Dignāga’s Criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka Theory of Perception

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When dealing with problems of perception in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga makes an attempt to refute various theories maintained by different schools. The Mīmāṃsakas is exposed, no less than other schools, to the severe criticism of Dignāga. This paper is intended for tracing main arguments developed therein by Dignāga with the purpose of repudiating the Mīmāṃsaka theory of perception.

At the outset, Dignāga makes reference to the Mīmāṃsaka definition of perception.

[A] The Mīmāṃsakas maintain as follows: ‘When man’s senses are in contact with existence (sat), there is the origination of a cognition; that [cognition] is the perception.’ [K, 106b.2-4; V, 25a.3 (25a.7-8)]

The Mīmāṃsaka statement herein referred to is the first half of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I, i, 4, the latter half of which runs as follows: ‘And it is not the means of knowing Dharma, because its function consists in apprehending what is actually present.’ According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s interpretation, this sūtra is meant for just explaining the incompetency of perception as the means of knowing Dharma and not for giving the definition of


2) MS, I, i, 4: sat-samprayoge puṇuṣasyendriyānāṁ buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam animittāṁ vidyamānāḥ palambhanatvāt.

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perception. On this point he contradicts the Vṛttikāra who, dividing the sūtra into two parts, construes the first half thereof as the definition of perception. If the perception, Kumārila observes, is characterized merely as the origination of a cognition following from the contact of sense with existence, then there will be no way to distinguish an erroneous perception from the valid one, because even such cognition as of silver for really a white conch-shell is found to be a product of the contact of sense with what exists. As the term ‘sat-samprayoga’ (the contact of sense with existence) is effective only to set aside the perception in a dream, it is untenable to take the sūtra in question as the definition of perception.

Kumārila, in his construction of the sūtra, is in agreement with Śabaravāmin, who takes the import of the compound ‘sat-samprayoga’ as ‘sati samprayoge (=satiṇḍriyārtha-sambandhe)’, viz., when there is the sense-object contact, and not as ‘sata samprayogah’, viz., the contact (of sense) with existence. There are some who, against Śabaravāmin’s interpretation, assert that the locative ‘samprayoge’ is, by itself, well expressive of the condition under which the perception arises. Kumārila hereupon lays emphasis on that the sense-object contact takes place at the present time: —the object which comes into contact with sense must be actually present (sat = vidya-

3) Kumārila’s interpretation of the sūtra is reduced by Sucarita Miśra to the following formulae: a) pratyakṣam animittaṁ, vidyamāṇopalambhanatvāt. b) pratyakṣaṁ vidyamāṇopalambhanatvāṁ, sat-samprayoga-jaṭavāt. c) pratyakṣaṁ sat-samprayoga-jaṭaṁ, pratyakṣaṭvāt, cf. ŚVK, ad IV, 21 (p. 210).

4) ŠVK, ad IV, 1: tad idam vṛtty-antare ‘nimittad avacchidya tat pratyakṣam ity evam antaṁ lakṣaṇa-paraṁ vyākhyātam. This Vṛttikāra is, according to Pārthasārathi Miśra, named Bhavadāsa, cf. NR, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 133: Bhavādāsaṣeinatāt sūtraṁ dvidhā kartvā sat-samprayoge ity evam ādi tat pratyakṣam ity evam antaṁ pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-param. .

5) ŚV, IV, 10-11:
na caopy anena sūtreṇa pratyakṣam lakṣyeates phūtām /
tad-abhāse 'pi tulyatvat svapna-jañānai-varjanat //
tad dhūndriyārtha-samyoga-vyāpāreṇa vinā bhavet /
kenacit samprayoga tu bhṛnty-ādiḥ syāt niyogataḥ //

6) cf. Śabarabhāṣya, ad MS, I, i, 4.
māna). Thus, according to Kumārila, the compound ‘sat-samprayoga’ is significant of denying the possibility of the perception of Yogins, which is thought to be operative upon the past or future object.

Now, judging from that Dignāga regards the first half of the sūtra as a definition of perception, it is conjectured that his attack is turned against the predecessors of Śabaravāmin including the Vṛttikāra. He is unconscious of Śabaravāmin’s view, to say nothing of Kumārila’s. Special mention is made of the Vṛttikāra, but no other particular name is referred to in his discourse.

With twelve verses and the commentary thereupon, Dignāga passes strictures upon every term used in the above Mimāṁsaka definition. He treats the term ‘existence’ (sat) in verses 1–4, ‘contact’ (samprayoga) in verse 5, ‘origination of a cognition’ (buddhi-janman) in verses 6–11 and ‘man’ or ‘soul’ (puruṣa) in verse 12. First of all, the superfluity of the term ‘existence’ is pointed out as follows:

[Ba] Now,

if [the Mimāṁsakas are of the opinion that the term] ‘existence’ (sat) is [used in the sūtra] with the purpose of excluding ‘non-existence’ (dsat), [then their opinion does not hold good, because] it is naturally comprehended [by the effect of the term ‘contact’ that the ‘non-existence’ is excluded]. Under any circumstance, a sense comes into contact with ‘existence’ only [and never with ‘non-existence’].

[Therefore,] it is improper to mention [the term] ‘existence’ with the

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7) cf. ŚV, IV, 26–36.
8) It seems that Śabaravāmin puts his interpretation upon the sūtra without bearing Dignāga’s opinion in mind. From this we infer that Śabaravāmin is not much-younger than Dignāga, whose date may be settled at ca. 470–530 A. D., cf. my article, ディグナーーガ及びその周辺の年代（堺本博士築基記念佛教史學論集所収）I hereupon propose to assign Śabaravāmin to ca. 490–550 A. D.
9) k. 1: sad ity asad-vyudāsāya na niyogat sa gaṁsyate / samprayogo hi niyamāt mata evāpadyate // cf. ŚVK, NR, ad IV, 36.
view to negating [the contact of senses with] 'non-existence'. [K, 106b. 3-4; V, 25a.3-4 (25a.8 -25b.1)]

Evidently Dignāga takes the compound 'sat-samprayoga' as implying 'sata samprayogah', and the view that the term 'sat' is effective to reject the perception of Yogins is not taken into consideration by him. It is obvious that Kumārila, being conscious of this criticism, put a new interpretation upon the sūtra.

Now the Mīmāṃsakas try to vindicate the sūtra by asserting that the term 'sat' stands for the object of sense in general. This view, however, is not traced in any extant literature of the Mīmāṃsakas. Anyway, Dignāga assails this view through the following argument.

[BB] If [it should be maintained that the term 'existence'] implies the counterparts [of senses],

As the mere statement that 'senses are in contact' would induce man to query as to what are [the objects] with which senses come into contact, it should be made clear that [senses] come into contact with their counterparts. [Thus] the term 'existence' is employed [in the sūtra] for the purpose of indicating the counterparts of senses.——Even if [the Mīmāṃsakas] assert in this way, [the infelicity of expression of the sūtra is not excused at all, because]

[the counterparts of senses] should be expressed [clearly] by [the names of] those which are determined (viśeṣa) by the senses.

Only those things which are determined by the senses, [i.e., colour, taste etc.] are deservedly called the counterparts of senses. [Therefore the sūtra should have mentioned definitely that man's senses are in contact with colour etc. instead of implying the counterparts of senses ambiguously by the term 'existence'.] [K, 106b. 4-6; V, 25a.4-5 (25b.1-2)]

The Mīmāṃsakas do not maintain that the sense-object contact is the only necessary condition of the perceptual knowledge. The sense-organs

10) k. 2a: / ci ste zla po bstan phyir yin /
11) k. 2b : / dbaṅ po(ḥi) khyad par can brjod kyis /
must be connected with the mind, and the mind with the soul, so that the knowledge may be produced in the soul. Accordingly, the ‘existence’, the contact with which is productive of a knowledge, is not confined to the object of sense. The senses and the mind are as well connoted by the term ‘existence’. This view of the Mīmāṃsākas is now examined by Dignāga.

[Bc] [The Mīmāṃsākas may try to justify the term ‘existence’, arguing as follows: ——] Here, [in the sūtra,] not merely the contact of senses with such objects as colour and the like, but also that of the mind (manas) with the senses and that of the soul (atman) with the mind are implied by the term ‘contact’. [Although the mention is made of ‘senses’ only, it must be taken as synecdoche (upalakṣaṇa). Accordingly, the composer of the sūtra] used the term ‘existence’, thereby implying all-inclusively [those with which either of the mind and the soul come into contact].

Even if the above interpretation is put [upon the sūtra by the Mīmāṃsākas, we observe that] it again is untenable, [because]

- it is never inadmissible, that[the senses, the mind and the soul can be in contact with ‘existence’ only.

It has already been proved that the soul (puruṣa), [the mind and the senses] come into contact solely with ‘existence’ because they can never operate upon ‘non-existence’.

[The Mīmāṃsākas may oppose our argument, citing an instance of seeing a mirage. The fact that a traveller in the desert sometimes sees the water, which really does not exist, shows undeniably that a sense is able to come into contact with non-existence as well as with existence. Ac-
cordingly, it is inadmissible to say that the soul operates merely upon ‘existence’ and never upon ‘non-existence’. However, we are ready to reply to this Mīmāṃsaka objection.] When a mirage and the like, which really do not exist, are cognized through the apparent perception, nothing, in fact, is in contact with ‘non-existence’. Nevertheless the apparent perception is produced through the following process: ——A certain spot [in the desert] is, at a certain time, in a peculiar condition owing to the heat of the sun. When eyes are in contact with this [spot, what is seen is] indescribable [in itself, but] the illusory mind, which functions of its own accord, constructs gradually [the determinate knowledge that the object seen is the water, despite that there is no real water. It thus is the mind that produces an apparent perception. Such being the case, there is no contact of the visual sense with ‘non-existence’ even in the case of seeing a mirage.] Consequently, we can hardly approve of [the Mīmāṃsaka interpretation that the term ‘existence’ in the sūtra is meant for] excluding ‘non-existence’.

[16b.6–107a.1 ; V, 25a.5–25b.1 (25b.2–6)]

Leaving out Dignāga’s further arguments against the Mīmāṃsaka interpretation of ‘sat’, we proceed to trace his critique of the concept of ‘contact’.

[C] [Now the meaning of the term ‘contact’ (samprayoga) in the sūtra will be examined.]

*If [the term ‘contact’ implies that the senses come into] direct contact with their respective objects in all cases, [then it is improper to employ*

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15) J, 76b. 2 (86a. 5-6) : *bstan par bya ba ma yin pa sges pas ran gi mtshan nid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin pa nid kyi phyir ro/


17) [Bd-a]: K, 107a. 1-5; V, 25b. 1-3 (25b. 6-26a. 1). [Bd-b]: K, 107a. 5-8; V, 25b. 3-5 (26a. 1-4) have been omitted.
this term in the definition of perception.) In the cases of [seeing] colour (rūpa) [through the visual sense] and [hearing] sound (śabda) [through the auditory sense], the objects which are distant (sāntara) [from] or larger (adhika) [than the sense] are found apprehended. The apprehension in these cases is at variance with [the apprehension of the object through] the immediate [contact of the sense with it].

If it should be maintained that the sense must come into direct contact in every case with its object, there would be no [possibility of the] apprehension of colour and that of sound [being caused, for their contact with the senses are not direct.] Both visual and auditory senses apprehend colour and sound together with intervenig space and also apprehend those objects which are larger than themselves. These two senses are never found to apprehend their objects directly with no interveing space, as is the case with apprehending smell (gandha) through the olfactory sense. (K, 107a. 8-107b.2; V, 25b. 5-7 (26a. 4-5))

There is a divergence of opinion among schools in regard to the sense-object contact as a condition of perceptual knowledge. The Buddhists establish the theory that the senses of sight and hearing function without actual contact with the objects. In other words, both visual and auditory senses are ‘distance receptors’ (aprāpyakārin), while other senses require immediate contact with their objects (prāpyakārin). Again, they hold that the eye and the ear, unlike the senses of smell, taste and touch, can perceive objects much larger than themselves. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsakas are in concert with the Naiyāyikas in holding that all senses act in actual contact with their objects. The visual sense reaches out to its object, and the auditory sense comes into contact with the sound-waves sent by the object. As to the rest, there may be no question. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka theory

18) k.5: / kun tu don dañ phrad grañ na // gzugs sgra bar du chod pa dañ /
   / chen po bañ ḫsin par mthoṅ bas na // bar du ma chod pa la gnod / (V)
19) cf. Abhidharmakośa, I, k. 44:
   cakṣu-srotā-mano 'prāpta-viśayaṁ trayam anyatha /
   tribhir ghrāṅ'ādibhis tulya-viśaya-grāhaṇāṁ matam //
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is not acceptable from the Buddhist viewpoint. Dignāga offers the same criticism to the Naiyāyikas too.

\[20] According to a certain Mīmāṃsā advocate, the assemblage (sāṃ-agrt) of the factors of cognition is the means of cognition (pramāṇa), because the cognition as the resulted content is produced through the instrumentality of it.

The Vṛttikāra holds the opinion that the cognition as the resulted content is different [from the means of cognition]. As there is, he maintains, no other result than the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman), what gives rise to a cognition must be regarded as the means of cognition. And, at the time [of the origination of a cognition], nothing can be its cause but the above-said conjunction (samprayoga) of the soul and other [factors, viz., mind, sense-organ and object], which has been defined as the perception (pratyakṣa), together with the impulse [to produce a cognition, which is given to the soul by that conjunction. Therefore, it is the assemblage of above-mentioned four factors that should be recognized as the means of perception.]

\[21] This argument, is not free from being exposed to our criticism.

Should it and none other be [the perception],

In case the assemblage of factors and none other should be called the perception,

what would be the use of the term ‘origination of a cognition’ (buddhi-janman) [in the sūtra]?

If [the perception as the means of cognition should be taken in the sense] as has been explained [by the Vṛttikāra], then the sūtra should

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21) Owing to limited space, the explanations will be omitted henceforward.
22) k. 6a-b: / blo yi rgyu yi tshogs pa dag // brjod las ḥgrol ḥahi tshad ma gaṅ /
23) k. 6c-d: / gaṅ las ci ste ḥdi ḥiṇ na // de blo skye ba ci ḥṣig bya /
have [simply] stated that man's sense which is in contact with existence is the perception. In such case, what is the use of the term 'origination of a cognition', which has been explained above as being resulted from that [sense-object contact? The cognition as the resulted content being assumed by him to be different from the means of cognition, the sūtra which is intended for giving the definition of the perception as the means, should have omitted the unnecessary term implying the result.]

[It may be argued that the term 'origination of a cognition' is necessary so that such sense-object contact that is not productive of any result may be excluded. However, there is no need of such consideration, as the sense-object contact does never fail to produce the perceptual knowledge.]

(K, 107b. 2-5; V, 25b.7-26a.3 (26a.6-26b.1))

[Db] Further, [the above argument involves the following difficulty].

_inasmuch as [the Vṛttikāra maintains that] the object, the sense, the mind and the self, which are conjoined with each other, along with the impulse [to produce cognition should be considered as the means of cognition, he must be asked] why the assemblage [of these factors] of the origination of a cognition should be called 'praty-akṣa' (being direct to the sense) [instead of being called 'prati-sāmagri' (being direct to the assemblage) or otherwise].

The assemblage of all these [factors] is not fit to be called 'praty-akṣa', which literally means what functions in direct connecton with each sense (ākṣam aksam prati vartate). The characteristic feature of the per-

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24) cf. J, 78a. 2-3 (87b.8-88a.1).
25) k. 7:/ gañ tshe don dañ dbañ po yid// skyes bu sbyor ba ḡdu byed ldan / /blo skyе ḡa yi tshogs pa la // mion sum brjod pa de ci ltar /
26) This is Dignāga's etymological explanation of 'pratyakṣa', cf. Nyāyamukha (Chin. version), Taishō, XXXI, p. 3b: 現現別轉故名現量, Prasannapada, p. 72, Dharmottarapradipa, p. 38, Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjika, ad k. 1237. cf. also my paper, Dignāga's Theory of Direct Knowledge (henceforth referred to as DTDK), Bulletin of the Univ. of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7, p. 6, note 13.
ception (pratyakṣa) as the means of cognition consists, as the term itself signifies, in the contact of the sense with its object, and the contact of the mind with the sense as well as that of the self with the mind are not to be regarded as the means of perceptual knowledge.

[Against this criticism the Vṛttikāra may raise the following objection: even when] the sense-object contact alone is thought to be the perception, that contact, [although] being effective to apprehend the object, rests on the basis of two factors, [i.e., the sense and the object,] and does not take place on the foundation of the sense alone; [hence the sense-object contact does neither befit the term ‘praty-akṣa’. This dissenting] opinion, [however,] should not be admitted. [As we have already stated, the sense-object contact can be properly called ‘praty-akṣa’ on the ground that the sense is the specific factor of perception while the object is common to other means of cognition.] (K, 107b. 5-7 ; V, 26a. 3-4 (26b. 1-3))

[Dc] [In order to vindicate the sūtra, the Vṛttikāra construes the term ‘cognition’ (buddhi) as the immediate awareness of an object and its determinant, and distinguishes it from the determinate cognition to be resulted therethrough.] The perception, [he explains,] is that through the instrumentality of which the determination (niścaya) of a certain [object, which is expressible in the form of a judgement] ‘this is a cow’, ‘this is a horse’ or the like, is produced. [As the determinate cognition is resulted by conjoining the object with its determinant, the immediate awareness of these two factors must be the instrument of the determination. Therefore, he concludes, the term ‘cognition’ in the sūtra is not unnecessary insofar as it is taken in the above sense.]

[This interpretation] again is not tenable.

Granting it to be true that one recognizes an object as a cow when it is conjoined with the cow-ness (gotva), the sensory apprehension (akṣa-buddhi) is devoid of the faculty (śakti) of conjoining [the determinant]

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27) PS, I, k. 4a-b: asādhaṇa-hetutvād aṅkais tad vyapadiṣyate. cf. PSV, ad I, 4a–b, DTDK, p. 11.

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with the thing [perceived by itself. Therefore the determinate cognition cannot be resulted by the sensory apprehension.]

According to the opponent’s view, the sensory apprehension is competent to get an immediate awareness (ālocana) of a cow itself shorn of any determinant as well as of that upon which it depends (āśraya), [i.e., its determinant ‘cow-ness’]. Admitting that this view is right so far, it is impossible [for the sensory apprehension] to conjoin these two factors together. And where there is no conjunction of a bare thing with its determinant, there can be no means of determining that thing to be, for instance, a cow. In conclusion, we consider that all sorts of conceptual knowledge concerning the relation of the determinant and the determined (viśeṣāna-viśeṣya) or of the name and the named (abhidhāna-abhidheya) are but the subjective construction (upacāra) of the mind, and they are not within the range of sensory apprehension. For,

it is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form that becomes the object of

sense.

Although the thing to be apprehended by the sense is composed of many elements, what presents itself to the sense is a particular (asadharana) form, which causes the cognition thereof to originate. [This particular form pre-

28) k. 8:// ba lañ ŋid sogls ldan las don // ba lañ la sogls ḫjal bar byed // don dañ yañ dag ḫbrel pa la // dbañ pohi blo ni nus yod min // The same argument is found in PSV, I, ad Vaiśeṣika Section k. 1a-b. cf. my paper, ザイシン・オーケンの知覚説に対するディクターガの批判 (大倉山學院紀要掲載豫定). Jinen-
drabuddhi, in the course of his comment on Dignāga’s Vṛtti annexed to this verse, says as follows:/ ḫo na gzegs zan brtag par don ḫdi / yul la lta don can ŋid kyi phyir / khyad par rnams kyis mtshams sbyor min / (PS, I, Vaiśeṣika Section k. 1a-b) šes pa bṣad zin pa kho na ste/ de slar yañ brjod pa ci še’ na/ de kho na/ raṅ gi rigs bya šes pa la sogls pas bar ma chad par ḫgyur bahi rigs pas / šin tu gsal bar byas paži don duḥo / J. 79a. 2-3 (89a. 2-3).

29) k. 9a-b:// rig bya raṅ ŋid bstan med pa/ / gzugs don dbañ pohi spyod yul lo / This verse exactly coincides with PS, I, k. 5c-d: svasaṁvedyam anir- 
deśyaṁ rūpam īḍriya-gocaraḥ / cf. DTDK, p. 13, note 34. cf. also J, 79a. 
5-6 (89a. 7): raṅ gis rig bya ni šes pa la sogls pas......ḥdi yan du maḥi no 
boḥi chos can ni (dharminѹ neka-rūpasya......PS, I, k. 5) šes pa ḫdiḥi nañ 
du bṣad zin to /
sented to the sense is deemed, from another point of view, to be the objective side of the cognition itself and, therefore, is self-cognizable or self-luminous like the cognition itself. [That is to say, the cognition of this particular form does not connote any subject-object relation in its constitution.] As such, [the object of the sense] is inexpressible, because what is expressible is only the universal properties of the object. (K, 107b. 7-108a. 4 ; V, 26a.4—26b.2 (26b.3—27a.1))

[De] If it should be maintained that (the means of cognition consists in) the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman),

[Now the Mīmāṁsakas may harbor] a doubt [against our argument, asserting] that the perception is learnt universally to be the origination of a cognition concerning a certain thing. Confronting this doubt, we answer as follows: [if the origination of a cognition should be considered to be the means of cognition (pramāṇa),]

those who maintain that the result is different from the means would get into self-contradiction, for it would then be impossible to find the result other [than the means].

Why is it impossible?

Now that the very cognition has originated, [there is] no [need of any] other result being produced.

The result to be produced through the means of cognition is the apprehension (adhibhāsa) [of an object], which, however, is nothing else than the cognition (buddhi). Accordingly, should the cognition [itself] be regarded as the means of cognition, there could be no result [to be distinguished from that means, and the Mīmāṁsakas would inevitably be led to the disaffirmance of the theory that the means and the result of cognition are different from each other]. (K, 108a. 1-3 ; V, 26b. 6-27a. 1 (27a. 6-8))

[Df] In case the 'origination' (janman) is distinguished from the 'cog-
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nition’ (buddhi), [then it must be recognized that the former is the effect (kārya) of the latter. As the relation of an effect to its cause (kāraṇa) is thought to be the intimate relation (samavāya), it follows that the ‘origination’ is intimately related to its own cause, [namely the ‘cognition’. Accordingly, it may well be conceived here that the ‘origination’ is resulted through the instrumentality of the intimate relation, which, in this respect,] is [deemed to be] the means (pramāṇa) [in regard to the ‘origination’ of a cognition]. Even so, however, how can [the intimate relation, which is perpetually present (nitya),] be the means [of the ‘origination’ which naturally is limited in time]?  

The Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that the ‘origination’ as the effect [of a cognition] is intimately related either to its own cause, viz., the cognition, or to the universal existence (sattā), [attribute-ness (gunaṭva), cognitiveness (buddhiṭva)] and so on, [which are the universals related to the cognition. On this point the Mīmāṃsakas are in concert with them.]  

There, if we admit, in accordance with their view, that the ‘origination’ of a sensory apprehension is resulted through that intimate relation, then it follows as a necessary consequence that the intimate relation is the means [in regard to the origination] of a perceptual knowledge. In fact, however, the intimate relation, being perpetually present, has no concern with the ‘origination’. Accordingly, it hardly stands to reason to presume that the origination of a sensory apprehension is resulted through  

36) k. 11a-c: / gal te blo las skye gṣan na // raṅ gi rgyu la ḡdu ba ste // tshad ma yin yaṅ gaṅ las der / cf. NR, ad IV, 53: yadi buddher arthātaraṁ janma, tat kim vaiśesikoktaṁ kāraṇe kāryasya samavāya iti cen na. tasya nityatvenāksanadhinatvāt prayakṣatvānupapatteḥ. cf. also ŚVK, ad IV, 53.  
37) cf. J, 80b. 1 (90b. 5)  
38) J, 80b. 2 (90b. 5): dpyod pa pa rnam s kyis kyaṅ dehi (=ka na bhu dzā yi) lugs kho na la brtend to /
the instrumentality of the intimate relation in either case [when the origination is intimately related to the cognition or to the universal existence and so on].

If, [on the other hand, the 'origination' is] not distinguished [from the cognition], then the term 'origination' will be meaningless.

In case the origination does not differ from the cognition, [then the purport of the sūtra will be well conveyed by the term 'cognition' alone.] As the term 'cognition' is expressive of that the cognition is the means of perceptual knowledge, it does not make any sense to reiterate the import by the term 'origination'. [K, 108a.3-6; V, 27a.1-3 (27a.8-27b.3)]

[E] If the soul should come to be modified at the time when a cognition originates, then it would be non-eternal.

If it be maintained that the soul (puruṣa) operates upon the object, changing its previous state due to the origination of a cognition, the soul must be recognized as transient (anitya). This assumption, however, is inadmissible [for the Mīmāṃsakas who maintain the eternity of the soul].

If, on the other hand, the soul should remain unmodified even when a cognition originates, it cannot be a cognizer (pramāṇa).

It again is inconsistent to maintain that the unchangeable soul, which, even at the moment of the origination of a cognition, does not alter its previous state of non-cognizerhood, is nevertheless presumed to be a cognizer. [K, 108a.6-109a.1; V, 27a.3-4 (27b.3-6)]

The theories of perception set forth by others do not, as have been examined above, establish that the very perception is the means of valid cognition, as many faulty expressions are found therein.

39) k. 11d: ci ste gaṇ min brjod don med / cf. NR, ŚVK, ad IV, 53.