EMENDATION OF SOME VERSES IN BHARTHRHARI’S TRIKĀṆḌI*

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1.1 Anyone who has tried to edit an ancient or medieval text systematically is usually aware that collection of manuscripts, preparing a genealogy or stemma codicum, collation of relevant manuscripts, and evaluation of available readings amount only to aparā vidyā or primary textual criticism. A good editor must go beyond even these demanding and time-consuming procedures. After he has proceeded as far as the manuscripts will take him, he must at least try to recover what is not in the manuscripts. Such secondary textual criticism becomes necessary in the case of ancient and medieval works mainly because we can rarely go back all the way to the autograph or the author’s own copy. Almost always even the oldest or most reliable of available manuscripts is considerably removed from the original copy. It has usually a long line of predecessors and is seldom better than, say, an inattentively prepared press copy of a modern author.

1.2 As is evident from many of my earlier publications, I have been engaged in a textual study of the works of Bhartṛhari and his ancient commentators for the last few years. In the present paper, I shall confine myself to only one work from that complex of works and to only one aspect of secondary textual criticism; I shall concentrate on the kārikā or main verse text of the Trikāṇḍī (or Vākyapadiya) from the point

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* This paper is a revised version of a part of the paper I read in the South Asia section of the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, which met in Mexico City in August 1976. I wish to express my thanks to all the individuals because of whose cooperation it became possible for me to study the Trikāṇḍī (or Vākyapadiya) kārikā text in its three traditions: (a) Kārikā manuscripts, (b) Vṛtti mss., and (c) Tīkā mss. Professor Rau’s generosity in allowing me free access to the typescript of his edition of the kārikās (1977) helped me considerably in finalising my conclusions at an early date. I am grateful to him also for providing several other study facilities. The findings contained in the paper were made in 1973—74 when I was a research fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. They were given the present form while I was engaged in Trikāṇḍī research as a grantee of the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute.
of view of emendation. A further restriction I shall observe is that I shall not discuss any acceptable emendation that is somehow present in the printed texts and manuscripts pertaining to the Trikāṇḍi. In the beginning of my study, I thought of many more emendations than I present below. Gradually I discovered that some of the readings I preferred were available in isolated manuscripts (e.g. akṣyādināṁ in the place of akṣādināṁ in 2.409)¹, or were implicit in the commentaries of the Trikāṇḍi (e.g. nirbhāgam in the place of nirbhāge in 3.11.14), or could be attested in works quoting the Trikāṇḍi (e.g. ākhyātam śabda-samghāto in the place of ākhyāta-śabdaḥ samghāto in 2.1 as can be gathered from Pārthasārathi-miśra, Nyāya-ratnākara p. 860), or had been suggested by earlier editors (e.g. manvate in the place of manyate in 2.121 as is the suggestion in Raghunātha Sharmā’s Ambākartri). Here I shall refrain from discussing all such cases. Emendations based entirely on different splitting and different punctuation of the text matter will also be left out of consideration. They amount to correction of previous editions, not necessarily of the more basic manuscripts. Anyone wishing to know them should go through Professor Wilhelm Rau’s (1977) edition of the kārikā text, in which the editor has kindly recorded my preferences in sentence segmentation implicitly in some instances (e.g. 2.144c, 2.241c, 3.1.28b, 3.14.271ab, and 3.14.307b) and explicitly with the abbreviation “AA” in some other (e.g. under 1.28d, 2.20a).

2.1 It is well-known in Mīmāṁsā that a person’s eligibility to perform a certain rite depends on three factors: (a) He must have desire to perform the particular rite. (b) He must be capable of performing what he desires. (c) He must not have been declared ineligible by the scriptures for the specific sphere of action. Verse 2.79, occurring in a group of verses devoted to listing some mīmāṁsā-nyāyas, seeks to state this relatively simple observation in Mīmāṁsā:² arhitvām³ atra⁴ sāmarthyam asminn

¹ The numbering of Trikāṇḍi verses varies considerably in the available editions. I follow Rau’s (1977) enumeration.
² Nonsensical variant readings have been ignored in the following lines. Readings that are grammatical in themselves (and to that extent sensible) are specified in the footnotes irrespective of their syntactic and metrical acceptability. Their sources and their relative worth according to the objective criteria of textual criticism will be known from my proposed edition of the Trikāṇḍi. Any inclusion in the present paper of that mass of information would have made some of my arguments even more difficult to follow.
³ v. 1. arhitvād.
⁴ v. 1. asya.
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In the form known at present, this verse succeeds in making the intended statement as far as the quarters (pādas) ‘a’, ‘c’, and ‘d’ are concerned. It is only quarter ‘b’, syntactically related to sāmartyam of the preceding quarter, that does not make any contextually acceptable sense. This is true irrespective of the reading one adopts: sāmartyam asmin artho/arthe/arthi nibadhyate/nibhidyate/nā bhidyate/na vidyate. Therefore, I would like to suggest that ‘b’ should be read as: asminn arthini vidyate. There is only a slight departure from manuscripts in reading thus. We are required to assume that artho/arthe/arthi ni/na is a corruption of arthini, which is in fact attested in one of the versions of the kārikā manuscripts (see Rau 1977:64). The other assumption implicit in the emendation, namely that bhidyate resulted from vidyate, is justified by the textual evidence available for 2.136 (see 2.4 below), 3.6.13 (vidhiyate for ṛbhidhiyate), 3.14.417 (ṛbhāvanā for ṛvāsanā), and 3.14.536 (ṛbhidhāne for vidhāne). As for the meaning expressed by the suggested reading, it is easy to see that a remark like sāmartyam asminn arthini vidyate (‘This person seeking (to perform the specific rite) has [the necessary] capability’) is both contextually proper and agreeable to the positive tone of quarters ‘a’ and ‘c’.

2.2 Ever since reading Trīkāṇḍī 2.91 (aprasiddham tu yad bhāgam adṛṣṭam anupāsyati | tāvat tu asamvidam mūḍhah sarvatra pratipadyate ||) for the first time, I have been puzzled by its wording. At first I thought that what I suspected to be an error existed only in the printed editions — that the manuscripts would dissolve my problem. However, when I consulted the manuscripts, my hope gradually evaporated. Choice existed only between yam and yat and between tāvatī and tāvat tu. But these were not the words that gave rise to the problem. Nor did they help in solving the problem by precisely determining what the other words of the verse should be. From all indications the problem was to be located in the words asamvidam ‘non-cognition, non-awareness’, sarvatra ‘everywhere, in the whole’ and pratipadyate ‘comes to, com-

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5 v. l. arthe, arthi.
6 v. l. na vidyate, nibhidyate, nibadhyate.
7 As far as I know, Nandi-nāgari is the only script in which v and bh are so close as to cause confusion. Such a confusion is likely, although not equally likely, also in old Telugu and modern Udiya. There is no evidence that the former was used to transmit the Trīkāṇḍī text. The use of the latter is ruled out by the very age of the manuscripts concerned.
8 v. l. yam.
9 v. l. tāvatī.
prehends, thinks'. The context is this: Bhartṛhari is an advocate of the indivisible sentence-meaning theory. On the strength of several insightful observations, he argues that, although one can, and one does, divide a sentence into certain constituents while engaged in linguistic analysis, on the level of cognition and actual communication a sentence or a sentence-meaning is a whole — something that transcends division. To bolster this thesis, Bhartṛhari states and refutes almost all the objections one can think of. One apparently powerful objection runs thus: Sometimes a person hears a sentence like vanāt pika āniyatām ‘Bring a cuckoo from the forest’. It so happens that he does not know the meaning of the word pika. Hence he says, ‘I understand vanāt and āniyatām, but what does pika mean?’ Now, is such a question possible if the sentence were an undivided whole? Obviously, the person involved understands the meanings of vanāt, āniyatām, and pika separately. In other words, there are divisions in sentence-meaning and hence in the sentence. Bhartṛhari counters this objection by maintaining that actually the person concerned did not understand the whole sentence, although his question gives us the impression that he did not understand only a part thereof. Someone who does not know what a wild bull is and who sees a wild bull for the first time actually does not cognise the entire creature, although it may seem to him at a later moment — on reflection — that a certain part was familiar and a certain other part was previously unseen\(^\text{10}\). Now, it is such a statement that verse 2.91 should contextually contain. However, one cannot derive any such statement from it unless one switches its words around in a very unnatural way or supplies certain crucial expressions that a careful author like Bhartṛhari is not likely to have left out. If one accepts the reading tāvat tu, the natural meaning of the second half is: ‘Until then the dull-witted one accepts non-cognition with respect to the whole.’ On the other hand, if one accepts the reading tāvati, the natural meaning of the second half is: ‘The dull-witted one accepts non-cognition of that much (of a part) as non-cognition of the whole.’ Both the meanings are contrary to the context, as what the dull-witted one does in Bhartṛhari’s view is exactly the opposite; although he has not comprehended the entire object, he thinks he has comprehended a part thereof; he accepts non-cognition in part, whereas, in Bhartṛhari’s view, he should accept

\(^{10}\) What happens at the first moment of the encounter is relevant in understanding the grammarian’s position, not what happens in the later stage of introspection, since the grammarian does not deny that sentence and sentence-meaning are divisible on the level of analysis.
it in totality. The commentator\textsuperscript{11} senses this difficulty and implicitly construes the line as $mūḍhāḥ tu tāvat sarvatra asaṃvidam pratipadyate to derive the meaning: ‘But (tu), on the other hand (tāvat = punah), the dull-witted one (mūḍhāḥ), in truth, comes to non-cognition (i. e. does not cognise) with respect to the whole’\textsuperscript{12} But this construal is extremely forced. It ignores the relative yat or yam of the preceding half. It arbitrarily tears asaṃvidam from tāvat tu or tāvati, and places it between sarvatra and pratipadyate. It cannot stand unless the commentator writes a sentence in between telling us what the reality is (paramārthatāh). It overlooks the fact that asaṃvidam pratipadyate is a strange construction, since what it should contextually convey can be stated simply by na pratipadyate ‘does not cognise’\textsuperscript{13}.

2.3 The considerations noted above led me to believe that textual damage had taken place and that the commentator of the second book of the Trikāṇḍi had simply offered a desperate interpretation out of his strict adherence to manuscript readings (sthitasya gatiḥ cintaniyā). I was confirmed in my belief when I chanced upon Bhoja’s (Śrīgāra-prakāśa vol. II, p. 333) citation of the verse: aprasiddham tu yam bhāgam adṛṣṭam anupaśyati || sarvatrasaṃvidam mūḍhas tāvati pratipadyate.|| From the fact that Bhoja transposes the words tāvati and sarvatra it is clear that he felt the same contextual and syntactic difficulty as I did. Of course, this does not mean that I must accept Bhoja’s solution. Instead of effecting a dainty little emendation, Bhoja almost rewrites the second half of the verse; he acts like a mechanic who prefers replacement of parts to repairing them. A less radical solution is called for and is possible. The problematic verse should be read as: aprasiddham tu

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\footnotetext{11} The commentary (Ṭīkā) to the second book (Vākyā-kāṇḍa) of the Trikāṇḍi is generally ascribed to Puṇyaratja. In a 1974 article I have argued that it should be ascribed to Helāraja.
\footnotetext{12} Ītikā: tatra ca gavyādayau bhāgam aprasiddham adṛṣṭam aniścitam anupaśyati mūḍhāḥ. paramārthatas tu saṃvīt tasya sarvatra nirvibhāge tasmin kutaścit kāraṇam notpannā. sarvatrāyam asaṃvidam [→ asaṃvidam?] tāvat punah pratipadyata iti.
\footnotetext{13} The phrase asaṃvidam pratipadyate is plausible if the intended sense is ‘advocates non-cognition, holds non-cognition to be the case.’ But then one would be speaking of a theoretician, of someone consciously putting forward a view, not of a common man as mūḍha indicates. In the obviously related preceding verse, pratipadyate is used to express what the person perceiving a wild bull thinks, not what deliberate judgement or view he develops.
\end{footnotes}
yad bhāgam adṛṣṭam anupakṛtyati | tāvat tv āsāṃvidan14 mūḍhaḥ sarvam na pratipade |. || It is then to be understood thus: 'As he regards the not-well-known part as uncomprehended, the dull-witted one, not cognising that much, to the contrary (actually, in fact), does not comprehend the whole'. In this interpretation, the words of the original are not forced out of their natural affiliations, in order not to violate the context. All that one is required to suppose is that āsāṃvidan mūḍhaḥ is a corruption of āsāṃvidan mūḍhaḥ (see fn. 14) and that sarvatra is a corruption of sarvam na. Both the corruptions are highly probable in older Sanskrit manuscripts, in which the words of a sentence, as is well-known, are rarely written separately; 0dan mū0 written together as 0dannū0 can be mistakenly read as 0dannū0 and later written as 0damnū0 (mis-)leading the editors to separate it for the modern readers as 0dam mū.0 Similarly, as an anusvāra is pronounced like the nasal of the class of the following consonant, sarvam na, pronounced as sarvan na, can be written in the manuscripts as sarvanna. It can then easily be mistaken for sarvatra.

14 When Charu Deva Shastri’s copy of the Vākyapādiya text was collated by the pandits of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras with a manuscript in that library (probably A [18] of Rau’s [1971] account; see Charu Deva Shastri 1934: Preface p. 6 for the identification of his source ga 4), he came to know the existence of a reading tāvatīt āsāṃvidan. In his incomplete edition of the Vākyakānda (1941 [?]: 63 fn. 2), he noted that reading and rejected it as ungrammatical. According to Pāṇini 1.3.29, sam + vid, when used intransitively, should take ātmane-pada endings, so that tāvatīt āsāṃvidānāḥ would alone be acceptable in the present context. However, if we read tāvat tv instead of tāvatīt, the use of the parasmai-pada present participle āsāṃvidan will not be ungrammatical, as then sam + vid will have an object associated with it in the form of tāvat. As for tāvat tv, Charu Deva Shastri objects to its acceptance as follows: atra tu-sabdena kim vyāvarṣīta iti śrutāḥ noktam. kim ca. tāvatāḥ puruṣa-arthe 'vyayasya pariśrēte yad iti pūrvārdha-gataṁ kena saṁbadhyeta. That this objection is not valid can be seen from my translation of the verse. The indeclinable tu has been used in the verse to bring out the contrast between (a) thinking that one has not comprehended only a part and (b) the actuality of not having comprehended the whole, i.e., the contrast between an impression and a fact. Secondly, yad is not used in the verse as a relative pronoun standing for any specific entity, so that it would need a form of tād in the remainder of the verse; it rather stands for an observation (a judgement or a proposition, if you will), and is to be translated by a clause-introducing “that” or “as” (cf. the usage of yad in kārikās 1.87 and 2.22, and English constructions of the type: 'That he is well-versed in Sanskrit need not be doubted').
2.4 The difficulty and the solution are of a considerably simpler nature in the case of 2.136: ekasminn api dr̥ye 'rthe darśanam bhidyate prthak | kālāntarena caiko\textsuperscript{15} 'pi tam paśyaty anyathā punaḥ ||. Here the expression bhidyate prthak contains redundancy; either prthak or bhidyate would be sufficient to convey the intended sense. The author of the Āıkā was probably aware of this, as he shows no explicit recognition of prthak\textsuperscript{16}. In my opinion, the solution lies in changing bhidyate to vidyate. Such a change, besides being minimal, conforms to what is noticed elsewhere in the Trikāndi manuscripts (see 2.1 above). No equally elegant or justifiable emendation seems possible for prthak.

2.5 Verse 2.230 (yam artham āhatur bhinnau pratyayāv eka eva tam\textsuperscript{17} | kvacid āha pacantiti dhātuḥ\textsuperscript{18} tābhyām vinā kvacit ||) appears in the discussion of non-uniqueness of grammatical description. Bhartṛhari stresses that the same linguistic reality can be analysed and described differently in different grammars; grammars are merely means or upāyas, and hence should not be mistaken for the reality itself. In this connection he points out the absence of a one-to-one relationship between the elements recognised by a grammar and the components of meaning conveyed. In pacati, two suffixes, ̄sap (= a) and tīp (= ti)\textsuperscript{19}, convey agent, voice, tense, etc. However, the same information may be conveyed by only tīp (= ti) in yāti etc., and in spite of the absence of both ̄sap (= a) and tīp (= ti) in ahan etc. Now, 2.230 expresses this observation quite clearly. It can be easily understood as: 'The meaning which is expressed by two different suffixes is in some cases expressed by only one suffix. In some (other) cases, the root is bereft of both the suffixes [and yet conveys all the information that is associated with the two suffixes]'. As will be clear from the omission in my translation, the problematic part of the verse is pacantiti. The form pacantī, containing both ̄sap and tīp, is hardly appropriate as an example after the statement, 'The meaning which is expressed by two different suffixes is in some cases expressed by only one suffix.' If pacantī is to be accommodated, it must be understood in the sense of pacantī ity atra and placed

\textsuperscript{15} v. l. vaiko 'pi.

\textsuperscript{16} Āıkā: vastuta ekasminn eka-rūpe dr̥ye 'rthe śāstra-vāsanā-bhedād darśanam jñānam asmin bhidyate. eko 'pi ca puruṣāḥ sugata-darśana-samskrta-matir anyathādhyavasyaty arthaṃ, kālāntaresa vaiśeṣika-śāstra-śravaṇād anyatheti.

\textsuperscript{17} v. l. tām.

\textsuperscript{18} v. l. yās tu.

\textsuperscript{19} The reference here is, of course, to the grammatical system of Pāṇini.
at the beginning of the sentence: *pacanti ity atra yam arthaṁ bhinnau pratyayaṁ āhatuṁ tam ekaḥ eva (pratyayaḥ) kvacid āha*. The Ṭīkā takes this course\(^{20}\). However, a close look at the Vṛtti helps one realize that the strained construing suggested by the Ṭīkā need not be followed. As the Vṛtti\(^{21}\) says, *tathā bhinnā-pratyaya-saṁnidhāno ’rthaḥ kenacid eva pratyayenābhidhiyate. tad yathā odanam paca, atti, atsāḥ iti*, one can see that the reading it presupposes in the Kārikā is *pacātiiti*, although the Kārikā portion even in the Vṛtti transcript does not contain that reading. With *pacātiiti* we need not indulge in any transposing. Furthermore, we get a doubly appropriate example; *paca* illustrates absence of *tipiṅ*, and *atti* illustrates absence of *sap*. That *pacātiiti* is likely to change into *pacantiti* should be acceptable to anyone knowing the Indian scripts.

2.6 Verse 2.409 (teṣām atyanta-nānātvam nānātvav-avahārināḥ | akṣyādīnām\(^{22}\) iva prāhur eka-jāti-samanvayāt\(^{23}\) ||) is about expressions that are put to different uses without any change in form. When a Veda-reciter recites the words of a Veda in daily repetition or review, he does not utter them to convey either their form or content. But when he teaches them to a disciple, they stand for their own forms. Further, when the same words are employed in a ritual they refer to objects — that is, they convey meanings other than their own forms. Now the question is: Are these words, which are identical in form, three different entities because of the difference in intention — because of what they do or do not signify — or are they one and the same entity simply assuming three different roles? Verse 2.409 is written to state the first view. Its first three quarters can be translated thus: ‘Those who talk of difference say that they (the Veda expressions in the three situations) are utterly different [from each other] just as expressions like *akṣi* [the

\(^{20}\) Ṭīkā: *tatra pacantityādau bhinnau pratyayaḥ sap-tiṅau yam arthaḥ kartṛ-lakṣaṇam āhatuṁ tam evaiko ’py āha atti juhotityādau. kvacid dhātur eva tam arthaṁ tābhyaṁ vinaiṁāha aham vṛtram indra ityādāv iti.*

\(^{21}\) Bhartṛhari’s Vṛtti of the Vākyayānṣṭa or the second book of the Vākyapadiya is not available in its entirety either in the Trikāṇḍī editions printed so far or in the manuscripts discovered so far. I propose to publish whatever of it is available in my forthcoming edition of the Trikāṇḍī. Until that edition is published, my reference to the Vṛtti will naturally be based on the manuscript material in my possession.

\(^{22}\) v. 1. aśvādīnām, akṣādīnām.

\(^{23}\) v. 1.° samanvayām.
neuter noun and aksi the finite verb\textsuperscript{24} are.' However, the fourth quarter, eka-jāti-samanvayā, meaning 'because of the presence of an identical universe', hardly agrees with this statement. In fact, it is contradictory, as it invests the verse with the meaning: 'Vedic words in the three utterances are different from each other because they belong to the same class.' Obviously, the original text must have read something different. I think it can be restored by inserting a visarga after eka-jāti. The last quarter then contains two words instead of one and becomes a separate sentence having the meaning: 'There is) one universal [of such entities that are actually different] because of continued presence (i.e. because some elements such as form persist — because some features are common).’ Thus, whereas the first three quarters state the view of the advocates of non-identity, the fourth explains how the advocates of non-identity account for the common acceptance of homophonous expressions as one and the same entity\textsuperscript{25}.

2.7 In 3.14.297 (ekārthe vartamānabhyām asatā brāhmaṇena ca | yadā\textsuperscript{26} jātyantaram bāhyam kṣatriyādy apadiṣyate ||), the reading yadā is as old as Helērāja's time\textsuperscript{27}. It forces the reader to understand at least as much

\textsuperscript{24} (a) The derivation of aksi as a verbal form is possible in more than one way according to Vṛṣabha (p. 136.9—10): aksēter aśer vā apratyayena sāpi luki ca sati sipī rūpam. ader vā luki ghasl-bhave karmany uttamaika-vacane mantravāc cer luki.

(b) The following are the examples given by Bharthari of the expressions that can be derived either as a nominal form (nāman) or as a verb (ākhyāta): aksi, āsvah, vāyuḥ, tena, khyātam, arunah, śyāmāḥ, aśvah, acitam [?], sāmak [?], duhitā and būvah gāvah (see fn. 25a below). See Tripādi p. 38.13, p. 138.18—19; Vṛttī 1.72; Vṛttī 2.268, Vṛttī 2.315—316, Vṛttī 2.409; cf. Tīkā 2.318 (pp. 218—219), which adds ajāpyah, yasya, and tasya to the above list; also Pārthasārathi-miśra, Nyāya-ratnakāra, p. 897, which elucidates aśvah-as a verb.

\textsuperscript{25} (a) Vṛttī: yathāiva gāvo ['kṣya a]śo[as t]ena vāyur [see fn. 24b above] iti tuṣya-rūpatvān nāmākhyālayor atyanta-nānāte 'py avishiṣṭe buddhi-samanvayād ekatva-vyavahāramātram evam artha-prakaranādbhib atyanta-bhede sva-bhāva-siddha eva bheda gamyate.

(b) Tīkā: teṣām śabdānāṃ bheda-vādino nānātavam āhuḥ. kevalam eka-jati-samanvayasya teṣām śārdvā-rūpo 'sti. udāharanam āha aksādīnām [→aksiyā-dinām?] iveti. yathākāśādāyaḥ [→yathākāśādāyaḥ?] śabdā bhinnā eva sthitāḥ. śārdvāya tv abhedenaic pratyayanta iti.

\textsuperscript{26} v. l. yathā.

\textsuperscript{27} Prakṛna-prakṛśa: idānim anya-padārtha-pradhāna-pakṣa-vicārāyaḥ ... tadāvakalpate 'nyā-padārtha-pradhāna naś-samāsa iti prakaranād averseyaṃ ... yadā tv asat-sāmānya-vṛttir apy ayaṃ naś sad-visēṣa-nibandha-nayā brāhmaṇa-srutyā sāmānya-visēṣa-bhāvenaikādhikaraneyena sambandham anubhūya tat-sambandha-prāptārthātisayaṃ bāhyam padāntaropādānam kṣa-
as tadā nañ-samāsaḥ (cf. Helārāja p. 287.11, 18) if the verse is to be syntactically complete. Although it is possible that Bhartṛhari could have intended to indicate such a completion in his planned but unwritten Vṛtti28, the probability of this being the case is negligible. Firstly, in the extant Vṛtti (i.e. in the first two books), we find instances of a proper beginning being supplied to a verse (Aklujkar 1972: 190—193), but not a single instance in which a necessary concluding portion is supplied. In other words, the syntactic supplementation made by the Vṛtti always pertains to the subject part, never to the predicate part, of the sentence contained in a Kārikā. Secondly, 3.14.297, as Helārāja correctly states, introduces the anya-padartha-pradhānyapaṇa concerning the nañ-samāsa. In that respect, it is similar to 3.14.260 and 3.14.306, which respectively introduce the uttara-padartha-pradhānya-paṇa and the pūrva-padartha-pradhānya-paṇa. These latter verses state how a nañ-samāsa conveys its meaning or how the meaning understood from a nañ-samāsa can be characterized. They do not have the form: ‘If the semantic situation happens to be such, then a pūrva-padartha-pradhāna nañ-samāsa (or an uttara-padartha-pradhāna nañ-samāsa) comes into existence’. It would be strange to have that form of expression only for 3.14.297. Thus, the addition of tadā nañ-samāsaḥ or tadā anya-padartha-pradhānaḥ nañ-samāsaḥ cannot be justified. Consequently, the reading yadā which occasions that addition is suspect. I think yadā has come about through a corruption of yad vā (mistaking dā for dā is not improbable). If one reads yad vā (‘or’, ‘to come to another alternative’) not only will the syntactic incompleteness be removed, but the verse will also contain the necessary indication to the effect that the discussion of the uttara-padartha-pradhānya-paṇa is over with 3.14.296 and that 297 takes up the second paṇa for consideration.

2.8 The last passage I wish to discuss here is 3.14.605: ekasyāpi29 pratiyeta30 bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ.31 saha | kāsyapasyeti32 tenayaṁ pratyekam avatiśhate ||. The context is that of the expressions gurūḍa ivemē hastinaḥ

triyādy anupatati, na tāvata eva viśrāmyati tadānya-padartha-pradhāno nañ-
samāsaḥ. tathā hy avidyamāno brähmaṇo brähmaṇa-vyaktir āśraya-bhūtā yasya
cṣatriyasya cṣatriya-jāter ity aṣṭā anya-padartha-bhūtāyā vartī-padarthā-
bhyām abhāva-brähmaṇbhyām avaccheda iti jātyantarām bāhyām bhavati.

28 I shall discuss the extent of the Vākyapadiya-vṛtti in a separate paper.
29 v. l. ekasyātra.
30 v. l. pramiyeta.
31 v. l. prakṛtibhiḥ, pravikṛtibhiḥ.
32 v. l. kāsyā.
and kāśyapā ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ. The first is likely to be employed in speaking of the arrangement of an army for a battle. If the elephant-riders in the army are arranged in an eagelike formation, an observer may say, ‘These elephants are like an eagle’. But suppose the observer is viewing images or statues of the members of the Kāśyapa family. Will it be proper if he says kāśyapa ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ instead of kāśyapāḥ ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ? If the singular garuḍaḥ is acceptable in the other expression, why not use a singular here as well? Bhartrhari points out that in the first expression a group of elephants is compared with an eagle on account of the specific shape of the group. However, images are not compared through some specific feature with the group of Kāśyapas in the second expression. Therefore, the only proper usage will be the one with the plural kāśyapāḥ. Helārāja explains this point accurately, but, to derive it from the verse, he takes saha in the un-attested sense tulya ‘equal’ and construes the verse as ekasya api kāśyapa-pasya bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha (= tulyā) pratiyeta. This is clearly strained. I would like to suggest that saha and kāśyapasyeti should be replaced by sadṛk and kāśyapaś ceti. The k of sadṛk could have been dropped in dictation or uninterrupted writing, as another k follows. Then the remaining sadṛ, being an ungrammatical expression, could have been easily mistaken for saha. The emendation suggested for kāśyapasyeti is also transcriptionally probable. Thus, spurred by the awkwardness of Helārāja’s explanation, we can guess that the first sentence in the verse is to be read as kāśyapaḥ iti ca ekasya api bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ sadṛk pratiyeta, and to be understood as: ‘And, in the case of [the singular


34 The iti in kāśyapasyeti cannot possibly be indicative of quotation. A construal of the form ‘kāśyapasya’ iti ekasya api bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha/ sadṛk pratiyeta is out of question, since the form used in the intended usage (cf. Helārāja p. 420.13) is the nominative kāśyapaḥ, not the genitive kāśyapa-pasya. Therefore, if one reads kāśyapasya, one must understand iti in the sense ‘therefore’ and construe the verse quarters ‘abc’ as ekasya api kāśyapa-pasya bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha/sadṛk pratiyeta iti. However, such a construing not only throws together ekasya and kāśyapasya that are far removed from each other, but also makes the following tena ‘therefore’ redundant.

35 Insertion of ca before iti (for the sake of the metre) is not strange, as it is noticed in other verses.
expression] kāśyapaḥ, the varied images would be comprehended as similar to even one (Kāśyapa) [which is a self-contradictory, undesirable proposition].

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Helārāja. See Bhartrhari (c).


Prakṛṇaka-prakāśa. See Bhartrhari (c).


Trikāndi. See Bhartrhari.


Vṛṣabhadeva. See Bhartrhari (a).

Vṛtti. See Bhartrhari (a) and fn. 21 above.