DIGNĀGA’S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

—An Annotated Translation of Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter I—

Masaaki HATTORI

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is just half a century ago that the late Mahāmahopadhyaya S. C. Vidyabhūsana published his monumental work, History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, in which he first introduced Dignāga’s theory of knowledge to the scholars of Indian philosophy. Notwithstanding this incentive, the furtherance of the study on this great figure was not a task that could be carried out without toil. Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS), a comprehensive and systematical work on epistemology and logic, though being known as a reformative work in the history of Indian Logic, is unfortunately not preserved in the original Sanskrit, and the Tibetan version, the only available material of the study on this text, cannot be considered to be quite a readable one, perhaps mainly due to the unsuitness of the Tibetan language to this kind of strict and subtle arguments and also sometimes to the translator’s lack of understanding. Attempts have been made by Randle and other scholars to collect passages of PS scattered in the Nyāya texts and elsewhere, and these attempts have proved to be very helpful for the study of Dignaga’s theory. Controversial points of his theory have been thus gradually made clear. An epoch was marked by Stcherbatsky when he published an elaborative study on the Nyāyabindu. While annexing precise notes to this concise treatise of Dharmakīrti, he made frequent references to PS, and moreover, translated the portion wherein Dignāga discussed the problem of self-cognition with Jinendra-buddhi’s commentary. Dignāga’s theory was brought forth under the brighter light and the preliminary course to the textual study of PS was well set up by his effort. Owing to the successful result of Dr. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s second expedition to Tibet, we are now provided with the Sanskrit text of Pramāṇavārttika (PV), an extensive critical commentary on PS, along with some commentaries on it. These are precious materials to further the study of the doctrines of Dignāga as well as of Dharmakīrti, for PV treats with the same problems as discussed in PS, and, fortunately enough, the passages of the latter are found often cited in the commentaries of the former. Recently some portions of PS have been rendered by Japanese scholars into their own language from the Tibetan version. The portion translated and annotated here was put into Japanese some years back by Mr. Takemura, Asst. Prof. of Ryūkoku Univ., Kyoto (Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronshū, No. 351, 1956), but, according to the opinion of the present writer, his translation can hardly be recognized as a scholarly work,
misreading of the text being found almost in every line. The present translation is 
based on, in principle, Tshad-ma kun-las btius-pahi hgrel-pa (Pramāṇasamuccaya-vrtti), 
Kānakavarman’s version, Peking Ed., Mdo-hgrel XCV (Ce), fol. 93 bff. Verses of PS 
are properly inserted between lines by the present writer. Constant references have 
been made to Vasudhararakṣita’s version, Peking Ed., Mdo-hgrel XCV, fol. 13 aff and 
Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī-nāma Pramāṇasamuccaya-vrtti, Sde-dge & Peking Eds. 
The writer wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Prof. Hatano, Tōhoku Univ., Asst. 
Prof. Miyasaka, Kōyasan Univ., Asst. Prof. Ihara, Kyūshū Univ. and Mr. Hasuba, Otani 
Univ., through whose courtesy he could obtain the photographic copies of the above-
mentioned texts. The writer has also to express his indebtedness to Jain Muni 
Jambuvijaya who was kind enough to send the writer a proof of his Sanskrit re-
construction of PS, Chap. I, which is expected to be out soon as an appendix to his 
edition of Nayacakra-vrtti. Owing to this excellent Sanskrit reconstruction, the writer 
could clarify some ambiguous points. Muni Jambuvijaya collected many original 
passages of PS thus far left unnoticed from various sources, which, however, have not 
been noted in this paper because the writer does not like to refer to them before the 
publishation of the said work.

§1. SALUTATION

Verse 1. (Fol. 93b, 5) 
I salute Him who is the personification of valid knowledge, who 
pursues the benefit of the living beings, who is the teacher, the sugata, the 
protector. And, in order to establish the means of valid knowledge, I shall unite 
here under one head the scattered fragments from all my other treatises.

Abbreviations.
AKV Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, Ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–36.
BL Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 2 Vols, Bibliotheca Buddhica XXVI, Leningrad, 1930–32.
NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti.
NBh Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
NBT Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara, Ed. with DP.
NM Nyāyamukha, Chinese Version, Taisho Tripitaka, XXXII, pp. 1–6.
NV Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara, Vārānasi Ed.
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya.
PSV Pramāṇasamuccaya-vrtti.
TS Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Nos. XXX, XXXI, Baroda 1926.
TSP Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, Ed. with TS.
VA Pramāṇavārttikabhaṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, Ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 
Patna, 1953.
VPM Vibhūticandra annexed to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Ma-
norathanandin, Ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1937.
DIGNĀGA’S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

Here (in the verse of salutation), in order to cause in the heart of the people, at the beginning of the treatise, the faith (in the Buddha), the praise is expressed in honour of the Buddhā, the Adorate, who, because of his perfectness of the cause and the effect, is to be regarded as the personification of the valid knowledge (pramāṇa-bhūta). There, the cause is the completion of the intention (āsaya) and the practice (prayoga). (The completion of) the intention means that the Buddha is the One pursuing the benefit of the living beings. (The completion of) the practice signifies that the Buddha is the teacher because he teaches the people. The effect is the

1) Dignāga is generally regarded as the founder of the so-called Logician Vijñānavādins (nyāyānusārīyo vijñānavādināḥ), the younger branch of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins; the elder school of it represented by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is known by the name of Vijñānavādins basing upon Scripture (āgamānusārīyo vijñānavādināḥ). The names given to these two subdivisions of the Yogācāra show clearly the difference of attitude between the two towards the Buddhist truth. Dignāga does not recognize, as the masters of the elder school do, the authority of the Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to the critical test before they are accepted as valid, and we find that his works are consistently permeated by the critical and rationalistic spirit. This spirit, however, is not introduced newly by him into Buddhism, but he inherited it from the Buddha, who used to exhort his disciples not to accept any of his words merely out of reverence but to test it critically, just as people test the purity of gold by burning it in fire, by cutting it and by examining it on a touchstone, cp. Aṅguttara Nikāya, III, 65,3, Majjhima N., sutta 38, TSP, p. 12, Ānānasārasamuccaya, k. 31 (transl. by S. Yamaguchi, Chākan Bukkyō Ronkō, p. 327), Th. Stcherbatsky, BL, Vol. I, p. 77, S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 611, do., The Dhammapada, pp. 10–11, S. Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. xl. Dignāga is convinced of his following the teaching of the Buddha by establishing the theory of knowledge, and basing upon this conviction, he gives, at the beginning of the treatise, a salutation to the Buddha, who, according to his expression, is to be reckoned as the personification of the valid knowledge (pramāṇa-bhūta). It is reported by Bu-ston that Dignāga wrote this verse on the side of a rock in the cavern known by his name, and that as he wrote down this salutation and his determination to establish the true theory of knowledge, various ominous signs appeared, cp. Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyun) by Bu-ston, Vol. II, p. 150. Dharmakirti attaches importance to this verse, by which, he thinks, the fundamental standpoint of the Buddhist Logicians is declared. He makes thorough discussion on this point in his extensive critical commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya, namely Pramāṇavārttika, and, in consequence, the chapter on the establishment of the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa-siddhi-pariccheda) is, in this work, separated from the chapter on the direct knowledge and is treated as independent. The full verse is cited at VPM, p. 518, and the first half at VA, p. 3, and AKV, p. 7, s.s.:  

pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhitāpiṇe prāṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine /  
pramāṇa-siddhiḥ svamatāḥ samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viśrṣṭād ihaikatah //

2) cp. VA, p. 3, 12f., 115, 31-32, 116, s.s.  
3) PSVT, 2a, 5–2b, 2: ’pramāṇa-bhūta’ implies that the Buddha is the authority (= the valid knowledge) and that He has come into the world (ḥad ma yaḥ ḍhi yin la gyur phaḥ yan pā= idam paramāṇam ca bhūtah ca). ‘bhūta’ means ‘to be born’ (skyes-pa=ṅgla) or ‘to come into the world’ (byun-ba=tupamna). What is meant by this term is that the Buddha, in whose personality the valid knowledge is embodied, is distinguished from the supposed authority which has no actual relation with the world, such as tīṣara who remains in eternal and non-self-revealing state and the like.
attainment of the objectives of his own and of others. ‘The attainment of the objective of his own’ is (evidenced) by the fact that the Buddha is titled sugata (one that has attained bliss); that title (can be explained as) indicating three meanings⁴, i.e., (i) praiseworthiness (prāṣastārtha), just like the handsome (su-rūpa)⁵, (ii) non-retrogression (=final emancipation, apunarārthit-arthā), just like the radical cure from the fever (su-naṣṭa-jvara) and (iii) wholeness (niḥśeṣārtha), just like the jar filled with water (su-pūrṇa-ghāta). These three meanings (of the title ‘sugata’ are grounds of) distinguishing the Buddha’s attainment of his own objective from the attainment of the outsiders (of Buddhism) who has subdued passions (vita-rāgā) or of those who is undergoing religious training (saikṣa) or who no longer need religious training (asaikṣa)⁶. ‘The attainment of the objective of others’ is to be taken as implying that the Buddha is possessed of the ‘protector-hood’ (ṭāyitva) in the sense that he is, the protection for others.

Saluting the teacher who is endowed with such merits, the author will compose, in order to establish the means of valid knowledge, Pramāṇasamuccaya or Collection of the Theory of Knowledge by collecting (passages) from Nyāyamukha and other treatises⁷ of the author himself. (The purpose of composing this work is) to reject the others’ theory of knowledge and to elucidate the characteristics of the author’s

---

⁴ ‘Sugata’, the word primarily meaning ‘well (su)-gone (gata)’, is counted among ten titles of the Buddha, cp. Mahāvyutpatti, Nos. 1-10, in the sense that He has well attained the enlightenment. This title of the Buddha is explained here as implying His three merits, prāṣastā, apunarāṛṭītiva and niḥśeṣaṭa, which are respectively the attributes of surāpa, suṣnātajvara and su-pūṛṇaghaṭa, each of which is prefixed to with ‘su’ like ‘sugata’. It seems that this dogmatical etymology of ‘sugata’ was prevalent among the Buddhist scholars of this school, for we find the same in Durvekamśra’s commentary on NBT, cp. DP, p. 3, 116, see also PV, III, kk. 141-144.

⁵ Tib. skes-bu gzugs-legs-pa: a graceful, handsome person. Surāpa might also be taken as the name of a legendary king who gave son, wife and himself to be eaten by an ogre in exchange for religious instruction, cp. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Skt. Dictionary. But this had better be taken here as a common noun, because DP, p. 3, says, when explaining prāṣastārtha, that those who make living by beauty of their form are ‘surāpa’ (surāpa rūpāṇeva).

⁶ Among those Buddhist disciples (śrāvaka) who has reached the stage of the sage (ārya-pudgala), the arhat is called ‘asaikṣa’, because he, extinguishing the influence of passions (āsravakṣaya), no longer needs religious training, and other seven (from srotāpati-pratipannaka to arhat-pratipannaka), who are to study more in order to attain the arhat-hood, are called ‘saikṣa’. cp. Abhidharmakośa, VI, pudgala-mārga-nirdesāḥ.

⁷ Dignāga’s works preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka are fourteen in number, while the Chinese Tripiṭaka enumerates six, which of these six are missed in the Tibetan. Among these twenty works now available, we find the same theory as expounded in PS(V) being stated, at least, in Hetucakṛdamanu, Tohoku, No. 4209, cp. PSV, III, 19, Ālambanapariṣṭiytti, Tohoku, No. 4206, XXXI, pp. 888-889, cp. PSV, ad. I, 4, 5, 9, Abhidhamakośavytti-Manmapradipa, Tohoku, No. 4095, cp. PSV, ad. I, 4, and Nyāyamukha. Especially many verses and passages of NM are seen re-arranged in PS(V), cp. G. Tucci, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga.
DIGNÄGA’S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

own theory of knowledge\(^8\); for there is a divergence of opinion with regard to the means of knowledge\(^9\), on which the apprehension of the object to be known depends\(^10\).

§ 2. TWO SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

V. 2.3ab: **There are two sources of valid knowledge; for the object to be known has two aspects. As regards (cognitions of those objects which are) related to these two aspects, no other independent source of valid knowledge is to be recognized. Nor is there other source in the case of recognition, because (if the other source be admitted to be required in this case), the fallacy of infinitude would be logically concluded, just as in the case of recollected knowledge\(^11\).**

---

8) In each chapter of this treatise, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory, refutes the views of Vadavidhi, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Mimāṃsaka.

9) PSVT, llb: *vipraṭipatī-vaśrūṣṭa-pratipatti* (ḥgaḥ bāḥi ṛtogs pa ni log par ṛtogs pa rnam stey). Theories maintained by others are contradicting each other in four points of view, i.e., the result (*khaṃ-bu-phala*), the nature (*rākṣi ṛno-bo-svarūpa*), the object (*sul=viṣaya*) and the number (*graṃs=sanākhya*) of the means of valid knowledge, cp. NBT, p. 35,1: *caturvidha cātra viprāpatiḥ sanākhya-lakṣaṇa-gocara-phala-viṣaya*. TSP, p. 366, 14: *tatra prameṣe svarūpa-phala-gocara-sanākhyaṁ pāreṣeṁ vipraṭipatiś catur-vidhā*. Dignāga’s theory is quite unique on each of these four points as seen below.

10) *pramāṇaḥ dhānīḥ hi prameṣyādhipamah*. cp. the opening statement of NBḥ: *pramāṇādhiḥ rthā-\[pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyaḥ arthavat pramāṇam*. In spite of the apparent affinity between Dignāga and the Naiyāyika in respect of the theory that *paramaḥ* (arthā) is apprehended by means of *pramāṇa*, both differ totally in the understanding of the nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. While the Naiyāyika holds, basing upon the Nyāya realism, that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are independent entities, Dignāga emphasizes their ideated character, cp. below ad. I, 9–10. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of apprehending *prameya* by means of *pramāṇa* on the ground that both, being mutually involved, have no independent substantiability, cp. Vīgraḥāvaśvārvat, kk. 31–33, Vaidalyāprakaraṇa, ad. sūtra 1–2, and Candrakirti, who lays stress on the Mādhyamik transcendentonal viewpoint, does not agree to the Dignāga’s proposition ‘*pramāṇadhīnḥ prameṣyādhipamah*’, for there is nothing to be apprehended or asserted from his point of view, cp. Prasannapada, p. 55ff. However, it is recognized by the Mādhyamika too that the transcendentonal truth does not stand aloof from the empirical world, but reveals itself in the world. Thus the transcendentonal intuition, admitting that it is essentially inexpressible, must also be transformed into the practical knowledge by virtue of which the worldly things are apprehended. That empirical knowledge in which the transcendentonal truth is revealed can alone be valid and be the criterion in criticizing the illusiveness of merely empirical apprehension. Dignāga’s aim of discussing the means of knowledge consists in making clear the structure of this knowledge and its relation to the common knowledge. Accordingly, his discussion does not overstep the boundary of cognitive phenomena, and the transcendentonal truth is referred to within the scope of its being reflected in empirical knowledge. And the knowledge, whether it be merely empirical or mediated through the transcendentonal intuition, so far as it is the act of knowing, must be something to be known by it. In this sense, it can rightfully maintained that where there is a fact of knowing, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are supposed to be there, although they are not to be regarded as real entities.

11) VPM, p. 140, cp. VA, p. 242, 29:

\[pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca prameṣya lakṣaṇa-dvayaṃ / prameṣyaḥ tatra sandhāne na pramāṇantaram na ca // 2 // pūnah punar-abhijñāne niṣṭhā-āsakteḥ smṛtādī-vat / 3a–b\]
There are only two sources of valid knowledge\(^{12}\), direct knowledge (\textit{pratyakṣa}) and indirect knowledge (\textit{anumāna})\(^{13}\); for the object to be known has two aspects. There is no other object to be known than the particular (\textit{svalakṣaṇa}) and the universal.

\(^{12}\) The number (\textit{sānkhyā}) of the source of valid knowledge recognized by the different schools of Indian philosophy is as follows: —Cārvāka, one—perception (\textit{pratyakṣa}); Vaiśeṣika, two—perception and inference (\textit{anumāna}); Sāṅkhya & one school of Nyāya, three—verbal testimony (\textit{sādā}) besides the said two; orthodox Nyāya, four—comparison (\textit{upamāna}) together with above three; Prabhākara Māṁsā, five—implication (\textit{arthāpatti}) together with above four; Bhāṭṭa Māṁsā & Vedānta, six—negation (\textit{abhāva}) together with above five; Paurāṇika, eight—inclusion (\textit{sambhava}) and tradition (\textit{aitihya}) together with above six, cp. Randle, \textit{Indian Logic in the Early Schools}, p. 305. The doctrine recognizing \textit{aitihya}, \textit{arthāpatti}, \textit{sambhava} and \textit{abhāva} as independent source of valid knowledge is refuted by the Naiyāyika, cp. NS, II, ii, 1ff, and it is supposed that the Nyāya doctrine of four sources of valid knowledge was most authoritative at the time of Dignāga. Among the Buddhists, the author of \textit{Upāyakhyāyā}, a Hinayānist before Nāgārjuna, recognizes four sources of valid knowledge as agreed by the Naiyāyika, and the elder school of the Yogācāra recognizes three, excluding \textit{upamāna}, but without mentioning reason, from the above said four. Dignāga maintains that \textit{sādā} is not a different source of knowledge from \textit{anumāna}, because the knowledge derived from \textit{sādā} indicates its own object through the ‘exclusion of other objects’ (\textit{anya-apoha}), which is nothing but the function of \textit{anumāna}, PS, V, k. 1, cited at TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 6: \textit{na pramāṇāntarām sādām anumānāt tathā hi sah (≡tat)/ kṛtakartvādi-tat svārtham anyājohena bhāṣate //}, transl. by Stcherbatsky, BL, Vol. I, p. 459, cp. Ihara, \textit{Jinna no okeru Gengo to Sonzai no Mondai}, Kyūshū Daigaku Tetsugaku Nenpō, Vol. XIV, p. 114, my paper, \textit{Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya}, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. VII, I, p. 326. \textit{Upamāna}, by means of which the similarity of two things is apprehended, is also rejected by Dignāga. If the apprehension of an object by its name, say \textit{gava}, be derived from the words ‘\textit{gava} is similar to \textit{cow}’, then it is the same in structure as \textit{sādā}. If the similarity between \textit{cow} and \textit{gava} be thought to be apprehended by the cognizant himself, then the apprehension is resulted through the operation of the mind (\textit{anumāna}) which relates two things separately perceived. Hence \textit{upamāna} also is not an independent source of valid knowledge, cp. PSY, V, 169b, 4.5: \textit{re sig ān haij ba ni ba la bā ha min dag ḫar bar ḫrogs ḫari don con yin na // de la ḫaṇ las thos nas ḫrogs na sgra las ḫuŋ ha yin la ra ni ḫid kyis yin na ni don ḫiṣ tshad ma ḫaṇ ḫiṣ ḫrogs na / yid kyis ḫar bar ḫrogs par byed pa yin la / de yā ḫaṇ tshad ma ḫaṇ ma yin te}. That \textit{pratyakṣa} and \textit{anumāna} are only two sources of valid knowledge (\textit{pramāṇa do eva}) is thus proved by Dignāga, cp. NM, p. 3b, 10:11: 唯有現量及比量，彼聲論等释在此中。In respect of the number of \textit{pramāṇa}, the Vaiśeṣika is in accord with Dignāga, but it is worth while noticing that the inconsistency of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine was the incentive which gave rise to the Nyāya theory of four \textit{pramāṇas}, cp. U, \textit{Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū}, Vol. I, p. 304. The Vaiśeṣika includes in the concept of \textit{pratyakṣa} the determinate perception or the perceptual judgement (\textit{sāvikalpaka-pratyakṣa} in later terminology), the characteristic of which consists in associating name or word with sense-datum, while \textit{sādā}, which also the apprehension of the object by dint of words, is regarded as \textit{anumāna}. It is to make good for this defect of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the Nyāya treats \textit{sādā} and \textit{upamāna} as separate sources of valid knowledge from \textit{pratyakṣa} and \textit{anumāna}. Accordingly, the theory of two sources of valid knowledge elucidated by Dignāga on his consistently critical ground is to be clearly distinguished from that of the Vaiśeṣika.

\(^{13}\) Dignāga’s etymological explanation of \textit{pratyakṣa} is: \textit{aksam aksam prati vartata iti pratyakṣam} (that kind of knowledge which exists in close connection with each sense faculty is \textit{pratyakṣa}), cp. NM, p. 3b, 17, cited at TSP, p. 373, 26, DP, p. 38, 26. Candrakīrti, who adopts the Vedānta definition—\textit{pratyakṣam aparokṣam} (that which is not beyond our ken is \textit{pratyakṣa})—,
(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), and we should recognize that direct knowledge takes the particular as its object and indirect knowledge the universal\(^{14}\).

How then are those cognitions which cognize colour etc. in the form of a judgement ‘this is non-eternal’\(^{15}\) or which cognize one and the same object in

assails the above explanation on the ground that it could also absurdly mean that a knowledge about the sense or a knowledge whose object is the sense is pratyākṣa, cp. Prasannapāda, p. 72, Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 159. Stcherbatsky is erroneous in noting that the citation here is attributed to Prāṣastapāda; whose definition, however, slightly differs from the above: aksam aksam pratyātyotpadyata iti pratyākṣam, Prāṣastapādabhāṣya, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 552, 28. To answer to the Candrakirti’s hypercriticism, the Nyāya etymology—aksasyāksasya prati viśayaṁ vṛttih pratyakṣam, NBh, ad. I, I, 3 may be better. Dharmottara, whose interpretation—pratyakṣam iti prati-gatam aśritaṁ aksam. {pratyakṣa means that the sense-organ is approached, reposed upon}—does not differ materially from Dignāga’s, makes distinction between the etymology and the real meaning, cp. NBT, ad. I, I, 5, 38, 34. Anumāna (anu+√mā+ana) literally means such knowledge as preceded by some other knowledge. What precedes anumāna is, according to the Nyāyāvakas, the preception of a mark and of the universal relation between this mark and the possessor of it, cp. NBh, ad. I, I, 5: liṅga-liṅginoh sambandha-dārsanah liṅga-dārsanah ca. However, Dignāga interprets differently the implication of the prefix anu-, which is righteously taken by the Nyāyāvakas as meaning ‘paścāt’ (afterwards) or ‘-pārśavak’ (preceded by), cp. NBh, ad. I, I, 3: mūleṇa liṅgenārthasya paścān mānam anumānam, NS, I, I, 5: tat-pārśavam trividham anumānam. Dignāga’s definition of svārtha-anumāna or anumāna for one’s own self is: tshul gsum paṭi riags las rjes su dpag paṭi don (V’s transl. rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don) mthong ba goṅ yin pa de ni raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paṅ {That apprehension of an object which is grounded on the triple-conditioned logical mark (tri-rūpa-liṅga) is svārtha-anumāna}, PSV, II, 109a, 2-3, cp. NB, II, 3: tatra svārthaṁ trirūpad līṅgād yad anumeyē jñānam tad-anumānam. The prefix anu- is thus replaced by ablative case-ending and is taken as implying logical ground. As the determinate perception is regarded by Dignāga as a kind of anumāna, cp. below note 15), pratyākṣa and anumāna may adequately be rendered respectively as ‘direct knowledge (or awareness)’ and ‘indirect knowledge (awareness)’.

\(^{14}\) According to the Viśeṣika-Nyāya realism, every individual existence (vyakti), excepting the extreme universal (para-sāmānya) and the extreme individual (antyā-viśeṣa), is in possession of the universal (jāti=sāmānya, viśeṣa). Hence we perceive a thing, at the first moment, in indifferentiated obscurity (nirvikalpa-pratyākṣa), but later on determinately (sāvikalpa-pratyākṣa), conjoining differentiated vyakti and jāti {jāti-viśeṣa-vyakti}. Dignāga does not assent to this realist view. He makes an essential distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa; the former is the particular individuality which can never be generalized or replaced by a concept, and the latter is the universal which, being constructed through the generalizing faculty of our thought, is lacking reality. In correspondence with this essential distinction between two kinds of prameya, the theory of a radical distinction between two sources of knowledge (pramaṇa-vidavyasātha) is definitely stated here. Evidently this theory is set up in opposition to the Nyāya view of the coalescence of different sources of knowledge (pramaṇa-samplava), i.e., the view that the same object can be cognized by any of four kinds of pramaṇa, cp. NBh, ad. I, I, 3. Elaborative arguments made by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimisra on this point are precisely traced by Stcherbatsky, and we need no further remark, cp. BL, Vol. II, Appendix II, p. 301ff.

\(^{15}\) Sāvikalpa-pratyākṣa or the determinate perception, which can be formulated in the judgement ‘this is red’, is recognized by most of the philosophical sūtras of India as a kind of pratyākṣa. But Dignāga, who is in the opinion that pratyākṣa apprehends only the particular stripped of the universal, is to be asked to explain by which pramaṇa the determinate perception is caused. See postscript of this paper.
Certainly there is such cognition as can be expressed in the judgement 'this is non-eternal', but this cognition, being related to the said two aspects of the object, is not another independent source of valid knowledge. In the case of such cognition, one cognizes at first colour etc. from two aspects, i.e., the inexpressible particularity (avyapadeśya = svālakṣaṇa) on the one hand and the universal colour-ness (varṇatva = sāmānyā-lakṣaṇa) on the other, then, relating through the operation of the mind (manas) the universal colourness to the universal 'non-eternity', forms the judgement 'colour etc. are non-eternal'. Hence (such cognition) is not other source of valid knowledge (than indirect knowledge).

Nor is there an independent source of valid knowledge in the case of recognition (pratyabhijña). (Indeed) one and the same object can be cognized in repetition, but this recognition also is not other independent source of valid knowledge. Why? Because, (if it be regarded as an independent source of knowledge,) then the fallacy of infinitude (aniṣṭha) would be logically concluded. In case, indeed, all kinds of cognition be deemed to be valid knowledge, there would be infinite number of the source of valid knowledge, and, as for instance, a recollected knowledge (which is commonly accepted as non-valid) would also be regarded as valid. The term 'recollected knowledge' (smṛta) in the verse stands for recreation (smṛti). Such mental faculties as recreation, desire (icchā), anger (dveṣa) and the like, operating on the object once cognized before, are not independent source of valid knowledge: likewise (the recognition also should not be deemed to be an independent source of valid knowledge).

16) Recognition (pratyabhijña) is generally thought to be of the same kind as recollection (smṛti), both being produced by dint of the impression (sāṁskāra) of previous cognition. What distinguishes it from recollection is the direct awareness of the object, which operate along with the impression. We are not acquainted with any particular school reckoning recognition as an independent source of knowledge, but Śāstradīptika, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 115, 19 indicates that there are some (probably Vedāntins) who hold that recognition is a separate means of apprehending an object from other five kinds of thought-construction.

17) Refutation of sāgākāśaka-pratyaksha as an independent source of valid knowledge.

18) Refutation of recognition as an independent source of valid knowledge.

19) The Mimāṃsā definition of pramāṇa—anadhigata-artha-gantī pramāṇam (the function of the source of knowledge consists in cognizing an object which is not yet cognized) —is accepted by the Buddhists, cp. NBT, p. 19, 2: ata esa cānadhigata-viṣayan pramāṇam. Vācaspatimisīra pleaded against this definition on the ground that it cannot include the case of an object which has stability being cognized by a series of perception (dharavahika-vijñāna), cp. NVTI, p. 21, 6-8. This criticism may be taken as being directed to the Mimāṃsakas, because, according to the Buddhists, there is no such object that has stability and duration.
§ 3. DEFINITION OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

V. 3cd: Direct knowledge is free from thought-construction. (Thought-construction) implies to associate name, genus etc. (with the object immediately perceived)\(^{20}\).

\(^{20}\) pratyakṣaṁ kalpaṇāpdaḥ, nāma-jāty-ādi-yojana / 3c-d

There, (i.e., among two kinds of valid knowledge,) direct knowledge is free from thought-construction (kalpana-āpodha)\(^{21}\). The knowledge wherein there is no sign of thought-construction is direct knowledge. What, then, is this thought-construction? It implies to associate name (nāma), genus (jāti) etc. (, which are considered to be the efficient cause of the verbal designation (sabda-praṇīti-nimitta), with the thing immediately perceived). In the case of spontaneous words (yadṛccha-sabda, proper

\(^{21}\) This definition of pratyakṣa which, we find, is almost discussed in every Sanskrit work on epistemology and logic is framed on the basis of the essential distinction between svakhaṇḍa and sūnāvā-saṅkṣanya (cp. above note 14). Notwithstanding its simplicity, it is supposed to be so exhaustive that any other qualifier is possible to be added without yielding to a superfluity, cp. note 35. It is perhaps under the influence of this definition that Vācaspati interpreted the word avyapadeśya in the definition of pratyakṣa in NS, I, i, 4 as referring to nivēkalpaka-pratyakṣa and the word vyavuṣaya-dāma as indicating svakhaṇḍa-pratyakṣa.

\(^{22}\) TSP, ad. k. 1224, p. 369, 228, NVTT, p. 153, 248. Dignāga is in affinity with the Grammarian in holding that the thought-construction is inseparable from the verbal expression, and, in this respect, differs in opinion from Vātsyāyana. cp. Randle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools, pp. 119–120. Sāntarāṣṭa and Kamalāśila lay stress on the expression ु (ucyate) ‘a thing…’ is expressed in word’ in these passages, and consider it to be the evidence of Dignāga’s understanding of kalpana as being inseparably related with word (nāma=sabda), and not with genus etc. (jāty-ādi), cp. TS & TSP, 1233. According to their interpretation, ‘name’ in Dignāga’s definition of kalpaṇa as ‘nāma-jāty-ādi-yojana’ should be essentially distinguished from ‘jāty-ādi’. Jāti etc. being not recognized by Dignāga as real entities, jāty-ādi-yojana is a heretical theory to be discarded; Dignāga’s own interpretation of kalpaṇa as nāma-yojana, cp. ibid., 1219–1221. Or, even when the existence of jāti etc. be provisionally admitted, it must be noticed that these are related to a thing only through the medium of nāma, cp. ibid., 1224–1225. After elaborating these arguments, they conclude that the coalescence with word (nāma) is the characteristic feature of Dignāga’s definition of kalpaṇa. These arguments, admitting that they are not off the point in conclusion, seems to be not faithful to the original thought of the passages here, because it is evident that yadṛccha-sabda is meant by the term ‘nāma’: yadṛccha-sabdaḥ nāma sāśājātā viṣṇu ucye ‘ājītaḥ iti. Classification of sabda into five categories is perhaps taken from the Grammarians, cp. Mahābhāṣya ad. Śivasastra 2, Vart, 1: catusṭayi sabdānaḥ pravṛttiḥ, jāti-sabdaḥ, guṇa-sabdaḥ, kriya-sabdaḥ, yadṛccha-sabdaśa ca caturthāḥ. As regards dravya-sabda, the origin is obscure, but Praśastapāda also adopts this category, cp. Randel, op. cit., p. 107ff. Dharmakīrti is more prudent than Dignāga in defining kalpaṇa as ‘a distinct cognition of mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation’ in order to include the thought-construction of infant and dumb person who have the potentiality of verbal designation but do not utter an actual word, cp. NB, 1, 5: abhilāpa-samsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītya kalpaṇa.
noun), a thing qualified by (or associated with) a name (as an efficient cause of verbal expression, e.g., *Dittha-tva*)\(^{23}\) is expressed in the word ‘Dittha’. In the case of genus-words (*jati-sabda*, common noun), a thing qualified by a genus (e.g., *go-tva* <cow-ness>) is expressed in the word ‘go’ <cow>. In the case of quality-words (*guna-sabda*, adjective), a thing qualified by a quality (e.g., *sukla-tva* <white-ness>) is expressed in the word ‘sukla’ <white>. In the case of action-words (*kriya-sabda*, verbal noun), a thing qualified by an action (e.g., *pacaka-tva* <cook-ness>) is expressed in the word ‘pacaka’ <a cook>. In the case of substance-words (*dravya-sabda*), a thing qualified by a substance (e.g., *dandi-tva* <stick-holder-ness> or *visani-tva* <horned-ness>) is expressed in the word ‘dandin’ <a stick-holder> or ‘visanin’ <the horned>. (The characteristic feature of the thought-construction thus consists in the verbal designation of a thing through the association of name, genus etc. with it). 

Here, (with regard to the last two cases of the above-mentioned five), some are in the different opinion that the efficient cause of verbal expression is nothing but the relation between an action or a substance and its possessor, and) maintain that (a thing) qualified by this relation (is expressed in the words ‘pacaka’, ‘dandin’ and so on)\(^{24}\).

On the other hand, some others hold that a thing qualified by the word which essentially can denote no real entity (*arthasaunya*) is expressed (in all five cases mentioned above)\(^{25}\).

---

23) cp. Balamanorāṇa ad. Siddhantakaumudi, 1781 = MBh, V, i, 119: (*<tva>+<tal>-pratyaya yata upatsyete, tasmat praktyi-bhata-) sabdā dvaykti-bodhe jáyamāne yaj jāty-adikān viśeṣaṇatayā bhāsate (tad vyakti-viśeṣanān ‘bhāva’-sabdān vivakṣitam …) yathá go-sabdā dhī vyakti-bodhe jáyamāne go-tvān viśeṣaṇatvam bhāsate. Dittha-tva is a generalization of an innumerable number of individual Dittha existing instantaneously in each moment from his birth to his death, cp. TSP, ad. 1226.

24) PSVT, 18b, se can be summarized as follows: 1) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to *samarā*, *kṛt* and *taddhita* implies the relation of action and that which is in case-relation with it (*kriyā-karaṇa-sambandha*, e.g., *pacakatvam* ... relation between *kriyā* and *karma*), the relation of possession and possessor (*sva-svāmi-sambandha* etc).

2) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to any word is the efficient cause of that word being applied to a certain thing, cp. MBh, V, i, 119.

3) *pacaka=kac+<gov/t>-aka* is *kṛt*, and *dandin=dandi+<imi>-in* is *taddhita*. 4) Therefore, the *bhāva-pratyaya* <tva> of ‘pacakatva’, ‘dandin’ etc. stands for the above-said relation and at the same time is deemed to be the efficient cause of verbal expression. (The present writer wishes to express thanks to Mr. Y. Ojihara, Asst. Prof. of Sanskrit, Kyoto Univ. for his rendering the writer much help for the understanding of this grammatical discussion.)

25) The Naiyāyikas and other realists are in the opinion that genus, quality etc., which are considered to be the efficient cause of verbal designation in the above passages, are *padarthas* or real entities, but according to Dignāga, they are mere products of the thought-construction and denote no real existence, cp. above note 14); what is denoted by genus-word ‘cow’ is not the universal which is supposed to be the common possession of every individual cow but ‘the
Anyway, that which is devoid of the thought-construct thus characterised is direct knowledge.

For what reason, then, the direct knowledge is called ‘praty-aksā’ (lit. being direct to sense-organ) and not ‘prati-viṣaya’ (lit. being direct to object), despite the fact that it is caused in dependence upon both the sense-organ and the object?

V. 4ab: It is signified by the sense-organ, for the sense-organ is the specific cause of it\(^{26}\).

It is not signified by the object, such as colour and the like. The reason is that the object is a factor common (sādhāraṇa) to other kinds of knowledge because of its being a cause of the mind (mano-viṣṇa) or of the knowledge of other persons (anya-saṃtāna) too. And it is generally known that (a thing or a fact) is designated by the name of its specific component (asādhāraṇa), as for instance, we use verbal expressions ‘the sound of a drum’ or ‘the sprout of berley’ to indicate a certain sound or a sprout, instead of naming it ‘the sound of hand’ or ‘the sprout of earth’, although the hand or the earth is also a cause in each case\(^{27}\).

That direct knowledge is free from thought-construct is established (thus on the ground that it is direct to the sense-organ).

It is stated in an Abhidharma treatise too that “one whose visual sense is normal perceives blue (nilam viṣṇanti) but does not apprehend that ‘this is blue’ (nilam iti viṣṇanti). Facing to an object, he perceives the object in itself (artha-saṃjña) but does not form an idea (dharma-saṃjña) of it”\(^{28}\).

§ 4. VARIETIES OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

If direct knowledge be absolutely devoid of thought-construct, then whence is this (stated in the Abhidharma treatise):—“Five kinds of perceptive function take exclusion of non-cow’ (anyā-apoka, -vyārytī). It is with the mind to make his own interpretation of genus etc. explicit that Dignāga interpolated this sentence here. ‘Some others’ (anye), accordingly, are the Buddhists, cp. TSP, ad. k. 1229, p. 371, PSVT, 19a, 1.

26) VPM, p. 177: asādhāraṇa-ḥetutvad aksās tad vyapadiśyate /4a–b.

27) cp. Abhidharmanāsas, Taisho, XXIX, p. 12b, 18-c, 2: 何因識坐俱生緣得所依名在根非境……彼及不共因 故隨根親識(ato sādhāraṇa tv ac ca tair eva nirdiśyate)……及不共者 謂眼唯自眼識所依,色亦通為他身眼識(anya-caksu-viṣṇanasayā) 及通自他識所取……識得名隨根非境。如名放声及妄芽等(yathā bheri-sabdo yañākuraḥ). Sanskrit is quoted from AKV, p. 87, 13n. Candrakirti refers to this discussion after criticizing Dignāga’s etymological explanation of pratyakṣa, cp. Prasannapada, p. 72.

28) cp. Prasannapada, p. 74. This quotation, says Stcherbatsky, could prove that Dignāga’s theory of pratyakṣa is foreshadowed in previous Sautrāntika works, cp. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 162, note 3.
the congregation (of atoms) as their respective object”29) (The object of the sense being a single atom (paramāṇu), the congregation (saṅcita) should be apprehended by means of the thought-construction which unites together the perception of each constituent atom. It seems, therefore, to be incongruous to hold that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction and yet it cognizes the congregation of atoms.) Again it is mentioned (in the Abhidharmakośa) that “these (mental functions) make the particular their respective object, so far as it is the particularity of outer seats (āyatana-svalakṣaṇa) and not of substance (=atom, draiva-svalakṣaṇa)”30). How is this statement to be understood?

V. 4cd: There (in the Abhidharmakośa), (the perception,) being caused by (the sense-organ through its contact with) many objects (=congregation of many atoms), makes the whole (sāmānya) its object when cognizing its own object31).

Since it (=perception) is caused by the sense-organ through its contact with (congregated) many substances (=atoms), it is said to take the undivided whole (=the congregation itself) as its object on cognizing its own (outer) seats32). It, however, does not apprehend the whole through the thought-construction which, after perceiving split substances (=atoms), unites them together. (Therefore, there is no incongruity with the statement of the Abhidharma in asserting that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction.)

However, (the author does not completely agree the above Abhidharma statement in respect of the object of the sense. The author's own view) is stated as follows:33)

29) VPM, p. 176: saṅcitalambanāḥ pañca viśṇaṇakataḥ. A similar passage is found in Abhidharmakośa, p. 12a, 26-28: 伝説……五識決定積集多微方或所依所縛性故 (saṅcitalāreyālambanato, AKV, p. 86, 9-10), and this is attributed to the Vaibhāṣika. According to Vinśātikā, k. 11 & Com., Ālambanaparipūka, kk. 1-5 & Com. and Trīṃśikābhāṣya, ad. k. 1, realists are divided into three groups in view of their theory concerning the object of cognition (ālambana). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is an individual atom (paramāṇu), the second the congregation or the gathering of many atoms (saṅcita) and the third the union of atoms (sāmghāta). It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is reported by Kuei-chī 窮基 to be the Vaibhāṣika, cp. Yamaguchi, Seskin Yuichi ko Genten Kaimi, p. 78, note 2. Vinśātikājñāna of Vinitadeva quotes exactly the same sentence explaining the theory of the second group.


31) VPM, p. 176, VA, p. 279, 10:

latinēkārtha-janyatvaḥ svārthe sāmānya-gocaram // 4c-d //

32) āyatana=bahya-āyatana; form, sound etc. When the perception operates, what is perceived is a form in its wholeness (āyatana-svalakṣaṇa), and is not the individual atom (draiva-svalakṣaṇa) which is the constituent of the form.

33) PSYT, 22b, 2-33: Rejecting a divergent view in regard to the object to be cognized (spod-vul las log par rtogs pa=gocara-vipratipatti), the author states definitely the impossibility of the object being conceptually cognized (rtan par rtog pa med pa nīd=avikalpata).
V. 5: The substance constituted by many elements (=the congregation of atoms) can never be cognized by the sense-organ. What is perceptible by the sense-organ is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form.

Anyhow, (it is established) in this way that direct knowledge which is caused by five kinds of sense-organ is devoid of thought-construction. According to the doctrine maintained by others, some other qualifications (of direct knowledge) are to be added here. However, 'being free from thought-construction' is enough (to define direct knowledge).

V. 6ab: The mind, so far as it perceives object or it perceives internally desire etc., is also free from thought-construction.

The mind (manas), which, (though) leaning upon the object such as form and the like, operates in the form of an immediate awareness, is also free from thought-construction. Desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain etc. (which are functions of

34) VA, p. 298, 1 (VPM, p. 189):

35) NS, I, i, 4 defines pratyakṣa as that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate (indriyārtha-sannahikarṣṭānām jñānam avyāpadeśyam avyabhicārī nyasasyatmakam pratyakṣam). Dignāga attacks this definition saying that the cognition caused by the sense-object contact is incapable of 'being expressible', 'being erroneous' or 'being determinate', PS, I, k. 19a–b. cited at VA, p. 338, 17, cp. my paper, Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya, p. 330. The qualification 'being inexpressible' is superfluous, because the expressible is cognized only by inference and can never be perceived through sense-organ. The error being attributed to the mind (manas) which is not sense-organ, the qualification 'non-erroneous' is also unnecessary. The nature of determination consisting in connecting the sense-datum with the universal which cannot be cognized by the sense, the third qualification does not hold good, cp. PSV, ad. I, 19, 97b, 8–98a, 8, cp. Kitagawa, Skōri-gakuho no Genryō-setsu ni tai suru jinna no Hikan, Nagoya Daigaku Bungaku-ku Kenkyū Ronshū, Tetsugaku, XXI, pp. 58–63. The second qualification is adopted also by the elder school of the Yogacāra, cp. Yogacārabhūmi, Taisho, XXX, 357a, 15–16: 現量 (pratyakṣa) 者, 謂有三種. 一非不現見 (aparokṣa). 二非己思應思 (parikalpita-parikalpya-abhava). 三非錯亂境界 (abhrānta). Dhammakṛiti adds again this qualification to the Dignāga's definition, cp. NB, I, 4: tatra pratyakṣan kalanāpōdham abhrāntam, and the meaning of this addition is variously interpreted by his commentators, cp. my paper, Bukkyō-roni-gakuho no Genryō-setsu ni kansuru Ichikō-satsu, Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū, Vol. II, I, pp. 123–124. Perhaps Dhammakṛiti's adoption of this qualification is meant for answering to the objection against Dignāga that the cause of the erroneous cognition is not always the operation of the mind but the defect of sense-organ also is to be taken into account, cp. TS & TSP, 1313, 1314.

36) VPM, p. 191, VA, p. 303:

According to Jinendra-buddhhi, the compound artha-rāgādi-sva-saṃvittti should be interpreted as implying artha-saṃvittti and rāgādi-sva-saṃvittti, PSVT, 24b, 4: don gyi sgra ḥdi ni šes byaḥi rnam grang s so // Ḥod chags la sogs pa rnam kyi rahn ni / chags la sogs // rahn no //

the mind) are also direct knowledge in the sense of internal perception, because those have nothing to do with sense-organ.

Likewise:

V. 6cd: *The intuition of the object itself which is exercised by yogins without relying upon the teacher's instruction (is also a direct knowledge, being free from thought-construction)*.

The intuitive perception of *yogins* which is not mingled with thought-construction pertaining to the reliable words of the teachers and which relates to a bare object is also a direct knowledge.

(One may assert) that the idea *(kalpanā-jñāna)* also would be deemed to be a direct knowledge, (in case this is defined simply as being free from thought-construction). This is right.

V. 7ab: *The idea also is regarded (as a direct knowledge) in the case of self-cognition. However, when the idea is formed with regard to an object, it is not a direct knowledge, because of thought-construction being there.*

The idea is not a direct knowledge similar to desire etc. in so far as it is formed with regard to an object, but in the case of self-cognition the idea is not non-direct. Hence there is no harm in defining direct knowledge as being free from thought-construction.

Such is indeed direct knowledge.

§ 5. APPARENT DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

V. 7cd–8ab: *Illusion, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and affection are apparent direct knowledge and are accompanied by obscurity (sa-taimira).*

---

38) VPM, p. 191: yogināṁ guru-nirdeśāvyatibhinnārtha-matra-dṛk // 6c–d //
39) VA, p. 331, VPM, p. 204: kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv isā nārthe vikalpanāt / 7a–b
40) cp. below ad. I, 9–10.
41) VA, p. 332, 20, TSP, ad. k. 1324: bhṛṇtisānam-anumāna / 7c–d //
    śrāvyatāśiṣākānāṁ ceti pratyakṣābhāṣāṁ sa-taimira / 8a–b

*PSVT*, 27b, states that four sorts of apparent direct knowledge are enumerated here, namely (1) illusion (*bhṛṇti*), (2) cognition of empirical reality (*sahṛti-sajñāna*), (3) inference (*anumāna*), its result (*anumānāka*), recollection (*śmāra*), and affection (*abhilāṣika*) and (4) sa-taimira. *Sa-taimira* is, according to *ibid.*, 28b, 2, an obscure knowledge caused by the defect of the sense-organ (*dahā-po la ṭē-baṛ gnow-pa-las skyes-pa=indriya-upaghātā-ja*), such as *timira* (eye-disease) and the like. This interpretation seems not to be faithful to the original thought expressed in this verse. The last word *sa-taimirá* is to be regarded as being in apposition
Among these, illusive cognition, being caused through the conceptual understanding which takes, for instance, vapour floating over sands as real water, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Cognition of empirical reality, functioning as a conceptual apprehension which, superimposing an extraneous element (e.g., name) upon a thing itself, takes the latter as having the form of the former, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Inference and cognition resulted by it etc., comprehending conceptually what has been immediately perceived before, are not direct knowledge.

§ 6. IDENTITY OF RESULT AND PROCESS OF COGNITION

Here also, (according to our opinion),

V. 8cd: *Resulted content of the cognition being supposed to possess the act of cognizing, it is simultaneously the result and the process of cognition.*

We do not admit here, as the realists do, that the result of cognition differs from the cognitive process. That cognition which has been resulted (is indeed to be regarded as the result of cognitive process in so far as it is the apprehension of the object, but from another point of view, it) is known as possessing with it the act of cognizing (*sa-vyāpāra*), because it arises in conformity with the form of the cognized object. In this latter sense, it is metaphorically called the cognitive process, i.e., the

with the preceding word ‘*pratyakṣabhasam*’; otherwise ‘*ca*’ is necessary to be added after ‘*salainiram*’. Our opinion is supported by the fact that Dignāga explains in his own commentary on this verse three sorts of apparent direct knowledge only and not the fourth. It is obvious that PSVT modified the original thought of this verse basing upon the theory of Dharmaśāstra, who, thinking it to be necessary to remove the erroneous cognition due to the defect of sense-organ from *pratyakṣa*, adopted the qualification ‘*abhānta*’ in his definition of pratyakṣa, cp. above note 35), Hasuba, Jīnendrabuddhi ni yoru Jigenryō Kaishaku ni tsuite, Yamaguchi Hakushi Kanreki Indō-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Ronsō, p. 205ff.

42) VA, p. 349, 5, VPM, p. 221, Nyāyamañjari, Kāshi Skt. Ser., p. 66, 20: 

*sa-vyāpāra-pratītiṣvat pramāṇaḥ phalam eva sat // 8c–d //*

It is generally admitted by the Naiyāyikas that the operation or the process of cognition (*pramāṇa*) is distinguished from the resulted content (*pramiti=pramāṇa-phala*), cp. NBh, ad. I, i, 3. Dignāga, when criticizing the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa*, takes up this problem for discussion. If it be held, he says, that the determinate cognition is *pramāṇa* in accordance with the Nyāya definition, then it would be unnecessary that the result differing from it should be produced, because the cognition is already determined. If again, he continues, it be assumed that *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* is the perception of the universal (*sāmānya*) which is the qualifying adjunct of the individual, and that *pramāṇa-phala* is the cognition of the individual qualified by the universal, then this assumption would lead us to the absurd conclusion that the object cognized in the process of perception differs from that actually cognized as the result of that process: this Nyāya doctrine is as ridiculous as the statement that the axe struck at the khadira-tree cuts in the result the *palaśa*-tree, PSV, ad. I, 22, 99a, 28, cp. Kitagawa, op. cit., pp. 13-14, TSP, ad. 1345, p. 399.
means of knowledge. (We conclude thus that the result and the process of cognition are not different each other.) In case, however, the resulted cognition be debarred of activity, it cannot be called the process. As for instance, when the effect produced (e.g., the corn) agrees in kind with its cause (=the seed), they say that it has 'taken' the shape of its cause, but it does not agree with the common notion to say that this expression is made even when the effect is devoid of activity. Similar is the case with the discussion here. (That is to say, when the resulted content of the cognition possesses the act of cognizing, it is rightly supposed to take the form of the object.)

§ 7. SELF-COGNITION

V. 9: It can also be maintained here that the self-cognition is the result of cognitive process, because its nature consists in determining the object. And, the mental image bearing resemblance to the object is the means of knowledge, through which the object is cognized.

It can also be maintained here (in examining direct knowledge) that the self-cognition (svasaṃvitī) is the result (of cognitive process). When the cognition is caused, it has two sides, appearance of the subject (sva-ābhāsa) and appearance of the object (viṣaya-ābhāsa). The self-cognition (which takes place) between these

44) Kumārila raises objection against Dignāga's this theory assented to by Dharmakīrti and his successors. He cites the same instance of cutting a tree by an axe as cited by Dignāga in his criticism of the Nyāya theory, cp. above note 43), but for different purpose. The axe, the instrument of cutting is distinct from the cut, the result,—this distinction is as generally recognized as the fact that the axe struck at the khadira-tree does not cut the palāsā-tree in effect. Likewise, Kumārila concludes, the distinction between the instrument of cognition (pramāṇa=prama-karana) and the cognition resulted through it (pramitī=pramāṇa-phala) must not be neglected, cp. Ślokavarttika, IV, 75, TS & TSP, 1345. The Buddhist answer to this objection is as follows: —The mere invariable concomitance (avinabhāsa) between the instrument of cognition and the object to be cognized does not provide sufficient ground for considering that instrument to be pramāṇa. Through the instrument may the cognition of the object be produced, but it is not the actual act of cognizing. Moreover, absolutely speaking, all things being instantaneous, the relation of producer and produced (utpadya-utpadaka-bhava) cannot be established between the instrument and the result. The relation between pramāṇa and prameya must, therefore, be that of what determines and what is determined (vyavasthāpa-vyavasthāpaka-bhava), and what determines the object is the very act of cognizing, i.e., the appearance of the object in the mental reflex, cp. TSP, ad. k. 1346, NB & NBT, I, 18–19.

45) VPM, p. 215, 221, (cp. VA, p. 349, 7, p. 393, 28): svasaṃvitīphalaṃ vātra tad rūpaḥ hy artha-miścayah / viṣayākārataivādyā pramāṇam tena miyate //

46) The theory that aelayavijñāna or store-consciousness appears or manifests itself (abhāti, pratibhāti, avabhāti, khyāti) as both the apparent subject (sva-ābhāsa=grāhaka) and the apparent object (artha-ābhāsa=grāhya) is met everywhere in Vījñānavāda treatises, and we need no explanation of it here. It is evident from the context of this passage that Dignāga established
two sides is the resulted content of the act of cognizing. Why? Because the nature of this self-cognition consists in determining the object (artha-niścaya)⁴⁷. When the idea, in which the form of the external object is represented, is taken as the object of cognition, the self-cognition which is corresponding to that idea determines the object either as something desirable or undesirable. But when the mere external thing is thought to be the object of cognition, then the appearance of the object in the mental reflex of the cognizant is the means of cognizing this object. Although the cognition should be self-cognizable in this case too, the appearance of the subject (in the mental state of the cognizant) is disregarded, and to the mental reflex resembling to the object is attributed the role of the means of cognizing this object, for the object is cognized through that mental reflex. Whatevsoer be the reflex of the object which has appeared in the cognition, whether it be the reflex of something white or non-white or of any other colour, this mental reflex which possesses the object within itself has the function of determining the object.

Thus, in accordance with the variety of (the nature of) cognition, the role of the cognizing agency or of the object to be cognized is hypothetically attributed (upacaryate) to respective factor in each case, because (absolutely speaking,) all elements of existence, (being instantaneous,) are devoid of any efficiency⁴⁸ (and, in consequence, there is no element which is to be defined invariably as the cognizing agency or as the object to be cognized).

The same content is stated (in the following verse).

V. 10: *That which appears in the image (in conformity with the form of the external thing) is the object of cognition, and the cognizing agency and the resulted content of cognition are respectively the apparent cognizant, (i.e., the*

his theory of knowledge on the ground of the Vijnānavāda philosophy, although he does not use the term 'ālaya-vijñāna'. The theory of self-cognition (svasamvit) which marks the specific feature of his theory of direct knowledge is understandable only on the basis of the Vijnānavāda doctrine. It deserves to be noticed that the verse 10 following the arguments here is cited in Dharmapāla's commentary on Vijnāpatimātratasiddhi as an evidence of Dignāga's theory of the triple division of vijñāna (grahya-akāra, grāhaka-akāra, svasaṃviti), which is criticized from the viewpoint of the Dharmapāla's fourfold division theory (証自証分 svasaṃviti? besides the above three), cp. Cheng-sheng-ših-lun, Taisho, XXXI, p. 106b, 13-16: 如果量論伽他中說, 似境相所量 能取 相自証 即能量及果 此三体無別, de la Vallée Poussin Vijnāpatimātratasiddhi, La Siddhi de Huan-tsang, traduit et annotée, Tome 1, p. 139.

⁴⁷) Niścaya is synonymous with vikalpa, kalpana, adhyavasaya etc., meaning thought-construction, cp. BL, II, Indices. Here, this term is used in different sense as is explained in the passages that follow.

⁴⁸) cp. TSP, ad. k. 1346, p. 399, 12-13: yasmāna pariṣambhāraṇa kārit-karavādi-bhavo 'sti, kṣaṇikatvena niraya-paratvāt sarva-dhāraṇam, ibid., ad. 1222, p. 369, 11-12: naiva tu kaścit kaṇcid yojayati, niraya-paratvāt sarva-dhāraṇam, see above not 44).
appearance of the subject) and the self-cognition (procuced through the relation between apparent object and apparent subject, which actually are two sides of the same cognition). Therefore, these three factors of cognition are not different each other\(^{49}\).

§ 8. TWO KINDS OF COGNITION AND SELF-COGNITION

\(^{50}\), 5)

How, then, is it recognized that cognition is of two kinds?

V. 11ab: Cognition is of two kinds, because of the constitutional difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that (cognition)\(^{50}\).

That cognition by virtue of which the (external) object such as form and the like is cognized consists of (two sides, i.e.,) the image of the object and the apparent subject. But that cognition which introspects the above said cognition of the external object consists of the idea, which reflects the external object, and the corresponding apparent subject\(^{51}\).

Otherwise, if the (first) cognition is in conformity with the (external) object only (and is lacking subjective side), or if it consists of the apparent subject only (and is devoid of the objective side), then the cognition of that (first) cognition would be of the same nature as (the first one, i.e.,) the cognition of the external object.

Further, (if the difference between these two kinds of cognition be not admitted,) then there would be no possibility of subsequent cognitions appearing in conformity with the (form of) the past, remote object. Why? Because the past object, (being not there at the time of subsequent cognitions)\(^{52}\), cannot be their object. Hence, (there must be the cognition which is other in constitution than the cognition of the external thing and by virtue of which the form of the past, remote thing is cognized. That kind of cognition is none other than the cognition which cognized the previous cognition possessed of the image of external thing. Thus) it is proved that the cognition is of two kinds.

\(^{49}\) VPM, p. 221, 229, Nyāyamaṇḍārajī, p. 67, 20–31:

\[ \text{yad abhāsam prameyam tat pramāṇa-phalate punah /} \]
\[ \text{grāhak'akara-svasanviti trayam nāhāh prthak-krta/} \]
\[ \text{// 10} \]

\(^{50}\) VPM, p. 232, 244, VA, p. 425, 12:

\[ \text{vīṣaya-jāna-taj-jñānāviśeṣat tu dvi-rūpata/} \]
\[ \text{11a–b} \]

\(^{51}\) Cp. note 46).

\(^{52}\) As all things are momentary, the object of the previous cognition does not continue to exist till the subsequent cognition arises. There is, accordingly, no possibility of the same object being cognized by a series of perception, cp. note 48).
V. 11cd: (That there are two kinds of cognition is evident) also from (the fact that we have) recollection afterwards. The recollection (of something) does not occur to the mind without having experienced (it before). \(^{33}\)

The words ‘also from the fact that we have recollection afterwards’ in the verse relate to the above-stated words ‘cognition is of two kinds’ (in the stanza c). \(^{36b, 1}\) Some time after we perceived something, the recollection of our cognition (that we have perceived it) occurs to our mind together with the recollection of the object. Therefore, the cognition is of two kinds, (i.e., the cognition of the external object and that of the cognition or of the idea,) and in consequence it should be maintained that it is self-cognizable. Why (is this maintained)? Because, the recollection (of something) does not occur to the mind without having experienced it before. If a thing has not been perceived before, we have no recollection of it; as for instance, the recollection of the colour and like (occurs to our mind only when we have perceived it before. Likewise, the recollection of a previous cognition is possible on the assumption that the cognition was self-cognized before.)

V. 12: If it be maintained that the recollected cognition is the apprehension of previous cognition by means of another cognition, then an infinite sequence would badly be resulted. Because, with regard to it (=second cognition) again will there be a recollection. Further, if it be so, the cognition of one object would not transit to that of another object. But, (in fact,) the transition of the cognition is commonly noticed.\(^{34}\)

\(^{36b, 2}\)

Some may hold this:—As colour and the like (are perceived by means of the other factor than themselves, i.e., by sense-organs), the cognition also is apprehended by means of another cognition. This is not right. Because, if the recollected cognition be assumed to be the apprehension (of the previous cognition) by means of another cognition, then the absurdity of infinite sequence (aniśṭhā), i.e., the endless series (anavasthā) of cognition would be logically concluded.\(^{35}\) (In order to be consistent, we have to admit that) this second cognition will also be apprehended by another

53) VA, p. 425, 5:
smṛters uṭṭarakālaṁ ca na ky asāv avibhāvite // 11c-d //

54) Ślokavarttiḥkavyākhyā, śānyaveda-sthānam, ad. k. 27, Ed. Ramanatha Śāstri, p. 247, 23-34:
jñāntāntarānubhave'niśṭhā, tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ /
vibhyāntara-saṅcāras tathā na syat sa cēsyate // 12 //

55) The Naiyāyikas, who hold that a cognition must be proved by another cognition, cannot avoid to face this difficulty of infinite sequence, cp. NBh, II, i, 17-19. It is to overcome this difficulty that the later Naiyāyikas establish the theory of anuvāvasaya or self-consciousness.
cognition. Why? Because, with regard to that (second cognition) again will there be a recollection, (the occurance of which is justifiable only on the assumption of the third cognition, and ad infinitum). In the case of that (second) cognition by virtue of which the (first) cognition is apprehended, we have, as generally known, the recollection of it afterwards. Hence, if it be held that the cognition is apprehended by a different subsequent cognition, then (the third, the fourth and thus) the endless series of cognitions would be logically concluded.\(^{56}\)

Further, (if it be so, then the first cognition would be continuously apprehended by subsequent cognitions, and consequently), the cognition of one thing would not transit to that of another. But (in fact,) the transition of the cognition is the fact generally admitted. Therefore, it must necessarily be recognized that the cognition is self-cognizable. And that very (self-cognition) is the resulted content of the act of cognizing.

In this way it is well proved that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction.

---

\(^{56}\) Candrakīrti makes reference, in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, VI, 72, to the theory of self-cognition established through the argument on the recollection as is unfolded here, but he ascribes this theory to the Sautrāntika, cp. S. Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U to no Tairon*, pp. 284-285. Cp. also *Pramāṇavārttika*, II, k. 485.

Postscript: Among two questions raised after the theory of radical distinction between two *pramāṇas* was expounded, the first one has been understood by the present writer as concerning *sāvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, see notes 15) & 17). This understanding, however, should be corrected so as to be in accord with Jinendrabuddhi, whose interpretation is as follows: The proposition "this (colour) is non-eternal" (*pratijñā*) is inferred through the minor premise "the colour is a product" (*hetu*) and the major premise "whatsoever is a product is non-eternal, e.g., a pot" (*dṛṣṭānta*). If the theory of radical distinction between two *pramāṇas* should be maintained, then the above inference could not avoid committing fallacy. While the colour which is the subject of *hetu* is *sāmānyā-lakṣaṇa*, the colour which is the subject of *pratijñā* is ‘this’ (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) immediately perceived. The subjects of *hetu* and *pratijñā* being thus radically different each other, this *hetu* is incompatible with *pakṣa-dharmatva*, the first aspect of *tri-rūpa-liṅga*. Dignāga, therefore, is asked to explain the ground of this proposition being valid, cp. *FSVT*, 146, s.7.