

# DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SĀMĀKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

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## FOREWORD

In the first chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), criticizes theories of perception formulated in the *Vādaividhi* and by the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhyas and the Mīmāṃsakas.<sup>1)</sup> This paper is intended for providing readers with critical edition of Tibetan texts along with an annotated translation of the portion of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti*, Chapter I, wherein the Sāṃkhyia theory of perception is criticized. In preparing this edition, the following have been collated:-

- K: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-paḥi ḥgrel-pa*, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-pa śes-rab, Peking Ed., TTRI<sup>2)</sup>, Vol. 130, No. 5702.  
V: *ditto*, Tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ-rgyal, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5701, Sde-dge Ed., Tōhoku No. 4204.  
Kk: *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa*, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-paḥi śes-rab, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5700.  
Vk: *ditto*, Tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Ṣa-ma seṅ-rgyal, Sde-dge Ed., Tōhoku No. 4203.

The verses of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* have been printed in italics and numbered in order. The whole text has been divided for convenience' sake into paragraphs A.....K, and some of them have been subdivided. In translating the text, K has been followed in principle, and constant reference has been made to V. Passages where the present writer has adopted V have been marked with (V... ..V). As Dignāga's exposition is very condensed in most cases, the writer has inserted between lines many explanatory words, which have

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1) Some portions have been translated and studied in M. Hattori, Dignāga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, *Bulletin of the Univ. of Osaka Prefecture*, Ser. C, Vol. 7, do., "Ronki" no Chikaku-setsu ni taisuru Dignāga no Hihan (Dignāga's Criticism of the Vādaividhi's Theory of Perception), *Syūkyō Kenkyū* (yet unpublished) and, H. Kitagawa, Shōri-gakuha no Genrō-setsu ni taisuru Jinna no Hihan (Dignāga's Criticism of the Nyāya Theory of Perception), *Nagoya-Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyū-Ronshū*, Tetsugaku, Vol. XXI.

2) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, reprinted and published by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo—Kyoto.

been placed in brackets [ ]. These explanatory words have been supplemented mostly on the basis of the following:-

J: Jinedrabuddhi, *Viśālāmalavati-nāma Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭikā*, Tibetan Version, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4268, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 139, No. 5766.

#### TIBETAN TEXTS

D: Sde-dge Edition. P: Peking Edition. As K and Kk are not available in D, P alone has been used. However, some words have been corrected at the discretion of the editor. In these cases, the original readings have been given in the footnote. As regards V, D and P have been collated, and the editor has not made any further correction, although some wrong readings are noticeable.

K Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5702.

V Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5701.  
(Sde-dge Ed., Tōhoku No. 4204)

A. [102b, 7] // ser skya pa [8] rnams  
kyi yañ rna ba la sogs pa hjug pa ni  
mñon sum du ḥdod de / rna ba dañ pags  
pa dañ / lce dañ / sna rnams yid kyi  
byin gyis brlabs nas / sgra dañ reg bya  
dañ gzugs dañ ro dañ / [103a, 1] dri  
rnams la go rim ji lta ba bñin du ḥdzin  
pa la hjug pa ni mñon sum gyi tshad  
maḥo šes zer ba /

Ba. de rnams kyi ltar na yañ dbaṅ po  
rnams // <sup>(1... ...1)</sup> *thug med* (k. la<sub>1</sub>) / de dag gis  
ni dbaṅ po gšan gyi [2] gzuñ bya yul  
ma yin pa ñid kyis dbaṅ po rnams rañ  
gi yul la hjug par ḥdod pa yin no //  
yon tan gsum ḥphel ba dañ ḥgrib pa  
tsam gyi khyad par las sgra la sogs  
paḥi rigs tha dad paḥi phyir // [3] sgra  
gcig kho naḥi yon tan ḥphel ba dañ  
ḥgrib pa tsam gyis mthaḥ yas paḥi  
phyir / ḥdzin pa po dbaṅ po mthaḥ yas  
par khas blaṅ bar bya dgos so /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. *thug pa med pa(ham)*

Bb. <sup>(1... ...1)</sup> / *yañ na dbaṅ po gcig* (k. la<sub>2</sub>) /  
ci ste der<sup>2)</sup> yon tan [4] gsum tha mi

[21b, 5] / <sup>(D. 21b, 6)</sup> ser skya pa rnams kyis ni  
rna ba la sogs paḥi hjug pa mñon sum  
du ḥdod do // rna ba dañ pags pa dañ  
mig dañ lce dañ sna rnams yid kyis  
byin gyis brlabs nas yul la hjug pa ste  
/ sgra dañ [6] reg bya dañ gzugs dañ  
ro dañ dri da ltar ba rnams la go rim  
bñin du ḥdzin pa ni mñon sum gyi  
tshad maḥo šes so /

/ de dag gi ltar na yañ dbaṅ po  
rnams kyi <sup>1)</sup> *thug pa med paḥam* / de  
dag gis ni dbaṅ po<sup>2)</sup> gšan gyi gzuñ  
bya yul ma [7] yin pa nid kyis rañ gi  
yul la hjug paḥi dbaṅ po ḥdod pa yin  
la yon tan gsum gyi ḥphel ba dañ  
<sup>(D. 22a)</sup> ḥgrib pa tsam gyis tha dad las sgra  
la sogs paḥi rigs tha dad ces ḥdod de /  
sgra gcig pu yañ yon tan gyi ḥphel  
ḥgrib [8] kyi tha dad kyis *thug pa*  
*med paḥi phyir dbaṅ po dpag tu med*  
*pas ḥdzin par khas blaṅ bar byaḥo* /

<sup>1)</sup> D. om. śad    <sup>2)</sup> P. poḥi

/ *yañ na dbaṅ gcig ḥgyur* / ci ste der  
yon tan gsum tha mi dad pas rigs gcig

dad paḥi phyir rigs tha mi dad pa de  
lta yin na / sgraḥi khyad par ḥdzin pa  
bṣin du reg bya la sogs paḥaṅ<sup>3)</sup> ḥdzin  
par thal baḥi phyir dbaṅ po gcig ṇid  
thob pa ste / khyad par thams cad la  
yon tan [5] gsum khyad par med paḥi  
phyir ro // gaṅ gi phyir gaṅ sgra kho  
na la ḥgyur gyi reg bya la sogs pa  
rnams la ni ma yin no ṣes bya ba yon  
tan gsum las gṣan paḥi sgraḥi rigs med  
pas thams cad la yon tan gsum las gṣan  
paḥi rigs med pas thams cad la yon tan  
[6] gsum khyad par med paḥi phyir ro /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. (pa)ḥam dbaṅ gcig ḥgyur

<sup>2)</sup> P. de <sup>3)</sup> P. par

Ca. / ci ltar med de /<sup>1)</sup> gaṅ gi tshe  
sṇin stobs la sogs paḥi dbyibs kyis  
khyad par gyis sgra la sogs pa la ni  
tha dad pa yin te / sgraḥi rigs la ni  
tha mi dad paḥi dbyibs yod [7] pa yin  
la reg bya la sogs pa rnams las<sup>2)</sup> ni  
tha dad paḥo // rigs de yaṅ rnam pa  
ḥjug paḥi gzuṅ bar bya ba yin la / de  
bṣin du reg bya la sogs pa rnams la  
yaṅ yin no // deḥi phyir ji skad bśad  
paḥi [8] nes par thal bar mi<sup>3)</sup> ḥgyur  
ro ṣe na / de lta na<sup>4)</sup> yaṅ mig daṅ reg  
pa dag yul mtshun pa thob ste / gaṅ  
gi phyir dbyibs ni / gṇis gzuṅ (k. 1b, 1)  
/ riṅ po la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig  
daṅ / reg paḥi ṣes pa [103b, 1] dag  
mthoṅ baḥi phyir de dag raṅ raṅ gi  
yul la ḥjug par ni ḥgal lo /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. śad <sup>2)</sup> P. la <sup>3)</sup> P. om.

<sup>4)</sup> P. om.

Cb. / sgra la sogs pa rnams kyaṅ  
rna ba la sogs pa rnams kyis gzuṅ

ṇid yin na ni de ltar na sgra tha dad  
ḥdzin [22a, 1] pa bṣin reg pa la sogs  
paḥaṅ<sup>1)</sup> ḥdzin par thal bar ḥgyur baḥi  
phyir dbaṅ po gcig ṇid du ḥgyur te /  
thams cad du yon tan gsum po tha  
mi dad paḥi<sup>2)</sup> phyir ro // yon tan  
gsum daṅ bral baḥi sgraḥi rigs [2] ni  
yod pa ma yin no // gaṅ sgra ṇid du  
gyur ba de ni reg bya la sogs pa la  
ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. inserts a śad after paḥaṅ. <sup>2)</sup> P. om.

/ gaṅ gi tshe sṇin stobs la sogs  
paḥi dbyibs kyis gnas skabs kyis tha  
dad kyi sgra la sogs pa tha dad pa ji  
ltar med / sgraḥi [3] rigs tha mi dad  
par mtshuṅs paḥi dbyibs kyi gnas  
skabs ni yod pa yin la / reg pa la sogs  
rnams las tha dad pa ste / rigs mthun  
paḥi gzuṅ bar bya baḥi yul la rna ba  
ḥjug pa yin no // de bṣin du reg pa la [4]  
sogs pa la yaṅ no // deḥi phyir ji skad  
du brjod paḥi skyon du thal bar ḥgyur  
ṣe na / de lta na yaṅ reg bya ni mig  
gis<sup>1)</sup> mthun paḥi yul du ḥgyur te /  
gaṅ phyir dbyibs ni gṇis kyi gzuṅ bya<sup>2)</sup>  
/<sup>3)</sup> riṅ<sup>4)</sup> po la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig  
[6] daṅ reg bya dag gi ṣes pa mthoṅ  
baḥi phyir raṅ gi yul de kho nar ḥjug  
go ṣes pa ni rnam par gsal to<sup>5)</sup> /

<sup>1)</sup> D. gi <sup>2)</sup> D. byar <sup>3)</sup> P. D. om. śad

<sup>4)</sup> P. D. ri, cf. K. <sup>5)</sup> D. te

/<sup>1)</sup> dbyibs kyis byas paḥi rigs kyi bye  
brag ḥdod paḥi ltar na ni sgra la sogs

bar bya ba ma yin par hgyur te gañ  
gi phyir dbyibs ni / *gsum gyi* [2] *spyod*  
*yul min* (k. 1b, 2) / dbyibs ni rna ba  
dañ sna dañ lce rnams kyis gzuñ bar  
bya bar ma mthoñ bañi phyir sgra dañ  
dri dañ ro rnams mñon sum ma yin  
par hgyur ro /

Cc. / dbyibs kyis byas pañi rigs  
kyi khyad par hdod pa ni [3] dbyibs  
mañ po rnams / *yul gcig tu*<sup>1)</sup> *thob* (k.  
1c, 1) ste / gañ gi phyir dbaṅ po gcig  
gi yul gyi rigs las ma h̄das pa kho nar  
deñi khyad par gyi rigs du ma yin  
pañi phyir dbyibs du ma yul mtshuñs  
pa thob bo /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. *ñid*

Cd. / [4] gser la sogs pañi skyogs  
dañ rgyan la sogs pañi dbyibs mtshuñs  
pa rnams la yañ / *tha mi dad*<sup>(1... 1)</sup> (k. 1c, 2)  
gser la sogs pa dañ sgra la sogs pa  
yañ rigs rnams gcig ñid thob ste  
/ dbyibs mtshuñs [5] pañi phyir ro //  
de lta na yañ rañ gi<sup>2)</sup> yul h̄jug pa  
med do /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. *tha dad med*    <sup>2)</sup> P. om. rañ gi

D. / dbaṅ po h̄jug pa yañ rigs<sup>1)</sup> tsam  
h̄jug par h̄dzin par byed par hgyur  
ram / rigs kyi khyad par can gyi bde  
ba la sogs pa h̄dzin par byed par  
hgyur /

<sup>1)</sup> P. rig

Daa. [6] gal te re ṣig rigs tsam

pa ni rna ba la sogs pa la mi h̄dzin  
par [6] hgyur te / gañ gi phyir ṣe na  
/ dbyibs ni <sup>(2... 2)</sup> *gsum gyi spyod yul min* //  
dbyibs ni rna ba dañ sna dañ lce  
rnams kyis gzuñ bar bya ba ma yin  
pas /<sup>3)</sup> mthoñ bñin pañi sgra dañ dri  
dañ ro rnams mñon sum ma yin par  
hgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> D. om. śad    <sup>2)</sup> Vk. 1b, 2: *gsum gyi yul*  
*ma yin*    <sup>3)</sup> P. om. śad

/ [7] *yul gcig* la dbyibs mañ po <sup>(1... 1)</sup> *h̄thob*  
par yañ hgyur te / dbaṅ po gcig gi  
yul gyi dbye ba yod na ni deñi bye  
brag gi rigs du ma yod pañi phyir  
yul gcig tu dbyibs du ma mthoñ bar  
hgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 1c, 1: *yul gcig ñid thob*.

/ dbyibs rnams la [8] khyad par med  
par mtshuñs pañi phyir gser la sogs  
pañi skyogs rnams dañ rgyan rnams  
kyi *tha dad kyañ med* <sup>(1... 1)</sup> *par hgyur ro* //  
dbyibs mtshuñ par yod pañi phyir  
gser dañ <sup>(2... 2)</sup> *stobs* dañ rdzas la sogs  
pa [22b, 1] rnams kyañ mtshuñs par  
hgyur ro // de bñin du rañ rañ gi yul  
la h̄jug pa yañ mi hgyur /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 1c, 1: *dbyer med hgyur*.    <sup>2)</sup> D. om.

/ ci dbaṅ poñi h̄jug pas rigs rañ  
tsam h̄dzin par byed dam / bde ba la  
sogs pañi<sup>1)</sup> khyad par du byas pañi  
rigs h̄dzin [2] par byed /

<sup>1)</sup> P. pas

gal te rigs rañ tsam h̄dzin na ni don<sup>(v...)</sup>

ḥdzin par byed pa yin na don / <sup>(v...)</sup>de las  
<sup>(...v)</sup>rañ bṣin ḥdzin ma yin (k. 1d) // sgra  
 la sogs pa rnams kyi dbyibs tsam  
 ḥdzin par byed pa ñid yin na ni bde  
 ba la sogs pa rnams kyi rañ bṣin [7]  
 ñes par ma gzuñ bar thal bar ḥgyur  
 te / gañ gi phyir śin tu gsal bar ma  
 yin par dbyibs tsam dmigs na yul gyi  
 rañ bṣin ma dmigs pa mthoñ ño /

Dab. / dbyibs tsam ḥdzin par byed  
 pa ñid yin [8] na / <sup>(v...)</sup>tha dad don mi <sup>(...v)</sup>ḥdzin  
 (k. 2a, 1) / sgra la sogs paḥi khyad  
 par ḥdzin pa med par ḥgyur ro // de  
 ltar na pi wañ gi sgra dañ rñāḥi sgra  
 ṣes bya ba de lta bu la rogs pa de lta  
 buḥi khyad par mi ḥdzin par ḥgyur  
 te [104a, 1] de la dbyibs gṣan med paḥi  
 phyir ro /

Dac. / don la // <sup>(1)</sup>yid bṣin rnam par  
 rtog pa can (k. 2a, 2-2b) / rañ gi don  
 rigs khyad par can nam deḥi khyad  
 par ḥdzin paḥi phyir rañ gi yul la yid  
 kyi ḥjug pa bṣin dñi rnam [2] par rtog  
 pa can du ḥgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. double śad

Dbā. / ci ste dbyibs kyi khyad par  
 can gyi bde ba la sogs pa ḥdzin par  
 byed pa de lta na yañ / <sup>(2...)</sup>gnas <sup>(...2)</sup>skabs  
 der ḥgyur (k. 2c, 1) / yid kyi ḥjug pa  
 bṣin rnam par rtog pa can ñid do ṣes  
 bya baḥi [3] don to /

<sup>(1...)</sup>gyi <sup>(...v)...</sup>rañ bṣin ḥdzin par mi ḥgyur te /  
 des ni dbyibs tsam ḥdzin pa yin pas  
 na sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi bde ba  
 la sogs paḥi rañ bṣin ma ñes par thal  
 bar ḥgyur [3] ro /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 1d: de las rañ bṣin ḥdzin ma yin.

/ dbyibs tsam ḥdzin pa ñid yin no  
<sup>(v...)</sup>// don gyi bye brag ḥdzin par mi ḥgyur  
<sup>(...v)</sup>te // gañ gi phyir <sup>(1)</sup>dbyibs tsam gyi snañ  
 ba cuñ zad la dmigs kyi don yul gyi rañ  
 gi ño bo la mi dmigs pas so // sgra la  
 sogs paḥi bye brag [4] kyañ mi ḥdzin  
 par ḥgyur ro // de bṣin du pi wañ gi  
 sgra dañ rñāḥi sgra ṣes bya ba la sogs  
 paḥi bye brag kyañ mi ḥdzin par  
 ḥgyur te // der <sup>(2)</sup>dbyibs gṣan mi srid  
 paḥi phyir ro /

<sup>1)</sup> D. om. <sup>2)</sup> D. de

<sup>(1...)</sup>/ don ḥdzin no ṣe na yañ / yid bṣin  
<sup>(...1)</sup>rnam par [5] rtog pa yin / rañ gi don  
 khyad par can du byed na yañ khyad  
 par de ḥdzin pa na yid kyi ḥjug pa  
 bṣin du rañ gi yul la rtog pa dañ bcas  
 par ḥgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 2a: ḥdzin naḥaṇ yid bṣin rnam  
 rtog ḥgyur.

/ ci ste bde ba la sogs pas khyad  
 par du byas paḥi dbyibs [6] ḥdzin na <sup>(1)</sup>  
 ni / de lta na yañ <sup>(2...)</sup>gnas <sup>(...2)</sup>skabs deḥi /  
 yid kyi ḥjug pa bṣin du rnam par  
 rtog pa ñid do ṣes bya baḥi don to <sup>(3)</sup> /

<sup>1)</sup> D. om. <sup>2)</sup> Vk. 2c, 1: gnas skabs der  
 ḥgyur. <sup>3)</sup> P. no

Dbb. bde ba la sogs pa ḥdzin pa na  
so so bar ḥam bsdu pa ḥdzin par  
byed /

Dbb-a1. de la re ṣig so so ba ḥdzin pa  
ma yin te / gañ gi phyir rañ gi yul  
la mñon du phyogs pa las dbaṇ po  
ḥjug paḥi phyir sgra la sogs [4] pa  
gzuñ bar bya ba yin gyi / <sup>(1...)</sup> *sñiñ stobs*  
<sup>...1)</sup> *sogs min* (k. 2c, 2) / *sñiñ stobs* la sogs  
pa so so ba ni sgra la sogs paḥi rañ  
bñin ma yin pa deḥi phyir de dag ni  
rna ba la sogs paḥi ḥjug paḥi gzuñ bya  
ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. ... *sñiñ stobs sogs* (2c) // *ma yin*  
(2d), cf. p. 26, note 34).

Dbb-a2. / [5] *ma yin gšan ma yin*  
*paḥi phyir* (k. 2d) / gañ gi phyir sgra  
la sogs pa rnam las *sñiñ stobs* la  
sogs pa gšan ma yin pa deḥi phyir  
sgra la sogs pa bñin du de yañ gzuñ  
bar bya ba yin te / *gšan min še na*  
*ḥbras min* [6] *paḥam* (k. 3a) / gal te  
*sñiñ stobs* la sogs pa rnam las sgra  
la sogs paḥi ḥbras bu gšan ma yin pa  
<sup>(v...)</sup> <sup>...v)</sup> des na tha dad pa med do // yañ na  
*sñiñ stobs* la sogs pa sgra la sogs paḥi  
rgyu ma yin par ḥgyur ro // [7] *sñiñ*  
*stobs*<sup>1)</sup> ḥbras bu sgrar<sup>2)</sup> snañ nas sgraḥi  
bdag ñid du rnam par gnas pa na ṣes  
bya ba la sogs pa gañ smras pa de  
dañ ḥgal bar ḥgyur ro // rgyu dañ  
ḥbras bu dag tha mi dad rañ bñin yin  
paḥi phyir *sñiñ stobs* la [8] sogs pa  
rnam ni phan tshun tha mi dad pa  
ñid dam / sgra du ma ñid dam ṣes  
rnam par brtags paḥi don la ḥam gyi  
sgra yin no /

/ bde ba la sogs pa yañ so sor ḥdzin  
par byed dam / sdom pa yañ ḥdzin par  
ḥgyur grañ /

de la re ṣig [7] so sor ni mi ḥdzin  
te / rañ gi yul la ḥdzin pa la sogs paḥi  
dbaṇ poḥi ḥjug pa ni sgra la sogs  
paḥi gzuñ bar bya ba la yin gyi /  
<sup>(1...)</sup> *sñiñ stobs* <sup>...1)</sup> *la sogs pa la ni ma yin no*  
// *sñiñ stobs* la sogs pa dañ sgra [8] la  
sogs paḥi rañ bñin so so ni ma yin no  
// deḥi phyir de dag rnam rna ba la  
sogs paḥi ḥjug paḥi gzuñ bar bya ḥa  
ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 2c, 2-2d, 1: *sñiñ stobs sogs* // *ma yin*.

/ *gšan min še na* / *sñiñ stobs* la  
sogs pa las gšan ñid ni [23a, 1] ma  
yin te / de yañ gzuñ bar bya yin no<sup>1)</sup>  
še na / *ḥbras min paḥam* / gal te  
*sñiñ stobs* la sogs pa sgra las gšan ma  
yin na ni tha mi dad kyi lus kyi sgra  
<sup>(v...)</sup> <sup>[D.23a]</sup> <sup>...v)</sup> la sogs pa ḥbras bu ma yin la / *sñiñ*  
*stobs* [2] la sogs pa<sup>2)</sup> yañ sgra la sogs  
paḥi rgyu ma yin par ḥgyur ro // *sñiñ*  
*stobs* sgraḥi rañ bñin du rnam par  
bñag par byas nas ni ṣes bya ba la  
sogs pa gañ brjod pa de yañ ḥgal bar  
ḥgyur ro // *sñiñ stobs* la sogs pa [3]  
phan tshun tha mi dad de sgra la sogs  
pa dañ gcig pa ñid du ḥgyur na ni  
tha mi dad kyi rañ bñin yin pas rgyu  
dañ ḥbras bu dag tu ḥdod pa la gnod  
do ṣes bya ba la sogs pa ni ḥam ṣes  
brtag paḥi sgraḥi don yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om.    <sup>2)</sup> D. inserts la after pa.

<sup>1)</sup> P. thams cad instead of *sñiñ stobs*.

Perhaps *sattva* was misread as *sarva*.

<sup>2)</sup> P. *sgra*

Dbb-a3. / *gṣan yañ / gṣan min na*  
*yañ gzuñ bya min* (k. 3b) // gal te yañ  
bde<sup>1)</sup> ba la [104b, 1] sogs pa sgra la  
sogs pa las / *gṣan ma yin pa de lta*  
na yañ dehi rdul phra rab rnams kyañ  
gzuñ bar bya bar ma gyur cig sñam  
nas so so ba gzuñ bya ma yin no // de  
srid de tsam la sogs pañi tshig gi  
don *gṣan ma yin de* [2] thams cad  
dbañ poñi don ma yin te hbras bu ñid  
la sogs pa ḥdzin pa spyiñi yul can ñid  
du thal bañi phyir te / de ltar re ṣig  
so so bar gzuñ ba ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. bde twice    <sup>2)</sup> P. so ba

Dbb-b1. / ji ste bsdus pa ḥdzin to  
ṣe na / de lta na yañ dbaṇ poñi [3]  
hjug pa thams cad / *sna tshogs rnam*  
par *hgyur* (k. 3c, 1) te gzuñ bya tha  
dad pa la tha mi dad pañi ḥdzin pañi  
rnam pa ni ḥthad pa ma yin te dehi  
dbaṇ gis gzuñ ḥya yoñs su ma bcad  
pañi phyir ro // sgra la sogs pa rnams  
la [4] tha mi dad pa mthoñ ba yin  
no /

Dbb-b2. / bde ba la sogs pañi yul  
ñid la dbaṇ po rnams / *don mtshuñs*  
*ñid* (k. 3c, 1) / *hgyur te dbaṇ po*  
rnams<sup>1)</sup> yul mtshuñs par *hgyur gyi* /  
rañ gi yul la hjug pa ñid du mi *hgyur*  
gyi / de yul *gṣan* [5] la bde ba la  
sogs pañi rigs tha mi dad pañi phyir

/ *gṣan yañ* /<sup>1)</sup> *gṣan ñid* [4] *min na gzuñ*  
*bya min* // <sup>2)</sup> gal te yañ bde ba la  
sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las<sup>3)</sup> *gṣan ma*  
yin pa de lta na ni so sor gzuñ bar  
bya bar mi *hgyur la / rdul phra rab*  
kyañ gzuñ bar bya mi *hgyur la / rdul*  
phra rab kyañ gzuñ bar bya bar mi  
[5] *hgyur ṣiñ de tsam la sogs pa yañ*  
ño // gañ don *gṣan ma yin pañi dbaṇ*  
poñi yul de thams cad dbaṇ poñi yul  
ma yin par *hgyur ro // hbras bu ñid*  
la sogs par ḥdzin pa ni spyiñi yul can  
ñid du thal bar *hgyur bañi* [6] *phyir*  
ro // de ltar na re ṣig so sor<sup>4)</sup> mi  
ḥdzin to /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. śad    <sup>2)</sup> P. one śad    <sup>3)</sup> P. om.

<sup>4)</sup> D. inserts ni after sor.

/ ci ste sdoms pa la ḥdzin na ni de  
lta na yañ dbaṇ po thams cad hjug  
par *hgyur te* <sup>(1... 1)</sup> *sna tshogs rnam par ro*  
// *sna tshogs kyi rnam pañi gzuñ bya*  
la tha mi dad pañi rnam par ḥdzin pa  
ma yin te / dehi dbaṇ gis gzuñ bar  
bya ba yoñs su bcad pañi phyir ro //  
sgra la sogs pa la tha mi dad par  
ḥdzin pa yañ mthoñ ño /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 3c, 1: *sna tshogs rnam hgyur*.

/ bde ba la sogs pañi yul ñid kyañ  
mtshuñs par *hgyur / dbaṇ po rnams*  
[8] *kyi yul ñid*<sup>(1... 1)</sup> *mtshuñs par hgyur ro*  
// dbaṇ po rnams rañ gi yul la hjug  
par mi *hgyur te bde ba la sogs pa yul*  
*gṣan la rigs kyi bye brag yod pañi*  
phyir ro // de lta na yañ dbaṇ po

ro // des na dbaṅ po gcig ñid du thal  
ba de ñid du ḡgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> P. rnam

Dbb-b3. <sup>(v...</sup> / ḡon te dbyibs kyi khyad  
par can ḡdzin par byed do ṣes brjod pa  
ma yin nam ṣe na / ḡdi smra ba yin  
nam [6] rigs par smras pa ma yin te  
/ gaṅ gi phyir / <sup>(v...</sup> *rjes ḡjug mi ḡdzin*  
*phyir* (k. 3d, <sup>1)</sup> / gaṅ gi phyir gzugs  
kyi rigs gcig la dbyibs kyi khyad par  
du mas ḡdzin pa na dbyibs gcig rjes  
su ḡjug pa ni ma mthoṅ ṅo /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om.

Ea. / de la dbyibs tha [7] dad pas  
rigs tha dad par ḡdod na dbaṅ po  
mthaḡ yas par thal ba de ñid yin no  
// ḡdir yaṅ / *ḡgah ṣig / graṅs can*  
*tha dad par ḡdod na* (k. 3d, <sup>2)</sup> -4a) /  
graṅs can ḡjig par byed paḡi mdo ni  
sḡar gyi graṅs can gyi mṅon par ḡdod  
[8] pas smras pa sgraḡi mtshan ñid  
gsum po rnams las reg bya la sogs pa  
gsum poḡi rigs can tha mi dad paḡi  
mtshan ñid can ma yin te / tha mi  
dad pa rnams la dbaṅ po gṣan gyis  
ḡdzin pa ni ḡthad pa ma yin no //  
deḡi phyir bde ba la [105a, 1] sogs pa  
dbaṅ poḡi yul rnams la rigs tha dad  
pa yod pa yin te / gaṅ gi dbaṅ du  
byas nas raṅ gi yul la ḡjug pa ñid ni  
dbaṅ po rnams so ṣes brjod pa yin no  
// des <sup>(v...</sup> raṅ gi khyad par rnams la tha  
dad pa med paḡi phyir dbaṅ po mthaḡ  
yas par thal bar yod pa [2] <sup>3)</sup> yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. double śad <sup>2)</sup> P. inserts a śad  
after can. <sup>3)</sup> P. ma yin no

gcig ñid du thal bar [23b, 1] ḡgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 3c, <sup>2)</sup> don mthunṣ ḡgyur.

<sup>2)</sup> P. inserts du after ñid.

<sup>(v...</sup> / <sup>1)</sup> ma yin te raṅ raṅ gi dbyibs  
kyis khyad par du byas pa ḡdzin no <sup>2)</sup>  
ṣes brjod do ṣe na / de skad du ni  
brjod na rigs par ni mi <sup>3)</sup> brjod de / gaṅ  
gi phyir *du mar ḡdzin phyir* gzugs kyi  
rigs gcig la yaṅ dbyibs tha [2] dad  
kyi sgo nas du mar ḡdzin par byed pa  
yin gyi dbyibs gcig gi rjes su ṣugs nas  
ḡdzin pa ni ma mthoṅ ṅo /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. śad <sup>2)</sup> P. to <sup>3)</sup> P. ma

<sup>1)</sup> der dbyibs kyi tha dad las rigs  
kyi tha dad ḡdod na ni de ñid dbaṅ  
po thug pa med par thal bar ḡgyur ba  
[3] yin no // ḡdi la <sup>2)</sup> ni *graṅs can gyi*  
// <sup>(4... 4)</sup> *bye brag la las mi ḡdod do* // sṅon  
gyi <sup>3)</sup> ser skya paḡi lugs la ḡdas par smra  
ba graṅs can phuṅ bar byed paḡi ma  
rdum pa <sup>6)</sup> na re sgraḡi mtshan ñid  
gsum <sup>7)</sup> las tha mi dad pa ma yin te /  
rigs [4] gṣan ñid las ni ma yin pas reg  
bya la sogs paḡi mtshan ñid gsum po  
dbaṅ po tha dad gṣan gyis gzuṅ bar  
ḡthad pa ma yin no // <sup>8)</sup> deḡi phyir  
bde ba la sogs pa rnams la tha dad yod  
pas dbaṅ po rnams raṅ [5] raṅ gi yul  
dbaṅ byed par brjod do // raṅ gi  
yul la ḡjug paḡi dbaṅ po rnams la tha  
mi dad paḡi raṅ gi bye brag yod pa  
yin pas dbaṅ po rnams thug pa med  
par thal bar ḡgyur <sup>9)</sup> ṣes zer ro /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. śad <sup>2)</sup> D. om. <sup>3)</sup> D. om. śad

<sup>4)</sup> Vk. *kha cig*, D. om. la <sup>5)</sup> P. om.

<sup>6)</sup> P. om. <sup>7)</sup> D. inserts pa after gsum.



8) P. one śad 9) P. inserts double śad after ro

Eb. / gal te yañ bde ba la sogs pa dbaṅ poḥi rigs yul rnam s rigs tha dad pa yañ bsgrub par bya baḥi phyir sñar gyi grub mthaḥ las ḥdaḥ par byed pa des na / śin tu gsal baḥi rigs pas kho bos [3] bśad par byaḥo // <sup>(V...)</sup> kun las rdul phran tha dad pa // re reḥi ṇo bo gtso bo <sup>(V...)</sup> yin (k. 4c-d) / bde ba dañ sdug bśālaḥ dañ gti mug dañ / sgra dañ reg bya la sogs pa rigs kyi khyad par gyis tha dad pa thams cad du soṇ baḥi rdul [4] phra rab rnam s gtso bo ṣes brjod par bya ste / yañ dag sbyor baḥi khyad par las // ḥbras buḥi ṇo bo mtshon par byed (k. 5a-b) // de lta na ni sbyor baḥi khyad par las rañ gi rigs las ma ḥdas par ḥbras buḥi rañ bśin dbaṅ [5] po rnam s kyi yul ṇid du rtogs par ḥgyur ro /

Ec. / rdul rnam s ṇo bo gsum ṇid na // ḥbras tha dad med ga la rtogs (k. 5c-d) // gañ sgra las ṣes bde ba la sogs pa las ldog paḥi tha mi dad paḥi blo skye ba gañ yin pa de tha dad pa du [6] maḥi rañ bśin la ni mi rigs te / ciḥi phyir ṣe na / sbyor yañ rigs mi mthun pa dag // yōṇs su ḥgyur bar mi ḥdod do (k. 6a-b) // gsum yañ dag par sbyor bas gcig tu ḥgyur ba ni ma yin te / graṇs can [7] rnam s kyi rigs tha dad paḥi phyir gcig gi sgraḥi brjod byar ḥgyur gyi rañ bśin gcig ni ma yin no /

/1) gal te rigs kyi tha dad [6] las kyaṇ bde ba la sogs paḥi yul dbaṅ po nus par dañ ldan par byaḥo ṣes sñon ma rnam s las khyad par du byed pa lta na ni de bas kyaṇ ches lhag par du kho bos smra bar bya ba ṇid de / <sup>(V...)</sup> re reḥi ṇo bo<sup>2)</sup> thams cad ni<sup>3)</sup> // gtso [7] bor<sup>4)</sup> rdul phran so sor yod // bde ba dañ sdug bśālaḥ dañ gti mug dañ sgra dañ reg bya dañ bya ba dag gis tha dad kyi rigs las tha dad paḥi gtso bo rdul phra rab thams cad du soṇ ba yod do ṣes brjod par byaḥo // rab tu [8] sbyor baḥi bye brag las // ḥbras buḥi<sup>5)</sup> ṇo bor mtshon par byed // de ḥdi lta yañ dag par rab tu sbyor baḥi bye brag las rañ gi rigs las ma ḥdas par ḥbras buḥi ṇo bor<sup>6)</sup> grub pa ni dbaṅ po rnam s kyi yul du ḥgyur ro /

1) P. om. śad 2) D. Vk. bor 3) Vk. na 4) Vk. bo 5) Vk. bu 6) boḥi

/ [24a, 1] <sup>(1...)</sup> rdul phran gsum poḥi rañ bśin du // <sup>(...1)</sup> gcig deḥi ṇo bor<sup>2)</sup> gañ gis ḥgro // <sup>(V...)</sup> gal te sgra la sgraḥo ṣes bde ba la sogs pa dañ bral baḥi tha mi dad kyi blo de don du maḥi rañ bśin tha mi dad pa yin par ni mi rigs te / ciḥi phyir [2] ṣe na / <sup>(4...)</sup> rigs mi mthun las gyur pa yi // rab tu sbyor bar ḥdod ma <sup>(...4)</sup> yin // gsum po sbyor<sup>5)</sup> ba las gcig tu gyur pa ni yod pa ma yin te / graṇs can rnam s kyi rigs tha dad du ḥgyur paḥi phyir ro // <sup>(6... 6)</sup> sgra gcig brjod pa ni [3] yod pa la rag las na dños po gcig pa ni yod pa ma yin no /

Ed. / ci ste yañ sgra rañ bšin gsum  
 pa can la bde ba la sogs pa gañ phyal  
 baḥam ḥdzin par ḥdod pa de dbaṅ [8]  
 poḥi yul du ḥgyur te / <sup>(v...)</sup> *no bo gñis ñid*  
*ḥdod med na // ḥbras la no bo gcig ñid*  
*thob* (k. 6c-d) // gal te rna bas sgra  
 ḥdzin pa la bltos pa med par bde ba la  
 sogs pa gañ yañ ruñ ba la ḥdir blo  
 ḥjug pa yin na de ñid rañ [105b,1] bšin  
 cig ṣes bya ba ḥthob bo // ciḥi phyir  
 ṣe na / *rañ bšin mañ poḥi dños rnams*  
*laḥaṅ*<sup>1)</sup> / *dbaṅ poḥi don ni khyad par*  
*can* (k. 7a-b) // du maḥi rañ bšin gyi  
 sgra la sogs pa la yañ dbaṅ poḥi don  
 gañ kho na la blo ḥjug pa de ñid [2]  
 dbaṅ poḥi blo yul yin la / de yañ gcig  
 ñid do // reg bya la sogs pa rnams  
 la mtshuṅs pa ṣes bya ba de mi rigs  
 so /

<sup>1)</sup> Kk. la

Ee. / deḥi phyir graṅs can ḥdod  
 spaṅs nas // *re reḥi no bo ñid mchog*  
 yin (k. 7c-d) // <sup>(v...)</sup> *sñon grags*<sup>1)</sup> paḥi [3]  
 graṅs can gyi lta ba spaṅs pa na /  
 ḥbras bu la rigs kyi khyad par re reḥi  
 rañ bšin mchog yin te / rgyu kho na  
 brtag par bya ba ma yin no // de ltar  
 na rigs mi mthun pa ḥbras bu mi

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 5c-d: *rdul phran rañ bšin gsum*  
*ñid na // ḥbras bu gcig par gañ gis*

*rtogs* / <sup>2)</sup> P. *boḥi* <sup>3)</sup> P. om. double śad.

<sup>4)</sup> Vk. 6a-b: *rigs mi mthun par sbyar na*  
*yañ // yoṅs su ḥgyur bar mi ḥdod do /*

<sup>5)</sup> D. sbyar <sup>6)</sup> P. la

/ ci ste gsum poḥi rañ bšin du ḥgyur  
 baḥi sgra <sup>(D.24a)</sup> bde ba la sogs par gañ  
 brjod pa ṣes par ḥdod paḥi rañ bšin de  
 dbaṅ poḥi yul du ḥbyuñ bar ḥgyur ro  
 ṣe na / [4] <sup>(2...)</sup> *tshul. gñis ṣes par mi ḥdod*  
*na // ḥbras bu gcig gi ṅa'bor ḥgyur*  
 // gal te rna bas gsra ṅan pa la sogs  
 paḥi blo ni bde ba la sogs pa la mi  
 ltos par gṣan las khyad par du gyur  
 pa ḥdi la ḥjug par byed de<sup>3)</sup> de [5] ñid  
 kho nas gcig gi rañ bšin du ḥgyur ro  
 // ciḥi phyir ṣe na / *don gyi rañ bšin*  
*du ma ste*<sup>4)</sup> // *dbaṅ poḥi yul ni khyad par*  
*can* // sgra la sogs paḥi don gyis rañ  
 bšin du ma yod pa las rañ bšin gañ la  
 blo ḥjug pa de [6] dbaṅ poḥi don te /  
 de ñid dbaṅ poḥi yul yin no // de yañ  
 gcig kho na ste / reg bya la sogs pa  
 rnams la yañ mtshuṅs pa<sup>5)</sup> yin no //  
 deḥi phyir rigs pa ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> D. te <sup>2)</sup> Vk. 6c-d: *no bo gñis ñid mi*  
*ḥdod na // ḥbras bu no bo gcig ñid thob /*

<sup>3)</sup> P. pa yin no // <sup>4)</sup> Vk. la <sup>5)</sup> D. in-  
 serts ma before yin no.

/ <sup>(1...)</sup> *deḥi phyir re reḥi dños po la* // <sup>(2)</sup>  
*graṅs can lugs las khyad par ḥphags*  
 // <sup>(v...)</sup> [7] *sñon grags* paḥi graṅs can gyi  
 lta ba las khyad par du ḥphags śin  
 mchog tu gyur pa ni bden pa kho na  
 ste / rigs kyi bye brag gcig gi rañ  
 bšin can<sup>1)</sup> gyi rgyu las ḥbras bu skye  
 bar brtags pa ste / de lta na ni rigs

rtsol ba ḥthad pa dañ bcas [4] par  
ḥgyur ro // gsum po rnams gcig gi  
ño bo ñid la ni ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. graṅs

F. / gal te yañ sgra la sogs pa ḥdzin  
pa tsam la dbaṅ poḥi ñes pa ḥjug pa  
mñon sum yin pa de lta na gṣal bya thams  
cad kyi yul can gyi tshad ma ma [5] bstan  
par ḥgyur te / gañ las ṣe na / *ma lus yul*  
*la ḥjug pa yi* // *tshad ma mñon par ma*  
*brjod phyir* // dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa yid  
kyis rig pa rtags<sup>2)</sup> la sogs pa med pas<sup>3)</sup>  
yid kyi dbaṅ po de ni tshad mar ma  
brjod paḥi [6] phyir ñuñ ba ñid do //  
deḥi ḥjug paḥi rig<sup>4)</sup> pa ni tshad ma  
gañ yañ ruñ bar ḥdu ba ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. *paḥi*, cf. Kk. <sup>2)</sup> P. brtags <sup>3)</sup> P. pa

<sup>4)</sup> P. rigs.

G. / ñes pa de ni med de deḥi  
ḥjug pa rig<sup>1)</sup> pa ni ḥdod pa la sogs pa  
bṣin du dran pa yin te / mñon sum  
gyi<sup>2)</sup> ñes paḥi khyad [7] par gyi dran  
pa ni yoc pa yin no ṣes ji skad bśad  
pa lta buḥo // deḥi phyir dbaṅ po  
rnams ni phyi rol gyi don la mñon  
sum gyi ṣes pa yin la / dbaṅ poḥi  
ḥjug pa la ni de ma thag paḥi yid  
kyi dran pa yin no ṣe na / *dran*  
[8] *pa ma yin ma myoñ phyir* (k. 8c)  
// dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug paḥi ñes pa la de  
ma thag paḥi yid kyi dran pa mi rigs  
te sñar ñams su ma myoñ baḥi phyir  
ro /

<sup>1)</sup> P. rigs <sup>2)</sup> P. gyis

mi mthun gyi ḥbras bu mi rtsom [8]  
mo ṣes mdzes par ḥgyur gyi / gsum gyi  
rañ bṣin gcig pa ñid las ni ma yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> Vk. 7c-d: *deḥi phyir graṅs can lugs*  
*dor te // re reḥi ño bo ñid mchog yin /*

<sup>2)</sup> P. one śad <sup>3)</sup> P. one śad <sup>4)</sup> D. tsam

/ gal te yañ da ltar baḥi sgra tsam  
ḥdzin par byed paḥi dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa  
mñon sum du ḥdod pa de lta na ni <sup>1)</sup>  
*yul gcig ma yin* <sup>2)</sup> gṣal bar bya [24b, 1] ba  
thams cad kyañ yul ma yin pas<sup>3)</sup> tshad  
ma yin pa bsal bar ḥgyur ro // *ḥjug*  
*pa de* <sup>4)</sup> <sup>5)</sup> *tshad mar brjod pa ma yin no*  
// dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa yañ dag par myoñ  
bar byed paḥi yid kyi dbaṅ po la ni  
rtags la sogs pa med pas<sup>6)</sup> tshad [2]  
mar ma brjod paḥi phyir ñams pa ñid  
du ḥgyur ro // der ḥjug paḥi yañ dag  
par myoñ ba tshad ma gṣan gyi khoṅs  
su ḥdu bar ni mi ḥgyur ro /

<sup>1)</sup> D. om. śad <sup>2)</sup> P. om. śad <sup>3)</sup> D. pa

<sup>4)</sup> Vk. *ste* <sup>5)</sup> D. om. śad <sup>6)</sup> D. inserts  
a śad between pas and tshad.

/ ñes pa de<sup>1)</sup> ni med de / der ṣugs  
paḥi ñams su myoñ ba ni dran pa ste  
/ ḥdod pa la [3] sogs pa bṣin no //  
gañ ji skad du dran pa ni mñon sum  
gyi<sup>2)</sup> ḥjug paḥi bye brag go ṣes brjod  
do // deḥi phyir dbaṅ poḥi ṣes pa ni  
phyi rol gyi don la mñon sum ste /  
/ dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pa dañ bar du ma  
chod pa yin no // dran [4] paḥo ṣe na  
/ *dran min ñams su ma* <sup>5)</sup> *myoñ phyir* //  
bar ma chod<sup>6)</sup> paḥi yid ni dbaṅ poḥi  
ḥjug pa ḥdzin par byed paḥi dran par  
rigs pa ma yin te<sup>7)</sup> / sñar ñams su  
ma myoñ baḥi phyir ro /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om. <sup>2)</sup> P. gyis <sup>3)</sup> P. phyir <sup>4)</sup> Vk.  
8c: *dran pa ma yin ma myoñ phyir*. <sup>5)</sup> P.

*mi* <sup>6)</sup> P. chad <sup>7)</sup> D. no //



paḥi phyir de ni ṅams pa ṅid do /

<sup>1)</sup> P. om.    <sup>2)</sup> P. om.    <sup>3)</sup> Vk. 9a,2-9b:  
gṣan lta la // ṅams paḥam yaṅ na dran  
pa yin /    <sup>4)</sup> P. om.    <sup>5)</sup> D. pa    <sup>6)</sup> P.  
inserts a śad after ḥam.

J. / gal te [6] ṅes pa ḥdi yod pa ma  
yin / dran pa lhag paḥi ṅes pa bstan  
paḥi don du lhan cig pa ṣes bya ba  
bkag pa yin no // lhan cig pa grub pa  
ṅid la ci phyi rol gyi don rnam la  
dbaṅ po daṅ yid dag lhan cig ṅes par  
byed dam [7] ṣes ṅes pa la ḥdri ba  
yin no // da ltar<sup>1)</sup> baḥi dus su dbaṅ  
po ḥgaḥ ṣig daṅ ldan pa gaṅ gi tshe  
yid yin no ṣes tshig sṅa ma yod paḥi  
phyir ro ṣe na / de ltar yaṅ / don la  
dran pa lhag bsgrub na (k. 9c) / gal  
te dran pa lhag pa sgrub [8] paḥi don  
du phyi rol gyi don gyi yul la yid kyī  
lhan cig pa bkag pa yin pa de lta na  
/ ci ltar yaṅ dbaṅ poḥi ṣes pa la yid  
ṣen par byed pa ma yin la de bṣin  
du yid kyī ṅes pas dbaṅ poḥi don rig  
pa ma yin no ṣes bya [106b, 1] ba la  
sogs pa de daṅ ḥgal ba<sup>2)</sup> (k. 9d, 1) yin  
no /

<sup>1)</sup> P. lta    <sup>2)</sup> Kk. te

/ ṅes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin  
te<sup>1)</sup> / dran paḥi yid lhag<sup>2)</sup> tu ḥdzin  
paḥi [3] ched du lhan cig kho nar skye  
ba bkag pa yin no<sup>3)</sup> // lhan cig par  
grub pa ṅid la ci phyi rol gyi don la  
dbaṅ po daṅ yid dag gis lhan cig tu  
ḥdzin byed dam ṣes ḥdzin lugs la brgal  
te / gaṅ gi tshe la lar dus gcig tu dbaṅ  
[4] daṅ ldan paḥi yid ḥbyuṅ no ṣes sṅar  
brjod paḥi phyir ro ṣe na / de lta  
na yaṅ / dran pa lhag par brjod phyir  
na // <sup>4)</sup> rnam bsal / <sup>5)</sup> gal te dran pa  
lhag par brjod par bya baḥi phyir  
phyi rol gyi don la yid daṅ lhan cig  
bkag pa yin na ni [5] de lta na yaṅ  
gaṅ ji skad du ḥdi ltar dbaṅ pos gzuṅ  
gi<sup>6)</sup> rjes la yid kyis ḥdzin par byed de /  
de ltar yid kyis gzuṅ nas dbaṅ po ji lta  
ba bṣin du rig par byed do ṣes bya ba  
la sogs pa brjod pa de rnam par bsal<sup>7)</sup>  
ba yin no // [6] deḥi phyir phyi rol  
gyi don la dran pa ḥdi<sup>8)</sup> yod pa ma  
yin no /

<sup>1)</sup> D. no //    <sup>2)</sup> D. rtag    <sup>3)</sup> P. te /    <sup>4)</sup> P.  
one śad    <sup>5)</sup> P. om. śad    <sup>6)</sup> D. inserts a  
śad after gi.    <sup>7)</sup> P. gsal    <sup>8)</sup> D. ni

K. / gal te yaṅ yid<sup>1)</sup> phyi rol gyi  
don la dṅos su ḥjug pa de lta<sup>2)</sup> yin na  
/ dbaṅ gṣan mthoṅ don med (k. 9d, 2)  
// phyi rol gyi don la dbaṅ [2] po gṣan  
dag don med par ḥgyur te / yid kyis  
skyes bu la don ṅe bar bsdus paḥi  
phyir ro /

/ gal te yid phyi rol gyi don la dṅos  
su ḥjug pa de lta<sup>1)</sup> na yaṅ / dbaṅ gṣan  
don med ḥgyur / dbaṅ po gṣan rnam  
phyi rol gyi don la ḥjug pa don med  
par ḥgyur te / [7] skyes buḥi don yid  
kyis sgrub paḥi phyir ro /

/ de ltar yul gyi rañ bñin nes par / deñi phyir de ltar yul gyi rañ bñin  
ma gzuñ bahi phyir grañs can gyi mñon nes par gzuñ bar mi nus pañi phyir  
sum ni tshad ma ma yin no // grañs can gyi mñon sum tshad ma ma

<sup>1)</sup> P. inserts kyi after yid. <sup>2)</sup> P. inserts  
na after lta.

yin no //

<sup>1)</sup> P. ltar

### TRANSLATION WITH ANNOTATION

A.<sup>1)</sup> The Sāṃkhya maintain that the operation (*vr̥tti*) of [senses, such as] auditory sense etc. is the perception (*pratyakṣa*)<sup>2)</sup> They say, "When auditory sense (*śrotra*), tactual sense (*tvac*), visual sense (*akṣa*), gustatory sense (*jihvā*) and olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*), being controlled by the mind (*manas*), are operative respectively upon sound (*śabda*), tangible object (*sparsa*), shape (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and odour (*gandha*) in order to apprehend them, the operation [of each sense] is the perception as means of valid cognition (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*)."<sup>3)</sup>

1) Cf. J, 61b,2 -62b,3 (69a,6 -70b,2). Folio number of Sde-dge edition is indicated first, and then that of Peking edition is given in brackets. Henceforth the same principle will be followed.

2) *śrotr'ādi-vr̥ttiḥ pratyakṣam*, cf. *Yuktidipikā*, ed. by P. Chakravarti, p. 4,10, 39,18 SK (=Sāṃkhya-kārikā) defines the perception differently as: *prativīṣayādhyavasāyo dr̥ṣṭam* (k. 5a). The definition referred to by Dignāga is ascribed by Vācaspatimiśra to Vārṣaganya, a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, cf. NV, ad. I, i, 4 (p. 43,10): ... *tathā śrotr'ādi-vr̥ttir iti. NVTT*, p. 155,20-23: *Vārṣaganyasyāpi lakṣaṇam ayuktam ity āha—śrotr'ādi-vr̥ttir iti. pañcānām khalv indriyānām arth'ākāreṇa pariṇatānām ālocana-mātram vr̥ttir iṣyate*. Dr. E. Frauwallner, in his elaborative article "Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen Sāṃkhya-systems," WZKSÖ, Bd. II, made a thoroughgoing examination of passages obviously quoted by Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi from a certain Sāṃkhya text, and proved that Dignāga's criticism was directed toward the *Śaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣaganya. By putting those passages in order, he reconstructed the portion of the *Śaṣṭitantra* where epistemological and logical problems are dealt with.

3) Cf. Simhasūri, *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi*, p. 107,24f (cf. Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, S. 17): *śrotra-tvak-cakṣur-jihvā-ghrāṇānām manas'adhiṣṭhitā vr̥ttiḥ śabda-sparsa-rasa-rūpa-gandheṣu yathā-kramam grahaṇe vartamānā pramāṇam pratyakṣam*. Jinendrabuddhi introduces Sāṃkhya interpretations of this definition of perception. '*Manas'adhiṣṭhita*' is interpreted in two different ways. (a) It is expressive of that the mind, together with the sense (*adhiṣṭhita=saha*), operates upon the external object (*manas=mano-vr̥tti*). (b) It means that the operation of the sense upon the external object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind. The operation (*vr̥tti*) of the sense is either intellectual (*sa-pratyaya*) or unintellectual (*a-pratyaya*) according as it is accompanied by *buddhi* (intellect) or not. It is with a view to removing *apratyaya-vr̥tti* that *vr̥tti* is characterized as '*grahaṇe vartamānā*'. '*Śabda ... gandheṣu yathā-kramam*' is indicative of that each sense operates upon its proper object, cf. J, 61b,4 (66b,1) ff. cf. also Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, S. 21 ff.

Ba.<sup>4)</sup> If their [theory of perception should be accepted,] *there must be infinite number of sense-organs*. They are of the opinion that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object, for the object to be apprehended by other sense does not come within its range.<sup>5)</sup> [In so far as all objects are equally composed of three *guṇas*, as is held by the Sāmkhyas,<sup>6)</sup> they are essentially not distinguished from each other. Accordingly,] the distinction between [five] classes (*jāti*) of [object, i. e.,] sound etc. is, [according to the Sāmkhyas,] solely due to the increase (*upacaya*) and decrease (*apacaya*) of three *guṇas*. [This theory, however, is not without involving difficulties. Although] the sound, [for instance,] is thought to be a single existence [as the object of the auditory sense], there must be, according as [three] *guṇas* increase and decrease, infinite [varieties of sound, such as seven musical notes and the like, inasmuch as these all are recognized as being composed of three *guṇas*.] Hence, one who apprehends the object [through his senses] must necessarily be in possession of infinite number of sense organs, [each of which apprehending its proper object.]

Bb.<sup>7)</sup> *Or, only one sense-organ [would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object].* [The Sāmkhyas may assert as follows:—] “In that case, [i. e., in case of apprehending various sounds, such as seven musical notes and the like, all sounds,] being equally [composed of] three *guṇas*, are grouped under one and the same [sound-] class, (thus being apprehended alike through the auditory sense).” On this assumption, however, not only various sounds but also tangibles and other objects would be apprehended [through one sense-organ, because these also are similarly composed of three *guṇas*]. Consequently, only one sense-organ [would apprehend all sorts of object, and other sense-organs would be useless]. Despite that there are various objects, three *guṇas*, of which they are composed, remain the same. [In vindication of their theory, the Sāmkhyas may state the following:—] “We need not presume that the number of sense-organ is limited according as the number of object is definitely

4) Cf. J, 62b,3 - 63a,1 (70b,2-8).

5) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the following Sāmkhya reasoning: The deaf person, whose auditory sense-organ is defective, is unable to hear sound, although he keeps other nine organs (four *buddhindriyas* and five *karmēndriyas*) in good condition. This fact proves that the sound is apprehended only through the auditory sense-organ and not through any other, cf. J, 62b, 4 (70b, 2-3): *ji skad du bśad pa “hon pas dbaṅ po dgu rnams yod pa na / sgra mi thos te / deḥi phyir rna ba kho na sgraḥi yul can te / ḥdis pags pa la sogs pa rnams raṅ gi yul hjug par rtogs par byaḥo”* šes so /

6) Both *triguṇa* and *viśaya* are predicated, along with other attributes, to *vyakta* in SK, k. 11. Cf. *Yogabhāṣya*, ad. IV, 13: *sarvam idaṁ guṇānāṁ sanniveśa-viśeṣa-mātram iti paramārthatō guṇ'ātmānaḥ*.

7) Cf. J, 63a, 1-7 (70b, 8-71a, 7).

limited. A certain number of sense-organs are produced so that *puruṣa* may achieve its own purpose therewith.<sup>8)</sup> If one sense-organ were sufficient for the purpose of *puruṣa*, then only one sense-organ would have evolved from *prakṛti*. That the number of sense-organ is limited to five is solely due to that *puruṣa* accomplishes its purpose with five sense-organs. Each of sense-organs, thus evolving from *prakṛti*, is endowed with a definite character, and operates upon its proper object alone. Hence the auditory sense operates upon the sound only and not upon other objects, and other senses act in like wise."<sup>9)</sup> This theory, however, does not hold good.] There is no sound-class which is different from three *guṇas* and which is indwelling in all sounds but not in tangibles and other objects. As all objects are equally pervaded by three *guṇas*, [there is no radical discrimination between sounds and tangibles. Accordingly, it is impossible that a sense operates upon the sound alone and not upon other objects.]

Ca.<sup>10)</sup> [The Sāṃkhya may argue:—] "Why [is it asserted that three *guṇas* do] not [vary with objects]? [Objects are] discriminated from each other according as *sattva* etc., [of which they are composed,] are differently arranged. [On the other hand, various sounds included in] the same sound-class are of similar shape,<sup>11)</sup> [that is to say, three *guṇas* composing them are shaped alike, and this shape of sound] is distinguished from [those of] tangibles and other objects.<sup>12)</sup> <sup>(v...)</sup> [We thus maintain that the sound-class inclusive of all] homogenous <sup>(...v)</sup> [sounds] is the object upon which the auditory sense operates. So with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, no such fault as pointed out by you above is to be found with us." Granted that their argument is plausible in a way, [there arises, in consequence of this argument, another difficulty that] both the visual sense and the tactual sense would have the object in common,

8) SK, k. 31c-d: *puruṣārtha eva hetur na kenacit kāryate karanam. ibid., k. 21: puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya / paṅgv-andha-vad ubhayor api samyogas tat-kṛtaḥ sargaḥ //*

9) Cf. J, 63a,3-6 (71a,3-6).

10) Cf. *ibid.*, 63a, 7-63b,5 (71a,7-71b,6).

11) *dbyibs=samsthāna, ākāra, rūpa.*

12) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passages from a Sāṃkhya treatise: *smras te "dbyibs kyi bdag nid can gyi rigs ni yod pa kho na ste / yon tan gsum tha mi dad na yañ yon tan gsum gyi gnas skabs tsam tha dad pa las sgra la sogs pañi rigs rnamz tha dad do" // de skad du yañ bśad pa "sgra dañ reg bya dañ gzugs dañ ro dañ dri ste lña rnamz ni / bde ba dañ sdug bśnal dañ gti mug gsum po rnamz kyi ñes par bkod pañi bye brag rnamz so"* şes paño / cf. J, 63a,7-63b,1 (71a,7-71b,1). Briefly speaking, three *guṇas* are variously arranged into shapes, so that sound-class etc. are distinguished from each other by their shapes. However, objects included in the same class are of the same shape, because three *guṇas* composing them are equally arranged.



because the shape is *apprehended through two* [senses]. It is commonly known that we apprehend the shape, such as 'long' and the like, through tactual sense as well as visual sense. Hence, [the Sāmkhya argument that a certain shape of object is apprehended through the sense is] incompatible with [their theory] that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object.<sup>13)</sup>

Cb.<sup>14)</sup> Further, [if the above argument should be accepted,] the sound etc., would not be apprehended through the auditory sense etc., because a shape is *not in the range of three* [sorts of sense-organ]. A shape [is apprehensible only through two senses, visual and tactual, and] is not found to be apprehended through [three other senses,] auditory, olfactory and gustatory. Accordingly, [objects of these three, i. e.,] sound, odour and taste would not be recognized as being direct to the sense (*pratyakṣa*).

Cc.<sup>15)</sup> If classes [of object] should be distinguished from each other by their shapes, then various shapes, [such as 'long', 'short' and the like,] would be regarded as *one and the same object*. [According to the above argument put forward by the Sāmkhyas, the sound of *viṇa*, of tambour and all other sounds would be equally apprehended through the same auditory sense, as they alike are within the extent of sound-class.<sup>17)</sup> It, therefore, follows that] there are various specified existences [of different shape], each being not beyond the extent of the class of a certain object. The consequence of this argument will be that various shapes, [such as 'long', 'short' and so on,] should, [irrespective of their specific features,] be treated as the same object. [This conclusion, however, will not be approved of even by the Sāmkhyas themselves. Hence, the above argument of the Sāmkhyas is deemed to be violative of the thought assented by them (*abhyupagama-virodha*)].

Cd.<sup>18)</sup> [Again, if classes of object should be distinguished from each other by their shapes, then] spoons, ornaments etc. of the same shape, whether they are made of gold, [silver or any other material,]<sup>19)</sup> *would be without distinction*.

13) Cf. above note 3) and Ba.

14) Cf. J, 63b, 5-7 (71b, 6-8).

15) Cf. *ibid.*, 63b, 7-64a, 1 (71b, 8-72a, 2).

16) V puts this passage at the beginning of Cb. However, K has been adopted here, as J is in accord with it, cf. J, 63b, 7 (71b, 8).

17) J, 63b, 7 (71b, 8-72a, 1): *pi wañ dañ rñā pa ña wa la sogs pañi sgrāhi rigs phan tshun tha dad pa rnams ni sgrāhi rigs las ma ḥdas par gnas pa ñid kyi phyir yul mtshuñs pa ñid du ḥgyur ro.*

18) Cf. J, 64a, 1-5 (72a, 2-7).

19) K: *gser la sogs pañi skyogs dañ rgyan la sogs pañi* . . is liable to be taken as meaning the identity of golden spoon and golden ornament. If this interpretation should be accepted, the point of argument would be identical with Cc. V: *gser la sogs pañi skyogs rnams dañ rgyan rnams kyi* . . . has been adopted.

[In answer to this criticism, the Sāṃkhyas argue:—"It may not be erring to say that all things are of the same shape in their states of *tanmātra* (subtle element of object). However, when gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, evolve from *tanmātras*, there must be clear distinction between these objects."<sup>20</sup>] This statement does not constitute a proper answer. According to the Sāṃkhya theory, the effect (*kārya*) is immanent in the cause (*kāraṇa*) prior to the evolution (*pariṇāma*), both effect and cause being thus essentially indiscriminate from each other. Hence, gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, must be of the same shape as they were in the state of *tanmātras*, from which they evolved. Further,] gold etc. would be recognized as being identical with sound etc., because they are indiscriminately shaped [before evolving from *tanmātras*.<sup>21</sup>] If the distinction between objects should be neglected] in this way, then the conclusion would be that [each sense-organ] does not operate upon its proper object. [Needless to say, this conclusion is inconsistent with what has been stated by the Sāṃkhyas.]

D.<sup>22</sup> [Inasmuch as it is maintained that classes of object are distinguished from each other according as three *guṇas* are differently arranged, we may well regard *guṇas* as distinguishing qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the class of object, which as opposed to the former is deemed to be the qualified (*viśeṣya*). Therefore, two alternatives are thinkable as regards the apprehension of object through the sense. That is to say,] when a sense operates [upon its object], it grasps<sup>23</sup> either a mere [appearance of] the class of object or its distinguishing qualifiers, i. e., *sukha* (pleasure), [*duḥkha* (pain) and *moha* (delusion) as natures of three *guṇas*].<sup>24</sup>

Daa.<sup>25</sup> If, anyhow, the sense should be thought to operate upon the class

20) Cf. J, 64a,3-4 (72a,4-5), SK, k. 38: *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣāḥ tebhyo bhūtāni ... ete smrtā viśeṣāḥ*... Those which come within the range of sense-organ are gross elements (*mahā-bhūta*) resulted from elements (*bhūta*), which again are produced according to varying combinations of *tanmātras*, cf. STK (=Sāṃkhya-tattvakaumdi), ad. k. 22. Gross elements are characterized as *viśeṣāḥ*, as they are distinguishable as pleasurable, painful or delusive objects according as *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas* is predominant in them. On the other hand, *tanmātras* are *aviśeṣāḥ*, because we cannot notice distinction between them.

21) The implication of V: 'gser dan snin stobs dan rdzas la sogs pa rnams kyan mtshuṅs par hgyur ro' is not quite clear.

22) Cf. J, 64a,5-6 (72a,7-72b,1).

23) K: *hjug par ḥdzin par*..., but *hjug par* seems to be unnecessary, because we read 'dbaṅ po hjug na' preceding these words. Both V and J read simply 'ḥdzin par...'

24) SK, k. 12: *prīty-aprīty-viśād'ātmakāḥ ..... guṇāḥ*. STK, ad. k. 12: *prītiḥ sukhaṁ prīty-ātmakāḥ sattva-guṇāḥ, aprītir duḥkham aprīty-ātmako rājo-guṇāḥ, viśādo mohaḥ viśād'ātmakas tamo-guṇa iti*.

25) Cf. J, 64a,6-64b,2 (72b,1-4).

as such [of an object], then *it would not apprehend the characteristic feature* (*svarūpa*) of that object. In case merely the appearance (*ākāra*) of the sound [-class] etc. should be apprehended [through the operation of the auditory sense etc.], the specific features of [qualifiers, i. e.,] *sukha* etc., [by dint of which a class of object is distinguished from others], would not be distinctly apprehended, and the erroneous conclusion [that the perceptual apprehension is no other than the mere indistinctive cognition] would follow. [To give an instance, when we perceive merely a cow-like appearance in the twilight and do not perceive marks distinguishing a cow from other things, we are not able to get the determinate knowledge that the object seen is a cow.<sup>26)</sup> Similarly,] it is found that when we apprehend indistinctly the appearance [of an object and do not apprehend its distinguishing qualifiers,] we are unable to apprehend the characteristic feature of the object.

Dab.<sup>27)</sup> [Again,] if [the sense] should grasp the appearance [of the class of object] alone, *it would not apprehend the difference between objects* [included in the same class]. Different [sounds etc., which are equally included in] the sound [-class] etc. would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense]. In such a case, the sense would not be subservient to apprehend the difference between, for example, the sound of *viṇa* and that of tambour (*diṇḍima*), because no difference of appearance is to be found between them, inasmuch as all sounds are apprehended merely in their common appearance.

Dac.<sup>28)</sup> [The following might be stated by the Sāmkhyas:—"Simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the sound-class, each specified sound is also apprehended as one qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the class. Accordingly, the criticism that the sense, which grasps the class only, would be inapprehensive of different objects included in the same class is not deemed to be apposite to the case. The statement that *merely* the class of object is apprehended through the sense was made solely with a view to rejecting the theory that *sukha* etc. are apprehended through the sense. It was not meant for denying the fact that various things qualified by a class are apprehensible." This vindication again is not exempted from our criticism. If this theory should be approved of, then the sense] *would, like the mind (manas), be possessed of the faculty of thought-construction (vikalpa) when operating upon its object.* The sense, apprehending its own object qualified by the class<sup>29)</sup> and its difference [from

26) Cf. *ibid.*, 64b,1 (72b,3).

27) Cf. *ibid.*, 64b,2-3 (72b,4-5).

28) Cf. *ibid.*, 64b,3-7 (72b,6-73a,3).

29) Both K and V are not quite readable. The translation is based upon J, 64b, 5 (72b,8) : *rigs kyis* (P. *kyi*) *khyad par du byas pa dan*...

other objects], would be capable of apprehending its own object through the conceptual construction, as is the case with the operation of the mind.<sup>30)</sup>

Dbā.<sup>31)</sup> [Now the second alternative as regards the sensory apprehension of the object should be examined.] If, [unlike the above theory,] it should be maintained that *sukha* etc. as distinguishing qualifiers of the appearance [of the class of object] are apprehensible through the operation of the sense, then again *that circumstance would follow*. That is to say, [the operation of the sense] would be thought-constructive like the operation of the mind.

Dbb.<sup>32)</sup> In so far as the sense is thought to be subservient to apprehend natures of *sukha* etc., it must apprehend them either separately or in unity.

Dbb-a1.<sup>33)</sup> Among [two] cases [just mentioned above, the first one does not appear probable.] The sense is not, at any rate, effective to apprehend each [of three *guṇas*]. It, operating upon its object, certainly is capable of apprehending sound etc., but *no one of sattva, [rajas and tamas] is possible to be grasped by it.*<sup>34)</sup> [As the sound is composed of three *guṇas*, i. e.,] *sattva* etc., [each of these three] is not to be regarded as the sound itself. So with the tangible and other object. Hence, each of three *guṇas* is not the object to be grasped through the operation of the auditory sense etc.

Dbb-a2.<sup>35)</sup> [The Sāṃkhya assert as follows:—"The above argument] is not [persuasive], because [we hold that three *guṇas*] do not differ [from the sound etc.]" *Sattva* etc., they opine, being not different from sound etc., are possible to be apprehended [through the operation of the sense] in the same way as sound etc. [are apprehended therethrough. However, this opinion also is subject to our criticism.] *Should it be maintained [that three *guṇas* do not essentially differ from sound etc.], the conclusion would possibly be that [sound etc. are] not*

30) If the sense itself has the faculty of thought-construction, it need not be accompanied by the mind (*manasā'dhiṣṭhita*). Hence, the above interpretation is inconsistent with the Sāṃkhya definition of perception, cf. above note 3).

31) Cf. *J.*, 64b,7 (73a,3).

32) Cf. *ibid.*, 65a,1 (73a,3-4).

33) Cf. *ibid.*, 65a,1-4 (73a,4-8).

34) According to Kk and Vk, k. 2c-d is: ... *sñin stobs sogs // ma yin gšan ma yin paḥi phyir* / K interprets '*ma yin*' once as the negation of the apprehensibility of *sattva* etc. (*sñin stobs sogs min*) and again as the word of dissent from the side of the Sāṃkhya (*ma yin, gšan* ..., cf. Dbb-a2). V interprets '*ma yin*' only in the first sense, and puts the first half of k. 3a in place of k. 2d at the beginning of Dbb-a2. Jinendra-buddhi seems to be in support of K, cf. *J.*, 65a, 3 (73a, 6-7): '*ma yin*' *śes pa la sogs pa ste / lna rñams gsum gyi bkod paḥi khyad par rñams śes khas blañs paḥi phyir ḥdi yod pa ma yin no* / and *ibid.*, 65a,4-5 (73a,8): '*ma yin ste / gšan ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir*' *śes pas* ...

35) Cf. *J.*, 65a, 4-65b,5 (73a,8-74a,2).

recognized as effects [of three *guṇas*. According to the Sāṃkhya doctrine, sensible objects, such as sound etc., are to be reckoned as effects (*kārya*) of three *guṇas*, which in their original forms are very subtle and imperceptible.<sup>36)</sup> Now,<sup>(v...)</sup> if [three *guṇas*, i. e.,] *sattva* etc. should be considered to be no other than sound etc., these latter, being effects indistinguishable [from three *guṇas*],<sup>37)</sup> would not be regarded as effects, while *sattva* etc. would not deserve to be called causes.<sup>(...v)</sup> This consequence, however, is inconsistent with the following statement of the Sāṃkhyas, [which they put forth with a view to proving that *sattva* etc. are considered as causes of sound etc.:—] “With the explanation that *sattva* manifests itself as the effect apprehensible as the sound, it is established that [*sattva* is] the essence of sound, (or that the sound is *sattvic*,)<sup>38)</sup> and so on. Further, inasuch as cause and effect are of indistinguishable nature, [the sound is as well identical with *rajas* or *tamas* according as it is *rajasic* or *tamasic*. The conclusion, therefore, will be] either that *sattva*, [*rajas* and *tamas*] are identical with each other or that the sound itself is differentiated into many [in accordance with *sattva* etc. being discriminated from each other.] It was in view of taking, on this wise, [some alternatives] into consideration that we used the term ‘possibly’ in the above passage: “the conclusion would possibly be [that sound etc. are] not recognized as effects [of three *guṇas*].”

36) SK, k. 34 states that five sense-organs have both subtle elements and gross elements for their objects, *buddhīndriyāni teṣāṃ pañca viśeṣāviśeṣa-viśayāni*, STK, ad. k. 34: *viśeṣāḥ sthūlāḥ śabd'ādayaḥ śānta-ghora-mūḍhāḥ pṛthivy-ādī-rūpāḥ, aviśeṣāḥ tānmatrāṇi sūkṣmāḥ śabd'ādayaḥ*. Subtle elements are perceived only by the sage, and are imperceptible to normal senses. In gross elements which comes within the range of normal senses, natures of three *guṇas* are distinctly manifested. For example, the wind (*vāyu*) is pleasurable (*sukha*) or *sattvic* for the man suffering from heat, painful (*duḥkha*) or *rajasic* for the man suffering from cold and stupefying (*moha*) or *tamasic* when it raises heavy dust, cf. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* and *Māthara-vṛtti*, ad. k. 38. As sound etc. are of the nature of gross elements, they are recognized as manifestations of three *guṇas*, and in this respect we may regard three *guṇas* as causes (*kāraṇa*) and sound etc. as their effects (*kārya*).

37) V: *tha mi dad paḥ lus kyi sgra*. Perhaps *kārya* was misread as *kāya*. The word corresponding to it is found neither in K nor in J.

38) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passage from a Sāṃkhya text: ‘*gaṇ brjod pa*’ *ṣes pa la sogs pas ni rgyu ṇid du khas blaṅs pa gsuṅs te* / “*sñiṇ stobs sgraḥi ḥbras bur bśad nas sgraḥi bdag ṇid du gnas pas ni* / *rdul daṅ mun pa dag sgra las byuṅ baḥi ched du ḥjug par ḥchad par byed do* // *rdul sgraḥi ḥbras bur bśad nas ṣes pa la sogs pa thams cad sna ma bśin no* // *ḥdi ni khyad par te* / *rdul gyis sñiṇ stobs daṅ mun pa dag sgraḥi dnos poḥi ched du ḥjug par byed do* // *mun pa ni sñiṇ stobs daṅ rdul dag sgra la yod paḥi ched du rnam par ḥjog par byed do*” *ṣes paḥo* / cf. J, 65a, 7-65b, 1 (73b, 3-5). K: *thams cad ḥbras bu sgra snaṅ nas...* ‘*thams cad*’ (= *sarva*) is obviously the misrendering of *sattva* (= *sñiṇ stobs*).

Dbb-a3.<sup>39)</sup> Moreover, if [three *guṇas*] were not different [from sound etc., then each *guṇa*] would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense]. In case [the Sāṃkhyas stick to their theory of the effect being immanent in the cause and still maintain that] *sukha* etc. do not essentially differ from sound etc., [then they shall be charged with another difficulty.] As the atom of sound,<sup>40)</sup> [which, like *guṇas*, do not essentially differ from the hearable sound evolved therefrom], is considered [by the Sāṃkhyas] to be insensible, each *guṇa* also would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense]. In the meanwhile, [sound-] *tanmātra*,<sup>41)</sup> [*ahamkāra*, *mahat*, *prakṛti*, etc.,<sup>42)</sup> which, inasmuch as appearing in the process of evolution,] are not different entities from the sound, do not come within the range of the [auditory-] sense, [despite that the sound itself is heard through the sense.] If it is maintained that [the sound] is recognized [through the sense] as the effect of these entities, then would follow [the absurd conclusion] that the sense has the universal (*sāmānya*) for its object,<sup>43)</sup> [because, in that case, the sense is thought to be capable of] apprehending [the relation of cause and] effect [or that of qualifier and qualified].

In this way, [it has,] anyhow, [been proved] that each [of three *guṇas*] is not apprehended [through the operation of the sense].

Dbb-b1.<sup>44)</sup> If, on the other hand, it should be maintained that [three *guṇas*] are apprehended in unity [through the sense], then every [apprehension resulted from] the operation of the sense would be with various phases (*nānā-ākāra*). Inasmuch as the object is [composed of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* possessing] their respective [phases,] the apprehension cannot be of a single phase. Because, the apprehension [with a single phase] is impossible to determine the object [with various phases]. It, [however,] is found that the [sensory] apprehension of sound etc. is of a single phase. [Accordingly, the

39) Cf. *J*, 65b,5-7 (74a,2-4).

40) *ibid*, 65b,6 (74a,2): 'deḥi rdul phra rab' ces pa sgraḥi rdul phra rab bo. Five kinds of *tanmātra* are thought to be composed of their respective atoms, cf. *Yogabhāṣya*, ad. IV, 14: *prthivī-paramāṇus tanmātrāvayavaḥ*.

41) *J*, 65b,5-6 (74a,2-3): 'de tsam la sogs paḥam' ṣes pa sgra de tsam la sogs paḥo.

42) *ibid*, 65b,6 (74a,3): 'sogs pa-' ḥi sgras ḥa rgyal dañ chen po dañ gtso bo gzuñ bar byaḥo. All of these are composed of three *guṇas* and stand in *vyakta-avyakta* (or *kārya-kāraṇa*) relation one after another.

43) According to Dignāga, the universal is apprehended by means of inference only, and the sense-perception is never concerned with the universal, cf. *PSV*, ad. I, k. 2, M. Hattori, Dignāga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, *Bulletin of the University of Osaka Prefecture*, Ser. C, Vol. 7 pp. 6-7.

44) Cf. *J*, 65b,7-66a,2 (74a,4-7).

object must not be composed of many phases, and the theory that three *guṇas* are apprehended in unity through the sense should be discarded.)<sup>45)</sup>

Dbb-b2.<sup>46)</sup> [Again,] should *sukha* etc. in unity be the object, *the object would be common* to different senses. That is to say, different senses would operate upon a common object, and [the Sāmkhya doctrine that] every sense operates upon its proper object would be violated; for *sukha* etc. in different objects are of the same kind. Consequently would follow the same wrong conclusion as said before that only one sense-organ [would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object].<sup>47)</sup>

Dbb-b3.<sup>48)</sup> [The Sāmkhyas may state:—“(v...  
fault. [We do not maintain that three *guṇas* in every object are of the same kind]. We said [that classes of object, such as sound-class and the like, which are] distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of the shape [made of *guṇas*], were to be apprehended [through the operation of senses],<sup>49)</sup> wasn't it?” Indeed, you said like that, but what you said does not prove rightful.<sup>...v)</sup> Because, [in that case,] *the conformity (anuvidhāna)* [of the sense to the shape of the object]<sup>50)</sup> *would not be comprehended*. If [the visual sense, for instance, operating upon] one and the same colour-class, should apprehend it variously in accordance with the difference of shape [between blue, yellow and so on], then it would be impossible to find the conformity [of the sense] to the shape of a certain class of object.

Ea.<sup>51)</sup> Now, if it should be maintained that the distinction between classes [of object, such as sound-class etc.], is due to the difference of the shape [of *triguṇa*], then would follow the same consequence [as stated at the beginning] that there must be infinite number of senses.<sup>52)</sup> *A certain Sāmkhya teacher holds the view that [shapes of *triguṇa*] differ according to classes of object.* In the treatise

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45) Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the above argument in the following syllogism: [*pratijñā*]: The apprehension of sound etc. is not related to the object with various phases. [*hetu*]: Because it is of a single phase. [*dṛṣṭānta*]: Whatsoever is of a single phase is not related to the object with various phases. This is a *vyāpaka-viruddhōpalabdhi* (affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension).

46) Cf. J, 66a,2 (74a,7).

47) Cf. above Ba.

48) Cf. J, 66a,2-4 (74a,7—74b,2).

49) Cf. above Ca.

50) Some Sāmkhya teachers are of the opinion that the sense-organs are modified into the shape of that object from which they receive the particular impression, cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 108,9: *indriyāṇi saṃskāra-viśeṣa-yogāt pariṅhita-rūpāṇi kecit*.

51) Cf. J, 66a, 4-67a, 1 (74b, 2-75a, 8).

52) Cf. above Ba.

of [Mādhava]<sup>53)</sup> who stands against the traditional Sāṃkhyas, the following is stated with an allusion to the old Sāṃkhyā theory:—[“The old Sāṃkhyā theory that] three qualities composing the sound are not different from those composing the tangible and the rest is not deemed to be valid.<sup>54)</sup> Because it does not stand to reason that objects of the same constitution are grasped by different senses. [The old theory would thus be led to the conclusion that one sense-organ is possible to operate upon all sorts of object.] It, accordingly, is better to consider that the distinction between classes of object is due to [the difference of the shape of *triguṇa*. To give a full explanation, an atom contains] *sukha* etc., [and thus the aggregation of many atoms, which] becomes manifested as the object of sense, [is recognized as being composed of three *guṇas*. However, *sukha* etc. in the sound-atom and those in the tangible-atom and the rest are not similarly arranged, and, in consequence, the sound etc., though being equally composed of three *guṇas*, are distinguished from each other because of the difference of the shape made of *triguṇa*. For this reason,] it is stated that the sense is operative upon its proper object.” That which has been referred to above in the verse is this [Mādhava’s theory].<sup>55)</sup> Should his theory be accepted, [various objects included in] the same [class] must be distinguished constitutionally from each other [according to varying permu-

53) K: *graṇs can hjiḡ par byed pa*. V: *graṇs can phuṇ bar byed paḥi ma rdum pa*. ‘*ma rdum pa*’ (P. *ma rdum*) is possibly a wrong transliteration of Mādhava. Jinendrabuddhi gives a full explanation of the Mādhava’s theory which differs from the elder Sāṃkhyā theory, and lastly says: *Mā dha ba yis ni thams cad rnam pa gṣan du khas blaṅs so // de ṅid kyī phyir hdi ni graṇs can phuṇ bar byed paḥo* / cf. J, 66b.6-7 (75a.6). It is reported by Hiuen-tsang that Mādhava was challenged by Guṇamati for a debate and was defeated, cf. *Ta-tang-hsi-yü-chi* (大唐西域記), Taisho LI, p. 913c ff. As Mādhava was very old when the debate was held, he must have been an elder contemporary of Guṇamati, whose date can be assigned to ca. 460-520 A. D. Cf. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, I Bd., S. 280, 407 ff, P. Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhyā System of Thought*, p. 154-5.

54) Both K and V seem somewhat defective and give no clear idea with regard to the difference of opinion between elder Sāṃkhyas and Mādhava. The translation is helped by the following explanation of Jinendrabuddhi: *ser skya pa śna ma rnam ni thams cad du bde ba la sogs pa rnam no bo gcig pa kho na ste / ma dhu (=dha) ba ni / thams cad du de rnam tha dad par ḥdod do* / cf. J, 66a.5-6 (74b.4).

55) J, 66a.6-66b.4 (74b.4-75a.2) is probably a quotation from an unknown treatise of Mādhava. On the basis of this source, we may interpret Mādhava’s theory as follows:—Every atom is composed of three *guṇas*, but some atoms differ qualitatively from others because of the difference of the arrangement of three *guṇas*. Thus the sound-atom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between the sound and the tangible is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms combine themselves together, and their varying combinations give rise to various things, which, however, are included in the same class so far as component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution, atoms exist dispersedly and, in this state, they are called *pradhāna*.



tations of atoms,<sup>56)</sup> and there must be infinite number of senses.

Eb.<sup>57)</sup> [Indeed, Mādhava's theory is considered to be] superior to the old [Sāmkhya] doctrine inasmuch as propounding that <sup>(58...</sup> *sukha* etc. vary in kind with classes of sense and object, but we shall state [our interpretation of his theory] <sup>...58)</sup> with much lucidity. <sup>(v...</sup> *Each atom is of a definite nature*: [*sukha*-atom, *duḥkha*-atom etc., sound-atom, tangible-atom etc., atom of auditory sense, that of tactual sense etc. are essentially different from each other in nature. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms aggregate and become manifested as objects and senses. However, prior to evolution,] <sup>(v...</sup> *they exist dispersedly and, [in this state,] they are called pradhāna (primordial matter).*<sup>59)</sup> *Sukha, duḥkha* and *moha* or sound, tangible etc., [when evolving from atoms,] are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class, and atoms which are capable of becoming all of these [by combining themselves together] are called *pradhāna*<sup>60)</sup> [in the state prior to evolution. Various] *effects are produced according as [atoms are] differently combined (samprayoga-viśeṣa)*. Thus in accordance with varying combinations of atoms, various objects, which are not beyond the extent of a certain class, [are produced, and these effects are recognized as objects of senses].

Ec.<sup>61)</sup> [However, Mādhava is of the opinion that each atom is not of one nature but is composed of three *guṇas*.<sup>62)</sup>] *In case an atom should be possessed of three natures, how could we recognize the effect, [which is the aggregation of atoms,] as being of one [nature]?* <sup>(v...</sup> [For example,] when the sound is heard, the cognition produced is of a single phase as is expressed by words: 'this is sound' and it lacks [three different phases, such as] <sup>(v...</sup> *sukha* etc. But the cognition of a single phase cannot be produced when the object is of various

56) J, 66b,1 (74b,7): *sgra so so la gsum po gšan dan gšan yin cin / dehi phyir na gsum po rnam man po nid kyi phyir man poḥi tshig go / cf. n. 55).*

57) Cf. *ibid.*, 67a,1-67b,2 (75a,8-76a,2).

58) Both K and V are unreadable, and J gives no explanation. The above translation has been given provisionally.

59) While Mādhava maintains that each atom is composed of three *guṇas*, cf. J, 66b, 2-4, herein the atom is said to have one definite nature. In other points, the above interpretation does not essentially differ from Mādhava's theory, cf. above n. 55) and below Ee.

60) Cf. J, 67a,4-5 (75b,4-5): *rdul phra rab kyi rdzas gcig kho na thams cad du soṅ ba yod pa ma yin gyi / ḥon kyaṅ rdul phra rab de rnam kho na graṅs med pa rnam thams cad du yod la / rigs gcig pa can ni de rnam kyi gtso bo ṣes brjod par byed par hgyur ro ṣes ston to /*

61) Cf. *ibid.*, 67b,2-68a,3 (76a,2-76b,5).

62) Cf. *ibid.*, 66b,2 (74b,8): *sgraḥi rdul phra rab gcig kho na gum po ste / rdzas gsum gyi bdag nid yin te /* See above n. 55) and 59).

phases. Why? *Because, heterogeneous [atoms], even if conjoining together, are not recognized as being able to transform themselves (pariṇāma) [into an effect].* Three [heterogeneous atoms] cannot be united, for, according to the Sāṃkhyas, they essentially differ in kind. Even if they all are expressed by one and the same term 'atom' (*paramāṇu*), their natures are different, [as for instance sugar juice and water are different although they are equally called 'drink' (*pāna*)].

Ed.<sup>63)</sup> [The following might be argued by Mādhava:— "The above criticism is not in place at all. We do not hold that three atoms of different natures are united together. Atoms are equally composed of three *guṇas*, but they are classified in accordance with different arrangements of three *guṇas*. Then some homogeneous atoms are combined together and become manifested as the sound etc., and these latter possess three natures. Such being the case,] the manifested object which is composed of three *guṇas* is defined as sound on the one hand, and as *sukha* etc. on the other. The object of sense is nothing else than the entity of such sort." [This thought also is not exempted from our criticism.] *As [an effect] is not to be admitted as possessing two natures, only one nature is grasped [when a sense operates] upon it.* In case the auditory sense were operative, in disregard of the sound, upon any one of *sukha* etc., then, under this very circumstance, [the object] might well be said to possess only one nature. For, *although things are possessed of various natures, one which is deemed to be the object of the sense is discriminated from others.* Although sound etc. are possessed of various natures, such as *śabda-tva*, *guṇa-tva*, *sukha-tva* and the like, the apprehension is concerned merely with that which becomes the object of the sense. This alone is deemed to be the real object of the sensory apprehension, and it is [of] one [nature]. [To cite an instance, when a little amount of barley flour is mixed up with much salt, the olfactory sense has only the taste of salt for its object.] The same is the case with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, [the theory that an effect is defined as sound on the one hand and as *sukha* etc. on the other] does not stand to reason.<sup>64)</sup>

63) Cf. *ibid.*, 68a,3-68b,4 (76b,5-77a,7).

64) K is liable to be interpreted as negating the theory that the object of the sense is of one nature. Besides the above-stated, Jinendrabuddhi points out the following defects found in Mādhava's theory of each atom being composed of three *guṇas*:—Although a *guṇa* appears variously according to circumstances in the state of *vyakta*, it essentially remains the same; for instance, *sattva* is always illuminative (*prakāś'ātmaka*), whether it appears as the sound or as any other object. Such being the case, there must not be a qualitative difference between sound-atom and tangible-atom. Thus the distinction between the sound and the tangible will be neglected, and one sense will operate upon

Ee.<sup>65)</sup> Therefore, [the theory we have set forth] that each atom is of a definite nature<sup>66)</sup> is superior to the Sāmkhya theory. Surely it is better than the thought of reputed old Sāmkhyas and is excellent. Distinction between classes [in effects] is due to that they are produced from their respective causes, each of which is of one [definite] nature.<sup>67)</sup> On this theory is also well grounded the proposition that heterogeneous [atoms] cannot produce an effect [even if they conjoin together].<sup>67)</sup> Three [heterogeneous factors] do not exist in the single-natured [atom as the cause].

F.<sup>68)</sup> [The Sāmkhyas hold the view that the sensory apprehension of the object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind, while the object mentally apprehended is actually arrived at by the sense<sup>69)</sup> On the other hand, they define the perception as the operation of senses upon objects, such as sound etc.<sup>70)</sup> If [their definition is taken as implying that] the perception is the operation of senses aiming solely at the grasp of sound etc., then it will be inadmissible to say that [the mind], which is thought to have all cognizables for its object,<sup>71)</sup> is also operative in perception. [That is to say, the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is not to be regarded as perception.] Whence [is this argued]? Because they, [after elucidating inference as the means of valid cognition, simply say, "The operation of auditory sense etc. also (is the means of valid cognition),"<sup>72)</sup> and] do not

all sorts of object. If, on the other hand, the emphasis should be laid upon the distinction between the sound and the tangible in their states of *vyakta*, then the distinction between various sounds also must not be neglected and, consequently, infinite number of senses would be needed to apprehend them, cf. J, 69b,1 (77a,2) ff.

65). Cf. J, 68b,4-5 (77a,7-8).

66). Cf. above Eb.

67). Cf. above Ec.

68). Cf. J, 68b, 5-70a,1 (77a,8-78b,7).

69) *ibid.*, 68b,5-6 (77a,8-77b,2): *phyi rol gyi don rnam la dbaṅ pos ṣen par byed la / dbaṅ pos rtogs par byas pa de la ni / yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed cin / ji ltar yaṅ dbaṅ pos. rtogs par byas pa la yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed pa de bṣin du / yid kyis ṣen pa dbaṅ pos yaṅ dag rig par byed do* / This is the second interpretation of the term '*manasā'dhiṣṭhita*' in the Sāmkhya definition of perception, cf. J, 61b, 5-6 (69b, 2-3) and above n. 3). Cf. also J, 69a,3 (77b, 6-7), 70a,3-4 (78a,8-78b,1), 70a, 7 (79a,6-7). The first interpretation of '*manasā'dhiṣṭhita*' is refuted in J, 69a,5 (78a, 1) ff.

70). Cf. above A.

71) J, 73b, 6 (83a, 4): "*dus gsum paḥi yul can daṅ don thams cad pa ni yid do*" ṣes bśad do / cf. SK, k.35: *sāntaḥkaraṇā buddhiḥ sarvaṃ viśayaṃ avagāhate*. STK, ad. k. 35: *tair (=indriyair) upanītaṃ sarvaṃ viśayaṃ sa-mano-hamkārā buddhiḥ yasmāt avagāhate* ...

72) J, 61b,2-4 (69a,6-7): "*ci rjes su dpaḡ pa gcig pu kho na tshad ma ḥam ṣe na / ma yin ṣes brjod par bya ste / rna ba la sogs paḥi ḥjug pa yaṅ ṅo (śrotr'ādi-vṛttiś ca) // mñon sum tshad ma ṣes pa lhag maḥo* / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 43.

mention that *the mind, which is operative upon all sorts of object, is the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)*.<sup>(V...)</sup> As there is neither a mark nor a testimonial word with regard to the mental sense which intellectualizes the operation of the sense, the said mental process should not be spoken of as the means of valid cognition. [Accordingly, the Sāṃkhya view referred to above will] be violative of [their own theory]<sup>(...V)</sup>. The intellectualization of the operation [of senses through the mind] is not included in any means of valid cognition.<sup>73)</sup>

G.<sup>74)</sup> [In defense of their view, the Sāṃkhyas may argue as follows:—] “That defect is not [to be charged upon us. We do not hold that] the intellectualization of the operation [of senses through the mind] is the means of valid cognition in the sense of the apprehension of that which is not yet apprehended. That mental process] is no else than the recollection (*smṛti*), just as desire (*rāga*)<sup>75)</sup> and the like are. As is established by us, the recollection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension.<sup>(V...)</sup><sup>76)</sup> Hence, while senses are the means of perceptual apprehension in relation to external objects, the mind recollects the sensory apprehension immediately after the operation of senses.” [In opposition to this statement, we allege that *the said mental activity*] is not a recollection, for [the mind] has not had direct awareness (*anubhava*) [of the sensory apprehension beforehand]. It is unreasonable that the apprehension [of the external object] through the operation of the sense is immediately followed by the recollection [of apprehension] through the mind, for [the mind] has had no [direct awareness] previously [with regard to the operation of the sense. What can be recollected by one must have been experienced before by him. The direct awareness of the object through the sense is impossible to be recollected by the mind, just as the experience of one person is impossible to be recollected by another.]

H.<sup>77)</sup> *Supposing that both the sense and the mind operate simultaneously,—* in case the Sāṃkhyas admit, [in defense of their view,] that the sensory apprehension and the mind cogitating thereupon function simultaneously,— even then [the difficulty is not explained away, because] the mark as an object (*viśaya*) would, in that case, be found on [the mind, which primarily is] the

73) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the far-fetched interpretation of the Sāṃkhyas that the word ‘*ca*’ in ‘*śrotr’ādi-vṛttiś ca*’ is meant for including *mano-vṛtti*. This interpretation, Jinendrabuddhi argues, is inadmissible, because ‘*ca*’ obviously means ‘besides *anumāna*, *śrotr’ādi-vṛtti* also’, cf. J, 69a,1-5 (77b,5-78a1).

74) Cf. J, 70a, 1-71a,7 (78b,7-80a,8).

75) *Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Pātañjaladarśanam*, Govt. Or. Ser., p. 362-3: *sukhā-bhijñāsya sukhānusmṛti-pūrvakaḥ sukha-sādhaneṣu tṛṣṇā-rūpo gardho rāgaḥ*.

76) Cf. J, 70a,6 (79a,5): ‘*khyad par*’ gyi sgra so sor mñon par sbrel par byaḥo.

77) Cf. *ibid.*, 71a,7-72a,1 (80b,1-81a,3).

subject (*viṣayin*).<sup>78)</sup> [Granting that this point is justifiable anyhow,<sup>79)</sup> that [mind which recollects the direct awareness of the sensory apprehension] cannot be the instrument of valid cognition. Now that the mind functioning as the direct awareness of sensory apprehension was not said to be the instrument of valid cognition, it still less is to be regarded so when it apprehends its [previous] situation [by reviving it]. [The above theory, thus,] has been violative of [the Sāmkhya doctrine]. [The following might be questioned by the Sāmkhyas:— “Why are desire etc. possible to be recollected? The feeling of desire and the like are caused with regard to the object which has been grasped by the sense. In this respect, the condition under which they are caused is the same with the case of the mind. If the mind is ineffective to recollect the sensory apprehension, desire etc. also must not be recollected!” We are quite ready to answer to this question. As we admit that the feeling of desire and the like are no else than] the self-cognition,<sup>80)</sup> it is not faulty to say that they are possible to be recollected. [The recollection, according to our theory, is thus not without previous experience, because desire etc. were self-cognized before. On the other hand, the Sāmkhyas, who do not approve of the theory of self-cognition or who, even if approving it, do not state it distinctly, are unable to set forth a proper reason for the sensory apprehension being recollected by the mind. Accordingly,] the statement ‘the recollection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension’,<sup>81)</sup> [which they made in view of proving that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is a recollection,] is expressive of [that the recollection is not preceded by any experience], just as the blind walks [without having the previous sight of his route].<sup>82)</sup>

I.<sup>83)</sup> Under the [above-said] circumstance, even the object of the sense is not possible to be recollected immediately after [it is grasped through the sense], because it is not directly known through the mind. [The Sāmkhyas

78) If it should be held that the ideation of sensory apprehension through the mind and the actual grasp of the ideate through the sense are simultaneous, the mind, which is *viṣayin* in contrast to the sensory apprehension would, at the same time, be regarded as the object (*viśaya*) upon which the sense operates. SK, k. 35 explains that the sense and the mind are respectively the gate (*dvāra*) and the gate-keeper (*dvārin*). On the above presumption, however, the mind would be recognized as the gate watched by the sense. Cf. J, 69b,1 (78a,5) ff and 72b,1 (81b,4) ff.

79) J, 71b, 3 (80b, 5): ‘*de yañ*’ šes pa khas blañs nas skyon gšan suñs paḥo.

80) PS, I, k. 6a-b: *mānasam cārtha-rāg’ādi-svasaṁvittir akalpikā*, cf. M. Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

81) Cf. above G.

82) J, 71b,6-7 (81a,1-2): *ji ltar loñ bañi gom* (P. *goms*) *pa ma mthoñ ba sñon ma can rnam par hgod par de bñin du hdiñi yañ tshad mas yonñ su ma bcad par mñon par brjod par byed pañi phyir ro* /

83) Cf. J, 72a,1-73a,4 (81a,3-82b,1)

try to justify their theory arguing as follows:—"The mind does not operate without previous experience. When a sense operates upon an object, the mind which accompanies the sense is also related to the same external object, and thus the mind recollects its previous awareness of the object."<sup>84</sup>) Against this we declare that] the mind is unable to have the direct awareness of the external object before [recollecting it]. [<sup>(v...)</sup>*If the mind should be related to the external object, the Sāṃkhya doctrine would*] be violated. Or, [on the supposition that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is deemed to be] the recollection, [the mind would] grasp something different [from that which is grasped by the sense.<sup>(v...)</sup>]<sup>85</sup>) The term 'or' (*vā*) in the verse is significative of the following alternatives: either the recollection is caused in spite of the lack of previous experience<sup>86</sup>) concerning the operation of the sense or [the Sāṃkhya doctrine] is violated. [In any case, it is no more reasonable that the mind recollects the operation of the sense without apprehending it before than that Yajñādatta recollects what has been experienced by Devadatta.]<sup>87</sup>) Why, then, is [the Sāṃkhya doctrine] violated? If the mind, which is produced simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the external object, is thought to be apprehensive of [the same object], then the Sāṃkhya theory expressed in the following statement will be violated:—"In case two senses are operative [simultaneously] for one and the same purpose, then the effectiveness (*sāmarthyatva*) of the sense will be lost."<sup>88</sup>)

84) *ibid.*, 72a,1-2 (81a,4): "dban poḥi ṣen pa de yod na / phyi rol gyi don kho na las (=la) yid kyis rjes su ṣen par byed do" // ṣes pa bstan bcos kyi don te /

85) K and V are not in accord with each other, while Vk coincides with K as well as with Kk. However, K (Kk, Vk) is quite unreadable. J, 72a,2 (81a,4-5): 'ñams paḥam' ṣes pa la sogs pa ste... 'gṣan mthoñ ba' ni... appears to be in support of V, but the meaning of 'dran pa' placed before 'ñams paḥam' in V is hardly made out. The translation is based upon V, 'dran pa' being omitted therefrom.

86) Both K and V (Pek. Ed.) read 'ñams su myoñ ba' instead of 'ñams su ma myoñ ba'. J, 72a,4-5 (81a, 7-8): 'ñams su ma myoñ ba la dran pa ḥam' ṣes pa / ci ste yid kho nas ñams su myoñ ba dran par ḥdod na / de ltar yin na ñams su ma myoñ baḥi don la dran par ḥgyur te / de ni yid kyis sñar ñams su ma myoñ ba ñid kyis (=kyi) phyir ro /

87) The repudiation of the first alternative is omitted in PSV, but Jinendrabuddhi states as follows: 'gṣan mthoñ ba' ni dran pa ste / dbaṅ poḥi ḥjug pas ñams su myoñ ba ñid kyi phyir dan yid kyis kyañ dran par bya ba ñid kyis phyir ro // de yañ mi rigs te / lhas byin gyis ñams su myoñ ba mchod 'sbyin gyis dran pa ni ma yin pas so ... cf. J, 72a, 5-6).

88) J, 72a,6 (81b,1-2): bstan bcos su bśad pa "ci phyi rol gyi don rnams dbaṅ po dan yid dag gis lhan cig ṣen nam ṣe na / ma yin ṣes brjod par byaḥo // cihi phyir ṣe na / don gciḡ byed paḥi dbaṅ po dag rtog pa na nus pa ñid ma yin no" ṣes paḥo / This must have been stated by those who are in support of the second interpretation of 'manasā'dhiṣṭhita' (cf. above n. 3)) against those who uphold the first interpretation.

J.<sup>89)</sup> "The fault pointed out above is not to be laid upon us. [The theory concerning] the simultaneity [of the sense with the mind] was expounded by us in explanation of that the recollection [through the mind] is a subsequent apprehension. The passage referred to by you above<sup>90)</sup> is stated in answer to the question as to whether the sense and the mind work together to apprehend the external object [or separately]. Preceding that passage, the following has been [distinctly] stated:—'In case the mind operates at the present time together with a certain sense, then the operation of the sense will become intellectual.'<sup>91)</sup> [Accordingly, the mind and the sense cooperate to get the intellectual understanding of the object, but the mind does not operate directly upon the external object in parallel with the sense.]" Even if [the Sāmkhyas defend their theory] in this way, [they cannot succeed in avoiding our criticism.] *If they tried to prove that the recollection of the [external] object [through the mind] is subsequent*,—if they explained that the mind operates simultaneously [with the sense] with a view to proving that the recollection occurs subsequently [to the intellectual apprehension of the object, then that explanation] will be incompatible with the following exposition given by them:—<sup>(v...)</sup> "The apprehension of the object through the sense is followed by the intellectual apprehension through the mind, while the object mentally apprehended is actually arrived at by the sense."<sup>92)</sup> <sup>(...v)</sup> Consequently, it is impossible that the external object is recollected [through the mind].

K.<sup>93)</sup> In the meanwhile, if the mind should operate directly upon the external object, then *senses other [than the mind] would be useless*: senses other than the mind would be unserviceable with regard to [the appre-

As regards *sāmarthyatva* of *indriya*, see the following etymological explanation: *indantitindriyāni*, *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, Ed. by Wogihara, p.93.

89) Cf. J, 73a,4-73b,5 (82b,4-83a,4).

90) Cf. the quotation at the end of I.

91) J, 73b, 1-2 (82b, 6-8): *bstan bcos su .... ḥdi skad bsad do // "de bṣin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa ṇid du rab tu ḥjug te / phyi rol gyi don rnams la da ltar baḥi dus su gaṇ gi tṣhe dbaṇ po ḥgaḥ ṣig daṇ ldan par yid gyur ba deḥi tṣhe dbaṇ po daṇ ni rkyen daṇ ldan paḥi ḥjug par ḥgyur ro // ḥbah ṣig pa ni ḥdas pa daṇ ma ḥons paḥi (dus dag la ḥjug go cf. 70b, 6 (79b, 6))"* ṣes pa la sogs pa sṇar brjod la / phyis ḥdri ba ḥdi byas paḥo / Cf. Frauwallner, *WZKSO*, Bd. III, S. 29.

92) Cf. above n. 69).

93) Cf. J, 73b,5-7 (83a,4-6). The first interpretation of '*manasā'dhiṣṭhita*' is referred to herein, and is repudiated through the same argument as set forward by those Sāmkhyas who adopt the second interpretation of the above words, cf. n. 88). Cf. also J, 69b,1-2 (78a,5-6): *gal te yaṇ yid phyi rol gyi don la dṇos su ḥjug na / de ltar gyur na dbaṇ po cig ṣos rnams de la ḥjug pa don med par ḥthob ste / yid kho nas skyes buḥi don phun sum tshogs pa ṇid kyi phyir ro /*

hension of] the external object, because the purpose of *puruṣa* would be accomplished through the mind only.

The perception as explained by the Sāṃkhyas, thus being incapable of determining the nature of object, is not [to be recognized as] the means of valid cognition.

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