

I did not receive proofs, the necessary corrections are added now.)

Dharmakīrti on the Inference of Effect (*kārya*)

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दीर्घानाम् लक्षणम् अस्ति।

५३/१

Several recent publications have shown how Dharmakīrti deals with a set of inferences which use logical reasons (*hetu*) that are seemingly not included in any of the three kinds of reasons (*trividha hetu*) he proposes in the first presentation of his new theory of logical reasons¹, and moreover point to a functional connection for the most conspicuous of these, namely, the inference of effect (*kāryānumāna*), with the theory of non-perception as reason (*anupalabdhihetu*).

Iwata², mainly interpreting the relevant passages of PV in III,³ where the discussion is already more comprehensive than in PV I–PVS V, shows that Dharmakīrti explains how such inferences, if acceptable, can be reduced to either *svabhāva* or *kārya* as logical reasons. The first inference Dharmakīrti deals with is the inference of an effect (*kārya*) from its cause (*kāraṇa*). Dharmakīrti shows how the reason in this inference must be understood in order for it to be acceptable, and that in this case the reason "complete cause" (*samagra hetu*) must be taken as a case of *svabhāva* as logical reason. Iwata further demonstrates how Dharmakīrti also uses this reduction to also reduce the reason "non-perception of something

perceptible" (*drśyānupalabdhi*) to a case of *svabhāva* as reason.⁴
This use of the reduction of the reason "complete cause" to a case of *svabhāvahetu* is also elaborated by Tani.⁵

I.

The systematical usage of the interpretation of the reason "complete cause" as an essential property (*svabhāva*) in an inference of the consequence (*sādhya*) "fitness for the production of the effect" for an explanation of the *anupalabdhihetu* as being included under the category *svabhāvahetu*, may look like a strong motivation indeed for Dharmakīrti to deal with the problem of a possible interpretation of the inference from cause to effect. However, we can see from the contextual situation in the *Hetuprakaraṇa*, that is not very likely to be the original motivation.⁶

There it is only in the later, more elaborate discussion of the *anupalabdhihetu* (PVSV 101,3–107,14)⁷ that this kind of reason is explained as a case of *svabhāvahetu* because of the fact that the inference of *asaj(jñāna)śabdavyavahāra* (PVSV 4,22; 104,27) from the reason *upalabhyānupalabdhi* (PVSV 104,28) is characterized as an inference from cause to effect (*kāraṇāt kāryānumānalakṣaṇatvāt*, PVSV 105,1f.). And although this characterization is based on the preceding words (PVSV 104,28–105,1), where every effect for which the presence of its complete causes as capable for its production applies, is adduced as an example (*drṣṭānta*), the sentence con-

taining a clear expression of a subsumption of the *anupalabdhihetu* under the *svabhāvahetu* category only refers, merely in conclusion, to a later clarification, namely to PV IV 269. This sentence (*ata eveyaṃ ... vakṣyāmaḥ*, PVSV 105,1–3) must therefore be considered as a later insertion belonging to the time when Dharmakīrti was composing the *Pramāṇavārttika* as a whole, but as not belonging to the text of the original *Hetuprakaraṇa*.

This motivation of a necessity for the *anupalabdhihetu* in order to allow its reduction to a case of *svabhāvahetu* – although already presented at a very early stage – cannot therefore have been Dharmakīrti's original motivation for dealing with the structure of the inference from cause to effect (*kāryānumāna*).

II.

When we look at the context of the introductory section of the *Hetuprakaraṇa*, another, much more natural motivation becomes apparent. After introducing the theory of the logical reason (*hetu*, PV I 1 = 3) and explaining it in its formal aspects (*trilakṣaṇa*-theorem: PVSV 1,12–2,14) and in its material aspects (*trividha*-theorem: PVSV 2,14–6,21), Dharmakīrti discusses the possibility of inferring from a cause to its effect (PVSV 6,22ff.). In this discussion he clearly distinguishes the alternatives as to whether the cause is complete (*samagra*) or incomplete (*asamagra*)⁸. In treating the first alternative (PVSV 6,22–8,15), he shows how the "complete cause" as

reason can be understood as being included among the three kinds of reasons he has just introduced.⁹

This first section, where Dharmakīrti explains cases of acceptable reasons and shows how they can be fitted into his theorem of the three kinds of reasons (*trividha hetu*), is again divided into two parts: 1. PVSV 6,22–7,12, treating the inference from the reason "complete cause", and 2. PVSV 7,12–8,15, treating cases such as the inference from the reason "taste" (*rasa*) to the consequence "colour etc." (*rūpādī*), where a causal relation cannot be relied upon directly, because reason and inferred consequence are simultaneous.

Both systematically and because of the parallel introductions,¹⁰ these two parts from the first section are of equal value as contextual alternatives: "inference from x to y as directly based on causation" against "inference from x to y as not directly based on causation". Thus the first alternative "complete cause : incomplete cause" (PVSV 6,22ff. : PVSV 8,16ff.) is not decisive for the analytical structure of this part of the text and must be subsumed under a structure which can be inferred from what Dharmakīrti actually achieves in these two sections, i.e. an explanation of reasons that can be accepted within the frame of his theorem of the three kinds, and of reasons that cannot be accepted. In other words, while the cases of reasons in the first section are valid, the cases in the latter are invalid.¹¹

The second part (PVSV 7,12–8,15) of the first section can now also be excluded from the present investigation, because it treats

inference from reasons not directly based on causal connections with the inferred consequence, e.g. from taste to colour (PV I 9b = 11b), from smoke to transformations of firewood (PV I 9d = 11d), or from a disturbance of ants or the changing behaviour of fish, such as jumping, to rain (PVSV 8,13–15). These inferences are all reduced to cases where an effect (*kārya*) serves as logical reason.¹²

In this second part, the motivation for explaining the cases of reasons as cases to be subsumed under the category of *kāryahetu* clearly lies in the fact that we are here confronted with a collection of inferences that are "accepted in the mundane world"¹³ which was entitled to hear from Dharmakīrti to just which of his three kinds of reason the reasons used in these inferences would belong.

However, the motivation for explaining the position of the first logical reason within his system of the three kinds, namely the reason "complete cause", can be seen – in the absence of other indications in this context, and without any interpretation influenced by the knowledge of its later application in interpreting the *anupalabdhihetu* as a case of *svabhāvahetu* – as not lying primarily in "mundane acceptance". It lies rather in a similar fact, namely an influential tradition with the right to hear from Dharmakīrti how the reason under discussion fits into his scheme of the three kinds of reasons, and would not invalidate this scheme by not fitting into it.

The difference to the "mundane" reasons referred to above and reduced by Dharmakīrti to cases of reasons as *kārya* is striking. While we have actual instances of concrete inferences in this case

which are "accepted in the mundane world", we have here the general concept of "complete cause" as the reason from which "the arising of the effect" (*kāryotpāda*) is inferred and "effect itself" (*kāryam eva*) is said to be not inferable. This means, of course, that Dharmakīrti is not dealing here with "mundane reasons", but referring to the conception of an important logical theory which was so influential that it had to be taken into consideration.

III.

This logical concept can in all probability be identified with a – for our historical context – prominent part of the theory of a *trividha anumāna* as propounded by competitive traditions of logical thought in Sāṃkhya and Nyāya.¹⁴ It is the kind of inference called *pūrvavat*, when the term is interpreted as a possessive adjective with the suffix *matup*.¹⁵ In this case the inference "from cause to effect" is well-established in the tradition as one of the possible meanings of the term.¹⁶ And although this theorem – in its own historical origin – evidently has also the purpose of allowing for "mundane inferences", e.g. the inference from (rising) clouds to (imminent) rain, it is in the form of a theorem belonging to rival logical schools that Dharmakīrti deals with this kind of mundane inferences from cause to effect.

This is how I understand Dharmakīrti's words:¹⁷

(Question:) [A] When the arising¹⁸ of an effect (*kāryotpāda*) is inferred from a complete (*samagra*) cause, how is this [logical reason "complete cause"] included in the threefold logical reason?

(Answer:)

[B] The arising¹⁸ of an effect (*kāryotpāda*) which is inferred from a complete¹⁹ cause [as logical reason] is called an essential property (*svabhāva*) [of this complete cause], because [this arising of the effect]²⁰ does not depend on (any) other things [for its occurrence]. (v.7=9)

[C] This [arising of an effect]²⁰, too, is an essential property (*svabhāva*) of the entity [consisting in the complete cause] as following only this [complete cause], because (it) does not depend on anything else but the (cause) as ^{being ready} ~~constituted~~ (*yathāsamniḥita*). [D] For in this case [of the inference of the arising of an effect]²¹ only the possibility (*sambhava*)²² of the arising¹⁸ (*utpatti*) of an effect is inferred from the complete cause, [E] because the fitness of the complete (causes which constitute the causal complex) for a production¹⁸ (*utpādanayogyatā*) of the effect is inferred. [F] And the fitness (*yogyatā*) follows only the complex [of the complete causes]. [G] Therefore it is inferred as being nothing but an essential property [of the complete complex of causes].

(Question:) [H] Why, on the other hand, is not the effect itself (*kāryam eva*) inferred from the complex of causes?²³

(Answer:)

[I] If an effect [itself] that is connected with transformations of the forces which result from [earlier phases of] the complex [is to be inferred from a cause], [this cause] is inconclusive [as logical reason], because an impediment (*pratibandha*) is possible. (v.8=10)

[J] For the (different) cause-substances [which constitute the complex of causes] do not [actually] produce their effect just because of being (conceived of as) complete, [K] because the [actual] arising of the effect depends on the (respective) transformations of the forces which arise from the [respective preceding] complex. [L] And since an impediment is possible within this [period of the complex' transformation], there is no inference of the effect [itself].

[M] The fitness (*yogyatā*) [of the complete complex], however, does not depend on substances other [than this complete complex]. Therefore the [following] inference is not contradicted: "This complex of causes is capable for a production of (its) effect on account of a [final] transformation of the respective later forces [in its causally connected continuum of phases], because another [i.e. cooperative] condition for the transformation of the [cause's] force, that [the production of the effect] would necessarily depend upon, is lacking."

[N] The fitness of the complex [for a production of its effect] is called "Independent of other [causes]", because only a preceding similar (*sajāti-*)²⁴ [complex] is the cause for the arising (*prasūti*) of (this) force.²⁵

Thus Dharmakīrti explains just how the inference "from cause to effect" has to be interpreted in order to be acceptable. An inference of the effect itself is quite impossible, since impediments to its production cannot be ruled out and the causal complex used as logical reason remains inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) in this case. This is shown in a digression ([H]–[L]) with the purpose of reinforcing the main argument ([B]–[G] and [M]–[N]) by refuting an alternative conception of this inference:

The main argument starts from a different idea: the term "arising of an effect" (*kāryotpāda*) is interpreted in [D] as "the possibility of the arising of an effect" (*kāryotpattisambhava*), and identified again in [E] as "fitness for a production of the effect" (*kāryotpādanayogyatā*).

In other words, if "the arising of an effect" (*kāryotpāda*) is inferred from a complete causal complex, this can only mean – according to Dharmakīrti – this complex' "fitness to produce the effect" (*kāryotpādanayogyatā*). And the latter, as dependent on this very complex alone, is in itself an essential property (*svabhāva*) of this complex.

In this way, the inference from an essential property (*svabhāva*) "being a complete causal complex" as logical reason to another essential property (*svabhāva*) "being fit for the production of an effect" as logical consequence is established as Dharmakīrti's conception of the inference "from cause to effect". And the reason

"complete cause" of the initial question [A] is thus explained as a case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*).

VI.

The question now arises of why Dharmakīrti starts this interpretation of the inference "from cause to effect" with a formulation [A] that lends itself – because of its peculiar expressions²⁶ – rather easily to be interpreted into an acceptable direction. This would, of course, be a good reason in itself. But there is a strong case for seeing more in these expressions than just a technique of linguistic variation for polemical purposes alone. The clue lies in the expression for the effect. For the expressions "complete cause" (*samagra hetu*) or "(causal) complex" (*kāraṇasāmagrī, sāmagrī*) are due to the fact that Dharmakīrti considers an effect always to be produced by a complex of causes, and never by a single cause alone.²⁷

In digressing on the possibility of inferring "effect itself" (*kāryam eva*) in [H], Dharmakīrti seems to be referring to the formulation of the Naiyāyika Pakṣilasvāmin, who reports an older interpretation of the *pūrvavat* kind of inference in NBh 146,4 simply as *yathā kāraṇena kāryam anumiyate, yathā meghonnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti*.²⁸

The expression "arising of an effect" (*kāryotpāda*), on the other hand, can be found in the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa's explanation

of the *pūrvavat* kind of inference.²⁹ Vṛṣagaṇa explains *pūrvavat* as the case of an inference "when from the observation of a complete cause (*rgyu ma tshañ ba med pa, 'avikalāhetu*) the imminent arising (*'byuñ bar 'gyur ba ñid, 'bhaviṣyattva*) of an effect is cognized, like the imminent arising of rain from the observation of the presence of clouds".³⁰

In this definition by Vṛṣagaṇa,³¹ both terms used by Dharmakīrti in discussing the inference "from cause to effect", i.e. "complete cause" and "arising of effect" are clearly present.³²

In conclusion: Dharmakīrti's inference "from a complete cause to the arising of the effect" is either entirely his own explanation of a possible meaning of the inference "from cause to effect"³³ with only "accidental" similarities to Vṛṣagaṇa's formulations, or – and I think this is much more plausible – his acceptance of this inference in the form to be found with Vṛṣagaṇa, interpreting it as an inference from an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāva-hetu*), while simultaneously refuting a Nyāya formulation of the same inference.³⁴

Since Dharmakīrti clearly says that "the origin of the effect" interpreted as "fitness of the complete cause for producing its effect" and conceived as the logical consequence (*sādhya*) is to be taken as an-essential property (*svabhāva*) of this "complete cause", we are in fact facing nothing more than the case of an inference operating with an essential property as logical reason for the purpose of conceptual determination³⁵. In this case, it is the inferential determination of the concept "fitness for the production of the

effect" as an essential property of the causal complex on the basis of its completeness (*'samagrātā*).

VII.

There is a systematical question that needs to be answered at this point before we can continue to investigate the usefulness of this structural scheme.

Strictly speaking, a causal complex (*hetusāmagrī*) can be called "complete" only when referring to its last phase (*antyāvasthā*, *antyakṣaṇa*). It seems, however, that Dharmakīrti did not press the issue that far in the *'Hetuprakaraṇa*.⁶ Only with the introduction of the new category of a "non-perception of effect" (*kāryānupalabdhi*) in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* do we find the relevant rigorous formulations.³⁶ If we consider the "complete cause" of our context of the *'Hetuprakaraṇa* to be meant as the causal complex in its last phase, an inference with regard to neither an effect as such nor a fitness for the production of the effect would be meaningful because of the perceptible presence of the effect even before any possible conclusion of the inferential process.³⁷

It is therefore clear that Dharmakīrti refers only to the "continuum" (*santāna*) of the causal complex (*hetusāmagrī*) when he speaks of a "complete cause" (*samagra hetu*) as logical reason in the *'Hetuprakaraṇa*. It is also clear that his usage of the attribute "complete" (*samagra*) in this context must not be taken in the strict

sense of referring only to the last phase (*antyāvasthā*) of the causal complex.³⁸

In short: when Dharmakīrti clarifies the possible meaning of an inference "from cause to effect" in the *'Hetuprakaraṇa*, he refers to "cause" in the sense of the continuum of the complete causal complex and states that – due to the possibility of impediments (*pratibandha*) – the effect cannot be inferred from it. It is, however, possible to infer the concept "to be fit for the production of the effect". In other words, a causal complex which is called "complete" can also be called "fit for the production of the effect".

In explaining the only possibility of understanding this type of inference, and systematically identifying it as an inference from an essential property (*svabhāva*), Dharmakīrti in addition presents a structural scheme that he will later also use to explain the *anupalabdhihetu*.

VIII.

This structural scheme amounts to a description of the possibilities and limits of conceptually determining the idea of "progressive causality": what can be said about causes as regards their necessarily producing effects? Or: in what way are causal processes entelechially³⁹ spontaneous or automatic?

As far as I can see, Dharmakīrti did not put this scheme to any interpretational use in his first work other than to explain the

logical nature of the *anupalabdhihetu*. Nor did he do so later. It is nevertheless of considerable import for Dharmakīrti's Buddhism. And, to be clear from the outset, I consider the true motivation for Dharmakīrti's treating this particular inference "from cause to effect" in its possibilities to be not logical, but soteriological, the path towards Buddhahood itself being at stake.

Inami and Tillemans, in their introduction to dGe 'dun grub pa's analysis of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*⁴⁰ already have drawn attention to the fact that in PV II 34–164a', where Dharmakīrti discusses the four famous epithets of the Buddha from the *maṅgala* verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* "in direct order" (*anulomena*), a causal progression towards Buddhahood is shown where "each preceding epithet is said to be the cause for the one which follows".⁴¹

Devendrabuddhi in explaining PV II 146 clearly states that this is a case where the effects are inferred as "possible" (*srid.pa*) from the respective preceding causes.⁴² Inami and Tillemans, in line with some Tibetan opinions, therefore also draw attention to PV I 7=9 as providing the theoretical scheme for this argumentation.⁴³

Of course, mere "possibility" or "fitness" to give rise to an effect would not be a sufficiently strong quality of the respective causes in this section to connect a causal chain in such a way that there is any certainty in the progression towards Buddhahood under discussion. But Dharmakīrti gives a clue with regard to the crucial necessity of the effect's origination from a cause in his explanation of the possible development of "mercy" (*kṛpā*) towards its highest

innate nature (*atyantasātmata*) and thus perfection:⁴⁴

"If mercy which originates from its respective seed (*bīja*) is not impeded by opposing forces (*vipakṣa*) which (also) originate from their respective seeds, it develops to highest innate nature (*atyantasātmata*) in the [continuum of the] mind."⁴⁵ (PV II 129)

In other words: if all opposing forces which could impede the arising of a cause's effect are eliminated from the mental continuum, the "complete" or "sufficient" cause or causal complex would give rise to its effect. Thus, although only the cause's fitness for the production of the effect would be inferable strictly speaking according to our scheme, an additionally ascertained absence of impediments would also guarantee the actual arising of the effect.

This additional moment is also already implied in the second part of the text examined above⁴⁶, namely PVSV 7,5–7, where Dharmakīrti rejects an inference of effect as such (*kāryam eva*) on account of the possibility of impediments (*pratibandhasambhavāt*). Of course, ascertaining the absence of possible impediments remains a crucial point in this extension of the original minimal scheme and must be considered as a necessary corollary to such an inference "from cause to effect". However, given the theoretical possibility of ascertaining the absence of impediments, we may deduce from Dharmakīrti's complete explanation of this inference in PVSV 6,22–7,12 that not only "a fitness for the production of the effect" can be inferred from the respective, i.e. complete cause, but also the effect itself as actually, or rather necessarily⁴⁷ originating from it. An

"unimpeded continuum" of a causal complex would then also be a possible logical reason for an inference of its effect, i. e. the respective later phases of the same continuum. For – as Dharmakīrti says later – "the impediment [to a causal complex in the production of its specific effect] is defined as the production of something that does not agree with the arising of (this specific) effect".⁴⁸

Thus, here, in the *Hetuprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti provides the theoretical frame for the idea of – what I would tentatively call – an "entelechiā causality",⁴⁹ without which the whole "progression towards Buddhahood" as depicted in the *anuloma* section from the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* would be inconceivable and illusory.

However, although Dharmakīrti presents in this chapter a case where his structural scheme for an inference "from cause to effect" is actually applied, I cannot find any indications in his writings that he intentionally elaborated this logical scheme in order to provide a logical structure for this particular application.⁴⁹ The connection of his argument in the *anuloma* section of PV II with the structural idea present in PV I 7–8 = 9–10 is nevertheless evident. And it is also evident that, as a Buddhist, he must have felt the need to conceive his new logical thought in such a way that inferences "from cause to effect" were not altogether impossible.⁵⁰

It will have to be left to future research in what way Dharmakīrti's followers and commentators made use to any larger extent of this connection of a minor logical theorem with the Buddhist spiritual background.⁵¹ There are, at any rate, some indications for the fact that Dharmakīrti's structural scheme for the inference "from cause to effect" as presented in PV I 7=9 was later understood and used as an explanatory structure for other acceptable cases of "entelechiā causality".⁵²

I have come across two such instances in post-Dharmakīrti literature that merit some attention in this context and may serve as reason to look for similar examples: a few sentences in a Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* of Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā*,⁵² and the *Tattvasiddhi* ascribed to Śāntarakṣita as a whole.⁵³ Both are related to the theme of yogic cognition (*yogijñāna*) and seem clearly to support the proposed hypothesis that Dharmakīrti's religious presuppositions as a Mahāyānist Buddhist must be considered as the final motivation for his elaborating the logical possibility of an inference of effect (*kāryānumāna*). However, this is already a topic for another paper.

ABBREVIATIONS:

TBV	Tattvabodhavidhāyīnī: <i>Ācārya-Śrī-Siddhasena-Divākara-praṇītaṃ Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇam . . . Śrīmad-Abhayadevasūrinīrmitayā Tattvabodhavidhāyīnyā vyākhyayā vibhūṣitam</i> . Ed. S. Sanghavi and B. Dośi. [5 Vols.] Ahmedabad 1924 – 1931.
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NBh	cf. NSū
NBhūṣ	Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: <i>Srīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam</i> . Ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ. Vārāṇasī 1968.
NM	<i>Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Tippanī – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor</i> . Ed. K. S. Varadacharya. [2 Vols.] Mysore 1969, 1983.
NV	cf. NSū
NSū	Nyāyasūtra. In: <i>Nyāyadarśanam. With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṭikā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti</i> . Critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatīrtha and Amarendra-mohan Tarkatīrtha. [2 Vols.] Calcutta 1936–1944 [Reprint Kyoto 1982].
PV I	Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter I:
	1. Raniero Gnoli, <i>The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes</i> . Roma 1960.
	2. Ācārya Dharmakīrti kṛta svārthānumāna-pariccheda. Ed. Dalsukh Bhāi Mālvanīyā, Varanasi 1959.
PV II,III,IV	Pramāṇavārttika, Chapters II, III, IV: <i>Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)</i> . Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. <i>Acta Indologica</i> 2 (1971/72), 1–206. [Chapters II, III, IV correspond to I, II, IV in Miyasaka's order.]
PVT	Pramāṇavārttikatikā (Sākyabuddhi): P 5718
PVSV	Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti): cf. PV
PVSVT	Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭikā (Kāṇakagomin): <i>Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛtṭyā Kāṇakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭikayā ca sahitaṁ</i> . Ed. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana. Ilāhābād 1943.
PVin II	Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapter II: Ernst Steinkellner, <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte</i> . Wien 1973.
PVin III	Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapter III: P 5710.
PVinT	Pramāṇaviniścayaṭikā (Dharmottara): P 5727.

YD	<i>Yuktīdīpikā. An ancient Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa</i> . Ed. Ram Chandra Pandeya. Delhi 1967.
SK	Sāṃkhyakārikā: cf. YD
SVR	Syādvādaratnākara: <i>Srīmad-Vāḍidevasūri-viracitaḥ Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāraḥ tadvyākhyāca Syādvādaratnākaraḥ</i> . Ed. L. Motilāl. [5 Vols.] Poona 1926–1930.
HB	Hetubindu: Ernst Steinkellner, <i>Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text</i> . Wien 1967.

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Frauwallner 1954:	E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's", in <i>Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller</i> , Leipzig, 142–154.
Frauwallner 1958:	Erich Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhyasystems", <i>WZKS</i> 2, 84–139 [Reprint in <i>Kleine Schriften</i> , Wiesbaden 1982, 223–278.
Iwata 1991:	Takashi Iwata, "On the Classification of three Kinds of Reason in <i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> III – Reduction of Reasons to <i>svabhāvahetu</i> and <i>kāryahetu</i> ", in <i>Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition</i> , ed. E. Steinkellner, Wien, 85–96.
Krasser 1991	<i>Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis. Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā. Teil II. Übersetzung</i> , Wien.
Malvaniya 1959	D.Bh. Mālvanīyā, "Introduction" in <i>Ācārya-Dharmakīrti kṛta Svārthānumāna-pariccheda</i> . Varanasi, 1–27.
Mimaki 1980	Katsumi Mimaki, "Sur le rôle de l' <i>anataraśloka</i> ou de <i>saṃgrahaśloka</i> ", in <i>Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr Etienne Lamotte</i> , Louvain-La-Neuve, 233–244.

- Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964 S. Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with The Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments [Kārikās I–L]*. Patna.
- Steinkellner 1967 Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubīnduh. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien.
- Steinkellner 1971 Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti", *WZKS* 15, 179–211.
- Steinkellner 1979 Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavinīś-cayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien.
- Tani 1991 Tadashi Tani, "Logic and Time-ness in Dharmakīrti's Philosophy – Hypothetical Negative Reasoning (*prasaṅga*) and Momentary Existence (*kṣaṇikatva*)", in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, ed. E. Steinkellner, Wien, 325–401.
- Yaita 1984 Hideomi Yaita, "Hōshō no 'hininshiki' [Dharmakīrti's *anupalabdhi*]", in *Makio Ryōkai-hakushi shōjukinen ronshū, Chūgoku no shūkyō shisō to kagaku*, Tōkyō, 35–45.
- Yaita 1985a H. Yaita, "On *anupalabdhi*, annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (I)", *Taishō Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyū Ronshū* 9, 216–199.
- Yaita 1985b H. Yaita, "On *anupalabdhi*, annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (II)", *Chisan Gakuhō* 34, 1–14.

* I gratefully acknowledge the helpful criticism and remarks of Tōru Funayama, Helmut Krasser, Monika Pemwieser and Prof. Tilmann Vetter on this paper.

1 PV I 1–6 = 3–8 with PVSV.

2 Iwata 1991.

3 Iwata has also prepared a German translation of PVin III 310b7–313a3 (vv. 64–67), the basis of his paper of 1991, to be published soon and which he has generously placed at my disposal.

4 Iwata 1991: 87–89. This connection already has been elaborated in Yaita 1984: 37–39 (cf. Yaita 1985a: 209 and notes 94–96) and Steinkellner 1967: 155.

5 Tani 1991: 328ff.

6 I use this hypothetical title, which was proposed by Frauwallner (1954: 152) for the text of PV I together with PVSV as being – before its incorporation into the complete *Pramāṇavārttika* as its first chapter together with a commentary ("*sva-vṛtti*") – a work of Dharmakīrti's youth, a work that was composed as an original unit of verse and prose (cf. also Malvaniya 1959: 11f.; Mimaki 1989: note 46).

7 Translated in Yaita 1985a and 1985b.

8 *hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa ... anumiyate* / (PV I 7ab=9ab) and *hetunā tv asamagreṇa ... anumiyate* / (PV I 11ab=13ab).

9 The second alternative deals with those cases where a valid inference is impossible according to Dharmakīrti, because the resultant cognition remains doubtful. This part (PVSV 8,16–10,25) does not concern us here.

10 *yas tarhi ... anumiyate, sa katham trividhe hetāv antarbhavati* (PVSV 6,22f.) and *yā tarhi ... -gatiḥ, sā katham* (PVSV 7,12f.) where the rest of the sentence *trividhe hetāv antarbhavati* has to be supplied from the first question (cf. PVSVT 45,29f.).

11 This is also supported by the analysis of, e.g., 'U yug pa who distinguishes the latter as invalid (*itar snān*) cases while he adds the former to the valid ones (*yaṇ dag*). Cf. Y. Fukuda and Y. Ishihama, *A Comparative Table of Sa–bcad of the Pramāṇavārttika Found in Tibetan Commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttika*. Tokyo 1986, 1a–2a.

Dharmakīrti finally chose to rearrange the texts involved here in accordance with their contextual structure in PVin III. There, the alternatives "complete cause : incomplete cause" serve to distinguish valid and invalid reasons in his discussion of a possible reduction to *svabhāvahetu* (PVin III 310b7–311a8 has two parts, 310b7–311a4: "complete cause", and 311a4–8: "incomplete cause" as reason).

12 This theme of explaining certain well-known inferences as cases of *kāryahetu* is later expanded by Dharmakīrti in PVin III 311a8–313a3 (vv. 65–67) under incorporation of the text and the examples of PV I and PVSV. Cf. Iwata 1991: 89–94.

13 Iwata 1991: 85.

¹⁴ Cf. NSū 1.1.5.: *atha tatpūrvakam trividham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam ca*; and SK 5bc: *trividham anumānam ākhyātam / tal-lingalingipūrvakam*.

¹⁵ Cf. A. Wezler, "Dignāga's Kritik an der Schlußlehre des Nyāya und die Deutung von Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5.", *ZDMG, Supplementa I, Teil 3*, 1969, 836–842. Wezler gives a survey of the interpretations of the terms *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* as known to Dignāga and Pakṣilasvāmin, and thus also to Dharmakīrti.

¹⁶ This would then be the tradition present, e.g., in the first interpretation of the terms in Pakṣilasvāmin's Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh 146,4) and in Vṛṣagaṇa's interpretation (cf. below note 30).

¹⁷ Cf. Mookerjee/Nagasaki 1964: 32ff. A new translation of the whole text by Hayes and Gillon was also available to me (Richard P. Hayes and Brendan S. Gillon, "Introduction to Dharmakīrti's Theory of Inference as Presented in *Pramāṇavārttika Svopajñavṛtti* 1–10." I am grateful to T. Funayama, Kyoto, for providing me with a copy of this manuscript). Parts of the text are translated in Steinkellner 1971: 185f. (PV I 7=9 and *Vṛtti*); Yaita 1985a: note 95 (PV I 7=9); Krasser 1991: note 263 (PV I 8=10 and *Vṛtti*), and of the parallel text in PVin III in Iwata 1991: 86.

¹⁸ I use "arising" here to translate *utpāda* and *utpatti*, its paraphrase in PVSV 6,27f., as distinguished from "production" to translate *utpādana*.

¹⁹ It is interesting to note that the attribute "capable" (*nus pa*, "samartha") is substituted for "complete" (*samagra*) in the parallel text of PVin III 64 (PVin III 310b7; cf. Iwata 1991: 86).

²⁰ Sākyabuddhi's explanations *rgyu tshogs pa de ni* (PVT 23b8) and *'di yan zhes bya ba ni rgyu tshogs pa'o'* (PVT 24a1) must be a mistake, for he continues saying "it does not depend on another cause but the complete cause as constituted" (*rgyu'i tshogs ji ltar ñe ba las rgyu gzan la mi ltos te* / PVT 24a1). Cf. also PVSVT 43,20: *kāryotpādanayogyatānubandhitvāt* as the reason for *kāryotpāda* to be the *svabhāva* of some *kāraṇa*, and PVSVT 43,22f.: *asāv apiti kāryotpādaḥ*.

²¹ I follow – with Iwata 1991: 86 – Dharmottara's interpretation of *tatra, de la* in PVin III (PVinT 133b3) against Sākyabuddhi (PVT 24a2 = Kārṇakagomin, PVSVT 43,28) and Steinkellner 1971: 185 who understand "in this case (of the complete cause)" thereby rather creating a minor redundancy.

²² The terms *kāryotpattisambhava* and *kāryotpādanayogyatā* below refer to the same fact (cf. PVSVT 43,29). The first term is expressed, however, from the viewpoint of the effect, while the second is expressed from the viewpoint of the cause. The slight redundancy thus resulting for the two sentences must have been the reason why Dharmakīrti drops the content of the main clause when he re-writes this passage in PVin III 310b8f.: *de la (D : de P) ni rgyu tshogs pa rnam kyī 'bras bu bskyed par (D : pa P) ruñ ba ñid 'ba' (P : 'ga' D) žig rjes su dag la / (D : par P) ["tatra hi kevalam samagrāṇām kāraṇāṇām kāryotpādanayogyatānumiyate]*.

I owe the ideas for this note to T. Funayama.

²³ *kāraṇasāmagryāḥ* ed. Malvania : *kāraṇam sāmagryāḥ* ed. Gnoli. There is, however, neither an equivalent to *kāraṇa-* in the Tibetan translation, nor confirmation to be gained for the word from Sākyabuddhi's (PVT 24a6) or

Kārṇakagomin's (PVSVT 44,13f.) commentaries. It does, however, occur in the parallel text of PVin III 311a1.

²⁴ *-sajāti-* (cf. PVSVT 45,6) : *rañ gi rigs (-'svajāti-)* Tib. (408b7), PVT 25a1.

²⁵ *yas tarhi samagreṇa hetunā kāryotpādo 'numiyate, sa katham trividhe hetāv antarbhavati.*

hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numiyate / arthāntarāṇapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ // (v.7=9)
asāv api yathāsamāhitān nānyam apekṣata iti tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo bhāvasya. tatra hi kevalam samagrāt kāraṇāt kāryotpattisambhavo 'numiyate, samagrāṇām kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt. yogyatā ca sāmāgrīmātrānubandhinīty svabhāvabhūtaivānumiyate.

kim puṇaḥ kāraṇasāmagryāḥ kāryam eva nānumiyate. sāmagriphalaśaktinām pariṇāmānubandhini / anāikāntikatā kārye pratibandhasya sambhavāt // (v.8=10)
na hi samagrāṇīty eva kāraṇadravyāṇi svakāryam jāyanti, sāmagrijanmanām śaktinām pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya. atrāntare ca pratibandhasambhavan na kāryānumānam.

yogyatāyās tu dravyāntarāṇapekṣatvān na virudhyate 'numānam – uttar-ottaraśaktipariṇāmena kāryotpādanasamarthyeyam kāraṇasāmagri, śaktipariṇāma-pratyayasānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvād iti. pūrvasajātīmātrahetutvāt śakti-prasūteḥ sāmagryā yogyatānanyāpekṣiṇīty ucyate. (PVSV 6,22–7,12)

²⁶ I.e. *hetunā* ... *samagreṇa* in the position of "cause", and *kāryotpādaḥ* in the position of "effect".

²⁷ Cf. T. Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964, 18f., and Steinkellner 1971: 187f.

²⁸ That this formulation is again not to be taken at its face value is then explained by Uddyotakara (cf. NV 147, 5ff.). However, this need not concern us here. It is sufficient that *kārya* has been offered as the form of the logical consequence in this inference in early Nyāya.

²⁹ Cf. Frauwallner 1958: 124 and 128 (translation) [reprint 1982: 263 and 267].

³⁰ *de la sna ma dan ldan pa ni gañ gi tshe rgyu ma tshañ ba med pa mthoñ nas 'bras bu 'byuñ bar 'gyur ba ñid rtogs pa ste / dper na sprin 'byuñ ba mthoñ nas char ba 'byuñ bar 'gyur ba ñid lta bu'o // (Frauwallner 1958: 124, reprint: 263).*

³¹ That his formulation was known to Dharmakīrti can be assumed from the fact that Jinendrabuddhi's post-Dharmakīrtian commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *Vṛtti* is the main source of information on Vṛṣagaṇa's epistemological thought (cf. Frauwallner 1958: 85ff.).

³² Especially when we adduce the formulations of the *Yuktidīpikā* which look like a derivative from Vṛṣagaṇa's definition: *tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṁ dr̥ṣṭvā b h a v i ś y a t t v a m kāryasya pratipadyate, tadyathā meghodaye bhaviṣyattvaṁ vṛṣṭeḥ. yadi tarhi kāraṇaśaktiṁ sahakāriśaktyantarānugrhitā apratīyoginīṁ dr̥ṣṭvā kāryasya v y a k t i m pratipadyate, tadā pūrvavat. (YD 38, 10f., 12f., 14).*

The fragment of Vṛṣagaṇa's text referred to above (cf. note 30) was quoted by Jinendrabuddhi to give the context as a whole which Dignāga referred to in parts (cf. Frauwallner 1958: 86f., reprint: 225f.). It is not totally impossible, therefore, that Jinendrabuddhi may have changed the relevant terms in accordance with Dharmakīrti's procedure. However, I find this unlikely. I prefer to think that Dharmakīrti used an extant formulation from an opposing tradition to interpret it according to his own understanding. Otherwise, the whole question of how a certain well-known inference fitted into his system would be pointless.

That the explanation of the *Yuktidīpikā* (YD 38,12f.) may also be influenced by Dharmakīrti could be assumed on the basis of N. Nakada's statement that "the author of the Yd. knows *svabhāvahetu*" ("Word and Inference in the *Yuktidīpikā*", *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Kiyō* 12, 1989, [47–74]47). However, the passage adduced as evidence by Nakada (YD 39,33f.) does not reveal a knowledge of Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvahetu*, but merely refers to Dignāga's explanation of linguistic cognition as a kind of inference.

The objection *naitad asty udāharaṇam a n e k ā n t ā t. na hi meghodayo 'vaśyam vṛṣṭeḥ kāraṇam bhavati, vāyavādinimitta p r a t i b a n d h a s a m b h a - v ā t* (YD 38,11f.) left out in the quotations above, may also give the impression of being influenced by PV I 8=10 and PVSV 7,5–7. Again, this need not be the case, because the *pratibandha* argument is fairly general and certainly not Dharmakīrti's original invention.

³³ Dharmakīrti does not hesitate to use also this simple formulation of the inference when the meaning in his own terms is sufficiently clear and undisputed, e.g. *kāraṇāt kāryānumāna-* (PVSV 105,1f.) and *kāraṇāt kāryasamsiddhiḥ* (PV IV 269a).

³⁴ The fact that this particular form of the inference was Dharmakīrti's way of understanding the inference "from cause to effect" is also supported by respective statements to be found in the works of some later opponents. Cf., e.g., in Jayantabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM I 336,13–337,3), Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhūṣ 300,8–13), Abhayadevasūri's *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* (TBV 562,34–563,4), Vāddevasūri's *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR 586,13–25).

³⁵ Cf. Steinkellner 1971: 199.

³⁶ Cf. PVin II 13,17–20; 15,13f., and later in the *Hetubindu* (HB 8,22f.; 9,4f.).

³⁷ This consequence is expressed in PVin II,15,14–18 (cf. Steinkellner 1979: 59). Cf. also PVSVT 43,16f.: ... *tāvatā nātyantāvasthāprāptena, tatra līṅgigrahaṇāt prāg eva kāryasya pratyakṣatvam*.

³⁸ Cf. PVSV 7,5, where he speaks of "cause-substances" (*kāraṇadravya*) as being called "complete" (*samagra*). Cf. also PVSVT 43,25: *santānāpekṣayaitad ucyate, na kṣaṇāpekṣayā*.

On the use of the expression "substance" (*dravya*) by Dharmakīrti cf. Steinkellner 1979: note 156.

³⁹ I would like to propose the term "entelechial causality" to refer to those causal processes where a "complete causal complex" necessarily proceeds towards perfection because of the ascertained impossibility of impediments.

The substantive "entelechy" in Western philosophical tradition refers to the fact that every being is directed to a certain goal on account of its constitution,

and as such aims at that goal independently, of its own. In this sense it implies a partly teleological explanation in contrast to a purely mechanical-causal one.

However, it would seem to be possible to use the adjective "entelechial" as an attribute of causality to refer to this Buddhist idea, although here a goal (*télos*) of perfection is not taken into consideration, since it cannot influence, as being inexistent, the original causal complex. The Buddhist idea of a causal process that "proceeds out of its own natural constitution" (*svarasavāhin*) therefore does not involve a conflict between a teleological and a causal model, but rather reserves an area within its purely causal explanation for the possibility of proceeding towards perfection out of necessity, without having to consider that goal itself as an essential part of an existent being.

It is of some import in this context, that Buddhist ideas of continuous causal processes are not developed by means of metaphors and examples from areas of mechanical causality, but rather of organic causality, e.g. in the tradition of the *Sālistambasūtra* (cf. E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1956, 49ff; Steinkellner 1967: 136ff.)

I owe the proposal to use the attribute "entelechial" for this purpose to Monika Pemwieser.

⁴⁰ Masahiro Inami and Tom T.F. Tillemans, "Another Look at the Framework of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*", *WZKS* 30, 1986, (123–142)125–127.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*: 125

⁴² Cf. *ibid.*: 126 and note 10.

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*: 127 (note 10).

⁴⁴ PV II 129–130. Cf. Vetter's description of the causality of mental properties (*caittāḥ*) in *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964, 25–27 and 84–87.

⁴⁵ *kṛpā svabijaprabhavā svabijaprabhavair na cet / vipakṣair bādhyate citte prayāty atyantasātmatām* // (PV II 129)
Cf. Vetter, *ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁶ Cf. the sentences [H]–[L] and the text in note 25.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Nyāyakaṇṭhikā* 146, 10f. (ed. Kāśī); 553,2–4 (ed. Stern): *tathā ca satyām eva tasyām* (Kāśī: *etasyām* Stern) *sāmāgryām apratibaddhāyām* (Stern: *apratibandhāyām* Kāśī) *n i y a m e n a phalam utpadyata iti*. (For these editions cf. note 52.)

⁴⁸ PVin II 13,20–22: *'bras bu skye ba dañ mi mthun pa bskyed pa ni gags kyi mtshan ñid yin pa'i phyir ro //*

⁴⁹ I believe that the reason for this lack of any cross-reference is the situation that an obvious coherence of ideas in the conceptual world of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti never made such a cross-reference necessary. Only the modern interpreter, belonging to another world, searches for one in order to understand as an idea in and from its context.

⁵⁰ Hayes/Gillon (cf. their paper mentioned in note 17) do not adduce the *Pramāṇavārttika* material but aim at an explanation in a fairly similar spirit, I think, when they find the consideration of "the cardinal principle of Buddhism,

namely, that the presence of unwholesome mental properties will certainly give rise to sorrow in the future" (in their note B.5) to be the motif for this theorem in Dharmakīrti's logic.

⁵¹ For Devendrabuddhi cf. the passage translated by Inami/Tillemans, *loc.cit.*, 126.

⁵² In *Vidhivivekaḥ, śrīmadācārya-Maṇḍanamiśra-viracitaḥ pūjyapādaśrīmad-Vācaspatimiśra-nirṇitayā Nyāyakanikākhyaḥ vyākhyayā samalāṅkṛtaḥ*. Ed. Tailaṅgarāśmaśāstrimānavallī, Kāśī 1903-1907: 146,9-13.

In Stern's new critical edition *Vidhivivekaḥ of Maṇḍanamiśraḥ with commentary Nyāyakanikā of Vācaspatimiśraḥ and Supercommentaries Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇi and Svaditaṅkaraṇi of Parameśvaraḥ, Critical and annotated edition. The pūrvapakṣaḥ*. By Elliot M. Stern. 4 Vols., PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1988 (available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor): 553,1-5.

⁵³ Peking edition No. 4531. The edition of the Sanskrit text by Kameshwar Nath Mishra, Sarnath, is forthcoming. I would like to express my gratitude for receiving a copy of this text in 1986.