DHARMAKĪRTI’S AND KUMĀRILA’S REFUTATIONS
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD:
A CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

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The chronological order of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, who are regarded as contemporaries, is still controversial. The main positions regarding their chronological relationship may be summed up as follows:¹ In his paper on Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā, Erich Frawullner² proposed that Dharmakīrti’s earliest writing, the so-called *Hetuprakarana, which he incorporated as Svārthānumāna chapter in his Pramāṇavārttika, already takes Kumārila’s critique on Dignāga in his Ślokāvārttika into consideration, and that Kumārila in his Bṛhaṭṭīkā refines his view in light of Dharmakīrti’s considerations. Frawullner’s arguments are supported by Steinkellner in his new interpretation of Pramāṇavārttika I 33.³ This sequence of the texts, Ślokāvārttika → *Hetuprakarana → Bṛhaṭṭīkā, has been questioned by John Taber, who feels “justified in believing that the ŚV was composed after the BT and contains Kumārila’s mature views” and that there exist “evidences suggesting that Kumārila is indeed sometimes addressing Dharmakīrti’s ideas also in the ŚV.”⁴ The present paper does not deal with the material and arguments used by the above authors, but aims at solving the question of the relation of the Pramāṇavārttika and the Ślokāvārttika by basing itself on material that has so far not been considered. Both parties, the Buddhists as well as the Mīmāṃsakas, do not accept an eternal God (Īśvara) as creator of the world, and both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila refute this idea, at least partially, with more or less similar arguments in the Pramāṇavārttika and Ślokāvārttika respectively. This examination attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between these passages at all, and if so, what the direction of influence might be.

¹ The problem is also dealt with in Tosaki Hiromasa (Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū—Hōshō-cho “Pramāṇavārttika” no genryōron [Studies on Buddhist Epistemology: The theory of perception in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika], Vol. I (Tokyo, 1979), 7–20) where he refers to the opinion of Prof. Hattori who considers Dharmakīrti to have had knowledge of Kumārila’s Ślokāvārttika. In a recent paper, too, dealing with the question of “the exclusion of others” (anyāpoha), Hattori proposes the same sequence of texts: Ślokāvārttika → Pramāṇavārttikasavyārtti (cf. Masaaki Hattori, “Discussions on Jātimat as the Meaning of a Word,” in Śrījñānāṃśtanam: A Memorial Volume in Honour of Prof. Shri Niwas Shastri, ed. Vijaya Rani (Delhi, 1996), 387–394).
At the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika (PV II), Dharmakīrti, after having shown that an eternal entity (nitya) that could serve as reliable authority (pramāṇa) is not possible, states that there are neither proofs for an ephemeral (anitya) nor for an eternal entity that could be assumed to be the creator of the universe (vv. 8–9). The reasons for this he formulates in the following verses:5

\[\text{sthiṇāpravṛttiṣamsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādīṣu /} \\
\text{iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā drśṭante sāṃśaya 'thavā II 10 //} \\
\]

"[In the case of the logical reasons put forward by the opponents] such as 'activity after a rest', 'having a specific configuration', and 'accomplishment of a purpose' [there obtain the logical faults that they are] proving what is already accepted [by us], or [that the probandum] is not established in the example, or [that there remains] doubt [regarding the hetu]."

The arguments referred to in this verse are, as Kamalaśīla informs us, those of Aviddhakāraṇa and Uddyotakara.6 In order to provide the context we may have a look at the proof of the existence of God as put forward by Aviddhakāraṇa:

\[\text{[ātṛa viddhakarnopanysam iśvarasādhanā pramāṇadāvayam ... tad uktam] dvindrīyagṛhyā-} \\
\text{grāhyāṃ vimatyadhiṁkaranabhāva-pampanāṃ buddhinatkāraṇapūrva-kam, svārambha-kāvayava-} \\
\text{sanniveśaviśṭatvatā, ghaṭādive, vaidharmyena paramāṇava iti TSP 52,16–18.} \\
\]

"That which is to be grasped and not to be grasped by two sense organs and which is subject of [our] dispute presupposes a conscious cause, because it has a specific configuration of its parts which cling together [in order to constitute the universe], like a pot, etc. The atoms [serve] as dissimilar example."

Without going into the details of the complicated formulation of the pakṣa, an explanation of which is given by Kamalaśīla, we now come back to Dharmakīrti in order to see why these proofs should be afflicted by these logical faults which are not at all self-evident and which we may expect to learn from the following verses. In the next verse Dharmakīrti states that an inference is based on a necessary connection between the probans and the probandum and formulates this

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5 As a critical edition of the following verses of PV II is included in my study on Saṅkarānanda's Isvarāpa-kārānasankṛpte (to be published in 1999). I refrain here from text critical remarks.

6 On sthiṇāpravṛtti cf. TSP 54,14–16: uddyotakaraṁ tu pramāṇāya iti bhuvanahetavāḥ pradhāna-paramāṇavā- 


dṛṣṭāḥ svakāryopatāvaitābhuddhimanantam adhiśṭhāram apekṣante, sthiṇāpravṛtteḥ, taututuryādivad iti. 


Kamalaśīla here probably is referring to pradhānaparamāṇukarmānī prāk pravṛttā buddhimaṅkārāni adhiśṭhitāni 


pravartante, accetanatvatā, vasyādivad iti. yathā vasyādi buddhiṁata taṅkṣā adhiśṭhitam accetanatvatā pravartate, 


tathā pradhānapparamāṇukarmānī accetanāni pravartante. tasmā tāny api buddhimaṅkārāni adhiśṭhitānti NV 954,12– 


16 ("Primordial matter, the atoms, and the karman become active [only] insofar as before their activity they are 


governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc. An ax, for example, becomes active when 


it is governed by a conscious carpenter. For it is insentient. Primordial matter, the atoms, and the karman which 


are insentient become active in the same way. Therefore, they too are governed by a conscious cause.") arthaṅkriyā is not 


reported by Kamalaśīla to refer to an argument held by Uddyotakara, but in his Nyāyavārttika we find a similar 


proof: buddhimaṅkārāni adhiśṭhitāti svāduḥ dṛṇānādikriyāśus mahābhūtāni vasyāntāni pravartante, accetanatvatā, 


vasyādivaṁ NV 957,9–11 ("The elements terminated by 'air' [i.e. excluding ākāśa] become active regarding their 


activities such as holding when they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc.")

7 Instead of the term sanniveśaviśṭa ascribed to Aviddhakāraṇa, Dharmakīrti uses the formulation samsthānaviśeṣa which already is to be found in Uddyotakara (NV 959,10ff. on NS 4.1.22).
general theorem by referring to Aviddhakarṇa’s reason alluded to in the previous statement:

\[
\begin{align*}
siddhaṃ yādṛg adhiṣṭhārthbhāvābhāvānuvṛttim\! & \! / \\
sanniveśādī tad yuktam tasmād yad anumāyate \! & \! II 11 \!\
\end{align*}
\]

"[That kind of governor] which is inferred from such a configuration, etc., of which it is established that it follows the presence and absence of a [certain] governor, is correct."

Here he is saying, in other words, that a hetu is correct and may be applied when the necessary conditions of positive and negative concomitance, anvaya and vyātiśeṣa, are satisfied. However, as he goes on, an incorrect hetu, which is similar to the correct, established one only inasmuch as one and the same word may be applied to both of them, does not bring about a valid inference. This would be like the inference of fire from snow on account of the snow being white, like smoke.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsāmyād abhedinaḥ} \! & \! / \\
\text{na yuktānimitthi pāṇḍūravād iha hūṣāśīne II 12} \!\
\end{align*}
\]

"It is not correct to infer something that is generally known [as occurring] in the case [of the presence] of one real entity (vastubheda) on account of [a reason] that is not different [from that entity] [only] due to the sameness of a word [applied to both of them]. [This would be] like [the inference] of fire on account of a white substance."

When we apply this critique to Aviddhakarṇa’s proof, it means that the reason sanniveśa-viśiśta-tvāt is not a property of the pakṣa to be proven. For the property sanniveśa-viśiśta-tvā, which belongs to the pot where the pervasion (vyāpti) has been established, and the property sanniveśa-viśiśta-tvā belongs to the sādhyadharmin are two completely different things, even if the same word is applied to them. If the opponent nevertheless insists on this kind of procedure, he is ridiculed. The opponent would then have to accept a termite hill as being produced by a potter like a pot, for both of them are modifications of clay:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mṛdvikārasya kasyacicī} \! & \! / \\
\text{ghatādeḥ karṇāṇi sādhyed vālmikāsyaśaḥ tātṛtiḥ II 13} \!\
\end{align*}
\]

"Otherwise it would be established that a termite hill is also a product of this [potter], because a certain modification of clay such as a pot is produced by that potter."

In the next verse Dharmakīrti objects that his criticism could be misunderstood to constitute a false objection, jāti or dvaśanābhāsa, called kāryasama, ‘similar to the effect’ or ‘balancing the effect’ (Tucci).8

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sādhyenānagamāt kārye sāmānyenāpi sādhane} \! & \! / \\
\text{sambandhibhedād bhedokīdōṣaḥ kāryasamo mataḥ II 14} \!\
\end{align*}
\]

"[And our criticism does not constitute the dvaśanābhāsa called kāryasama, for] the fallacy that is assumed as kāryasama consists in pronouncing a difference [between the effect which serves as hetu and the effect known in the example] [only] because of a difference of the related terms [i.e.

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8 kāryasama is defined by Dignāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya VI v. 7 and in Nyāyamukha, Taishō vol. 32, 5b (translated in Giuseppe Tucci, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga (Heidelberg, 1930), 60).
sādhyadharmin and drṣṭāntadharmin] when an effect is a probans also in general because it is accompanied by the probandum [in general].

In verse 15 Dharmakīrti repeats what he had formulated in verse 12 with regard to a real entity (vastu), but relates his statement to general concepts (jāti) by which he means notions such as ‘effect’ (kārya) or ‘configuration’ (saṃsthaṇa) or that of any other universal. By the last verse dealing with the refutation of the opponents’ proofs for the existence of God, he expresses the view that things are not established by the mere utterance of the words denoting them.

jāryantare prasisddhasya śabdasāmānyadarśanāt /
na yuktam sādhanam gotvād vāgādināṁ viśānivat // 15 //
"[However] a proof of something that is generally known [to occur] in the case [of the presence of the property consisting of] a certain general concept on account of knowing (darśana) a universal consisting of a word [applied to both of them] is not correct. [This is] like [proving] that speech and so on have horns on account of [their having the property consisting of the general concept of] the gotva [because the word go denotes, besides other things, ‘cow’ as well as ‘speech’]."

vivakṣāparatrantratvān na śabdāḥ santi kutra vā /
tadbhāvād arthasiddhau tu sarvām sarvasya sidhyati // 16 //
"Or, since [words] depend on [the speaker’s] intention, is there any [object] for which there are no words? [However] if objects were established by the [mere] presence of that [word applied to them], everything would be established for everybody."

Now, if we consider these verses again, we may say that nos. 11–16 are more or less self-evident and can be understood without difficulty. This also applies to verse 14, the definition of the kāryasama dāsanābhāsa, although at first glance it does not look that obvious. For this is nothing but a reformulation of the definition as given by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya VI v. 7. These verses do not, however, constitute an explanation of verse 10 as one would have expected. The logical fault addressed in verse 12, for example, is, as one can easily see, that the hetu is not established (asiddha). This classification also obtains for verse 15. And this is the exact way that Dharmakīrti himself classifies this fallacy of the reason addressed here, for he had incorporated vv. 11–16 into the third chapter of his Pramāṇaviniścaya (vv. 70–75) under the heading of the hetvābhāsa called asiddha. Thus it is quite obvious that vv. 11–16 are not intended by Dharmakīrti as a comment on verse 10 but as an additional criticism. However, why the proofs of the opponents constitute the fallacies of proving what is already established for the Buddhists (iṣṭasiddhi) and of the probandum’s being unestablished in the example (asiddhir vā drṣṭānte), etc., still remains unclear.

As it is unlikely that Dharmakīrti would accuse his opponents of using incorrect arguments without discussing them and without showing why these fallacies should obtain, we may assume that this has been formulated elsewhere either by himself or by somebody else and that here in

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the Pramānasiddhi chapter he presupposes that explanation. But such an explanation is, at least to my knowledge, not to be found in any of Dharmakīrti’s works. However, help in understanding that verse may be obtained from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika.

In Ślokavārttika, Sambandhakṣepaparāhāra, vv. 74–82ab, Kumārila considers the argument of Aviddhakarṇa, reformulating it at the beginning of this section in the following way:

sanniveśavīśṭānām utpattīm yo grhaṇāvat /
śādhyeyec cetanādhiṣṭhāṁ[10] dehaṇāṁ tasya cottaram // 74 //
"Now (ca), the [following is our] answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation (upatti) of bodies specific in configuration must be governed by a conscious being (cetanādhiṣṭā), like [the creation of] houses, etc."[11]

In the first part of his answer, in vv. 75 and 76ab, Kumārila argues that this proof is not valid because it proves what is already established for the Mīmāṃsaka:

karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānām[14] tattsidheh siddhasādhanam // 75 //[15]
"If [you] assume that to govern something means no more than to be its cause, then [you] prove what already is established [for us]. For that [fact of being no more than cause] is constituted (tattsidhi) by the [past] actions (karma) of all beings."

echāpārvaṇakapakṣa ‘pi, iṣṭapārvavatena karmanām / 76ab //
"[The same defect disqualifies you] even if [you take] the alternative [and claim] that [to govern something means] presupposing the will [of that governor]. For the actions [themselves] presuppose that [will]."

In the second half of v. 76 Kumārila shows that the proving property would not occur in the example if this governing agency (adhiṣṭhātṛtā) were understood in such a way that things come into existence immediately after he had wished it.

ichānantarasiddhis tu drṣṭānte ‘pi na vidyate // 76cd //
"[You may assume that to govern something means] to come into existence (siddhi) immediately after that will. But (tu) this is not to be found in any example."

Verse 77 expresses the idea that the body of God could be taken as a counter-example, for his body possesses the proving property, namely upatti and being specific in configuration, but the property to be proven, i.e. being governed by a conscious being, is not to be found. For the opponent does not assume that for its creation God’s body requires yet another conscious being: this would lead to an infinite regression. As the hetu thus occurs where the property to be proven

[11] I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Alexis Sanderson, Oxford, for kindly providing his translation of ŚV. Sambandhakṣepaparāhāra, vv. 42c–114b.
[14] sarvajīvān ŚV, NBhūṣ, NM : sarvabjānām Vyom
is available as well as where this is not the case, it would be inconclusive, anekānta.

anekāntas ca hetus te taccharirādinā bhavet /
utpattīmāṃś ca taddeho dehatvād asmadādivat // 77 //

"Moreover, your reason would be inconclusive because of his body, etc. And [you cannot deny
that] his body had an origin, because it is a body, like ours."

If, as formulated in the next verse, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in order to avoid this fault, argues
that his body does not serve as a counter-example (vipakṣa), for his body, too, is governed by God
himself, then it follows that God, in order to create his body, would have to be a governor without
a body, like any other liberated soul. To govern without having a body, however, is not possible.

atha tasyāpy adhiṣṭhānam tenaivety avipakṣatā /
asaśāraḥ hy adhiṣṭhātā nāsav16 muktātmavad bhavet // 78 //

"If [the opponent claims] that [God’s body] is not a counter-example, for that [body] too, is gov-
erned by this [God] himself, [we answer that this assumption is] not [possible]. For he would have
to be a governor without a body, like [any other] liberated soul."

Verse 79 shows another case where the example lacks the proving property. This fault would
obtain, Kumārila argues, if one assumes pots, for example, to be governed by God. For this has
not been seen by anyone. If, on the other hand, one assumes that pots are governed by potters,
then the undesired consequence follows that they could not be governed by God.

kumbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānam ghatādau yadi cesyate17 /
neśvarādhiṣṭhiatvam syād, asti cet sādhyahinaatā // 79 //18

"Moreover, if you hold that in case of the pot and so on the governing agency (adhiṣṭhāna) is that
of the potter, etc., then [pots, etc.] would not be governed by God. If [on the other hand] [they] are
[governed by God himself], then [the example] is lacking the property to be proven."

Aviddhakārṇa’s reason is not only considered to be inconclusive (anekānta), but also to
prove the opposite of what it is intended to do. For if the example is understood to exhibit the
property to be proven, then it would follow that the atoms are governed by human beings which
are neither God nor eternal. Thus the reason would be contradictory.

yathāsiddhe ca drṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā //19
aniśvaraviniśāyādikartrmattvam prasajyate // 80 //

"And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood (yathāsiddha), then the reason
would be contradictory. [For] it would follow that [the subject to be proven] would have a creator
who is a non-God and perishable (vināśin)."

As a final refutation of Aviddhakārṇa’s proof Kumārila adds that if, unlike the creation of a
pot by a potter, God creates the world without having a body by his mere will, then the atoms

16 nāsav 1 Pu [cf. ŚV 468]: nāmā ŚV
17 cesyate ŚV, NBhūś : cesyate IS
18 v. 79 quoted in ĪS 6,4–5: NBhūś 449,11–12
19 v. 80ab quoted in ĪS 6,6: NBhūś 449,13
could not obey to his will, for they are unconscious by nature.

\[ \text{kulålavac ca naitasya vyåpåro yadi kalpyate}^{20} / \]
\[ \text{acetanaå katham bhåvas tadicchåin anurudhyate}^{21} \text{ // 81 //}^{22} \]

“And if his activity is not held [to be of the same kind] as that of a potter, how could an entity that is insentient (acetana) [like an atom] obey [this] will of his?”

\[ \text{tasman na paramånååder årambhå syåt tadicchåyå} \text{ // 82ab //} \]

“Therefore, the atoms do not cling together [in order to constitute the world] due to his [mere] will.”

In this small section of the Ślokavārttika we have seen so far that the fallacies of īṣtasiddhiḥ, asiddhir và drśtante, and sanśāyo ‘hvå referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV II 10 are explained here in extenso in verses 75–76ab, 76cd and 79, and 77–78 respectively. Thus, these verses could be a candidate for what Dharmakīrti may have had in mind when he accused the opponents’ proofs of containing the fallacies just mentioned. In order to see whether Kumārila’s critique is also acceptable for a Buddhist, we should have a look at how Dharmakīrti is explained by his commentators.

The fault of siddhasādhana as explicated in ŚV 75 obtains, because, under the condition that ‘the being mere cause’ (hetumātratva) is intended to be the sādhyå, this fact of being the mere cause is constituted by the actions of all living beings. And this is the very way in which this fallacy is expounded by Dharmakīrti’s commentators. For the sake of convenience I do not follow one commentary only, but quote those passages where the correspondence with Kumārila’s ideas finds its most clear and succinct expression. In this case we will have a look at Prajñākarāgupta’s Pramāṇavārttikāḷaṅkāra:

\[ \ldots \text{īṣasyaiva siddhiḥ siddhasādhanaṁ} \ldots \text{karmalakṣanacetanādhiśhitam ca sakalam isyate.} \]

PVA 35,29f

“\ldots ‘proving what already is accepted [by us]’ means ‘proving what already is established [for us]’\ldots ’ And we assume that everything is governed by volition (cetanā) which is defined as karman.”

In this context the commentators normally quote Abhidharmaśa IV 1ab, which says that “the variety of the world arises from action. And this [action] is volition and that which is produced through volition.”\(^{23}\) Here there is no doubt that the argument as formulated by Kumārila and the one adopted by Prajñākarāgupta are the same. One could now assume, however, that Dharmakīrti was thinking of this passage from the Abhidharmaśa alone. But this does not seem very likely to me. For he could not expect an opponent to understand and react to such an accusation that his proof when understood in a general way contains the fault of īṣtasiddhi because of that statement in the Abhidharmaśa alone.

\[^{20}\text{kalpyate 3 Pu [cf. ŚV 469?]}, \text{NM, NBhūś : kalpate ŚV} \]
\[^{21}\text{anurudhyate ŚV, NBhūś : anuvarte NM} \]
\[^{22}\text{v. 81 quoted in NM 508,8–9; NBhūś 453,14–15} \]
\[^{23}\text{karmajam lokavaicåtryam. cetanå tatkåtå ca tat. Abhidharmaśa IV 1ab} \]
Be this as it may be. The next fault, namely *asiddhir vā drṣṭānte*, which, according to ŚV 79, obtains when the opponent wishes to prove that things are governed by a specific conscious being, namely God, is explained in the very same manner, for example, by Devendrabuddhi having Uddyotakara’s proof in mind:

\[
\text{ci ste de las gzhan pa'i phan 'dogs par byed pa la ltos pa med pa'i skyes bu gcig gi khayad par gyi blos byin gyis brlabs pa sngon du song ba can nyid sgrub pa de'is tshe / dpe ma grub pa yin te / dpe bsgrub par bya bas stong pa zhes bya ba'i don to // PVp D 8b4f, P 9b5f}
\]

“If [the opponent] wishes to prove that [things] presuppose the governance of the mind of a specific, single *puruṣa* that is independent of subsidiary causes (*upakāra*) different from him, then [the probandum] is not established in the example. That means that the example is lacking the property to be proven.”

The last fault addressed by Dharmakīrti, *samśaya 'thavā*, may correspond to ŚV 77–78, where Kumārila explains that the *hetu* brought forward by the opponent is inconclusive (*anekānta*) because of the body of God which is not governed by another sentient being. This defect is illustrated by Devendrabuddhi, who—as was the case with the previous one—considers Uddyotakara’s proof in the following way:

\[
\text{sdod nas 'jug pa'i phyir dang / don byed par nus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni / yang na the tshom za ba yin te / (v. 10d) de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu de nyid kyis ma nges pa yang yin no // de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu gzhan gyis phyin gyis brlabs pa de ni sdod cing / sdod nas lus la sogs pa dag la 'jug par byed na / thug pa med pa thal bar 'gyur pa'i phyir ro // PVp D 8b7–9a1; P 9b8–10a2}
\]

“Or there [remains] doubt regarding the logical reasons [such as] ‘because [they] act after a rest’ and ‘because [they] are capable of accomplishing a purpose’. This means that [these *hetus*] are also inconclusive (*ma nges pa, anaiṅkāntika*) because of that very *puruṣa* [i.e. God] which is of such a kind [as you assume]. For if he [i.e. God] becomes active regarding such [things as his and others’] bodies by being governed by another *puruṣa* of that kind, then an infinite regression (*anavasthā*) follows...”

Because from the above examination it is quite obvious that all of these fallacies alluded to by Dharmakīrti are illustrated by his commentators in the very same way as they have been demonstrated by Kumārila and because PV II 10 could not have been understood at that time in a proper context without knowledge of the critique as formulated in the Ślokavārttika, we safely may conclude that Dharmakīrti was aware of the criticism by Kumārila when he set out to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas’ proofs for the existence of God.

The fact that Dharmakīrti did not include the *hetu*’s being contradictory (*viruddha*) or the statement that the atoms, being insentient, could not obey God’s will, may be explained in such a way that he considered it to be enough to refer to that passage in the Ślokavārttika by mentioning some of the faults shown there, and that he felt no need to repeat all of them. What is noteworthy in this connection is that Dharmakīrti’s commentators did not refer to these fallacies either.24

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24 It is only Śantarakṣita in TS 74 and Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* who consider the *hetus* to be also *viruddha*. 
### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>PVP</td>
<td>Pramāṇavārttikapaṇjikā (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, che 1b1–326b4), P 5717(b) (vol. 130, che 1–390a8).</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>Tatvasaṅgrahaṇaṇajā (Kamalāśīla): See TS.</td>
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