

## *Dharmakīrti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)*

Piotr Balcerowicz, Warszawa

1. As it is well-known, in his PV/PVSV 3.181–184 *Dharmakīrti briefly criticises the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)*. In this paper I will attempt to identify possible sources of *Dharmakīrti's inspiration in Jaina literature, to analyse his account of the Jaina theory as well as discuss Jaina response to his criticism.*

1.1. The whole passage of PV/PVSV<sub>4</sub> 3.183–187 (59,24–61,29) = PV/PVSV<sub>5</sub> 3.181–185 (89,22–93,5) = PV/PVSV<sub>9</sub> 3.181cd–185 (262,18–265,20) reads as follows:

{181.1} *etenaiva yad ahrīkaḥ kiṃ apy aślīlam ākulam /  
pralapanti pratikṣiptaṃ tad apy ekāntasambhavāt // 181 //*

By this [refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory, viz. by proving that all things are discrete,<sup>1</sup>] that really primitive and confused [theory] the shameless [Jainas] nonsensically profess is also disproved, because singular character [of reality] (sc. absolutely discrete entities) is possible.

{181.2} *yad ayam ahrīkaḥ syād uṣṭro dadhi syān neti kiṃ apy aślīlam ayuktam aheyopādeyam apariniṣṭhānād ākulaṃ pralapanti.* {181.3} *tad apy anena nirastaṃ svabhāvenaikāntabhedāt.*

What the shameless [Jainas] nonsensically profess, namely: “a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt,” [a theory] which is really primitive, inconsistent and is not relevant to what should be avoided and to what should be appropriated (sc. is useless) – insofar as it does not help establish [that which should be avoided and that should be appropriated] – [and is therefore] confused, also that [theory] is refuted by this [refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory], because [things] in [their] essential nature are different in the absolute sense.

{181.3} *tadanvaye vā.*

{182.1} *sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ /  
codito dadhi khādeti kiṃ uṣṭraṃ nābhīdhāvati // 182 //*<sup>2</sup>

Or, if [one admits that] there is [some kind of] association [between entities (or: between a camel and yoghurt) that are discrete in their essential natures, then...]

Since – if everything [is supposed] to have a form of both<sup>3</sup> – [any] distinction between these [entities (or: between the camel and yoghurt)] would be revoked, then why does a person enjoined as follows: “Eat yoghurt!”, not run towards the camel?

<sup>1</sup> PVSVT: *etenaiveti sarvasyārthasya bhedasādhanena.*

<sup>2</sup> The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,27–28; NASV 35 § 30, p. 93,27; NKC 620,20–21; AJP I 23,2–3; AVP 7; AśS 9, 92,22–93,1; NViV I 177,19–20; NViV 2.203 (233,11); SVR 837,###; [SViṬ 124,27]; [SViṬ 212,24]; [SViṬ 615,19]; [SViṬ 749,11].

<sup>3</sup> Viz. either (1) ‘of the universal and of the particular’ (*sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa*) or (2) ‘of itself and of the other’ (*sva-*

{182.2} *tathā hy uṣṭro 'pi syād dadhi nāpi sa evoṣṭraḥ yenānyo 'pi syād uṣṭraḥ. tathā dadhy api syād uṣṭraḥ nāpi<sup>4</sup> tad eva dadhi yenānyad api syād dadhi.* {182.3} *tad<sup>5</sup> anayor ekasyāpi kasyacit tadrūpābhāvasyābhāvāt svarūpasya vātadbhāvināḥ<sup>6</sup> svanīyatasyābhāvāt na kaścīd viśeṣa iti.* {182.4} *dadhi khādeti codita uṣṭram api khādet.*

For it is as follows: a camel is, [as you say,] in a certain sense, yoghurt; it is not the case that [the camel] is only a camel, because likewise the camel is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely a camel]. Similarly, also yoghurt is, in a certain sense, a camel; it is not the case that this [yoghurt] is only yoghurt, because yoghurt is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely yoghurt]. Therefore, since any of these two (the camel and yoghurt) lacks the absence of the form of the other or [any of these two (e.g. the camel)] lacks the intrinsic nature which is not present in the other (e.g. in yoghurt) [and] which is confined [only] to itself (e.g. to the camel), there is no distinction whatsoever [between the camel and yoghurt]. [Accordingly], someone enjoined as follows: “Eat yoghurt!” could eat camel as well.

{183.1} *athāsty atīśayaḥ kaścīd yena bhedena vartate /  
sa eva dadhi so 'nyatra nāstīty anubhayaṃ param // 183 //*<sup>7</sup>

If [the Jaina says that] there is indeed some **ultimate quality** by virtue of whose singular character [the person enjoined as above] acts [with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel, then what follows is that the entity] does not have both [natures but eventually] is [only] something different: that very [ultimate quality] is yoghurt [and] that [ultimate quality] is not present in any other [thing, e.g. in the camel].<sup>8</sup>

{183.2} *athānayoḥ kaścīd atīśayo 'sti yenāyaṃ tathā coditaḥ kṣīravikāra eva pravartate nānyatra.* {183.3} *sa<sup>9</sup> evatīśayo 'rīhākriyārthipravṛtṭiṣayo dadhi. tatphalaviśeṣopādānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvaṃ hi vastu dadhīti.* {183.4} *sa ca tādṛśaḥ svabhāvo 'nyatra nāstīti<sup>10</sup>. pravṛtyabhāvād arthinaḥ. tasmāt tan nobhayaṃ param<sup>11</sup> ity ekāntavādaḥ. api ca.*

If [the Jaina says that] these two (sc. the camel and yoghurt) indeed have some ultimate quality by virtue of which this [person] enjoined in such a manner [to eat yoghurt] proceeds only towards the modification of milk (sc. yoghurt), and not towards anything else (e.g. the camel), then precisely this ultimate quality alone is yoghurt [itself], which is the scope of the activity of [the person] aiming at executing causally efficient action. For yoghurt is [here] the real thing whose essential nature is characterised by the condition [that allows] the appropriation of its particular result. And such essential nature of this kind does not exist in any other thing (e.g. in the camel), because [the person enjoined to eat curd and] aiming at [executing causally efficient action] does not undertake activity [with respect to the other thing]. Therefore, this [yoghurt] does not have both forms (viz. of itself and of the camel). Such is [the proof of] the doctrine of absolutely singular character of reality (sc. the refutation of Jaina *anekāntavāda*).

{184.1} *sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ<sup>12</sup> bhinnau syātāṃ na dhīdhvanī /*

*pararūpa*). For the discussion on the meaning of *ubhayaṃ* see § 1.3.

<sup>4</sup> PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>5</sub>: *nāpi*.

<sup>5</sup> AJP I 23,8: *tad evam*.

<sup>6</sup> Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>4</sub>: *vā tadbhāvināḥ*.

<sup>7</sup> The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,29–30; NViV I 177,21–22; NViV II 233,15–16; AJP I 24,5–6.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the paraphrase of the argument by *Vādirājasūri* in NViV II 2.203 (233,11–16): *tad uktam “sarvasyobhayaṃ paratve” [PV 3.182] ityādi. vidyata eva dadhani kaścīd viśeṣo yato na karabhatvaṃ tasyeti cet, tarhi sa eva dadhīti vaktavyaṃ tata eva tatphalasya tṛptiyāder bhāvāt, sa ca na karabhādaḥ astīti kathaṃ tadatatsvabhāvatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ yata ekāntavāda eva praśasto na bhavet. idam apy abhihitam:*

*athāsty atīśayaḥ kaścīd yena bhedena vartate /  
sa eva dadhi so 'nyatra nāstīty anubhayaṃ varam // [PV 3.183]*

<sup>9</sup> AJP I 24,8: *evam tarhi sa*.

<sup>10</sup> AJP I 24,10: *nāsti*.

<sup>11</sup> AJP I 24,11: *tasmān nobhayaṃ param*.

<sup>12</sup> AJP I 25,6: *bhāvānāṃ*.

*bhedasamhāravādasya tadabhāvād asambhavaḥ* // 184 //

If everything were of the nature of everything,<sup>13</sup> then cognitions (mental images) and linguistic units would not be different [from each other]. Since these [cognitions and linguistic units] are not [non-different], the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible.

{184.2} so 'yam ahrīkaḥ<sup>14</sup> kvacid apy ekam ākāraṃ pratiniyatam apaśyan vibhāgābhāvād bhāvānām katham asaṃ-srṣṭānyākāravatyā buddhyādhimucyetārthān<sup>15</sup> abhilaped vā. {184.3} tato bhedāgrahāt tatsamhāravādo na syāt syād uṣṭro dadhi syān neti. atha punar asaṃsrṣṭāv ākārau pratipadya saṃharei<sup>16</sup>. {184.4} ekarūpasamṣargiṇyāḥ buddheḥ kvacit pratiniyamāt tatpratibhāsabhedakṛta eva tayo<sup>17</sup> rūpayoḥ svabhāvabhedo 'pi syāt, ekānekavyavasthiteḥ pratibhāsaviśayatvāt. {184.5} tathā ca naikas tadubhayarūpaḥ<sup>18</sup> syād iti mithyāvāda eṣaḥ. {184.6} sthītam etat na bhāvānām kaścit svabhāvānvayo 'sti bhedalakṣaṇam eva tu sāmānyam. {184.7} atha ca prakṛtyā kecid ekajñānādīphalāḥ kecin neti.

This very shameless [Jaina] does not notice that one [particular] form is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. a camel or yoghurt); since there is [supposedly] no [essential] distinction between entities, how would he get actively

<sup>13</sup> A possible response to the above PV 3.40–41 is *ĀMī* 11:

*sarvātmakaṃ tad ekaṃ syād anyāpohavyatikrame /  
anyatra samavāyena vyapadiśyeta sarvathā //*

This [real thing (AśS: *tattvaṃ*)] is in a certain sense of the nature of everything, if we put aside [the Buddhist theory of] the exclusion of the other. If [the real thing] resided in something else [than itself (its own nature)], it could not be designated in any respect [at all].

That *ĀMī* 11 is treated as a reply to *Dharmakīrti* is confirmed by PVSVT ad PVSV 40, p. 109 which quote *ĀMī* 11ab: *yo 'pi digambaro manyate "sarvātmakaṃ ekaṃ syād anyāpohavyatikrame" tasmād bheda evānyathā na syād anyonyābhāvo bhāvānām yadi na bhaved iti*.

In the background of the discussion regarding the charge 'if everything were of the nature of everything,' there is also the theory of *sarvasarvātmakatva*, viz. 'the identity of everything with everything,' which is mentioned side by side with, and clearly distinguished from the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* by *Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa* in DNC 173,1–2: *evaṃ ca kalpyamānaṃ sarvasarvātmakatvasatkāryatvamūlahasyānatiremeṇa kalpitam*. On *sarvasarvātmakatva* see Wezler: Wezler 1981 and Wezler 1982.

Whereas the well-known 'doctrine of the pre-existence of effect [in its cause]' (*satkāryavāda*) was to explain how phenomena occur, being only transformations of (from) an already existent substratum, the concept of *sarvasarvātmakatva* stated that the substratum (here: conscious substratum) continues to exist in all its transformations which all have the same nature, being the transformations of the same substratum, see DNCV 173,12–14: *evaṃ hi "sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ sac ca kāryam" it mūlahasyam etan nātikrāntaṃ bhavati puruṣātmakatvāt sarvasya tadvikāramātratvāc ca bhedānām tatraivāntarlayāvīrbhāvāt sarvakāryāṇām kṛkalāsavarṇaviśeṣāṇām iva kṛkalāse*. – 'For in this way, [the doctrine of the conscious principle] does not violate the following principal esoteric doctrine that "everything has the essence of everything and is the existent effect," because everything has the essence of the conscious principle and because all individual things are merely modifications of this [conscious principle], insofar as all effects (sc. individual things) inhere in and have their manifestation in this [conscious principle], just like [all] particular colours of a chameleon [inhere in and are manifested in] the chameleon.'

Interestingly, *Dharmakīrti* treats Jaina and *Sāṃkhya* doctrines together (PV/PVSV<sub>4</sub> 3.183a: *etenaiva*), as against *Mallavādin's* criticism of both *Sāṃkhya* and the theory of *sarvasarvātmakatva*.

<sup>14</sup> AJP I 26,5: 'yam anekāntavādī.

<sup>15</sup> AJP I 26,5–6: *buddhyādhimucyetārthān*. Cf. n. 19.

<sup>16</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: *saṃhared*.

<sup>17</sup> Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: °–*kṛta etayo*.

<sup>18</sup> PVS<sub>9</sub>: °–*rūpa*.

involved in<sup>19</sup> [things] with his cognitive awareness, in which various forms (images of things) are present as not intermixed, or talk about [distinct] things? For this reason, since he does not admit any [absolute] distinction [between things], there could not be any doctrine of the mixed character of these [individual entities] in the form: “[a camel] is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, [yoghurt].” If, however, [a person] intermixed two different unmixed forms [of the camel and yoghurt], having cognised [them as unmixed], then – since cognitive awareness, which intermixes [them] into one form, is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. either a camel or yoghurt, not to both) – there would still be some distinction in essential natures of these two forms, [a distinction] which would be based on the distinction of [mental] representations of these [two things (e.g. a camel or yoghurt)]. [It would be so], because the determination of many [forms] as one has [their] representations as its contents. And, accordingly, it would not be the case that one [entity (e.g. either the camel or yoghurt)] could not have the form of both of them. Hence, this is a false doctrine. Indeed it has been established that there is no association of essential natures of entities at all, but [rather their] universal character is characterised by distinction (sc. discrete character). Furthermore, some [entities generate] their results [in the form] of one [common] cognition by virtue of their nature, whereas others do not.

{184.8} *bhavatu nāma bhāvānām svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyam. yeṣāṃ tu nirupākhyānām svabhāva eva nāsti tatra katham svabhāvabhedaviśayāḥ śabdāḥ.*

[The Jaina opponent]: “Let the universal character of entities consist in the distinction of essential natures [of entities], if you wish. But how can speech elements have as their contents essential natures [of entities] such as inexpressible [particulars] which do not have, [as you claim,] any essential nature at all?”

{184.9} *teṣv avaśyaṃ śabdapravṛtṭiyā bhāvyam. kathamcid avyavasthāpitesu vidhipraṭiśedhāyogāt*<sup>20</sup>.

[Reply:] Of course speech elements refer necessarily to these [inexpressible particulars], because affirmation (‘*x* is *P*’) and negation (‘*x* is not *P*’) are not possible with regard to [entities] that are not determined one way or another (sc. either through cognition or speech).

{184.10} *tathā ca sarvatrāyam anvayavyatirekāśrayo vyavahāro na syāt uṣṇasvabhāvo ‘gnir nānuṣṇa ity’ api. svabhāvāntarasyāsataḥ kathamcid avyavasthāpanāt. {184.11} sarvathāpratipatter<sup>21</sup> agnisvabhāvasyāpratipattir iti vyāmūdham jagat syāt.*

[Jaina opponent:] And, thus, this practical action which is based on positive concomitance (affirmation) and negative concomitance (negation) could not take place with respect to anything, that is: [the affirmation]: “fire is hot in its essential nature” and also [the implied negation]: “[fire] is not not-hot,” because one cannot determine one way or another something non-existent that is different from the essential nature [of an entity one wants to cognise]. Since there could be no comprehension [of, say, something not-hot] in every respect, there would be no comprehension of the essential nature of fire. Thus, the world would be stupefied.

{184.12} *syād etat na tatra kasyacid asato niṣedhaḥ anuṣṇaṃ sad evārthāntaram niṣidhyata iti.*

[Reply:] That would be the case; [however,] in this case [of, e.g., fire,] there is no negation of anything non-existent: only something really existent such as something not-hot, which is something different [from fire], is negated.

{184.13} *katham idānīm sad asan nāma.*

[Jaina opponent:] How then something which you say is non-existent is something existent?

{184.14} *na brūmaḥ {184.15} sarvatrāsat. tatra nāstīti deśakāladharmaniṣedha eva sarvabhāveṣu<sup>22</sup> kriyate na dharmiṇaḥ, tanniṣedhe tadviśayaśabdapravṛtṭiyabhāvāt, anirdiṣṭaviśayasya nañō ‘prayogāt.*

<sup>19</sup> Haribhadrasūri, while quoting the passage in AJP 26,5–6, replaces *adhimucyeta* with *adhibuddhyeta* (n. 15), for apparently the strictly Buddhist meaning of the rare ver *adhi√muc* is not known to him. However, the verb is very well attested in Buddhist literature in the sense of ‘intent upon; take interest in; be actively interested in.’ For a list of occurrences see BHSD II 13–15, entries: *adhimukta* / *adhimucyate*.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. SvSt<sub>1</sub> 5.5 = SvSt<sub>2</sub> 25: *vidhir niṣedhaś ca kathamcid iṣṭau vivakṣayā mukhyaguṇavyavasthā / iti praṇītiḥ sumates taveyaṃ matipravekaḥ stuvato ‘stu nātha //*

<sup>21</sup> PVS<sub>9</sub>: *sarvathā pratipatter*.

<sup>22</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: *sarvatra bhāveṣu*.

[Reply:] We do not say that [something not-hot] is non-existent in all cases. Merely the negation of place, time and property with respect to all entities is expressed in the form: “[something not-hot] is not in this [fire],” but not [the negation] of the property-possessor (sc. fire), because when one negates the [property-possessor], speech element the contents of which is this [property-possessor] cannot be applied, because the negation particle, the contents of which remaining unexpressed, cannot be verbally employed.

{184.16} *so 'pi tarhi deśādipratīṣedhaḥ katham.*

[Jaina opponent:] That being the case, how is the negation of place etc. [possible]?

{184.17} *yasmān na tatrāpi deśādīnām<sup>23</sup> pratiṣedho nāpy arthasya.*

[Reply:] [It is possible], because even in that case there is neither negation of place etc. nor of the object [as such].

{184.18} *sambandho niṣedhyata iti cet.*

[Jaina opponent:] “[Here] the relation [between the property (e.g. not-hot) and property-possessor (e.g. fire)] is negated.”

{184.19} *nanu tanniṣedhe 'pi tulyo doṣo 'niṣedhād<sup>24</sup> asati śabdāpravṛttir ityādi.* {184.20} *asato vāsyā niṣedhe tadvad dharmino 'pi niṣedhaḥ.*

[Reply:] Also when this [relation] is negated, there is the same fault, because the negation is not [expressed], in view of the fact that speech elements cannot be applied with respect to something non-existent (sc. relation) etc. Or, when a negation of this [relation] which is non-existent [could be expressed, this is the case of] the negation of the property-possessor as well, just like [of] the relation.

{184.21} *na vai sambandhasya nāstīti niṣedhaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. neha ghaṭo nedānīm naivam ity uktau<sup>25</sup> nānena sambandho 'sti naitaddharmā vā iti pratītiḥ. tathā ca sambandho niṣiddho bhavātī<sup>26</sup>.*

[Jaina opponent:]<sup>27</sup> [With the words:] “[the relation] does not exist,” [one expresses] absolutely no negation of the relation. Rather, when one says: “There is no pot here,” [or] “[There is no pot] now,” [or] “[There is no pot] in this condition,” the understanding [arises] that there is no relation [of the pot] with this [particular place] or that [this pot] does not possess such and such properties. And in this manner the relation is negated.

{184.22} *tathāpi katham niṣiddho yāvad asya sambandho dharmo vā nāstīti matir na bhavati. na cāsyāḥ kathamcid bhāve sambhavo 'bhāveṣu tathābhāvāt. tasmāt sambandhābhāvapratīter nāyam ihetyādyā pratītiḥ. sā tadabhāve<sup>28</sup> na syāt. pratītau vā tadabhāvasya. yathā pratītimatas tatprabhavāḥ śabdāḥ kena nivāryante. sa eva hi śabdānām na viśayo yo na vitarkānām. te cet pravṛttāḥ ko vacanasya niṣeddhā. na hy avācyam artham buddhayaḥ samīhante. sambandhasya tu svarūpeṇānabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvena buddhāv upasthānāt. yathābhiprāyam apratītiḥ. tad āyam pratīyamāno 'pi sambandhirūpa eveti svarūpeṇa nābhidhīyate. tasmān nābhāvavat sambandhe 'pi prasaṅgaḥ. api cāyam abhāvam abhidheyaṃ bruvāṇaṃ prati pratividadhann<sup>29</sup> abruvāṇaḥ katham pratividadhyāt. vacane cāsyā<sup>30</sup> katham abhāvo 'nuktaḥ. athābhāvam eva necchet, tenāvacanam. tad evedānīm katham abhāvo nāstīti. yat punar etad {uktam}<sup>31</sup> arthanīṣedhe anarthakaśabdāprayogān nirviśayasya nañō 'prayoga ity ātrottaram vakṣyate. tasmāt santy abhāveṣu śabdāḥ.*

<sup>23</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: *yasmāt tatrāpi na deśādīnām.*

<sup>24</sup> PVS<sub>5</sub>: *niṣedhād.*

<sup>25</sup> PVS<sub>9</sub>: *ukto.*

<sup>26</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: *bhavati.*

<sup>27</sup> PVS<sub>7</sub> *ad loc.*: *netyādi paraḥ.*

<sup>28</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>: *ihetyādyā pratītiḥ syāt tadabhāve.*

<sup>29</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub>: *pratividadhad(nn).* PVS<sub>5</sub>: *pratividadhad.*

<sup>30</sup> PVS<sub>5</sub>: *vāsyā.*

<sup>31</sup> PVS<sub>7</sub> *ad loc.*: *yat punar etad uktam.* PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>5</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub> omit *uktam: punar etad.*

[Reply:]<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, how can [this relation] be negated as long as its relation or property does not exist? Hence there exists no cognition [of that]. And the cognition [of the kind that the relation does not exist] is not possible, when [the relation] exists, because it is absent as such among non-existent things. Due to the cognition that the relation is absent, there [arises] cognition the contents of which is: “there is no relation here” etc. This [cognition] would not occur, if there were no [cognition of the absence of the relation], or if there were cognition of the absence of this [relation], just like for a person who has the cognition [of the absence of the relation], what prevents [him from using] the speech elements which have their origin in this [cognition that there is no relation]? For whatever is not [the contents] of conceptual cognitive acts is certainly not the contents of speech elements. If these [conceptual cognitive acts] operate, what is the factor preventing [their] expression? For acts of cognitive awareness do not concern inexpressible thing. However, it has been said that the relation, as [being grasped] by its intrinsic nature, is not explicitly expressed, because when it is expressed it is presented in cognitive awareness as a relatum (term of a relation). There is no [such] cognition [of it] in accordance with the intention [to express it]. Therefore, this [relation], even when it is being cognised, [is cognised] as having the form a relatum; consequently, it is not expressed in its intrinsic nature. Thus, there is no undesired consequence also with respect to the relation, just as [there is no undesired consequence] with respect to the absence of relation. Furthermore, how could possibly such a person who [wishes to] contradict someone maintaining that absence can be expressed, [and] who [himself] does not maintain [it, be able to] contradict? And how it is possible that absence is not expressed when this [word “absence”] is uttered? If one does not accept [that] absence [can be expressed], then it is inexpressible by virtue of the [non-existence of absence]. Now, how could this very [expression]: “there is no absence,” be possible? As regards to what is being said [now], namely: when the meaning is negated, insofar as one does not employ meaningless speech elements, then the negation particle, having no contents, cannot be employed, [and] that [idea] will be explained later on [in PV 3.207]. Therefore, there are speech elements which refer to non-existent entities.

{184.23} *teṣu kathaṃ svabhāvabheda iti.*

[Jaina opponent:] How is the distinction in essential natures among these [non-existent entities] possible?

{184.24} *tatrāpi.*

[Reply:] Also with respect to these [non-existent entities we say the following:]

{185.1} *rūpābhāvād abhāvasya śabdā rūpābhīdhāyinaḥ /  
na āśaṅkā eva siddhāś te vyavacchedasya vācakāḥ //185//*

Since absence has no intrinsic nature, speech elements are expressive of intrinsic nature. [Speech elements] are by no means liable to doubt. They convey the exclusion.

{185.2} *vastuvṛttināṃ śabdānāṃ kiṃ rūpam abhidheyaṃ āhosvid bheda iti śaṅkā*<sup>33</sup> *syāt. abhāvas tu vivekalakṣaṇa eva nimittikartavyasya kasyacid rūpasyābhāvāt tadbhāve*<sup>34</sup> *’bhāvāyogāt, tadbhāvalakṣaṇatvād bhāvasya. tasmād ayaṃ eva sa mukhyo vivekaḥ. tasya tathābhāvākhyāpinaḥ*<sup>35</sup> *śabdāḥ kiṃ vivekaviśayā ity asthānam evaitad āśaṅkāyāḥ. tasmāt siddham etat sarve śabdā vivekaviśayā vikalpāś ca*<sup>36</sup> *. ta ete*<sup>37</sup> *ekavastupratīśaraṇā api yathāsvam avadhibhedopakalpāitair bhedaḥ bhinneṣv iva pratibhātsu buddhau vivekeṣūpalayanād*<sup>38</sup> *bhinnaviśayā eva. tena svabhāvasyaiva sādhyasāadhanabhāve ’pi na sādhyasāadhanasamsargaḥ. tan na pratijñārthaikadeśo hetur*<sup>39</sup> *iti. sa cāyaṃ hetuvenāpadīśyamānaḥ.*

<sup>32</sup> PVSVT *ad loc.*: *tathāpītyācāryaḥ.*

<sup>33</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>; *śaṅkāpi.*

<sup>34</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> emends *tadabhāve* to *tadbhāve*. PVS<sub>9</sub>; *tad bhāve.*

<sup>35</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>; *tathākhyaṇapinaḥ.*

<sup>36</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> emends *vikalpālpāś ca* to *vikalpāt: vikalpāt(lpāś ca)*. PVS<sub>9</sub>; *vikalpālpāś ca.*

<sup>37</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub> omit *ta: ete.*

<sup>38</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>; *vivekeṣūpasthāpanād*. PVS<sub>7</sub>: *vivekeṣu bhedeṣu vikalpānām copasthāpanāt.*

<sup>39</sup> PVS<sub>4</sub> = PVS<sub>9</sub>; °–*deśahetur.*

A doubt might be raised as follows: “Do speech elements which refer to real things have as their designatum [a positive] form or difference?” Absence is, however, characterised by the exclusion [of the other] only, because there is no [positive] form at all which could be taken as the factor [causing cognition / verbal concept of absence (sc. a point of reference)], insofar as if such [a positive form] existed, it would not be consistent to assume absence, insofar as an [existent] entity is characterised by this [positive form]. Therefore, this very [existent entity] is what is [known as] the primary exclusion [of the other]. [Objection:] “Do speech elements [expressing] this [exclusion of the other] which conveys absence in such a manner have [this] exclusion [of the other] as [their] contents?” This is an improper way indeed [to express] doubt. Therefore, it has been established that all speech elements as well as concepts have exclusion [of the other] as [their] contents. Even though they accommodate [only] one real thing, these very [speech elements and concepts] – because they refer to exclusions [present] in cognitive awareness which are represented as if different by virtue of individual entities made up of differences in their individual applications – have in fact different contents. Consequently, even though [the logical reason as] essential nature itself consists in the relationship between the inferable property and the proving property, there is no intermixture (sc. merging as identical) of the inferable property and the proving property. Thus, the logical reason does not extend only to a part of the object of the thesis. And this [essential nature] itself is referred to as the logical reason.

1.2. Before I proceed to deal with the analysis of the passage, there are some additional relevant issues to be discussed first. A larger portion of the above passage of PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is quoted in AJP I 23,1–27,2, being introduced as follows:

· *tathā pareṇāpy uktam* –

*sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ...*

Separate sections of the above-quoted passage of PV/PVSV are subsequently disproved by Haribhadrāsūri in AJP:

section(s) of PV/PVSV	quoted in AJP	refuted in AJP
{182.1}	AJP I 23,4–5	AJP I 295,10ff.
{182.2}–{183.1}	AJP I 23,6–24,6	AJP I 297,13–14
{183.2}–{183.4}	AJP I 24,6–11	AJP I 300,5–12
{183.***}	AJP I 25,3–5	AJP I 300,5–302,6
{184.1}	AJP I 25,6–26,3	AJP I 302,7–8 and 316,7
{184.2}–{184.5}	AJP I 26,4–27,4	AJP I 317,4–10 and AJP II 124ff.

The passage of PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is quoted by Haribhadrāsūri AJP faithfully, and the *variae lectionis* (enumerated in nn. 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15) are negligible. The only major difference is the deliberate replacement of the offensive “*so 'yam ahrikah*” in with neutral expression “*so 'yam anekāntavādī*” in Section PVSV {181.2}. This could be easily be deemed a case of light censorship or the whitewashing of the offensive character of Dharmakīrti's statement. Generally, the authenticity – in terms of strictly internal analysis of AJP – of the quotation PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is additionally supported by two factors: the sections quoted are first commented upon by Haribhadrāsūri in his commentary AJPSV and then refuted in succeeding portions of AJP/AJPSV.

We do, however, come across an intriguing insertion in the AJP quote. Interestingly, AJP I 25,3–5 inserts – between {183.4} and {184.1} – a passage {183.\*\*\*} which is absent from PV/PVSV but is subsequently refuted by Haribhadrāsūri in AJP I 300,5–302,6:

*kimca sarvavastuśabalavādinah kvacid anyāsaṃsrṣṭākārabuddhyasiddheḥ tathāvācakābhāvāt saṃhāravādānupa-  
pattiḥ, tatsiddhau vā tata eva tatsvabhāvabhedāt tadekarūpataiveti.*

Furthermore, since it is not established for the proponent of manifoldness of all things that there exists cognitive awareness of a real thing (e.g. camel) which has the form [of the real thing] which is not intermixed with another [object (e.g. yoghurt)], and therefore there exists no referring term [denoting the real thing] in such a manner (as not

intermixed with other things), the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual entities] (sc. the object having its own form and the form of the other) is inexplicable (sc. is not meaningful). Or, [even] if it were established [that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object], then [the result would be] that – because of the singular character of the essential nature of the [real thing] – this [real thing is represented in cognition as] having singular form (sc. of its own, not that of the other thing) due to this very [fact that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object].

The interpolated passage is later repeated in the refutation section of AJP I 300,3–5. This interpolation apparently bears all the marks of an authentic quotation from PVSV for the following reasons:

- 1 It is commented by Haribhadrasūri in AJPSV I 25,13–21 and treated by him as genuine.
- 2 The only element of the passage {183.\*\*\*} that might suggest that it is Haribhadra's own interpolation is the marker *iti* at the end of it (*tadekarūpataiveti*). However, Haribhadrasūri himself takes it to belong to the original text of PVSV, for he comments on it in AJPSV I 25,21: *iti na saṃhāravādo vāstavaḥ* – ‘Thus the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual entities] is not true,’ which is merely a paraphrase of PV 184.cd: *bhedasaṃhāra-vādasya ... asambhavaḥ* (‘the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible’).
- 3 It is subsequently refuted in AJP I 300,5–302,6, after being repeated *verbatim* (AJP I 300,3–5).
- 4 The refutation of the passage is introduced by Haribhadra with the standard formula: *yac cōktam* – ‘*sarvavastuśabalavādinah ... tadekarūpataiva*’ *ity etad apy ayuktam*, and this particular refutation is the whole portion refuting PV/PVSV, e.g. it is immediately followed by the criticism against the verse of PV 184 (section {184.1}).
- 5 Additionally, Haribhadrasūri comments in AJPSV I 300,14 on the refuted quotation: *yac cōktam mūlapūrvapakṣe...* demonstrating that this interpolated passage belongs to PV/PVSV as he had it in front of him.
- 6 Haribhadra sets off to refute the verse of PV 184 with the words: *etena “sarvātmatve ca bhāvāṇaṃ” ityādy api pratyuktam*. In his AJPSV I 302,22, he comments on this portion as follows: *etena anantarodītena vastunā sarvātmakatve ca...* In his opinion the pronoun *etena* refers to ‘the real thing which has been mentioned immediately before’ (*anantarodītena vastunā*). Indeed, we do find the mention of ‘*vastu*’ three times in the interpolated passage: *sarvavastuśabalavādinah...*, *tatsvabhāvabhedāt* and *tadekarūpatā*. However, there is no mention of ‘*vastu*’ in the immediate vicinity of verse 184 in the preserved reading of PV/PVSV. The immediately preceding verse 183 does not mention it. PVSV does mention ‘*vastu*’ slightly before in section {183.3} (*vastu dadhi*), however, the reference to it is made in passing, whereas the whole passage {183.2}–{183.4} discusses the issue of ultimate quality (*atiśaya*). Furthermore, the mention of ‘*vastu dadhi*’ in section {183.3} is separated from the interpolated passage {183.\*\*\*} with section {183.4}, which does not deal with real thing (*vastu*) directly. Accordingly, Haribhadrasūri's remark *etena anantarodītena vastunā sarvātmakatve ca* cannot refer to any portion of PVSV other than the passage {183.\*\*\*}.
- 7 In the interpolated passage, *anekāntavādin* is called *śabalavādin* (‘the proponent of the variegated’), and the unusual term *śabala* signifies here the idea of *anekānta* (multiplexity of reality). This is indeed a highly uncommon term with respect to *anekāntavāda*, to a degree that I have personally never come across it in Jaina literature in this sense. Also for this reason it would be incorrect, in my opinion, to assume that the problematic passage, containing the atypical locution *sarvavastuśabalavādinah*, was Haribhadrasūri's, or any of the Jaina authors' for that matter, own insertion. However, the rare term *śabala* is used, at least once, in by



*Dharmakīrti* himself in PV 4.132ab in a related context, namely with reference to perception which has non-dual character: *advayaṃ śabalābhāsasyādr̥ṣṭer buddhijanmanaḥ* / ('...for [we] do not see any production of cognitive awareness which has manifold representation.'). That is why it is not improbable that that the compound *sarvavastuśabalavādinah* may have stemmed from *Dharmakīrti* himself.

On the other hand, the passage is not only absent from extant editions and manuscripts of PV/PVSV but also is not referred to by Karṇakagomin in his PVSṬ. Although there is nothing in the passage as such that would speak against *Dharmakīrti* as its author, we would need some independent additional confirmation in Buddhist sources to accept the passage {183.\*\*} as genuine part of PVSV.

Interestingly, the passage AJP I 23,1–27,2 seems to be the only Jaina text which quotes any larger portion of PV/PVSV 181–184. Apart from this singular occurrence, Jaina authors quote only two PV verses: 182 (see n. 2) and 183 (see n. 7); in addition, *Vādirājasūri* in NViV 2.203 (233,11–16) paraphrases the argument of verse 183 (see n. 8).

One has the impression that that the remaining verses of the PV passage on *anekānta*, and the whole commentary of PVSV, were either unknown to Jaina authors, with some notable exceptions, or did not stimulate them to any reaction or refutation. In view of the fact that only a restricted selection of verses from rival philosophical works are cited in Jaina works, at the same time their selection remains constant and always the same verses/passages are repeated (often with the same *variae lectionis*), this may confirm the prevailing tendency among Indian authors in general, especially after 7th/8th centuries, that they either relied on earlier quotations as they had been reproduced in earlier Jaina works or (2) relied on some anthologies that presented a selection of verses, which became the major source of information on rival schools, whereas direct, first-hand readership of original sources gradually became scarce.

1.3. A separate issue is the reliability of commentators of PV/PVSV. In the expositions of the verse PVSV 182 (the most often quoted verse of the whole passage) offered by commentators we encounter various interpretation of the expression *ubhaya rūpatve*.

1.3.1. *Dharmakīrti's criticism directed against the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)* follows his criticism of the Sāṃkhya and verse 182 should be read in such context (verse 181 is merely an introduction which marks the change of the opponent, not the change of the topic: *etenaiva ... kiṃ apy ... pratikṣiptaṃ*). Accordingly, *ubhaya rūpatve* should be taken to mean *sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatve*, especially in view of the following two passages, which directly precede PV/PVSV 181–184:

- 1 PV/PVSV<sub>5</sub> 3.179d–180c (58,23–59,2) = PV/PVSV<sub>5</sub> 3.177 (88,13–20) = PV/PVSV<sub>9</sub> 3.177d–178c (260,16–261,9):

*na hi kvacid asyaikāntiko bhedo 'bhedo vā vivekena vyavasthāpanāt – sāmānyam viśeṣa iti.*

*yenātmanā tayoh /*

*bhedaḥ sāmānyam ity etad yadi bhedaḥ tadātmanā // 177 //*

*bheda eva [178a]*

*yadi sāmānyaviśeṣayor yam ātmānam āśritya sāmānyam viśeṣa iti sthitis tenātmanā bhedaś tadā bheda eva. yasmāt tau hi tayoh svātmānau tau ced vyatirekiṇau<sup>40</sup> vyatireka eva sāmānyaviśeṣayoh svabhāvabhedaś.*

2 PVS<sub>4</sub> 3.182 (59,18–19) = PVS<sub>5</sub> 3.179 (89,13–14) = PVS<sub>9</sub> 3.181ab (262,13–14):

*...gavādisamāveśāt tadātmabhūtānām cānanvayena tatrānubhaya rūpatvāt.* The expression *anubhaya rūpa* occurring in the passage clearly means *asāmānyaviśeṣa rūpa*, as it is correctly explained in PVS<sub>7</sub>: *anubhaya rūpatvād asāmānyaviśeṣa rūpatvād eveti yāvat.* And that is how, analogously, *ubhaya rūpa* should be understood in PV 3.182a.

1.3.2. Karṇakagomin, however, is inclined to interpret the expression *ubhaya rūpatve* strictly in the context of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*) as referring to an object ‘being both itself and being the other.’<sup>41</sup>

1.3.3. Also Manorathanandin, apparently following Karṇakagomin, takes *ubhaya rūpatve* to mean ‘[every object having] its own form and the form of the other.’<sup>42</sup>

1.3.4. It is only the Jaina author Haribhadraśūri who properly understands the expression the way *Dharmakīrti* himself did, viz. *sāmānyaviśeṣa rūpa*.<sup>43</sup>

For certain reasons, that will be discussed below, both Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin – either having better knowledge of *anekāntavāda* than *Dharmakīrti* or being more faithful to the unbiased presentation of the Jaina doctrine – felt obliged to introduce their own interpretation of the phrase, thus bringing it in line with the typical expositions of *anekāntavāda*, in accordance with which the double nature of any object that is both itself (*sva rūpa*) and shares in the nature of another thing (*para rūpa*) is vital, whereas the double nature of a thing based on its universal-cum-particular character (*sāmānyaviśeṣa rūpa*) is secondary. That was not *Dharmakīrti*’s concern: he either distorted the picture of the Jaina theory deliberately or was not sufficiently well informed.

2.1. The passage PV/PVS<sub>4</sub> 181–184 mentions some elements that are vital for the reconstruction of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality in the form as it may have been known to *Dharmakīrti*. These expressions have been underlined in § 1.1.

Beside the allusion to the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*) by name (*ekānta*—° in {181.1}, {181.3}, {183.4}), there is also an explicit reference to be found in the PV/PVS<sub>4</sub> passage – with the words: *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na* in sections {181.2} and {184.3}, where the modal operator *syāt* (= *kathamcit*)<sup>44</sup> occurs – which concerns a particular element of the doctrine, namely to the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description, known under the names *saptabhaṅgī* and *syādvāda*. It is merely one of three complementary cognitive-linguistic procedures within the scope of

<sup>40</sup> PVS<sub>9</sub>: *vyatirekiṇī*.

<sup>41</sup> PVS<sub>7</sub> *ad loc.*: *sarvasyobhaya rūpatvaṁ. ubhaya grahaṇam anekatvopalakṣaṇārtham tasmin sati tadviśeṣasya uṣṭra uṣṭra eva na dadhi. dadhi dadhy eva noṣṭra ity evaṁ lakṣaṇasya nirākṛteḥ.*

<sup>42</sup> PVV *ad loc.*: *sarvasya vastuna ubhaya rūpatve svapararūpatve sati...*

<sup>43</sup> AJPVS *ad loc.*, 23,11: *ubhaya rūpatve sāmānyaviśeṣa rūpatve. ubhaya grahaṇam anekatvopalakṣaṇam.*

<sup>44</sup> On *syāt* see below p. **Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.**ff.

*anekāntavāda*, beside the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayavāda*) and the method of the four standpoints (*nikṣepavāda*, *nyāsavāda*). The expressions are the following ones:

{181.2} = {184.3} *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na*

{183.1} *asty atīśayaḥ kaścīd yena bhedenā vartate*

{184.9} *kathaṃcid avyavasthāpīteṣu vidhipratiṣedhāyogāt*

*The exact sources for Dharmakīrti cannot be identified. Furthermore, it seems that none of these passages is a genuine quotation, albeit they do have authentic Jaina sources in the background.*

2.2. The first and most conspicuous reference to the *anekāntavāda* is the phrase *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na* ({181.2} = {184.3}). This is clearly an echo of, or what should look like a quotation from a Jaina source instantiating the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (*syādvāda*), the characteristic trait of which is the use of the modal operator *syāt*. I shall first attempt to reconstruct the picture of *syādvāda* as it emerges from Dharmakīrti's exposition and criticism of it, including the commentaries.

2.2.1. In none of the two occurrences of the phrase in question does Dharmakīrti offer the logical reason why a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, and is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt. In not supplying the logical reason for the *syāt* thesis Dharmakīrti is in agreement with Jaina practice, insofar as no Jaina text consulted by me mentions logical reason in such a context either. Only Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin supply the justification for the Jaina thesis: 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [these two] are identical as consisting in a substance etc. [A camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because the circumstances of yoghurt are different from the circumstances of the camel';<sup>45</sup> and 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [both] are real things. On the other hand, [a camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt as something that has a particular.'<sup>46</sup>

The logical reasons adduced by them (*dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt* and °—*avasthāyā bhinnatvāt*, *vastutvāt* and *viśeṣarūpatayā*, respectively) are clear references to the substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*) and the mode-expressive (*paryāyārthika*) viewpoints, already amply attested in the Jaina literature prior to Dharmakīrti, e.g. in Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇasāra*<sup>47</sup>, in Siddhasena Divākara's

<sup>45</sup> or PVSVT 183 (339,23–24): *syād uṣṭro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvāt.*

<sup>46</sup> PVV<sub>2</sub> 3.180 (352,8–9) = PVV<sub>7</sub> 3.181 (212,15–16) = PVV<sub>9</sub> 3.181 (262,21–22): *syād uṣṭro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syād uṣṭro viśeṣarūpatayā.*

<sup>47</sup> PSā 2.22–23 (p. 144–146): *davvaṭṭhienā savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhienā puṇo / havadi ya aṇṇaṃ aṇṇaṃ takkāle tammayattādo //*  
*aṭṭhi tti ya ṇaṭṭhi tti ya havadi avattavvaṃ idi puṇo davvaṃ / payyāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubhayaṃ ādiṭṭhaṃ aṇṇaṃ vā //*

[22] From a substance-expressive viewpoint every substance is the same. However, from a mode-expressive viewpoint, [every substance] becomes also different. [Every substance] is non-different, [i.e. identical with other substances], because it consists in it (sc. substance) at its own time, [viz. when it is taken into consideration].

[23] Further, the substance can be said (1) to exist, (2) not to exist and (3) to be inexpressible. However, taking a particular mode [into consideration] it is explained to (4) be both (sc. it both exists and does not exist) or otherwise.

*Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* (ca. 450–500<sup>48</sup>)<sup>49</sup> in *Mallavādin's Dvādaśāranayacakra* (ca. 550–600)<sup>50</sup>, in *Pūjyapāda Devanandin's Sarvārthasiddhi*<sup>51</sup> etc. What Manorathanandin refers to by *vastu* corresponds to what the Jainas usually call *dravya*, a substance<sup>52</sup>, and *avasthā* parallels what the Jainas call *paryāya*, a mode. They served as a kind of parameters that qualified an angle under which a thing was predicated of. Neither these two viewpoints nor any other kind of *parameterisation should not be confused with what Dharmakīrti called atīśaya* (vide supra § 3.5.) inasmuch they were not a special quality of the thing as such.

*Dharmakīrti must therefore have known these two viewpoints, or any other parameters for that matter, and their absence in PV was in all probability not dictated by his poor knowledge of Jaina arguments but rather by the fact that he considered a detailed account of Jaina line of reasoning unnecessary.*

2.2.1. How accurate and faithful was then his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality? To answer this, we should first identify central components of the *anekānta* theory as it emerges in *Dharmakīrti's exposition*. Indeed, we can distinguish a number of important elements there that appear to underlie the Jaina doctrine at his times:

- (a) the assertion: 'x is, in a certain sense, y,' i.e.  $\sigma (x \text{ is } y)$ , where the symbol  $\sigma$  represents the modal operator *syāt*;
- (b) the assertion: 'x is, in a certain sense, not-y,' i.e.  $\sigma (x \text{ is } \neg y)$ ;

---

Three remaining permutations of the three principal options (*sc. asti, nāsti, avaktavyam*) are implied by *aṇṇaṃ vā* ('otherwise'): (5) the substance both exists and is inexpressible, (6) the substance both does not exist and is inexpressible, (7) the substance simultaneously exists, does not exist and is inexpressible.

<sup>48</sup> For the dating see Balcerowicz 2003a.

<sup>49</sup> These are referred to in STP 2.1: *jaṃ sāmāṇaggahaṇaṃ daṃsaṇaṃ eyaṃ viśesiyaṃ ṇāṇaṃ / doṇho vi ṇayāṇa eso paḍekkaṃ atthapajjāo //*

Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object [viz. its general and particular aspect] is individually [the contents] for both viewpoints, [i.e. substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*) and the modal, or mode-expressive *paryāyārthika*].

They are also taken for granted in the formulation of STP 3.10:

*do uṇa ṇayā bahavayā davvaṭṭhiyapajjavatṭhiyā niyayā / etto ya guṇavisese guṇatṭhiyaṇao vi jujjanta //*

See also STP 3.57: *davvaṭṭhiyavattavvaṃ sāmāṇaṃ pajjavassa ya viśeso / ee samovaṇṇā vibhajjavāyaṃ viśeseṃti //*

<sup>50</sup> DNC 6,2–7,1: *dravyārthaparyāyārthadvitvādyanantāntavikalpopaklptavidhibhedapadārthakavākyavidhividhānād* ... DNC 876,1–2: *teṣāṃ dravyārthaparyāyārthanayau dvau mūlabhedau, tatprabhedāḥ saṅgrahādayaḥ*. – 'Among these [viewpoints], there are two main divisions, viz. the viewpoint the object of which is the substance and the viewpoint the object of which is the mode. Their subdivisions are the collective viewpoint etc.'

<sup>51</sup> SSi 1.33 (100,8–10): *sa dvēdhā dravyārthikāḥ paryāyārthikāś ceti. dravyaṃ sāmānyam utsargaḥ anuvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviśayo dravyārthikāḥ. paryāyo viśeṣo 'pavādo vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviśayaḥ paryāyārthikāḥ. tayoṛ bhedā naigamādayaḥ*.

<sup>52</sup> Compare e.g. the way Mallavādin describes the nature of (1) *vastu* and (2) *dravya*: (1) DNC 864,8–9: *tathā ca sarvātmaṃ ekam evāsti vastu iti pratyakṣādīpramāṇair upalabhāmahe*; DNC 869,1–2: *tadrūpaśaktivivartamātraṃ tv etat sarvaṃ bhāvaikyāt. ato nāniṣṭhitaṃ vastu, anārabdhārābhdhatvāt śīkyakādivat*; (2) DNC 866,1–2: *ghaṭo mṛt, mṛdaḥ pṛthivītvam, pṛthivyā dravyatvaṃ druvikāratvāt...*

- (c) the contention: 'everything has a double form,' viz. either it has the form of itself and of the other, i.e.  $\forall x (x \text{ is } x \ \& \ \neg x)$ , or it has the form of the universal and of the particular;
- (d)  $x$  is, in a certain sense, both  $x$  and  $y$  (*nāpi sa evosaṅgrahāṇī yenaṇyo 'pi syād uṣṭraḥ; nāpi tad eva dadhi yenaṇyad api syād dadhi*), i.e.  $\sigma (x \text{ is } (x \ \& \ \neg x))$ ;
- (e) there is some ultimate quality (*atiśaya*) by virtue of which an entity  $x$  can be treated as non- $x$ ;
- (f) everything is of the nature of everything (*sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ*), i.e.  $\forall x \forall y (x = y)$ ;
- (g) there is no essential distinction between entities (*vibhāgābhāvād bhāvānām*); in other words, absolute distinction between things is not a part of the empirical world (*bhedāgrahāt*);
- (h) the universal character of entities may consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities (*bhāvānām svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyam*). In other words, the essence of a class of entities  $\{A\}$  instantiating a universal  $A$  may be defined in negative terms, and the universal  $A$  is not that which the entities of the class  $\{A\}$  have in common in positive terms, but rather the fact that the entities do not share their universal character  $A$  with other entities of another class  $\{\neg A\}$  that are not subsumed under that universal. On the basis of PVSV it is not possible to determine, however, how far the above idea is presented as a genuine constituent element of the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* (I consider it less likely) and how far the idea is a hypothetical reply to Dharmakīrti's criticism, being in fact a concession to the Buddhist theory of *apoha* (I consider it more probable).

3. Before I proceed to assess the reliability of Dharmakīrti's description, let us see what Jaina sources he might have used, how these sources outlined the doctrine of multiplexity of reality and what the crucial points it were. In the following, I am going neither to give a detailed exposition of the *anekāntavāda* nor to enlist a complete inventory of relevant passages from Canonical and non-Canonical literature etc., because any systematic account, including historical development, would turn into a large-size monograph. I will merely focus on some elements of the theory that are, in my opinion, relevant in our case.

3.1. One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, one of the most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, but also one which is explicitly mentioned by Dharmakīrti, are the three basic angles (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:

- *syād asti* (' $x$  is, in a certain sense,  $P$ '), i.e.  $\sigma (x \text{ is } P)$ .
- *syān nāsti* (' $x$  is, in a certain sense, not- $P$ '), i.e.  $\sigma (x \text{ is } \neg P)$ ,
- *syād avaktavyam* (' $x$  is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'),  $\sigma (x \text{ is } (P \ \& \ \neg P))$ ,

the nature of which will be briefly discussed below (???). They are mentioned on a few occasions both in later Canonical strata (being absent from early portions of the Canon) and, especially, in non-Canonical literature. Some are enumerated, for instance, by Kāpadiā 1940–1947: cxi ff., Upadhye 1935: 81–84, discussed by Schubring 1962: 1163–165 and occasionally in Shah 2000; stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry '*syādvāda*,' Vol. 4, pp. 496–502). I just list a couple of examples where the *bhaṅga*s are used as well as some occurrences of the modal operator *siya* / *siyā* / *siyāt*:

- (a) Viy 12.10 (p. 608–614): ...*siya atthi siya natthi*..., esp.: 610,15ff.: *rayaṇappabhā puṭhavī siya āyā, sya no āyā, siya avattavyam – āyā ti ya, no āyā ti ya*; and 611,20ff.: *dupaesie khamdhe siya āyā, siya no āyā, siya avattavyam – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya āyā ya no āyā ya, siya āyā ya avattavyam – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya no āyā ya avattavyam – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya*.
- (b) Viy 5.7.1 (210,20–21ff.): *paramāṇupoggale ṇaṇ bhaṇte! eyati veyati jāva taṇ taṇ bhāvaṇ pariṇamati? goyamā! siyā eyati veyati jāva pariṇamati, siya no eyati jāva no pariṇamati*.

- (c) Paṇṇ 784 (195,21ff.): *caupaesie ṇaṃ khaṃdhe siya carime no acarime siya avattavvae no carimāiṃ no acarimāiṃ no avattavvayāiṃ, ... siya carimāiṃ ca acarime ya siya carimāiṃ ca acarimāiṃ ca siya carime ya avattavvae ya siya carime ya avattavvayāiṃ ca ..., etc.*
- (d) AṇD 415 (166,22ff.): *tathā ṇaṃ je te baddhellayā te ṇaṃ siyā atthi siyā natthi, jai atthi jahaṇṇeṇaṃ ego vā do vā tiṇṇi vā...*
- (e) AṇD 473 (p. 182): *siyā dhammapadeso siyā adhammapadeso siyā āgāsapadeso siyā jīvapadeso siyā khaṃdhapadeso.*

Occasionally, similar three basic angles (*bhaṅga*) are mentioned, however, the modal operator *syāt* (*siya, siyā*) is missing, which may reflect an earlier historical layer:

- (f) Paṇṇ 781–788 (p. 194ff.), e.g. 194,25ff.: *paramāṇupoggale ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kiṃ carime acarime avattavaye carimāiṃ acarimāiṃ avattavayāiṃ, udāhu carime ya acarime ya udāhu carime ya acarimāiṃ ca udāhu carimāiṃ ca acarime ya udāju carimāi ca acarimāiṃ ca..., etc.*
- (g) Viy 8.2.29 (337,20ff.): *jīvā ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kiṃ nāṇi annāṇi? goyamā jīvā nāṇi vi, annāṇi vi.*

These three basic angles (*bhaṅga*) are subsequently permuted so that, in a full version of the doctrine of the modal description (*syādvāda, saptabhaṅgī*), the total of seven basic angles is reached.

Perhaps the earliest non-Canonical occurrences of the basic angles (*bhaṅga*), some of them including the modal operator *syāt*, are to be found in works ascribed to Kundakunda (between 3th–6th centuries).

- (h) PSS<sub>2</sub> 14 already offers what is later known as *pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī*<sup>53</sup>:

In a certain sense, [the substance] is...; [in a certain sense, the substance] is not ...; [in a certain sense, the substance] is both; [in a certain sense, the substance] is inexpressible; and further, [in a certain sense, the substance] is the triplet of these (sc. is predicated of according to the permutations of the these). [In such a manner], the substance is, as one should realise, possible as seven-angled on account of the description.<sup>54</sup>

- (i) Another example is found in PS<sub>2</sub> 2.22–23:

[22] From the substance-expressive viewpoint everything is a substance. From the mode-expressive viewpoint, [any thing] becomes different. It is [nevertheless] non-different, because it consists in that [substance] in the time of its [existence].<sup>55</sup> [23] The substance is said – on account of any particular mode – to be..., and not to be..., and again [the substance] becomes inexpressible; but further [the substance] is both, [viz. is... and is not... at the same time] or is otherwise, [viz. any other permutation of the three basic angles (*bhaṅga*)].<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> See NC 254ab (p. 128): *satteva huṃti bhaṅgā pamāṇaṇayaduṇayabhedaḍḍhāvi* / ('There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.') and SBhT 1.7: *iyam eva pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī nayasaptabhaṅgī ca kathyate*. Cf. Balcerowicz 2003b: 37.

<sup>54</sup> PSS<sub>2</sub> 14 (p. 30): *siya atthi natthi uhaṃ avvattavvaṃ puṇo ya tattidayam / davvaṃ khu sattabhaṃgaṃ ādesavasena sambhavadi //*

<sup>55</sup> The verse is rather obscure. Another possibility to translate it as follows: 'From the substance-expressive viewpoint and from the mode-expressive viewpoint, any substance is [both] different and non-different, because [the particular] consists in that [universal] in the time of its [existence],' where *aṇṇam* corresponds to *viśeṣam* and *aṇṇaṇṇam* to *sāmānyam*. The difficulty with that translation is that the idea it renders is that 'everything is different from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and everything is the same from the mode-expressive viewpoint.' On the other hand *dravyārthika* relates to *sāmānya*, whereas *paryāyārthika* to *viśeṣa* (comp. p. 16, STP 3.57), which finally yields a contradiction. That is why the commentators Amṛtasena and Jayasena (p. 144–145) are at pains to relate *dravyārthika*–*sāmānya*–*ananya* and *paryāyārthika*–*anya*–*viśeṣa*.

<sup>56</sup> PS<sub>2</sub> 2.22–23 (p. 146ff.): *davvaṭṭhiṇeṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhiṇeṇa puṇo / havadi ya aṇṇam aṇṇaṇṇam takkāle tammayattādo //* 22 //

- (j) *Also Siddhasena Divākara in his STP 1.36–40 describes all the seven angles (bhaṅga). The picture presented there is already a mature concept, wherein Siddhasena supplies also additional parameters such as: atthaṃtarabhūehi ya niyaehi ya* ('in view of the qualities of another thing and the substance's own qualities,' STP 1.36ab), *sabbhāve ... asabbhāvapajjave* ('with respect to the substance's own existence ... [and] with respect to the mode in which it does not exist,' STP 1.37ab). He also regularly speaks of aspects (*deso*) from which the substance can be predicated of.

3.2. An essential and well-known element of the theory is the modal operator *syāt* (*kathaṃcit*): 'in a certain sense, somehow.' It is well described in many sources, just to mention two references *dating to the times around Dharmakīrti. It is said to operate by means of affirmation (vidhi) and negation (niṣedha, pratiṣedha, niyama)*. They are extensively detailed and elaborated by *Mallavādin, e.g. in DNC 6,2ff. (vidhibheda), and DNC 9,7–8: vidhiniyamabhaṅgavṛtti-vyatiriktatvad...* All the permutations of *vidhi* and *niyama* are enumerated also in DNC 10,1–11,2. Also, Samantabhadra refers to them in his *Svayambhūstotra*:

Affirmation and negation are accepted [in the sense of] "somehow." [Thereby] the distinction between primary and secondary [angle] is established. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth *īrthaṃ-kara* Sumati). That is your most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, as we can see, by approximately the end of the fifth century we find a developed idea of the seven-fold modal description, which had needed some centuries to take shape.

3.3. It is difficult to determine when the term *saptabhaṅgī* was used for the first time. Although it seems to be absent from the Canon, it is, however, used by such pre-Diṇnāga authors as *Siddhasena Divākara and Kundakunda*.

- (a) *Siddhasena Divākara speaks of 'a verbal procedure that consists of seven options' (saptavikalpaḥ vacanapan-thaḥ), which he has just described before in STP 1.36–40:*

In this way, there emerges a verbal procedure that consists of seven options, taking into account the substantial modes. However, taking into account momentary manifestations, [the method of analysis] has either options [of description, viz. the object can be predicated of from various viewpoints,] or it has no options<sup>58, 59</sup>.

- (b) *Another occurrence of the technical term saptabhaṅgaṃ is found in Kundakunda's verse of PSSā 14 (p. 30ff.), already cited above (p. 14).*

- (c) *Further, the same author refers to the saptabhaṅgī method as a capacity of the soul:*

The great-soul is one (viz. either 'self-same,' or 'one perceiving organ' (*akṣa*) or 'it is possessed of cognitive application (*upayoga*)'). It is [also] two (viz. 'it is possessed of two-fold cognitive application: cognition and perception'). It becomes of threefold characteristics, it is said to roam in four [types of existence]. And it is

*atthi tti ya ṇatthi ya havadi avattavvaṃ idi puṇo davvaṃ /  
pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubhayam ādittḥam aññaṃ vā // 23 //*

<sup>57</sup> SvSt<sub>1</sub> 5.5 = SvSt<sub>2</sub> 25: *vidhīr niṣedhaś ca kathaṃcid iṣṭau vivakṣayā mukhyaguṇavyavasthā /  
iti praṇītiḥ sumates taveyaṃ matipravekaḥ stuvato 'stu nātha //*

For later descriptions see e.g. *RVār 2.8, p. 122, 15ff., esp. RVār 1.6, p. 33, 15ff.*

<sup>58</sup> I.e. it is not possible to predicate of an object because momentary manifestations, being transient and infinite, are beyond the scope of the language (sc. there are not enough words to describe each of them). The verse offers another possibility of interpretation, see TBV.

<sup>59</sup> STP 1.41: *evaṃ sattaviyappo vayanapaho hoi atthapajjāe /  
vaṇjanapajjāe uṇa saviyappo ṇivviyappo ya //*

grounded in five primary qualities (viz. karmic states (*bhāva*)). It is endowed with the capability to move in six [directions]. It is cognitively apt as having the existence of (viz. as being to apply) *the sevenfold modal description*. It has eight substrata (viz. qualities). It has nine objects (sc. the nine categories (*tattva*)) [to cognise]. It has ten states. It is called the living element.<sup>60</sup>

3.3. The term *saptabhaṅgī* is occasionally juxtaposed with various ‘aberrations’ of the *anekāntavāda*. Some of these are listed by Siddhasena Divākara in STP 3.56–59, who displays an awareness that there is indeed certain, albeit superficial similarity between the Jaina *anekāntavāda* and the Buddhist theory *vibhajyavāda* (*vibhajjavāyaṃ*)<sup>61</sup>:

The universal should be spoken of from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and the particular [relates] to the mode. When these two are brought together (sc. confused), they are defined as the doctrine of conditional analysis.<sup>62</sup>

3.4. The idea of *syādvāda* does not, however, have to necessarily involve the usage of the term ‘multiplexity’ (*anekānta*). And indeed, the term occurs only some time later, in the work of *Pūjyapāda Devanandin* (6th c.) for the first time.<sup>63</sup> The sources of the term *anekānta* can be traced back to the following two passages:

- (1) The general and particular definition of these [seven viewpoints (*naya*) enumerated in TS 1.33] should be formulated. The general definition, to begin with, [states that] a viewpoint is a verbal procedure (formal pronouncement) that aims – with respect to a real thing, which is of multiplex nature – at conveying, in conformity with essence [of the real thing], a particular [property of it] which one intends to establish, by laying emphasis on [a particular] reason without contradiction [by virtue of which that particular property is established].<sup>64</sup>
- (2) On account of the purpose [which] a real thing, which is of multiplex nature, [is to serve or is to be referred to], prominence is extended to, or is emphasised, i.e. [prominence] is given to a certain property in accordance with the expressive intent [of the speaker]. [The property] which is contrary to that [emphasised property] is not-emphasised [property]. Since [such a not-emphasised property serves] no purpose [at a particular time], even though it exists, there is no expressive intent [to assert it]; hence it is called subordinate [property]. Since these two [kinds of properties] are establish, viz. “because emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property] are established,” there is no contradiction.<sup>65</sup>

3.5. A brief reference to STP 1.36–40 above (p. 15) indicated a use of a series of certain parameters which determine the angle from which the thing under consideration is judged. And this is another

<sup>60</sup> PSS<sub>2</sub> 71–72 (p. 123): *eko ceva mahappā so duviyappo ttilakkhaṇo hodi / cadusaṃkamaṇo bhaṇido paṃcaggagunaṃpadhāṇo ya // 71 //*  
*chakkāpakkamajutto uvautto sattabhaṅgasabbhāvo / aṭṭhāsao ṇavattho jīvo dasaṭṭhāṇago bhaṇido // 72 //*

<sup>61</sup> For a brief comparison of *vibhajyavāda* and *anekāntavāda*, see Matilal 1981: 7–11.

<sup>62</sup> STP 3.57: *davvaṭṭhiyavattavvaṃ sāmāṇṇaṃ pajjavassa ya viseso / ee samovaṇṇā vibhajjavāyaṃ viseseṃti //*

<sup>63</sup> See Soni 2003: 34: ‘As for the word *anekānta* itself, in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of manifoldness unique to the Jains, it seems that *Pūjyapāda* was the first person to explicitly use it.’

<sup>64</sup> SSi 1.33, § 241, p. 100,7f.: *eteṣāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tāvad vastuny anekāntātmany avirodhena hetvarpaṇāt* [cf. TS 5.32] *sādhya viśeṣasya yāthātmyaprapaṇapravaṇaḥ prayogo nayaḥ*.

<sup>65</sup> SSi 5.32, § 588, p. 231,9ff.: *anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ prayojanavaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā prāpitaṃ pradhānyam arpitam upanītam iti yāvat. tadviparītam anarpitam. prayojanābhāvāt sato 'py avivakṣā bhavātīty upasarjanītam iti ucyate. tābhyāṃ siddher “arpitānarpitasiddher”* [TS 5.32] *nāsti virodhaḥ*.



important feature indispensable for the proper assessment of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality as the Jainas conceived of it. In the classical formulation of the theory we come across a set of four such parameters: substance (*dravya*) = *S*, place (*kṣetra*) = *P*, time (*kāla*) = *T*, condition (*bhāva*) = *C*; see e.g. Tṭ 5.31 (409,29ff.), *RVār* 4.42 (254,14ff.), SVM 23.113 (143,12) or JTBh 1.22 § 63 (JTBh<sub>1</sub>, p. 19; JTBh<sub>2</sub>, p. 19), DNCV 3,6.

Interestingly, the concept of the parameters to specify the angle (*bhaṅga*) from which an object is analysed developed over some centuries, and as early as in the sixth century we find elaborated attempts to list them. That is done by Siddhasena Divākara, who treats of 8 such parameters:

The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with *syādvāda*] is based on substance, place, time, condition as well as mode, aspect and relation, and also distinction.<sup>66</sup>

The list comprises more than four 'classical' parameters already mentioned. The parameters were an important device to show that method of the seven-fold modal description (*syādvāda*) was not trivial or beset with contradictions, but a rather complex analytical framework, which contained, alongside the seven angles (*bhaṅga*), a kind of second-level parametrisation. Historically speaking, the parameters evolved from the Canonical theory of descriptive standpoints (*nikṣepa*, *nyāsa*), the *locus classicus* of which is the enumeration found in the *Tattvārthasūtra*.<sup>67</sup>

3.6. Let us see how the angles of the seven-fold modal description were practically applied by Jaina authors prior to Dharmakīrti and what instances are used. Typical examples in genuine Jaina *syāt*-sentences are generally restricted to the terms: *paṭa*, *ghaṭa* and *kumbha*. An interesting reference is found in Jinabhadra-gaṇin's *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (6th/7th century):

Being something the existence, non-existence and both [the existence and non-existence] of [a particular property of it] is emphasised through [the pitcher's] own mode and through the mode of something else, this [pitcher] is differentiated as "a pitcher," as "something else than a pitcher," as "something inexpressible" and as "both [a pitcher and something else than a pitcher]."<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> STP 3.60: *davyaṃ khittaṃ kālaṃ bhāvaṃ pajjāyadesasamjoge / bhedam ca paducca samā bhāvāṇaṃ pañṇavaṇapajjā //*

<sup>67</sup> TS 1.5: *nāmassthāpanādravyabhāvatāṃ tannyāsaḥ*. Ample material on the *nikṣepa* is supplied in the monograph by Bhatt 1978.

<sup>68</sup> VĀBh 2232 (p. 910): *sabbhāvāsabbhāvobhayappi saparapajjaobhayao / kumbhākumbhāvattavyobhayarūvāibheo so //*

Hemacandra Maladhārīn aptly elaborates on the verse in VĀVṛ 910,12 ff: *saptabhaṅgīm pratipadyata ity arthaḥ, tad yatha – ūrdhvagrīvākāpālakuṣībudhnādibhiḥ svaparyāyair sadbhāvenārpito viśeṣitaḥ kumbhaḥ kumbho bhaṅyate – "san ghataḥ" iti prathamā bhaṅga bhavatiṭy arthaḥ. tathā paṭādigatais tvaktrāṇādibhiḥ paraparyāyair asadbhāvenārpito viśeṣito 'kumbho bhavati – sarvāyāpi ghaṭasya paraparyāyair asattvavivakṣāyām "asan ghataḥ" iti dvitīya bhaṅga bhavatiṭy arthaḥ. tathā sarvo 'pi ghaṭaḥ svaparobhayaparyāyair sadbhāvāsadbhāvābhyām sattvāsattvābhyām arpito viśeṣito yugapad vaktum iṣṭo 'vaktavyo bhavati, svaparaparyāyasattvāsattvābhyām ekena kenāpy asāṃketikena śabdena sarvāyāpi tasya yugapad vaktum aśakyatvād iti. ete trayaḥ sakalādeśāḥ. atha caivāro 'pi vikalpādeśāḥ procyaṇte...* – 'The idea is that [the author of the verse] demonstrates the seven-fold modal description, namely: a [particular] pitcher is called 'pitcher' when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through its own modes such as an upward neck, a hull, a spherical shape, a base etc., as something existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class A). That is what is meant by the first angle: "the vessel is existent [as  $a \in A$ ]." Similarly, [a particular pitcher] is [taken to be] something else than a pitcher when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through the modes of another [thing] such as the protection of the skin, as something non-existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class  $\neg A$ ). When the expressive intent is [to emphasise] the non-existence (sc. its being something else) [in the case] of any pot whatever through the modes [typical] of another [thing], that is

The idea indicated in the verse is that a particular entity *a* may – when certain parameters (typical of its own class) are emphasised, in other words when it is considered from a certain angle  $\sigma$  – be predicated of as a member of a class of objects endowed with a fixed set of qualities:  $\sigma(a \in A)$ ; whereas when other set of parameters is taken into account, it can be predicated of as a member of another class:  $\sigma(a \in \neg A)$ . However, this style of predication can be reduced to the idea that a particular thing can, from a certain angle, be said to either possess a property *P* (which it shares with other members of its class *A*) or not to possess it, etc. In other words:  $\sigma(x \text{ is } P)$ ,  $\sigma(x \text{ is } \neg P)$  and  $\sigma(x \text{ is } (P \& \neg P))$ .

In his *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*, *Umāsvāti* likewise speaks of *ghaṭa* and *mṛd*<sup>69</sup> as does Siddhasena-gaṇin<sup>70</sup>, giving an impression that these are the only entities used in the sources to exemplify the seven-fold modal description. There are some rare exceptions, such as the pair of *viṣa* and *modaka* ('poison and medicine') in Haribhadrāsūri's *Anekāntajayapatākā*<sup>71</sup>.

*In none of the literature, prior to Dharmakīrti, I have managed to consult, is there any mention of 'camel' (uṣṭra, karabha etc.) or any kind of 'dairy product' (dadhi, kṣīra etc.) as the subject of the proposition. That throws some doubt whether the 'camel-yoghurt' example Dharmakīrti adduces is a genuine one. The only mention of 'yoghurt' is found in the Āptamīmāṃsā:*

A person who has taken a vow [to eat only] milk does not partake of yoghurt; a person who has taken a vow [to eat only] yoghurt, does not partake of milk; a person who has taken a vow to refrain from all dairy products does not [partake of] both [milk and yoghurt]. Therefore, reality has triple nature (origination, cessation and continuation).<sup>72</sup>

---

what is meant by the second angle: "the vessel is non-existent [ $a \in A$ ]." By the same token, when one wishes to speak of any pot with no exception when, being predicated of, it is simultaneously emphasised – through its own modes, through the modes of another [thing] and through both [in the same breath] – as something [both] existent and non-existent, then it becomes inexpressible. [It becomes inexpressible], because it is not possible to speak, by means of any conceivable, numerically singular speech element which is not convention-bound, of any thing at all simultaneously as both existent and non-existent. These [angles] present a complete account [of a thing]. Now, the [remaining] four are explained in its turn explained as incomplete account [of a thing]... See also VĀBh 911,9ff.: *kumbhaḥ akumbhaḥ avaktavyaḥ ...* and p. 912 (on *paṭa*).

<sup>69</sup> PRP<sub>2</sub> and PRPT 202–206 (p. 139–144), esp. PRPT 205–206 (p. 143): *ghaṭārtho mṛtṭiṇḍe nāsti nābhūd ityārthaḥ...*, etc.

<sup>70</sup> TT 5.21 (407,26–27): *yathā ghaṭaḥ paṭādir api bhavati syātkārasaṃlāñcchanaśabdābhidheyatāyām. ...*

<sup>71</sup> AJP I 294,5–6: *na viṣaṃ viṣam eva, modakādyabhinnaśāmyāvyatirekāt*. Haribhadra notices that, despite the fact both poison and medicine can be predicated of as the same from a certain angle, there is a fundamental practical difference between the two. After taking a medicine, one does not die as it is the case with poison. Therefore, purely out of practical considerations, one should reject the idea of the identity between the poison and the medicine, see AJP I 295,10–11: *etena "viṣe bhakṣite modako 'pi bhakṣitaḥ syāt" ityādy api pratikṣiptam avagantavyam, tulyayogakṣematvād iti*.

According to Haribhadra, these practical considerations, which reflect Jaina realism, are decisive to falsify *Dharmakīrti*'s misrepresentation, inasmuch people apply medicine, instead of poison, albeit one could find an angle from which they could be described to share similar property, because they clearly see the difference between two different entities, see AJP I 295,5–9: *ato yady api dvayam apy (= viṣamodakau) ubhaya rūpam tathāpi viṣārthi viṣa eva pravartate, tadviṣeṣapariṇāmasyaiva tatsamānapariṇāma vinā bhāvāt tadviṣeṣapariṇāmasyeti, ataḥ prayāsamātraphalā pravṛttinīyamocchedacodaneti*.

<sup>72</sup> ĀMī 60: *payovrato na dadhy atti na payo 'iti dadhivrataḥ / agorasavrato nobhe tasmāt tattvaṃ trayātmakam //*

Despite seemingly irrelevant character of this verse, its pertinence to the theory of *anekānta* is independently confirmed by Vidyānanda<sup>73</sup> commenting on the verse and it is perhaps Samantabhadra who might have been a source of possible inspiration for Dharmakīrti. That suggestion seems to me exceedingly unlikely not only because of the exact contents of the verse but also because, despite an often repeated claim<sup>74</sup>, Samantabhadra *does not* seem to have predated Dharmakīrti<sup>75</sup> and should be, instead, considered a contemporary of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila.

4. The question now is how Jaina thinkers reacted to Dharmakīrti's attacks and how his criticism relates to what the Jains themselves understood under 'anekānta.'

4.1. In most cases the reply of Jaina philosophers who flourished after Dharmakīrti is the same and can be summarised briefly as: 'we have never professed the opinions which Dharmakīrti ascribes to us.'

4.1.1. One of very few Jaina philosophers who seriously responded to Dharmakīrti's critical remarks on *anekānta* is Abhayadevasūri (c. 1050–1100).

4.1.1.1. According to Abhayadeva Dharmakīrti misrepresents the Jaina idea of the universal, which is his opinion underlies the alleged equation of the camel and the yoghurt and thus Dharmakīrti's whole account of *anekāntavāda* is flawed: 'For we do not accept that there exists one synchronic homogeneity<sup>76</sup>, such as "being the real thing" etc., [which would be common] for both yoghurt and camel, [and] which [would be] established by virtue of the non-difference (selfsameness) of [respective] individuals (sc. as independent of individuals); [we do not accept this], because there appears no representation [in mind] of something of such kind. However, we do accept [some homogeneity] which is different from all particular individuals [comprised by it,] which exists as having as its contents the mental idea of "similar things" [and] which is of such kind that – when the verbal designation of this [homogeneity] of such kind [is made] by a speech element [expressing

<sup>73</sup> AṣṢ *ad loc.*, 212,17–18: *tataḥ sūktam sarvaṃ vastu syān nityam eva, syād anityam eveti. evaṃ syād ubhayam eva, syād avaktavyam eva, syān nityāvaktavyam eva, syād anityāvaktavyam eva, syād ubhayāvaktavyam eveti api yojanīyam.*

<sup>74</sup> See, for instance, Pathak 1893, Pathak 1930, Pathak 1930–1931, Fujinaga 2000. Pathak's erroneous conclusions are aptly summarised in his own words: 'I have proved that Kumārila has attached the view of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva that Arhan alone is sarvajña' (Pathak 1930–1931: 123). These analyses do not take into account other possible sources for Kumārila's statements, e.g. Jinabhadra-gaṇin's *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* or Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa's *Dvādaśāranayacakra*.

<sup>75</sup> That issue is going to be dealt with in a separate paper 'On the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra.'

<sup>76</sup> The notion of *tiryaksāmānya* is post-Akalaṅkian, cf. Balcerowicz 1999: 218–219: 'the terms synchronic homogeneity (*tiryaksāmānya*) and diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatāsāmānya*) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalaṅkian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside *ūrdhvatāsāmānya* and *tiryaksāmānya*, we find such forms as *ūrdhvasāmānya* and *tiraścīnasāmānya*.'

it] – [one wonders] why a person urged [by it] towards one thing (sc. yoghurt) should run towards another thing (sc. camel), unless he were a madman.’<sup>77</sup>

The above comment by Abhayadevasūri, *albeit being directed against Dharmakīrti, seems to* have been prompted also by a passage from Manorathanandin’s *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: ‘In a certain sense yoghurt is camel, because [both] are real things. Or, in a certain sense [yoghurt] is not camel, because it consists in particular.’<sup>78</sup>

While commenting on PVSV<sub>9</sub> 3.181 passage, Manorathanandin not only elaborates on Dharmakīrti’s argument but converts Dharmakīrti’s wording, which appears seemingly incomplete to the commentator, of PVSV 181: *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na*, into a full-fledged proof formula (*prayoga*), by supplying logical reasons for both theses (*vastutvāt*, *viśeṣarūpatayā*). These are clearly reflected in Abhayadeva’s response. The similarities between PVV and TBV in wording and contents are as follows:

Manorathanandin	Abhayadevasūri
(1) <i>vastutvāt</i>	<i>na ... asmābhir ... ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vastutvādikaṃ ... abhyupagamyate</i>
(2) <i>viśeṣarūpatayā</i>	<i>na ... asmābhir ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vyaktyabhedenā vyavasthitam ... abhyupagamyate</i>

Abhayadevasūri’s reply is meant to invalidate Dharmakīrti’s criticism, seen through the prism of Manorathanandin’s statements, by rendering it into a flawed and inaccurate account of Jaina thesis.

It is worth noting in passing that Abhayadevasūri’s reference to Manorathanandin’s account may help establish a relative chronology between Manorathanandin and Abhayadevasūri who both lived at more or less the same time: 2nd half of the 11th century. If my assessment is correct, Manorathanandin must have preceded Abhayadevasūri.

Another possible inspiration for Abhayadevasūri’s remark could be the statement of PVSV<sub>7</sub> 183 (339,23–24): *syād uṣṭro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvāt*. The ideas and formulations, however, are slightly different and thus Kaṇakagomin is much less probable a source.

#### 4.1.1.2. Abhayadevasūri rejects also what he takes for Dharmakīrti’s misrepresentation of Jaina idea of the particular:

If this real thing, which is [supposedly] excluded from [all] things that belong to the same class and from things that belong to a different class [and] which is undiversified (homogeneous), is represented in exactly such a manner in perception which has the efficacy to [represent] it, then, however, acts of conceptual cognition which take place in subsequent time [and] which [merely] represent something unreal, arise as manifesting – with respect to the

<sup>77</sup> TBV 242,31–243,2: *na hy asmābhir dadhyuṣṭrayor ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vastutvādikaṃ vyaktyabhedenā vyavasthitam tathābhūtapratibhāsābhāvād abhyupagamyate, yādrghūtaṃ tu prativyaktibhinnaṃ “samānāḥ” iti pratyayaviṣayabhūtam abhyupagamyate tathābhūtasya tasya śabdenābhīdhāne kim ity anyatra prerito ‘nyatra khādanāya dhāveṭa yady unmatto na syāt*. This passage follows Abhayadevasūri’s criticism (TBV 242,19–26) against Dharmakīrti’s understanding of the universal, as it is found e.g. in PV<sub>4</sub> 3.109 = PV<sub>4</sub> 3.107, *padu d* of which being quoted in TBV 242,19: *samānā iti tadgrahāt*.

<sup>78</sup> PVV<sub>2</sub> 3.180 (352,8–9) = PVV<sub>7</sub> 3.181 (212,15–16) = PVV<sub>9</sub> 3.181 (262,21–22): *syād uṣṭro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syād uṣṭro viśeṣarūpatayā*.

excluded real thing – various universals, which are based on the exclusion of everything else by virtue of the real thing to be excluded. It is not consistent [to assume] that the distinctive nature of the universals is established by virtue of this [real thing] because of too far-reaching consequence.<sup>79</sup>

#### 4.1.2. Another Jaina thinker in whose work we come across a refutation of Dharmakīrti's account of the universal is Vādirājasūri:

For it is as follows. This criticism, which one wishes to raise against [our doctrine of multiplexity of reality that states that] the real thing consists in positive aspect (*P*) and in negative aspect (*non-P*) cannot hold true, to begin with, with respect to [such a real thing] that consists in the universal or in the particular, because there is no single universal which is concomitant with [both] yoghurt and [camel,] etc. For the universal is the transformation pertaining to likeness, and it is indeed confined to yoghurt etc.; there is no other entity at all or anything else associated [with it, and independent of it], just like the likeness between something blue and the cognition of it. Therefore, how can oneness between yoghurt and camel be possible, on the basis of which some activity were possible with respect to one thing [even though] the injunction concerning the other [thing were expressed]?<sup>80</sup>

The main line of his argumentation is, again, that Dharmakīrti *misrepresents the Jaina concept of the universal* and his criticism might hold valid only with respect to a theory which would understand the universal the way the Jainas do not.

4.1.3. *Not only Abhayadeva and Vādirāja, but generally no Jaina text* consulted by me refers to any kind of universal (*sāmānya*) in the sense of a special quality (*atiśaya*), over and above the thing itself, by virtue of which two entities could be associated or dissociated as it is done in the exposition above (*vastutvāt*, see p. 11). We come across clear statements that deny such an approach, see e.g. Akalaṅka's *Svarūpasambodhana*: 'Acknowledge that the essence of the real thing is [the thing] itself and the other by virtue of the nature of the real thing.'<sup>81</sup> Clearly, *atiśaya* cannot be considered to correspond to parameters or stand for the *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika* viewpoints.

Further, Akalaṅka's riposte to Dharmakīrti (*PV* 3.182) in his *Nyāyaviniścaya* points out the general misrepresentation of the main idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description. His strategy is to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti commits 'the fallacy of criticism' (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*):

[Your] false riposte with respect to the [inferable property of our thesis] is a counterfeit rejoinder [as a formal flaw in discourse to blame] on the enemies of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality, just like one injunction [concerning both yoghurt and camel] due to the undesired consequence of non-difference of yoghurt and camel.<sup>82</sup>

He further ironically points out the consequences of Dharmakīrti's understanding of *anekānta*:

<sup>79</sup> TBV 243,12ff.: *atha sajjāṭṭiyavijāṭṭiyavyāvṛttaṃ niraṃśaṃ vastu tatsāmarthyabhāvinī ca pratyakṣe tat tathaiva pratibhāti, tad uttarakālabhāvinas tv avastusaṃsparśino vikalpāḥ vyāvartyavastuvaśavibhinnavyāvṛttinibandhanān sāmānyabhedān vyāvṛtte vastuṇy upakalpayantaḥ samupajāyante na tadvaśāt tadvyavasthā yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt.*

<sup>80</sup> NViV 2.203 (233,19ff.): *tathā hi – tad api tadatatadātmake vastuni dūṣaṇam uddhuṣyamāṇam na tāvat sāmānya-viśeṣātmake bhavitum arhati, dadhyādyanvayinaḥ sāmānyasyaikaśyābhāvāt. sādṛśyapariṇāmo hi sāmānyam, tac ca dadhyādiṇyavasāitam eva na kiṃcid api sattvam anyad vā samanvitam asti nīlatajjñānayoḥ sārūpyavat. tat kathaṃ dadhyuṣṭrayor ekatvaṃ yata ekacodanāyām anyatrāpi pravṛttiḥ.*

<sup>81</sup> SSam 20ab: *svaṃ paraṃ ceti vastutvaṃ vasturūpeṇa bhāvaya /*

<sup>82</sup> NVi<sub>1</sub> 371 (79,29–30) = NVi<sub>2</sub> 2.203 (vol. II 233,2,6):  
*tatra mithyottaram jātīḥ yathānekāntavidviṣāṃ /  
dadhyuṣṭrāder abhedatvaprasaṅgād ekacodanam //*

Also the Buddha was [once] born as a deer, and the deer is known as the [future] Buddha. Nevertheless, the Buddha is venerated, [whereas] the deer is eaten, in accordance with what is accepted.

Since the [relative] difference and non-difference [between things (e.g. the Buddha and the deer)] is established only by force of the real thing [which is emphasised] in such a manner, why should the person enjoined as follows: “Eat yoghurt!”, run towards the camel?<sup>83</sup>

These two verses, especially the phrase *mṛgaḥ khyādyo yatheṣyate*, parodies *Dharmakīrti*’s ridicule contained in PV 3.182 (*codito dadhi khāda...*).

4.2. *The above comparison of the main features in Dharmakīrti’s account of anekānta* (see § 2.2.) and the way the doctrine is explicated by the Jainas themselves (§ 3.) leads us to the conclusion that, in his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, *Dharmakīrti* is off the mark as regards several points. Apart from the arguments formulated by the Jaina thinkers and summarised above that concern *Dharmakīrti*’s account of the Jaina understanding of the universal (§§ 4.1.1.1., 4.1.2.) and the particular (§ 4.1.1.2.), we can mention a few more in the following.

4.2.1. The qualified identity or difference, predicated of with the modal operator *syāt*, does not entail complete (*ekānta*) identity or difference of the predicated object.

4.2.2. No Jaina text consulted by me refers to some ultimate quality (*atiśaya*), reported in PVSV {183.1}, or any kind of special character (*viśeṣa*) which would qualify things and by virtue of which we could predicate of the things as being either identical or different. In Jaina works there seems to be no mention of things that are *x-viśiṣṭa*, where *x* would be such a special quality. On the contrary, some Jaina thinkers explicitly deny there exists any such ultimate quality (*atiśaya*). *Haribhadra*, while refuting *Dharmakīrti*’s account of *anekāntavāda*, ironically states in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*:

[9] Hence, there is [indeed] some ultimate quality in this [yoghurt] by virtue of whose singular character [the person enjoined] acts [with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel]. [And] that is nothing but yoghurt. Thus it is not [the case that there exists the ultimate quality], because that would go against the fact that [yoghurt] is an existing substance. [10] Therefore this ultimate quality does exist [as the substance of yoghurt as such]. It does not exist in anything else, and there is nothing else at all except for these two (sc. the yoghurt and the camel). Accordingly, since the true nature [of yoghurt] is well established, there is no fault [with the doctrine of multiplexity of reality].<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> NV<sub>i1</sub> 373–4 (p. 80) = NV<sub>i2</sub> 2.204–5 (vol. II 234,1–4):

*sugato ’pi mṛgo jato mṛgo ’pi sugataḥ smṛtaḥ /*  
*tathāpi sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khyādyo yatheṣyate //*  
*tathā vastubalād eva bhedābhedavyavasthiteḥ /*  
*codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭram abhidhāvati //*

<sup>84</sup> Vol. I 297,13–14 (*kā*. 9–10):

*ato ’sty atiśayas tatra yena bhedena vartate /*  
*sa dadhy evety ado neti saddravyatvānuvedhataḥ //* 9 //  
*tataḥ so ’sti na cānyatra na cāpy anubhayam param /*  
*evaṃ tattvavyavasthāyām avadyaṃ nāsti kimcana //* 10 //

Another example of a philosopher who rejects it is *Prabhācandrasūri*<sup>85</sup>. The existence of any kind of special quality is thus denied, and indeed it is hard to find a trace of it also in earlier Jaina sources.

4.2.3. In opposition to what Dharmakīrti claims (*vide supra* § 2.2.1.f.), no Jaina text consulted by me speaks of the identity of two unrelated things  $x = y$ . Instead, the formulation of the *syāt* proposition is one of the following:

- (a) an incomplete sentence of the sort:  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is ...),  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is not ...), etc., in which no explicit predicate is mentioned;
- (b) a modal statement in which the subject is predicated of in terms of a predicate:  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is  $P$ ), where  $P$  is a property,  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is non- $P$ ), etc.;
- (c) a modal statement – e.g. *syāt ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ*, *syāt ghaṭo 'ghaṭaḥ* etc. (see § 3.6.) – that links a member of a class to the class of the kind  $\sigma$  ( $a \in A$ ),  $\sigma$  ( $a \in \neg A$ ), etc. by virtue of a property  $P$  all the members of the class possess; therefore, this kind of statements can be reduced to the pattern of § 4.2.3.(b):  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is  $P$ ),  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is non- $P$ ), etc.;
- (d) rather rare type:  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is  $x$ -related),  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is non- $x$ -related) etc., where the relation is strictly causal, based on the idea of the triad: origination (*utpāda*), cessation (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*), e.g. 'a pot is, in a certain sense, a lump of clay' (*syād ghaṭo mṛdpiṇḍaḥ*<sup>86</sup>;  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is  $x$ -related)), 'a pot is not, in a certain sense, a lump of clay' (*syād ghaṭo mṛdpiṇḍo nāsti*;  $\sigma$  ( $x$  is non- $x$ -related)); what Haribhadrāsūri formulates is already implied by the two verses of *Prasamaratiprakaraṇa*:

[204] Whatever is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence, all that with no exception exists. It is [predicated of as] something existent, something non-existent or otherwise (sc. inexpressible as well as the remaining permutations) on account of whether a particular [property] is emphasised or not emphasised.  
 [205] The production, [caused] by [the substratum]  $y$ , is of such an object  $x$  which was not there in [the substratum]  $y$ , and is seen presently there in [the substratum]  $y$ . The opposite of this is the destruction of [the object]  $x$ .<sup>87</sup>

4.2.4. In Dharmakīrti's account we see absolute absence of the four parameters *dravyakṣetrakālabhāva* (*vide supra* § 3.5.) which, at a point, become essential in Jaina exposition of *syādvāda*.

4.2.5. Dharmakīrti does not seem to notice an important distinction between the substantial aspect of *dravya* and the modal, transient aspect of *paryāya* that are at the basis of such propositions as *syād asti* and *syān nāsti*, respectively, etc. That oversight is unhesitatingly pointed out by Śāntisūri in the *Nyāyāvātārasūtravārttika*, while directly referring to Dharmakīrti's verse: 'One should not claim the following: ... [PV 3.182], because also the aspect of the mode is to be taken into account. It is only in that way that the seven-fold modal description is [properly] established. For it is as follows: When one wants to express the primary character of the substance, then one asserts: " $x$  is, in a certain sense, [ $P$ ]." Similarly, [When one wants to express the primary character] of the mode, one [asserts]: " $x$  is, in a certain sense, not- $[P]$ ." When one wishes to express the contention that both

<sup>85</sup> NKC, Vol. 2 463,5–6: ...*kiñcīt sat samastasad iti, evam asad api. sampūrṇaniratiśayasvātmāna eva tu vastutvād nirūpyam – katamat tat kva vā kiñcitsattvam asattvaṃ vā? etarhi nirūpyate – nanv idam eva tad ekasattāsad asad api asamarthagavavat.*

<sup>86</sup> Comp. Haribhadrāsūri's account in PRPT.

<sup>87</sup> PRP 204–205: *utpādavīgamanīyatvalakṣaṇam yat tad asti sarvaṃ api / sad asad vā bhavatīty anyathārpitānarpitaviśeṣāt // 204 //*  
*yo 'rtho yasmin nābhūt sāmpratākāle ca dṛśyate tatra / tenotpādas tasya vīgamas tu tasmād viparyāsaḥ // 205 //*

are primary at the same time, then [one asserts]: “*x* is, in a certain sense, inexpressible.” These [three] are the cases of the complete (sc. basic) account. The combinations of precisely these [three] yield another four angles. And these [remaining four] are the cases of the incomplete account insofar as they are based on the [arrangement of] the elements of these [three]. [The permutations] are as follows: “*x* is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P]”; “*x* is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is inexpressible”; “*x* is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P], and is inexpressible.” Thus, no other angle is possible.”<sup>88</sup>

What is important, the parameterisation of the modal propositions within the framework of the seven-fold modal description had already become a standard procedure among the Jainas before *Dharmakīrti*, for examples see §§ 3.1.j., 3.5., 3.6, so *Dharmakīrti* must, at least should, have been acquainted with it.

4.2.6. We come across similar criticism against a charge of the identity of two unrelated things  $x = y$  (*vide supra* § 2.2.1.f. and 4.2.3.), expressed by Samantabhadra. He explains that any two things can be regarded as equal and unequal the way a substance and its modes can be interpreted as identical and different:

[70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both [phenomena that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated] by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when [a charge is expressly formulated by the opponents] that if [a thing is] indescribable<sup>89</sup> it is [indescribable] in the absolute sense, then [such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case,] it is [seen to be] expressible.<sup>90</sup>

[71] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no disassociation of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as [these two always] undergo [their respective] particular kind of transformation due to the relationship [that holds between these two] of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes).

[72] On the other hand, since [these two] have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (sc. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc., [therefore] there is difference between them. However, [the difference] is not in the absolute sense.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> NASV 35 § 30, p. 93,26–94,4: *na caitad vācyaṃ –*

*sarvasyobhaya rūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ /*  
*codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭraṃ nābhidhāvati // PV 3.182 //*

*paryāyanasyāpy abhyupagamāt. ata eva saptabhaṅgī siddhiyati. tathā hi – yadā dravyasya prādhānyam vivakṣate tadā “syād asti” iti kathyate. yathā paryāyānām tadā “syān nāsti” iti. yadā yugapad ubhaya prādhānyapratipādanam vivakṣyate tadā “avaktavyam.” ete sakalādeśāḥ. tatsaṃyoga evāpare catvāro bhaṅgā bhavanti. te ca svāvayavāpekṣayā vikalādeśāḥ. tad yathā – asti ca nāsti ca. asti cāvaktavyam ca. nāsti cāvaktavyam ca. asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyam ca iti nāparabhaṅgasambhavaḥ.*

<sup>89</sup> Here: *avācya*=*avaktavya*, in the sense of the third (or fourth) modal proposition (*syād avaktavyam*).

<sup>90</sup> *ĀMī* 70cd is apparently a reply to PVSV {184.22}: *na hy avācyaṃ arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante*. The verse of *ĀMī* 70 (*kārya–kāraṇa*) is a repetition of *ĀMī* 13 (*abhāva–bhāva*), and it recurs again and again in Samantabhadra’s work: 32 (*sāmānya–viśeṣa*), 55 (*nitya–anitya*), 74 (*apekṣika–anapekṣika*), 77 (*pratyakṣa–āgama*), 82 (*antarjñeya–bahirjñeya*), 90 (*daiva–adaiva*), 94 (*punya–pāpa*), 97 (*ajñāna–jñāna*). In each case *ubhaya* (in *ubhayaikātmyam*) changes its meaning, here supplied by me in brackets.

<sup>91</sup> *ĀMī* 70–72:

*virodhān nobhayaikātmyam syādvādanyāyavidviṣām /*



The implication of Samantabhadra's exposition, which I believe is directly prompted by Dharmakīrti, is that any two entities can be considered both as identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive (*dravyārthikanaya*) and the mode-expressive (*paryāyārthikanaya*) viewpoints (see pp. 11, 14, 16), where the two viewpoints serve as parameters.

5. To conclude, we easily see some points in Dharmakīrti's account of the *anekāntavāda* that significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves. Now wonder that the Jainas are keen to demonstrate how greatly Dharmakīrti misrepresents it. It is particularly Akalaṅka who ridicules Dharmakīrti on that basis:

You who are someone who proves the manifold continuum of cognition [which grasps] something impermanent [as represented] in false appearance [and] who criticises, indeed, the statements (sc. *saptabhāṅgī*) of cognition of truth, you are a jester.<sup>92</sup>

Vādirājasūri follows the suit: 'Therefore, [when Dharmakīrti] has not understood the opinion of the propounder of modal description, and [still] formulates this [objection] against him, [the objection] reveals Dharmakīrti's nature of jester: "Someone who has not understood the initial position [of his opponents] and yet criticises is a jester",<sup>93</sup> the last line being a pun (*avijñāya DŪṢAKO 'pi vidūṢAKAḥ*).

In these acts of derision they reciprocate Dharmakīrti's own tactics, who calls his opponents 'shameless' (*ahrīkāḥ*) and their theory 'primitive and confused' (*aślīlam ākulam*) in PV 3.181. Both approaches seem to be compatible neither with the Jaina and Buddhist principles of *ahiṃsā* or *karuṇā*.

The question arises whether the points Dharmakīrti 'misses' can be justified historically with his poor acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine? That supposition seems highly unlikely to me, although one cannot exclude the possibility that what Dharmakīrti depicts are some early developments of the theory. Rather Dharmakīrti deliberately invents his own example of the camel and the yoghurt in order to graphically emphasise the paradoxes he believed Jaina theory contained, but also in order to draw a caricature of it with his sharp tongue. His approach is reductionist in the sense that

avācyataikānte 'py uktir nāvācyam iti yujyate // 70 //  
dravyaparyāyor aikyaṃ tayoṃ avyatirekataḥ /  
pariṇāmaviśeṣāc ca śaktimacchaktibhāvataḥ // 71 //  
saṃjñāsaṅkhyāviśeṣāc ca svalakṣaṇaviśeṣataḥ /  
prayojanādibhedāc ca tannānāivāṇi na sarvathā // 72 //

<sup>92</sup> SVi 3.26 (412):

mithyārthābhāsthīrajñānacitrasantānasādhakaḥ /  
tattvajñānagīrām aṅga dūṣakas tvaṃ vidūṣakaḥ //

See also SViV 6.37 (437,22–25):

daddhyādaṃ na pravarteta bauddhaḥ tadbhuktaye janaḥ /  
adṛśyāṃ saugatīṇi tatra tanūṃ saṃśaṅkamānakaḥ //  
daddhyādike tathā bhukte na bhuktaṃ kāñcīkādikam /  
ity asau vetu no veti na bhuktā saugatī tanuḥ //

<sup>93</sup> NViV 2.203 (233,26–27): tataḥ syādvādimatam anavabuddhiya tatredam ucyamānaṃ dharmakīrtī viduḥśakatvaṃ āvedayati "pūrvapakṣam avijñāya dūṣako 'pi vidūṣakaḥ" [NVi] iti prasiddheḥ.

he redraws and simplifies essential elements of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality for his main objective is not a doxographic report but a successful tactics to win over the opponent.

## Bibliography

- AJP *Haribhadrāsūri: Anekāntajayapatākā. H. R. Kāpadīā (ed.): Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri with his own commentary and Muncandra Sūri's supercommentary. 2 Vols., Gaekwad Oriental Series 88, 105, Baroda 1940, 1947.*
- AJPSV *Haribhadrāsūri: Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñavyākhyā. See AJP.*
- ĀMī *Samantabhadra: Āptamīmāṃsā.*  
 (1) Pannālāl Jain (ed.): *Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra Svāmi, with two commentaries: Aṣṭaśatī of Bhaṭṭākalaṅka and Devāgamavṛtti of Vasunandī. Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā 10(7), Kāśī (Benares) 1914.*  
 (2) Udayachandra Jain (ed., Hindi tr.): *Tattvadīpikā. A Commentary with Introduction etc. on Āptamīmāṃsā of Acharya Samantabhadra. Śrī Gaṇeś Varṇī Digambar Jain Saṁsthān, Kāśī Vīr-Saṁ. 2501 [= 1982 r. n.e.].*  
 (3) Nagin Shah (ed., tr.): *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an Authority [Along with English Translation, Introduction, Notes and Akalaṅka's Sanskrit Commentary Aṣṭaśatī]. SSG 7: 1999.*
- AnD *Aṇugaddārāṁ (Anuyogadvārāṇī). Muni Puṇyavijaya, Dalsukh Mālvaṇīā, Amṛitlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak (ed.): Nandīsuttaṁ and Aṇugaddārāṁ. Jaina-Āgama-Series 1, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1968.*
- AṣS *Vidyānanda Pātrakesarīsvāmin: Aṣṭasahasrī. Vamśīdhar (ed.): Aṣṭasahasrī tārikacakracūḍāmaṇīsyaḍvādividyāpatinā śrīVidyānandasvāminā nirākṛta. Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay 1915.*
- AṣŚ *Akalaṅka: Aṣṭaśatī. See (1) ĀMī, (3) ĀMī and (5) AṣS.*
- AVP *Haribhadrāsūri: Anekāntavādapraveśa. Edited with Ṭippaṇaka. Hemacandrācārya Granthāvalī, Pattan 1919.*
- Balcerowicz 1999 *P. Balcerowicz: 'How Could a Cow be Both Synchronically and Diachronically Homogeneous, or On the Jaina Notions of tiyṛak-sāmānya and ūrdhva-sāmānya.' In: N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnstrom (eds.): Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols. [Proceedings of the International Conference on Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols, 31.03–2.04.1995 Toronto]. Edited by N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnström. South Asian Studies Papers 11, University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto 1999: 211–235.*
- Balcerowicz 2003a *P. Balcerowicz: 'On the Relationship of the Nyāyavatāra and the Saṁmati-tarka-prakarana,' Indologica Taurinensia [Proceedings of the XI<sup>th</sup> World Sanskrit Conference (Turin, April, 3<sup>rd</sup>–8<sup>th</sup>, 2000)] 29 (2003) 31–83.*
- Balcerowicz 2003b *P. Balcerowicz: 'Some Remarks on the Naya Method,' in: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion [Proceedings of the International Seminar on Jainism 'Aspects of Jainism.' Warsaw University 8<sup>th</sup>–9<sup>th</sup> September, 2000]. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2003: 37–67.*
- Balcerowicz 2005 *P. Balcerowicz: 'Pramāṇas and language. A Dispute between Diṇnāga, Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka,' Journal of Indian Philosophy 33 (2005) 343–400.*
- Bhatt 1978 *B. Bhatt: The Canonical Nikṣepa. Studies in Jaina Dialectics. With a foreword by K. Bruhn and H. Haertel. E.J.Brill, Leiden 1978 [reprinted: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi–Varanasi 1991].*

- BHSD F. Edgerton: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, Dictionary, Reader*. 3 Vols. New Haven 1953.
- DNC *Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa: Dvādaśāranayacakra*. Muni Jambūvijayaḥ (ed.): *Dvādaśāraṇa Naya-cakraṇ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādī Kṣamāśramaṇa*. With the commentary *Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī* of Ācārya Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādī Kṣamāśramaṇa. Edited with critical notes by .... Pt. I (1–4 Aras), Śrī-Jaina-Ātmānanda-sabhā, Bhāvnagar 1966 [reprinted: Bhāvnagar 2000]; Pt. II (5–8 Aras): Bhāvnagar 1976; Pt. III (9–12 Aras): Bhāvnagar 1988.
- DNCV Siṃhasūri: *Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī Dvādaśāranayacakravṛtti*. See: DNC.
- Pathak 1893 B.K. Pathak: 'The Position of Kumārila in Digambara Jaina Literature,' in: E.D. Morgan (ed.): *The Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists*, Vol. 1, Printed for the Committee of the Congress, 22 Albemarle St., London 1893: 186–214.
- Pathak 1930 B.K. Pathak: 'Śantarakṣita's Reference to Kumārila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva,' *ABORI* 11 (1930) 155–164.
- Pathak 1930–1931 B.K. Pathak: 'Kumārila's Verses Attacking the Jain and Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient Being,' *ABORI* 11 (1930–1931) 123–131.
- Fujinaga 2000 S. Fujinaga: 'Determining which Jaina Philosopher was the Object of Dharmakīrti's Criticism,' *Philosophy East and West* 50/3 (2000) 378–385.
- Jain 1974 Mahendrakumār Jain: *Jain darśan*. Tṛtīya saṃskāraṇa, Gaṇeś Prasād Varṇī Jain Granthamālā 2, 7, Śrī Gaṇeś Varṇī Di. Jain Saṃsthān, Goladhār / Vārāṇasī 1974 [Prathama saṃskaraṇa: 1955].
- JSK Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa. Ed. by Jinendra Varṇī, Parts 1–5, Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā, 38, 40, 42, 44, 48 [Saṃskṛta Granthāṅka], Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Delhi 1997, 1999, 2000.
- JTBh Yaśovijayasūri Upādhyāya: *Jainatarkabhāṣā*.  
 (1) Bhargava, Dayanand (ed., transl.): *Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya's Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā With Translation and Critical Notes*. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi–Varanasi–Patna 1973.  
 (2) Sukhlālī Saṅghavī, Mahendra Kumār, Dalsukh Mālvanīyā (ed.): *Mahopādhyāyaśrīyaśovijaya-gaṇīracitā Jainatarkabhāṣā*. Sarasvatī Pustak Bhaṇḍār, Ahmadābād (Ahmedabad) 1993. [first ed.: 1938].
- Kāpadīā 1940–1947 H. R. Kāpadīā: 'Introduction,' see AJP.
- Matilal 1981 B.K. Matilal: *The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekāntavāda)*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 79, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir – L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981.
- NASV Śāntisūri: *Nyāyāvatārasūtravārttika*. *Nyāyāvatārasūtravārttika of Śrī Śānti Sūri critically edited in Sanskrit with notes, indices etc. in Hindi* [with the Vṛtti] by Dalsukh Malvania, published by Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikshapitha, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1949.
- NC Māilla-dhavalā-[deva]: *Ṇayacakko* [Dravyasvabhāvaprakāśakanayacakra]. Kailash Chandra Shastri (ed., transl.): *Ṇayacakko* [Nayacakra] of Śrī Māilladhavalā. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Grantha-mālā 12, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Delhi 1999. [first edition.: 1971].
- NKC Prabhācandrasūri: *Nyāyakumudacandra*. Mahendra Kumār Nyāya Śāstri (ed.): *Nyāyakumudacandra of Śrīmat Prabhācandrācārya. A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva's Laghīyastraya*. With an introduction (Prastāvanā) by Kailāścandra Śāstri. 2 Vols., SGDOS 121, D 1991. [1. ed.: Bombay 1938–1942].
- NVi Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: *Nyāyaviniścaya*.  
 (1) Nyāyācārya Mahendra Paṇḍita Kumār Śāstri (ed.): *ŚrīmadBhaṭṭākalaṅkadevaviracitam Akalaṅkagranthatrayam* [Svopajñāvivṛtisahitam Laghīyastrayam, Nyāyaviniścayaḥ, Pramāṇasaṅgrahaś ca]. Sarasvatī Pustak Bhaṇḍār, Ahmadābād (Ahmedabad) 1996 [1<sup>st</sup> edition: Ahmedabad–Calcutta 1939].  
 (2) Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri, the Sanskrit Commentary on Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva's Nyāyaviniścaya*. Vol. 1 & 2, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha

- Prakāśana, Vārāṇasī 1949, 1955 [2<sup>nd</sup> edition: Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, New Delhi 2000].*
- NViV *Vādirājasūri: Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa. See: NVi<sub>2</sub>.*
- Paṇṇ *Paṇṇavaṇāsutta [Prajñāpanāsūtra]. Muni Puṇyavijaya, Dalsukh Mālvaṇiā, Amṛitlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak (ed.): Paṇṇavaṇāsuttam. 2 parts, Jaina-Āgama-Series 9 (Part 1, 2), Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1969, 1971.*
- PRP *Umāsvāti: Praśamaratiprakaraṇa.*
- (1) *Rājakumāra (ed.): Śrīmadumāsvātiviracita Praśamaratiprakaraṇa [Śrīharibhadrāsūriviracitaṭīkāṅkita]. Śrīmad-rājacandra-jaina-śāstra-mālā, Śrī-parama-śruta-prabhāvaka Maṇḍala, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, Agās 2514 (Vīra Saṃvat) [= 1989].*
- (2) Yajñeshwar S. Shastri: *Ācārya Ūmāsvāti Vācaka's Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 107, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir – L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1989.
- PRPT *Haribhadrāsūri: Praśamaratīṭīkā. See: PRP<sub>1</sub> and PRP<sub>2</sub>.*
- PSā *Kundakunda: Pavayaṇasāra [Pravacanasāra]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakṛit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena. Śrī Paramaśruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1984. [first edition: Bombay 1935].*
- PSā *Kundakunda: Pavayaṇasāra [Pravacanasāra]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakṛit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena. Parama-Śruta-Prabhāvaka Mandal, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agās-Gujarat 1984. [First edition: Bombay 1935].*
- PSSā *Kundakunda: Paṃcatthiyasaṃgaha [Pañcāstikāyasamayāsāra].*
- (1) A. Chakravartinayanar and A.N. Upadhye (ed.): *Pañcāstikāyasāra. The Building of the Cosmos. Prakrit text, Sanskrit chāyā, English commentary etc. Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, New Delhi 1975. [1. edition: The Sacred Books of the Jainas 3, Kumar Kendra Prasada – The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah 1920].*
- (2) Manoharlāl (ed.): *Śrīmatkundakundasvāmiviracitaḥ Pañcāstikāyaḥ TattvapradīpikāṭāparyavṛttiBālāvabodhakabhāṣeti ṭīkātrayopetaḥ. Śrī Paramaśruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1997.*
- PV *Dharmakīrti: Pramāṇavārttika.*
- (1) *Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.): Pramāṇavārttikam by Ācārya Dharmakīrti. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24, Patna 1938: 1–123.*
- (2) *Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.): Pramāṇavārttikam ĀcāryaManorathanandikṛtāyā vṛtṭyā saṃvalitam [Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam with a commentary by Manorathanandin]. Parts I–II, Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24–26, Patna 1938–1940.*
- (3) See: PVA.
- (4) *Dalasukha Mālvaṇiā (ed.): Ācārya Dharmakīrti kṛta Svārthānumānapariccheda. General Edition: V.S. Agarwala, Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series 2, Varanasi [1959].*
- (5) Raniero Gnoli (ed.): *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Ismeo, Roma 1960.*
- (6) See: Mookerjee–Nagasaki (1964).
- (7) *Svāmī Dvārikādās Śāstri (ed.): Dharmakīrti Nibandhawali (I): Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin. BBS 3, 1968 [reprinted: 1984].*
- (8) *Yūsho Miyasaka (ed.): 'Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).' [Chapter 2 = Pramāṇasiddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyakṣa, Chapter 4 = Parārthānumāna]. Acta Indologica [Indo-koten-kenkyū] 2 (1971/72) 1–206 [Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji].*
- (9) Ram Chandra Pandeya (ed.): *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with*

- Subcommentaries: Svopajñavṛtti of the Author and Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin.* MB, 1989. [the chapter numbering follows: PV<sub>2</sub>].
- PVA Prajñākaragupta: *Pramāṇavārttikāṅkāra*. Tripiṭakāchārya Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.): *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikāṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikam*). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953.
- PVSV Dharmakīrti: *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. See: (4) PV<sub>4</sub>, (5) PV<sub>5</sub> and (9) PV<sub>9</sub>.
- PVSVT Karṇakagomin: *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.): *Ācārya Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛtityā Karṇakagomiviracitayā tatṭikayā ca sahitam. Kitāb Mahal, Ilāhābād [Allahabad] 1943 [reprinted: Kyoto 1982]*.
- PVV Manorathanandin: *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*. See: PV<sub>2</sub>, PV<sub>7</sub>, PV<sub>9</sub>.
- RVār Akalaṅka: *Tattvārthavārttika (Rājavārttika)*. Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): *Tattvārthavārttika [Rājavārttika] of Śrī Akalaṅkadeva*. Edited with Hindi Translation, Introduction, Appendices, Variant Readings, Comparative Notes etc. Parts I–II. First edition, JMIG 10, 20 [Sanskrit Grantha], D 1953–1957. [2. ed.: D 1982].
- SBhT Vimaladāsa: *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī*. Manoharlāl (ed.): *Śrīmadvimaladāsaviracitā Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī. Śrī Paramaśruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1995* [first edition.: 1913].
- Schubring 1962 W. Schubring: *The Doctrine of the Jainas*. Translated from the German by Wolfgang Beurlen, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1962 [reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1978. Reedited with the three indices enlarged and added by Willem Bollée and Jayandra Soni, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2000].
- Shah 2000 J.N. Shah (ed.): *Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth*. Bhogilal Leharchand Institute of Indology, Delhi 2000.
- Soni 2003 J. Soni: „Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on Anekānta-vāda.” In: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): *Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion*. Warsaw Indological Studies 2, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2003 25–35.
- SSam Akalaṅka: *Svarūpasambodhana. Kallāpā Bharamāppā Niṭve* (hrsg.): *Laghīyastrayādisaṅgrahaḥ. 1. bhaṭṭākalāṅkadevakṛtaṁ Laghīyastrayaṁ, Ānantakīrtiracitatātpāryavṛttisahitaṁ, 2. bhaṭṭākalāṅkadevakṛtaṁ Svarūpasambodhanam, 3–4. Anantakīrtikṛtalaghubṛhatsarvajñasiddhī ca. Māṇikacandra-Digambara-Jaina-Grantha-mālā 1, Bombay 1915: 1–4–106*.
- SSI Pūjyapāda Devanandin: *Sarvārthasiddhi*. (1) Phoolchandra Shastri (ed.): *Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi [The commentary on Ācārya Griddhapiccha's Tattvārthasūtra]*. Edited and translated [into Hindi]. Varanasi 1934 [reprinted: Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Grantha-mālā, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana 13, Delhi 2000].
- STP Siddhasena Divākara: *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa*. (1) Sukhlāl Saṅghavi; Becardās Doṣī (ed.): *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam by Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūri's Tattvabodhavidhāyinī. Gujarāt-purātattvamandirgranthāvalī 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir, Amdāvād 1924–1931 [reprinted: 2 Vols., Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI–1, 2; Kyoto 1984]*.
- SVi Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: *Siddhiviniścaya*. Mahendrakumār Jain (ed.): *Siddhiviniścaya of Akalaṅka edited with the commentary Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā of Anantavīrya*. 2 Vols. BhJP, V 1959.
- SViT Anantavīrya: *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*. See: SVi.
- SViV Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: *Siddhiviniścayavivṛti*. See: SVi.
- SVM Malliṣeṇasūri: *Syādvādamañjarī*. (1) See: AYVD. (2) Jagadīśacandra Jain (ed.): *Śrīmaliṣeṇasūri-praṇīṭā Syādvādamañjarī. Śrī Paramaśruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1992*.
- SVR Vālidevasūri: *Syādvādaratnākara*. Motilāl Lālāji (ed.): *Śrīmadvālidevasūriviracitaḥ Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāraḥ tadvyākhyā ca Syādvādaratnākaraḥ*. 5 Vols., Poona 1926–1930 [reprinted: 2 Vols., Bhāratīya Buk Kārporeśan, Dillī (Delhi) 1988].
- SvSt Samantabhadra: *Svayambhūstotra*. (1) Jugāl Kīśor Mukhtār 'Yugavīra' (ed., introd.): *Śrīmatṣvāmi-*

*samangabhadra-cāryaviracita caturviṃśatijīnastavanātmaka Svayambhūstotra* (stutiparaka jaināgama). *Virasevāmandiragranthamālā* 7, *Vira-sevā Mandira, Sarasāvā Jilā Sahāranapura* 1951. (2) Devendra K. Goyal (ed., tr.): *The Path to Enlightenment. Svayambhu Stotra by Acharya Samantabhadra Svami. English Translation with introduction.* Radiant Publishers, New Delhi 2000.

- TBh *Umāsvāti: Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya.* See: TS<sub>1</sub>, TS<sub>2</sub>.
- TBV *Abhayadevasūri: Tattvabodhavidhāyinī.* See: STP.
- TS *Umāsvāmin: Tattvārthasūtra.* (1) M.K. Mody (ed.): *Tattvārthādhigama by Umāsvāti being in the Original Sanskrit with the Bhāṣya by the author himself. Bibliotheca Indica* Nos. 1044, 1079, 1118, Calcutta 1903, 1904, 1905. [= *Śvetāmbara Recension*]. (2) See: TṬ. [= *Śvetāmbara Recension*] (3) See: SSi. [= *Digāmbara Recension*]. (4) See: RVār. [= *Digāmbara Recension*].
- TṬ Siddhasena-gaṇin: *Tattvārthādhigamaṭīkā. Hīrālāl Rasikdās Kapadia* (ed.): *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra (A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Jainism) by His Holiness Śrī Umāsvāti Vāchaka, together with His connective verses commented upon by Śrī Devaguptasūri & Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi and His own gloss elucidated by Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi, edited with Introduction in English and Sanskrit.* 2 Vols., Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series Nos. 67 and 76, Jivanachand Sakerchand Javeri, Bombay 1926 (Part I: Chapters I–V), 1930 (Part II: Chapters VI–X).
- Upadhye 1935 A.N. Upadhye: 'Introduction,' See: PSā, pp. 1–120.
- VĀBh Jinabhadra-gaṇin: *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya. Haragovinda Dās* (ed.): *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyaṇ. Maladhārīśrīhemacandrasūriviracitayā śiṣyahitānamnayā brhadvṛttiyā vibhūṣitam.* Śrī-Yaśovijaya-jaina-grantha-mālā 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, Shah Harakhchand Bhurabhai, Vārāṇasī 1915.
- VĀVṛ *Hemacandra Maladhārīn Gandhavimukta: Viśeṣāvaśyakavṛtti (Brhadvṛtti).* See: VĀBh.
- Viy *Viyāhapannatti / Viyāhapaṇṇatti / Bhagavāṇvīyāhapaṇṇattī [Bhagavatī Vyākhyāprajñapti / Bhagavatīsūtra].* Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): *Viyāhapaṇṇattisuttam.* 3 parts, Jaina-Āgama-Series 4 (Part 1, 2, 3), Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1974, 1978, 1982.