

DIGNĀGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

—An Annotated Translation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter I—

Masaaki HATTORI

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is just half a century ago that the late Mahāmahopadhyaya S. C. Vidyabhūṣana published his monumental work, *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic*, in which he first introduced Dignāga's theory of knowledge to the scholars of Indian philosophy. Notwithstanding this incentive, the furtherance of the study on this great figure was not a task that could be carried out without toil. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*), a comprehensive and systematical work on epistemology and logic, though being known as a reformative work in the history of Indian Logic, is unfortunately not preserved in the original Sanskrit, and the Tibetan version, the only available material of the study on this text, cannot be considered to be quite a readable one, perhaps mainly due to the unfitness of the Tibetan language to this kind of strict and subtle arguments and also sometimes to the translator's lack of understanding. Attempts have been made by Randle and other scholars to collect passages of *PS* scattered in the Nyāya texts and elsewhere, and these attempts have proved to be very helpful for the study of Dignāga's theory. Controversial points of his theory have been thus gradually made clear. An epoch was marked by Stcherbatsky when he published an elaborate study on the *Nyāyabindu*. While annexing precise notes to this concise treatise of Dharmakīrti, he made frequent references to *PS*, and moreover, translated the portion wherein Dignāga discussed the problem of self-cognition with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Dignāga's theory was brought forth under the brighter light and the preliminary course to the textual study of *PS* was well set up by his effort. Owing to the successful result of Dr. Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana's second expedition to Tibet, we are now provided with the Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇavārttika* (*PV*), an extensive critical commentary on *PS*, along with some commentaries on it. These are precious materials to further the study of the doctrines of Dignāga as well as of Dharmakīrti, for *PV* treats with the same problems as discussed in *PS*, and, fortunately enough, the passages of the latter are found often cited in the commentaries of the former. Recently some portions of *PS* have been rendered by Japanese scholars into their own language from the Tibetan version. The portion translated and annotated here was put into Japanese some years back by Mr. Takemura, Asst. Prof. of Ryūkoku Univ., Kyoto (*Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronshū*, No. 351, 1956), but, according to the opinion of the present writer, his translation can hardly be recognized as a scholarly work,

misreading of the text being found almost in every line. The present translation is based on, in principle, *Tshad-ma kun-las btus-paḥi ḥgrel-pa* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti*), Kanakavarman's version, Peking Ed., Mdo-ḥgrel XCV (Ce), fol. 93 bff. Verses of *PS* are properly inserted between lines by the present writer. Constant references have been made to Vasudhararakṣita's version, Peking Ed., Mdo-ḥgrel XCV, fol. 13 aff and Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī-nāma Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti*, Sde-dge & Peking Eds. The writer wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Prof. Hatano, Tōhoku Univ., Asst. Prof. Miyasaka, Kōyasan Univ., Asst. Prof. Ihara, Kyūshū Univ. and Mr. Hasuba, Otani Univ., through whose courtesy he could obtain the photographic copies of the above-mentioned texts. The writer has also to express his indebtedness to Jain Muni Jambuvijaya who was kind enough to send the writer a proof of his Sanskrit reconstruction of *PS*, Chap. I, which is expected to be out soon as an appendix to his edition of *Nayacakra-vṛtti*. Owing to this excellent Sanskrit reconstruction, the writer could clarify some ambiguous points. Muni Jambuvijaya collected many original passages of *PS* thus far left unnoticed from various sources, which, however, have not been noted in this paper because the writer does not like to refer to them before the publication of the said work.

§ 1. SALUTATION

Verse 1. ^[Fol. 93b, 5] *I salute Him who is the personification of valid knowledge, who pursues the benefit of the living beings, who is the teacher, the sugata, the protector. And, in order to establish the means of valid knowledge, I shall unite here under one head the scattered fragments from all my other treatises¹⁾.*

Abbreviations.

- AKV Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, Ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-36.
 BL Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 2 Vols, Bibliotheca Buddhica XXVI, Leningrad, 1930-32.
 DP Dharmottarapradīpa, Ed. by D. Malvania, Patna, 1955.
 NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti.
 NBh Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
 NBT Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara, Ed. with DP.
 NM Nyāyamukha, Chinese Version, Taisho Tripiṭaka, XXXII, pp. 1-6.
 NV Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara, Vārāṇasī Ed.
 NVTT Nyāyavārttika-tātparyā-ṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra, Kāśhī Skt. Ser.
 PS Pramāṇasamuccaya.
 PSV Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti.
 PSVT Viśālāmalavatī-nāma Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭīkā, Tibetan Version, Tohoku, No. 4268.
 TS Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Nos. XXX, XXXI, Baroda 1926.
 TSP Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, Ed. with TS.
 VA Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, Ed. by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, Patna, 1953.
 VPM Vibhūticandra annexed to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin, Ed. by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, Patna, 1937.

(2...

Here (in the verse of salutation), in order to cause in the heart of the people, at the beginning of the treatise, the faith (in the Buddha), the praise is expressed in honour of the Buddha, the Adorate, who, because of his perfectness of the cause and the effect, is to be regarded as the personification of the valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-bhūta*)³. There, the cause is the completion of the intention (*āśaya*) and the practice (*prayoga*). (The completion of) the intention means that the Buddha is the One pursuing the benefit of the living beings. (The completion of) the practice signifies that the Buddha is the teacher because he teaches the people. The effect is the

1) Dignāga is generally regarded as the founder of the so-called Logician Vijñānavādins (*nyāyānusāriṇo vijñānavādināḥ*), the younger branch of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins; the elder school of it represented by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is known by the name of Vijñānavādins basing upon Scripture (*āgamānusāriṇo vijñānavādināḥ*). The names given to these two subdivisions of the Yogācāra show clearly the difference of attitude between the two towards the Buddhist truth. Dignāga does not recognize, as the masters of the elder school do, the authority of the Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to the critical test before they are accepted as valid, and we find that his works are consistently permeated by the critical and rationalistic spirit. This spirit, however, is not introduced newly by him into Buddhism, but he inherited it from the Buddha, who used to exhort his disciples not to accept any of his words merely out of reverence but to test it critically, just as people test the purity of gold by burning it in fire, by cutting it and by examining it on a touchstone, cp. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, 65,3, *Majjhima N.*, sutta 38, TSP, p. 12, *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, k. 31 (transl. by S. Yamaguchi, *Chūkan Bukkyō Ronkō*, p. 327), Th. Stcherbatsky, *BL*, Vol. I, p. 77, S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 611, do., *The Dhammapada*, pp. 10-11, S. Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, p. xl. Dignāga is convinced of his following the teaching of the Buddha by establishing the theory of knowledge, and basing upon this conviction, he gives, at the beginning of the treatise, a salutation to the Buddha, who, according to his expression, is to be reckoned as the personification of the valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-bhūta*). It is reported by Bu-ston that Dignāga wrote this verse on the side of a rock in the cavern known by his name, and that as he wrote down this salutation and his determination to establish the true theory of knowledge, various ominous signs appeared, cp. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-kyi'uñ)* by Bu-ston, Vol. II, p. 150. Dharmakīrti attaches importance to this verse, by which, he thinks, the fundamental standpoint of the Buddhist Logicians is declared. He makes thorough discussion on this point in his extensive critical commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, namely *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, and, in consequence, the chapter on the establishment of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-siddhi-parīccheda*) is, in this work, separated from the chapter on the direct knowledge and is treated as independent. The full verse is cited at *VPM*, p. 518, and the first half at *VA*, p. 3, and *AKV*, p. 7, 5-6:

pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhītaiṣiṇe prañamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine /
pramāṇa-siddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṣtād ihaikataḥ //

2) cp. *VA*, p. 3, 12f, 115, 31-32, 116, 5-6.

3) *PSVT*, 2a, 5-2b, 2: '*pramāṇa-bhūta*' implies that the Buddha is the authority (=the valid knowledge) and that He has come into the world (*ñhad ma yañ hdi yin la gyur paḥaṇ yin pa= idam paramāṇam ca bhūtam ca*). '*bhūta*' means 'to be born' (*skyes-pa=jāta*) or 'to come into the world' (*byuñ-ba=utpanna*). What is meant by this term is that the Buddha, in whose personality the valid knowledge is embodied, is distinguished from the supposed authority which has no actual relation with the world, such as *īśvara* who remains in eternal and non-self-revealing state and the like.

attainment of the objectives of his own and of others. 'The attainment of the objective of his own' is (evidenced) by the fact that the Buddha is titled *sugata* (one that has attained bliss); that title (can be explained as) indicating three meanings⁴⁾, i. e., (i) praiseworthiness (*praśastārtha*), just like the handsome (*su-rūpa*)⁵⁾, (ii) non-retrogression (=final emancipation, *apunarāvṛtti-artha*), just like the radical cure from the fever (*su-naṣṭa-jvara*) and (iii) wholeness (*niḥśeṣārtha*), just like the jar filled with water (*su-pūrṇa-ghaṭa*). These three meanings (of the title '*sugata*' are grounds of) distinguishing the Buddha's attainment of his own objective from the attainment of the outsiders (of Buddhism) who has subdued passions (*vīta-rāgā*) or of those who is undergoing religious training (*śaikṣa*) or who no longer need religious training (*aśaikṣa*)⁶⁾. 'The attainment of the objective of others' is to be taken as implying that the Buddha is possessed of the 'protector-hood' (*tāyitva*) in the sense that he is the protection for others.^{...2)}

Saluting the teacher who is endowed with such merits, the author will compose, in order to establish the means of valid knowledge, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or Collection of the Theory of Knowledge by collecting (passages) from *Nyāyamukha* and other treatises⁷⁾ of the author himself. (The purpose of composing this work is) to reject the others' theory of knowledge and to elucidate the characteristics of the author's

4) '*Sugata*', the word primarily meaning 'well (*su*)-gone (*gata*)', is counted among ten titles of the Buddha, cp. *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, Nos. 1-10, in the sense that He has well attained the enlightenment. This title of the Buddha is explained here as implying His three merits, *praśastatā*, *apunarāvṛttitva* and *niḥśeṣatā*, which are respectively the attribute of *surūpa*, *sunāṣṭajvara* and *supūrṇa-ghaṭa*, each of which is prefixed to with '*su*' like '*sugata*'. It seems that this dogmatical etymology of '*sugata*' was prevalent among the Buddhist scholars of this school, for we find the same in Durvekamiśra's commentary on *NBT*, cp. *DP*, p. 3, 11ff, see also *PV*, III, kk. 141-144.

5) Tib. *skes-bu gzugs-legs-pa*: a graceful, handsome person. *Surūpa* might also be taken as the name of a legendary king who gave son, wife and himself to be eaten by an ogre in exchange for religious instruction, cp. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Skt. Dictionary*. But this had better be taken here as a common noun, because *DP*, p. 3, says, when explaining *praśastārtha*, that those who make living by beauty of their form are '*surūpa*' (*surūpā rūpājivāḥ*).

6) Among those Buddhist disciples (*śrāvaka*) who has reached the stage of the sage (*ārya-pudgala*), the *arhat* is called '*aśaikṣa*', because he, extinguishing the influence of passions (*āsrava-kṣaya*), no longer needs religious training, and other seven (from *śrotāpatti-pratīpannaka* to *arhat-pratīpannaka*), who are to study more in order to attain the arhat-hood, are called '*śaikṣa*'. cp. *Abhidharmakośa*, VI, *pudgala-mārga-nirdeśaḥ*.

7) Dignāga's works preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka are fourteen in number, while the Chinese Tripiṭaka enumerates six, of which four are missed in the Tibetan. Among these twenty works now available, we find the same theory as expounded in *PS(V)* being stated, at least, in *Hetucakraḍamaru*, Tohoku, No. 4209, cp. *PSV*, III, 19, *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*, Tohoku, No. 4206, XXXI, pp. 888-889, cp. *PSV*, ad. I, 4, 5, 9, *Abhidharmakośāvṛtti-Marmapradīpa*, Tohoku, No. 4095, cp. *PSV*, ad. I, 4, and *Nyāyamukha*. Especially many verses and passages of *NM* are seen rearranged in *PS(V)*, cp. G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*.

own theory of knowledge⁸⁾; for there is a divergence of opinion with regard to the means of knowledge⁹⁾, on which the apprehension of the object to be known depends¹⁰⁾.

§ 2. TWO SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

V. 2-3ab: *There are two sources of valid knowledge; for the object to be known has two aspects. As regards (cognitions of those objects which are) related to these two aspects, no other independent source of valid knowledge is to be recognized. Nor is there other source in the case of recognition, because (if the other source be admitted to be required in this case), the fallacy of infinitude would be logically concluded, just as in the case of recollected knowledge¹¹⁾.*

8) In each chapter of this treatise, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory, refutes the views of *Vādaśāstra*, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsaka.

9) PSVT, 11b: *vipratipatti=viruddha-pratipatti* (*hgal bañi rtogs pa ni log par rtogs pa rnamste*). Theories maintained by others are contradicting each other in four points of view, i.e., the result (*hbras-bu=phala*), the nature (*rañ:gi ño-bo=svarūpa*), the object (*yul=viṣaya*) and the number (*grañs=samkhyā*) of the means of valid knowledge, cp. NBT, p. 35, 1: *caturvidhā cātra vipratipattiḥ samkhyā-lakṣaṇa-gocara-phala-viṣayā*. TSP, p. 366, 14: *tatra pramāṇe svarūpa-phala-gocara-samkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattiḥ caturvidhā*. Dignāga's theory is quite unique on each of these four points as seen below.

10) *pramāṇādhino hi prameyādhigamaḥ*. cp. the opening statement of NBh: *pramāṇato'rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*. In spite of the apparent affinity between Dignāga and the Naiyāyika in respect of the theory that *paramēya* (*artha*) is apprehended by means of *pramāṇa*, both differ totally in the understanding of the nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. While the Naiyāyika holds, basing upon the Nyāya realism, that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are independent entities, Dignāga emphasizes their ideated character, cp. below ad. I, 9-10. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of apprehending *prameya* by means of *pramāṇa* on the ground that both, being mutually involved, have no independent substantiality, cp. *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, kk. 31-33, *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, ad. sūtra 1-2, and Candrakīrti, who lays stress on the Mādhyamic transcendental viewpoint, does not agree to the Dignāga's proposition '*pramāṇādhino prameyādhigamaḥ*', for there is nothing to be apprehended or asserted from his point of view, cp. *Prasannapāda*, p. 55ff. However, it is recognized by the Mādhyamika too that the transcendental truth does not stand aloof from the empirical world, but reveals itself in the world. Thus the transcendental intuition, admitting that it is essentially inexpressible, must also be transformed into the practical knowledge by virtue of which the worldly things are apprehended. That empirical knowledge in which the transcendental truth is revealed can alone be valid and be the criterion in criticizing the illusiveness of merely empirical apprehension. Dignāga's aim of discussing the means of knowledge consists in making clear the structure of this knowledge and its relation to the common knowledge. Accordingly, his discussion does not overstep the boundary of cognitive phenomena, and the transcendental truth is referred to within the scope of its being reflected in empirical knowledge. And the knowledge, whether it be merely empirical or mediated through the transcendental intuition, so far as it is the act of knowing, there must be something to be known by it. In this sense, it can righteously be maintained that where there is a fact of knowing, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are supposed to be there, although they are not to be regarded as real entities.

11) VPM. p. 140, cp. VA, p. 242, 29:

*pratyaḥśam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇa-dvayam /
prameyaṃ tatra sandhāne na pramāṇāntaram na ca // 2 //
punah punar-abhijñāne 'niṣṭhā-āśakteḥ smṛt'ādi-vat / 3a-b*

[^{94a}, 4]

There are only two sources of valid knowledge¹², direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*anumāna*)¹³; for the object to be known has two aspects. There is no other object to be known than the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal

12) The number (*samkhyā*) of the source of valid knowledge recognized by the different schools of Indian philosophy is as follows: —Cārvāka, one—perception (*pratyakṣa*); Vaiśeṣika, two—perception and inference (*anumāna*); Sāṃkhya & one school of Nyāya, three—verbal testimony (*śabda*) besides the said two; orthodox Nyāya, four—comparison (*upamāna*) together with above three; Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā, five—implication (*arthāpatti*) together with above four; Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā & Vedānta, six—negation (*abhāva*) together with above five; Paurāṇika, eight—inclusion (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*) together with above six, cp. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 305. The doctrine recognizing *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava* and *abhāva* as independent source of valid knowledge is refuted by the Naiyāyika, cp. NS, II, ii, 1ff, and it is supposed that the Nyāya doctrine of four sources of valid knowledge was most authoritative at the time of Dignāga. Among the Buddhists, the author of the *Upāyahrdaya*, a Hinayānist before Nāgārjuna, recognizes four sources of valid knowledge as agreed by the Naiyāyika, and the elder school of the Yogācāra recognizes three, excluding *upamāna*, but without mentioning reason, from the abovesaid four. Dignāga maintains that *śabda* is not a different source of knowledge from *anumāna*, because the knowledge derived from *śabda* indicates its own object through the 'exclusion of other objects' (*anya-apoha*), which is nothing but the function of *anumāna*, PS, V, k. 1, cited at TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 6.7: *na pramāṇāntaram śabdām anumānāt tathā hi sah (=tat)/kṛtakatv'ādi-vat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* //, transl. by Stcherbatsky, BL, Vol. I, p. 459, cp. Ihara, *Jinna ni okeru Gengo to Sonzai no Mondai*, Kyūshū Daigaku Tetsugaku Nenpō, Vol. XIV, p. 114, my paper, *Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. VII, 1, p. 326. *Upamāna*, by means of which the similarity of two things is apprehended, is also rejected by Dignāga. If the apprehension of an object by its name, say *gavaya*, be derived from the words '*gavaya* is similar to cow', then it is the same in structure as *śabda*. If the similarity between cow and *gavaya* be thought to be apprehended by the cognizant himself, then the apprehension is resulted through the operation of the mind (*anumāna*) which relates two things separately perceived. Hence *upamāna* also is not an independent source of valid knowledge, cp. PSV, V, 169b, 4.5: *re sig ñe bar hjal ba ni ba lañ dañ ba min dag hdra bar rtogs pañi don can yin na // de la gšan las thos nas rtogs na sgra las byuñ ba yin la / rañ ñid kyis yin na ni don gñis tshad ma gšan gyis rtogs na / yid kyis hdra bar rtog par byed pa yin la / de yañ tshad ma gšan ma yin te*. That *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are only two sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇe dve eva*) is thus proved by Dignāga. cp. NM, p. 3b, 10-11: 唯有现量及與比量。彼声喻等撰在此中。In respect of the number of *pramāṇa*, the Vaiśeṣika is in accord with Dignāga, but it is worth while noticing that the inconsistency of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine was the incentive which gave rise to the Nyāya theory of four *pramāṇas*, cp. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, Vol. I, p. 304. The Vaiśeṣika includes in the concept of *pratyakṣa* the determinate perception or the perceptual judgement (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* in later terminology), the characteristic of which consists in associating name or word with sense-datum, while *śabda*, which also the apprehension of the object by dint of words, is regarded as *anumāna*. It is to make good for this defect of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the Naiyāyika treats *śabda* and *upamāna* as separate sources of valid knowledge from *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Accordingly, the theory of two sources of valid knowledge elucidated by Dignāga on his consistently critical ground is to be clearly distinguished from that of the Vaiśeṣika.

13) Dignāga's etymological explanation of *pratyakṣa* is: *akṣam akṣam prati varitata iti pratyakṣam* «that kind of knowledge which exists in close connection with each sense faculty is *pratyakṣa*», cp. NM, p. 3b, 17, cited at TSP, p. 373, 26, DP, p. 38, 26. Candrakīrti, who adopts the Vedānta definition—*pratyakṣam aparokṣam* «that which is not beyond our ken is *pratyakṣa*»—,

(*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), and we should recognize that direct knowledge takes the particular as its object and indirect knowledge the universal¹⁴).

How then are those cognitions which cognize colour etc. in the form of a judgement 'this is non-eternal'¹⁵ or which cognize one and the same object in

assails the above explanation on the ground that it could also absurdly mean that a knowledge about the sense or a knowledge whose object is the sense is *pratyakṣa*, cp. *Prasannapadā*, p. 72, Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 159. Stcherbatsky is erroneous in noting that the citation here is attributed to *Prasastapāda*; whose definition, however, slightly differs from the above: *akṣam akṣam pratityōtpadyata iti pratyakṣam*, *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 552, 28. To answer to the Candrakīrti's hypercriticism, the Nyāya etymology—*akṣasyā-kṣasya prati viṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*, *NBh*, ad. I, i, 3 may be better. Dharmottara, whose interpretation—*pratyakṣam iti prati-gatam āśritam akṣam*. «*pratyakṣa* means that the sense-organ is approached, reposed upon»—does not differ materially from Dignāga's, makes distinction between the etymology and the real meaning, cp. *NBT*, ad. I, 3, p. 38, 34. *Anumāna* (anu+√mā+ana) literally means such knowledge as preceded by some other knowledge. What precedes *anumāna* is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the preception of a mark and of the universal relation between this mark and the possessor of it, cp. *NBh*, ad. I, i, 5: *liṅga-liṅginoh sambandha-darśanam liṅga-darśanam ca*. However, Dignāga interpretes differently the implication of the prefix *anu-*, which is righteously taken by the Naiyāyika as meaning '*paścāt*' «afterwards» or '*pūrvaka*' «preceded by», cp. *NBh*, ad. I, i, 3: *mitena liṅgenārthasya paścān mānam anumānam*, *NS*, I, i, 5: *tat-pūrvakam trividham anumānam*. Dignāga's definition of *svārtha-anumāna* or *anumāna* for one's own self is: *tshul gsum paḥi riags las rjes su dpag paḥi don* (V's transl. *rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don*) *mthoḥ ba gaṇ yin pa de ni raṇ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo* «That apprehension of an object which is grounded on the triple-conditioned logical mark (*tri-rūpa-liṅga*) is *svārtha-anumāna*», *PSV*, II, 109a, 2, 3, cp. *NB*, II, 3: *tatra svārtham trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānam tad-anumānam*. The prefix *anu-* is thus replaced by ablative case-ending and is taken as implying logical ground. As the determinate perception is regarded by Dignāga as a kind of *anumāna*, cp. below note 15), *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* may adequately be rendered respectively as 'direct knowledge (or awareness)' and 'indirect knowledge (awareness)'.

14) According to the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya realism, every individual existence (*vyakti*), excepting the extreme universal (*para-sāmānya*) and the extreme individual (*antya-viśeṣa*), is in possession of the universal (*jāti*=*sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*). Hence we perceive a thing, at the first moment, in indifferentiated obscurity (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), but later on determinately (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), conjoining differentiated *vyakti* and *jāti* (*jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti*). Dignāga does not assent to this realist view. He makes an essential distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; the former is the particular individuality which can never be generalized or replaced by a concept, and the latter is the universal which, being constructed through the generalizing faculty of our thought, is lacking reality. In correspondence with this essential distinction between two kinds of *prameya*, the theory of a radical distinction between two sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) is definitely stated here. Evidently this theory is set up in opposition to the Nyāya view of the coalescence of different sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa-samplava*), i. e., the view that the same object can be cognized by any of four kinds of *pramāṇa*, cp. *NBh*, ad. I, i, 3. Elaborative arguments made by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati-miśra on this point are precisely traced by Stcherbatsky, and we need no further remark, cp. *BL*, Vol. II, Appendix II, p. 301ff.

15) *Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* or the determinate perception, which can be formulated in the judgement 'this is red', is recognized by most of the philosophical schools of India as a kind of *pratyakṣa*. But Dignāga, who is in the opinion that *pratyakṣa* apprehends only the particular stripped of the universal, is to be asked to explain by which *pramāṇa* the determinate perception is caused. See postscript of this paper.

repetition (*asakṛā*)[†]?¹⁶⁾

(17...
Certainly there is such cognition as can be expressed in the judgement 'this is non-eternal', but this cognition, being related to the said two aspects of the object, is not another independent source of valid knowledge. In the case of such cognition, one cognizes at first colour etc. from two aspects, i.e., the inexpressible particularity (*avyāpadeśya* = *svalakṣaṇa*) on the one hand and the universal colour-ness (*varṇatva* = *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) on the other, then, relating through the operation of the mind (*manas*) the universal colourness to the universal 'non-eternity', forms the judgement 'colour etc. are non-eternal'. Hence (such cognition) is not other source of valid knowledge (than indirect knowledge).

(18...
Nor is there an independent source of valid knowledge in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*).^(94b, 14) (Indeed) one and the same object can be cognized in repetition, but this recognition also is not other independent source of valid knowledge. Why? Because, (if it be regarded as an independent source of knowledge,) then the fallacy of infinitude (*anīṣṭhā*) would be logically concluded. In case, indeed, all kinds of cognition be deemed to be valid knowledge, there would be infinite number of the source of valid knowledge, and, as for instance, a recollected knowledge (which is commonly accepted as non-valid would also be regarded as valid). The term 'recollected knowledge' (*smṛta*) in the verse stands for recollection (*smṛti*). Such mental faculties as recollection, desire (*icchā*), anger (*dveṣa*) and the like, operating on the object once cognized before, are not independent source of valid knowledge:¹⁹⁾ likewise (the recognition also should not be deemed to be an independent source of valid knowledge).

16) *Recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*) is generally thought to be of the same kind as recollection (*smṛti*), both being produced by dint of the impression (*samskāra*) of previous cognition. What distinguishes it from recollection is the direct awareness of the object, which operate along with the impression. We are not acquainted with any particular school reckoning recognition as an independent source of knowledge, but *Śāstradīpikā*, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 115, 14 indicates that there are some (probably Vedāntins) who hold that recognition is a separate means of apprehending an object from other five kinds of thought-construction.

17) Refutation of *sṅgikalpaka-pratyakṣa* as an independent source of valid knowledge.

18) Refutation of recognition as an independent source of valid knowledge.

19) The Mīmāṃsā definition of *pramāṇa*—*anadhigata-artha-gantī pramāṇam* «the function of the source of knowledge consists in cognizing an object which is not yet cognized»—is accepted by the Buddhist, cp. *NBT*, p. 19, 2: *ata eva cānadhigata-viśayaṃ pramāṇam*. Vācaspatimīśra pleaded against this definition on the ground that it cannot include the case of an object which has stability being cognized by a series of perception (*dhāravāhika-vijñāna*), cp. *NVTT*, p. 21, 6-8. This criticism may be taken as being directed to the Mīmāṃsakas, because, according to the Buddhists, there is no such object that has stability and duration.

§ 3. DEFINITION OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

V. 3cd: *Direct knowledge is free from thought-construction. (Thought-construction) implies to associate name, genus etc. (with the object immediately perceived)*²⁰⁾.

[94b, 1]

There, (i. e., among two kinds of valid knowledge,) direct knowledge is free from thought-construction (*kalpanā-apoḍha*)²¹⁾. The knowledge wherein there is no sign of thought-construction is direct knowledge. What, then, is this thought-construction? It implies to associate name (*nāma*), genus (*jāti*) etc. (, which are considered to be the efficient cause of the verbal designation (*śabda-pravṛtti-nimitta*), with the thing immediately perceived). In the case of spontaneous words (*yadṛcchā-śabda*, proper

20) *pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham, nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā* / 3c-d

cp. NV, p. 41, 19ff: *āpare tu manyante pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham iti.* (NVTT, p. 153, 20: *samprati Dignāśya lakṣaṇam upanyasyati, āpare iti.*) *atha keyaṁ kalpanā? nāmajātyādiyojanēti.* TSP, ad. k. 1221, p. 368, 23: *kathaṁ lakṣaṇa-kareṇōktaṁ nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpanēti.*

21) This definition of *pratyakṣa* which, we find, is almost discussed in every Sanskrit work on epistemology and logic is framed on the basis of the essential distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, cp. above note 14). Notwithstanding its simplicity, it is supposed to be so exhaustive that any other qualifier is possible to be added without yielding to a superfluity, cp. note 35). It is perhaps under the influence of this definition that Vācaspati interpreted the word *avyapadeśya* in the definition of *pratyakṣa* in NS, I, i, 4 as referring to *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* and the word *vyavasāya-ātmaka* as indicating *savikālpaka-pratyakṣa*.

22) TSP, ad. k. 1224, p. 369, 22ff, NVTT, p. 153, 23ff. Dignāga is in affinity with the Grammarian in holding that the thought-construction is inseparable from the verbal expression, and, in this respect, differs in opinion from Vātsyāyana. cp. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp. 119-120. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla lay stress on the expression «ucyate» 'a thing... is expressed in word' in these passages, and consider it to be the evidence of Dignāga's understanding of *kalpanā* as being inseparably related with word (*nāma=śabda*), and not with *genus* etc. (*jāty-ādi*), cp. TS & TSP, 1233. According to their interpretation, 'nāma' in Dignāga's definition of *kalpanā* as '*nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā*' should be essentially distinguished from '*jāty-ādi*'. *Jāti* etc. being not recognized by Dignāga as real entities, *jāty-ādi-yojanā* is a heretical theory to be discarded; Dignāga's own interpretation of *kalpanā* is *nāma-yojanā*, cp. *ibid.*, 1219-1221. Or, even when the existence of *jāti* etc. be provisionally admitted, it must be noticed that these are related to a thing only through the medium of *nāma*, cp. *ibid.*, 1224-1225. After elaborating these arguments, they conclude that the coalescence with word (*nāma*) is the characteristic feature of Dignāga's definition of *kalpanā*. These arguments, admitting that they are not off the point in conclusion, seems to be not faithful to the original thought of the passages here, because it is evident that *yadṛcchā-śabda* is meant by the term 'nāma': *yadṛcchā-śabdeṣu nāmnā visiṣṭo'rtha ucyate 'dīṭha' iti.* Classification of *śabda* into five categories is perhaps taken from the Grammarians, cp. *Mahābhāṣya* ad. *Śivasūtra* 2, Vārt., 1: *catusṭayī śabdānāṁ pravṛtṭiḥ, jāti-śabdāḥ, guṇa-śabdāḥ, kriyā-śabdāḥ, yadṛcchā-śabdāś ca caturthāḥ.* As regards *dravya-śabda*, the origin is obscure, but Prāśastapāda also adopts this category, cp. Randle, *op. cit.*, p. 107ff. Dharmakīrti is more prudent than Dignāga in defining *kalpanā* as 'a distinct cognition of mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation' in order to include the thought-construction of infant and dumb person who have the potentiality of verbal designation but do not utter an actual word, cp. NB, 1, 5: *abhilāpa-samsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā.*

noun), a thing qualified by (or associated with) a name (as an efficient cause of verbal expression, e. g., *Ḍittha-tva*)²³⁾ is expressed in the word '*Ḍittha*'. In the case of genus-words (*jāti-sabda*, common noun), a thing qualified by a genus (e. g., *go-tva* <cow-ness>) is expressed in the word '*go*' <cow>. In the case of quality-words (*guṇa-sabda*, adjective), a thing qualified by a quality (e. g., *sukla-tva* <white-ness>) is expressed in the word '*sukla*' <white>. In the case of action-words (*kriyā-sabda*, verbal noun), a thing qualified by an action (e. g., *pācaka-tva* <cook-ness>) is expressed in the word '*pācaka*' <a cook>. In the case of substance-words (*dravya-sabda*), a thing qualified by a substance (e. g., *daṇḍi-tva* <stick-holder-ness> or *viṣāṇi-tva* <horned-ness>) is expressed in the word '*daṇḍin*' <a stick-holder> or '*viṣāṇin*' <the horned>.^{...22)} (The characteristic feature of the thought-construction thus consists in the verbal designation of a thing through the association of name, genus etc. with it).

Here, (with regard to the last two cases of the above-mentioned five,) some (are in the different opinion that the efficient cause of verbal expression is nothing but the relation between an action or a substance and its possessor, and) maintain that (a thing) qualified by this relation (is expressed in the words '*pācaka*', '*daṇḍin*' and so on)²⁴⁾.

On the other hand, some others hold that a thing qualified by the word which essentially can denote no real entity (*artha-sūnya*) is expressed (in all five cases mentioned above)²⁵⁾.

23) cp. *Bālaṃanoramā* ad. *Siddhāntakaumdi*, 1781=MBh, V, i, 119: (<*tvatal*>-*pratyaya yata utpatsyete, tasmāt prakṛti-bhūta-*) *śabdād vyakti-bodhe jāyamāne yaj jāty-adikaṃ viśeṣaṇatayā bhāsate (tad vyakti-viśeṣaṇaṃ 'bhāva'-śabdena vivakṣitam...*) *yathā go-śabdād dhi vyakti-bodhe jāyamāne go-tvaṃ viśeṣaṇatvena bhāsate. Ḍittha-tva* is a generalization of an innumerable number of individual *Ḍittha* existing instantaneously in each moment from his birth to his death, cp. *TSP*, ad. 1226.

24) *PSVT*, 18b, 5ff can be summarized as follows: 1) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to *samāsa*, *kṛt* and *taddhita* implies the relation of action and that which is in case-relation with it (*kriyā-kāraka-sambandha*, e. g., *pācakatvam*...relation between *kriyā* and *kartṛ*, *pācyamānatvam*...relation between *kriyā* and *karma*), the relation of possession and possessor (*sva-svāmi-sambandha*) etc. 2) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to any word is the efficient cause of that word being applied to a certain thing, cp. *MBh*, V, i, 119. 3) *pācaka*=*pac*+<*nvul*>(-*aka*) is *kṛt*, and *daṇḍin*=*daṇḍa*+<*ini*>(-*in*) is *taddhita*. 4) Therefore, the *bhāva-pratyaya* <-*tva*> of '*pācakatva*', '*daṇḍitva*' etc. stands for the above-said relation and at the same time is deemed to be the efficient cause of verbal expression. (The present writer wishes to express thanks to Mr. Y. Ojihara, Asst. Prof. of Sanskrit, Kyoto Univ. for his rendering the writer much help for the understanding of this grammatical discussion.)

25) The Naiyāyikas and other realists are in the opinion that genus, quality etc., which are considered to be the efficient cause of verbal designation in the above passages, are *padārthas* or real entities, but according to Dignāga, they are mere products of the thought-construction and denote no real existence, cp. above note 14); what is denoted by genus-word 'cow' is not the universal which is supposed to be the common possession of every individual cow but 'the

Anyway, that which is devoid of the thought-construction thus characterised is direct knowledge.

[94b, 6]

For what reason, then, the direct knowledge is called '*praty-akṣa*' (lit. being direct to sense-organ) and not '*prati-viśaya*' (lit. being direct to object), despite the fact that it is caused in dependence upon both the sense-organ and the object?

V. 4ab: *It is signified by the sense-organ, for the sense-organ is the specific cause of it*²⁶⁾.

It is not signified by the object, such as colour and the like. The reason is that the object is a factor common (*sādhāraṇa*) to other kinds of knowledge because of its being a cause of the mind (*mano-vijñāna*) or of the knowledge of other persons (*anya-saṃtāna*) too. And it is generally known that (a thing or a fact) is designated by the name of its specific component (*asādhāraṇa*), as for instance, we use verbal expressions 'the sound of a drum' or 'the sprout of barley' to indicate a certain sound or a sprout, instead of naming it 'the sound of hand' or 'the sprout of earth', although the hand or the earth is also a cause in each case²⁷⁾.

[95a, 1]

That direct knowledge is free from thought-construction is established (thus on the ground that it is direct to the sense-organ).

It is stated in an Abhidharma treatise too that "one whose visual sense is normal perceives blue (*nīlaṃ vijānāti*) but does not apprehend that 'this is blue' (*nīlaṃ iti vijānāti*). Facing to an object, he perceives the object in itself (*artha-saṃjñā*) but does not form an idea (*dharma-saṃjñā*) of it"²⁸⁾.

§ 4. VARIETIES OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

[95a, 2]

If direct knowledge be absolutely devoid of thought-construction, then whence is this (stated in the Abhidharma treatise):—"Five kinds of perceptive function take

exclusion of non-cow' (*anya-apoha*, -*vyāvṛtti*). It is with the mind to make his own interpretation of genus etc. explicit that Dignāga interpolated this sentence here. 'Some others' (*anye*), accordingly, are the Buddhists, cp. TSP, ad. k. 1229, p. 371, PSVT, 19a, 1.

26) VPM, p. 177: *asādhāraṇa-hetuvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate* /4a-b.

27) cp. *Abhidharmakośa*, Taisho, XXIX, p. 12b, 18-c, 2: 何因識起俱託二緣得所依名在根非境……彼及不共因 故隨根說識 (*ato'sādhāraṇatvāc ca tair eva nirdiśyate*)……及不共者 謂眼唯自眼識所依, 色亦通為他身眼識 (*anya-cakṣur-vijñānasyāpi*) 及通自他意識所取……識得名隨根非境. 如名鼓聲及麥芽等 (*yathā bheri-śabdo yavāṅkuraḥ*). Sanskrit is quoted from AKV, p. 87, 13ff. Candrakīrti refers to this discussion after criticizing Dignāga's etymological explanation of *pratyakṣa*, cp. *Prasannapādā*, p. 72.

28) cp. *Prasannapādā*, p. 74. This quotation, says Stcherbatsky, could prove that Dignāga's theory of *pratyakṣa* is foreshadowed in previous Sautrāntika works, cp. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 162, note 3.

the congregation (of atoms) as their respective object"?²⁹⁾ (The object of the sense being a single atom (*paramāṇu*), the congregation (*saṃcita*) should be apprehended by means of the thought-construction which unites together the perception of each constituent atom. It seems, therefore, to be incongruous to hold that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction and yet it cognizes the congregation of atoms.) Again it is mentioned (in the *Abhidharmakośa*) that "these (mental functions) make the particular their respective object, so far as it is the particularity of outer seats (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*) and not of substance (=atom, *dravya-svalakṣaṇa*)"³⁰⁾. How is this statement to be understood?

V. 4cd: *There (in the Abhidharmakośa), (the perception,) being caused by (the sense-organ through its contact with) many objects (=congregation of many atoms), makes the whole (sāmānya) its object when cognizing its own object*³¹⁾.

Since it (=perception) is caused by the sense-organ through its contact with (congregated) many substances (=atoms), it is said to take the undivided whole (=the congregation itself) as its object on cognizing its own (outer) seats³²⁾. It, however, does not apprehend the whole through the thought-construction which, after perceiving split substances (=atoms), unites them together. (Therefore, there is no incongruity with the statement of the Abhidharma in asserting that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction.)

However, (the author does not completely agree the above Abhidharma statement in respect of the object of the sense. The author's own view) is stated as follows:—³³⁾

29) VPM, p. 176: *saṃcitālambanāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ*. A similar passage is found in *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 12a, 26-28: 伝説……五識決定積集多微方成所依所縁性故 (*saṃcitāśrayālambanatvāt*, AKV, p. 86, 9-10), and this is attributed to the Vaibhāṣika. According to *Viṃśatikā*, k. 11 & Com., *Ālambanaparikṣā*, kk. 1-5 & Com. and *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, ad. k. 1, realists are divided into three groups in view of their theory concerning the object of cognition (*ālambana*). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is an individual atom (*paramāṇu*), the second the congregation or the gathering of many atoms (*saṃcita*) and the third the union of atoms (*saṃghāta*). It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is reported by Kuei-chi 窺基 to be the Vaibhāṣika, cp. Yamaguchi, *Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei*, p. 78, note 2. *Viṃśatikāṭikā* of Vinītadeva quotes exactly the same sentence explaining the theory of the second group.

30) *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 3a, 9-11: 約處自相許五識身取自相境, 非事自相 (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇa-viśayā na dravya-svalakṣaṇam prati*, cp. AKV p. 28, 10-16). Cp. VPM, p. 176.

31) VPM, p. 176, VA, p. 279, 10:

tatrānekārtha-janyatvāt svārthe sāmānya-gācaram // 4c-d //

32) *āyatana=bāhya-āyatana*; form, sound etc. When the perception operates, what is perceived is a form in its wholeness (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*), and is not the individual atom (*dravya-svalakṣaṇa*) which is the constituent of the form.

33) PSVT, 22b, 2-33: Rejecting a divergent view in regard to the object to be cognized (*spyod-yul las log par rtogs pa=gocara-vipratipatti*), the author states definitely the impossibility of the object being conceptually cognized (*rnam par rtog pa med pa nīd=avikalpatva*).

V. 5: *The substance constituted by many elements (=the congregation of atoms) can never be cognized by the sense-organ. What is perceptible by the sense-organ is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form³⁴.*

Anyhow, (it is established) in this way that direct knowledge which is caused by five kinds of sense-organ is devoid of thought-construction. According to the doctrine maintained by others, some other qualifications (of direct knowledge) are to be added here³⁵. However, 'being free from thought-construction' is enough (to define direct knowledge).

V. 6ab: *The mind, so far as it perceives object or it perceives internally desire etc., is also free from thought-construction³⁶.*

The mind (*manas*), which, (though) leaning upon the object such as form and the like, operates in the form of an immediate awareness, is also free from thought-construction³⁷. Desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain etc. (which are functions of

34) VA, p. 298, 1 (VPM, p. 189):

*dharmīṇo 'neka-rūpasya nēndriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ /
svasamvedyam anirdeśyam rūpam indriya-gocaraḥ // 5 //*

cp. NM, p. 3b, 18-19: 有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內証離言 是色根境界。

35) NS, I, i, 4 defines *pratyakṣa* as that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate (*indriyārtha-samnikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*). Dignāga attacks this definition saying that the cognition caused by the sense-object contact is incapable of 'being expressible', 'being erroneous' or 'being determinate', PS, I, k. 19a-b. cited at VA, p. 338, 17, cp. my paper, *Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya*, p. 330. The qualification 'being inexpressible' is superfluous, because the expressible is cognized only by inference and can never be perceived through sense-organ. The error being attributed to the mind (*manas*) which is not sense-organ, the qualification 'non-erroneous' is also unnecessary. The nature of determination consisting in connecting the sense-datum with the universal which cannot be cognized by the sense, the third qualification does not hold good, cp. PSV, ad. I, 19, 97b, 8-98a, 8, cp. Kitagawa, *Shōri-gakuha no Genryō-setsu ni taisuru Jinna no Hihan*, Nagoya Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyū Ronshū, Tetsugaku, XXI, pp. 58-63. The second qualification is adopted also by the elder school of the Yogācāra, cp. *Yogācārabhūmi*, Taisho, XXX, 357a, 15-16: 現量 (*pratyakṣa*) 者。謂有三種。一非不現見 (*aparokṣa*)。二非已思慮思 (*parikalpita-parikalpya-abhāva*)。三非錯亂境界 (*abhrānta*)。Dharmakīrti adds again this qualification to the Dignāga's definition, cp. NB, I, 4: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*, and the meaning of this addition is variously interpreted by his commentators, cp. my paper, *Bukkyō-ronri-gakuha no Genryō-setsu ni kansuru Ichikōsatsu*, Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū, Vol. II, 1, pp. 123-124. Perhaps Dharmakīrti's adoption of this qualification is meant for answering to the objection against Dignāga that the cause of the erroneous cognition is not always the operation of the mind but the defect of sense-organ also is to be taken into account, cp. TS & TSP, 1313, 1314.

36) VPM, p. 191, VA, p. 303:

mānasam cārtha-rāgādi-svasamvittir akalpikā / 6a-b

According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *artha-rāgādi-sva-samvitti* should be interpreted as implying *artha-samvitti* and *rāgādi-sva-samvitti*, PSVT, 24b, 4: *don gyi sgra ḥdi ni śes byaḥi rnam graḥs so // ḥdod chags la sogs pa rnam kyī raṅ ni / chags la sogs / raṅ no //*

37) NBT, ad. I, 9 attempts to make clear the structure of mental sensation (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). cp. BL, Vol. II, p. 311 ff.

the mind) are also direct knowledge in the sense of internal perception, because those have nothing to do with sense-organ.

Likewise :-

V. 6cd: *The intuition of the object itself which is exercised by yogins without relying upon the teacher's instruction (is also a direct knowledge, being free from thought-construction)*³⁸⁾.

The intuitive perception of *yogins* which is not mingled with thought-construction pertaining to the reliable words of the teachers and which relates to a bare object is also a direct knowledge.^[95b, 1]

(One may assert) that the idea (*kalpanā-jñāna*) also would be deemed to be a direct knowledge, (in case this is defined simply as being free from thought-construction). This is right.

V. 7ab: *The idea also is regarded (as a direct knowledge) in the case of self-cognition. However, when the idea is formed with regard to an object, it is not a direct knowledge, because of thought-construction being there*³⁹⁾.

The idea is not a direct knowledge similar to desire etc. in so far as it is formed with regard to an object, but in the case of self-cognition the idea is not non-direct⁴⁰⁾. Hence there is no harm in defining direct knowledge as being free from thought-construction.

Such is indeed direct knowledge.

§ 5. APPARENT DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

V. 7cd-8ab: *Illusion, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and affection are apparent direct knowledge and are accompanied by obscurity (sa-taimira)*⁴¹⁾.

38) VPM, p. 191: *yoginām guru-nirdeśavyatibhimārtha-mātra-dṛk* // 6c-d //

39) VA, p. 331, VPM, p. 204:

kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāu iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt / 7a-b

40) cp. below ad. I, 9-10.

41) VA, p. 332, 20, TSP, ad. k. 1324:

bhrānti-saṃvṛtisaj-jñānam anumānānumānikam // 7c-d //

smārtābhilāṣikam cēti pratyakṣābhāsaṃ sataimiram / 8a-b

PSVT, 27b, 2ff says that four sorts of apparent direct knowledge are enumerated here, namely (1) illusion (*bhrānti*), (2) cognition of empirical reality (*saṃvṛti-saj-jñāna*), (3) inference (*anumāna*), its result (*anumānika*), recollection (*smārta*) and affection (*abhilāṣika*) and (4) *sa-taimira*. *Sa-taimira* is, according to *ibid.*, 28b, 2, an obscure knowledge caused by the defect of the sense-organ (*dbañ-po la ñe-bar gnod-pa-las skyes-pa=indriya-upaghāta-ja*), such as *timira* (eye-disease) and the like. This interpretation seems not to be faithful to the original thought expressed in this verse. The last word '*sataimiram*' is to be regarded as being in apposition

[95b, 3]

Among these, illusive cognition, being caused through the conceptual understanding which takes, for instance, vapour floating over sands as real water, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Cognition of empirical reality, functioning as a conceptual apprehension which, superimposing an extraneous element (e.g., name) upon a thing itself, takes the latter as having the form of the former, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Inference and cognition resulted by it etc., comprehending conceptually what has been immediately perceived before, are not direct knowledge.

§ 6. IDENTITY OF RESULT AND PROCESS OF COGNITION

[95b, 5]

Here also, (according to our opinion),

V. 8cd: *Resulted content of the cognition being supposed to possess the act of cognizing, it is simultaneously the result and the process of cognition*⁴²⁾.

We do not admit here, as the realists do, that the result of cognition differs from the cognitive process⁴³⁾. That cognition which has been resulted (is indeed to be regarded as the result of cognitive process in so far as it is the apprehension of the object, but from another point of view, it) is known as possessing with it the act of cognizing (*sa-vyāpāra*), because it arises in conformity with the form of the cognized object. In this latter sense, it is metaphorically called the cognitive process, i. e., the

with the preceding word '*pratyakṣābhāsam*'; otherwise '*ca*' is necessary to be added after '*sataimiram*'. Our opinion is supported by the fact that Dignāga explains in his own commentary on this verse three sorts of apparent direct knowledge only and not the fourth. It is obvious that PSVT modified the original thought of this verse basing upon the theory of Dharmakīrti, who, thinking it to be necessary to remove the erroneous cognition due to the defect of sense-organ from *pratyakṣa*, adopted the qualification '*abhrānta*' in his definition of *pratyakṣa*, cp. above note 35), Hasuba, *Jinendrabuddhi ni yoru Jigenryō Kaishaku ni tsuite*, Yamaguchi Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Ronsō, p. 205ff.

42) VA, p. 349, 5, VPM, p. 221, *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kāshī Skt. Ser., p. 66, 20:

sa-vyāpāra-pratitativāt pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat // 8c-d //

43) It is generally admitted by the Naiyāyikas that the operation or the process of cognition (*pramāṇa*) is distinguished from the resulted content (*pramiti*=*pramāṇa-phala*), cp. NBh, ad. I, i, 3. Dignāga, when criticizing the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa*, takes up this problem for discussion. If it be held, he says, that the determinate cognition is *pramāṇa* in accordance with the Nyāya definition, then it would be unnecessary that the result differing from it should be produced, because the cognition is already determined. If again, he continues, it be assumed that *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* is the perception of the universal (*sāmānya*) which is the qualifying adjunct of the individual, and that *pramāṇa-phala* is the cognition of the individual qualified by the universal, then this assumption would lead us to the absurd conclusion that the object cognized in the process of perception differs from that actually cognized as the result of that process: this Nyāya doctrine is as ridiculous as the statement that the axe struck at the *khadira*-tree cuts in the result the *palāśa*-tree, PSV, ad. I, 22, 99a, 2ff, cp. Kitagawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14, TSP, ad. 1345, p. 399.

means of knowledge⁴⁴). (We conclude thus that the result and the process of cognition are not different each other.) In case, however, the resulted cognition be debarred of activity, it cannot be called the process. As for instance, when the effect produced (e.g., the corn) agrees in kind with its cause (=the seed), they say that it has 'taken' the shape of its cause, but it does not agree with the common notion to say that this expression is made even when the effect is devoid of activity. Similar is the case with the discussion here. (That is to say, when the resulted content of the cognition possesses the act of cognizing, it is rightly supposed to take the form of the object.)

§ 7. SELF-COGNITION

V. 9: *It can also be maintained here that the self-cognition is the result of cognitive process, because its nature consists in determining the object. And the mental image bearing a resemblance to the object is the means of knowledge, through which the object is cognized⁴⁵.*

(^{95b}, 7)

It can also be maintained here (in examining direct knowledge) that the self-cognition (*svasamvitti*) is the result (of cognitive process). When the cognition is caused, it has two sides, appearance of the subject (*sva-ābhāsa*) and appearance of the object (*viśaya-ābhāsa*)⁴⁶. The self-cognition (which takes place) between these

44) Kumārila raises objection against Dignāga's this theory assented to by Dharmakīrti and his successors. He cites the same instance of cutting a tree by an axe as cited by Dignāga in his criticism of the Nyāya theory, cp. above note 43), but for different purpose. The axe, the instrument of cutting is distinct from the cut, the result,—this distinction is as generally recognized as the fact that the axe struck at the *khadira*-tree does not cut the *palāśa*-tree in effect. Likewise, Kumārila concludes, the distinction between the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*=*pramā-karaṇa*) and the cognition resulted through it (*pramiti*=*pramāṇa-phala*) must not be neglected, cp. *Ślokavārttika*, IV, 75, *TS* & *TSP*, 1345. The Buddhist answer to this objection is as follows: —The mere invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the instrument of cognition and the object to be cognized does not provide sufficient ground for considering that instrument to be *pramāṇa*. Through the instrument may the cognition of the object be produced, but it is not the actual act of cognizing. Moreover, absolutely speaking, all things being instantenous, the relation of producer and produced (*utpadya-utpādaka-bhāva*) cannot be established between the instrument and the result. The relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* must, therefore, be that of what determines and what is determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*), and what determines the object is the very act of cognizing, i.e., the appearance of the object in the mental reflex, cp. *TSP*, ad. k. 1346, *NB* & *NBT*, I, 18–19.

45) *VPM*, p. 215, 221, (cp. *VA*, p. 349, 7, p. 393, 28):

*svasamvittiḥ phalaṁ vā'tra tad-rūpo hy artha-miśrayaḥ /
viśay'ākārataivāsya pramāṇam tena miyate //*

46) The theory that *ālayavijñāna* or store-consciousness appears or manifests itself (*ābhāti*, *pratibhāti*, *avabhāti*, *khyāti*) as both the apparent subject (*sva-ābhāsa*=*grāhaka*) and the apparent object (*artha-ābhāsa*=*grāhya*) is met everywhere in Vijñānavāda treatises, and we need no explanation of it here. It is evident from the context of this passage that Dignāga established

two sides is the resulted content of the act of cognizing. Why? Because the nature of this self-cognition consists in determining the object (*artha-niścaya*)⁴⁷⁾. When the idea, in which the form of the external object is represented, is taken as the object of cognition, the self-cognition which is corresponding to that idea determines the object either as something desirable or undesirable. But when the mere external thing is thought to be the object of cognition, then the appearance of the object in the mental reflex of the cognizant is the means of cognizing this object. Although the cognition should be self-cognizable in this case too, the appearance of the subject (in the mental state of the cognizant) is disregarded, and to the mental reflex resembling to the object is attributed the role of the means of cognizing this object, for the object is cognized through that mental reflex. Whatsoever be the reflex of the object which has appeared in the cognition, whether it be the reflex of something white or non-white or of any other colour, this mental reflex which possesses the object within itself has the function of determining the object.

[96a, 3]

Thus, in accordance with the variety of (the nature of) cognition, the role of the cognizing agency or of the object to be cognized is hypothetically attributed (*upacaryate*) to respective factor in each case, because (absolutely speaking,) all elements of existence, (being instantenous,) are devoid of any efficiency⁴⁸⁾ (and, in consequence, there is no element which is to be defined invariably as the cognizing agency or as the object to be cognized).

The same content is stated (in the following verse).

V. 10: *That which appears in the image (in conformity with the form of the external thing) is the object of cognition, and the cognizing agency and the resulted content of cognition are respectively the apparent cognizant, (i. e., the*

his theory of knowledge on the ground of the Vijñānavāda philosophy, although he does not use the term '*ālayavijñāna*'. The theory of self-cognition (*svasamvit*) which marks the specific feature of his theory of direct knowledge is understandable only on the basis of the Vijñānavāda doctrine. It deserves to be noticed that the verse 10 following the arguments here is cited in Dharmapāla's commentary on *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* as an evidence of Dignāga's theory of the triple division of *vijñāna* (*grāhya-ākāra*, *grāhaka-ākāra*, *svasamvit*), which is criticized from the viewpoint of the Dharmapāla's fourfold division theory (証自証分 *sva-svasamvit*? besides the above three), cp. *Cheng-wei-shih-lun*, Taisho, XXXI, p. 10b, 13-16: 如集量論伽他中說。似境相所量 能取相自証 即能量及果 此三体無別, de la Vallée Poussin *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*, traduite et annotée, Tome 1, p. 139.

47) *Niścaya* is synonymous with *vikalpa*, *kalpanā*, *adhyavasāya* etc., meaning thought-construction, cp. *BL*, II, Indices. Here, this term is used in different sense as is explained in the passages that follow.

48) cp. *TSP*, ad. k. 1346, p. 399, 12-13: *yasmān na pāramārthikaḥ kartṛ-karaṇ'ādi-bhāvo 'sti, kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām*, *ibid.*, ad. 1222, p. 369, 11-12: *naiva tu kaścit kaṁcid yojayati, nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām*, see above not 44).

appearance of the subject) and the self-cognition (procuced through the relation between apparent object and apparent subject, which actually are two sides of the same cognition). Therefore, these three factors of cognition are not different each other⁴⁹⁾.

§ 8. TWO KINDS OF COGNITION AND SELF-COGNITION

[96a, 5]

How, then, is it recognized that cognition is of two kinds?

V. 11ab: *Cognition is of two kinds, because of the constitutional difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that (cognition)⁵⁰⁾.*

That cognition by virtue of which the (external) object such as form and the like is cognized consists of (two sides, i.e.,) the image of the object and the apparent subject. But that cognition which introspects the above said cognition of the external object consists of the idea, which reflects the external object, and the corresponding apparent subject⁵¹⁾.

Otherwise, if the (first) cognition is in conformity with the (external) object only (and is lacking subjective side), or if it consists of the apparent subject only (and is devoid of the objective side), then the cognition of that (first) cognition would be of the same nature as (the first one, i.e.,) the cognition of the external object.

Further, (if the difference between these two kinds of cognition be not admitted,) then there would be no possibility of subsequent cognitions appearing in conformity with the (form of) the past, remote object. Why? Because the past object, (being not there at the time of subsequent cognitions)⁵²⁾, cannot be their object. Hence, (there must be the cognition which is other in constitution than the cognition of the external thing and by virtue of which the form of the past, remote thing is cognized. That kind of cognition is none other than the cognition which cognized the previous cognition possessed of the image of external thing. Thus) it is proved that the cognition is of two kinds.

49) VPM, p. 221, 229, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 67, 30-31 :

*yad abhāsam prameyam tat pramāṇa-phalāte punaḥ /
grāhak'ākāra-svasamvitṭi trayam nātaḥ prthak-kṛtam // 10*

cp. above note 46).

50) VPM, p. 232, 244, VA, p. 425, 12 :

viśaya-jñāna-taj-jñānāviśeṣāt tu dvi-rūpātā / 11a-b

51) Cp. note 46).

52) As all things are momentary, the object of the previous cognition does not continue to exist till the subsequent cognition arises. There is, accordingly, no possibility of the same object being cognized by a series of perception, cp. note 48).

V. 11cd: (*That there are two kinds of cognition is evident*) also from (*the fact that we have*) recollection afterwards. The recollection (*of something*) does not occur to the mind without having experienced (*it before*)⁵³⁾.

The words 'also from the fact that we have recollection afterwards' in the verse relate to the above-stated words 'cognition is of two kinds' (in the stanza c).^[96b, 1] Some time after we perceived something, the recollection of our cognition (that we have perceived it) occurs to our mind together with the recollection of the object. Therefore, the cognition is of two kinds, (i. e., the cognition of the external object and that of the cognition or of the idea,) and in consequence it should be maintained that it is self-cognizable. Why (is this maintained)? Because, the recollection (of something) does not occur to the mind without having experienced it before. If a thing has not been perceived before, we have no recollection of it; as for instance, the recollection of the colour and like (occurs to our mind only when we have perceived it before. Likewise, the recollection of a previous cognition is possible on the assumption that the cognition was self-cognized before.)

V. 12: *If it be maintained that the recollected cognition is the apprehension of previous cognition by means of another cognition, then an infinite sequence would badly be resulted. Because, with regard to it (=second cognition) again will there be a recollection.*

*Further, if it be so, the cognition of one object would not transit to that of another object. But, (in fact,) the transition of the cognition is commonly noticed*⁵⁴⁾.

^[96b, 2] Some may hold this:—As colour and the like (are perceived by means of the other factor than themselves, i. e., by sense-organs), the cognition also is apprehended by means of another cognition. This is not right. Because, if the recollected cognition be assumed to be the apprehension (of the previous cognition) by means of another cognition, then the absurdity of infinite sequence (*anīṣṭhā*), i. e., the endless series (*anavasthā*) of cognition would be logically concluded⁵⁵⁾. (In order to be consistent, we have to admit that) this second cognition will also be apprehended by another

53) VA, p. 425, 5 :

smṛter uttarakālam ca na hy asāv avibhāvite // 11c-d //

54) *Śloka-vārttikavākyā, śūnyavāda-sthānam*, ad. k. 27, Ed. Ramanatha Śāstri, p. 247, 23-34 :
jñānāntarānubhave'niṣṭhā, tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ /
viśayāntara-sañcāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate // 12 //

55) The Naiyāyikas, who hold that a cognition must be proved by another cognition, cannot avoid to face this difficulty of infinite sequence, cp. *NBh*, II, i, 17-19. It is to overcome this difficulty that the later Naiyāyikas establish the theory of *anuvyavasāya* or self-consciousness.

cognition. Why? Because, with regard to that (second cognition) again will there be a recollection, (the occurrence of which is justifiable only on the assumption of the third cognition, and *ad infinitum*). In the case of that (second) cognition by virtue of which the (first) cognition is apprehended, we have, as generally known, the recollection of it afterwards. Hence, if it be held that the cognition is apprehended by a different subsequent cognition, then (the third, the fourth and thus) the endless series of cognitions would be logically concluded.⁵⁶⁾

Further, (if it be so, then the first cognition would be continuously apprehended by subsequent cognitions, and consequently), the cognition of one thing would not transit to that of another. But (in fact,) the transition of the cognition is the fact generally admitted. Therefore, it must necessarily be recognized that the cognition is self-cognizable. And that very (self-cognition) is the resulted content of the act of cognizing.

In this way it is well proved that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction.

56) Candrakīrti makes reference, in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, VI, 72, to the theory of self-cognition established through the argument on the recollection as is unfolded here, but he ascribes this theory to the Sautrāntika, cp. S. Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U to no Tairon*, pp. 284-285. Cp. also *Pramāṇavarttika*, II, k. 485.

Postscript: Among two questions raised after the theory of radical distinction between two *pramāṇas* was expounded, the first one has been understood by the present writer as concerning *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, see notes 15) & 17). This understanding, however, should be corrected so as to be in accord with Jinendrabuddhi, whose interpretation is as follows:— The proposition “this (colour) is non-eternal” (*pratijñā*) is inferred through the minor premise “the colour is a product” (*hetu*) and the major premise “whatsoever is a product is non-eternal, e.g., a pot” (*dṛṣṭānta*). If the theory of radical distinction between two *pramāṇas* should be maintained, then the above inference could not avoid committing fallacy. While the colour which is the subject of *hetu* is *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, the colour which is the subject of *pratijñā* is ‘this’ (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) immediately perceived. The subjects of *hetu* and *pratijñā* being thus radically different each other, this *hetu* is incompatible with *pakṣa-dharmatva*, the first aspect of *tri-rūpa-līṅga*. Dignāga, therefore, is asked to explain the ground of this proposition being valid, cp. *PSVT*, 146, 5-7.