Dignāga on *trairūpya* Reconsidered:
A Reply to Prof. Oetke

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0. Introduction

It is most likely that Dignāga was the first Indian logician to employ two new terms, viz. ‘inference for oneself’ (*svārthānumāna*) and ‘inference for others’ (*parārthānumāna*). The former stands for inference (*anumāna*) as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in the Indian epistemological tradition, while the latter corresponds to proof (*sādhana*) in the Indian debate (*vāda*) tradition. As a matter of fact, in his earlier work on logic, the *Nyāyamukha* (=NMukh), Dignāga still uses the terms ‘*anumāna*’ (比量) and ‘*sādhana*’ (能立), respectively. By renaming the proof and identifying it as a type of inference in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (=PS), he succeeded in integrating the two different traditions of Indian logic into his new system of epistemological logic.

Dignāga defines *svārthānumāna* as “knowledge of an object / a state of affairs (*artha*) through a valid inferential mark (*liṅga*) which possesses three characteristics (*trirūpa*)” (PS II. 1ab: *anumānaṁ dvidhā; svārtham trirūpāṁ liṅgato ’rthadṛk /).*¹ He defines *parārthānumāna* as “revealing / communicating an object / a state of affairs which has been known for oneself” (PS III. 1ab: *parārtham anumānaṁ tu svadrṣṭārthapraśāsanam /).*² It is clear that *svārthānumāna* represents a mental process of inferring, which is a private experience of a cognizer, while *parārthānumāna* is a public act of communicating what he has experienced.³

Now what are the three characterisitics of a valid inferential mark? There have been many attempts to explain it systematically. In 1994 Claus
Oetke published *Studies on the Doctrine of Trairūpya* (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 33, Wien) in which he criticized some of the previous studies, including my own (“Dignāga on Trairūpya”, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, 1983), and proposed his new systematic interpretations. I am yet to digest all the implications of Oetke’s rather difficult interpretations and far from giving the final opinion on them. However, I feel obliged to answer his criticisms and present my own understanding of the *trairūpya* again.

It is to be noted at the outset that my article mentioned above was written in order to show some possible improvements upon previous translations of PS-Vṛtti II. 5cd, namely, the Japanese version by Hidenori Kitagawa (*Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 96–100) and the English rendering by Richard Hayes (“Diṅnāga’s Views on Reasoning *(svārthānumāna)*,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8, 1980, pp. 252–253). The main point of my criticism against Kitagawa’s translation is that we should read the restrictive particle *eva* into both the second and the third characteristics of the *trairūpya*. I also wanted to correct the imprecise renderings of the Tibetan phrase *nges par gzung ba*; namely, ‘確定されるべきこと’ (what is to be determined) by Kitagawa and ‘requirement’ by Hayes. The most likely candidate for its Sanskrit original is *avadhārana* which means ‘restriction’ and which is the function assigned to the particle *eva* in Indian Grammatical tradition. When Hayes published *Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Studies of Classical India, Vol. 9, Dordecht / Boston / London 1987), he seems to have adopted some of my suggestions.

Apart from my 1983 paper, I have discussed the *trairūpya* on at least two other occasions, namely, “On Trairūpya Formulae,” (*Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions*, Kyoto 1985), and “Ronri gakuha” (The school of Buddhist Logic), (*Iwanami Kōza Tōyōshisō* Vol. 8, Tokyo 1988). In the latter paper I fully discussed the development of the *trairūpya* formulae in some basic texts of Indian or Buddhist logic, but the paper seems to have evaded the attention of Prof. Oetke.
The controversy between Oetke and me lies in the question whether Dignāga intended to insert the particle eva in the formula of the second characteristic (or ‘condition’ in Oetke’s terminology) or not, the solution of which depends on how we should read PS II. 5cd and its Svavṛtti. Therefore, I would like to give the two Tibetan versions of the above texts as well as a new literal translation of my own.

1. **PS II. 5cd & Svavṛtti**

   1.1. **Kanakavarman’s version** (Kitagawa pp. 455b–456b)

   (Peking 111a6–111b1) tshul gsum rtags las zhes gang bstan pa de bshad par bya ste /
   rjes dpag bya dang de mtshungs la //
   yod dang med la med pa’o // (PS II 5cd)

   rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / (a7) de la dus phyis
glešk kyi spyi’i tshul gyis mngon sum nam rjes su dpag pas mthong ba’o //
   de’i rigs la yang mtha’ dag gam phyogs cig yod pa nyid do //
   de gang las zhe na /

   de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod (a8) pa zhes nges par gzung ba’i phyir yin
   gyi yod pa kho na zhes ni ma yin no //

   de ltar na med pa lam (Read la) med do zhes brjod pas mi bya’o zhe na /

   ’di ni med pa nyid la med pa yin gyi / gzhan pa la’ang ma yin ’gal ba la (111
   b1) ma yin no zhes nges pa’i don du ’gyur ro //

   ’dir tshul gsum pa’i rtags gang las rtags can rtogs pa yin no //

   1.2. **Vasudhararakṣita’s version** (Kitagawa pp. 455a–456a)

   (Derge 29a4–7 = Peking 30a1–5) tshul gsum pa’i rtags zhes gang brjod pa de
   brjod par bya ste /

   rjes {P: su} dpag bya dang de mthun la //
   yod dang med nyid la med pa’o // (PS II. 5cd)

   rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi {P: kyis} khyad par du byas pa’i chos can
   no //
As Richard Hayes has done in his 1980 paper, I shall translate Kanakavarma's version except for the underlined portion where I followed Vasudevharakṣita's because the latter version definitely gives the better reading. The Sanskrit fragments will be supplied in parentheses wherever they are available.

1.3. Translation:

"The phrase 'trirūpāl liṅgatah' [in PS II. 1] should be explained.

PS II. 5cd: [The three characteristics of a valid inferential mark (liṅga) consist in its] presence in the object to be inferred (anumeya) as well as in what is similar to it (tattulya), and absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred (anumeya) and / or of what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya)]. (anumeya 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsatī)⁴

The object to be inferred is a property-possessor / locus (dharmin) qualified by a property [which one wishes to know]. (dharmaniṣṭo dharmy anumeyah)⁵

After having known, either by perception or by inference, [the presence of an inferential mark] there (i.e., in the object to be inferred = the object of
inference), we also establish in a general manner [its] presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference).

[Question:] Why is it so (i.e., a valid inferential mark is present in all or in some members of the class, not in all members of the class)?

[Answer:] Because we restrict \( \text{nges par gzung ba=avadhāraṇa} \) [the second characteristic] in the way that it is present only in what is similar to it (i.e., the object of inference) \( \text{de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod pa=tattulya eva sadbhāvah} \), not in the way that it is necessarily present [in what is similar to the object of inference \( \text{yod pa kho na=tattulye} \text{ sadbhāva eva} \)].

[Objection:] If so, it will be useless to state [the third characteristic, i.e.,] absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred and / or of what is similar to the object of inference] \( \text{nāṣṭītāsatī} \).

[Answer:] It is [stated] in order to determine / restrict that [the inferential mark is] absent in the absence [of the property to be inferred and / or of what is similar to the object of inference], not in what is other than or incompatible with [what is similar to the object of inference].

Thus we understand the marked (\text{liṅgin}, i.e., the property to be inferred) through the inferential mark (\text{liṅga}) which possesses the three characteristics."

1.4. Comment

Throughout Dignāga’s works this is the only place where he discusses the theory of \text{trairūpya} at length. This seems to indicate that the theory had been well established at least among Buddhist logicians before the time of Dignāga, as I demonstrated in my 1985 paper, and that he did not feel it necessary to elaborate upon it. As a matter of fact in NMukh Dignāga did not even formulate the \text{trairūpya} in one place, though it is certain that he knew and presupposed such a theory. I would like to point to the following two passages in NMukh:

NMukh (Taisho p. 3a): 則於所比顯法性故說因言
Cf. PS-Vṛtti [Kanakavarman] 150b8: \textit{phyogs kyi chos nyid} (\textit{=paksadharma}tva) bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa /

NMukh (Tashi p. 2c): 由如是説能顯示因同品定有異品遍無
Cf. PS-Vṛtti [Kanakavarman] 148b4: \textit{de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa} (*sapakṣa eva sattvam) dang / bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid (*sādhyābhāve 'sattvam eva) bstan par nus pa yin . . . /

It is to be noted that there existed several different versions of the \textit{trairūpya} formulae before Dignāga, as I showed in my 1985 paper. The most standard version seems to be (1) \textit{paksadharma}tva, (2) sapakṣe \textit{sattvam}, and (3) vipakṣe 'sattvam. The above passages, however, clearly indicate that Dignāga intended to insert the restrictive particle eva in the formulae of the second and the third characteristics.

2. Oetke’s Objections

2.1. Objection 1: the meaning of the phrase \textit{nges par gzung ba}

Oetke (p. 58) says:

First of all, it is not even certain that the expression \textit{ṅes par gzunī ba} has the meaning of “must restrict”, as assumed by Katsura. It is equally well possible that it represents a Sanskrit expression that means “(must be) recognized with certainty” or “(must be) ascertained” so that the whole sentence could possess the following literal sense: “It is [so] because it must be ascertained / one must ascertain that it (the logical reason) exists only in what is similar to it, but it is not the case that it exists only (i.e. exists without exception) [in this realm].”

It is very easy to show that the expression \textit{nges par gzung ba} is Tibetan equivalent of the Sanskrit \textit{avadhāraṇa} (or \textit{niyama}) which has the meaning of ‘restriction’. In commenting upon the \textit{Nyāyabindu} II. 6: sapakṣa eva sattvam Dharmottara states the reason why the second characteristic of a valid
inferential mark (!) is restricted (avadhārana) by the particle eva in that particular manner.

\[
\text{sattvagrahanāt pūrvāvadhārānāvacanena sapakṣāvypyāpisattākasyāpi pratyāntānantariyakasya hetutvam kathitam / paścādavadhārānē tv āyam arthaḥ syāt / sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetur iti pratyāntānantariyakata\text{-}tvam na hetuḥ syāt } / (\text{Bibliotheca Buddhica VII, p. 19})
\]

It is put into the following Tibetan sentences:

\[
yod pa smos pa las sngar nges par gzung ba smos pa ni yod pa yin yang mthun pa'i phyogs la ma khyab pa rtsol ba las byung ba dag kyang gtan tshigs nyid du bstan pa yin no // physis nges pas (sic!) gzung ba byas na ni don 'dir 'gyur te / gang zhig mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa nyid de gtan tshigs yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur bas / rtsol ba las byung ba nyid gtan tshigs ma yin par 'gyur ro // (\text{Bibliotheca Buddhica VIII, p. 43})
\]

Thus, it is quite certain that the expression nges par gzung ba means ‘restriction.’ Consequently we cannot deny the fact that Dignāga intended to read the restrictive particle eva in the second characteristic of a valid inferential mark. And he was well aware of its implication, namely, the redundancy of the third characteristic. Incidentally, Oetke’s rendering of the same expression ‘(must be) recognized with certainty’ or ‘(must be) ascertained’ seems to correspond to Sanskrit niścita which was added by Dharmakīrti to each characteristic of a valid inferential mark (See e.g. Nyāyabindu II. 7) but which is missing from Dignāga’s formulae.

Oetke (p. 58) further says: “But it is not even necessary to insist that the expression nes par gzun ba has another sense than the one assumed by Katsura.” He argues that the object of the restriction could be “the logical reason” or “the canon of Trairūpya,” instead of “the second characteristic” as I assume. However, as the above-quoted passage of the Nyāyabindu and many other similar texts support, the context of the argument in PS-Vṛtti II. 5cd forces us to regard “the second characteristic” as the object of the restric-
2. 2. Objection 2: the purpose of insertion of the particle eva

Oetke (p. 59) says:

A natural assumption would be that the second and the third condition together guarantee that the logical reason occurs in at least one similar instance apart from the pakṣa and only there, i.e. never in the vipakṣa-domain.

Furthermore he considers that the formulae of the trairūpya presented in PS 5cd: anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitā 'sati, namely, those without the particle eva, properly represent the above assumption. According to him it is awkward that Dignāga inserts the particle eva in the second condition, which leads to the redundancy of the third condition—the difficulty to be solved by Dignāga himself. Then Oetke goes on to investigate the possible purposes of Dignāga’s insertion of the particle eva. In this connection I would like to give my own understanding of the trairūpya formulae with and without eva.

2. 2. 1. The trairūpya formulae without eva

PS II. 5cd can be re-formulated into the following three formulae:

(1) anumeye [liṅgasya] sadbhāvah /
(2) tattulye [liṅgasya] sadbhāvah /
(3) asati [liṅgasya] nāstitā /

The first formula is traditionally called pakṣadharmatva⁷ and the second and the third formula are later called anvaya and vyatireka respectively.⁸ Although Dignāga does not apply the names anvaya and vyatireka in this context, he uses them in order to explain how a word (śabda) expresses its meaning in PS-Vṛtti Chapter V.
PS-Vṛtti ad PS V. 34: śabdayānvayavyatirekāv arthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vrṭtyavrṭṭi/

“Association / continued presence (anvaya) and dissociation / continued absence (vyatireka) are the two ways that a word expresses its object / meaning. They consist respectively in applying to what is similar (tulye vrṭṭīḥ) and in not applying to what is dissimilar (atulye vrṭṭīḥ).”  

For instance, the word ‘cow’ is applied to those animals which resemble each other in sharing some common features, viz. a dewlap and others, but it is not applied to those which do not share such features. In the above passage anvaya and vyatireka are formulated in the following manner:

(4) anvaya = tulye [śabdaya] vrṭṭīḥ /
(5) vyatireka = atulye [śabdaya] avrṭṭīḥ /

If we compare them with the above formulae (2) (3), we cannot but see a close resemblance in their formulations. Thus it is safe to assume that the second and the third characteristics of a valid inferential mark can be named anvaya and vyatireka respectively. As a matter of fact it is not too difficult to see the reason behind such a correspondence, if we take into consideration Dignāga’s fundamental doctrine that a verbal cognition (śabda, discussed in PS V) is only a kind of inference (anumāna discussed in PS II) and that a word (śabda) functions exactly in the same way as an inferential mark (liṅga), namely, by means of ‘exclusion of others’ (anyāpoha / anyavyāvrṭṭi / anyavyavcchāda), in the realm of universals.

Now what are the roles of anvaya and vyatireka? Here I would like to refer to Geroje Cardona’s thoery expressed in his article “On Reasoning from Anvāya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita.”

Indian thinkers have used a mode of reasoning that involves the related presence (anvaya ‘continued presence’) and absence (vyatireka) of entities as follows:

(1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.
2. 2. 2. The trairūpya formulae with eva and the meaning of the eva-restriction

In PS-Vṛtti II. 5cd, as I have shown above, Dignāga inserts the restrictive particle eva at least in the second characteristic of a valid inferential mark in the following manner:

\[(6) \text{tattulye eva [liṅgasya] sadbhāvah} /\]
In this connection I would like to explain what is the meaning of the ‘eva-restriction’. Here is an often-quoted paribhasa (No. 131) attributed to a Grammarian Vyadi:

\[ yata eva-kāras tato’nyatrāvadhāraṇam \]  
\[ (Paribhasāsāmgraha ed. by Abhyankar, Poona, 1967, p. 43) \]

“When the restrictive particle ‘eva’ is attached to the word X, the other word Y is restricted.”

In a sentence \{X eva Y\} or “vrkṣa eva śimsapā” (śimsapā is a tree), the domain of Y is restricted by the domain of X and the domain of śimsapās is restricted by the domain of trees. The terms ‘avadharaṇa’ or ‘niyama’ express such a restrictive function of the particle eva. X and Y are called ‘niyāmaka’ and ‘niyamya’ respectively.\(^{11}\) If we graphically represent the relation between niyamya (Y) and niyāmaka (X), it can be presented in the following two circles:

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X=niyāmaka
     /
    /  
Y=niyamya
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The same relationship can be called ‘vyāpti’ (pervasion); namely, the domain of Y is pervaded by that of X when Y is vyāpya (the pervaded) and X is vyāpaka (the pervader). As a matter of fact, the Nyāyakośa, compiled by Jhalakikar and revised by Abhyankar (Poona, 1978), gives vyāpti as the first meaning of ‘niyama’ and Nārāyaṇa (ca. 1560–1656) presents ‘niyama’ as one of the synonyms of ‘vyāpti’ in his Mānameyodaya (ed. and tr. by Kunhan Raja and Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, 1933, p. 50), other synonyms being ‘pratibandha’, ‘avyabhicāra’, and ‘avinābhava’.

Dignāga refers to the notion of restriction again in PS II. 21:
liṅge liṅṭi bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punah / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ //12)

"The marked (liṅgin) necessarily (eva) occurs where the inferential mark (liṅga) occurs, and the latter (i.e. the mark) occurs only (eva) where the marked occurs. If the restriction (niyama) [by the particle eva] is reversed, there is no [proper] relation (sambandha) between the mark and the marked."

In the above verse the term liṅgin is followed by the particle eva in relation to the term liṅga; therefore, the domain of the marked is restricted (niyata) by that of the mark. Such a relation is regarded by Dignāga as the proper relation (sambandha) between the mark and the marked. Although he does not mention the term vyāpti as an equivalent of sambandha in this context (he refers to it in PS-Vṛttri IV. 4), I understand that PS II. 21 is the first attempt to define the relation of 'pervasion' in the history of Indian logic.13 It may be supported by the fact that Dharmakirti phrases his definition of pervasion, following the model presented in PS II. 21.

vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva / vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvah / (Pramāṇavārttika-Svavrtti, ed. by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome 1960, p. 2)

"Pervasion is the pervader (vyāpaka)'s necessary (eva) presence in the domain [where the pervaded (vyāpya) occurs] or the pervaded's presence only (eva) in the domain [where the pervader occurs]."

As I demonstrated in detail in my article "Indo Ronrigaku niokeru Henjū-gainen no Seisei to Hatten" (The Origin and Development of the Concept of vyāpti in Indian Logic, Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō, Vol. 46, Special Issue No. 1, 1986), it was Dignāga who first introduced the concept of vyāpti as the foundation of a valid inference. He was well acquainted with the Indian Grammatical tradition and applied their concept of niyama as the forerunning model of the logical concept vyāpti.
Thus I would like to conclude that Dignāga’s purpose of inserting the particle *eva* in the second characteristic is to restrict the domain of an inferential mark by that of what is similar to the object of inference (*tattulya*), which, I believe, gave the way to the formation of the theory of pervasion in Dignāga’s logic. In any case, the second characteristic with the *eva*-restriction expresses not the necessary but the sufficient condition for a valid inferential mark; hence, Dignāga felt it unavoidable to explain the necessity of the formulation of the third characteristic. I hope that the foregoing argument makes it clear why I referred to PS II. 21 in my 1983 paper, which has been questioned by Oetke (p. 70).

2.3. Objection 3: translation of the word ‘*asati*’ in the third characteristic

Oetke (p. 65) says:

Despite the fact that the interpretation of *nāstitāsati* in the sense of “absence in what is not similar to it” is linguistically a very natural, perhaps even the most natural one in the given context it should be given up because of the undesirable objective consequences it involves. Thus the expression *asati* should not be taken as representing a participle of the copula ‘to be’, but as a negated present participle of the verb ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’.

Here Oetke is quite right in pointing out my misunderstanding of the expression *asati*. I simply followed Kitagawa’s Japanese translation (p. 96): [同類に] 非ざるものには存しないということ [である] (absence in what is not *[tattulya]*)), though Hayes (1980: p. 252) correctly translated: “absent in their absence”. In my new translation I accepted Oetke’s criticism and adopted the meaning of ‘in the absence’ for *asati*.

Now the question is what is the logical subject of ‘absence’ in the third characteristic. Hayes seems to take it to be both *anumeya* and *tattulya* mentioned in the first and the second characteristics, which is perhaps the most
natural reading, if we expect vipakṣa in the third characteristic and if we can identify anumeya and tattulya with pakṣa and sapakṣa, for the universe of discourse in Dignāga's logic is divided into three parts, namely, pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa.

Oetke, on the other hand, seems to opt for anumeya as the logical subject of the phrase asati and says (p. 65):

Perhaps . . . the author of the PS invited the reader to take the word anumeya in two different senses for the interpretation of the verse, first in the sense of 'substratum of the property to be proven' at the beginning of the kārikā and later in the sense of 'property to be proven' for the supplementation of the logical subject of the existence-predicate represented by asati.

Now I would like to support the above interpretation of Oetke as one of the possible meanings of the third characteristic. But his second alternative, to take anumeya (in the first characteristic) in the sense of 'property to be proven', is contradicted by Dignāga's own comment, viz. dharmaviśisto dharmy anumeyah. First I would like to show that Dignāga possibly assigned not two but three meanings to the word anumeya.

2.3.1. The meaning of the term anumeya

When we read Dignāga's texts on logic, we must be careful to distinguish different meanings attributed to the same technical term and to identify different terms which are meant to express the same or similar logical concepts. For example, in NMukh (Taisho p. 1b) Dignāga attributes three distinct meanings to the word pakṣa (宗), namely, (1) a proposition consisting of the topic / property-possessor dharmin (有法) and the property to be proven dharma (法) (e.g. "The mountain possesses a fire"), (2) the property-possessor as the topic of the proposition (e.g. the mountain), and (3) the property to be proven (e.g. a fire).
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[Objection:] Haven't you in a general manner [in the first kārikā] called by the name ‘pakṣa’ the synthesized [proposition consisting of dharmin and dharma] which somebody wants to prove? Why in this [second kārikā] do you apply [the same term] ‘pakṣa’ only to dharmin (i.e. the topic of the proposition)?

[Answer:] There is no such a defect because the word for an aggregate can be employed to express its constituent as well; e.g., the expression ‘burned robe’ [can be employed even when only a part of the robe is burned]. Furthermore, sometimes the word pakṣa can be employed only to express [the other constituent of the proposition,] dharma (i.e., the property to be proven).

In the first kārikā of NMukh Dignāga defines ‘proposition’ (pakṣa) and in the second kārikā he enumerates nine possible cases for a reason (hetu) which is defined as a property of pakṣa (pakṣadharma). In the second kārikā the word pakṣa is used in the sense of the topic of the proposition. Dignāga justifies this move by referring to the general principle in Sanskrit semantics that the word for an aggregate (samudāya-sābda) can be metaphorically employed to express its parts (avayava). Consequently, the word pakṣa can be employed in the three different meanings.

In PS III. 10 Dingāga says the exactly same thing about the word sāḍhya:

\[ \text{samudāyārthasādhyaatvād dharmamātre 'tha dharmini /} \]
\[ \text{amukhye 'py ekadesatvāt sādhyaatvam upacaryate //} \]

“Since [the word] sāḍhya has the meaning of an aggregate (samudāya) [i.e., a proposition consisting of dharmin and dharma], both a simple dharma as well as dharmin, though not the direct meaning [of the word sāḍhya], can be metaphorically called ‘sāḍhya’, because they are parts [of the proposition].”
The word sādhyā, which literally means ‘that which is to be proven’, too can be employed in three meanings, viz., (1) a proposition to be proven consisting of dharmin and dharma, (2) the property-possession (sādhyā-dharmin) as the topic of the proposition, and (3) the property to be proven (sādhyā-dharma). Thus we can conclude that both pakṣa in NMukh and sādhyā in PS III have the same range of meanings and, consequently, they refer to the same logical concept in Dignāga’s system of logic.

I believe that the word anumeyya, which literally means ‘that which is to be inferred’, also possesses the same set of three meanings, viz. (1) a state of affairs or a proposition to be inferred consisting of dharmin and dharma, (2) the property-possession or locus to be inferred (anumeyya-dharmin), and (3) the property to be inferred (anumeyya-dharma), although Dignāga does not explicitly mention this.

The reason behind my conviction is that the word anumeyya occupies the place of pakṣa in the first formula of the trairūpya. As I mentioned earlier, Dignāga refers to the first characteristic of a valid inferential mark by the traditional expression pakṣadharmatva in NMukh. In PS II. 5cd, however, he refers to it by his new phrase anumeye sadbhāvaḥ, as we have seen above. Therefore, it seems quite possible to assume that the word anumeyya is employed by Dignāga in the same way as the words pakṣa and sādhyā in NMukh and PS III.

The word pakṣa seems to stem from the old Vāda-tradition. In PS Dignāga seems to distinguish between anumeyya and sādhyā, by employing the former in svārthānumāna and the latter in parārthānumāna. A similar phenomenon can be found regarding the words referring to a logical reason; namely, hetu (reason) and sādhana (dharma) (a proving property), which seem to stem from the Vāda-tradition, are used in parārthānumāna, while linga (an inferential mark) and anumāna (a means of inference), which seem to stem from the Pramāṇa-tradition, are used in svārthānumāna.

Thus Dignāga would support Oetke’s first interpretation regarding the meanings of the word anumeyya in the trairūpya; namely, it means the sub-
stratum of the property to be proven in the first characteristic and just the
property to be proven in the third characteristic. Now, in order to identify
the logical subject of the third characteristic, we must have a clear idea
about two more technical terms, namely, sapakṣa and vipakṣa, for I under-
stand that they correspond to tattulya and asat in the second and the third
characteristics of trairūpya.

2.3.2. sapakṣa and vipakṣa

Dignāga first defined sapakṣa and vipakṣa in NMukh (Taisho 1c–2a) as fol-
lows:

此中，若品與所立法隣近均等說名同品。以一切義皆名品故。
若所立無說名異品。非與同品相違或異。

“In this connection, if an object (pakṣa) is close (samtpa?) or similar
to (samāna) the property to be proven (sādhyadharma), it is called ‘sa-
pakṣa’ (同品), for any object (artha) can be called ‘pakṣa’. If [an
object] lacks [the property] to be proven, it is called ‘vipakṣa’ (異品).
The latter is neither incompatible (viruddha) with nor different
(unya) from sapakṣa...”

In PS III Dignāga gives somewhat different definitions of the two terms:

PS-Vṛtti [Kanakavaran] 130a°: de la don thams cad phyogs su byas pas
nye ba'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi spyis mthun pa'i phyogs so //
(Cf. Nyāyabindu II. 9= Nyāyapraveśa §2.2: sādhyadharmasāmānyena
samāno 'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ)

“In this connection, since any object (don=artha) can be called ‘pakṣa’,
[an object is called] ‘sapakṣa’ (similar to pakṣa) in respect of the universal
/similarity (sāmānya) which is the property to be proven, for [it is]
close to [pakṣa].”

PS [Kanakavaran] III. 19–20a: de las gzhan dang de ’gal ba // gnyis po
yang mi mthun phyogs ma yin // gtan tshigs med dang ’gal ba las // rnam
par gcod par thal bar 'gyur // de'i phyir mthun phyogs med pa nyid //

"That which is different from or incompatible with it (i.e. sapakṣa); neither of them is [called] vipakṣa... Therefore, [vipakṣa is] nothing but the absence of sapakṣa."

In NMukh Dingāga defines sapakṣa as any object which is similar to sādhyadharma and in PS III as any object which is close / similar to [pakṣa] (the topic of a proposition) in respect of sādhyadharma-sāmānyā—though he simply says “nye ba'i phyir”, I assume from the context that we can supply the word pakṣa.

I must confess that I cannot make good sense of the definition in NMukh, namely, “any object which is similar to the property to be proven.” Incidentally, the idea comes close to the Tibetan translation of the Nyāyabindu II. 9: mthun phyogs ni bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi spyi dang don mthun pa'o, which influenced the dGe lugs pa’s understanding of sapakṣa as demonstrated by Tom Tillemans.17 If we adopt Tillemans’s suggestion (p. 59), the NMukh definition of sapakṣa may mean “any object which has the property to be proven”, in which case, however, it would be difficult to distinguish between pakṣa and sapakṣa.

The PS III definition clearly distinguishes sapakṣa from pakṣa and more explicitly indicates that sapakṣa is “any object which has the property to be proven”. For example in the proposition: “The mountain has a fire,” sapakṣa consists of any object which has the property to be proven, in other words, the domain of presence of the property to be proven, i.e., fiery places. The PS III version becomes the standard definition of sapakṣa after Dignāga.

In NMukh Dignāga defines vipakṣa as “an object which lacks the property to be proven”, in other words the domain of absence of the property to be proven. If we adopt the above-mentioned definition of sapakṣa in PS III, namely, the domain of presence of the property to be proven, then the two domains are complementary to each other and together will make up the
complete universe of discourse (minus *pakṣa*, i.e. the topic under discussion) or what Richard Hayes once called ‘induction domain’.\(^{18}\)

In PS III Dignāga defines *vipakṣa* simply as ‘absence of *sapakṣa*’. If we follow the above-mentioned definition of *sapakṣa* in PSIII, it should mean ‘absence of any object which has the property to be proven’, which in the final analysis can be understood as the domain of absence of the property to be proven as in NMukh.

In both NMukh and PS III Dignāga emphasizes that *vipakṣa* is neither what is different from *sapakṣa* nor what is incompatible with *sapakṣa* and that it is ‘absence’ (*abhāva*) of *sapakṣa*. I understand that by restricting the meaning of *vipakṣa* in such a way, Dignāga tried to establish the complementary relationship between *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as mentioned above.\(^{19}\)

Now let us go back to PS II. 5cd: *anumeye ’tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāsitā-śati*. As the logical subject of *asati* we have two alternatives, viz. ‘*anumeya*’ and ‘*tattulya*’. If we take the first alternative, the third characteristic means “absence [of the inferential mark] in the absence (*asati*) [of the property to be inferred (*anumeya*)]”, which corresponds to the NMukh definition of *vipakṣa* (i.e., absence of the property to be proven). If we take the second alternative, then the phrase means “absence [of the inferential mark] in the absence [of what is similar to the object of inference (*tattulya*)], which corresponds to the PS III definition of *vipakṣa* (absence of *sapakṣa*).”

Just like Oetke I prefer the first alternative because it fits well with the alternative meanings of the word *anumeya* as I have explained above.\(^{20}\) Jinendrabuddhi, however, supports the second alternative.\(^{21}\) In any case, I believe that there is no fundamental difference in the interpretation of the *trairūpya* in either alternative.

The more I read Oetke’s examinations of the *trairūpya* formulae, the more I am inclined to admire his thorough logical thinking. On the other hand, perhaps the problem with his approach is that he tends to rely on a few selected passages of the relevant Indian texts which he analyses minutely
and from which he derives rather bold conclusions. My approach to the problem of *traitīpya* and other subjects is that I try to understand them in the broader context of the whole text under investigation. For example, Oetke (pp. 71–72) questions the relevancy of my reference to *PS-Vṛttī* IV. 4. To meet his objection and emphasize my wholistic approach, in a future paper, I shall show the connection between the theory of *traitīpya* and that of *sādharmya-* and *vaidharmya-drṣṭānta*, in which I will deal with the role of ‘Example’ in Dīnāgā’s logic.²²)

3. *traitīpya* and Hetucakra

In order to strengthen my position that Dīnāgā intended to insert the restrictive particle *eva* in the the formula of the second characteristic, I would like to add the following argument. In *PS-Vṛttī* II. 5cd Dīnāgā stated: “. . . we also establish in a general manner [its] presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference).” We may assume that he is here alluding to the second and the eighth *hetu* of the Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons), where *hetu* is present in all or some members of *sapakṣa*, respectively.

Hetu No. 2:

[pakṣa] anityah śabdah /
[hetu] kṛtakatvāt /
[drṣṭānta] yathā ghaṭah, yathā ākāśam /

Hetu No. 8:

[pakṣa] anityah śabdah /
[hetu] prayatnānantarītyakatvāt /
[drṣṭānta] yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca, yathā ākāśam /

Then comes the next question of how we justify the second and the eighth *hetu* as valid ones. Dīnāgā answers by means of the restriction of the
second characteristic. If we restrict it in the way “tattulye (=sapakṣe) liṅgasya sadbhāva eva”; then the domain of the property to be proven or inferred (sādhyā/anumeya-dharma) is restricted by the domain of liṅga. In other words, the former is pervaded by the latter. In that case, liṅga is deviant or inconclusive (vyabhicārin/anaikāntika) in respect to what is to be proven (sādhyā) and it cannot be regarded as valid.

If we restrict the anvaya formula in the way “tattulya (=sapakṣa) eva liṅgasya sadbhāvah”, then the domain of liṅga is restricted by the domain of the property to be proven. In this case, liṅga is neither deviant nor inconclusive and it is a valid inferential mark.

In the case of Hetu No. 2 the domain of sādhyadharma (=anityatva) and the domain of hetu (=kṛtakatva) are co-extensive but at least the domain of hetu does not deviate from the domain of sādhyadharma. Therefore, it can be regarded as a special case of hetu’s being restricted by sādhyadharma.

In the case of Hetu No. 8 it is quite clear that the domain of hetu (=prayatnānantariyatva) is restricted by the domain of sādhyadharma (=anityatva). Consequently, it is regarded as a valid hetu.
4. Conclusion

In PS II Dignāga presents two different formulae of the *trairūpya*, one without *eva* and the other with *eva*. PS II. 5cd can be divided into the following three formulae:

(1) *anumeye*[lingasya] sadbhāvah /
(2) *tat* (=*anumeya*)-tulye*[lingasya] sadbhāvah /
(3) *[anumeya] / tattulya-* asati*[lingasya] nāsitā /

They correspond to the following traditional formulae:

(1) *[hetoh] pakṣadharmatvam /
(2) *sapakṣe*[hetoh] sattvam /
(3) *vipakṣe*[hetoh] asattvam /

The second and the third formulae are respectively called *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, which constitute what Cardona called the 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning'. If we understand *tattulya / sapakṣa* and *asat / vipakṣa* in the above formulae in the sense of 'the domain of presence of the property to be proven' and 'the domain of absence of the property to be proven', then *anvaya* and *vyatireka* can be reformulated in the following manner:

(1) *anvaya* (continued presence): in the domain of presence of the property to be proven (*sādhyadharma*) *linga* is present; e.g., where there is a fire there is smoke.
(2) *vyatireka* (continued absence): in the domain of absence of the property to be proven *linga* is absent; e.g., where there is no fire there is no smoke.

*anvaya* and *vyatireka* constitute the inductive method or process by which we can determine what is a valid inferential mark or reason, and *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* make up what Hayes called the 'induction domain' where we can conduct such an induction. In modern terminology, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* without *eva* express the necessary conditions for a valid reason.
In PS-Vṛtti II. 5cd Dignāga inserts the restrictive particle eva at least in the anvaya formula: tat (=anumeya)-tulye eva [liṅgasya] sadbhāvah, which can be reformulated as: sādhyadharma-bhāve eva liṅgasya sadbhāvah. As a result of the insertion of eva the anvaya formula no more represents the inductive process; it expresses the relation between the domain of liṅga and that of the property to be proven (sādhyadharma), namely, the former is restricted by the latter; in other words, the former is pervaded (vyāpta) by the latter. As far as I can see, Dignāga insisted on inserting the particle eva in order to express the relation of pervasion (vyāpti) between liṅga and sādhyadharma which he considered to be the foundation of any valid inference or reasoning.

The fact that he does not employ the word vyāpti in this particular context may suggest that he is still in the process of struggling toward a new terminology for his theory of logical proof. Dignāga was well acquainted with the Indian Grammatical tradition. He borrowed from them not only the method of anvaya and vyatireka in order to determine a valid reason but also the notion of ‘restriction’ (avadhārāna / niyama) by the particle eva in order to express the proper relation between the valid reason and its object, in short, ‘pervasion’.

Although Dignāga does not mention the vyatireka formula with eva in PS-Vṛtti II. 5cd, NMukh and the corresponding passages of PS-Vṛtti quoted at the beginning of this paper seem to indicate that he intended to insert the eva-restriction in the vyatireka formula, too. Thus we can reformulate it as: asati [liṅgasya] nāstitā eva or sādhyadharma-abhāve liṅgasya nāstitā eva. In this formulation, the domain of absence of the property to be proven is restricted by that of absence of liṅga, which is logically equivalent to the anvaya formula with eva. Dignāga seems to be aware of such a logical equivalence and tries to solve problems related to it in PS-Vṛtti IV, which I shall deal with in a future paper. Dharmakīrti calls anvaya and vyatireka with eva ‘niyamavat’ (restricted) and apparently regards them as logically equivalent. He tries to justify the necessity of both anvaya and vyatireka by
saying that either formula with eva actually expresses both of them at once.\(^{23}\)

anvaya and vyatireka with eva singularly express the relation of ‘pervasion’ (vyāpti) of a valid inferential mark or reason by the property to be inferred or proven. In modern terminology, they express the sufficient condition for a valid reason.\(^{24}\)

Notes


2) For Sanskrit fragments, see Jambuvijaya, op. cit., Appendix p. 125. A different recension: parārthānumānam tu svadṛṣṭārthapraṇāsakaṃ /.

3) Dharmakirti cleverly characterized them as ‘knowledge’ (jñāna) and ‘verbal expression’ (śabda) in the beginning of the Pramāṇaviniścaya Chapter II.

4) Sanskrit fragment is found in the Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara ad Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5, and many other places.

5) Sanskrit fragment is found in the Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra of Prajñākaragupta (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, ed. by R. Sānkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953), p. 580.

6) Cf. Karṇakagomin, Pramāṇavārttika-Tīkā, p. 14: kim punāh kvaicit tarkāśātre draṣṭāṃ niyamārtham vacanam ity atā āha / sajāṭīya evetyādi / tatra yaḥ san sajāṭīye dvedhā cāsams tadatyaye sa hetur ity (PS III. 22) atrācāryiye hetulkṣaṇe / sajāṭīya eva sattvam ity avadhāranena siddhe’pi vijāṭiyād vipakṣād dhe- tor vyatireke yad etad asams tadatyaya iti sādhyaḥbhāve sattvavacanam tan niyamārtham acāryena vyākhyātam asaty eva nāstīta yathā syān nānyatra na viruddha iti / atethāpi dharmvacanam bhāvanīyamārtham āśamkyate / (…).

By the restriction [in the second characteristic of traṅgupya:] “sajāṭīya eva sattvam” the exclusion (vyatireka) of the reason (hetu) from the dissimilar class (vijāṭīya=vipakṣa) (i.e. the third characteristic) is established, yet the absence of [the reason] in the absence of what is to be proved (sādhya) (i.e. the third characteristic) is stated [again] by [PS III. 22:] “asaṃs tadatyaya” [in the definition of a valid reason]. The Teacher [Dignāga] justifies it as having the purpose of restriction (niyama) [of the meaning of the term ‘asat’ (i.e. sādhya-bhāva)] by saying “asaty eva nāstīta yathā syān nānyatra na viruddhe.”

Cf. also Śākyabuddhi’s Tīkā (Derge 7b1–b3): yang ci rtogs pa’i bstan bcos la la las grub bzhin du brnan pa’i phyir yang smos pa lta mthong ngam zhe na / mthun pa kho na la zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / slob dpön phyogs kyi glang po’i mtshan nyid ni phyogs kyi chos [d: 7b2] gang zhig mthun pa la yod la de
med pa la med pa de ni gtan tshigs yin no zhes bya ba yin no // de la ni mthun pa kho na la yod pa zhes bya ba'i nges par gzung ba 'di kho nas gtan tshigs mi mthun pa las ldog pa grub mod kyi / de med pa la med pa zhes bsgrub par bya ba med pa la med pa [7b3] smos pa gang yin pa de ni med pa kho na la med pa yin gyi 'gal ba la yang ma yin la de las gzhan pa la yang ma yin no zhes brnan pa'i phyir yin te / de lta bas na brnan pa yin par dogs pa bstsal ba'i phyir nye bar btags pa yin no //

7) For references see my paper "On Trairûpya Formulae".

8) See for example Jinendrabuddhi's Ţikā on PS II.5cd (Derge 93b–94a): de mtshung la yod gyur (= tattulye saddhāvah) ni rjes su 'gro ba (= anvaya) mtshon par rig par bya ste // rjes su 'gro ba ni tshul gnyis pa'o zhes pa'o // ... rjes su 'gro ba zhes bya ba ni rtags la rtags can yod pa kho na ste // ... med pa la med pa nyid (= asati nāstiti) ni ldog pa (= vyatireka) nye bar mtshon par yang bta bar bya'o // ldog pa yang tshul gsum pa'o ... //

Cf. also Tarkabhāṣā (of Mokṣākaragupta, ed by Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore 1944) pp. 24–26: anumeyeyā sattvam eva niṣcitam ...(tad ekam rūpaṁ pakṣadharmamatāsāṁjñakam / ... sapakṣa eva sattvam niṣcitam ity anvayasamjñakam dvitiyam rūpaṁ / ... tatra (= asapakṣe) asattvam eva niṣcitam vyatirekasamjñakam śṛtiyaṁ rūpaṁ /


12) For Sanskrit fragment, see Hetubindu-Tikā (ed. by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jivnivayaji, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series CXIII, Baroda 1949) p. 18.

13) N.B.: NMukh does not contain such a definition of niyama or vyāpti.

14) NMukh k. 2: 宗法於同品 謂有非有俱 於異品各三 有非有及二＝PS III. 9: sapakṣe sāna asan dvēdha pakṣadharmah punas tridhā / pratyekam asapakṣe ca sadasaddvidhatvataḥ // (Quoted in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭhikā ad NS 1. 1. 35 and PVA p. 580).

NMukh (Taisho p. 1b): 因與似因多是宗法 Quoted in the Nyāyavārttika ad Nyāyasūtra 1.1.35: hetuḥ tadbhūso vā prāyaḥ pakṣadhharma eva bhavati.
Cf. PS III. 8: *sādhyadharma* yato hetus tadābhāsaś ca bhūyasā / tasmāt tad vistarah pūrvaṁ hetvādyarthāt pradarsyate // Quoted in the *Pramāṇavārttikā* p. 580.

15) Quoted in the *Pramāṇavārttikā* p. 580; *Hetubinduṭikā* p. 11, Dharmottarapradīpa p. 97 reads: samudāyasya sādhyatvād dharmamātre ca . . .

16) As a matter of fact, Dharmakirti went back to the old terminology ‘pakṣadharma’ when he first defined hetu in *Pramāṇavārttikā* I. 1ab1: *pakṣadharma* mas tadamśena vyāpto hetuḥ. In Nyāyabindu II. 5, however, he defines the first characteristic as lingasyānumeye sattvam eva [niścitam], which echoes the definition in PS II. 5cd.


18) See for example Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

19) It is to be noted that Dharmakirti does not agree with Dignāga’s definition of vipakṣa. According to him, vipakṣa / asapakṣa is what is not sapakṣa, which includes what is different from or incompatible with sapakṣa as well as absence of sapakṣa. See for example, Nyāyabindu II. 11–12: na sapakṣo 'sapatḥaś // tato'nyas tadviruddhas tadabhāvaś ceti //.

20) Praśastapāda’s formulae of the *traitrūpya* (anumeyena sambaddham, tadanvite prasiddham, tadbhāve nāsty eva) seems to support our interpretation of the logical subject of asati. For reference see my paper “On Trairūpya Formulæ”, p. 163.

21) Jinendrabuddhi’s *Ṭikā* (D94a): ’dir med pa’i sgras de dang mtshungs pa’i med pa brjod par bya ba ’ba’ zhig ma yin gyi / ’on kyang de las gzhan pa dang de dang ’gal ba yang ste de’i rnam pas dben pa’i phyir ro zhes rig par bya’o //

22) I have discussed the matter in my paper presented at the XIIth IABS conference in Lausanne in August 1999.

23) See *Hetubindu* (ed. by Ernst Steinkellner, Wien 1967, Teil I) p. 34.

24) One final remark on Oetke’s book (p. 52): He seems to have some difficulty in identifying the two Chinese expressions which appear in NMukh (Taisho p. 2c), namely, 遮詮 and 止濁; they correspond to paryudāsa and prasajyapratiṣedha, which can be proven from the parallel passage in PS-Vṛtti IV. 3. This fact has been pointed out by Yasunori Ejima, *Chūgan Shisō no Tenkai—Bhāva-viveka Kenkyū—*, Tokyo 1980, p. 117.

I would like to thank Prof. Jonathan Silk for correcting my English and giving me several important suggestions.

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