

DHARMOTTARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE  
IN HIS *LAGHUPRĀMĀṆYAPARĪKṢĀ*\*

I recently published a critical edition of the Tibetan text of the *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* (PPar II) together with an annotated German translation.<sup>1</sup> The ideas developed by Dharmottara (c.740—800) in this treatise are somewhat difficult to grasp both because the main thoughts are often interrupted in order to explain the problems involved, and because he considers the same topics several times from various points of view. For this reason, and in order to facilitate access to the text for those who are not familiar with German, I have tried to present the relevant material more systematically, omitting the detailed discussion in some cases. I do not intend, however, to show the development and elaboration with regard to Dharmakīrti or of Dharmottara's theory of knowledge as can be found in his other texts like the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, the *Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* or the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. This will only be possible when a critical edition and translation of the *Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* is also available.<sup>2</sup> I will refer to these texts only when it is necessary for the understanding of the passage under consideration.

Sanskrit terms in brackets are either based on the parallel Sanskrit materials that I have presented in my edition of the text, or they are assumed to be the equivalents of the Tibetan translation. The two types are not distinguished here. Small numbers in brackets { . . . } refer to the passages (pages and lines) of the text edition of PPar II on which my explanations are based.

Following Dharmakīrti,<sup>3</sup> Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable cognition (*avisamvādam jñānam*). *Avisamvādaka* is explained as causing a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) the indicated (*pradarśita*) object (*vastu*), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one's purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*) {1,9—11}. And causing to obtain the object is identified with indicating (*pradarśakatva*) the object of activity (*pravṛttiviśaya*) {3,13—17}. *Prāpakatva* is also considered to cause a

person to act, i.e. to motivate him (*pravartakatva*), by indicating the object of activity. And motivating is the same as indicating {1,11f.; 5,12–15; 7,14–16}. Indicating is said to be the cause (*nimitta*) or means (*upāya*) that motivates a person and thus it is also the cause of a person's obtaining the object. Thus, an indicating cognition which is the cause that allows a person to obtain the object is a correct cognition {6,13–7,2}. And the object may either be indicated by perception (*pratyakṣa*) which has ascertained (*adhyavasita*) the object as it has been seen (*drṣṭatayā*), or, if the object is not seen directly, it may be indicated by an inference (*anumāna*) which determined (*niścita*) that object by means of a logical mark that does not deviate from it (*liṅgāvyabhicāritayā*) {1,14–16}. For example, when a pot is seen and perception ascertains it, this perception is a valid cognition. For it is *avisamvādin* since, by ascertaining this pot, it indicates the latter, and by this it motivates a person towards it and thus causes a person to obtain it. And it is in this way, according to Dharmottara, that Dharmakīrti himself understood the term *avisamvādin* when he defined valid cognition as reliable cognition. For, after quoting several passages from Dharmakīrti,<sup>4</sup> he says: "Therefore (Dharmakīrti's) intention was that the reliable (cognition), that is (the cognition) which causes (a person) to obtain the indicated (object), is the correct cognition (*pramāṇa*)."<sup>5</sup> Causing to obtain (*prāpakatva*) the object, however, does not mean that the person who acts on the motivation of this cognition really has to obtain that particular object. This would imply that a cognition, although indicating the object and motivating towards it, would be incorrect if the object is not obtained for any reason {42,18f.}. Thus *prāpakatva* is equated with the mere capability of causing to obtain (*prāpanaśakti*) the object {43,3–5}.

Dharmottara follows Dharmakīrti not only in taking over his definition of *pramāṇa* but also in the point that a cognition, in order to be *pramāṇa*, has to be related to an object as yet unknown (*anadhigataviṣaya*). He refers to this topic twice. In one passage he uses this as an argument to exclude the validity of those cognitions that follow the first phase (*kṣaṇa*) which alone is regarded as *pramāṇa* {11,1–9}. The second passage is intended to show that his understanding of *pramāṇa* accords with that of Dharmakīrti. For this purpose he presents several quotations,<sup>6</sup> the last two of which are concerned with the question of an object as yet unknown. One

quotation I cannot identify and I would therefore like to draw attention to it. It says that if the word 'validity' acquires the meaning of the word 'reliability' (*avisamvādatva*), an individual characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is ascertained (*adhigata*)<sup>7</sup> {4,15—5,2}. It is interesting that Dharmottara — for whatever reason — does not refer to the second defining characteristic, i.e. *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā* (PV II 5c), although he takes over the definition from PV II 1ab (*pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam*).<sup>8</sup> Thus he avoids being involved in the discussion of the meaning of the disjunctive particle *vā*.<sup>9</sup> The quotation would suggest that for Dharmakīrti the second characteristic is implied in the first.

The term *pramāṇa*, which, as explained above, is based on the cognition being reliable (*avisamvādatva*) = ascertaining (*adhyavasāya*) or determining (*niścaya*) = indicating (*pradarśakatva*) = motivating (*pravartakatva*) = causing to obtain (*prāpakatva*) the object = capability of causing to obtain (*prāpaṇaśakti*) the object, is simply used in a worldly sense (*laukika*) {5,5—7}.

#### PRAMĀṆAVYĀPĀRA AND PRAMĀṆAPHALA

Indicating an object is not only equated with the terms mentioned above but virtually at the beginning of the text the activity of indicating is regarded as the 'function of a correct cognition' (*pramāṇavyāpāra*) {1,12—14}. And indicating an object means to determine or ascertain it (*adhyavasāya*), not merely to grasp it (*grahana*) as an opponent from the Cārvāka school maintains {9,17f.}. Thus the function of a correct cognition is to determine the object, which is the cause of obtaining it, but not to grasp it {10,3f.}. And this function is completely finished when the object is indicated. For then the person is motivated and the object is one that has been caused to be obtained (*prāpita*) {6,1—3}. Or as Dharmottara formulates it with regard to the two kinds of *pramāṇa*: "When something, inasmuch as it is determined by these (namely perception and inference), is an object of activity, the determining (*nirūpaṇa*) (in the case of inference) and the ascertaining (*avasāya*) of that which is definite (*niyata*) (in time, space and its appearance) (and) which has been seen (in the case of perception) is the complete function of the correct cognition" {25,1—3}. And since determining belongs to the realm of conceptions, it cannot grasp a thing

in its entire nature but is dependent on a general aspect that is superimposed (*āropita*). Determining nevertheless reveals an object in accordance with its nature (*prakṛtyā*). It does so, however, in such a way that the nature of the real thing is limited by its exclusion from other things. And because the function of correct cognition is determining, the function can also be called “one particular exclusion” (*ekavyāvṛtti*). From this point of view the function is said to be completed when the nature of the thing is limited by one exclusion. That means, for example, when we see something blue and determine it as being blue, the function is to exclude it from those things which are not blue. And this “one particular exclusion” is the complete function of a *pramāṇa* {38,15–39,11}.

Moreover, in order to be *pramāṇa*, this function, namely *adhyavasāya* or *ekavyāvṛtti*, necessarily has to be performed by a cognition. And that which necessarily has to be performed is said to be its effect (*phala*). Thus determining is also the effect of a valid cognition. And since determining is the cause of activity, *pramāṇa* is also considered to have activity as its effect (*pravṛttiphala*) {10,12–20}. That determining is said to be the cause of activity should not be understood in the very strict sense that the cause precedes the effect, but only metaphorically. For activity (*pravṛtti*) is maintained to be the function (*vyāpāra*) that is produced by desiring an effect (*phala*) and which is directed towards the object that realizes that effect {26,6f.}. And this activity is defined as an understanding (*buddhi*) that is accompanied by bodily and verbal operation (*vyāpāra*) and which desires to obtain the real thing (*vastu*) that is restricted (*niyata*) in terms of space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and appearance (*ākāra*), has been indicated by the cognition which appears as if it itself had the function (*vyāpāra*) of the motivating cognition and which is followed by a conceptual cognition. Moreover, this understanding is initiated or undertaken (*brtsams pa*) by the motivating (*pravartaka*) cognition and is completed when the real thing (*vastu*) is indicated {26,7–12}. This means that this so-called “activity” or “function” lasts only one moment, namely the moment that immediately follows the first phase (*kṣaṇa*) of perception or inference, which alone is regarded as *pramāṇa*. Already in a passage referred to above (cf. p. 249; {6,1–3}) Dharmottara explains that the function is completely finished when the object is indicated. For then the person is

motivated and the object is one that has been caused to be obtained (*prāpita*). This definition of activity (*pravṛtti*), which is regarded as the effect of a valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) and which is the same as the cognition's function (*pramāṇavyāpāra*), allows, as we shall see later, validity (*prāmāṇya*) to be reduced to the mere capability of causing a person to obtain (*prāpaṇaśakti*) the object, for the agent (*byed mkhan*) of this activity is only the first phase of either perception or inference (cf. below p. 253). This definition of *pravṛtti* is followed by a short statement, which is not explained, that the other type of activity is related to the real thing (*vastuviśaya*) {26,12}. The question here, however, is what the difference between these two types of activity is.

As there are two kinds of object, namely that which is to be grasped (*grāhya*) and that which is to be ascertained or determined (*adhyavaseya*) (cf. below p. 254), it is tempting to relate the two types of activity to these two kinds of object. But this does not work. For in the case of perception one cannot respond to the grasped phase, as it has already disappeared, and the grasped object in the case of inference is not real at all. Thus the *vastu* with which these activities are concerned in both cases must be that which is determined. The main difference between these two kinds of activity seems to be that the definition of the former is given on an "epistemological level" while the latter is on an "empirical level." That is to say that the latter activity continues, if there are no obstructing causes, until the object or *vastu* is obtained. Although cognition is momentary and its function or activity is — on an epistemological level — completed when the object is indicated, one can assume such a continuing activity as long as the first phase of perception is followed by other phases which perceive the following phases of that object apprehended by the first phase. In this case, the impressions (*saṃskāra*) of recollection — i.e. that one remembers the seen object to be of this or that nature — the first of which is caused or "awakened" by the first phase of perception, have not disappeared (*ma ñams pa*), that is to say, are still present. And as long as these impressions continue it is only the first phase of perception which is to be regarded as valid, because it already satisfies the criteria of a valid cognition when it indicates the object. The subsequent conceptual cognitions which abandon their own function, namely that of pondering (*vicāra*), but which have

the function of seeing (*lta ba'i bya ba darñ ldan pa*), are not regarded as valid.<sup>10</sup> As already mentioned, Dharmottara does not describe the latter kind of activity but one is forced to interpret it in this way as one cannot otherwise explain why an incorrect cognition which, for example, comprehends a mirage (*marīcikā*) as water, can be annulled (*bādhyate*) by that perception which later determines the mirage correctly (cf. below p. 265), or why a certain doubtful cognition can obstruct (*upa/rudh-*) or another one does not obstruct the function of perception which is already performed when that doubt takes place (cf. below p. 261f.). This is only possible if the activity of perception continues.

The fact that neither *pramāṇa*, nor its *vyāpāra* or its *phala* are differentiated and that the activity of determining, which obviously belongs to the realm of conceptions (*vikalpa*), is said to be the *vyāpāra*, leads to the question of how this *vyāpāra* is possible in the case of perception (*pratyakṣa*), which by definition, according to the Buddhists, lacks conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Beside this it seems to imply, as an opponent puts it, that the *vyāpāra*, inasmuch as it belongs to the realm of conceptions, would be different from *pramāṇa* and thus one would also have to accept that *pramāṇaphala* is different from *pramāṇa* {11,10–17}. In order to avoid these consequences Dharmottara explains the process of determining an object in the case of inference. First of all, he states, that on the basis of the opponent's understanding even inference which is conceptual by its nature could not have that function and thus could not be regarded as correct cognition because it exists only for one moment (*kṣaṇa*). If one tries to escape these implications by assuming that the object is determined by another conceptual cognition which is different from inference, then either inference together with the whole complex of cognitions that come about until the object is obtained, or only the cognition that precedes the actual obtainment, would be the correct cognition, but not inference by itself. By this, Dharmottara says, conceptual perception (*savikalpikapratyakṣa*)<sup>11</sup> is also demonstrated {11,17–12,11}.

A 'normal' conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*) cannot ascertain the object because the function (*vyāpāra*) of such a cognition is mere pondering or investigating (*vicāramātra*). This is proved by our experience (*anubhava*). For at the time of investigating when there

is no cognition produced by our senses (*indriyavijñāna*) we know that we are pondering and that we do not see or ascertain any object. But those *vikalpas* produced by perception and inference are not of that kind. When ascertaining an object they give up or abandon (*√tyaj-*) their own function, that is pondering, and take over (*√grah-*) or imitate (*anu√kr-*) the function of perception and inference. In the case of perception the function (*pratyakṣavyāpāra*) is seeing (*darśana*). Thus the ascertaining conceptual cognition takes over the function of seeing and consequently, among these *vikalpas* which are based on perception, it is only perception which shows the object, and not the conceptual cognition. For the object is then conceptualized as it has been seen (*drṣṭatvena*), but not as having been investigated (*vicāritatvena*). Since perception is free from conceptual constructions (*nirvikalpika*) it does not determine the object by itself in its very first moment of existence. It does so by placing its own function, which is cause for obtaining the object, into the conceptual cognition immediately following, or, expressed more poetically, "riding on the carriage of *vikalpa*" (*rnam par rtog pa'i śiñ rta la žon nas*) {15,16}. Nevertheless, only perception shows the determined object, because conceptual cognition does not ascertain it without the preceding perception. In this sense *pratyakṣa* is even said to be of a determining nature (*adhyavasāyātmaka*).<sup>12</sup> However, this should not be understood as claiming that the first phase of perception is already conceptual, as, for example, do the Naiyāyikas, with whom he seems to be debating here. Perception and inference are regarded as *pramāṇa*, and perception can be called *adhyavasāyātmaka*, because they are the agents (*byed mkhan*) of the function of the correct cognition, namely that of indicating the object of activity, and the conceptual cognition is only the agent (*kartr*) of behaviour (*vyavahāra*) {12,11–16,14}.

#### THE OBJECT OF CORRECT COGNITION

Another problem to be solved in this context is the question introduced in the form of a *pūrvapakṣa* of what is to be considered as the object, *viṣaya* or *artha*, of a correct cognition. For when correct cognition is defined as that which causes a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) its object, perception as well as inference cannot be regarded as correct cognitions since the object of perception is the

real thing (*vastu*), which does not exist any longer than one moment, and the object of inference is not the real thing itself (*avastu*), because it is grasped only in its general form.<sup>13</sup> Although it is correct, Dharmottara answers, that a single phase (*kṣaṇa*) and that which is not real, which are the grasped objects of perception and inference respectively, cannot be obtained, it is not the case that they do not cause a person to obtain their objects. For there are two kinds of object: that which is to be grasped (*grāhya*) by them and that which is to be determined (*adhyavaseya*) by them. The objects referred to in the *pūrvapakṣa* are those which are grasped. But the object of activity (*pravṛttiviṣaya*) which can be obtained is only that which is determined. And determining must comprise the aspects of appearance (*ākāra*) of a thing, its time (*kāla*) and space (*deśa*). Thus a thing is determined in the form “this, now, here” (*idam idānīm iheti*) and one can behave only with regard to an object that is determined in terms of appearance, time and space. For when it is not determined, even if it is grasped like momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), it is similar to something that is non-existent {8,4–9,7}.

Regarding the aspects of time and space, Dharmottara does not give a definition but exemplifies them with the help of incorrect cognitions (cf. below p. 259).

“Appearance” (*ākāra*) is said to designate an essential property (*svabhāva*) of the thing which is capable of producing an effect (*arthakriyākṣama*) {29,5–6}.<sup>14</sup> And only the atoms (*paramāṇu*) of colour (*varṇa*) are capable of producing an effect, but not the shape (*saṃsthāna*) which, when it exists, is not different from the atoms {29,5–10}. Shape is only a property of the image (*pratibhā-sadharma*) that cognition has, it is not the real thing {33,13–15}.

In the case of perception the grasped phase is determined as a stream or continuum (*santāna*) of phases. And because a continuum of phases is not limited in time as one single phase, it is the continuum that can be obtained. And inference determines an external object by means of a superimposition (*āropa*) of the difference (*vyāvṛtti*) from that which does not have its nature. And this external object can be obtained. Thus, the object of activity is that which is determined, but not that which is grasped {9,8–18}. In the strict sense, however, it is not the continuum of phases itself that can be obtained, for this is merely imagined and thus not real. It is



only the absolutely real (*paramārtha*) or momentary thing that can be obtained {37,4–6}, i.e. a latter phase belonging to the determined continuum.

#### ON SĀMĀNYA AND VIŚEṢA

As there are two kinds of objects, that which is to be grasped (*grāhya*) and that which is to be determined (*adhyavaseya*), which are represented either by the particular (*viśeṣa*) or by the general aspect (*sāmānya*), Dharmottara deals with the question of their relationship at length and illustrates it with many examples. The importance of this lies in the point that a cognition can cause a person to obtain its object and thus be valid only by means of determining either the particular in its general form, in the case of perception, or by determining the general characteristic as particular, in the case of inference.

The particular (*viśeṣa*) as a real thing that lasts only one moment (*kṣaṇa*) exists outside cognition<sup>15</sup> and is characterized as the real entity (*vastu*) which produces an effect (*arthakriyā*) {40,4–6}. The thing which is capable of producing an effect is that which has a specific "appearance" (*ākāra*) as its essential property and which consists of atoms (*paramāṇu*) of colour (*varṇa*), as only colour is absolutely real (*paramārtha*). Moreover, these atoms do not have extension in space and time, and material phenomena (*rūpa*), apart from atoms, do not exist {29,5–8}.

Contrary to the particulars, the general characteristics or universals (*sāmānya*) are not regarded as real because they cannot produce an effect. They are only imagined or conceptualized (*parikalpita*) as being common (*sādhāraṇa*) to many particulars. Nevertheless, these general properties are not completely non-existent. They are not different from the particular, being nothing but their nature (*ātman*). Thus they are grasped when the particular is grasped. They are present when the particular is present and when the particular is absent or not grasped, they are also absent or not grasped. And although they are not really existent they can be proven by an inference, as is the case with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), because they are not different from the really existing particular {40,1–41,3}.

The significance of this relation between the general properties

and the particular is also due to the fact that it serves as a basis to distinguish valid from invalid cognitions. For when an object is ascertained by perception thus that the determined general characteristics contradict one of the three aspects of the thing, namely time, space and appearance, and thus the grasped particular itself, it must be regarded as invalid. It is also due to this specific relationship that an erroneous cognition that takes a mirage (*marīcikā*) for water cannot be even partially valid, for example, with regard to the mere being a thing (*vastutvam eva*). For *vastutva* of the sunrays is not determined and a *vastutva* of water is not even grasped as there is no water.<sup>16</sup>

However, some serious problems still remain to be solved: why does a person obtain a tree which is far away and which is ascertained as being (a) non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*), (b) gross (*sthūla*), (c) small, (d) unclear, and as (e) having leaves that coalesce (*samsrṣṭa*) due to a valid cognition which is related to a tree that is momentary, subtle (*sūkṣma*), big, clear and that does not have leaves which coalesce? {31,4–8} Although it seems that all general characteristics are determined contradictory to the particular tree, Dharmottara holds that the real thing (*vastu*) that has a shape and which is necessarily of the nature to fulfill a purpose has been perceived {31,8–10}. Then he goes on to explain each component. The problems addressed in (a) and (b) deserve special attention because all perceptions, except yogic perception, determine a momentary and subtle particular as lasting and gross {37,2–4; 38,9–11}.

(a) The thing that appears in the mind, he argues, is a combination of the common properties of momentariness and non-momentariness. Thus, it neither contradicts duration nor non-duration and therefore anything that is determined is not real. The real thing itself could have duration if it could be obtained even if it were determined as being momentary,<sup>17</sup> or if one grasped a thing that contradicts momentariness. But this is obviously not the case and therefore that which is determined, he repeats, is not real. It exists only as a common feature (*sādhāraṇa*) and thus one has to understand that its non-momentariness is not grasped but later superimposed (*āropita*) due to an error {31,11–32,5}. And it is not the case that something different from that which is determined is obtained. But the non-momentariness and all other properties that

have been determined cannot be obtained. For the momentariness is the nature of that thing which is perceived, but nothing else {35,15—20}. In a latter passage Dharmottara again demonstrates that the non-momentariness is not perceived but is only a common feature that appears in the mind and is determined because a certain cause for error exists (*bhrāntinimitta*) {42,4—16}.

Although it is not easy to follow the arguments, they all have the purpose of keeping the conceptually constructed ideas apart from the real thing. The main points seem to be firstly that not the thing itself but only that which appears in the mind neither contradicts duration nor non-duration, secondly that the determined properties are not real and thirdly that one does not obtain the non-momentariness which would contradict the momentary thing. In a latter text, his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*,<sup>18</sup> a discussion of the *sthūla* — *sūkṣma* problem<sup>19</sup> contains a few remarks which shed light on our problem. There it is stated that one single phase (*kṣaṇa*) does not possess parts of time which are earlier and later. Only many phases that are grasped by one and the same cognition appear to possess parts of time. And because duration appears when many phases are grasped, it is said to be a property of the grasping cognition (*grahaṇadharmā*) but not a property of the real thing that is to be grasped (*grāhyadharmā*).

(b) In the case where the tree is ascertained as being gross (*sthūla*) there is no contradiction, Dharmottara explains, because the many atoms the tree consists of and which are gross can be proven to consist of many single atoms that are subtle (*sūkṣma*). There would be a contradiction, if, in the case of the many atoms, one were to see a single gross one. But when one sees a mass of atoms only the multitude of atoms is gross, whereas the single atoms are subtle {32,6—11}.

(c) When something large is ascertained as being small it does not contradict the thing itself. For shape (*saṃsthāna*) is not the thing itself (*vastu*) but a property of the image (*pratibhāsadharmā*). And as extension (*parimāṇa*) is a property of shape (*saṃsthānadharmā*), in reality (*vastutah*) there is no contradiction, although this cognition is erroneous with regard to the extension {33,13—17}. However, when something small is ascertained as being large the cognition is incorrect (cf. below p. 259).

(d) A tree which is clear as such appears unclear from far away

because it is mixed (*saṃsr̥ṣṭa*) with dust (*rajas*) in the air. Consequently, it is not the tree alone that is grasped as unclear but when accompanied by dust and therefore it is not a grasping of one and the same thing in a contradictory way {32,12–33,12}.

(e) The last point addressed in the *pūrvapakṣa* that could constitute a contradiction is explained as follows: when a tree is grasped such that its leaves coalesce, the other thing called “interval” that is between the leaves is not grasped and thus the leaves are grasped without interval between them (*nirantara*). This kind of grasping is not erroneous with regard to time, space and appearance and thus there is no contradiction. And one cannot say that a tree with leaves “without interval” and “with interval” is contradictory in its nature. Because when one speaks about a tree “with interval,” it means that there *exists* another thing called “interval.” And “without interval” in this case just means that the interval is *not grasped*, but not that it does not exist. If “without interval” meant that this thing called “interval” does not exist, then, of course, this kind of grasping would be contradictory.

In all the cases shown here we can see Dharmottara’s pragmatic standpoint. Even when, due to an error, the real thing is ascertained as being non-momentary, unclear or having a different extension, etc., the cognition is not erroneous provided there is no contradiction with regard to space, time and appearance. For these are the characteristics that differentiate between things and thus the validity or invalidity of a cognition depends on them.

#### INVALID COGNITIONS

Cognitions which are not valid (*apramāṇa*) are explained by Dharmottara as either (1) being incorrect (*mithyā*) or (2) as being doubtful (*saṃśaya*). Both of them are characterized by the fact — as one would expect after the definition of a correct cognition as that which causes a person to obtain its indicated object — that they are not able to cause a person to obtain their objects {18,1–10}.

##### (1) *mithyājñāna*

That an incorrect or false cognition is not able to cause a person to obtain its object is due to the fact that its object is not real (*asattva*)

{18,1f}. As mentioned above, an object of correct cognition is restricted (*niyata*) in terms of space, time and appearance, for these are the characteristics that differentiate things from each other {25,9–12}. Thus a cognition that determines an object incorrectly in one of these aspects is incorrect, because it determines a completely different thing. And an object of this kind is not real and cannot be obtained. As all kinds of incorrect cognition can be explained by a false determining of either *deśa*, *kāla* or *ākāra*, these three aspects may serve as criteria to distinguish them.

(a) Incorrect determining of the *deśa* aspect: this is illustrated by a cognition that takes the shine of a jewel which can be seen through the keyhole of a door to be a jewel that is located in the keyhole itself. As the jewel in reality is connected with a place other than the keyhole, it is not the object of a valid cognition. And it is also not possible for only a jewel as such (*-mātra*) without any peculiarities to be determined. For the object of activity has to be determined in terms of space, time and nature, and a mass as such (*piṇḍamātra*), not being specified, cannot be determined and therefore also cannot be obtained {25,14–26,5}.

Other kinds of erroneous cognition which deviate with regard to space are the one in which a rapidly swung torch appears as a circle of fire and the cognition when in a desert one ascertains someone small as being tall. In the first case it is easy to understand that a torch cannot be in all places at the same time. The second kind is interesting insofar as a cognition that takes something large to be small is classified as a correct cognition because extension (*parimāṇa*) is said to be only a property of shape (*saṁsthāna-dharma*), and thus this kind of error does not contradict the thing itself (cf. above p. 257). In accordance with this, a cognition which takes someone small to be tall is not explained as erroneous because it ascertains the extension incorrectly, but because it comprehends the tall person as being situated in a different place to where he is in reality, that is in a closer place. Moreover, the tall person also appears to be occupying parts of the ether (*ākāśa*) because he exceeds the limits (*sīma*) of the small person. This, too, constitutes an error {33,17–34,16}.

(b) Incorrect determining of the *kāla* aspect: regarding a thing that is ascertained as being connected with a different time, the text of the *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* {29,1–4} is corrupt but the meaning seems

to be similar to Dharmottara's explanation in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, where he says that a cognition in a dream which grasps at midnight something that has been seen at midday is not correct with regard to that thing which belongs to the time of midnight.<sup>20</sup>

(c) Incorrect determining of the *ākāra* aspect: as already mentioned, the term *ākāra*, appearance, denotes an essential property of that which is capable of producing an effect (*arthakriyākṣama*). And these are only the atoms of colour (*varṇa*) but not shape (*saṃsthāna*), which is just a property of the image (*pratibhāsadharmā*). Although shape, like all other essential general properties (*sāmānyadharma*) — for example, momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) — is not really existent in the sense that it is capable of producing an effect, it exists insofar as it is not different from the atoms of colour. Thus shape and other essential general properties can only be grasped (*grah-*) when the particular (*viśeṣa*) or individual characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is grasped, but never separately. And they can be determined only in accordance with the individual characteristic grasped {29,5–16}. Though appearance is not mentioned again in this explanation, it is this aspect or essential property through which, as can be seen from the following examples, the real thing can be grasped.

Furthermore, due to the fact that the general properties are not different from the particular it is not possible that a cognition that takes a mirage (*marīcikā*) for water, although it is erroneous with regard to water, is not erroneous with regard to its merely being real (*vastutvam eva*), for there is something existent, namely the sunrays, as an opponent maintains. In that case, Dharmottara argues, the cognition is necessarily erroneous with regard to existent (*yod pa*) water. Thus the existence of water cannot be ascertained for there is no water present, and the existence (*yod pa*) of the sunrays can only be ascertained in accordance with the existence of the particular (*viśeṣa*) of the sunrays {29,17–21}. This obtains also for other imagined common features like being momentary (*kṣaṇikatva*) or having a material form (*mūrtatva*) {41,3–6}.

In the same way it is not possible for a cognition which ascertains a white shell as yellow to be partially reliable (*avisamvādin*), for example, with regard to the shape. For when the whiteness of the shell is excluded from being cognized, its shape, too, is excluded. Therefore, as the appearance (*ākāra*) of the white and the yellow

shell is different, one cannot obtain the white shell by relying on the cognition of the yellow one {30,1—6}.

In these as well as in all other cases of erroneous cognition, the obtainment is possible only due to another correct cognition, which may either be an inference or ultimately even the touching (*sparsā*) of the real thing. But it is in no way possible for the obtainment to follow an erroneous cognition {30,7—31,3}.

## (2) *saṃśaya*

The discussion of doubtful cognitions is introduced with the general statement that a doubt cannot cause a person to obtain its object because it determines an object in such a way that it is not certain or restricted (*aniyata*) as regards its being or non-being (*bhāvābhāva*). Furthermore, no such object exists. For an object must either be existent or non-existent, but it is not possible for it to be both existent and non-existent at the same time {18,6—10}.

Usually a doubtful cognition is related to two things in the form of the question: "Is this X or Y?". In the case of perception "this" is the thing that appears in cognition. Doubt regarding the object is always directed towards the thing that appears in cognition, but one never doubts whether anything actually does appear or not {19,9—13}. In the most general form one doubts if "this" exists or not. When "this" has already been ascertained in its general form to be existent a doubt may be more specific with regard to the particular (*viśeṣa*). Then it takes the form: "Is this a fire or a heap of blossoms?" or "Is this fire real or not?", etc. In the case that one of the two parts which have been doubted is true and thus can be obtained, this doubtful cognition does not obstruct (*upa/rudh-*) the function of the previous perception (*pratyakṣavyāpāra*). Consequently, this perception is a valid cognition {20,14—21,3}. For the function of perception is to determine the restricted thing as it has been seen (*dr̥ṣṭatvena*). Its function is not to determine the restricted thing unambiguously (*ekānta*), as in the case of inference. This is of no use here because an incorrect perception also determines its object, which obviously cannot be obtained, unambiguously. Therefore, when a doubt imitates the function of perception and determines the object — although not restricted to one part — as it has been seen (*dr̥ṣṭatvena*), one can respond to that object in some

way. The motivating (*pravartaka*) cognition, however, is only the previous perception but not *saṁśaya*, because the object is the image in perception which already is determined in its general form. Determining the other part or second appearance (*ākāra*) is something that doubt performs in addition (*adhika*) to the function of perception. Furthermore, it is only this additional appearance which is superimposed by the doubt that is removed (*apanīyate*) by another, later, valid cognition, but not the function of the previous perception {21,4–22,10}.

The above explanations can be related only to those kinds of doubtful cognition which are directed towards the real object of perception. Doubts which do not touch the nature of the object grasped by perception at all — for example, when red water is doubted to be either fire or a heap of *palāśa* blossoms — obstruct the function of perception. Therefore these perceptions are not valid {24,7–13}.

In other words: when, for example, a *śiṁśapā* tree that is far away is grasped and determined by perception as a mere tree, one is motivated by that perception and acts to obtain that tree. As the tree that is ascertained is not different from the *śiṁśapā*, one in fact is moving towards that *śiṁśapā*. If one now doubts if this tree is a *śiṁśapā* or a *dhava* tree, this doubt on the one hand incorrectly determines a completely different tree, namely a *dhava*, and on the other hand it correctly determines the tree that already has been ascertained by the previous perception in its general form more specifically as a *śiṁśapā*. Thus the function of perception on the “empirical level” (cf. above p. 251) is still “active” and related to the *śiṁśapā*, although only in its general form. And one expects to obtain either a *śiṁśapā* or a *dhava*. Consequently its function is not interrupted or obstructed and it is regarded as valid. However, if one doubts whether this tree is a *dhava* or a *kadalī* tree, this doubt does not refer to the *śiṁśapā* at all and one now expects to obtain either a *dhava* or a *kadalī*, but in fact a *śiṁśapā* will be obtained. Thus this kind of doubt obstructs the function of the previous perception. Although the previous perception on an “epistemological level” could be regarded as valid since its function of determining the *śiṁśapā* in its general form has already been performed, Dharmottara is silent on this point. By comparing it



with the case of an incorrect superimposition (*āropa*) {24,7–13} it is clearly implicit that it should be counted as invalid.

Besides the kinds of doubt explained above which are related to two things, there are also some which determine only one part (*ekaniścaya*). These are cognitions which may come about either (a) without having seen either the object directly or something necessarily concomitant (*avinābhāvin*) that could serve as reason in an inference, or (b) based on a logical mark or reason (*liṅga*), the nature of which is uncertain.

Type (a) is exemplified by a cognition phrased in the following form: “In the well (in front of the house) there is water.” From the additional material gained from other texts<sup>21</sup> it must be understood that this cognition takes place when one is standing inside a house. Therefore neither can one see the water itself nor is there any inferential mark from which the fact that there is water could be inferred. And because one is aware of this fact this cognition remains doubtful {18,11–18}.

Type (b) is illustrated by a cognition where a fire is inferred on the basis of a cognition in which from far away a swarm of mosquitoes has been determined as being smoke. In this case, Dharmottara explains, the nature of smoke is not determined definitely (*ñes par rtogs pa ma yin; ni/rūp-*). And as a cognition of a fire that presupposes smoke, the nature of which is not ascertained, is merely a doubt, it does not cause a person to obtain its object. For, he goes on, inference causes a person to obtain the object because it determines an existent or non-existent object definitely (*ñes par 'jog pa*) {18,19–19,8}.

At first glance it is not clear why this sort of cognition is classified as *saṃśaya* and not as *mithyājñāna*, like the cognition which erroneously takes a mirage to be water, for it merely seems to be an incorrect determining of the logical mark, *liṅga* or *hetu*. But to understand Dharmottara's intention here we can enlist help from a longer passage in the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā* and from Durvekamiśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa*, where the same problem is treated more extensively.<sup>22</sup> According to these texts it must be understood that before the present inference takes place, one either did not recognize the nature of smoke which is restricted (*niyata*) to being the effect of a fire (*vahnikārya*) as being different from the nature

of a swarm of mosquitoes, etc., or even if one comprehended that difference one could not remember it at the time of inference. For if one remembered the difference an error would not be possible. Thus not only when one sees mosquitoes, but also when one sees the smoke itself the restricted nature of which is not known or remembered, an intelligent person will have doubts and therefore a cognition of this kind is to be considered as *saṃśaya*.

#### ON VALIDITY AND THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY

In accordance with the definition of correct cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable (*avisamvādaka*) cognition, which is that which indicates (*upadarśaka*, *pradarśaka*) an object and by this motivates (*pravarṭaka*) towards the indicated object and thus causes a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) it, we find that peculiarity or nature due to which a cognition becomes *pramāṇa*, its “correctness” or “validity”, (*prāmāṇya*, *pramāṇatā/-tva*), explained as the fact that cognition is reliable (*avisamvādatva*) with regard to that which is capable of fulfilling one’s purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*) {3,10}, that it causes a person to obtain (*prāpakatva* or *prāpaṇa*) the indicated object {4,13–15}, or the fact that it determines (*avasāya*) {10,20f.} the object. As the cognition’s causing to obtain its object is nothing but its ability to cause a person to obtain it (*prāpaṇaśakti*) {17,3–5}, this ability, too, is said to be its validity {43,3–5}. And this *prāpaṇaśakti* is due to the cognition being necessarily concomitant with the object (*arthāvinābhāvin*) {43,6}, or, as he formulates later {50,12f.}: “For the Buddhists the validity is due to the mere fact that (cognition) is produced by the real thing (*vastu*).” According to the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, however, this ability is possible only when the cognition accomplishes its function. There he explains: “A cognition which causes a person to obtain (the indicated thing) is a valid cognition. And the ability of causing (a person) to obtain (a thing) is not due to the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant with the thing, for a sprout, etc., although it is necessarily concomitant with a seed, etc., does not cause (a person) to obtain (the seed). Thus, although a cognition arises from the object that can be obtained, there is a certain function of causing (a person) to obtain (the object) which necessarily has to be performed, through which, when it is performed, the object has been caused to be obtained

(*prāpita*).<sup>23</sup> Although this statement is not repeated in the *Laghu-prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* with regard to the necessary concomitance of the cognition with the object, it should also be understood here in that way. For Dharmottara has explained previously ({10,13–15}; cf. above p. 250) that a cognition, in order to be *pramāṇa*, has to perform its function. And this validity, that of perception as well as that of inference, is related to the real thing (*prāmāṇyam vastu-viṣayam*) {10,6}.

Regarding the ascertainment of validity, Dharmottara holds the position that in some cases it is intrinsic (*svataḥ*) and in some extrinsic (*parataḥ*). However, he does not treat this problem systematically in this text, discussing only a few cases. He does not even make use of the specific term *svataḥ*, and he uses the term *parataḥ* only once {43,15}.<sup>24</sup>

The question he deals with here at length is whether the “necessary concomitance with the object” (*arthāvinābhāvitva*) of the cognition, i.e. its validity (*prāmāṇya*) or invalidity, is to be inferred, or whether it is known by perception (*pratyakṣa*) {43,9–51,14}. In this context he distinguishes between those cognitions the objects of which are experienced directly (*anubhūtavīṣaya*), and those where this is not the case. And only when the object is not experienced directly is the necessary concomitance of the cognition with the object to be inferred {44,12–45,4}. In *all* other cases, when the object is experienced directly, the *arthāvinābhāva* of the cognition is ascertained by perception. This includes cognitions where one doubts the object and thus the necessary concomitance of the cognition {43,13–17}, as well as erroneous perceptions {43,18–45,19}. In these cases, of course, the validity or invalidity is ascertained by another, later, perception. While doubtful cognitions are not treated further, Dharmottara explains that the invalidity of an erroneous cognition that takes a mirage for water is ascertained by the later perception which determines the nature of the sunrays and which arises after one has failed to obtain the water. It should be understood, he states, that the cognition which ascertains the presence of the sunrays simultaneously determines the absence of water; just as a cognition of the absence of a pot from a certain place consists in a perception of that place that lacks a pot {43,18–44,7}. That the invalidity of such a cognition is determined on the basis of the later cognition of sunrays is possible

only because the incorrect cognition is still “functioning” at that time (cf. above p. 251).


In this connection he vehemently refutes the possibility that the invalidity of the previous incorrect cognition could be inferred on the basis of the later correct perception as a logical mark. And one also cannot base such an understanding on formulations of Dharmakīrti such as PVin I v.2a (*pramāṇetarasāmānyasthiter*), which says that valid and invalid cognitions are ascertained as such in their general form, or on PVin I 36,5f.<sup>25</sup> which says that something, when it is known due to a corresponding similarity, is nothing but an object of inference. For these statements can only be applied to those cognitions the objects of which are *not* experienced directly (*ananubhūtaṣaya*), but not to all cognitions, i.e. those the objects of which are experienced directly {44,8–45,19}.

Dharmottara further refutes an opponent who maintains, with the above mentioned passage PVin I 36,5f. in mind, that when a cognition is determined as valid due to its similarity to a previous cognition, the determining cognition must be an inference {46,1f.}. For in that case, he says, we do not think that the later cognition is similar to the previous one, but its validity is determined on the basis of experience (*vyavahāra*). This means that such a cognition has previously been experienced several times and thus one knows immediately when it takes place that it is correct. On this occasion he distinguishes between two kinds of similarity: a perceivable one (*drśya*) and an imagined one (*kalpita*) and shows that neither can be used as logical marks (*liṅga* or *hetu*) in the case under discussion. Moreover, he demonstrates that the fact of the cognition being the effect of the object cannot be inferred but only remembered and that an effect (*kārya*) can by no means be inferred from the cause (*kāraṇa*) {46,1–51,4}.

As a last point in the discussion on *prāmāṇya* Dharmottara introduces the objection that there would be the mistake of a mutual dependence (*itaretarāśrayadoṣa*) between acting and ascertainment of validity when one doubts the validity of a cognition, for one acts when the cognition is ascertained as valid and the cognition is ascertained as valid after one has acted. He disproves this argument with reference to the fact that a person who aims at something acts towards the thing that shows itself due to the cognition which is endowed with the image (*pratibhāsa*) of the thing.

This is also the case when one doubts the object as well as when one doubts the validity. He already {22,1–5} stated that if people did not act in the case of a doubt they should have to abstain from acting when there is doubt. But as one can see that they act, a doubt does not prevent them from acting {51,5–14}.

In concluding this description of Dharmottara's theory of knowledge I would like to explain, as far as it is possible, the process of cognizing a visible object through a valid perception by showing how the different phases (*kṣaṇa*) of cognition and object are related to each other. Causes like light, etc., which are also necessary in order that something can be perceived are not taken into consideration. The following diagram may serve as a starting-point.



The first phase of the object (A-k1) produces in C-k2 together with the first phase of cognition (C-k1) a perceptual cognition which consists of the image (*pratibhāsa*) of the object (A-k1) and lacks conceptual construction. This first phase of perception (C-k2) produces in C-k3 a determining (*adhyavasāya*) which takes as its direct object the image (*pratibhāsa*) of the object in C-k2 and determines this as the continuum (*santāna*) of the object (A-k1 — A-kn). Phase C-k2 is that which is regarded as *pramāṇa*. In phase C-k3 the function (*vyāpāra*) of this perception, that is indicating, determining, motivating, etc., is performed. This phase is identical to that of the effect (*phala*) of this perception. This effect is said to consist on the one hand of “determining” (*niścaya*) and on the other hand of “activity” (*pravṛtti*). As phase C-k2 which is regarded

as *pramāṇa* is the agent (*byed mkhan*) of the function (*vyāpāra*) in C-k3, the function and the effect are said not to be different from *pramāṇa*; that means that to this extent C-k3 is not different from C-k2. The two objects of a valid perceptual cognition, namely the one to be grasped (*grāhya*) and the one to be ascertained or determined (*adhyavaseya*), are represented by the image of the object that produces this perception, namely C-k2, and the continuum of the object (A-k1 — A-kn) respectively. The object to be grasped cannot be obtained. It is only the continuum which is determined that can be obtained. In a very strict sense, however, it is not the continuum itself but a later phase belonging to that continuum (A-kn). And the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of perception is related to that phase A-kn.

As a last point, having seen the main structure of Dharmottara's theory, I would now like to draw attention to the frame in which he presents this. He begins this treatise with a *maṅgala* verse consisting of an homage to Buddha. There the Buddha is said to have become an authority or source of knowledge (*pramāṇabhūta*) because he has taught the highest level where suffering comes to an end and which is unknown to the major part of beings. And by showing this level he causes it to be obtained by those aiming at it {1,5–8}. Then he concludes his work with another verse which says that "the way to liberation from defilements (*kleśavimokṣamārga*)," the highest Buddhist goal, "relies on *pramāṇa*" {52,1f.}, namely Buddha.

Thus, the Buddha is first considered to have become *pramāṇa* because he causes the beings to obtain the "object" which he has shown and which is not yet known and then he is said to be the basis for liberation. All the characteristics attributed to the Buddha here are those, as we have seen, due to which a cognition is considered to be reliable (*avisamvādin*) and valid. And as the whole text of the *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* is devoted to the proof of these characteristics of a *pramāṇa* and to treating all the problems involved, with these verses, without explicitly mentioning it, Dharmottara also clearly shows the spiritual place and the necessity of the epistemological tradition in Buddhism,<sup>26</sup> namely to prove the Buddha as a *pramāṇa*.

## NOTES

\* Parts of this paper were read at several occasions during my stay in Japan from April 1991 to April 1993: Waseda University (Tōkyō), Ryūkoku University (Kyōto), the International Institute for Buddhist Studies (Tōkyō), the University of Hiroshima, and the University of Kyōto. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Profs. T. Iwata, E. Mikogami, A. Yuyama, Sh. Katsura and K. Mimaki for inviting me to their institutes and to all the participants of the lectures for the helpful criticism and remarks. I also gratefully acknowledge the grants from the Japanese-German Center Berlin and from the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai which made my stay possible. Finally I would like to thank Ms. Sophie Kidd, lecturer at the University of Vienna, for correcting my English.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. PPar II and Krasser (1991). For more information on this text and Dharmottara in general see the introductions to these two volumes.

<sup>2</sup> An edition and translation of this text is in preparation.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam* PV II 1ab.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. below notes 6 and 7.

<sup>5</sup> PPar II 5,2f. In my German translation (Krasser 1991, p. 36) the equivalent for *rab tu bstan pa* is missing.

<sup>6</sup> PV II 1ab; PV III 56ab; PVin I 30,17f.; HB 3,14–16 and the unidentified quotation.

<sup>7</sup> *tshad ma'i sgra ñid kyis mi slu ba ñid thob pa na ran gi mtshan ñid rtogs pa zes* PPar II 4,17f. Since Dharmottara refers to other passages in the *Pramāṇavi-nīścaya*, the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Hetubindu* immediately prior to this, this unidentified quotation must be considered as having its source in one of Dharmakīrti's texts, too.

<sup>8</sup> He either quotes HB 3,8f. (*tasmād anadhighatārthaviśayaṃ pramāṇam ity apy anadhighate svalakṣaṇa iti viśeṣanīyam*) as in PPar II 5,15–17, or he merely takes over the formulation as in NBT 19,2f. (*ata evānadhigataviśayaṃ pramāṇam*), PPar II 11,2, and PVinT(a) 9,14–16. A similar phrase of Dharmakīrti occurs in PVin I.60,17f. (*tshad ma ni ma rtogs pa'i yul can yin pa ñid kyi phyir te*).

<sup>9</sup> The disjunction *vā* is interpreted by the commentators quite differently; for references cf. Krasser (1991), p. 29 n. 3.

<sup>10</sup> This explanation is based on PPar II 13,1–14,2; especially 13,15ff. Cf. also Krasser (1991), p. 50 ns. 78 + 79.

<sup>11</sup> Note the rare usage of the term *savikalpikapratyakṣa*; cf. below note 12.

<sup>12</sup> Although perception by definition lacks conceptual construction (*kalpanā-podha*), Dharmottara specifies it as being conceptual (*savikalpika*) and of determining nature (*adhyavasāyātmaka*), expressions which are normally used at least by later Naiyāyikas<sup>a</sup>. Who first used this term is not yet clear. Regarding the meaning of 'conceptual' and 'non-conceptual perception', cf. Lambert Schmithausen (1963), 'Vorstellungsfreie und vorstellende Wahrnehmung bei Śālikanātha', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 7: 104–115.

<sup>a</sup> Vācaspatimiśra ad *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4: *iha dvayī pratyakṣajātir avikalpikā savikalpikā ceti . . . tatrāvikalpikāyāḥ padam avyapadeśyam iti savikalpikāyās ca vyavasāyātmakam iti* (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* 108,22–24 in: *Nyāyadarśanam*).

With *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*, *Uddyotakara's Vārttika*, *Vācaspati-Miśra's Tātparyatikā* & *Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatīrtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha. [2 vols.] Calcutta 1936 [Reprint Kyoto 1982]).

<sup>13</sup> In the case of perception one single phase is the object to be grasped (cf. *pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyah* NBT 71,2, and further *yad asādhāraṇam tat pratyakṣasya grāhyam* DhPr 71,10). This refers to the external object which produces perceptual cognition or, more precisely, to its image in perception. Inference is said to grasp an object that is not real (*rjes su dpag pa'i gzun ba yan dños po med pa yin la* PPar II, 8,18f.) This seems to refer to the image (*pratibhāsa*) of inference itself (cf., e.g., *anumānam api svapratibhāse 'nartho dhyavasāyena pravṛtter* NBT 71,5).

<sup>14</sup> Once the term *ākāra* in the triad *deśa-kāla-ākāra* is replaced by *vyañjaka* {48,7}, which is not explained here but characterized by Dharmakīrti as that which is cause of the cognition; *tasmā jñānaheturāiva vyañjakatvam*, PVSV 75,7.

<sup>15</sup> Dharmottara does not touch on the problem of whether the object exists outside cognition or if it is internal to cognition at all. That it is an external entity can be seen from the statement that inference determines the grasped object which is not real as external (*bahir, phyi rol*) object {9,11–14}.

<sup>16</sup> These types of incorrect cognition are treated later; cf. below p. 260.

<sup>17</sup> This interpretation is questionable; cf. Krasser (1991), p. 77f., n. 154.

<sup>18</sup> On the sequence of these texts see Krasser (1991), p. 12ff.

<sup>19</sup> PVinT 206b3–207a4; the passage is translated in Krasser (1991), p. 78 n. 155.

<sup>20</sup> *kālāntarayuktagrāhi ca na kālāntaravati vastuni pramāṇam. yathārdharātre madhyāhṇakālavastugrāhi svapnajñānam nārdharātrakāle vastuni pramāṇam.* NBT 25,5–7.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Krasser (1991), p. 54f. n. 90.

<sup>22</sup> PVinT 6a4–8 and DhPr 33,16–21. Both passages are translated in Krasser (1991), p. 56f., n. 93.

<sup>23</sup> NBT 79,8–10: *prāpakam jñānam pramāṇam. prāpaṇaśaktiś ca na kevalād arthāvinābhāvitvād bhavati, bījādyavinābhāvino 'py āṅkurāder aprāpakatvāt. tasmāt prāpyād arthād utpattāv apy asya jñānasyāsti kaścid avaśyakartavyaḥ prāpakavyāpāro yena kṛtenārthaḥ prāpito bhavati.*

<sup>24</sup> This question is systematically dealt with in PVinT(a) 13,3–20,14. Dharmottara's theory is summarized in Ernst Steinkellner (1992), 'Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (*nges byed kyi tshad ma*)', in *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita 1990*. Ed. Sh. Ihara & Z. Yamaguchi. Narita 1992 [257–273]: 266ff.

<sup>25</sup> *tad yathā drṣṭasādharmyāt tathā prasādhitam anumeyatām nātipatati.* PVin I 36,5f.

<sup>26</sup> This question is dealt with in E. Steinkellner (1982), 'The spiritual place of the epistemological tradition in Buddhism', *Nanto Bukkyō* 49: 1–15.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- DhPr *Dharmottarapradīpa*: D. Malvania (ed.), *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*. Patna <sup>2</sup>1971.
- HB *Hetubindu*: Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.
- Krasser (1991) (translation of PPar II): s. PPar II — Teil 2.
- NBT *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*: s. DhPr.
- PPar II *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā*: Helmut Krasser, *Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis, Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā. Teil 1: Tibetischer Text und Sanskritmaterialien. Teil 2: Übersetzung*. Wien 1991.
- PV II, III *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapters II, III: Yūsho Miyasaka (ed.), 'Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)', *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1—206. [Chapters II and III of my counting correspond to chapters I and II in Miyasaka]
- PVin I *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Chapter I: Tilmann Vetter, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung*. Wien 1966.
- PVinT *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) Chapters I, II: P 5727 (Vol. 136, Tshad ma, Dse 1a1—347a8).
- PVinT(a) *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) P 7b6—13a7: Ernst Steinkellner / Helmut Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya. Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Übersetzung*. Wien 1989.
- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: Raniero Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Auto-commentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.

Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften  
Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens  
Austria