of meditation, MEUTHRAH supplies only "Versenkung" as the referent of tad- (cf. MEUTHRAH 1996, 198). Vātsyāyana, whose interpretation I follow preliminarily, clearly interprets tad- to refer to release (apavarga) (cf. also JACOB 1929, 163; JUNANKAR 1978, 471 and OBERHAMMER 1984, 123 [n. 228]); the term occurs first in the pūruṣopakāra-sūtra 4.2.42 and concludes the immediately preceding siddhāntasūtra 4.2.44. Bhāsarvāja, who quotes the sūtra in NBh p. 445,27-28, seems to follow this interpretation: although he does not gloss tadārtham, the fact that the quotation follows immediately after his statement that dharma produced with pure means, such as devotion to God and the "limb" of yoga, is nothing but a cause for the highest good (niḥṣreyasa) — and does not also lead to suffering in an indirect way — (cf. on this passage OBERHAMMER 1984, 77; 96), suggests that he understood tad- to refer to niḥṣreyasa, i.e., apavarga. Furthermore, his introduction to his partial quotation of 4.2.45 earlier on in the text (cf. NBh p. 10,19-20: tatha cātmakādān pramāṇapapannavām prasthāpyañi adhyātma-vidyāpyañi) follows upon the concluding statement "... to the effect that a circumspect person, who is free of uncertainty after having determined that everything which has been stated in the Upaniṣads, etc. (i.e., "and in other teachings of yoga," cf. line 12) is indeed true, will attain release inasmuch as he [then] enacts the means which is well established there" (... yenaṃpanoṣadādhyāsaṁ sarvam tathā ete niḥṣreyasa niṣādākasya prekṣāvat svatpratidhām evapavargo anuṣṭhitam "pavaraṇātpratīt bhavatīti"). This sequence of concluding statement, introduction and partial quotation also implies that tad- should refer to release according to Bhāsarvāja (for another partial quotation of 4.2.45 cf. NBh 584,11: yoge ca dhyātāmaevidyapāyaḥ; on the whole passage see also OBERHAMMER 1984, 122-123).
50 It may also be considered to connect this sūtra with sūtra-s 39-40, assuming the interpolation of 41-44, because an answer to 40 has not been given and 41 does not provide its answer to 39 in the more straightforward way as is typical for the standard dialectical style of the sūtra-s. tad- would under this assumption relate back to samādhi (viśeṣā) in 38; the compound would thus mean "for the purpose of the [special concentration]," with the implication "for the purpose of counteracting the disturbances of the special concentration mentioned by the opponent in 39 and 40."
macro-structure of the *Nyāyasaṅgraha* as known to and commented upon by Vātsyāyana (i.e., under the presupposition that a division into five *adhyāya*-s was already in place), provide a transition to the fifth book of the text which deals foremost with purely eristic topics, namely, the so-called sophistcic objections (*jātīti*) and the points of defeat in debate (*nigrahaṅkāra*). The sequence in question is obviously taken from some other text belonging to the tradition of debate because the threefold division of debate presupposed in this section, namely, *samvāda, jālpa* and *vitanḍa*, terminologically differs from the threefold division as found in the first book of the *Nyāyasūtra*. There, in *NS* 1.2.1-3, three types of debate called *vāda, jālpa* and *vitanḍa* are characterized after *vāda* has been mentioned in the programmatic first *sūtra* as a relevant topic, presumably to be understood as a generic term for debate. This terminological deviation regarding the types of debate and their internal classification, that is, the grouping together of *jālpa* and *vitanḍa* as “contentional discourse” (*vighṛtyakathanam*) which is not addressed at all in the first book, are discrepancies which concern the doctrinal basis of the Nyāya school and thus point at the fact that we are dealing here with a cutout from elsewhere, most probably from a text close to the tradition of debate which is reflected in the section on debate presented in the *Carakasamhitā*. As has been shown by VidyaBhusana, Guiseppe Tucci and Erich Frauwaller, to mention the names of the three most important pioneers in this connection, the intellectual environment of origin of the Nyāya was related to this tradition of debate.

Next to this terminological and classificatory discrepancy, a further remarkable feature has to be mentioned which touches upon the very nature of the first type of debate as described in the section at the end of book four: According to *NS* 4.2.48, *samvāda* is also recommended if a counter-position is not held by one of the participants in the colloquy (cf. also below, p. 235). In book one, however, an exception to the overall requirement of a position and counter-position in debate is made only in the case of *jālpa* which then turns into *vitanḍa*. The relevant statement in *NS* 1.2.3, if interpreted in a strict manner, may point to an even more pronounced classificatory discrepancy between the two sections than assumed above: according to *NS* 1.2.1-3, debate (*vāda*) would only be twofold, namely, *vāda* and *jālpa*, the latter with an acceptable variant called *vitanḍa*.
However, even if the five relevant *siddhântasūtra*-s do not have their original place at the conclusion of book four of the *Nyāyasūtra*, I feel justified by their very inclusion at this place to use them for my present purpose as representing the point of view of early Nāyāyikas prior to Vātsyāyana and at the time when the compilation of the *Nyāyasūtra* came to its close. The first of these *sūtra*-s, 4.2.46, interpreted in its present context, proclaims two more activities conducive to release in addition to the preparation of the Self (*ātmasaṃskāra*) by means of yogic discipline and practices concerning the Self, the activity mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*. These two are (1) the continuous engagement in the grasping, that is, firm comprehension (tārāṇa), of knowledge (*jñāna*), and (2) the collocy (samvāda) with experts. A type of debate is thus placed in the context of the final aim of liberation and of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. The following *sūtra*, naming those persons with whom one should conduct a collocy, evokes strong traditional connotations: it mentions disciple (*śiṣya*) and teacher (*guru*), fellow-students of the orthodox tradition (*sabrahamacārin*), learned authorities (*śiṣṭā*) and those who (equally?) strive for the supreme good (*śreyorhihin*). And although a collocy, as a type of debate, normally would presuppose a position and a counter-position, it may – according to the next *sūtra* – also alternatively, or even preferably(?), be conducted without a counter-position, in case one asks for it(?) for the sake of the specific aim, which presumably would be, in the present context of the *sūtra*, knowledge and the highest good resulting from it. Even the remaining two types of debate, which are classified as constituting...

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63 Obviously following RUBEN 1928 (cf. also JUNAKAR 1978, 471), MEUTHRATH translates the first compound as if its final member would be a dāvandwa-compound ("Erfassen und Wiederhören der Lehre"); "Lehre" for *jñāna* also goes back to RUBEN’s translation, probably influenced by Vātsyāyana’s paraphrase with *dāvandvādāśtra* in *Nbh* [CAISS] p. 1097,2 (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 200). However, the masculine nom. sg. case-ending is difficult to explain in this case.

64 Cf. NS 4.2.47: *tāṃ śiṣyaguruśabrahamacārīśiṣṭāśreyorhihin anastāyabhir abhyupayāt.* On my emendation of the text as compared to the *sūtra* as edited by RUBEN cf. below, n. 62.

65 Although the *sūtra* is quoted, as edited in RUBEN’s edition, with the reading *śiśṭā* in *Ajyatvatāpadikā* (ĀV) p. 631,24-25 on *Gv* Vijnānābhidhāna ch. 8, § 18, the carefully weighed testimony of the *Nyāyavārttikāpadāyaparādikā* on this *sūtra* as well as the quotation in the *Nyāyabhidhāna* (p. 70,8-9) speak very strongly in favour of an original reading *śiṣṭā*, also supported by Bhāṭavāgīvāra’s *Gautamayāturāparādikā* (ed. Kishor Nath Jha, Allahabad 1979; to be placed chronologically between the *Tātparyatākā* and Udayana’s *Parādikā*), a reading which seems to have been replaced not only in the modern editions of the basic text, the *Vānuma* and the *Tātparyatākā* itself, but also in the ms. by *śiśṭā*.

66 This tentative interpretation of *api* would follow Joachim Friedrich SPROCKHOFF’s recent observations on the usage of *api* in the ritual Śūtras (cf. SPROCKHOFF 1999). The occurrences studied by SPROCKHOFF are sentence-initial, with one exception adduced from the *Vaikunthaśravasūtra*-śūtra. If it could be demonstrated that also in the philosophical śūtra-literature *api* is used in the meaning “or better” – to suggest the best, preferable alternative – proposed by him, *api* in *NS* 4.2.48 would strengthen the hypothesis that the sequence 46-50 is taken from elsewhere, more specifically from a context where another statement preceding the sentences preserved in the *Nyāyasūtra* would hold.

67 Cf. NS 4.2.48: *pratipakṣāhinaḥ api vā prayojāṅdāraḥ anīti.*
To sum up, for those early Naiyāyikas who were responsible for the insertion and phrasing of the two sequences 38-45 and 46-50 at the conclusion of Nyāyasūtra 4.2, the Nyāya is indeed a science concerning the Self due to its inclusion of Self-oriented yogic practices (cf. the keywords samādhīviveka, yoga and ātmāsaṃsākāra), practices which are meaningful activities directly and indirectly aimed at achieving adequate knowledge and release through it. The foundational Nyāya activity of debate in its three accepted varieties, which forms a central topic and concern of the school, is not in contradiction to these activities and their purpose; on the contrary, the latter are vigorously supported by it in more than one way. The closeness to the orthodox tradition where the practice concerning the Self (adhyātmavidhi) is authoritatively anchored and cultivated is also warranted by the fact that the basic type of debate, the colloquy, is meant and envisioned to take place between persons who identify and comply with this tradition. Now, this justification of debate is at the same time a justification of its means and the intense occupation with them; their refinement eventually serves the achievement of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. A glance at the characterizations of the three types of debate provided earlier on in NS 1.2.1-3, in the portion of the Nyāyasūtra sheltering the typically Nyāya manual of debate, reveals that the various components of debate include the most important among the 16 relevant topics of the school. This applies especially to the characterization of the basic type of debate, there simply designated as vāda:

"Debate consists in the taking up of a position and a counter-position in which proof and censure are [accomplished] through [the use of] the means valid cognition (pramāṇā) and reasoning (tarka), which is not in contradiction to established tenets, and which is endowed with the five parts [of proof]."

At the heart of debate we thus find the means of valid cognition, four in number according to NS 1.1.3 and including verbal communication (śabda) which comprises tradition as the instruction of a trustworthy person." Reference to tradition thus appears as an integral part of debate. Of equal relevance as the pramāṇa-s in the characterization of debate is reasoning (tarka), which just as the pramāṇa-s and the five parts of proof constitutes a separate relevant topic of the Nyāya; it is character-

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63 Cf. NS 4.2.50: tāhāyānā vighyakaraṇanam.
64 RUBIN, followed by MEUTHRATH, understands the compound differently: similar to the case of 4.2.46 (cf. above n. 60) he interprets -adhyātavaiśyamoktāgamana- as a dvandva-compound; however, I wonder how one could protect (or defend) the truth in the sense of the true nature of things (tattva) (cf. RUBIN 1928, 128 and MEUTHRATH 1996, 201). MATILAL speaks more adequately of the "protection of one’s learning," restricting, however, this function of the two types of debate to the "young beginner" (cf. MATILAL 1990, 15).
65 Cf. 4.2.49: tatvādhyātavaiśyāgamanaṁ jajalpāvataṁ bhajāprakāśaṁgamanaṁ rtham kṣaṇakālākṣāhvaranavat. This sūtra is quoted e.g. in Nyāyakumudacandra (NKC) p. 319,2 and in Pramāṇapramitā (PM) on sūtra 30, p. 63,21-22, in the latter with the variant reading -prati- varanavat. Bāhārvijita quotes only the first compound in Nībha p. 11,8.
66 Cf. *Upāyārdaya (*UH) 23b, retranslated into Sanskrit in TUCKI 1929b, Part I, Upāyārdaya, p. 3; see also KANG 1998, 38.
67 TUCKI refers to Prabodh BAOGHÉ’s Le canon bouddhique en Chine, Vol. I, Paris 1927, for an earlier translation by Buddhabhadra belonging to the Eastern Tsin dynasty (who died in 429 AD according to BAOGHÉ, p. 344) that has been lost (cf. TUCKI 1929b, xi), a piece of information obviously not taken up by Yuichi KAIYAMA (cf. KAIYAMA 1991, 107).
ized in the first book of the Nyāyaśāstra in the following manner:

"Reasoning consists in deliberation (ūha) with regard to a thing/event whose true nature is not [yet] known, aiming at [its] adequate knowledge on the basis of the appropriateness of reason(ings)."72

The distinctive feature of reasoning as described here and further explained in Vātsyāyana’s commentary on this sūtra is its hypothetical aspect implied in the phrase “deliberation on the basis of the appropriateness of reason(ings) (kāraṇopapattitah ... āhah) – thus the familiar translation of tarka in the Nyāya context as “hypothetical reasoning.” That is, the reasoning person tries to find out if the individual reason(ings) (kāraṇa)73 which could be adduced under the assumption of certain contradictory, still to be proven properties of the thing or event in question, are appropriate or suitable in the light of their conformity with other basic assumptions. Reasoning thus examines reason(ings) in the course of this examination itself operates with reasons, in this way preparing the ground for the application of the means of valid cognition which alone effect the definitive ascertainment of the true nature of a thing or event.

As another important element of debate one can isolate the most crucial component of proof among its five “limbs,” namely, the reason (hetu).74

The central component tarka, together with the five parts of proof, is also assumed for the remaining two types of debate as characterized in the Nyāyaśāstra.75 This means that if the early Nālayīkas found at work at the end book four of the Nyāyaśāstra claim that debate as such is a meaningful and important activity in company with other practices and objectives to be connected with an adhyātmavidyā, this claim certainly includes the activity of examination with reasons – which again distinguishes Kauṭilya’s investigative science (ānvikṣikī) (cf. above, p. 228), thus opening the way for Vātsyāyana’s explicit identification of the Nyāya with the ānvikṣikī while stressing at the same time its aspect as an adhyātmavidyā.

The position which I have attempted to uncover above for early Nyāya prior to Vātsyāyana can be compared to the attitude displayed in a group of chapters called Vaiśṇavādhyātyāma76 in the Moksadharma section of the Mahābhārata77 which simply presuppose that examination with reasons is not in contradiction with the concern about the Self, and thus with an adhyātmavidyā. The chapters present a path characterized by examination and consideration leading to the elimination of faults as the cause for the liberation of the Self. Among the keywords in this context one first notices “understanding” (budhī),78 clearly preferred to “knowledge” (vidyā).79 Furthermore, there occur a number of verbal derivatives of pari-vākyā80 which evoke one of the three ways of the “proceeding of the teaching” (śāstrapraṇavṛtti) evidenced according to Vātsyāyana in the Nyāyaśāstra, namely, the third one which is called “examination” (parikṣā).81 Even if the term parikṣa itself in this specific methodological sense is not used in the Nyāyaśāstra, other derivations of pari-vākyā figure in the characterization of two relevant topics in the first chapter of the first book82 and testify to the fact that the notion of examination belongs to the older strata of the Nyāya school. This is corroborated by the frequent employment of derivatives of pari-vākyā in the section on debate in the Carakasamhitā, Vimānasthāna chapter 8, which, as already mentioned above (cf. p. 232f.), reflects an older tradition of debate in whose environ-
ment the Nyāya tradition may have developed. The affinity of the medical tradition with this older tradition of debate finds its expression in the strikingly copious usage of these derivatives also in those parts of the relevant chapter of the Vīmaṇasthāna which surround the sections relating to debate proper.

Of terminological interest in the Vāraṇṣeyādhyāyata chapters are also the verbal derivates of vi-vimarṣa—consideration (vimarṣa) functions essentially in the characterization of the relevant topic “doubt” in the first chapter of the Nyāyasūtra, and is also referred to in this very section as preceding the decision, another relevant topic. Moreover, the employment of reasons (hetu) appears in a decidedly positive light according to one Vāraṇṣeyādhyāyata half-verse which concludes that “due to intellectual vision (jñāṇacakṣus) so much (i.e., the preceding teaching) can be proclaimed as being endowed with reasons (hetumat).” The use of the term jñānacakṣus, which I understand literally as “faculty of vision which is nothing but knowledge,” implies that knowledge which provides matters with reasons is acknowledged to have the same status as the most powerful sensory perception. The following question of the disciple, asked of his instructing teacher, is related to the statement just translated; it carries with it strong associations with the characterization of the ānvikṣikī’s procedure I have already adduced from the Arthasastra (cf. above, p. 228) because the disciple asks: “The strength and weakness of which [faults] should the wise consider with [their] understanding by means of reasons?” The ānvikṣikī for its part “investigates the strength and weakness of the [other three sciences] with reasons (hetu).”

In the first chapter of the Vāraṇṣeyādhyāyata we even encounter, in a macrocosmic context, methodical thinking (nyāya) on an equal standing with a group of well-established sciences or branches of knowledge including the sacred tradition. At the beginning of the yuga the great sages received the Veda-s together with the traditional narratives (itihāsa) which had been hidden at the end of the previous yuga. The Bhagavat knew the Veda-s, Bṛhaspati pronounced the “limbs of the Veda” (vedāṅga) and Bhārgava the teachings relating to government and politics (nitiśāstra). Nārada the science of music (gāndharvaveda), Bharadvāja archery (dhānurgraha), Gārgya the deods of gods and sages (devārdvacarita) and Krṣclamation the medicine (cikits−

ta). After this enumeration, the text continues:

“By all these [sages] individually, when engaged in debate (vādin), many basic models/rules of methodical thinking (nyāyaṇantarāṇa) have been taught. What has been taught with reasons (hetu), tradition (āgama) and good conduct (saadācāra), that is resorted to.”

Taken in this way, that is, considering its immediate context, the verse thus implies that methodical thinking or reasoning on the part of the great sages accompanies the various sciences mentioned, being voiced or expressed specifically in the context of

89 To my knowledge, the classification presented here has not yet been included in studies of the brahmanical vidyāsthanā-s and related concepts.

90 Cf. MBh 19.17-20.

91 The Kumbhakonam edition of the Mahābhārata adds a verse in which Gautama, as the authority on the Nyāyaantastra, Dvāpārya, as having seized or apprehended Vedānta and Karmayoga, and Bhṛgu, responsible for the Śilpaśāstra, are mentioned. This is certainly an interpolation as the association of the name Gautama/Gautama with the Nyāya and its Stīra occurs, to my knowledge, in the preserved Nyāya literature itself first in the Nyāyabhāṣya (referring to the gautamamāla), that is, from the tenth century onwards; the name is connected implicitly with the Nyāya in the well-known satirical verse quoted e.g., MBh p. 594,18-19, Nyāyavṛttikākritaparyāparītāddhā (NVṬP) p. 90,22-23 and ŚŚT p. 15, § 84. Explicit, maybe earlier associations are found at a few places in the Purānic literature.

92 Cf. MBh 12.203.20: nyāyaṇantarāṇa anekāni tais tair uktāni viddhihi / hervāgamasaṃdācārarāj yad uktam tad upāyate // This verse (corresponding to B 12.210.22) is quoted also in Vidyabhūana 1920, 39, and referred to ibid., p. 7 (as proof for Vidyabhūana’s claim that the Ānvikṣikī was called Hetuśrstra or Hetuvīdya) and p. 42 (used by Vidyabhūana as evidence for the use of nyāya in the sense of logic in the Mahābhārata); cf. also Vidyabhūana’s introduction p. xviii, to his translation of the Nyāyasūtra as published in Vidyabhūana 1930 (original introduction p. xv). Further references to this verse have been made in MOSA 1966, 9, and TAIKUR 1974, 404 (as evidence for the existence of different Nyāya schools and treatises; cf. also TAIKUR 1975, 39 and 43 with wrong reference in n. 8). All authors mentioned follow readings not adopted in the critical edition; most relevant for differences in their interpretations are hervāgamasaṃdācārarāj and yad uktam in the second part of the verse. HALFABs obviously sees a continuation of the classification of “orthodox sciences” in the reference to the “various systems of logic,” as he interprets nyāyaṇantarāṇa anekāni (cf. HALFABs 1988, 539 [n. 60]; cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 225).
debate. Moreover, according to the second part of the verse employment of reasons goes hand in hand with reference to tradition and appropriate behaviour.

From the historical point of view I would certainly consider it mistaken to claim that in the Vāraṇyādaḥyāta chapters we encounter a developmental stage of the Nyāya preceding the stage represented by the final compilation of the Nyāyasūtra. However, one could characterize these materials as presented in the Māntadharma (1) – using Vatsyāyaṇa’s terminology – as reflecting an adhyātmavidiya which works as an investigative science (ānivitikā) relying on examination and consideration by means of reasons, and (2) as belonging in this latter aspect to, or having drawn from, the intellectual milieu concerned with debate out of which the Nyāya developed as a philosophical school and of which further traces, touching upon other distinctive features of this milieu, remain in the Epic. Of more specific relevance in the present context, however, is the fact that apologetics do not figure in these philosophically and at the same time soteriologically and theologically oriented materials. I want to place them therefore at a time and in a climate when tradition did not yet feel seriously threatened by the employment of reasons and dialectical-eristic means vis-à-vis its specific topics, and those employing them did not think it absolutely necessary to counteract these feelings.

Nonetheless, elsewhere in the Epic, and not excluding the Māntadharma section, we do find some rather pronounced attacks against the use of reason and reasons in matters concerning the Self or the tradition as such, reflecting or even paralleling historically the extreme caution, suspicion and even hostility to be observed in general towards the free employment of reasoning in the Dharmasūtra literature – in contradistinction to the attitude displayed in the Dharmasūtras. In the context of the present essay it suffices to adduce briefly two examples from the Māntadharma. The first one refers to reasoning under the term tarka discussed above as an essential activity and one of the relevant topics of the Nyāya (cf. p. 237f.). A secret teaching leading to the knowledge and understanding of the Self and meant for students of the Veda who have completed their training should not be communicated to, among others, a person who has been “burnt,” that is, destroyed completely, by the (or: a) teaching concerning reasoning (tarkaṣṭrātrodagdha)94. The second example attacks reasoning, referring to it with an array of related terms. God Indra, appearing in the form of a jackal, narrates in a warning tone to the wise, but deeply distressed Brahmīn Kaśyapa how his own birth in the form of this despised, impure animal came about:

“I was a little pandit, busy with reasons (hātuka) [and] censuring the Veda, devoted to the useless investigating (ānvitikā) science of reasoning (tarkavidiya); I made bombastic speeches about reasons (hetu) and spoke, equipped with reasons, in the assemblies. I abused twice-born [persons] and snapped [at them] in the context of [their] statements on brahman. I was a [heretical] denier (nāstika) and an all-doubting fool who deemed himself a scholar.95

The jackal adds that should he ever be reborn as a human being, he would wish to know only what one should and may know, and would avoid what is to be avoided.96 Taking also into consideration the usage of the alarming term nāstika, the words of the jackal can be understood as a warning to the developing orthodox philosophical traditions with their growing emphasis on logic and increasing distance from the Veda, at their head the Nyāya.

The resulting precarious position of the Nyāya is articulated in the Skanda-purāṇa in the form of a legend about Gotama, as the legendary founder of the Nyāya school is called there,97 linked with the episode of the jackal in the Māntadharma and expressing the continuing ambivalent attitude of the orthodox tradition vis-à-vis reasoning in an almost anecdotical manner:

94 Cf. MBh 12.246.15c (= B 12.246.16c): na tarkāśāstrātrodagdhyā ... (K: na hetuvadang-dhyā; D: na tarkāśāstrātrodagdhyā; G: na tachātstrātrodagdhyā). Cf. also DILLMANN 1895, 224; VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 37, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xii); WINTERNITZ 1929, 7 (n. 18); THAKUR 1974, 403 and 1975, 42 (266 should be corrected to 246).
95 Cf. MBh 12.173.45-47ab (= B 12.180.47-49ab):
aham āsām panḍitakā hātukā veda-nidakā! / ānvitikātā tarkavidiyām anurakto nirāthīkām // 45 // hetuvādān pravadāt vaktā sansārutat hetumät / derūtyata dhīviktāt ca brahmaṇa-gatrāt vā dvīdān // 46 // nāstikātā sarvasaṅkāt ca māṁ khaḥ panḍitumānākāh /
For the relevant variants and further details cf. the appendix relating to this sequence.
96 Cf. MBh 12.173.49cd (= B 12.180.51cd): jñeyajñātā bhaveyām vai varṣyavaroṣītān tathā //
97 On this name cf. above, n. 91.
“Gotama, however, inasmuch as he destructively tore apart [matters] here and there with his reasoning, was finally cursed by the wise and reborn as a jackal. And [later] again he was favoured [by them, with the words]: Your teaching should be of assistance to the whole world [inasmuch as it proceeds] from revelation, the established tenets [of the tradition] and reasoning.”

In this way, within the foundations of Gotama’s teaching after his rehabilitation reasoning (tarka) has been relegated to the last place.

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Appendix on MBh 12.173.45-47ab (= B 12.180.47-49ab):

aham āsām panditaka hai’tuko1 vedanindakah2 /
ānvīkṣikīṁ3 tarkavidyāṁ anurakto nīrarthikāṁ // 45  45 //
hetuvaddan pravaditakā vaktā samatsu hetumat /
ākroṣṭā cābiḥvaktā ca brahmayaṅjaṅeṣu4 vai dvijān // 46  //
nāstikāh5 sarvaśankā ca mārkhaḥ panditamānikaḥ /

For the present purpose the following variants are of relevance:

1 Śi, Kṣ, Dā, G; hetuko

2 Kṣ, 4 read vādanindakah (“censuring in debate”); G; devanindakah (“censuring the gods”). Although with “censuring in debate” the connection between reasons and disputation would be addressed already at this point, this reading seems to presuppose a rather unusual type of dissolution of the compound; cf. also Manuṣmṛti (MS) 2.11:

3 Kṣ, B, Dā, D; ānvikṣikīṁ; Dā, D, T, G; ānvikṣakīṁ; G; ānvikṣyaki

4 Dā; praśītā; Dā; pravadatā

5 Kṣ, V, B, Dā, D, D, T, G, M, S; cāti(Kṣ; vi)vaktā ca; Dā; ca dvijānām;
Dā; cāti va+kānām; G; atkroṣītāvaktā ca

6 I translate brahmavākyeṣu following B 12.180.48d and the reading found in Dā, D, M, C, D, T, G, S, M, S, T, S, S, vādyesu; T2, M; vādyesu; G; -vādyesu; C; jñeyeṣu. Although brahmavākyā is not attested in the dictionaries, the reading -vādyā seems to support this choice and the interpretation of the situation as one comparable to the situation in which brahma dhyāya-s are voiced, i.e., in which statements relating to brahmān are pronounced for comment and discussion. brahmavāyajñeṣu, i.e., “in the context of [their] recitation and study of the śruti,” does not fit the context well because these activities are not necessarily performed publicly and in interaction with others.

7 M; nāstitaḥ

8 G; pariśañkā

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96 Cf. Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa 17, quoted and referred to in Vidyabhusana 1920, 8; 17; 37; 48, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xiii):

gotamah svena tarkena khandyamsa tatra tatra hi /
saṭo 'tha munihiḥ tatra tārgyāṁ yoniḥ reçhati //
punām cānugrhyāṁ sau svarīsādānāntaratataḥ /
sarvaśokopahātya tatra śāstraḥ bhavatīyat //

I have not yet succeeded to locate these verses in the editions of the Skandapurāṇa accessible to me. Thakur (1975, 42 [n. 5]) reproduces the reference as Kālikākhaṇḍa 7 (cf., however, 41 [n. 4]: Kālikā 17).
Elements of the jackal’s self-description are taken up in a speech on honourable and dishonourable persons by Bāhma directed to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Anuśāsanaparvan; the Veda-censuring Brahmin who is described there is equated with a dog in this context. Cf. MBh 13.37.11-14:

aprāmānyam ca vedānāṁ śastrānāṁ ca tāṅgāṅgam /
sarvatra cānāvasthānam etan nāsanam āmaṇah // 11 //
ḥavet paṇḍūramāṁ yo brāhmaṇo vedāṅdakaḥ /
āṅvīkṣikśāṁ tarkavidyāṁ anurakto nirartheśāṁ // 12 //
hetuvaḍān brauṇa sasvat vijetaḥ hetuvaḍikāḥ /
ākroṣṭā cātivaktā ca brāhmaṇānāṁ sadaivā hi // 13 //
sarvābhiśāṁ cā bālaḥ kaṭukavāg api /
bodhivyāस tādārās tātā naraśvānāṁ hi tuṁ viduḥ // 14 //

13ab is interpreted differently in MESQUITA 2000, 126 (n. 215).

For the situation of 12.173.46ab cf. 14.87.1 (= B 14.85.27):

tasmin yajñe pravṛtte tu vōgmino hetuvaḍinah1 /
hetuvaḍāṁ bahūn prāhuḥ2 parasparajīgṭavah //

Relevant variants:

1 Mv: brahmavaḍinah
2 D: devavānān
3 DC: hetuvaḍānakūtāla tu

Cf. again VIDYABHASANA 1920, 39 and 1930, xviii (original introduction p. xv); THAKUR 1974, 404. Cf. also Rāmāyaṇa (R) 1.13.14:

karmāntre taddā viprāḥ hetuvaḍāṁ baḥūn api /
prāhuḥ suvāhino dhūrāḥ parasparajīgṭavya //

and MBh 2.33.3-4.

ABBREVIATIONS


ÅSS Ånandakrama Sanskrit Series.


KSS Kashi Sanskrit Series.

CalSS Calcutta Sanskrit Series.

CaS Carakasaṃhitā, see ĀVD.


NBh Nyāyabhāṣya, in Nyāyadarśana of Gauṭama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uḍḍyotakara, the Tātparyāṭkā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana, ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Vol. I: Chapter I, Darbhanga 1967.


NBhū Nyāyabhāṣāṇa of Bhāṣarvajña, ed. YOGINDRANANDA, Varanasi 1968.


NV Nyāyavārttika, cf. NBh.

NVT Nyāyavārttikātātparyāṭkā, cf. NBh.

NVTp Nyāyavārttikātātparyāṭkāpariśuddhi, cf. NBh.

NS Nyāyasūtra, as edited in RUBEN 1928.

B Bombay edition of the Mahābhārata.

BK Bālakrīḍā, in The Yājñavalkyasūtra with the Commentary Bālakrīḍa of Viśva-
rāpacchārya, ed. T. GANAPATI SASTRI, Trivandrum 1921-1922.

BSBh Madhava's Brahmāsrutabhadra, in Sarvamula Granthād, Vol. 1: Prasthān-
trayi, ed. SRI ANANDATHIRTHA BHAGAVATPAD, Udipi 1969.


MS Manu-Sūtra with nine commentaries ..., Vol. I, ed. JAYANTAKRISHNA HARI-
KRISHNA DAVE, Bombay 1972.


VS Vaiśeṣikasāra of Kanāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, ed. MUNI SIJAMBUVIYAJAJI, Baroda 1961.

VSS Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

ŚKT Śrīkantaṭiṣṭipranam by Śrīkantācārya, ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Calcutta 1986.

SDS Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha of Sāyana-Mādhava, ed. VASUDEV SHASTRI 

SS Sudhi Series.

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