# EMENDATION OF SOME VERSES IN
# BHARTṚHARI'S TRIKĀṆḌĪ*

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1.1 Anyone who has tried to edit an ancient or medieval text systematically is usually aware that collection of manuscripts, preparing a genealogy or *stemma codicum*, collation of relevant manuscripts, and evaluation of available readings amount only to *aparā vidyā* or primary textual criticism. A good editor must go beyond even these demanding and time-consuming procedures. After he has proceeded as far as the manuscripts will take him, he must at least try to recover what is not in the manuscripts. Such secondary textual criticism becomes necessary in the case of ancient and medieval works mainly because we can rarely go back all the way to the autograph or the author's own copy. Almost always even the oldest or most reliable of available manuscripts is considerably removed from the original copy. It has usually a long line of predecessors and is seldom better than, say, an inattentively prepared press copy of a modern author.

1.2 As is evident from many of my earlier publications, I have been engaged in a textual study of the works of Bhartṛhari and his ancient commentators for the last few years. In the present paper, I shall confine myself to only one work from that complex of works and to only one aspect of secondary textual criticism; I shall concentrate on the *kārikā* or main verse text of the Trikāṇḍī (or Vākyapadīya) from the point

of view of emendation. A further restriction I shall observe is that I shall not discuss any acceptable emendation that is somehow present in the printed texts and manuscripts pertaining to the Trikāṇḍī. In the beginning of my study, I thought of many more emendations than I present below. Gradually I discovered that some of the readings I preferred were available in isolated manuscripts (e. g. *akṣyādīnām* in the place of *akṣādīnām* in 2.409)[1], or were implicit in the commentaries of the Trikāṇḍī (e. g. *nirbhāgaṃ* in the place of *nirbhāge* in 3.11.14), or could be attested in works quoting the Trikāṇḍī (e. g. *ākhyātaṃ śabda-saṃghāto* in the place of *ākhyāta-śabdaḥ saṃghāto* in 2.1 as can be gathered from Pārthasārathi-miśra, Nyāya-ratnākara p. 860), or had been suggested by earlier editors (e. g. *manvate* in the place of *manyate* in 2.121 as is the suggestion in Raghunātha Sharmā's Ambākartrī). Here I shall refrain from discussing all such cases. Emendations based entirely on different splitting and different punctuation of the text matter will also be left out of consideration. They amount to correction of previous editions, not necessarily of the more basic manuscripts. Anyone wishing to know them should go through Professor WILHELM RAU's (1977) edition of the *kārikā* text, in which the editor has kindly recorded my preferences in sentence segmentation implicitly in some instances (e. g. 2.144 c, 2.241 c, 3.1.28 b, 3.14.271 ab, and 3.14.307 b) and explicitly with the abbreviation "AA" in some other (e. g. under 1.28 d, 2.20 a).

2.1 It is well-known in Mīmāṃsā that a person's eligibility to perform a certain rite depends on three factors: (a) He must have desire to perform the particular rite. (b) He must be capable of performing what he desires. (c) He must not have been declared ineligible by the scriptures for the specific sphere of action. Verse 2.79, occurring in a group of verses devoted to listing some *mīmāṃsā-nyāyas*, seeks to state this relatively simple observation in Mīmāṃsā:[2] *arthitvam*[3] *atra*[4] *sāmarthyam asminn*

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1 The numbering of Trikāṇḍī verses varies considerably in the available editions. I follow RAU's (1977) enumeration.

2 Nonsensical variant readings have been ignored in the following lines. Readings that are grammatical in themselves (and to that extent sensible) are specified in the footnotes irrespective of their syntactic and metrical acceptability. Their sources and their relative worth according to the objective criteria of textual criticism will be known from my proposed edition of the Trikāṇḍī. Any inclusion in the present paper of that mass of information would have made some of my arguments even more difficult to follow.

3 v. l. *arthitvād.*

4 v. l. *asya.*

*artho[5] na bhidyate śāstrāt prāptādhikāro 'yaṃ vyudāso 'sya kriyāntare.* ||
In the form known at present, this verse succeeds in making the intended
statement as far as the quarters (*pādas*) 'a', 'c', and 'd' are concerned.
It is only quarter 'b', syntactically related to *sāmarthyam* of the preced-
ing quarter, that does not make any contextually acceptable sense.
This is true irrespective of the reading one adopts: *sāmarthyam asmin
artho/arthe/arthī nibadhyate/nibhidyate/na bhidyate/na vidyate*. Therefore,
I would like to suggest that 'b' should be read as: *asminn arthini vidyate*.
There is only a slight departure from manuscripts in reading thus.
We are required to assume that *artho/arthe/arthī ni/na* is a corruption
of *arthini*, which is in fact attested in one of the versions of the *kārikā*
manuscripts (see RAU 1977:64). The other assumption implicit in the
emendation, namely that *bhidyate* resulted from *vidyate*, is justified by
the textual evidence available for 2.136 (see 2.4 below), 3.6.13 (*vidhīyate*
for *°bhidhīyate*), 3.14.417 (*°bhāvanā°* for *°vāsanā°*), and 3.14.536 (*°bhi-
dhāne* for *vidhāne*).[7] As for the meaning expressed by the suggested
reading, it is easy to see that a remark like *sāmarthyam asminn arthini
vidyate* ('This person seeking (to perform the specific rite) has [the
necessary] capability') is both contextually proper and agreeable to
the positive tone of quarters 'a' and 'c'.

2.2 Ever since reading Trikāṇḍī 2.91 (*aprasiddhaṃ tu yad[8] bhāgam
adṛṣṭam anupaśyati | tāvat tv[9] asaṃvidaṃ mūḍhaḥ sarvatra pratipadyate* ||)
for the first time, I have been puzzled by its wording. At first I thought
that what I suspected to be an error existed only in the printed editions
— that the manuscripts would dissolve my problem. However, when I
consulted the manuscripts, my hope gradually evaporated. Choice
existed only between *yam* and *yat* and between *tāvati* and *tāvat tu*.
But these were not the words that gave rise to the problem. Nor did they
help in solving the problem by precisely determining what the other
words of the verse should be. From all indications the problem was to
be located in the words *asaṃvidam* 'non-cognition, non-awareness',
*sarvatra* 'everywhere, in the whole' and *pratipadyate* 'comes to, com-

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[5] v. l. *arthe, arthī.*
[6] v. l. *na vidyate, nibhidyate, nibadhyate.*
[7] As far as I know, Nandī-nāgarī is the only script in which *v* and *bh*
are so close as to cause confusion. Such a confusion is likely, although not
equally likely, also in old Telugu and modern Udiya. There is no evidence
that the former was used to transmit the Trikāṇḍī text. The use of the latter
is ruled out by the very age of the manuscripts concerned.
[8] v. l. *yam.*
[9] v. l. *tāvaty.*

prehends, thinks'. The context is this: Bhartṛhari is an advocate of the indivisible sentence-meaning theory. On the strength of several insightful observations, he argues that, although one can, and one does, divide a sentence into certain constituents while engaged in linguistic analysis, on the level of cognition and actual communication a sentence or a sentence-meaning is a whole — something that transcends division. To bolster this thesis, Bhartṛhari states and refutes almost all the objections one can think of. One apparently powerful objection runs thus: Sometimes a person hears a sentence like *vanāt pika āniyatām* 'Bring a cuckoo from the forest'. It so happens that he does not know the meaning of the word *pika*. Hence he says, 'I understand *vanāt* and *āniyatām*, but what does *pika* mean ?' Now, is such a question possible if the sentence were an undivided whole ? Obviously, the person involved understands the meanings of *vanāt*, *āniyatām*, and *pika* separately. In other words, there are divisions in sentence-meaning and hence in the sentence. Bhartṛhari counters this objection by maintaining that actually the person concerned did not understand the whole sentence, although his question gives us the impression that he did not understand only a part thereof. Someone who does not know what a wild bull is and who sees a wild bull for the first time actually does not cognise the entire creature, although it may seem to him at a later moment — on reflection — that a certain part was familiar and a certain other part was previously unseen[10]. Now, it is such a statement that verse 2.91 should contextually contain. However, one cannot derive any such statement from it unless one switches its words around in a very un-natural way or supplies certain crucial expressions that a careful author like Bhartṛhari is not likely to have left out. If one accepts the reading *tāvat tu*, the natural meaning of the second half is: 'Until then the dull-witted one accepts non-cognition with respect to the whole.' On the other hand, if one accepts the reading *tāvati*, the natural meaning of the second half is: 'The dull-witted one accepts non-cognition of that much (of a part) as non-cognition of the whole.' Both the meanings are contrary to the context, as what the dull-witted one does in Bhartṛhari's view is exactly the opposite; although he has not comprehended the entire object, he thinks he has comprehended a part thereof; he accepts non-cognition in part, whereas, in Bhartṛhari's view, he should accept

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[10] What happens at the first moment of the encounter is relevant in understanding the grammarian's position, not what happens in the later stage of introspection, since the grammarian does not deny that sentence and sentence-meaning are divisible on the level of analysis.

it in totality. The commentator[11] senses this difficulty and implicitly construes the line as *mūḍhaḥ tu tāvat sarvatra asaṃvidaṃ pratipadyate* to derive the meaning: 'But (*tu*), on the other hand (*tāvat = punaḥ*), the dull-witted one (*mūḍhaḥ*), in truth, comes to non-cognition (i. e. does not cognise) with respect to the whole'.[12] But this construal is extremely forced. It ignores the relative *yat or yam* of the preceding half. It arbitrarily tears *asaṃvidam* from *tāvat tu* or *tāvati*, and places it between *sarvatra* and *pratipadyate*. It cannot stand unless the commentator writes a sentence in between telling us what the reality is (*paramārthataḥ*). It overlooks the fact that *asaṃvidaṃ pratipadyate* is a strange construction, since what it should contextually convey can be stated simply by *na pratipadyate* 'does not cognise'[13].

2.3 The considerations noted above led me to believe that textual damage had taken place and that the commentator of the second book of the Trikāṇḍī had simply offered a desperate interpretation out of his strict adherence to manuscript readings (*sthitasya gatiś cintanīyā*). I was confirmed in my belief when I chanced upon Bhoja's (Śṛṅgara-prakāśa vol. II, p. 333) citation of the verse: *aprasiddhaṃ tu yaṃ bhāgam adṛṣṭam anupaśyati | sarvatrāsaṃvidaṃ mūḍhas tāvati pratipadyate. ||* From the fact that Bhoja transposes the words *tāvati* and *sarvatra* it is clear that he felt the same contextual and syntactic difficulty as I did. Of course, this does not mean that I must accept Bhoja's solution. Instead of effecting a dainty little emendation, Bhoja almost rewrites the second half of the verse; he acts like a mechanic who prefers replacement of parts to repairing them. A less radical solution is called for and is possible. The problematic verse should be read as: *aprasiddhaṃ tu*

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[11] The commentary (Ṭīkā) to the second book (Vākya-kāṇḍa) of the Trikāṇḍī is generally ascribed to Puṇyarāja. In a 1974 article I have argued that it should be ascribed to Helārāja.

[12] Ṭīkā: *tatra ca gavayādau bhāgam aprasiddham adṛṣṭam aniścitam anupaśyati mūḍhaḥ. paramārthatas tu saṃvit tasya sarvatra nirvibhāge tasmin kutaścit kāraṇān notpannā. sarvatrāyam asaṃvidam* [→ *asaṃvidan* ?] *tāvat punaḥ pratipadyata iti.*

[13] The phrase *asaṃvidaṃ pratipadyate* is plausible if the intended sense is 'advocates non-cognition, holds non-cognition to be the case.' But then one would be speaking of a theoretician, of someone consciously putting forward a view, not of a common man as *mūḍha* indicates. In the obviously related preceding verse, *pratipadyate* is used to express what the person perceiving a wild bull thinks, not what deliberate judgement or view he develops.

*yad bhāgam adṛṣṭam anupaśyati | tāvat tv asaṃvidan*[14] *mūḍhaḥ sarvaṃ na pratipadyate.* || It is then to be understood thus: 'As he regards the not-well-known part as uncomprehended, the dull-witted one, not cognising that much, to the contrary (actually, in fact), does not comprehend the whole'. In this interpretation, the words of the original are not forced out of their natural affiliations, in order not to violate the context. All that one is required to suppose is that *asaṃvidaṃ mūḍhaḥ* is a corruption of *asaṃvidan mūḍhaḥ* (see fn. 14) and that *sarvatra* is a corruption of *sarvaṃ na*. Both the corruptions are highly probable in older Sanskrit manuscripts, in which the words of a sentence, as is well-known, are rarely written separately; *⁰dan mū⁰* written together as *⁰danmū⁰* can be mistakenly read as *⁰dammū⁰* and later written as *⁰dammū⁰* (mis)-leading the editors to separate it for the modern readers as *⁰daṃ mū.⁰* Similarly, as an *anusvāra* is pronounced like the nasal of the class of the following consonant, *sarvaṃ na*, pronounced as *sarvan na*, can be written in the manuscripts as *sarvanna*. It can then easily be mistaken for *sarvatra*.

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[14] When CHARU DEVA SHASTRI's copy of the Vākyapadīya text was collated by the pandits of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras with a manuscript in that library (probably A [18] of RAU's (1971) account; see CHARU DEVA SHASTRI 1934: Preface p. 6 for the identification of his source *ga* 4), he came to know the existence of a reading *tāvaty asaṃ-vidan*. In his incomplete edition of the Vākyakāṇḍa (1941 [?]: 63 fn. 2), he noted that reading and rejected it as ungrammatical. According to Pāṇini 1.3.29, *sam* + *vid*, when used intransitively, should take *ātmane-pada* endings, so that *tāvaty asaṃvidānaḥ* would alone be acceptable in the present context. However, if we read *tāvat tv* instead of *tāvaty*, the use of the *parasmai-pada* present participle *asaṃvidan* will not be ungrammatical, as then *sam* + *vid* will have an object associated with it in the form of *tāvat*. As for *tāvat tv*, CHARU DEVA SHASTRI objects to its acceptance as follows: *atra tu-śabdena kiṃ vyāvartyata iti śrutyā noktam. kiṃ ca. tāvataḥ punar-arthe 'vyayasya parigrahe yad iti pūrvārdha-gataṃ kena sambadhyeta.* That this objection is not valid can be seen from my translation of the verse. The indeclinable *tu* has been used in the verse to bring out the contrast between (a) thinking that one has not comprehended only a part and (b) the actuality of not having comprehended the whole, i. e.,.the contrast between an impression and a fact. Secondly, *yad* is not used in the verse as a relative pronoun standing for any specific entity, so that it would need a form of *tad* in the remainder of the verse; it rather stands for an observation (a judgement or a proposition, if you will), and is to be translated by a clause-introducing "that" or "as" (cf. the usage of *yad* in kārikās 1.87 and 2.22, and English constructions of the type: 'That he is well-versed in Sanskrit need not be doubted').

2.4 The difficulty and the solution are of a considerably simpler nature in the case of 2.136: *ekasminn api dṛśye 'rthe darśanaṃ bhidyate pṛthak | kālāntareṇa caiko*[15] *'pi taṃ paśyaty anyathā punaḥ* ||. Here the expression *bhidyate pṛthak* contains redundancy; either *pṛthak* or *bhidyate* would be sufficient to convey the intended sense. The author of the Ṭīkā was probably aware of this, as he shows no explicit recognitiọn of *pṛthak*[16]. In my opinion, the solution lies in changing *bhidyate* to *vidyate*. Such a change, besides being minimal, conforms to what is noticed elsewhere in the Trikāṇḍī manuscripts (see 2.1 above). No equally elegant or justifiable emendation seems possible for *pṛthak*.

2.5 Verse 2.230 (*yam artham āhatur bhinnau pratyayāv eka eva tam*[17] | *kvacid āha pacantīti dhātus*[18] *tābhyāṃ vinā kvacit* ||) appears in the discussion of non-uniqueness of grammatical description. Bhartṛhari stresses that the same linguistic reality can be analysed and described differently in different grammars; grammars are merely means or *upāyas*, and hence should not be mistaken for the reality itself. In this connection he points out the absence of a one-to-one relationship between the elements recognised by a grammar and the components of meaning conveyed. In *pacati*, two suffixes, *śap* (= *a*) and *tip* (= *ti*)[19], convey agent, voice, tense, etc. However, the same information may be conveyed by only *tip* (= *ti*) in *yāti* etc., and in spite of the absence of both *śap* (= *a*) and *tip* (= *ti*) in *ahan* etc. Now, 2.230 expresses this observation quite clearly. It can be easily understood as: 'The meaning which is expressed by two different suffixes is in some cases expressed by only one suffix. In some (other) cases, the root is bereft of both the suffixes [and yet conveys all the information that is associated with the two suffixes]'. As will be clear from the omission in my translation, the problematic part of the verse is *pacantīti*. The form *pacanti*, containing both *śap* and *tip*, is hardly appropriate as an example after the statement, 'The meaning which is expressed by two different suffixes is in some cases expressed by only one suffix.' If *pacantīti* is to be accommodated, it must be understood in the sense of *pacanti ity atra* and placed

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[15] v. l. *vaiko 'pi.*

[16] Ṭīkā: *vastuta ekasminn eka-rūpe dṛśye 'rthe śāstra-vāsanā-bhedād darśanaṃ jñānam asmin bhidyate. eko 'pi ca puruṣaḥ sugata-darśana-saṃskṛta-matir anyathādhyavasyaty arthaṃ, kālāntareṇa vaiśeṣika-śāstra-śravaṇād anyatheti.*

[17] v. l. *tām.*

[18] v. l. *yās tu.*

[19] The reference here is, of course, to the grammatical system of Pāṇini.

at the beginning of the sentence: *pacanti ity atra yam artham bhinnau pratyayau āhatuḥ tam ekaḥ eva (pratyayaḥ) kvacid āha*. The Ṭīkā takes this course[20]. However, a close look at the Vṛtti helps one realize that the strained construing suggested by the Ṭīkā need not be followed. As the Vṛtti[21] says, *tathā bhinna-pratyaya-saṃnidhāno 'rthaḥ kenacid eva pratyayenābhidhīyate. tad yathā odanaṃ paca, atti, atsāḥ iti*, one can see that the reading it presupposes in the Kārikā is *pacāttīti*, although the Kārikā portion even in the Vṛtti transcript does not contain that reading. With *pacāttīti* we need not indulge in any transposing. Furthermore, we get a doubly appropriate example; *paca* illustrates absence of *tip/tiṅ*, and *atti* illustrates absence of *śap*. That *pacāttīti* is likely to change into *pacantīti* should be acceptable to anyone knowing the Indian scripts.

2.6 Verse 2.409 (*teṣām atyanta-nānātvaṃ nānātva-vyavahāriṇaḥ | akṣyādīnām*[22] *iva prāhur eka-jāti-samanvayāt*[23] ||) is about expressions that are put to different uses without any change in form. When a Veda-reciter recites the words of a Veda in daily repetition or review, he does not utter them to convey either their form or content. But when he teaches them to a disciple, they stand for their own forms. Further, when the same words are employed in a ritual they refer to objects — that is, they convey meanings other than their own forms. Now the question is: Are these words, which are identical in form, three different entities because of the difference in intention — because of what they do or do not signify — or are they one and the same entity simply assuming three different roles? Verse 2.409 is written to state the first view. Its first three quarters can be translated thus: 'Those who talk of difference say that they (the Veda expressions in the three situations) are utterly different [from each other] just as expressions like *akṣi* [the

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[20] Ṭīkā: *tatra pacantītyādau bhinnau pratyayau śap-tiñau yam arthaṃ kartṛ-lakṣaṇam āhatus tam evaiko 'py āha atti juhotītyādau. kvacid dhātur eva tam arthaṃ tābhyāṃ vinaivāha ahan vṛtram indra ityādāv iti.*

[21] Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti of the Vākya-kāṇḍa or the second book of the Vākyapadīya is not available in its entirety either in the Trikāṇḍī editions printed so far or in the manuscripts discovered so far. I propose to publish whatever of it is available in my forthcoming edition of the Trikāṇḍī. Until that edition is published, my reference to the Vṛtti will naturally be based on the manuscript material in my possession.

[22] v. l. *aśvādīnām, akṣādīnām*.

[23] v. l.° *samanvayam*.

neuter noun and *akṣi* the finite verb[24]] are.' However, the fourth quarter, *eka-jāti-samanvayāt*, meaning 'because of the presence of an identical universe', hardly agrees with this statement. In fact, it is contradictory, as it invests the verse with the meaning: 'Vedic words in the three utterances are different from each other because they belong to the same class.' Obviously, the original text must have read something different. I think it can be restored by inserting a *visarga* after *eka-jāti*. The last quarter then contains two words instead of one and becomes a separate sentence having the meaning: '(There is) one universal [of such entities that are actually different] because of continued presence (i. e. because some elements such as form persist — because some features are common).' Thus, whereas the first three quarters state the view of the advocates of non-identity, the fourth explains how the advocates of non-identity account for the common acceptance of homophonous expressions as one and the same entity[25].

2.7 In 3.14.297 (*ekārthe vartamānābhyām asatā brahmaṇena ca | yadā*[26] *jātyantaraṃ bāhyaṃ kṣatriyādy apadiśyate ||*), the reading *yadā* is as old as Helārāja's time[27]. It forces the reader to understand at least as much

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[24] (a) The derivation of *akṣi* as a verbal form is possible in more than one way according to Vṛṣabha (p. 136.9—10): *akṣater aśer vā apratyayena śapi luki ca sati sipi rūpam. ader vā luṅi ghasl-bhave karmaṇy uttamaika-vacane mantratvāc cer luki.*

(b) The following are the examples given by Bhartṛhari of the expressions that can be derived either as a nominal form (*nāman*) or as a verb (*ākhyāta*): *akṣi, aśvaḥ, vāyuḥ, tena, khyātam, aruṇaḥ, śyāmaḥ, asyāḥ, ācitam* [ ?], *samaḥ* [ ?], *duhitā* and *bhāvaḥ/gāvaḥ* (see fn. 25a below). See Tripādī p. 38.13, p. 138.18—19; Vṛtti 1.72; Vṛtti 2.268, Vṛtti 2.315—316, Vṛtti 2.409; cf. Ṭīkā 2.318 (pp. 218—219), which adds *ajāpayaḥ, yasya*, and *tasya* to the above list; also Pārthasārathi-miśra, Nyāya-ratnākara, p. 897, which elucidates *aśvaḥ* as a verb.

[25] (a) Vṛtti: *yathaiva gāvo ['kṣy a]śv[as t]ena vāyur* [see fn. 24b above] *iti tulya-rūpatvān nāmākhyātayor atyanta-nānātve 'py aviśiṣṭe buddhi-saman-vayād ekatva-vyavahāramātram evam artha-prakaraṇādibhir atyanta-bhede sva-bhāva-siddha eva bhedo gamyate.*

(b) Ṭīkā: *teṣāṃ śabdānāṃ bheda-vādino nānātvam āhuḥ. kevalam eka-jāti-samanvayas teṣāṃ sādṛśya-rūpo 'sti. udāharaṇam āha akṣādīnām* [ →*akṣyā-dīnām* ?] *iveti. yathākṣādayaḥ* [ → *yathākṣyādayaḥ* ?] *śabdā bhinnā eva sthitāḥ. sādṛśyāt tv abhedenaiva pratiyanta iti.*

[26] v. l. *yathā.*

[27] Prakīrṇa-prakāśa: *idānīm anya-padārtha-pradhāna-pakṣa-vicārayā-ha . . . tadāvakalpate 'nya-padārtha-pradhāno nañ-samāsa iti prakaraṇād avaseyam . . . yadā tv asat-sāmānya-vṛttir apy ayaṃ nañ sad-viśeṣa-nibandha-nayā brāhmaṇa-śrutyā sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvenaikādhikaraṇyena sambandham anubhūya tat-sambandha-prāpitārthātiśayaṃ bāhyaṃ padāntaropādānaṃ kṣa-*

as *tadā nañ-samāsaḥ* (cf. Helārāja p. 287.11, 18) if the verse is to be
syntactically complete. Although it is possible that Bhartṛhari could
have intended to indicate such a completion in his planned but unwritten
Vṛtti[28], the probability of this being the case is negligible. Firstly, in
the extant Vṛtti (i. e. in the first two books), we find instances of a proper
beginning being supplied to a verse (AKLUJKAR 1972: 190—193), but
not a single instance in which a necessary concluding portion is supplied.
In other words, the syntactic supplementation made by the Vṛtti
always pertains to the subject part, never to the predicate part, of the
sentence contained in a Kārikā. Secondly, 3.14.297, as Helārāja correctly
states, introduces the *anya-padārtha-prādhānya-pakṣa* concerning the
*nañ-samāsa*. In that respect, it is similar to 3.14.260 and 3.14.306, which
respectively introduce the *uttara-padārtha-prādhānya-pakṣa* and the
*pūrva-padārtha-prādhānya-pakṣa*. These latter verses state how a *nañ-
samāsa* conveys its meaning or how the meaning understood from
a *nañ-samāsa* can be characterized. They do not have the form: 'If the
semantic situation happens to be such, then a *pūrva-padārtha-pradhāna
nañ-samāsa* (or an *uttara-padārtha-pradhāna nañ-samāsa*) comes into
existence'. It would be strange to have that form of expression only for
3.14.297. Thus, the addition of *tadā nañ-samāsaḥ* or *tadā anya-padārtha-
pradhānaḥ nañ-samāsaḥ* cannot be justified. Consequently, the reading
*yadā* which occasions that addition is suspect. I think *yadā* has come
about through a corruption of *yad vā* (mistaking *dvā* for *dā* is not im-
probable). If one reads *yad vā* ('or', 'to come to another alternative')
not only will the syntactic incompleteness be removed, but the verse
will also contain the necessary indication to the effect that the discussion
of the *uttara-padārtha-prādhānya-pakṣa* is over with 3.14.296 and that
297 takes up the second *pakṣa* for consideration.

2.8 The last passage I wish to discuss here is 3.14.605: *ekasyāpi*[29]
*pratīyeta*[30] *bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ*[31] *saha | kāśyapasyeti*[32] *tenāyaṁ pratyekam
avatiṣṭhate ||*. The context is that of the expressions *garuḍa iveme hastinaḥ*

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*triyādy anupatati, na tāvaty eva viśrāmyati tadānya-padārtha-pradhāno nañ-
samāsaḥ. tathā hy avidyamāno brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇa-vyaktir āśraya-bhūtā yasya
kṣatriyasya kṣatriya-jāter ity asyā anya-padārtha-bhūtāyā varti-padārthā-
bhyām abhāva-brāhmaṇābhyām avaccheda iti jātyantaraṁ bāhyaṁ bhavati.*

[28] I shall discuss the extent of the Vākyapadīya-vṛtti in a separate
paper.

[29] v. l. *ekasyātra.*

[30] v. l. *pramīyeta.*

[31] v. l. *prakṛtibhiḥ, pravikṛtiḥ.*

[32] v. l. *kaśya°.*

and *kāśyapā ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ*. The first is likely to be employed in speaking of the arrangement of an army for a battle. If the elephant-riders in the army are arranged in an eaglelike formation, an observer may say, 'These elephants are like an eagle'. But suppose the observer is viewing images or statues of the members of the Kāśyapa family. Will it be proper if he says *kāśyapa ivamāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ* instead of *kāśyapāḥ ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ*? If the singular *garuḍaḥ* is acceptable in the other expression, why not use a singular here as well? Bhartṛhari points out that in the first expression a group of elephants is compared with an eagle on account of the specific shape of the group. However, images are not compared through some specific feature with the group of Kāśyapas in the second expression. Therefore, the only proper usage will be the one with the plural *kāśyapāḥ*. Helārāja explains this point accurately, but, to derive it from the verse, he takes *saha* in the un-attested sense *tulya* 'equal' and construes the verse as *ekasya api kāśya-pasya bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha* (= *tulyā*) *pratīyeta*[33]. This is clearly strained. I would like to suggest that *saha* and *kāśyapasyeti*[34] should be replaced by *sadṛk* and *kāśyapaś ceti*. The *k* of *sadṛk* could have been dropped in dictation or uninterrupted writing, as another *k* follows. Then the remaining *sadṛ*, being an ungrammatical expression, could have been easily mistaken for *saha*. The emendation suggested for *kāśyapasyeti* is also transcriptionally probable. Thus, spurred by the awkwardness of Helārāja's explanation, we can guess that the first sentence in the verse is to be read as *kāśyapaḥ iti ca*[35] *ekasya api bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ sadṛk pratīyeta*, and to be understood as: 'And, in the case of [the singular

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[33] Prakīrṇa-prakāśa: *yadi kāśyapa ivemāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ kāśyapa ity eka-vacanāntam upamānaṃ prayujyate tadā garuḍasyeva hastino vyūhena tulyāḥ* [. . . ?] *kāśyapasya nānā-bhūtā pratikṛtiḥ kenacit saṃniveśādinā dharmeṇa saha tulyā vijñāyeta. na tu pratyekam upamānaṃ gamyeta. saha-śabdas tulyārthaḥ. tad-yoge kāśyapasyeti ṣaṣṭhī. tasmāt pratyekam upamāna-bhāva-pratipattyartham atra kāśyapa-śabdaḥ pratyupameyaṃ bhedenaivāva-tiṣṭhate.*

[34] The *iti* in *kāśyapasyeti* cannot possibly be indicative of quotation. A construal of the form '*kāśyapasya*' *iti ekasya api bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha/ sadṛk pratīyeta* is out of question, since the form used in the intended usage (cf. Helārāja p. 420.13) is the nominative *kāśyapaḥ*, not the genitive *kāśya-pasya*. Therefore, if one reads *kāśyapasya*, one must understand *iti* in the sense 'therefore' and construe the verse quarters 'abc' as *ekasya api kāśya-pasya bhinnā pratikṛtiḥ saha/sadṛk pratīyeta iti*. However, such a construing not only throws together *ekasya* and *kāśyapasya* that are far removed from each other, but also makes the following *tena* 'therefore' redundant.

[35] Insertion of *ca* before *iti* (for the sake of the metre) is not strange, as it is noticed in other verses.

expression] *kāśyapaḥ*, the varied images would be comprehended as similar to even one (Kāśyapa) [which is a self-contradictory, undesirable proposition]'.

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