

DHARMAKĪRTI'S AND KUMĀRILA'S REFUTATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: A CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

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The chronological order of Kumāṛila and Dharmakīrti, who are regarded as contemporaries, is still controversial. The main positions regarding their chronological relationship may be summed up as follows:¹ In his paper on Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, Erich Frauwallner² proposed that Dharmakīrti's earliest writing, the so-called **Hetuprakaraṇa*, which he incorporated as Svārthānumāna chapter in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, already takes Kumāṛila's critique on Dignāga in his *Ślokavārttika* into consideration, and that Kumāṛila in his *Bṛhaṭṭikā* refines his view in light of Dharmakīrti's considerations. Frauwallner's arguments are supported by Steinkellner in his new interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* I 33.³ This sequence of the texts, *Ślokavārttika* → **Hetuprakaraṇa* → *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, has been questioned by John Taber, who feels "justified in believing that the ŚV was composed after the BT and contains Kumāṛila's mature views" and that there exist "evidences suggesting that Kumāṛila is indeed sometimes addressing Dharmakīrti's ideas also in the ŚV."⁴ The present paper does not deal with the material and arguments used by the above authors, but aims at solving the question of the relation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Ślokavārttika* by basing itself on material that has so far not been considered. Both parties, the Buddhists as well as the Mīmāṃsakas, do not accept an eternal God (*īśvara*) as creator of the world, and both Dharmakīrti and Kumāṛila refute this idea, at least partially, with more or less similar arguments in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Ślokavārttika* respectively. This examination attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between these passages at all, and if so, what the direction of influence might be.

¹ The problem is also dealt with in Tosaki Hiromasa (*Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū—Hōshō-cho "Pramāṇavārttika" no genryōron* [Studies on Buddhist Epistemology: The theory of perception in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*], Vol. I (Tokyo, 1979), 7–20) where he refers to the opinion of Prof. Hattori who considers Dharmakīrti to have had knowledge of Kumāṛila's *Ślokavārttika*. In a recent paper, too, dealing with the question of 'the exclusion of others' (*anyāpoha*), Hattori proposes the same sequence of texts: *Ślokavārttika* → *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (cf. Masaaki Hattori, "Discussions on Jātimat as the Meaning of a Word," in *Śrījñānāmṛtam: A Memorial Volume in Honour of Prof. Shri Niwas Shastri*, ed. Vijaya Rani (Delhi, 1996), 387–394).

² E. Frauwallner, "Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 6 (1962): 78–90.

³ E. Steinkellner, "Kumāṛila, Īśvarasena, and Dharmakīrti in Dialogue. A New Interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* I 33," in *Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraḥ: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1997), 625–646.

⁴ John A. Taber, "Further Observations on Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*," *The Journal of Oriental Research* (Madras) 56–62 (1986–92) [179–189], 189; 180.

At the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV II), Dharmakīrti, after having shown that an eternal entity (*nitya*) that could serve as reliable authority (*pramāṇa*) is not possible, states that there are neither proofs for an ephemeral (*anitya*) nor for an eternal entity that could be assumed to be the creator of the universe (vv. 8–9). The reasons for this he formulates in the following verses:⁵

*sthityāpravṛttisaṁsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu /
iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dr̥ṣṭānte saṁśayo 'thavā // 10 //*

“In [the case of the logical reasons put forward by the opponents] such as ‘activity after a rest’, ‘having a specific configuration’, and ‘accomplishment of a purpose’ [there obtain the logical faults that they are] proving what is already accepted [by us], or [that the probandum] is not established in the example, or [that there remains] doubt [regarding the *hetu*].”

The arguments referred to in this verse are, as Kamalaśīla informs us, those of Aviddhakārṇa and Uddyotakara.⁶ In order to provide the context we may have a look at the proof of the existence of God as put forward by Aviddhakārṇa:

*[atrāviddhakārṇopanyastam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadvayam . . . tad uktam] dvīndriyagrāhyā-
grāhyam vimatyadhikarāṇabhāvāpannam buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam, svārambhaḥkāyava-
sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt,⁷ ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti TSP 52,16–18.*

“That which is to be grasped and not to be grasped by two sense organs and which is subject of [our] dispute presupposes a conscious cause, because it has a specific configuration of its parts which cling together [in order to constitute the universe], like a pot, etc. The atoms [serve] as dissimilar example.”

Without going into the details of the complicated formulation of the *pakṣa*, an explanation of which is given by Kamalaśīla, we now come back to Dharmakīrti in order to see why these proofs should be afflicted by these logical faults which are not at all self-evident and which we may expect to learn from the following verses. In the next verse Dharmakīrti states that an inference is based on a necessary connection between the probans and the probandum and formulates this

⁵ As a critical edition of the following verses of PV II is included in my study on Śāṅkaranandana's *Īśvarāpa-kāraṇasāṅkṣepa* (to be published in 1999), I refrain here from text critical remarks.

⁶ On *sthityāpravṛtti* cf. TSP 54,14–16: *uddiyotakaraṣ tu pramāṇayati—bhuvanahetavaḥ pradhānaparamāṇva-dr̥ṣṭāḥ svakāryotpattāv atīśayabuddhimantam adhiṣṭhātāram apekṣante, sthityāpravṛtteḥ, tantuturyādivad iti*. Kamalaśīla here probably is referring to *pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante, acetanatvāt, vāsyādivad iti. yathā vāsyādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi acetanāni pravartante. tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitānī* NV 945,12–16 (“Primordial matter, the atoms, and the *karman* become active [only] insofar as before their activity they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc. An ax, for example, becomes active when it is governed by a conscious carpenter. For it is insentient. Primordial matter, the atoms, and the *karman* which are insentient become active in the same way. Therefore, they too are governed by a conscious cause.”) *arthakriyā* is not reported by Kamalaśīla to refer to an argument held by Uddyotakara, but in his *Nyāyavārttika* we can find a similar proof: *buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni svāsu dhāraṇādikriyāsu mahābhūtāni vāyvantāni pravartante, acetanatvāt, vāsyādivat* NV 957,9–11 (“The elements terminated by ‘air’ [i.e. excluding *ākāśa*] become active regarding their activities such as holding when they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc.”)

⁷ Instead of the term *sanniveśaviśiṣṭa* ascribed to Aviddhakārṇa, Dharmakīrti uses the formulation *saṁsthānaviśeṣa* which already is to be found in Uddyotakara (NV 959,10ff. on NS 4.1.22).

general theorem by referring to Aviddhakarṇa's reason alluded to in the previous statement:

*siddham yādr̥g adhiṣṭhātr̥bhāvābhāvānūvṛttimat /
sanniveśādi tad yuktaṁ tasmād yad anumīyate // 11 //*

"[That kind of governor] which is inferred from such a configuration, etc., of which it is established that it follows the presence and absence of a [certain] governor, is correct."

Here he is saying, in other words, that a *hetu* is correct and may be applied when the necessary conditions of positive and negative concomitance, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, are satisfied. However, as he goes on, an incorrect *hetu*, which is similar to the correct, established one only inasmuch as one and the same word may be applied to both of them, does not bring about a valid inference. This would be like the inference of fire from snow on account of the snow being white, like smoke.

*vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsāmyād abhedinaḥ /
na yukṭānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravayād iva hutāśane // 12 //*

"It is not correct to infer something that is generally known [as occurring] in the case [of the presence] of one real entity (*vastubhede*) on account of [a reason] that is not different [from that entity] [only] due to the sameness of a word [applied to both of them]. [This would be] like [the inference] of fire on account of a white substance."

When we apply this critique to Aviddhakarṇa's proof, it means that the reason *sanniveśa-viśiṣṭatvāt* is not a property of the *pakṣa* to be proven. For the property *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* which belongs to the pot where the pervasion (*vyāpti*) has been established, and the property *sanniveśa-viśiṣṭatva* belonging to the *sādhya* *dharmīn* are two completely different things, even if the same word is applied to them. If the opponent nevertheless insists on this kind of procedure, he is ridiculed. The opponent would then have to accept a termite hill as being produced by a potter like a pot, for both of them are modifications of clay:

*anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mṛdvikārasya kasyacit /
ghaṭādeḥ karaṇāt sidhyed valmīkasyāpi tatkr̥tiḥ // 13 //*

"Otherwise it would be established that a termite hill is also a product of this [potter], because a certain modification of clay such as a pot is produced by that potter."

In the next verse Dharmakīrti objects that his criticism could be misunderstood to constitute a false objection, *jāti* or *dūṣaṇābhāsa*, called *kāryasama*, 'similar to the effect' or 'balancing the effect' (Tucci).⁸

*sādhyanānugamāt kārye sāmānyenāpi sādhanē /
sambandhibhedād bhedoktidoṣaḥ kāryasamo mataḥ // 14 //*

"[And our criticism does not constitute the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* called *kāryasama*, for] the fallacy that is assumed as *kāryasama* consists in pronouncing a difference [between the effect which serves as *hetu* and the effect known in the example] [only] because of a difference of the related terms [i.e.

⁸ *kāryasama* is defined by Dignāga in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* VI v. 7 and in *Nyāyamukha*, Taishō vol. 32, 5b (translated in Giuseppe Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga* (Heidelberg, 1930), 60).

sādhyadharmin and *dr̥ṣṭāntadharmin*] when an effect is a probans also in general because it is accompanied by the probandum [in general].”

In verse 15 Dharmakīrti repeats what he had formulated in verse 12 with regard to a real entity (*vastu*), but relates his statement to general concepts (*jāti*) by which he means notions such as ‘effect’ (*kārya*) or ‘configuration’ (*saṁsthāna*) or that of any other universal. By the last verse dealing with the refutation of the opponents’ proofs for the existence of God, he expresses the view that things are not established by the mere utterance of the words denoting them.

*jātyantare prasiddhasya śabdāsāmānyadarśanāt /
na yuktaṁ sādhanam gotvād vāgādīnām viśānivat // 15 //*

“[However] a proof of something that is generally known [to occur] in the case [of the presence of the property consisting of] a certain general concept on account of knowing (*darśana*) a universal consisting of a word [applied to both of them] is not correct. [This is] like [proving] that speech and so on have horns on account of [their having the property consisting of the general concept of] the *gotva* [because the word *go* denotes, besides other things, ‘cow’ as well as ‘speech’].”

*vivakṣāparatantratvān na śabdāḥ santi kutra vā /
tadbhāvād arthasiddhau tu sarvaṁ sarvasya sidhyati // 16 //*

“Or, since [words] depend on [the speaker’s] intention, is there any [object] for which there are no words? [However] if objects were established by the [mere] presence of that [word applied to them], everything would be established for everybody.”

Now, if we consider these verses again, we may say that nos. 11–16 are more or less self-evident and can be understood without difficulty. This also applies to verse 14, the definition of the *kāryasama dūṣaṇābhāsa*, although at first glance it does not look that obvious. For this is nothing but a reformulation of the definition as given by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* VI v. 7. These verses do not, however, constitute an explanation of verse 10 as one would have expected. The logical fault addressed in verse 12, for example, is, as one can easily see, that the *hetu* is not established (*asiddha*). This classification also obtains for verse 15. And this is the exact way that Dharmakīrti himself classifies this fallacy of the reason addressed here, for he had incorporated vv. 11–16 into the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (vv. 70–75)⁹ under the heading of the *hetvābhāsa* called *asiddha*. Thus it is quite obvious that vv. 11–16 are not intended by Dharmakīrti as a comment on verse 10 but as an additional criticism. However, why the proofs of the opponents constitute the fallacies of proving what is already established for the Buddhists (*iṣṭasiddhi*) and of the probandum’s being unestablished in the example (*asiddhir vā dr̥ṣṭānte*), etc., still remains unclear.

As it is unlikely that Dharmakīrti would accuse his opponents of using incorrect arguments without discussing them and without showing why these fallacies should obtain, we may assume that this has been formulated elsewhere either by himself or by somebody else and that here in

⁹ Derge Tshad ma Vol. 14, No. 4227 Tshe [1–178a3]: 128a5–129b1 = Peking Vol. 137, No. 5727 We [1–209b3]: 150a7–151b6. For a Japanese translation and explanation of these verses, cf. Motoi Ono, “Pramāṇaviniścaya ni okeru shusaishin sonzai ronshō hihan” [Critique of the proof for the existence of God in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*], *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 5, 1986: 65–71.

the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter he presupposes that explanation. But such an explanation is, at least to my knowledge, not to be found in any of Dharmakīrti's works. However, help in understanding that verse may be obtained from Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*.

In *Śloka-vārttika*, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 74–82ab, Kumārila considers the argument of Aviddhakarṇa, reformulating it at the beginning of this section in the following way:

sanniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattiṃ yo grhādivat /

sādhayec cetanādhiṣṭhām¹⁰ dehānām tasya cottaram // 74 //

"Now (*ca*), the [following is our] answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation (*utpatti*) of bodies specific in configuration must be governed by a conscious being (*cetanādhiṣṭhā*), like [the creation of] houses, etc."¹¹

In the first part of his answer, in vv. 75 and 76ab, Kumārila argues that this proof is not valid because it proves what is already established for the Mīmāṃsaka:

kasyacid dhetunātratvam¹² yady adhiṣṭhātrteṣyate¹³ /

karmabhiḥ sarvajīvanām¹⁴ tatsiddheḥ siddhasāadhanam // 75 //

"If [you] assume that to govern something means no more than to be its cause, then [you] prove what already is established [for us]. For that [fact of being no more than cause] is constituted (*tatsiddhi*) by the [past] actions (*karma*) of all beings."

icchāpūrvakapakṣe 'pi, tatpūrvatvena karmaṇām / 76ab //

"[The same defect disqualifies you] even if [you take] the alternative [and claim] that [to govern something means] presupposing the will [of that governor]. For the actions [themselves] presuppose that [will]."

In the second half of v. 76 Kumārila shows that the proving property would not occur in the example if this governing agency (*adhiṣṭhātrtā*) were understood in such a way that things come into existence immediately after he had wished it.

icchānantarasiddhis tu drṣṭānte 'pi na vidyate // 76cd //

"[You may assume that to govern something means] to come into existence (*siddhi*) immediately after that will. But (*tu*) this is not to be found in any example."

Verse 77 expresses the idea that the body of God could be taken as a counter-example, for his body possesses the proving property, namely *utpatti* and being specific in configuration, but the property to be proven, i.e. being governed by a conscious being, is not to be found. For the opponent does not assume that for its creation God's body requires yet another conscious being: this would lead to an infinite regression. As the *hetu* thus occurs where the property to be proven

¹⁰ *cetanādhiṣṭhām* ŚV : *cetanādhiṣṭhā* Kā sam [cf. ŚV 467²]

¹¹ I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Alexis Sanderson, Oxford, for kindly providing his translation of ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 42c–114b.

¹² *mātratvam* ŚV : *mātrasya* NBhūṣ, Vyom

¹³ *adhiṣṭhātrteṣyate* ŚV : *adhiṣṭhātrtocyate* NBhūṣ, Vyom

¹⁴ *sarvajīvanām* ŚV, NBhūṣ, NM : *sarvabījānām* Vyom

¹⁵ v. 75 quoted in NBhūṣ 448, 11f.; Vyom 103, 20f.; v. 75cd quoted in NM 510, 11

is available as well as where this is not the case, it would be inconclusive, *anekānta*.

*anekāntas ca hetus te taccharīrādinā bhavet /
utpattimāms ca taddeho dehatvād asmadādivat // 77 //*

“Moreover, your reason would be inconclusive because of his body, etc. And [you cannot deny that] his body had an origin, because it is a body, like ours.”

If, as formulated in the next verse, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in order to avoid this fault, argues that his body does not serve as a counter-example (*vipakṣa*), for his body, too, is governed by God himself, then it follows that God, in order to create his body, would have to be a governor without a body, like any other liberated soul. To govern without having a body, however, is not possible.

*atha tasyāpy adhiṣṭhānam tenaivety avipakṣatā /
aśarīro hy adhiṣṭhātā nāsau¹⁶ muktātmavad bhavet // 78 //*

“If [the opponent claims] that [God’s body] is not a counter-example, for that [body] too, is governed by this [God] himself, [we answer that this assumption is] not [possible]. For he would have to be a governor without a body, like [any other] liberated soul.”

Verse 79 shows another case where the example lacks the proving property. This fault would obtain, Kumārila argues, if one assumes pots, for example, to be governed by God. For this has not been seen by anyone. If, on the other hand, one assumes that pots are governed by potters, then the undesired consequence follows that they could not be governed by God.

*kumbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānam ghaṭādau yadi ceṣyate¹⁷ /
neśvarādhiṣṭhitatvam syād, asti cet sādhyahīnatā // 79 //*¹⁸

“Moreover, if you hold that in case of the pot and so on the governing agency (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is that of the potter, etc., then [pots, etc.] would not be governed by God. If [on the other hand] [they] are [governed by God himself], then [the example] is lacking the property to be proven.”

Aviddhakarṇa’s reason is not only considered to be inconclusive (*anekānta*), but also to prove the opposite of what it is intended to do. For if the example is understood to exhibit the property to be proven, then it would follow that the atoms are governed by human beings which are neither God nor eternal. Thus the reason would be contradictory.

*yathāsiddhe ca drṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā¹⁹ /
anīśvaravināśyādikarṣṇamattvam prasajyate // 80 //*

“And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood (*yathāsiddha*), then the reason would be contradictory. [For] it would follow that [the subject to be proven] would have a creator who is a non-God and perishable (*vināśin*).”

As a final refutation of Aviddhakarṇa’s proof Kumārila adds that if, unlike the creation of a pot by a potter, God creates the world without having a body by his mere will, then the atoms

¹⁶ *nāsau* I Pu [cf. ŚV 468¹]: *nātmā* ŚV

¹⁷ *ceṣyate* ŚV, NBhūṣ: *veṣyate* ĪS

¹⁸ v. 79 quoted in ĪS 6,4–5; NBhūṣ 449,11–12

¹⁹ v. 80ab quoted in ĪS 6,6; NBhūṣ 449,13

could not obey to his will, for they are unconscious by nature.

*kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate*²⁰ /

*acetanaḥ katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate*²¹ // 81 // ²²

"And if his activity is not held [to be of the same kind] as that of a potter, how could an entity that is insentient (*acetana*) [like an atom] obey [this] will of his?"

tasmān na paramāṇvāder ārambhaḥ syāt tadicchayā // 82ab //

"Therefore, the atoms do not cling together [in order to constitute the world] due to his [mere] will."

In this small section of the *Ślokavārttika* we have seen so far that the fallacies of *iṣṭasiddhiḥ*, *asiddhir vā drṣṭānte*, and *saṁśayo 'thavā* referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV II 10 are explained here *in extenso* in verses 75–76ab, 76cd and 79, and 77–78 respectively. Thus, these verses could be a candidate for what Dharmakīrti may have had in mind when he accused the opponents' proofs of containing the fallacies just mentioned. In order to see whether Kumāṛila's critique is also acceptable for a Buddhist, we should have a look at how Dharmakīrti is explained by his commentators.

The fault of *siddhasādhana* as explicated in ŚV 75 obtains, because, under the condition that 'the being mere cause' (*hetumātratva*) is intended to be the *sādhya*, this fact of being the mere cause is constituted by the actions of all living beings. And this is the very way in which this fallacy is expounded by Dharmakīrti's commentators. For the sake of convenience I do not follow one commentary only, but quote those passages where the correspondence with Kumāṛila's ideas finds its most clear and succinct expression. In this case we will have a look at Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālankāra*:

... *iṣṭasyaiva siddhiḥ siddhasādhanam*. ... *karmalakṣaṇacetanādhiṣṭhitam ca sakalam iṣyate*.

PVA 35,29f

"... 'proving what already is accepted [by us]' means 'proving what already is established [for us]'. ... And we assume that everything is governed by volition (*cetanā*) which is defined as *karman*."

In this context the commentators normally quote *Abhidharmakośa* IV 1ab, which says that "the variety of the world arises from action. And this [action] is volition and that which is produced through volition."²³ Here there is no doubt that the argument as formulated by Kumāṛila and the one adopted by Prajñākaragupta are the same. One could now assume, however, that Dharmakīrti was thinking of this passage from the *Abhidharmakośa* alone. But this does not seem very likely to me. For he could not expect an opponent to understand and react to such an accusation that his proof when understood in a general way contains the fault of *iṣṭasiddhi* because of that statement in the *Abhidharmakośa* alone.

²⁰ *kalpyate* 3 Pu [cf. ŚV 469²], NM, NBhūṣ : *kalpate* ŚV

²¹ *anurudhyate* ŚV, NBhūṣ : *anuvartate* NM

²² v. 81 quoted in NM 508,8–9; NBhūṣ 453,14–15

²³ *karmajaṁ lokavacitryam. cetanā tatkr̥taṁ ca tat. Abhidharmakośa* IV 1ab

Be this as it may be. The next fault, namely *asiddhir vā dr̥ṣṭānte*, which, according to ŚV 79, obtains when the opponent wishes to prove that things are governed by a specific conscious being, namely God, is explained in the very same manner, for example, by Devendrabuddhi having Uddyotakara's proof in mind:

ci ste de las gzhan pa'i phan 'dogs par byed pa la ltos pa med pa'i skyes bu gcig gi khyad par gyi blos byin gyis brlabs pa sngon du song ba can nyid sgrub pa de'i tshe / dpe ma grub pa yin te / dpe bsgrub par bya bas stong pa zhes bya ba'i don to // PVP D 8b4f, P 9b5f

"If [the opponent] wishes to prove that [things] presuppose the governance of the mind of a specific, single *puruṣa* that is independent of subsidiary causes (*upakāra*) different from him, then [the probandum] is **not established in the example**. That means that the example is lacking the property to be proven."

The last fault addressed by Dharmakīrti, *saṃśayo 'thavā*, may correspond to ŚV 77–78, where Kumāṛila explains that the *hetu* brought forward by the opponent is inconclusive (*anekānta*) because of the body of God which is not governed by another sentient being. This defect is illustrated by Devendrabuddhi, who—as was the case with the previous one—considers Uddyotakara's proof in the following way:

sdod nas 'jug pa'i phyir dang / don byed par nus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni / yang na the tshom za ba yin te / (v. 10d) de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu de nyid kyis ma nges pa yang yin no // de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu gzhan gyis phyin gyis brlabs pa de ni sdod cing / sdod nas lus la sogs pa dag la 'jug par byed na / thug pa med pa thal bar 'gyur pa'i phyir ro // PVP D 8b7–9a1; P 9b8–10a2

"**Or there [remains] doubt** regarding the logical reasons [such as] 'because [they] act after a rest' and 'because [they] are capable of accomplishing a purpose'. This means that [these *hetus*] are also inconclusive (*ma nges pa*, *anaikāntika*) because of that very *puruṣa* [i.e. God] which is of such a kind [as you assume]. For if he [i.e. God] becomes active regarding such [things as his and others'] bodies by being governed by another *puruṣa* of that kind, then an infinite regression (*anavasthā*) follows . . ."

Because from the above examination it is quite obvious that all of these fallacies alluded to by Dharmakīrti are illustrated by his commentators in the very same way as they have been demonstrated by Kumāṛila and because PV II 10 could not have been understood at that time in a proper context without knowledge of the critique as formulated in the *Ślokavārttika*, we safely may conclude that Dharmakīrti was aware of the criticism by Kumāṛila when he set out to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' proofs for the existence of God.

The fact that Dharmakīrti did not include the *hetu*'s being contradictory (*viruddha*) or the statement that the atoms, being insentient, could not obey God's will, may be explained in such a way that he considered it to be enough to refer to that passage in the *Ślokavārttika* by mentioning some of the faults shown there, and that he felt no need to repeat all of them. What is noteworthy in this connection is that Dharmakīrti's commentators did not refer to these fallacies either.²⁴

²⁴ It is only Śāntarakṣita in TS 74 and Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* who consider the *hetus* to be also *viruddha*.

Abbreviations

ĪS	<i>Īśvarasiddhi</i> (Utpaladeva): Madusudan Kaul Shastri, ed. <i>The Siddhitrayi and the Pratyabhijñākarika-vritti of Rajanaka Utpala Deva</i> . Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 34. Srinagar, 1921.
NBhūṣ	<i>Nyāyabhūṣaṇa</i> (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, ed. <i>Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñāpranītasya Nyāyasāraṣya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam</i> . Śaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇasī, 1968.
NM	<i>Nyāyamañjarī</i> (Jayantabhaṭṭa): K. S. Varadacharya, ed. <i>Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī—Nyāyasaurabha by the editor</i> . Vol. 1. Mysore, 1969.
NV	<i>Nyāyavārttika</i> (Uddyotakara): <i>Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyāṭikā-sahitam</i> , with Vātsyāyana's <i>Bhāṣya</i> , Uddyotakara's <i>Vārttika</i> , Vācaspati Miśra's <i>Tātparyāṭikā</i> and Viśvanātha's <i>Vṛtti</i> . Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatīrtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatīrtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.
PV II	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Pramāṇasiddhi): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. <i>Pramāṇavārttikakārikā</i> (Sanskrit and Tibetan). <i>Acta Indologica</i> 2 (1971/72): 2–41. [Chapter 1 in Miyasaka's edition.]
PVA	<i>Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra</i> (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. <i>Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālāṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam</i> . Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
PVP	<i>Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā</i> (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, Che 1b1–326b4), P 5717(b) (vol. 130, Che 1–390a8).
ŚV	<i>Ślokavārttika</i> (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa): Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, ed. <i>Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary Nyāyaramākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra</i> . Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.
TS	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita): Svāmī Dvārikadas Shastri, ed. <i>Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla</i> . 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981–82.
TSP	<i>Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla): See TS.
Vyom	<i>Vyomavatī</i> (Vyomaśīva): Gaurinath Sastri, ed. <i>Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya</i> . Vol. 1. Varanasi, 1983.