Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity

(nges byed kyi tshad ma)

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The intensive efforts of the Tibetan epistemologists in appropriating the Indian epistemological tradition in continuation particularly of the "seven works of Dharmakirti" resulted in the fact that their explanations must be considered as a qualified testimony for any interpretation of the Indian tradition, a fact that has to date rarely been seriously acknowledged. Of course, the contextual presuppositions, systematic as well as philological, must always be taken seriously. But in view of the depth and consequence with which the leading Tibetan scholars treated the inherited themes and problems their interpretational opinions can no longer simply be neglected. On the other hand it is well known and clearly exemplified in Leonard van der Kuijp's pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology\(^1\), that the appropriation and understanding of the themes, theories, concepts and problems raised and developed by Dharmakirti and his school was a historical process that was governed by the dialectics of trial and error. A host of scholars from the eleventh century onwards took part in this living and lively process until by the fourteenth and fifteenth century\(^2\) authoritative commentaries, above all on the Pramāṇavārttika and the Pramāṇaviniścaya, were composed which can be considered as a valid statement on the tradition irrespective of their mutual deviations and irrespective of their "methodological deficiencies" in terms of modern critical historical scholarship.

We have no right to denigrate these beautiful fruits of Tibetan intellectual creativity as being of merely interpretational character and not philosophically innovative. For do we not do the same? That is, do we not also try to understand Dharmakirti's works, e.g. within and from their context as a document of reflection on man and his actions? We only distinguish our work from that of the Tibetan exegetes by our concern for the respective context and by our sincere dedication to the exclusion of any creative philosophical activity of our own with regard to the problems confronted. For the Tibetan scholar the interpretation of Dharmakirti and his own epistemological creativity is only one and the same because a living Buddhist tradition provides him with a framework within which he can securely rely on an integral spiritual identity in all his intellectual enterprises.

But if we follow our own obsessive presuppositions that creativity must reach new shores, has to result in new original creations, where and how can we find the original Tibetan mind at work?

No doubt in all those areas where the stream of Indian heritage carried tributaries of heterogeneous and contradictory traditions, and where the need for the establishment of a coherent character resulted in differentiations on all interpretational levels, thereby creating new and comprehensive views of Buddhist theory and praxis, as e.g. in Tibetan Madhyamaka or Tantricism.

However, this mind can also be found where "error, misinterpretation" has contributed to the progress towards a finally accepted interpretation of an Indian complex. The epistemological theories of the famous Phywa pa Chos kyi Seng ge (1109–1169) are a good example. Famed for

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2) A periodization has been proposed recently in van der Kuijp 1989: 5ff.
his introduction of the 'thal phyir-praxis in dialectical discussion, hardly any of this innovative man's epistemological ideas\(^3\) escaped the critique of Sa pañ and his followers. But his contributions are certainly original and his influence was lasting and was of remarkable import to the theories of the later dGe lugs pa scholars.\(^4\)

Finally there are many topics in all the theoretical traditions that have not been dealt with in all their details and consequences within the Indian Buddhist documents.

Such topics provide another broad field for the activity of the Tibetan scholars who tried to express the implications and to bring the often rudimentary beginnings in their sources to systematical completion.\(^5\)

An example of the latter is the theme of the present paper. Already van der Kuijp indicated in a note\(^6\) that we here face an area that was hardly developed by the Indian scholars but must have been of considerable interest to the Tibetans during the first period of their study of epistemology on the basis of the Indian tradition.

And in fact the problem under discussion in an interesting one, for it is related to no less than the question of how validity of a cognition (tshad ma nyid, pramāṇa) can be ascertained (nges pa, niścita).

In the Tibetan epistemological literature this theme is usually dealt with under the topic of “the valid cognition which ascertains the validity of a valid cognition” (mtshan nyid nges byed kyi tshad ma).\(^7\) This topic forms a corollary to the definition of valid cognition (tshad ma'i mtshan nyid) and can be found dealt with – more or less extensively – in all relevant treatises.\(^8\)

The question of whether the validity (pramāṇa) of a valid cognition (pramāṇa) is certain on account of the cognition itself (svatah), is intrinsic to the cognition, or is in need of another

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4) Even if we cannot yet say anything definite regarding his often indicated dependency on Sankaranandana (cf. e.g. van der Kuijp 1983, note 340). It should also be considered in this connection that he evidently did not know Sanskrit (cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 61). On his impact on Tibetan dialectical practice cf. Jackson 1987: 129 and van der Kuijp 1989: 13ff.

5) Cf. the system of invalid cognitive acts (tshad min) in van der Kuijp 1978: 358ff.

6) Cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 60 and note 207.

7) E.g. Rang 'grel 100a6: mtshan gzhis la mtshan nyid nges pa'i tshad ma, or Mun sel 120, 20: mtshan nyid nges byed kyi tshad ma, or similar formulations.

8) The following is a survey of major sources and of major paraphrases. It is not comprehensive, but includes examples from the different traditions mainly for the earlier period and adding some from later times.

rNgog Lotsāba Blo Idan shes rab: paraphrases in Pham byed II 366,6–367,5; 350,2f.; rNgog lugs: paraphrases in Rang 'grel 101b2–4; Rol mtho 618,6–619,1.

Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge: paraphrases in Pham byed II 367,5–370,3; Rol mtho 617,2–7; 623,5–6.

gTsang nag pa br'Tson grus seng ge: bsDus pa 26a2–27b5.

Sa skya pandita: Rigs gter VIII 54b–58a; Rang 'grel 106a6–102al.

'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seng ge: Rigs mdzod (A), 197,1–3.

Bo dong pan chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal: Rigs snang (Vol. 7) 479,3–488,6.

Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge: rNam bshad 127al–134a4; gSal byed 56b5–60a5; 'Od zer 105a6–b6.

gSer mdog pan chen Shākya mchog ldam: Pham byed II 341,4–375,1; Rol mtho 615,6–619,2; Kun bzang 300,4–301,3.

Mas rab 'byams pa Thugs rje dpal bzang: Rab gsal 166,5–169,6.

Glo bo mkhan chen bSod nams lhun grub: Nyi ma 278,3–280,2.

Ngag dbang chos grags: dpal ster 351,5–376,6.

Tsong kha pa: 'Jug sgo 22,10–24,9.

mKhas grub rje: Mun sel 120,20–122,2; Rigs pa'i rgya mtho (Vol. Da) 25b1–26b2.

rGyal tshab rje: Thar lam sal byed 129b2–131a2; dGongs pa rab gsal 12b3–14a6.

dGe 'dun grub: Rigs rgyan 118,3–125,5.

Pan chen bSod nams grags pa: dGongs gsal 408,1–429,2.

'Jam dpal bsdh pa'i rdo rje: Blo rigs 399,1–342,1.


Phur lcogs Yongs 'dzin rDo rje chang: Blo rigs 10b1–12b4.

cognition (*paratāh*), since its ascertainment is extrinsic to it, is a well-known theme of the polemics between the Indian Buddhist epistemologists and the Mīmāṃsā.\(^9\) It owes its origin to the Mīmāṃsāka’s insistence on the independent authority of the eternal Veda and was promulgated strongly by Kumārila\(^10\) who became the main opponent of the Buddhist epistemologists from Dharmakīrti onwards.

The difference between these two traditions regarding the derivation of validity is succinctly characterized by Sāntarakṣita when he says: “Because some strongly pronounce the restriction, that (a cognition) is (valid) only by itself (*svatāh*), while others hold no (such) restriction, (when they say) that some (cognitions are valid) by themselves, and others because of other (cognitions) (*anyatah*).”\(^11\) The first opinion is the Mīmāṃśaka’s, the second the Buddhist’s. Sāntarakṣita does not elaborate on the question of which cases of valid cognitions are in fact of the one or the other kind according to the Buddhist epistemological tradition, but Kamalaśīla provides us with a neat list. He distinguishes seven kinds of valid cognition and says that

1. the self-awareness-perception (*svasamvedanapratyakṣam*),
2. yogic cognition (*yogijñānam*),
3. cognition of the fulfillment of purpose (*arthakriyājñānam*)
4. inference (*anumānam*), and
5. trained perception (*abhyāsavaḥ pratyakṣam*) are valid intrinsically (*svatāh*), and that
6. cognition produced by prescription (*cudanājanitam jñānam*), and
7. perception that is not free from causes for error (*pratyakṣam anapagatabhrāntinīmittam*) are extrinsically (*anyatah*) valid.\(^12\)

This small list is the only one I know of. A comparable but different list can be gathered from Dharmottara’s commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya,\(^13\) to which I shall refer later.\(^14\) We may further assume from later Tibetan informations\(^15\) that Śaṅkaranandana treated this subject too in one of his relevant works, but they are not yet accessible.\(^16\) Finally there are some short remarks of relevance by Manorathanandin\(^17\) and Moksākaragupta.\(^18\)

Not anticipating detailed research on these and further materials—nothing has been done so far—I can only summarize at present a first rough impression on the early Indian development of our theme.

In Dharmakīrti’s works only two small remarks are available that can be understood—and in fact were thus understood by some Tibetans\(^19\)—as referring to the issue of an ascertainment of validity. Dharmakīrti says in PV II 4d–5a: “The cognition of the proper nature (of a cognition as such follows) from itself, (but) that (this cognition) is valid (is only known) through practice.”\(^20\)

These words clearly state that the cognition of validity depends on something else, but the later treatment of the problems, e.g. in Śaṅkaraśīla’s discussions of TS 295ff., also makes clear that these remarks by Dharmakīrti cannot be taken as a comprehensive answer to our question. Dharmakīrti simply did not deal with this problem at all. But that it was discussed to some extent

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9) Cf. e.g. the long Svataḥprāmāṇyapariśā in Śaṃkarāśīla’s Tattvasaṅgara (vv. 2810–3122).
11) TS 2944: yanaiśau svata eveti praccair niyama ucyate / kīcīt svato ‘nyataḥ kīcīt paraś cañyamo mataḥ //
12) TSP 938, 19–23.
14) Cf. below p. 266 ff.
15) Cf. below p. 262 f.
16) Śaṅkaranandana wrote three Prāmāṇya-treatises, a Sūkṣma-, a Madhya- and a Brhatprāmāṇyākārikā (cf. Much 1988: 16; for a description of the texts from glass negatives at the Bihar Research Institute cf. Bühnemann 1980). The extent texts have only the kārikā, but it is possible that Śaṅkaranandana also added a commentary in prose (cf. below p. 262). Although I have a xerox-copy of these texts at hand, they are virtually illegible and the editing of them by an expert Pandit would be an urgent task.
17) Cf. PVV 2,22–3,8.
19) E.g. by mkhas grub tje, cf. Mun sel 120,21–121,4.
20) PV II 4d–5c: svatāpasaṃ svato gatiḥ / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahārena. For a detailed explanation cf. van Bijlert 1989: 147f.
in his school is evident from Kamalasila's list and from Dharmottara's treatment. Nevertheless we can say that in the Indian Buddhist epistemological school the problem was — with the exception of Dharmottara — of only marginal interest.

This impression is vividly corroborated by the words of gSer mdog pan chen Shakyamchog ldam (1428–1507) who in his larger commentary on the Tshad ma rigs gter says with respect to the source of this theorem (lung khangs bsam pa): "With respect to the twofold divisions of intrinsic ascertainment and extrinsic ascertainment in the case of a valid cognition the sources (consisting) of the Pramāṇavācinñācayya and the Seven Treatises are not clear (gsal po med). The commentators, too, did not clearly distinguish that this was the way these two have been taught by the sources (this was) the definition of each (definiendum), and (this was) the exemplificate. Particularly the opinion that intrinsic ascertainment and extrinsic ascertainment are respectively explained by the two (!) feet 'PV II 4d' [and 'PV II 5c'] is not held by anybody competent (tshad ldam) and is also in general impossible."[22]

Shakyamchog ldam's words and, even more so, his elaborate discussions[23] are representative for a more final stage of the Tibetan development of our theme. We shall not deal with it as such, although mainly his and other, even later texts will be exploited as sources of information on ideas of the early period.

There are two main sources presently available for the treatment of our theme in this earliest period of Tibetan interest in it: the Pramāṇavācinñācayya-commentary[24] of gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge († after 1105),[25] a pupil of Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge, and the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, together with an autocommentary by the Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251).[26]

For two reasons I shall not incorporate the treatment of gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge into the first step of this study: gTsang nag pa's terminology naturally shows the strong impact of Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge's systematical categories and terms. And those are still hardly known except for the general information from Shakyamchog ldam which was interpreted by van der Kuijip.[27] I assume that van der Kuijip will present a study of Phywa pa's theories on the basis of Shakyamchog ldam's summary and the available fragments and paraphrases in the future. For the time being I have to refrain from offering the results of a study of his pupil's statements except for an occasional reference to them, where they supplement other information. The second and more decisive reason is that Sa skya Paṇḍita limits his critique of earlier views in connection with the present theme to opinions propounded by RNgog Lotsāba and his school, and does not seem to deal with Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge and his pupils at all.

[21] The second foot has been lost in the edition (?).

[22] Pham byed II 342.1–3: tshad ma la rang nges dang gzhan nges gnyis su 'byed pa 'di la / mDo dang sDe bshun gyi khangs gyal po med cing / gred pa byed pa dag gis kyang de gnyis gzhung gis ji liar btan pa'i tshad dang / so so'i mtshan nyid dang / mtshan gzhis 'di yin zhes bsa'i bar phye ba med do // khyad par du / rang las rang gi ngo bo rtoqs / zhes dang / tha snyad las ni tshad ma nyid l'i zhes tsig kyang gnyis kyi rang nges dang gzhan nges so sor bshad par 'dod pa ni / tshad ldam sus kyang bshad pa min zhung / spyi yang rung ba min no //

[23] Pham byed II 341.4–375.1 ("mtshan gzhis steng du mtshan nyid dang mtshan bya nges byed kyi tshad ma bsam pa") which forms the last part of his study of the definition of a valid cognition (ibid. 281.5f.) that van der Kuijip rightly called "extremely thought provoking" (van der Kuijip 1983: note 340).

[24] Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i tika. Legs bshad bdus pa. A manuscript is in the possession of the Otani University Library (cf. Otani Tibetan Catalogue Number. 13971, Tome 968). It was indicated to me years ago by Gene Smith whom I would like to take the opportunity of thanking here. This manuscript has now been published in the new series of the Otani Library (Otani University Tibetans Works Series 2, Kyoto 1989) with a foreword by van der Kuijip (cf. particularly van der Kuijip 1989: 22-26 for analytical remarks). Cf. also van der Kuijip 1983: note 267.

[25] On gTsang nag pa cf. van der Kuijip 1983: 69 and 96 (for a collection of fragments), van der Kuijip 1989: 2–5, also Jackson 1987: 150. Except for Shakyamchog ldam "gTsang nag pa's work seems to have been little studied" by the Tibetan authors (van der Kuijip, letter of July 23, 1988). Van der Kuijip changed the date of his death from 1171 to after 1185 (van der Kuijip 1989: 2).


[27] Cf. van der Kuijip 1983: 66ff. and 71–84. gTsang nag pa treats the topic mtshan gzhis la mtshan nyid nges byed bsam pa in 26a2–27b6.
With the exception of gTsang nag pa’s treatment, fragments and/or paraphrases from the works of Tibetan epistemologists preceding Sa pan’s work can be gathered mainly from Sa pan’s work itself and the many commentaries written on it, above all from the large commentary of Shākya mchog ldan already referred to.

In the following I shall therefore present only the essentials of Sa skya Panḍita’s explanations, first of his own position and then of the earlier statements criticized by him. For these I shall supplement the information from other sources, but only as far as it facilitates an understanding of Sa pan’s arguments.

Finally I shall look at the three kinds of valid cognitions held to be extrinsically ascertained (gzhan las nges) by Sa pan. Here the alleged dependency of Sa pan on Dharmottara can be examined more closely.

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Our theme is dealt with by Sa pan in the third section of the third part of Chapter VIII. This section has the title “the valid cognition which ascertains the definition in case of the exemplificate” (mtshan gzhi la mtshan nyid nges pa’i tshad ma).

The structure of this section is as follows:

III. mtshan gzhi la mtshan nyid nges pa’i tshad ma
1. dri ba dgod pa (putting the question) 100a6–102a1
2. lan (answer) 100b1–2
   a. gzhan gyi lan dgag (refuting the answer of others) 100b2–5
   b. rang gi lan (own answer) 100b5–101b2
   c. de la rtsod pa spang ba (rejecting contentions against this [answer]) 101b2–102a1

The question is put forth in Rigs gter VIII 54bc: “If (it be asked), whether an ascertainment of these valid cognitions is known intrinsically (rang) or extrinsically (gzhan)” and is explained as raising the problem in the commentary: If its validity was known intrinsically, it would be futile to teach its definition. And if it was known extrinsically, an infinite regression would be unavoidable.

Sa pan’s own position is expressed in Rigs gter VIII 55d–57a. Accordingly he distinguishes the following valid cognitions that are either intrinsically or extrinsically ascertained in their validity:

28) bsDos pa 26a2–27b6 with the title -mtshan- gzhi la mtshan nyid nges byed bsams pa.
31) Rang ’grel 100a6–102a1.
32) Rigs gter VIII 54bc/: tshad ma de dag nges pa mi /
   / rang gzhan gling las rtags she na /
33) Rang ’grel 100b1f.: nges shes tshad ma de nyid kyi stobs khyis ’dren nam gzhan gyi stobs khyis ’dren / de nyid khyis ’dren na tshad ma’i mtshan nyid la ni mtshan pa med par ’gyur la gzhan las nges na thug med du ’gyur ro zhes zer ro. Cf. Go ram pa, rNam bshad 127a2f., and Mus rab ’byams pa, Rab gsal 166,6f.
   The question and its explanation are given in substantially the same way by gTsang nag pa (bsDos pa 26a2–3). It is possible, because of the referential way of presenting it (...zhes zer ro) that Sa pan is referring to gTsang nag pa here. But lacking other indications we cannot say so for certain.
34) Rigs gter VIII 55d–57a/: don rig gnys dang rang rig dang (55) /
   / rjes su dpag pa rang las (: la) nges /
   / dang po pa dang yid ma gtad /
   / ’khrul rgyu can rnamz gsham las nges /
   / don byed pa dang goms pa can i (56) /
   / rjes su dpag pas nges par byed /
35) Cf. Rang ’grel 100b5–6.
I. intrinsically ascertained:
1. don byed par snang ba'i mngon sum ("perception in which the [actual] fulfilment of a purpose appears", *arthakriyānirbhāsam* pratyākṣam)
2. mngon sum goms pa can ("trained perception", *abhyaṣapratyākṣam*
3. rang rig ("self consciousness", *svasaṃvedanam*)
4. rjes dpag ("inference", *anumānam*)

II. extrinsically ascertained:
5. mngon sum dang po pa ("first perception")
6. yid ma glad pa ("[perception] with distracted mind")
7. 'khrul rgyu can ("[perception] with grounds for error", *bhraṃtinimitta—*)

III. ascertaining cognitions for the perceptions of Nos. 5, 6, 7 are the perceptions no. 1, 2 and inference.  

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In the first (100b2–5) and third part (101b2–102a1) of his answer Sa pañc indicates the views of different opponents that I would like to identify in the following.

The subsequently refuted answer of others to the above question is condensed in Rigs gter VIII 54c–55a: "Some assume, that [a valid cognition] is intrinsically ascertained. Some others say, that (it) is extrinsically ascertained." And this is supplemented in the commentary by the words: "Some say: 'It is only intrinsically ascertained' and some say: 'It is only extrinsically ascertained.'"

The second of these theorems, that it is extrinsically ascertained (gzhon las) is unanimously attributed to the Bram ze (chen po) by the commentators, i.e. Šankaranandana. Go ram pa presents in rNam bshad 127a5f. a quotation from Šankaranandana that consists of a half verse and an explanation in prose:

"Although something (don) is proven by a valid cognition, the validity (tshad ma, *prāmāṇya*) [of this valid cognition] is not (proven) by this same [valid cognition]. (That means:) Although the respective object of activity (jug yul) is ascertained by the two valid cognitions, an ascertainment of the definitive character (mthun nyid), (i.e.) reliability (mi slu ba) is not provided through itself. Therefore the general definition and (its) contrary concomitance (gal 'brel etc. are ascertained by a cognition called 'examination' (dpoy pa, *vivekā) which occurred subsequently to the valid cognition. As such the definitive character of a valid cognition is ascertained only by another (valid cognition)."

37) Rigs gter VIII 54d–55a: la la rang las nges par 'dod /
    / 'gai thig gzhon las nges zhes zer /
38) Rang 'grel 100b3: kha cig rang kho na las nges so zhes zer ba dang / 'ga' thig gzhon kho na nges par byed do zhes zer ba ni ...
39) Cf. rNam bshad 127a5f. and gsal byed 57a3; Pham byed II 370,5 (Bram ze chen po Shal ka ril [?]: Rab gsal 167,2; Nyi ma 278,5; dPal ster 354,5f.
40) Go ram pa, rNam bshad 127a5f.: Bram zes -
    / tshad ma las don' grub pa yang /
    / tshad ma de nyid las ma yin /
    zhes tshad ma gnyis kyi rang rang gi 'jug yul nges par byed kyang mthun nyid mi bstu la nges par rang stobs kyis 'den par mi byed pas tshad ma'i rjes su skyes pa'i bho dpoy pa zhes bya bse snyi's mthun nyid dang / 'gal 'brel la sogs pa nges par byed pas na tshad ma'i mthun nyid ni gzhon kho na las nges par byed do - zhes zhed do /
    " don (cf. Nyi ma 278,6); don

The half verse quoted is attributed to Šankaranandana's Sambandhaparikṣā (Brep la brtag pa) by Glo bo mkhan chen (cf. Nyi ma 278,5f.), but to be found in neither the Sambandhaparikṣā nor its commentary, the Anusāra (cf. Frauwallner 1934: 263ff. for the text of the verses in the translation of the Anusāra).

The above explanation is also referred to in Ngag dbang chos grags' dPal ster 354,5f.; cf. also Bo dong pañc chen's Rigs snang 483,4–6.
At this time we can only assume that this verse comes from one of the three Prāmāṇyaaparīkṣā- texts written by Śāṅkaraṇandana,141 but the ascription of the theorem to this Indian scholar need not be doubted.

The ascription of the first theorem, that validity is intrinsically ascertained (rang las nges pa), seems to be more problematic because most of the commentators42 think that the opponent here is the same that is adduced later in the third part of the answer (Rang 'grel 101b2f.), namely Gangs pa she'u.43 However, only the theorem as such is shared by Gongs pa she'u and in the present first part of the answer it is evidently introduced as being propounded by the Mīmāṃsā.44 Indeed, Glo bo mkhan chen in his 'Grel bshad (278,4f.) rightly identifies this opponent as Kumārila by referring to ŚV II 47.45

That Sa paṅ here in Rigs gter VIII 54c–55a first refers to the Indian background is more likely for two reasons: firstly the second theorem is unanimously attributed to Śāṅkaraṇandana. And secondly Sa paṅ only starts refuting earlier Tibetan viewpoints, among them also that of Gongs pa she'u, in the third part under the title “refutation of contentions against this (answer of our own).”46

In this third part Sa paṅ concerns himself only with objections to his own treatment as coming from the interpretation of rNgog Lotsāba Blo ldan shes rab's school, the so-called rNgog lugs.47 The two objections as formulated in Rigs gter VIII 57bc and supported by two quotations48 in Rang 'grel 101b2f. and 101b3f. are directed against the possibility of an ascertainment of a cognition's validity by means of another cognition, i.e. against the later part of Sa paṅ's system where he holds that some cognitions are ascertained as valid by others. The two objections differ

41) Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 192. The three Prāmāṇyaaparīkṣā-texts are in verse only. It is however quite possible that Śāṅkaraṇandana has also composed commentaries in prose on these texts of which nothing so far is known. The prose part of Go ram pa's quotations might well belong to the fragment from Śāṅkaraṇandana too.
42) Cf. rNam bshad 127a9–127b2 and gSal byed 57a3f.; Rab gsal 167,2; dPal ster 394,8;
43) Cf. below p. 264.
45) This verse by Kumārila is also reproduced in TS 2811ab and 2812cd, while Kamalālāśa has only the second part (TSP 904,17f.) although Glo bo mkhan chen refers only to the quotations of “Kālaśila”. For the ascription of his theorems to the Mīmāṃsā cf. also TS 2944ab and TSP 958,18.
46) de la rivod pa spang ba, Rang ‘grel 101b2f.
47) The anachronism in this reference to an earlier scholar as attacking Sa paṅ's position can be explained by the fact that Sa paṅ was convinced that his own position was identical with that of Dharmottara. Therefore he felt justified in presenting polemics of earlier Tibetan scholars against Dharmottara as polemics against his own position. But if he deals with Gongs pa she'u only in this last part he cannot be referred to here in the first part, although Kumārila's theorem of intrinsic ascertainment was, no doubt, shared by Gongs pa she'u. This common ground must have thus been the reason for the most commentators took both passages as referring to Gongs pa she'u.
49) The Tibetan scholars intentionally quote quite literally from Indian sources, and deviations are mostly due to a lapse of memory. We can therefore easily distinguish real “quotations” which thus transmit textual “fragments” of the quoted original from mere “reference” when they adduce Indian Buddhists sources. But when they refer to Tibetan sources their manner of quoting is much less rigorous. They often present us with only a report of the meaning or general idea of a statement propounded by a Tibetan predecessor or opponent where the literalness of their report seems to be directly related to the authoritative association with the personality quoted. It is therefore particularly difficult to decide in many cases whether, e.g., a certain term occurring belongs to the terminological usage of the text or person quoted or of the author who quotes. Also, in general, the reliability of such quotations has to be carefully judged in each case (cf. van der Kuijp 1989: 22 for a warning in respect of Shākyamchog ldan’s “paraphrases” of gTsang nag pa).

With a view to this delicate situation I shall apply for practical reasons and with only tentative claim a qualified terminology in reference to such quotations from Tibetan sources. "Q u o t a t i o n" will be used for a text from another source without defining its quality of literalness between the extremes of presenting a real fragment of the source and of being a general paraphrase. If such a quotation for whatever reasons may be taken as a reliable re-statement I shall use the term "F r a g m e n t", and if it is clear that the source is only re-stated in a referring way I shall use the term "P a r a p h r a s e".
in that they base their argument on a reference to the object of the cognitions (yul la brtags nas) and on the essential nature of the cognition (ngo bo la brtags nas) respectively.

Sa pañ’s quotations have been identified by Shākya mchog Idan: both as of (rnNgog Lobsāba, Khyung and others (Rol mtsho 618,6ff.), by Mus rab ’byams pa; both as of Khyung, Gang(s) (pa) she(’u) and others (Rab gsal 169,2ff.), and by Ngag dbang chos grags: both as of Gangs pa she’u and others (dPal ster 354,6ff.)

These identifications can only be taken as tracing the quotations back to the direct pupils of rNog Lobsāba, thus representing a “rNog luugs view-point”. The seeming anachronism here can be explained by Sa pañ’s conviction that his own position is not different to Dharmottara’s. Since the objections adduced by Sa pañ must be understood as originally having been directed against Dharmottara we have to interpret them accordingly. Due to lack of time and in view of the fact that a manuscript of rNog Lobsāba’s commentary on Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścyayatikā has now been found in Beijing I shall not discuss rNog Lobsāba’s critique of Dharmottara and his own view in detail. This must be reserved for a later date. I shall refer to the information now available from fragments and paraphrases only in order to clarify the objections adduced by Sa pañ.

Since it seems clear that Sa pañ refers to two opponents, but at the moment the divergent identifications of the commentators cannot be clarified, I shall for the sake of convenience refer to the first objection as that of Khyung (Rin chen grags) and to the second as that of Gangs pa she’u (Blo gros byang chub).

Both objections share the idea that the validity of a valid cognition can only be ascertained intrinsically and their arguments are formulated against the possibility of an extrinsical ascertainment as assumed to be necessary at least for some cognitions by Dharmottara and Sa pañ.

50) Cf. above note 46.
51) Several relevant quotations from rNog Lobsāba have been identified by van der Kuip (van der Kuip 1983: 58,60 and note 205), and others can be associated with these. rNog Lobsāba contributed to not only the translation of the Pramāṇaviniścyayā and of Dharmottara’s commentary, the ‘Thad Idan, but also wrote a summary (bsDus don) and a subcommentary (rNam bshad) on the latter (Kuip 1983: 34).

These works are mentioned in Bu ston’s catalogue with the titles Tshad ma rnam nges tik dang bcas pa’i don bs dus (Nishioka 3091) and rNam bshad chen po (Nishioka 3092). Van der Kuip tentatively identifies the “tik chen” mentioned by Shākya mchog Idan (dGa’ byed 12,6) with the latter and “dka’ grel” (dGa’ byed 29,3) with the former. Jackson (1987: 128) rightly assumes that the subcommentary “was still available to Shākya-mchog-Idan at the end of the 15th century”.

To our great surprise a work with the title Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka’ gnas rnam bshad of rNog Blo Idan shes rab occurs in a handlist (“Bod yig gi tshad ma’i skor kyi dpe tho”) of pramāṇa-works kept at the Library of the Cultural Palace of National Minorities (Minzu wenhua Gong Tushuguan) in Beijing which was compiled by Prof. Huang Min-xin. According to this list this is a manuscript with three chapters: mNgon sum gyi le’u (46ff.), Rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa’i le’u (45ff.) and gZhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa’i le’u (33ff.)

The title of this manuscript would allow the assumption that this is in fact the “rNam bshad”, but that this rNam bshad is not a subcommentary but only an “explanation of difficult points”. We could thus tentatively identify this “dka’ gnas rnam bshad” with the two titles “tik chen” and “dka’ grel” given by Shākya mchog Idan and take the attribute chen to be meaningful only in relation to the bsDus don work, but not in an absolute sense.

Two longer quotations which I consider as fairly reliable because of their specific terminology can give us a fairly broad knowledge of rNog Lobsāba’s ideas on the ascertainment of validity and of the kind of critique he had on Dharmottara’s views.

The first quotation (quoted by Shākya mchog Idan in Pham byed II 366,6–367,5 and referred to in Pham byed II 374,3 and by Go ram pa in rNam bshad 127b3f.) contains a definition of intrinsical and extrinsical ascertainment, a list of cases of valid cognitions as examples for the two kinds of ascertainment, a short critique of Dharmottara’s division of three kinds of “first perception” and a summary of his own views. The second quotation (in Pham byed II 350,2ff.) states which cognitions can be considered as ascertaining cognitions. Thus these two fragments cover the same ground as Sa pañ’s verses Rigs gter VIII 55d–56c and 56d–57a respectively. Both quotations are said to be taken from the rNam par nges pa’i tīkā of rNog Lobsāba.
Khyung bases his argument on a consideration of the object (yul) of the cognition. The second argument, possibly Gangs pa she'u's, is based on a consideration of the nature (ngo bo) of cognition.

In his answer to these two objections Sa pan makes the point that they both are irrelevant because they confound the functions (byed pa) of perception (mgon sum) and conception (rgog pa) and thereby do not take into consideration that only perceptual cognitions are possible items where the validity is extrinsically determined.

In his clarification Sa pan first recalls the definition of perception: "A perception is a valid cognition only because of (the fact that it is) non-conceptual and non-erroneous", and then offers a statement that can be taken as his formula of defining both intrinsical and extrinsical ascertainment. He says: "If a certain cognition (nges shes) can be produced immediately by force of the perception only, [this perception] is ascertained [as valid] intrinsically; and [a cognition] for which a certain cognition cannot be produced immediately by force of the perception and (therefore) has to be ascertained [as valid] later by another valid cognition is ascertained extrinsically.

To sum up: if Sa pan correctly interprets both objections as being directed against the possibility that one cognition can be ascertained as valid by another cognition, it can be assumed that both Khyung and Gangs pa she'u deviate from rNgog Lotsaba's original opinion as attested by a paraphrase of Skakya mchog ldan. Because there rNgog Lotsaba is said to have clearly distinguished between the ascertainment of the nature of a valid cognition which is only intrinsic and the ascertainment of the valid cognition to be defined which is both intrinsic and extrinsical.

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52) It is presented by Sa pan in the following form: Rang 'grel 101b2f.: nges bya'i tshad ma dang nges byed kyi tshad ma gnyis yul geig na nges byed kyi tshad ma gnyis pa bcad pa'i yul can du 'gyur la yul mi geig na yul gzhans dngos por grub pas / gzhana i lkar dngos por grub - ces zer ba dang / [...]."When both, the valid cognition to be ascertained and the valid cognition ascertaining, have one and the same object, the second valid cognition which ascernants would refer to an object (already) determined (bcad pa). And when they have different objects, another object is established as real [for the later, ascertaining cognition]. How then is the first (gzhana) [i.e. the object of the cognition to be ascertained] established as real?"

This refutation is already attested in G'Tsang nag pa br'Tson 'grus seng ge's Pramāṇavivācinīcāya commentary (bsDus pa 26a7f.: tshad ma rnam ni rang nyid kyi grub pa yin te / blo rnam yul mi geig pas gzhana gyi nges pa mi rang ba'i phyis ro zhes zer ba ni /...).

Van der Kuip in his recent publication changed his earlier calculation of 1171 for the year of G'Tsang nag pa's death (Kuipp 1983: 83) to after ca. 1185 (cf. Kuipp 1989: 2).

Several other paraphrases of his objection, mostly in connection with the second objection are extant, e.g. in Shakyā mchog ldan's Rol mtho 618,6f., Go ram pa's rNam bshad 133a6f., Mus rab 'bya' ngs pa's Rab gsal 169,2f.

53) Rang 'grel 101b1f.: yongs sda'i - gzhana la nges pa thams cad kyi phyang de'i the sgru dogs ma xod na tshad ma nyid ma yin pas gzhana nges su 'ang ni tshad la / sgru 'dogs chod na rang las nges su 'gyur ro / des na gzhana las nges kyi tshad ma gthan mi xad do zhes zer ro // "(A cognition) is certainly not a valid cognition, if the wrong superimpositions (sgru 'dogs) (on its object) are not excluded even by all extrinsical ascertainment at its own time. Therefore no extrinsical ascertainment is possible at all. And when the wrong superimpositions are excluded, (the cognition) would be intrinsically ascertained (as valid). Thus a valid cognition extrinsically ascertained (as valid) is absolutely impossible.""

a Cf. Rol mtho 619,1: rang gi 'jug la sgru 'dogs, rNam bshad 133b3: rang yul la sgru 'dogs.

For other paraphrases cf. Rol mtho 618,7f., rNam bshad 133b3, Rab gsal 169,6f.

54) Rigs gter VIII 57d–58a: de dag gis ni mgon sum dang / riog pa'i byed pa 'dres par zad /

55) Rang 'grel 101b4f.: mgon sum ring brai ma 'khrul ba tsam giis tshad ma 'gro la /..."

56) Such definitions of the two ascernments are later usually given in the introductory sections of the theme (cf. e.g. Go ram pa, rNam bshad 130a4ff., or gSal byed 57b6ff.) and already in the fragment from rNgog Lotsaba referred to above (cf. note 51) they are found at the beginning (cf. Pham byed II 366,6f.). But Sa pan states them only here parenthetically in a refutation.

57) Rang 'grel 101b5f.: mgon sum nyid kyi rang stobs kyi de ma thag tu nges shes 'dren nu nang las nges yin cing / mgon sum gzi rang stobs kyi de ma thag tu nges shes 'dren ma nus pa / phyis tshad ma gzhana gyz gi nges dgos la / gzhana las nges yin pa'..."


59) Pham byed II 367,3–4: tshad ma yin na rang nyid gang la tshad ma yin pa'i don de la rang las nges yin dgos te / tshad ma yin na rang gi gzhed bya bden par nges dgos la de nges pa na rang nyid ma bula bar shugs la nges nus pa'i phyis / "(If a cognition is a valid cognition the ascertainment with regard to that meaning (don) of a valid cognition which is (its) nature must be intrinsical. For, if (a cognition) is a valid cognition, its respective cognitional object must be certain as real, and when this is certain the (cognition's) reliable nature can be ascertained by implication."]
extrinsic.\textsuperscript{60} And Khuyng and Gangs pa she'u would deviate from rNgog insofar as they argue against a possible extrinsic ascertainment seemingly also in case of the latter.

\* \* \*

We shall now investigate the three kinds of perception said by Sa pañ to be extrinsically ascertained (\textit{gzhon las nges}), because it is with regard to this theme that we can best judge to which extent Sa pañ's view can be said to conform with the view of Dharmottara as is assumed e.g. by Shāka mchog Idan.\textsuperscript{61}

Sa pañ does not himself state that he depends on Dharmottara,\textsuperscript{62} but the differentiation and examples he gives point clearly in this direction and Shāka mchog Idan's philological efforts to determine the respective sources are well grounded.\textsuperscript{63}

Sa pañ says: "The first perception (\textit{dang po pa}) and that with a distracted mind (\textit{yid ma gdad po}) and that (perception) which is affected by grounds for error (\textit{'khrul ba'i rgyu mtshan gyis zin po}) are extrinsically ascertained (as valid)."\textsuperscript{64}

These terms and their mutual systematic relation need to be clarified first in their usage by Sa pañ and then we try to relate Sa pañ's differentiations to their alleged source, Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaśākā. In this Shāka mchog Idan's exegetical ideas will be of considerable help because he seems to have been the first who tried to point out the relevant passages in Dharmottara for this whole system with great care and precision.

1) \textit{dang po pa}, "the first", is a perception of something for the first time. The term is not attested so far in Indian sources but was already used by rNgog Lotsāba in his description of Dharmottara's classifications.\textsuperscript{65}

Sa pañ does not offer a definition\textsuperscript{66} of this first perception, but gives two clear examples (\textit{dper brjod na}): a perception of this kind is the case when the appearance of the object (\textit{snang ba}) is extrinsically ascertained, but the share of reality (\textit{bden pa'i cha}) in this appearance is extrinsically ascertained. E.g., when the form of something shining red from afar (\textit{rgyang ring po nas dmak 'bar ba'i rnam pa}) is extrinsically ascertained, the doubt (\textit{the tshom za ba}) whether this is fire real or merely a wrong superimposition (\textit{sgro btags}) like an illusion or a magical creation is settled extrinsically.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{60} Pham byed II 367.4–5: \textit{de lla na yang thad ma yin pa'i tha snyad rang las nges po dang / gzhon las nges pa gyis yin no i}/["The term (\textit{tha snyad}) of a valid cognition is, nevertheless, both, intrinsically and extrinsically ascertained."

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. also Shāka mchog Idan's short summary of this position in Pham byed II 374.3: \textit{mdor na' mtshan bya tshad ma' thi sthn la lla na rang nges gzhon nges su 'jog cing / mtshan nyid mi bslu ba la lla te rang nges kyis khya par bsed pa Lo chen gyi lugs /}

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. Pham byed II 354.7, 374.2f. and dGa' byed 41.3 (translated in van der Kuij 1983: 115).

\textsuperscript{63} Already noted in van der Kuij 1983: note 346.

\textsuperscript{64} It will be also necessary to pursue the indications of Go ram pa, who adduces not only Dharmottara, but also Devendrabuddhi and Sākyamati in his attempt to pin down the Indian sources of these differentiations (cf. rNam bshad 132b3–135a6). But this will be done on another occasion, when the Indian development can be more fully elaborated than is possible at this time.

\textsuperscript{65} Rang 'grel 100b6: \textit{mgon sum dang po pa dang yid ma gdad pa dang / 'khrul ba'i rgyu mtshan gyis zin pa gsum po gzhon las nges par byed do i}/; cf. Rigs gter VIII 56bc (quoted above, note 34).

\textsuperscript{66} Pham byed II 366.1f.; rNgog uses the term, however, slightly differently to Sa pañ in that it serves as a general term for the three perceptions doubtful with regard to \textit{don yod pa tsa'm}, or to \textit{spyi yod par nges kyang khya par} or \textit{snang ba nyid}, while with Sa pañ it would refer only to the first two cases.

\textsuperscript{67} For a definition from the Sa skya tradition cf. Go ram pa's rNam bshad 131a5f.: \textit{dang po pa ni dangos po 'go' zngig gi rigs 'dra snagar ma mthong ba gser du mthong ba ste / ba men dang po mthong ba'i mgon sum lla bu'i //} ["A new perception of a kind of thing that has not been perceived before, e.g. a perception of (somebody) seeing a Gyal for the first time."] Cf. dPal ster 367.1.

\textsuperscript{60} Pham byed II 367.4–5: \textit{de lla na yang thad ma yin pa'i tha snyad rang las nges po dang / gzhon las nges pa gyis yin no i}/["The term (\textit{tha snyad}) of a valid cognition is, nevertheless, both, intrinsically and extrinsically ascertained."

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\textsuperscript{67} For a definition from the Sa skya tradition cf. Go ram pa's rNam bshad 131a5f.: \textit{dang po pa ni dangos po 'go' zngig gi rigs 'dra snagar ma mthong ba gser du mthong ba ste / ba men dang po mthong ba'i mgon sum lla bu'i //} ["A new perception of a kind of thing that has not been perceived before, e.g. a perception of (somebody) seeing a Gyal for the first time."] Cf. dPal ster 367.1.
And the second case of a first perception of this kind is when the general aspect (spyi) of something with branches appearing afar is intrinsically ascertained, but the specific aspect (bye brag), e.g. that it is a Śīṃśapā-tree is ascertained extrinsically.\(^{68}\)

Both cases are meant as cases of “first perceptions” (dang po pa), for Sa paṅ connects the examples with the disjunctive particle “or” (’am).

The original source of these two cases of “first perception” has been found by Shākya mchog Idan in Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā\(^{69}\) as a part of Dharmottara’s exposition of extrinsically ascertained cognitions.\(^{70}\)

Dharmottara explains the first case as a cognition with an object determined as existent in its appearance but doubtful with regard to the necessarily connected thing: is that fire real or not?\(^{71}\)

And the second case is more elaborately explained by Dharmottara, because he also considers the ascertainment of general aspects other than the one already intrinsically ascertained.\(^{72}\)

Although it is clear therefore that Sa paṅ takes these cases from Dharmottara, the systematic aspect of his subsuming them under the category “first perception” is not extant in Dharmottara’s exposition. It is however preformed by rNgog Lotsāba’s arrangement of three cases of “first perception”,\(^{73}\) although rNgog’s third case is treated differently by Sa paṅ.

This third case of “first perception” in rNgog Lotsāba’s description of Dharmottara’s explanation is the case of a perception which is doubtful with regard to the appearance itself (snyang ba nyid), i.e. when it is not clear that something has actually appeared in one’s perception.

Sa paṅ evidently refers only to the first two cases as cases of “first perception” and explains the third case in another way, namely by splitting it up into two kinds, which he calls yid ma gtad pa and khrul rgyu can respectively.\(^{74}\)

Although already rNgog Lotsāba distinguishes three kinds of “first perception” according to Dharmottara\(^{75}\) and refuses the third kind,\(^{76}\) and others like Phywa pa Choś kyi seng ge\(^{77}\) and Shākya mchog Idan also clearly attest to such a division for Dharmottara, I am unable to find a threefold division of that kind in either Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā or his other works, that is particularly the two Pramāṇapaṭikā-essays.

Dharmottara seems rather to be strict about the fact that a doubt (sāṃśaya) only relates to the later determining function of a perception\(^{79}\) and that the first function of perception, determination of the appearance of an object, cannot be impeded by a doubt at all.\(^{80}\) He even offers a quotation from Dharmakīrti to this effect.\(^{81}\)

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\(^{68}\) Rang ’grel 101a1f.: rgyang rang po na yul ’dabs dang Idan pa snyang ba na / spyi shing sdom la b lsts las sgrub ’dogs chos nas’ rang las nges shing bye brag sha pa la rtags bral na khrul ba yin pas mong sum tshad ma yin yang sha pa ’i ldog pa la sgra ’dogs ma chod pas gshan las nges so //

\(^{69}\) Cf. Pham byed II 349,6f.

\(^{70}\) PVinTd(a) 14,16–18,5.

\(^{71}\) PVinTd(a) 16,2–4: goa zhi god par zhen par byas pa yul can ci me ’di bden nam ’on te ma yin zhes med na mi byung bar the shom za ba ’di la yang /

\(^{72}\) Cf. PVinTd(a) 16,5–18,5, where Sa paṅ’s second case corresponds only to PVinTd(a) 16,5–17,14.

\(^{73}\) Cf. above note 65.

\(^{74}\) Cf. Pham byed II 349,7f. and 353,2ff.

\(^{75}\) Cf. above note 65.

\(^{76}\) Cf. Pham byed II 367,2f.

\(^{77}\) Cf. his polemics against Dharmottara in the fragment of Pham byed II 367,5–370,3 (368,2 and 368,4f.).

\(^{78}\) In his Rol mtha’ 616,6f. he even quotes a passage from Dharmottara: slob dpon Chos mchog ni / gshan las nges kyi tshad ma gsum ste / snyang ba rang las nges shing bden pa gshan las nges pa dang / spyi shing las nges shing kh Yad par gshan las nges pa dang / snyang ba yid kyang gshan las nges dgos pa dang gsum mo // zhes gsum ba... This quotation may be only a summarizing paraphrase, but I can find neither a text of this kind in Dharmottara’s works nor a similar statement.

\(^{79}\) Cf. PVinTd(a) 18,8ff.

\(^{80}\) Cf. PVinTd(a) 18,14ff.

\(^{81}\) Cf. PVinTd(a) 18,12ff.; this quotation, said to be from the Pramāṇavārttika, has not been identified so far, but a similar passage is to be found in PVSV 31,21–23 (cf. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 87, note 67).
Thus it is highly questionable whether this third kind of “first perception” where the appearance itself (snang ba nyid) is doubtful has been proposed by Dharmottara at all.

We have to wait until rNgoṅ Lotsāba’s commentary is available in order to see how he extracts such a threefold division from Dharmottara’s work. For the time being we must be content with the assumption that Sa paṅ follows rNgoṅ Lotsāba in this respect and presents the following two categories of extrinsically ascertained perceptions with the purpose not only of defending Dharmottara but also of giving a complete and reasoned presentation of his alleged opinion.

2) yid ma gtsal pa, “(perception) with distracted mind”, is a case of perception where the appearance itself (snang ba rang nyid) is ascertained extrinsically.

Again Sa paṅ does not give a definition but only an example: “If one doubts when somewhere fire appears ‘Did I have a cognition of fire appearing or not?’, the sense-cognition which cannot be ascertained by the [following] mental cognition (yid shes) is extrinsically ascertained, although it is nonconceptual (and) nonerroneous (and) therefore a valid cognition.”

In accordance to what I have said above with regard to the difficulty of tracing the idea of a doubtful appearance (snang ba nyid) in Dharmottara it is not astonishing that this perception under distraction can also not be found in Dharmottara’s work. On the contrary, a small remark in Dharmottara’s second Prāmāṇyaparikṣā propounds the very opposite of Sa paṅ’s assumption. For Dharmottara says in an answer that a doubt has the form “is this thing which appears in the perception real or not?” but not the form “does it appear in the perception or not?”

3) khrul rgyu can, “(perception) with grounds for error”, or khrul ba’s rgyu mtshan gyis zin pa, “(perception) affected by grounds for error.”

In this case Sa paṅ gives neither a definition nor an example. But this perception is sufficiently clear. It is the case of an erroneous perception. Go ram pa’s definition may serve as an explanation: “Although (this cognition) has really arisen on the basis of the three conditions, an ascertainment cannot be brought about by its own force, because some external (or) internal ground for error is impeding.”

In other words Sa paṅ distinguishes here erroneous sense-perceptions as a second kind of appearance where the appearance is doubtful. There is however a clear statement by Dharmottara to the fact that an erroneous sense-perception – and he gives an example of a perception of sunrays as water – is not a valid cognition.

82) I cannot even find a definition later, but for other examples cf. Go ram pa, rNam bshad 131a6f.: rig pa ’nyiṅ du bduṣ pa’i gnas stobs kyis rgyungs ’dzins dbang mngon la bu’o // "E.g. a sense perception which grasps a form, when the mind (rtog=-yid) is withdrawn."
83) Cf. also 132a2 and Pham byed 11 353,3ff.; dPal ster 367,1.
84) Rang ’grel 101a3f.: yang snang ba rang nyid kvang gzhan las nges pa ’mer na ’go’i žig tu me snang ba na / kho bo na me snang ba’i, blo griz byung ngam ma byung shes the thom sa ba na dbang shes rtog bral ma ’khrul pa tshad ma yin yin glad kyi stobs kho’i rgyu mtshan gyis zin pa
85) nus pa’i gtsal la nges pa byed pa’o //
86) “ma om. D.
87) 132a2f.: gal te b]int cag mngon sum la the thom skyes so che na bden te / mngon sum la snang ba’i don ’di yang dag pa yin nam ’on te ma yin snyam du the thom z’o’o // ’di snang ngam mi snang snyam du ni ma yin te /
88) Rang ’grel 100b6.
89) rNyen gsum, i.e. alambana-, adhipati-, samanantaraprataya.
90) rNam bshad 131a6f.: rNyen gsum las dangs su skyes kvang phyi nang gi ’khrul rgyu ’go’i žig gi sgegs byed pas ngas pa’i stobs kho’i ’dren ni nus pa’i steb //, also Pham byed 353,3ff. for further subdivisions and examples dPal ster 367,1f.
91) Cf. VinT(a) 15,12–16. This evident deviation from Dharmottara in Sa paṅ’s interpretation of cognitions where the appearance itself needs extrinsical ascertainment is corroborated by his polemics against an inclusion of such cognitions among the list of invalid cognitions (tshad min). For in the second chapter of his Rigs gter he refutes the theory of Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge (cf. the paraphrase in rNam bshad 351b1ff.) who lists a cognition uncertain with regard to its appearance (snang la ma nges pa) as a distinct kind of cognition (cf. Rang ’grel 39a6ff.) and distinguishes three subdivisions: yul rnam la ma ngas pa / tshad ma min na mngon sum kun // tshad ma min ’gyur mngon sum la // nges pa nyid ni bkag phyir ro / Rigs gter II 9c–10b). In other words, Sa paṅ does not follow Phywa pa in classifying the two cognitions yid ma gtsal pa and ’khrul rgyu can as invalid cognitions (cf. rNam bshad 38b1ff.).
It seems that Go ram pa tries to cover this curious discrepancy. For after first quoting Devendarbuddhi and Śākyamati he quotes Dharmottara as a source first for the intrinsically ascertained cognitions (PVīnṬ(a) 13.3f. and 13.5–7 in rNam bshad 133a3f.) and then for the extrinsically ascertained ones he paraphrases the beginning of PVīnṬ(a) 14.16f.: “Some (cognitions) are only extrinsically (ascertained): (perception) with grounds for error and...” 89) He then states that Rigs gter VIII 55d–57a, the verses with the list of cognitions, are in accordance with these passages. The second reference is, however, quite problematic, because in this form it cannot be traced to the context in the PVīnṬ referred to.

Shākya mchog Idan is much more cautious in this connection. He refers to the same passage as Go ram pa, literally quoting the beginning of Dharmottaratas text PVīnṬ(a) 14.16f., continues to say that Dharmottara has differentiated the cases of reality (bden pa) and the specific (khyad par) as extrinsically ascertained, and then states that Dharmottara certainly did not mention the appearance itself (snang ba nyid) as extrinsically ascertained in this context (shabs der ma gsungs mod). After that he asks for a careful investigation of whether Dharmottara clearly has such a distinction in mind. And he ends this remark with the note that the two kinds of yid ma gtad pa and ’khrul rgyu can are in this place assumed to be valid cognitions in Sa pañ’s Rigs gter. 90)

Again, when Shākya mchog Idan later explains the example of a perception of sunrays as water, the second kind of his own subdivision of a ’khrul rgyu can-perception of this kind91), he notes that this is not in accordance with Dharmottara and gives an identifiable quotation from the ’Thad Idan: “Since the sunrays are not ascertained in (their) nature, although the individual entity (rang gi mthstan nyid) of the sunrays has been grasped, (this cognition) is not a perception of the sunrays. In this way other cases too are to be understood.” 92)

Supported by Shākya mchog Idan’s careful exegetical observations we may therefore safely conclude that Sa pañ himself conceived the idea to arrange these last two categories in this place among the valid cognitions in order to give some substantiation to the third kind of extrinsically ascertained perception, which must have been assumed to be held by Dharmottara by Sa pañ’s predecessors as well as by himself.

The terms and their definitions, however, are not his own invention but are taken from Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge’s list of kinds of cognitions as known from paraphrases by Go ram pa and Shākya mchog Idan.93)

A discussion of the earlier history of these terms in Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge would exceed the limit of this paper, but their inclusion among the kinds of valid cognitions extrinsically ascertained evidently was Sa pañ’s way of defending Dharmottara’s position against the polemics of rNgog Lotsāwa and Phywa pa. For the time being, however, it must also be stated that this seems to be a

89) RNam bshad 133a4f.: la la ni gzhann kho na las 'gyur te / 'khrul rgyu can dang zhes dang / ...
90) Pham byed II 349.6–350.1: yang ji skad du / Chos mchog las / la la ni don med na mi 'byung ba gzhann las (; la) nges par byed do // zhes mthsham sbyar nas bden pa gzhann las nges dang / khyad par gzhann las nges gnyis gsal bar gsungs shing / snang ba nyid kyang gzhann las nges pa shabs der ma gsungs mod / slob dpon Chos mchog 'di mzung sun du bshe ld ma bshe rd ma par dpyad dgos pa yin no // Rigs pa'i gter las ni 'di la yid ma gtad dang 'khrul rgyu can gnyis su phye nas gnyis ka mzung sun gyi sbar bshe pa yin no //
91) Pham byed II 354.5f.
92) Pham byed II 354.6f.: ji skad du / 'Thad Idan las / smig rgyu'i rang gi mthtan nyid bzsong du xin kyang smig rgyu rang bzhin du ma nges pa'i phyur / smig rgyu la mzung sun min te nma pa de la bu gzhann dag kyang shes par bya' ches gsungs nga // This is a quotation of PVīnṬ 15a5f. (cf. also PPar I 2266b–8; PPar II 242bs2; with fragmentary Sanskrit-materials in TBV 471.12 and TSP 946.22f.); for remarks in the same sense cf. PVīnṬ(a) 11,19–12,5.
93) Cf. rNam bshad 35b1ff., particularly 36a2ff. for a definition of snang la ma nges pa'i blo and its three kinds yul nma pa mi gyal ba (a perception where the object of the perception is of indistinct appearance), yid ma gtad pa (a perception with distracted mind) and ’khrul pa'i rgyu mthshan gnyis zin pa (a perception affected by grounds for error). The examples given for the second and third kind as probably conceived by Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge himself are: rtog pa zhang du bsdus pa'i gnas shabs kyi gsungs ldan gyi mig shes (rNam bshad 35b4), and yid rña phyes la dangdul 'khrul pa'i gnas shabs kyi rña phyes 'ldzin pa'i mig shes (rNam bshad 35b4).

The whole paraphrase of Phywa pa’s list of cognitions has already been interpreted, however with some gross misunderstandings, by van der Kuip in his paper of 1978 (cf. note 3 above), 361ff.
For Shākya mchog Idan’s presentation cf. Pham byed II 74,3–76,2.
case of overinterpretation, since Dharmottara does not really hold the category he is supposed to have held.

Although we seem to be forced by these textual facts to "accuse" Sa pan of an overinterpretation of Dharmottara when he followed this curious interpretation of his predecessors, I think we can also suggest a good reason for this overinterpretation that has nothing to do with exegetical correctness in interpreting an acceptable Indian authority. This reason can be found, I think, in an attempt at systematical completeness, i.e. completeness of the list of possible items relevant under the category of "cognitions which are extrinsically ascertained".

I cannot elaborate this point here, but it seems to me that one of the specific characteristics of Tibetans in their theoretical disciplines is a natural desire towards a complete covering of an investigated area or theme. Thus I would dare to say – as an hypothetical afterthought – that to Sa pan it seemed natural that rNgog Lotsāba's reference to the case where "appearance itself" is doubtful as having been taught by Dharmottara was not suspicious as such. Since – for completeness' sake – it would have been a well acceptable item on the list, and once recognized, isolated and labelled – for whatever reasons that we do not yet know – it would have been very odd not to find it in Dharmottara's writings at all.

This concludes my brief attempt to look into a corollary of the great theme of the definition of a valid cognition and the early development of its differentiation. In spite of the fragmentary material still available for the early period of Tibetan epistemology, the efforts of the scholars involved to interpret the Indian heritage and at the same time to shape systematical forms with considerable creativity are fascinating and impressive. The study of these developments of the various theoretical themes and problems of the Buddhist epistemological tradition proves to be a direct path to the very heart of Tibetan intellectual culture.
Abbreviations

1. Indian Sources

TBV  

TBh¹  

TBh²  

TS  

TSP  
Tattvasaṅgrahapaṇjikā (Kamalāśīla): cf. TS

PPar II  

PāV  

_PV  
[The sequence of chapters in Miyasaka for my sequence I, II, III is III, I, II].

PVV  

PVSV  

PVInṬ(a)  

SV  

2. Tibetan Sources

(CW  
“Collected Works”)

Kun bzung  
gSer mdog Paṇ chen Shākya mchog Idan, rGyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rnam bshad kun bzung chos kyi rol mtsho. CW 18, Thimphu 1975, 189ff.

dGa’ byed  
---, Tshad ma’i mdo dang bstan bcos kyi shing rta’i srol rnam s ji ltar ’byung ba’i tshul gtam du bya ba nyin mor byed pa’i snang bas dpyod ldan mtha’ dag dga’ bar byed pa. CW 19, Thimphu 1975, 1ff.

dGongs pa rab gsal  
rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam nges tīk chen dgongs pa rab gsal. CW 7, New Delhi 1982, 3ff.

dGongs gsal  
Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa, rGyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ’grel dgongs pa rab gsal. CW 1, Mundgod 1985, 53ff.

’Jug sgo  
Tsung kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, sDe bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel. Sarnath 1969.

Nyi ma  
Glo ba mkhan chen bSod nams lhun grub, sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs ’grel tshad ma rig-sū pa’i gter gyi ’grel pa’i rnam bshad rig lam gsal ba’i nyi ma. CW 2, Dehradun, 1ff.

Thar lam gsal byed  
rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa. CW 6, New Delhi 1982, 3ff.

bsDus pa  
gTsang nag pa brTson ’grus seng ge, Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ti ka legs bshad bs dus pa. (Otani University Tibetan Works Series 2) Kyoto 1989.

rNam bshad  
Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun rab gsal. CW in: SB 12, Tokyo 1969, No. 41.

Nishioka  

*Pham byed* 11
gSer mdog Pan chen Shākyā mchog ldan, *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa'i khor los lugs ngan pham byed ces bya ba'i bstan bcos sqyal chub.* CW 10, Thimphu 1975, 1ff.

*Blo rigs*
'Jam dpal bsam 'phel, *Blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyer mkha kun 'dus blo gsal mig 'byed.* In: Rigs lam sgo brgya 'byed pa'i 'phrul gyi kde mig dang po. Mundgod 1979.

*Blo rigs*

*Blo rigs*
Phur lcogs Yong's 'dzin rdo rje chang, *Tshad ma'i gzhang don 'byed pa'ibsdus grwa'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde mig ces bya ba las rigs lam che ba yul yul can dang blo rig gi rnam par bshad pa.* In: Textbooks of Se-ra Monastery, ed. Tshulkrim-Kelsang and Shunzō Onoda. Kyoto 1985, 46ff.

*Blo rigs*
'A kya yongs 'dzin dByang can dgra ba'i blo gros, *Blo rigs kyi sdem tshig blang dor gsal ba'i me long.* CW 1, New Delhi 1971, 515ff.

*Mun sel*
mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po, *Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel.* Beijing 1984.

*’Od zer*
Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, *rgyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rnam par bshad pa kun tu bzang po'i 'od zer.* CW in: SB 11, Tokyo 1969, No. 38.

*Rang ’grel*
Sa skyā Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang ’grel.* CW in: SB 5, Tokyo 1969, No. 20 (=SB); *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi rtsa dang rang ’grel.* Dehradun 1985 (= D).

*Rab gsal*
Mus rab 'byams pa Thugs rje dpal bzang, *Tshad ma rig's pa'i gter gyi rnam par bshad pa rigs lam rab tu gsal ba'i nya ma.* In: Kun mkhyen Go bo rab 'byams pa bSod nams seng ge'i bka' 'bum kha skong, pha. Dehradun 1985.

*Rigs rgyan*
dGe 'dun grub pa, *Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan.* CW 4, Gangtok 1979, 97ff.

*Rigs gter*

*Rigs snang*

*Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*
mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po, *rgyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho.* CW 10, 620ff.; 11, 3ff. New Delhi 1980.

*Rigs mdzod*
'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seng ge, *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa rigs pa'i mdzod.* 2 Vols., Delhi 1982.

*Rol mtsho*
gSer mdog Pan chen Shākyā mchog ldan, *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rnam par bshad pa sde bdun ngag gi rol mtsho.* CW 19, Thimphu 1975, 447ff.

*SB*

gSal byed
Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, sDe bdun mdo dang bcos pa'i dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa.* CW in: SB 11, Tokyo 1969, No.40.

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