


**FACETS OF JAIN PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION AND CULTURE**



Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda

General Editor :

Sreechand Rampuria

Edited by :

Rai Ashwini Kumar

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JAIN VISHVA BHARATI INSTITUTE

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Prologue

Jain literature is very rich, varied and vast. No subject worth the name has been left untouched by the Jain saints, thinkers and scholars. It is really a pity that Jain literature and thought has not been able to generate awareness among the scholars about the different aspects of Jainism. Of course, some scholarly articles have been published in various Journals. As these materials are scattered here and there, one, therefore, fails to have a full and comprehensive view of the different aspects of Jain Philosophy, Religion and Culture. There is a dearth of excellent treatises on different themes of Jainism. I have, therefore, embarked on a project to fulfil this desideratum. About a decade ago I collected some of the finest research articles on the various aspects of Jainism from the outstanding Journals and books written by eminent scholars and thinkers, and decided to publish them in 25 Volumes, each volume containing articles on some specific aspect of Jainism.

Jain Vishva Bharati Institute is bringing out these volumes and we are fortunate in having the blessings, inspiration and guidance of Ganadhipati Gurudeva Tulsi and Acharya Shri Mahaprajña for the completion of this work. The first volume of the series is addressed to the study of Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda, which are considered to be the foundation-stone of Jainism and permeate all the spheres of Jain thinking.

I express my thankfulness to the editors who have taken pains in getting the present volume published in record time. I would feel amply rewarded if the work stimulates the mind and heart of the readers to understand the true spirit of Anekāntavāda.

Let all attain peace and happiness.

Ladnun
11th January, 1996.

Sreechand Rampuria

Foreword

Jain Vishva Bharati Institute is a centre of higher studies, learning and research in Jainology. It has been set up to bring forward the treasure of knowledge lying hidden in the Canonical texts of Prakrit literature. One of the most important tasks undertaken by this Institute is to cull out the Scientific concepts from the heap of wide-spread teachings of Lord Mahavira. Jain doctrines assume special significance and relevance in the context of present day violence, conflicts and tensions.

In addition to translating Jain Agamas from Prakrit into Hindi and English, the Institute has decided to edit the articles on Jain Philosophy, Religion and Culture written in English by different scholars at different times which were published in old magazines and books, and to divide them under specific themes. Altogether, there are 25 themes under which such articles have been classified. The present volume is the first of these volumes. There could not have been more appropriate subject than “Anekāntavāda” to start this series meant for English knowing persons, who want to understand the concepts and doctrines of Jain philosophy, particularly for those living abroad.

The distinguished authors of the articles included in this volume come from different Schools of thought. They have expressed their views according to their own study and understanding. The reader will find this healthy mixture quite enlightening and thought-provoking. There could not have been a better example of Anekāntavāda than this book itself which presents different views on the same subject, each relevant and true in its own way.

The relevance of “Anekāntavāda” in the present context of conflicts needs no emphasis. It is as much a philosophy as a science. True Anekāntavādin does not discriminate on the basis of caste,

religion, sex, race and nationality. He is secular in outlook and scientific in approach. The human values will find their roots in this universal concept.

I am very happy that this volume is coming out in the International year of "Tolerance", which is the essence of Anekānta. I am sure that it will benefit thinkers as well as decision-makers all over the world, and strengthen the foundation of peace in the minds of those who rule the polities and communities.

Ladnun
11th January, 1996.

M.S. Bhandari
Vice-Chancellor
Jain Vishva Bharati Institute

Preface

With the drawing of the present millennium to a ~~close~~, scholars are now increasingly acknowledging the value of the rich, profound and varied philosophical, religious and cultural heritage of India bequeathed to us by a ~~galaxy~~ of illustrious genius of the Brahminical, Buddhist and Jainist seers, saints and thinkers together with the followers of other faiths who also evinced keen interest in enriching and elevating the thought and culture of the country. The contributions and achievements of Brahminism (later known as Hinduism) and Buddhism are more or less widely known but it is a wonder that Jainism has remained unknown, to a greater extent, to scholars who, due to some reason or other, could not bestow adequate attention to it which it really deserves.

Jainism is one of the few religions of India which, dating back to hoary past, has survived the ravages of time. It is said to be promulgated, during the present period, by twentyfour tirthankaras, the first being Rshabha, who is found mentioned even in the Vedas and whose details are also recorded in the Hindu Puranas. Neminatha, the twenty second tirthankara, is associated with Krsna. All these tirthankaras are not regarded as historical personages. Only the last two tirthankaras, Parsvanatha and Mahavira, are accepted as historical persons. Parsva flourished in the eighth century B.C. and preceded Mahavira by 250 years. We find some details about the life and teachings of Parsva in the Jaina texts. The early Pali texts also furnish some information about him. Mahavira is regarded as the twenty fourth and the last tirthankara. The sermons delivered by Mahavira were first transmitted orally from one generation to another and later on compiled and committed to writing, and are now known as Agamas. What we,

today, know as Jain philosophy, religion and culture all this has, in fact, originated with Mahavira. This knowledge has been made explicit in the vast post-canonical literature. There are a good number of literary and mythological works in several Indian languages produced by Jain poets and saints. Jain thinkers like Umasvati, Kundakunda, Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Haribhadra, Vidyānanda. Hemacandra, Upadhyaya Yasovijaya, Acarya Tulsi and others have made significant contributions of abiding value to Jain philosophy and religion. In the field of art and architecture, too, the Jainas have achieved singular heights and some of the images, temples, paintings etc. which exhibit rare artistic beauty can be regarded as excellent specimen of their workmanship.

With a view to providing an opportunity to the academic world to have a thorough acquaintance with the opulent and colossal information about Jain philosophy, religion and culture and opening the way for further research, we have undertaken a gigantic project to publish in 25 volumes such articles written by a number of scholars on these subjects which have already appeared in various Journals. We have also utilized some portions, relevant to our project, from the works of scholars of eminence. Each volume will contain articles on some specific topic. We are sure, this proposed project, when completed, would prove to be a valuable source for understanding the spiritual, intellectual and cultural contours of religio-philosophical thought of the Jainas.

The present volume, the first in the series of 25 volumes, contains articles on Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda. The doctrine of Anekānta forms the corner-stone of Jain philosophical thinking. Hence, the first volume is devoted to the study of the different aspects of this important doctrine of Jaina philosophy. It is the prerogative of the human beings to know the truth and also to express it. According to the Jainas, we find a multiplicity of reals in the world and each object of knowledge is found to be endowed with infinite characteristics. The infinite number of characteristics, though appear to be mutually contradictory, are, in fact, the inalienable part of a real. As a matter of fact, a real is an integrated whole of infinite number of qualities or attributes. They do certainly, say the Jainas, co-exist in the same object. This co-existence of mutually opposed characteristics should be accepted as a reality. This is the intrinsic nature of the reality. If we deny this, then there arise various sorts of complications and confusions which lead to conflicts, strifes and tensions. Seeing widely differing theories on the

same subject one is apt to get confused, hardly knowing which of them represents the correct position. Here Anekāntavāda comes to our aid and rescue, and provides an amicable solution to controversies.

Anekāntavāda stands for right vision. It enables us to comprehend the true nature of an object which is possessed of infinite attributes. Reality, according to the Jainas, is multi-dimensional. It has many facets and qualities. So it is very difficult to comprehend the true nature of a reality in its entirety. Really speaking, only a particular aspect of an object is comprehended by a common onlooker. He, therefore, gives an estimate of reality from a particular standpoint. This is, in fact, only a partial truth about an object and if the person asserts in the like manner then he is not looking upon this standpoint as the only true standpoint. This goes well so far as he admits his limitations. The fact of the matter is that he understands that there may be a multitude of different viewpoints of a given situation or event and all those viewpoints in their totality reflect the full nature of the situation or event. And hence, unless we take into account all the different aspects of a thing we cannot be in a position to comprehend it fully as also to express it correctly and completely.

On the otherhand, if a person claims his thesis to be the absolute truth on the basis of his comprehension of only a particular aspect of the object, then certainly he is going beyond what he has comprehended. This assertion may be called false according to Anekāntavāda and will certainly encourage dogmatism and fanaticism, extremism and intolerance. Hence, Anekāntavāda cautions us against building closed systems of philosophy and rather encourages us to formulate a theory of relativity which harmonizes all mutually contradictory standpoints. This doctrine intends to convey the truth that co-existence of mutually contradictory characteristics of an object is a fact which should not be ignored if we want to live peacefully and smilingly. This is also a source of strength of democracy. The existence of opposition is essential for the survival and effective functioning of democracy. In the absence of opposition, democracy certainly loses its lustre, grandeur, creditibility and utility. This is our experience, and to deny it its due place and importance would be suicidal. To deny opposition, therefore, would mean to deny democracy. Similarly, to deny the co-existence of mutually conflicting viewpoints about a thing would mean to deny the true nature of a reality. All our statements are conditional, and are made keeping in mind a certain context. If we present our viewpoints conditionally, then we are speaking the truth

inasmuch as our statements are quite in conformity with our comprehension of those aspects of reality. Thus, Anekāntavāda fosters the spirit of reconciliation in us by pointing to the essential interrelatedness of different views and harmonizing them in a new Synthesis.

Anekāntavāda unfolds its vision through Nayavāda and Syādvāda. Nayavāda is an analytical method of standpoints, while Syādvāda is the Synthetical method of Knowledge. What we to-day know as the doctrine of co-existence, or the spirit of reconciliation, or the theory of relativity—all these, in fact, originate from Anekāntavāda. It is a dynamic philosophy of life through which we can lead a life of partnership and participation, a life of friendliness and harmony, a life of non-violence and equality. It indeed touches almost every aspect of life and envisages total change in the horizon of our outlook, thought and action. It provides an integral, balanced and effective approach to the solutions of the problems which mankind is facing to-day. Thus it has all the potentialities for the emergence of a new man.

As in the past, so even to-day and years to come, Jainism is destined to play a vital role in the intellectual, social and cultural transformation of the humanbeings. Hence, a correct understanding, exploration and application of anekānta will certainly be fruitful for the welfare of the humanity. It will lead to the establishment of a peaceful world-order. To inculcate the spirit of tolerance as also the attitude of appreciation of other's point of view is the need of the hour which may be made possible by understanding and following the philosophy of Anekānta.

We hope, this volume will encourage the scholars and lovers of Jainism to undertake a critical exposition of the different aspects of Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda. There is a vast literature on this topic. Jain Āgamas throw a welcome light on Anekāntavāda. But this has remained unexplored so far. Later Jain thinkers have also produced their masterpieces on this important doctrine. The contribution of each thinker should be brought to light. A thorough study of this doctrine has remained, more or less, neglected. It would not be out of place to mention that it has not been properly understood. Hence, we believe, it is the duty of earnest scholars to dispassionately evaluate the merit of Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda from various standpoints and present their results before the academic world.

This work we have been able to publish only due to the benign

grace of Ganadhipati Gurudeva Tulsi and Acharya Mahaprajñā who have been perennial source of inspiration to us. We offer our obeisance to them.

To the General Editor, Shri Sreechand Rampuria, who happens to be the Chancellor of our Institute, we offer our sincere gratitude for providing us an opportunity to edit this volume. We place on record our indebtedness to our Vice-Chancellor, Shri M.S. Bhandari for allowing us to complete this important task.

We are also thankful to Shri Suresh Bansal for printing this volume in a very short time.

Anuvrata Bhawan
New Delhi
January 14, 1996

Rai Ashwini Kumar
T.M. Dak
Anil Dutta Mishra

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**ANEKĀNTAVĀDA
AND
SYĀDVĀDA**

INTRODUCTION

1

The Axioms of Non-absolutism*

ACHARYA MAHAPRAJÑA

The Concomitance between the Universal and the Particular

*We can know the truth and also express it. It consists in the trio of entity, word and knowledge. Different philosophies have looked at the problem from different angles of vision. The Vedānta has explained the problem from three standpoints—the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The *Brahman* is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will-o' the wisp and dream is pure appearance. In *Hinayāna* Buddhism the truth is twofold, viz. the ultimate and the conventional, while in the idealist Buddhism it is threefold, viz. the ultimate (*pariṇiṣpanna*), the dependent (*paratantra*) and the imaginary (*parikalpita*). The self-nature (momentariness) of the object is the ultimate truth. The universal nature is only a conventional truth on account of its being a product of the intellectual function of exclusion.¹*

Different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The foundation-stone of such presentation is twofold—intuitive experience and rational knowledge. In intuitive experience the object is known directly and, therefore, there is no difference in such experience. The rational knowledge that occurs at

* New Dimensions in Jaina Logic. Today and Tomorrow's Printers and Publishers, New Delhi, 1984.

1. *Pramāṇavārttika*, 2.4.
arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat, tadatṛa paramārthasat/
anyat samvṛtisat proktam, te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe//

2 *Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*

the sensual level does not cognise the object directly and this is the reason why there are varieties in such cognitions. The Vedānta rejected the modes as unreal while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist, on the other hand, rejected the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. According to Jaina logic, both the substance and the modes are ultimately true. When the substance hidden under the waves of modes has no appeal, the modes come up prominently at the cost of the substance which lies submerged under them. When the modes, like waves, lose their identity in the calmness of the unfathomed ocean of substance, the latter alone appears to be ultimately real. The Vedāntic monism is like the waveless ocean and the Buddhist phenomenalism is the state of the ocean agitated by waves. Non-absolutism appropriates them both, as so finely expressed in the following beautiful imagery—*Aparyayaṁ vastu samasyamānāma- dravyametacca vivicyamānam/ Adēśabhedoditasaptabhaṅga- madidṛśastvam budharūpavedyam*¹²

From the synthetic viewpoint the object is without modes and from the analytic standpoint it is unsubstantial. “You have realised. Oh Lord, the truth in its sevenfold aspects on account of sevenfold view-points, that reveals itself only to the Wise.”

The substance presents itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period of *anekānta* some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch-making achievement of that age.

The first axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the universal and the particular. The one without the other is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without a substance is as impossible as a substance without a mode. There is no such gap between truth and untruth. There is hardly any line of demarcation between the truth of the concept and the falsity of another. The gap between them, if any, can be understood if one realises that the particular bereft of universal is as nonsensical as the universal bereft of the particular. Both the concepts, viz. the universal and the particular, are true if they are mutually dependent. One rejecting the other is false, while both are the true representatives of their own objects of reference.

2. *Anayogavyavacchedadvātrīṣikā*, verse 23.

Concomitance between the Permanent and the Impermanent

The second axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of the one is verified by the truth of the other.

The materialist thinks that the sensuous world alone is true. There is nothing like the spiritual. The spiritualist, on the other hand, asserts that it is the self alone that is true, the sensuous world is false. The logicians of the Jaina school investigated the truth behind the rival claims and found that the sensuous world was not false. Whatever is possessed of causal efficiency is true. The senses are causally efficient and hence cannot be untrue. Their objects also cannot be false. The characteristic features of a real are origination, cessation and persistence.³ Whatever is causally efficient does necessarily arise, cease to exist and also continue. To say that the sensuous world is true and the self is untrue can be possible only in ordinary parlour, but it can never be a language expressive of the truth that is deep and unfathomable. On the other hand, to say that the self alone is the ultimate truth while the sensuous world is unadulterated falsehood, can be the language of the spiritual world, but it can never be true of the world as it is. The saints and philosophers cannot express themselves in identical linguistic tools. In spiritual idiom the sensuous objects are momentary and evanescent. Such idiom could inspire detachment and renunciation, but would miserably fail as a device of logical investigation of the nature of truth. Logic does not distinguish between the reality of the sensuous object and the reality of the self. The material atoms are as real as the spiritual self in the eyes of the rationalist. All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple criterion of truth is as validly applicable to the material atom as to the spiritual self. When the spiritual values become identical with the world outside, the doctrine of impermanence turns to be a controversial issue. Otherwise that is a very valuable doctrine. All the spiritual thinkers, without any exception, have endorsed it. The Jainas also have assigned adequate importance to it. Among the twelve contemplations, impermanence occupies the first position. The practitioner of such contemplation repeats within himself the formula—everything is impermanent. But that belongs to the sphere of spirituality. As soon as one switches to rational thinking, it is the definite view of the Jaina philosophers that the discrepancy between the impermanence

3. *Tattvārthasūtra*. 5.29.
utpādavyayadhrauyayuktam sat.

4 *Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*

of the material and the permanence of the spiritual becomes untenable. To the reasoning mind the permanence and the impermanence are equally shared by the spiritual and the material world. A clear line of demarcation can never be drawn between permanence and impermanence. By the admission of such distinction the Sāṃkhya system had to assign both bondage and emancipation to *Prakṛti* (the primordial matter) instead of *Puruṣa* of whom the two were only metaphorically admissible. The *Puruṣa* is eternally free and pure. The admission of bondage and emancipation would make the latter amenable to change and impermanence, a position which could not be acceptable to the Sāṃkhya system.

Among the Jains, Ācārya Kundakunda has also asserted, like the Sāṃkhya, that the *Jīva* (the soul) is not the agent of *karma*. The *karma* is agent of itself. If the soul were the agent of *karma*, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly because he is not the agent, he is capable of getting rid of *karma*. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific nature which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the agent of the *karma* which is a heterogeneous entity? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious adjunct.⁴ One can defend the Sāṃkhya's assignment of bondage and emancipation to the *Prakṛti*. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say that it is only the *karmic* body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the semi-absolute substantial standpoint one could assert that the *jīva* (the soul) is the agent of *karma*.⁵ The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant.⁶ Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists for ever. An entity's continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we concentrate on similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of identity, universality or substance presents itself as the only valid alternative. The flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could

4. Bṛhad nayacakra. 191.

5. Ibid, 194.

bhāve sarāyamādī savve jīvammi jo du jāmpedi/
so hu asuddho utto kammāṇovāhiṇiravekkho//

6. Ibid, 192.

uppādavayam gaṇam kiccā jo gahai kevalā sattā/
bhaṇṇai so suddhaṇṇo iha sattāgāhio samaye//

one say that the mountain that his ancestors saw still continues to exist? Or the person in front is the same whom he saw yesterday? The old atoms are constantly giving place to new ones. A person's atomic physical conglomerate is being constantly emitted and replaced by a facsimile. In the absence of such emission the method of photography of the absent object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of permanence, exactly as the attention directed to the discrete modes gives rise to the impression of impermanence. Under these two diverse situations how should we distinguish between the truths of permanence and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would lead to the controversy that exists between the rival camps, each believing in one or the other alternative. Non-absolutism, however, does not admit the absolute validity of any one of these alternatives. According to it neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only relatively.⁷ There is no creation, according to Kundakunda, without destruction and no destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three—creation, destruction and continuity—is the truth.⁸ The instantaneous modality (*arthaparyāya*) is the mode that is momentary, according to which the mountain or man in front cannot be the same as had been seen ten years before. The prolonged modality (*vyañjanaparyāya*), on the other hand, is one that continues for an appreciably long time, according to which the mountain or the man standing before is the same as had been seen ten years ago. In instantaneous modality the recognition of similarity is absent while in prolonged modality it is predominant. To deduce impermanence and permanence respectively from dissimilarity and similarity is only a truth and not the truth that is ultimate. The dissimilarity in instantaneous modality as well as similarity in prolonged modality are both nothing but modes which would entail impermanence. In the unending chain of causality there comes a moment when a mountain or

7. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā 72.

evam vivadanti ṇayā micchābhīṇivesato paropparato/
idaniha savvaṇayamayam jīṇamatamaṇavajjamaccantam//

8. Pravacanasāra, 100 and 101.

ṇa bhavo bhāṅgavihīṇo bhāṅgo vā ṇatthi sambhavavihīṇo/
uppādo vi ya bhāṅgo ṇa viṇa dhovveṇa atthena//
uppādatthidibhāṅgā vijjante pajjaesu pajjāyā/
davve hi santi ṇiyadam tanhā davvam havadi savvam//

6 *Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*

a man, as an entity, ceases to exist and dissolves in atoms which, however, do continue to exist in the eternity of time and space. The soul that infused life in that body does likewise never cease to exist. The condition of permanence is the basic substance. A mode, whether momentary or continuous, dissimilar or similar, does as a rule establish impermanence.

The approach or the viewpoint (*naya*) of universality and permanence is the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika naya*) while that of particularity and change as origination-cum-cessation is the standpoint of modes (*pariyāyārthika naya*). These two are the basic standpoints that are mutually relative. From the relativity of these two are derived the two principles of non-absolutism, viz. identity-cum-difference of the universal and the particular, and the relativity or permanence-cum-impermanence.

The concomitance of existence and non-existence

The third axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of existence and non-existence. It is sometimes argued that because the surface of a wooden chair is hard, it bears weight and because it is soft, an axe can cut through it. And because hardness and softness contradict each other, they cannot co-exist. But as they appear to co-exist, both of them are only appearance and not reality. And along with their unreality the wooden chair is also unreal. This is not the way of non-absolutism, which regards an infinite number of mutually opposed attributes as an inalienable part of a real. A real is an integrated whole of infinite number of attributes. It is exactly because those attributes are mutually opposed that a real is a real in the true sense of the term. Opposition in fact is the richness of the real and in the absence of such opposition a real would be denuded of its reality. It is indeed the intrinsic nature of a real to be possessed of such opposed attributes and if so why should an attempt be made to deny its reality, by getting ourselves entangled in the labyrinth of imaginary contradictions. As Dharmakīrti puts it, who are we to deny what commends itself to the objects themselves? What should exercise our mind is the search for the source of those oppositions and the conditions of their synthesis. The philosophy of non-absolutism made such search and found that existence and non-existence go together. Affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is never possible. Affirmation is as much an attribute of a real as the negation. Existence is affirmation and non-existence is negation. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the

source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of non-existence. The substance of earth of which a pot is made is its own substance. Similarly the pot has its own space, time, colour and shape. A pot exists with reference to its own substance, space, time and modes. But it is non-existent as alien substance, space, time and modes. This relative estimation is a principle of synthesis. A pot does not both exist and not-exist with reference to identical factors of reference. Existence and non-existence as mutually opposed attributes do certainly exist simultaneously in the same object, but the basic conditions of the two (viz. existence and non-existence) are not identical. The principle of relativity points to the way of synthesis and testifies the reality of co-existence.

Acārya Akalaṅka has mentioned a number of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence. A pot exists with reference to its own nature, it does not exist with reference to an alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature' and 'alien nature'. *Akalaṅka's* reply is—the own nature refers to the things that is responsible for the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the alien nature establish the reality of a thing. If the alien nature, viz. a piece of cloth, is not excluded from the own nature, viz. the pot, the word 'pot' would be applicable as designation to all things. And in spite of such exclusion, if the own nature of the pot is not cognised, the latter would be a non-entity like a hare's horn.

The specifically intended pot again passes through a number of phases. Any one among these phases is the own nature while the preceding and succeeding phases are its alien natures.

An intermediate phase of the independent pot again is constantly subject to growth and decay. Therefore the state of the present moment is the own nature while the past and future states are the alien natures. If the existence of the pot is determinable by the past and future moments, exactly in the fashion of the present moment, then all pots—past, present and future—should together be existent at any one moment. The same logic will apply to the nature of non-existence. In other words, if a particular non-existence were determinable by all the past and future non-existences in the same fashion as the present non-existence is determined by its own nature, the upshot will be that any particular moment of non-existence is a totality of all non-existences—past, present and future. Existence and non-existence

8 *Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*

must each have its own nature, in the absence of which they would lose their identity.

Again, the momentary pot has a good many qualities and modes like colour, taste, smell, form etc. We know its existence by seeing its colour with our eyes, and in this context the colour is the own nature, while taste etc. of which we are not aware at the moment, are the alien nature. Had taste etc. been the own nature like the colour of the pot, visible at the moment, then the former would be of the nature of colour, on account of its being cognised along with the colour by the eye. And as a result the conception of senses, other than the eye, will be a futile imagination.

Epistemologically viewed, the idea of pot consequent upon the usage of the word 'pot' is the own nature (of pot), while the shape of the pot outside is the alien nature.

Consciousness has two aspects—

- (1) The aspect of being a cognition, just like an imageless mirror.
- (2) The aspect of being possessed of a cognitum, just like a mirror with an image

Of these two, the aspect of being possessed of a cognitum is the own nature (of a pot). In other words, in the epistemological situation, the pot qua the cognitum is the own nature while the cognition itself is the alien nature. The criterion is that the point of focus is the own nature while the other auxiliary conditions are the alien nature. The own nature in its essence is the object on which our cognition is fixed. Otherwise all things would be indeterminable. Thus if a pot is considered as nothing other than the cognition itself, then all other things, like a piece of cloth etc., as cognita would be identical with the pot. Exactly similar consequences will follow if non-existence of a pot is identified with the cognition itself because in that case, non-existence being something indeterminable, the entity called pot would not be amenable to any kind of treatment, ontological or practical.⁹

The Concomitance of the Speakable and the Unspeakable

The fourth axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the

9. *Tattvārthavārttika*, 1/6:

athavā nāmasthāpanādravyabhāveṣu yo vivakṣitaḥ saḥ svātmā, itaraḥ parātmā. tatra vivakṣitātmanā ghaṭaḥ, netaṛātmanā. yadītarātmanāpi ghaṭaḥ syāt, vivakṣitāmānā vā' ghaṭaḥ, nāmādivyavahārocchedaḥ syāt.

speakable and the unspeakable. A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes. It is, however, not possible to express in language those infinite number of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this infinitude of the aspects of a thing.¹⁰ Only one attribute can at best be spoken of in one moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus speakable with reference to only a limited number of its attributes.

The Wide Range of Non-absolutism

The above four axioms are the foundations of non-absolutism. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy this tetrad of axioms was fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. The growth and development of the epistemological apparatus also did not detract from the importance of these basic axioms. It was always appreciated that the epistemological apparatus itself needed the service of non-absolutism for its own systematic development. Non-absolutism, in fact, was a most comprehensive principle that determined the nature of Jaina thought in all its branches, social, ethical, psychological, ontological, metaphysical and the like. It was Acārya Siddhasena with whom the application of non-absolutism to the various branches of Jaina thought started. After dealing with the nature of varieties of the valid sources of knowledge, Siddhasena added, at the end of his *Nyāyāvātāra*, an investigation into the nature of non-absolutism signifying its unavailability in every such treatise. Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Haribhadra, Mānikyanandi, Vādideva, Hemacandra and others also discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of non-absolutism. The principle of non-absolutism was not in the least adversely affected with the development of the science of logic and epistemology, but its importance was rather enhanced as a criterion of the investigation of the nature of logico-epistemological tools. And as a result the concomitance of being and non-being, one and many etc. was gradually firmly established, and Jaina metaphysics developed with the growth of the logical thought.

There is, however, no reason to believe that these axioms of

10. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā 450 (svopajñavṛtti.).

ukkosayasutaṇāṇī vi jāṇamāṇo vi te' bhillappe vi/
na tarati savve vottum ṇa pahuppati jeṇa kālo se//

—iha tānutkṛṣṭaśruto jānāno' bhilāpyānapi sarvān (na)

bhāṣate, anantatvāt, parimitatvāccāyusaḥ, kramavartimītvād vāca iti.

non-absolutism were not effective in the *Āgamic* period. Nor is it a valid assumption that these axioms were discovered in the period of philosophical speculations. The difference, if any, lay in the spheres of the application of these axioms in those two periods. In the *Āgamic* period, the principles were applied mainly in the field of ontology, while in the speculative age it was in demand for the synthesis of philosophical issues of all types.

The Concomitance of Being and Non-being

The following dialogue between Lord Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama throws welcome light on the problem.

Gautama : O Lord ! Does being change into being ? Does non-being change into non-being ?

Lord : Yes, Gautama ! This is exactly so.

Gautama : O Lord ! Does this change of being into being and non-being into non-being take place owing to some effort or occur spontaneously ?

Lord : Gautama ! It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.

Gautama: O Lord ! Does your non-being change into non-being exactly in the same way as your being changes into being ? Similarly does your being change into being exactly as your non-being changes into non-being ?

Lord : Yes, Gautama ! That is exactly so.¹¹

The above dialogue clearly defines Lord Mahāvīra's assertion of the concomitance of being and non-being in the same entity as also their distinct causal identities.

Lord Mahāvīra rejected both the propositions viz. everything exists (*sarvaṃ asti*) and nothing exists (*sarvaṃ nāsti*). He proposed a synthesis of the two. Both being and non-being are true. They are distinct, though predicable of the same entity. The distinctness of the two is unambiguously demonstrated in the following words of

11. Bhagavāi. I.133-135.

se nūṇaṃ bhante ! athittam atthitte pariṇama? natthittam natthitte pariṇamai?
hantā goyamā! athittam atthitte pariṇamai.

je ṇaṃ bhante! athittam atthitte pariṇamai. natthittam natthitte pariṇamai. tam kim payogasā? vīsasā?

goyamā! payogasā vi tam, vīsasā vi tam. jahā te bhante ! athittam atthitte pariṇamai, natthittam natthitte pariṇamai? Jahā te natthittam natthitte pariṇamai, tahā te athittam atthitte pariṇamai ? hantā goyamā! jahā me athittam atthitte pariṇamai, tahā me natthittam natthitte pariṇamai. jahā me natthittam natthitte pariṇamai, tahā me athittam atthitte pariṇamai.

Gautama addressed to the upholders of heterodox doctrines. 'We never, O beloved of gods ! speak of being as non-being and non-being as being. We affirm being of the concept 'everything exists' (*sarvaṃ asti*) and non-being of the proposition 'nothing exists' (*sarvaṃ nāsti*). The implication is that being is true as being and non-being is true as non-being. In other words, being and non-being are both real. It is interesting to note here that it is exactly these two propositions which were advanced by two rival Buddhist schools viz., the *sarvāstivādins* and the *Mādhyamika śūnyavādins*.¹²

The implication of the above dialogue is the rejection of absolute being and absolute non-being, and acceptance of the synthesis of the two as concrete aspects of an entity. Being and non-being are also explained as possessed of their definite place and value in the above dialogue.

The Concomitance of the Permanent and the Impermanent

'Is it true, O Lord!', asked Gautama, 'that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable breaks whereas the stable does not break ?'

'Yes, Gautama! This is exactly so.'¹³

A substance is the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence. This is explained in the following dialogue between Maṇḍitaputra and the Lord.

Maṇḍitaputra: 'Is it true, O Lord ! that the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it passes through various states ?'

Lord : 'Yes, Maṇḍitaputra ! This is true.'¹⁴

The same has been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity in Jainism.¹⁵

12. Ibid, 7. 217.

tae naṃ se bhagavaṃ goyame te aṇṇuttthie evaṃ vayāsī—no khalu vyaṃ devaṇuppiā ! atthi bhāvāṃ natthi tti vadāmo, natthi bhāvāṃ atthi tti vadāmo. aṃhe naṃ devaṇuppiyā ! savvaṃ atthi bhāvāṃ atthi tti vadāmo, savvaṃ natthi bhāvāṃ natthi tti vadāmo.

13. Ibid, 1.440.

se nūnaṃ bhante ! athire palottai, no thire palottai ? athire bhajjai, no thire bhajjai ?—hantā goyamā ! athire palottai, no thire palottai. athire bhajjai, no thire bhajjai---

14. jīve naṃ bhante ! sayā samitam eyati, veyati, calati, phandai, ghattai, khubbhai, udīrai, taṃ taṃ bhāvāṃ pariṇamai ? hantā maṇḍiaputtā ! jīve naṃ sayā samitam eyati—taṃ taṃ bhāvāṃ pariṇamai.

15. Ibid, 7. 150.

The permanence of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while its impermanence is due to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is manifest from the following dialogue:—

Gautama : 'Is the soul permanent or impermanent, O Lord ?'

Lord : 'The soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in another respect. It is permanent in respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes which originate and vanish.'¹⁶

This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor absolutely impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.

The Concomitance of Identity and Difference of Substance and Modes

'Knowledge is the defining characteristic of a soul.'¹⁷ Here the soul-substance and the knowledge-quality are given from the stand-point of difference. On the other hand, it has also been said that what is designated as the soul is the knower, or conversely what is designated as the knower is the soul.¹⁸ Such *Agamic* texts assert the identity of soul and knowledge.

The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water, before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally different from earth.¹⁹ A pot is a product and earth is its material cause; in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity-cum-difference.

16. Ibid, 7. 58-59.

jīvaṃ naṃ bhante! kiṃ sāsaya? asāsaya?
goyamā! jīvaṃ siya sāsaya, siya asāsaya.
se keṇattheṇaṃ bhante! evaṃ vuccai—jīvaṃ siya sāsaya, siya asāsaya?
goyamā! davvatthayaē sāsaya, bhāvatthayaē asāsaya.

17. Uttarajjhayaṇāni, 28. 10.

jīvo uvaogalakkhaṇo.

18. Āyāro, 5. 104.

je āyā se viṇṇāyā, je viṇṇāyā se āyā. jeṇa vijāṇati se āyā.

19. Sanmatiprakaraṇa, 3. 52.

natthi pudhaviṇṇaṃ ghaḍo tti jaṃ teṇa jujjai aṇaṇṇo/
jaṃ puṇa ghaḍo tti puvvaṃ na āsi pudhaviṇṇo taṃ aṇṇo//

The Concomitance of One and Many

There are dialogues which throw light on the concomitance of one and many. The following dialogue is an illustration in point:—

Somila : 'Are you one or many, O Lord ?'

Lord : 'I am one in respect of substance, O Somila, However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance) I am immutable, eternal and unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.'²⁰

The nature of the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The substance stands for the universal and the modes for the particular. The substance is eternal while the modes are changeable.

The universal is two-fold—the horizontal (*tiryag*) and the vertical (*ūrdhva*).²¹ The proposition 'I am one', refers to the horizontal universal which is the experience of unity (*ekatva*), pervasiveness (*anvaya*) and essence (*dhruvatva*). The proposition 'I am many', in respect of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universal. There is the experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universal is the essence pervading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The vertical universal consists in the successive changes that are similar, which establishes a unity running through the past, present and future.

We find elaborate investigations into the nature of non-absolutism and the doctrine of relativism in the *Āgamic* literature. The dictum—no word of the *jina* is independent of *naya* (a particular viewpoint) is the reputed principle of *Āgamic* exegesis. Each proposition of the *Āgama* was explained by means of the *nayas*. The tradition says that the *Dr̥ṣṭivāda*, the twelfth text of the basic scripture, contained philosophical discussions based on different viewpoints. By the third century B.C. the main part of the text was lost, leaving behind only a fragment of it. *Vācaka Umāsvāti* and *Ācārya Siddhasena* were the

20. Bhagavaī, 18. 219-220.

ege bhavam? duve bhavam? akkhae bhavam? avvae bhavam? avattie bhavam?
aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie bhavam?

somilā ege vi aham jāva aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie vi aham.

se keṇa/thenam bhante! evam vuccai....?

somila ! davva/ṭhayāe ege aham, nāṇadamsaṇa/ṭhayāe dūvihe aham, paesa/ṭhayāe
akkhae vi aham, avvae vi aham] uvayoga/ṭhayāe aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie vi aham.

21. Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, 5.3.

pioneers in the application of the *nayas* to the different philosophical problems of their times and Ācārya Samantabhadra carried this process to its consummation by including a good number of new issues that had cropped up by his time. Siddhasena clearly demonstrated that the Sāṃkhya system illustrated the substantial standpoint whereas the Buddhist philosophy is a representative of the modal viewpoint. In this way he made an evaluation of all the systems of thought that were extant, from the relativistic standpoint, with reference to different *nayas*. The most important treatise of his on the subject is the *Sanmati Tarka*, while the most significant work of Samantabhadra on this subject is the *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, in which he has most successfully been able to apply the principle of sevenfold predication to the current problems of universal and particular, identity and difference, existence and non-existence and such other mutually opposed doctrines to establish a synthesis between them. Both these treatises can be regarded as pioneer works of the philosophy of non-absolutism.

Non-absolutism : Results and Problems

The philosophical speculations based on the non-absolutistic attitude gradually gained in depth. By the eighth century A.D. Ācārya Haribhadra and Akalaṅka further widened its scope. Ācārya Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* bears self-evident testimony to this process. The synthetic approach had also an uninterrupted growth. A serious doubt, however, presented itself. The question arose as to whether Jaina philosophy is a mere syncretistic eclectic movement or it had its own original thinking. Some modern scholars also adopt this line of thinking and are convinced that the Jaina thinkers developed their own philosophy by appropriating alien doctrines. Such thought owes its origin to the synthetic approach of the Jains to philosophical problems. Vācaka Umāsvāti raises the question whether the *nayas* are the proponents of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition inspired by diverse opinions, and answers that they are only different estimates (literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision) of the object known.²² *Yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇaireko'rthah*

22. Tattvārthabhāṣya, 1.35.

kimete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapaḥṣagrāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti. atrocyate, naite tantrāntarīyā nāpi svatantrā matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ. jñeyasya tvarthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṅghetāni.

yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇairekorthaḥ pramīyate saviśayaniyamāt, na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti, tadvannavavādāiti.

pramīyate svaviṣayaniyamāt, na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvad nayavāda iti. It is also asserted in this connection that three is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between different cognitions of the same object by different instruments of knowledge, such as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person.

The Doctrine of Conditional Dialectics and Sevenfold Predication

The expression *Syādvāda* (conditional dialectics) is composed of two words, viz. 'syāt' and 'vāda'. 'syāt' is an indeclinable that appears like a verbal form in the potential mood. It stands for multiplicity, obligation, reasoning etc.. But in the present context it stands for multiplicity or multiple character (*anekānta*).²³ The term is also used to denote particular space and time,²⁴ as well as probability (*sambhāvanā*) and doubt. The word *syāt* in the expression *syādvāda* has not been used to mean doubt. It is used to denote multiplicity or multiple character (*anekānta*). The implication is that *Syādvāda* is the doctrine of the multiple character of real. It is a doctrine that is known as *Anekānta* or the non-absolutistic estimation of reality in its infinitely multiple character. This non-absolutistic estimation is definite in its character and free from all doubts as indicated by the expression *syāt* which is absolutely free from any kind of association, direct or indirect, with the verbal form *syāt* used in the potential mood of *Sanskrit* conjugation of verbal roots.²⁵ Probability (*sambhāvanā*) and relativity, however, are implied by the word 'syāt'

The word 'syāt' is necessary for the affirmation of the desired attribute to the exclusion of the undesired one. And this is why all the propositions, in order to be precise in meaning, should be accompanied by the use of the word 'syāt'.²⁶ The propositions without such express use of 'syāt' should be understood to have that word implicitly. The word 'syāt' has a double implication:

(1) Negation without affirmation or affirmation without negation is

23. Tattvārthavārttika, 4.42.

sa ca liṅanta (tīnanta) pratirūpako nipātaḥ. tasyānekāntavidhivicārādiṣu bahuṣvartheṣu sambhavatsu iha vivakṣāvaśāt anekāntārtho gṛhyate.

24. Kaśāyapāhuda, part I, p. 370.

siyāsaddo nivāyattādo jadi vi anegesu atthesu vattade, to vi ettha kattha kāle dese tti edesu atthesu vattamāṇo ghettaṅvo.

25. Tattvārthavārttika, 1.6.

syādvādo niścitarthaḥ apekṣitayāthātathyavastuvāditvāt.

26. Nyāyakumudacandra, part II, p. 694

syātkāramantareṇa iṣṭāniṣṭayorvidhiniṣedhānupapatteḥ.

not possible.

- (2) The generic attribute (continuity or the universal) and the specific attribute (origination, cessation or the particular)—both these are relative. We never experience origination-cessation without continuity or the latter without the former.

The nature of a real is not omnigenous and so it exists in its own nature and does not exist in the nature of alien things, or, to be more exact, a real exists in its present mode and does not exist in its modes that have passed away or will come in the future.

The cycle of origination and cessation goes on uninterrupted. The mode that arises is the affirmation, whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise is the negation of the object. Affirmation and negation are thus simultaneous moments of the real.

A sensuous cognition of an object is positive in character and never negative according to some thinkers. The inference (*anumāna*) is, however, positive and negative both. According to the conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*) affirmation and negation are the attributes of the real. We perceive fire and the affirmation in this case means that the fire exists in a particular place. When we try to infer fire from smoke, the existence of smoke proves the existence of fire in a particular place while the existence of a contradictory probans (*hetu*) proves the non-existence of fire. But the affirmation or the negation in the conditional dialectics is not related to space or time of the object. They are related to the determination of the nature of the object. The fire in a particular place or time exists in its own nature, that is, its affirmation is dependent on its constituents and its denial is dependent on the elements that do not constitute its character. Affirmation and negation are co-existent in an object. On account of its positive character a thing is existent in its own nature, while on account of its negative aspect it is not mixed up with what is other than itself. In other words, the nature of an object is definite on account of its self-affirmation and negation of alien elements. This is indeed the reality of the real.²⁷ The word 'syā' defines this definiteness of the nature of an object.

The conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*) is also known as the exposition by division (*vibhajyavāda*)²⁸ or the doctrine of alternatives

27. Tattvārthavārttika, 1.6.

svaparātmopādānāpohanavyavasthāpādyam hi vastuno vastutvam.

28. Sūyagaḍo, 1. 14. 22.

saṃkejja yā' saṃkitabhāva bhikkhū,

vibhajjavāyam ca viyāgarejjā/

bhāsādugam dhammasamutthitehim,

viyāgarejjā samayā' supaṇṇe//

(*bhajanāvāda*)²⁹ This follows from the following exhortation of Lord Mahāvīra: 'A monk should take resort to the doctrine of exposition by division (*vibhajyavāda*); he should utilise all possible alternatives and should never adhere to an absolutistic attitude in explaining the nature of a thing.' The Lord himself explained many a problem by means of this method of division.

Once Jayantī asked the Lord which was better between the states of slumber and awakening.

'For some souls, O Jayantī! the slumber is commendable, but for others awakening is wholesome.'³⁰

'Why is it so, O Lord!'

'The slumber is wholesome for those who are engaged in sinful activities, while for the virtuous awakening is commendable.'

The exclusive assertion of the wholesomeness of slumber or awakening would be an absolutistic answer which was not approved by Lord Mahāvīra who explained all the questions by means of divisions of issues avoiding exclusiveness.

If the identity of the substance and the attributes is accepted, both will merge into each other, losing their duality, and as a consequence the proposition 'the attribute subsists in a substance' would be impossible.

If, again, the attribute were absolutely different from the substance, the proposition 'this attribute belongs to this substance' would be impossible, because, in the absence of some sort of identity the proposition would be meaningless. According to the doctrine of alternatives (*bhajanāvāda*) the rule of exclusiveness of identity or difference cannot be acceptable. The doctrine of alternatives (*bhajanāvāda*) approves of both identity and difference. The adjective-substantive relationship between the substance and the attribute would be impossible if there were absolute identity between them. This difficulty is resolved by the relativistic viewpoint of the doctrine of alternatives. In the proposition 'a blue lotus', 'blue' is the adjective while 'lotus' is the substantive. The quality 'blue' is identical with the 'lotus', yet the substantive-adjective relationship subsists between them. 'A man with a beard is coming', in this proposition the expression 'with a beard' is the adjective of the expression 'man' which is the substantive. The adjective must be in some respect different from the substantive, and this is why the substantive-adjective

29. Kasāyapāhuḍa, part I, p. 281.

30. Bhagavāi, 12. 53. 54.

18 *Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*

relationship does not offer any logical inconsistency in accepting the relationship of identity-cum-difference between the substance and its attributes.

There is no contradiction between the positum and the negatum. This is the implication or pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*). The duality of apparently contrary attributes enjoys mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) as a synthesis of infinite number of such dualities is established. The conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) is, in essence, the system of propositions expressing such multiple character of the real. In these propositions affirmation, negation and such other alternatives define the nature of the real. This can be demonstrated by the doctrine of sevenfold predication (*saptabhāṅgī*) which is as follows:

1. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists in some respect (*syat*).
2. The pot certainly (*eva*) does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
3. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists and does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
4. The pot is certainly (*eva*) indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
5. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
6. The pot certainly (*eva*) does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
7. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists, certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).

It represents the existence of the pot, relegating the other attributes to a secondary position by excluding them from the intended area of reference.

The expression 'eva' (certainly) in the above propositions indicates the definite character of the assertion or the negation or indescribability or their possible combinations. Sometimes it is suggested that the expression 'also' (*api*) should be substituted for the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) in the above propositions. But such substitution would not carry much meaning. Without the use of the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) the intended attributes (existence, non-existence etc.) would not be definitely determined. In the absence of relativism indicated by the phrase 'in some respect' (*syāt*) the use of the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) would confer an absolutistic import on the propositions. But by the use of the word 'syāt' (in some respect)

indicative of relativism, the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) loses the absolutistic import and confers definiteness on the intended attributes predicated in the propositions.

The expression 'eva' (exclusively) is used to serve three purposes—

1. The exclusion of non-relationship. (*ayogavyavaccheda*)
2. The exclusion of the relationship with other (*anyayogavyavaccheda*)
3. The exclusion of absolute non-relationship (*atyantayogavyavaccheda*)

In the proposition 'the conch is white exclusively' there is the exclusion of non-relationship. The expression 'eva' (exclusively) is attached to the adjective for excluding the doubt about the existence of the adjective. When the whiteness of the conch is under query, the assertion is made that the conch is white exclusively.

In the proposition 'Pārtha alone is the archer', the exclusion of archership from any person other than Pārtha (Arjuna) is intended. Nobody is in doubt about the archership of Pārtha, but the use of the expression 'exclusively' (*eva*) is used to set at rest the common doubt as to whether there is any other person equal to Pārtha in the art of archery.

In the proposition 'a blue lotus certainly exists', the absolute non-relationship (between a lotus and blueness) is excluded. In this proposition 'certainly' (*eva*) is attached to the verb 'exists' in order to exclude the doubt about the affirmation of universal existence or absolute non-existence (of blueness in the lotus).

In the proposition 'the pot certainly exists in some respect', the word 'pot' is the substantive and the word 'exists' is the adjective. The word 'certainly' (*eva*) is connected with the adjective (viz. *asti*) and determines the attribute of existence of the pot. If the phrase 'in some respect' (*syāt*) were not used in the proposition, the admission of absolute existence would be the result, which was not desirable, because there are also attributes other than existence in the pot. The use of the expression 'syāt' (in some respect) precludes such undesirable consequences. It also widens the limit imposed by the expression 'eva' (certainly). The unambiguous assertion of the intended attribute and the comprehension of many an unmentioned attribute are effected by the joint use of the words 'syāt' and 'eva'.

In the doctrine of sevenfold predication (*saptabhāṅgī*) the

affirmation and negation of the predicate are respectively made in the first two propositions, the predominant feature in the first being position and in the second negation. The attribute verbally mentioned is evidently predominant, while the attribute not so mentioned, but only understood, is secondary and subordinate.

A thing is not absolutely devoid of its own nature and so it is described by means of affirmation as a predominant character. Nor is it omnigenous and so it is described by means of negation as a predominant factor. Negation is as much an attribute of a thing as affirmation. A pot has existence in respect of its own substance. This is affirmation. The pot has non-existence in respect of an alien substance. This is negation. Apparently thus the negation is a relative mode, that is, a mode with reference to another thing. But truly speaking this is not so. Negation is an intrinsic potency of a thing. A substance, if it were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would not be able to preserve its substancehood. Negation is predicated with reference to other things and so it is called relative or 'dependent on others'. The negation acts as a protecting shield by not allowing the encroachment of alien existences. A pot exists in respect of its own substance and does not exist in respect of an alien substance—both these propositions reveal the truth that the pot is a relative entity, as much dependent on itself as on others for its definite nature. This relativism falsifies either of the propositions, viz. the moment of existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence or that the moment of non-existence of a thing is bereft of existence. Existence and non-existence (affirmation and negation) are simultaneous. But this simultaneity is incapable of being expressed by a single word at a single moment. This is why a third proposition is requisitioned for expressing the simultaneity of existence and non-existence through the expression 'indescribable' (*avaktavya*). The implication is that the existence and non-existence are necessarily co-existent, but they are unspeakable simultaneously by a single expression on account of the absence of any linguistic symbol capable of discharging this ambivalent function.

It would follow from the above that there are only three fundamental predicables, viz. existent, non-existent and indescribable. The remaining four predicables are but the different combinations of these three taken two or three at a time. In the *Āgamic* period the use of three predicables was mostly in vogue. The use of the seven

predicables is also found in some cases.^{31*}

Once Gautama asked Lord Mahāvīra—‘O Lord! is a two spaced aggregate self, not-self or indescribable?’

Lord replied—‘O Gautama! a two spaced aggregate is self in some respect, not-self in some respect and indescribable in some respect.’

Gautama said—‘How is it so, O Lord!?’

Mahāvīra replied—‘O Gautama! it is self in respect of its own nature, it is not-self in respect of alien nature and it is indescribable in respect of both.’

Four additional predicables follow spontaneously, viz.—

1. A two-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not-self in some respect.
2. A two-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
3. A two-spaced aggregate is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.

The seventh predicable follows in respect of a three-spaced aggregate—

4. A three-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.

A thing is positive and negative rolled into one. The doctrine of sevenfold predication has been framed on the basis of this dual attribute of position and negation. The dualities of universal-particular, permanent-impermanent, describable-indescribable can also constitute this system of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*).

31. Ibid, 12. 2. 9.

* In the case of the objects that are non-composite (for instance, a monad), the attributes are only three in number, viz. self, not-self and indescribable. Here ‘indescribable’ means the impossibility of the object being spoken of or described exclusively as ‘self’ or ‘not-self’ because of the same object being both (self and not-self) at the same time. These three attributes, however, become six in the case of a dyad (a composite body of two space-points) as follows : (1) self, (2) not-self, (3) indescribable, (4) self and not-self (one attribute for each space-point), (5) self and indescribable (one attribute for each space-point), (6) not-self and indescribable (one attribute for each space-point). These six ways again become seven in case of a triad (a composite body of three space-points) in the following way : (1) to (2) as above, and (3) self, not-self and indescribable (one attribute for each of three space-points). Here the fourth, fifth and sixth ways have each two more subdivisions. Thus the fourth, viz. self and not-self, has the following two additional subdivisions. (1) self (for two space-points) and (2) not-self (for the remaining one space-point). The fifth and sixth ways also have similar subdivisions.

Each of these dualities can be used as the predicates of the seven propositions. Three propositions constituted by these duals are given below by way of illustration. It should be noted here that the Jaina philosopher's conception of universal is quite different from that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. The Jainas substitute similarity for universal—

1. The pot certainly is similar in some respect.
The pot certainly is different in some respect.
The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
2. The pot certainly is permanent in some respect.
The pot certainly is impermanent in some respect.
The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
3. The pot certainly is speakable in some respect.
The pot certainly is unspeakable in some respect.
The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.

Each attribute of an object can give rise to a system of sevenfold predication (*saptabhangī*). Permanence and impermanence being mutually contradictory attributes, how could they qualify the same pot. It is on the basis of relativism that a synthesis is established between these mutually opposed attributes.

The Greek poet-philosopher Heraclitus of the 6th-5th century B.C believed in the doctrine of the co-existence of contraries. His relativism is the spur which pricks the side of a sluggish conservatism in all departments of life—taste and morals, politics and society—and it is the absence of relativism that, according to Heraclitus, is responsible for absolutisms and stagnation in philosophical thinking. Heraclitus announced for the first time in Greek thought the principle of relativity of qualities which he pushed forthwith to its extreme consequences in the words 'good and bad are the same', 'we are and we are not'. The movement of life, according to him, is like the back-returning of the bow, to which he compares it,³² an energy of traction and tension restraining an energy of release, every force of action compensated by a corresponding force of reaction. By the resistance of one to the other all the harmonies of existence are created.*

Heraclitus was a fluxist and, therefore, a relativist. In point of fact his doctrine of flux and his doctrine of relativity lead to the same result; the successive states of an object as well as its simultaneous qualities

32. Pāścātya Darśana, pp. 5, 6.

* Sri Aurobindo, Birth Centenary Library, Vol. XVI, page 3521.

frequently both bear the stamp of a far-reaching diversity which amounts at times to complete contradiction. In one aspect, according to him, X is 'good', in another aspect it is 'bad'. He believed in a fundamental law in the natural as well as the spiritual world that contraries were not mutually exclusive, but rather pre-supposed and conditioned, or were even identical with each other. His theory of relativity contained like a folded flower the correct doctrine of sense-perception with its recognition of the subjective factor, and it taught Greek thinkers the lesson they were bound to acquire if they were to be saved from a bottomless scepticism.*

The relativism of Heraclitus is based on fluxism. But the basis of relativism of the Jaina philosopher is quite different, according to whom the momentariness is as much dependent on permanence as the latter is dependent on the former. Momentariness and permanence both together constitute the nature of the real. They do not occur in succession but are co-existent and inseparable. Change or momentariness is only one aspect of the thing and is meaningless without its co-ordinate, viz. the permanence. Relativity, in fact, is understandable on the interdependence of the two aspects, viz. momentariness and permanence, in the absence of which it is unthinkable. It is only on the simultaneous existence of the two contrary aspects or attributes that relativity acquires a meaning.

Śrī Aurobindo thinks that Heraclitus seems to recognise the inextricable unity of the eternal and the transitory, that which is for ever and yet seems to exist only in this strife and change which is a continual dying.

If this estimate is acceptable, the philosophy of Heraclitus would be nearer to the Jaina standpoint. But even then the Jaina philosopher would disagree because the transitoriness and eternity are co-ordinate factors, neither being sub-ordinate to the other, as Śrī Aurobindo or the Vedāntists would like to believe. Ācārya Amṛtacandra³³ has brought out the equipollence of the two contrary attributes by the examples of churning by a milkmaid, who moves her left and right arm alternately in opposite directions to make butter, thus exercising both the arms in succession. In the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*), similarly, of the two contrary attributes one is

* T. Gomperz, op. cit. pages 66-70.

33. Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya, verse 225.

ekenākaraṣantī ślathayantī vastutattvamitareṇa/
antena jayati jaini nītirmanthānanetramiva gopī//

assigned prominence by relegating the other to the background at a time. This explains the nature of relativism or relativity of the Jaina philosopher. None of the attributes is subordinate to the other, both being active in their own way to discharge their respective functions and constitute the nature of the real.

The doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*) and its results

1. In the science of logic causality is a universal postulate. But in the conditional dialectic causality is not a universally applicable principle which is active only in the gross world. The subtle or the micro-cosmic world is governed by its own rules where the cause effect relationship becomes too thin to be recognised. The succession of cause and effect becomes meaningless at that stage. Momentariness changes into smooth passing from one state to another without any gap. Origination and cessation become meaningless. In the language of the traditional *karma* doctrine the causal concatenation can be detected in the phenomena of the fruition or disappearance of *Karma*. The changes taking place in the gross atomic aggregates also appear as subject to causality. However, in the changes that are spontaneous and intrinsic, the principle of causality is not applicable in the ordinary sense of the term. In Jaina ontology it is averred that the colour of an atom definitely changes after the lapse of a definite period, the cause of such change being undefined. An atom is here governed by its own intrinsic nature. The instantaneous modality (*artha paryāya*) of an atom is beyond the range of the principle of causality. A substance undergoes change every moment. The reality of the present moment can remain intact in the succeeding moment provided the former could mould itself in consonance with the latter. The nature of the instantaneous mode (*artha paryāya*) has found expression in the following traditional verse—

*Anādinidhane loke, svaparyāyāḥ pratikṣaṇam/
Utpadyante vipadyante, jalakallolavajjale//*

‘In the substance, which is without beginning and without end, the modes arise and vanish by themselves every moment like the waves that emerge and merge in the ocean without interruption.’

The doctrine of causality stands exposed in the light of the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayas*) thus—

The doctrine of causality finds its proper place and exposition in

the pantoscopic, analytic and momentary viewpoints (that take note of the prolonged mode.).

The doctrine of causality assumes quite a different meaning that is tantamount to its abrogation in the verbal, etymological and functional viewpoints. An effect arises by its own nature spontaneously according to these viewpoints. An effect cannot depend on anything else for its origination. It is meaningless to say that a self-created object has a cause that is something other than itself. When the cause and effect are identical, it is redundant to assert a relationship *tertium quid* between the two. It follows, therefore, that an effect arises spontaneously and intrinsically from and by itself independent of anything outside it.³⁴

2. The existence of mode is made subordinate and ignored in the purely substantial viewpoint (*śuddha-dravyārthika-naya*), and, therefore, the divisions of time into the past, future and present do not exist.³⁵ The three verbal viewpoints (*śabda-nayas*), being concerned with 'becoming', accept modes and, therefore, three divisions of time are real according to them. The implication is that the unchanging aspect of the substance is timeless, the instantaneous mode being just momentary is also virtually timeless. It is only the verbal or conceptual mode (*vyañjana-paryāya*) that depends on the divisions of time, being a sort of prolonged existence. The substance in its three aspects virtually represents three different systems of philosophy, viz. the monistic Vedānta that believes in absolutely unchanging Brahma, the Buddhist fluxism that adumbrates unceasing change and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that believes in both permanence and change.

3. The substance consists in modes that are successive and non-successive. Such modes exist in the present in the aspects as intendent or known by the cogniser, but do not exist in those aspects in the other divisions of time. This differentiation of aspects owing to the condition of time is matched by a similar differentiation on account of

34. Kasāyapāhūḍa, part I, p. 319.

edaṃ negama-saṃgaha-vavahāra-ujusudāṇam, tattha kajjakāraṇabhāvasambhavādo. tiṇhaṃ saddaṇayāṇaṃ ṇa keṇa vi kasāo, tattha kāraṇeṇa viṇā kajjupattīe. ahavā odaieṇa bhāveṇa kasāo. edaṃ negamādicauṇhaṃ ṇayāṇam. tiṇhaṃ saddaṇayāṇaṃ pāriṇāmieṇa bhāveṇa kasāo. kāraṇeṇa viṇā kajjupattīdo.

35. Ibid, part I, p. 260.

appahāṇīkayapariṇāmesu suddhadavvaṭṭhīesu ṇaesu ṇādī-dāṇāgayavattamāṇakālavibhāgo atthī.

other causes and conditions as well. A novel system of sevenfold predication of the conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) can be conceived on this variety of causes and conditions, viz.³⁶

1. The substance is one.
2. It exists in some respect.
3. It has an originating condition.
4. It has also a source of origin.
5. It is also related to something else.
6. It has also a location.
7. It has also a time.

Among the modes that occur in succession it is only the present one that is definite, whereas the modes that are to come are not regulated by any rule regarding their probability and indefinite occurrence. It is not possible to predict definitely that such a mode could necessarily occur in succession of a particular mode. In this connection one should note Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics according to which it is impossible to assert in terms of the ordinary conventions of geometrical position and of motion that a particle (as an electron) is at the same time at a specified point and moving with a specified velocity, for the more accurately either factor can be measured, the less accurately the other can be asserted.

4. The doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) is applicable not only for the explanation of spatial, temporal and quantitative relative modes, but it can be validly applied for ascertaining the intrinsic modes of the substance. Permanence and impermanence are the intrinsic modes which appear as contraries in the gross world. These are not contrary in essence and, therefore, their contrariety can be solved by relativity.

5. In the context of the doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) a study of the relativity of the modern science is very valuable.

Some expert statisticians have studied this sevenfold predication of the doctrine of conditional dialectic in the light of the principles of statistics. We quote here an *excerpt* from an article of Prof. P.C. Mahalanobis.—

'I should now like to make some brief observations of my own

36. Ibid, part I, p 309 (quoted from Jayadhavalā)
 kathancit kenacit kaścit kutāścit kasyacit kvacit/
 kadācicceti paryāyāt syādvādaḥ saptabhaṅgabhr̥t//

on the connection between Indian-Jaina views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of *syādvāda*, namely *avaktavya* or the 'indeterminate' is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1) assertion ('it is'), (2) negation ('it is not'), and (3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of *syādvāda*, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative (but not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability. Used in a purely qualitative sense, the fourth category of predication in Jaina logic corresponds precisely to the meaning of probability which covers the possibility of (a) something existing, (b) something not-existing, and (c) sometimes existing and sometimes not existing. The difference between Jaina '*avaktavya*' and 'probability' lies in the fact that the latter (that is, the concept of probability) has definite quantitative implications, namely, the recognition of numerical frequencies of occurrence of (1) 'it is', or (2) 'it is not', and hence in the recognition of relative numerical frequencies of the first two categories of 'it is' and 'it is not' in a synthetic form. It is the explicit recognition of (and emphasis on) the concept of numerical frequency ratios which distinguishes modern statistical theory from the Jaina theory of *syādvāda*. At the same time it is of interest to note that 1500 or 2500 years ago *syādvāda* seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.

Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jaina view that 'a real is a particular which possesses a generic attributes.' This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jaina view, in fact, denies the possibility of making any predication about a single and unique individual which would be also true in modern statistical theory.

The third point to be noted is the emphasis given in Jaina philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern statistics.

The Jaina view of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. 'A real changes every moment and at the same time continues' is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.

Fifthly, the most important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. In *syādvāda* the qualification 'syāt' that is, 'may be or perhaps' must be attached to every predication without any exception. All predication, according to *syādvāda*, thus, has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of 'uncertain inference' in modern statistical theory. The Jaina view, however, is essentially qualitative in this matter (while the great characteristic of modern statistical theory is its insistence on the possibility and significance of determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely certain predication naturally leads Jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the inadequacy of 'pure' or 'formal' logic, and hence to stress the need of making inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.

I should also like to point out that the Jaina view of causality as 'a relation of determination' based on the observation of 'concomitance in agreement and in difference' has dual reference to an internal condition 'in the developed state of our mind' which would seem to correspond to the state of organized knowledge in any given context and also to an external condition based on 'the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events' which is suggestive of a statistical approach.

Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of Jaina philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jaina philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of reality in modern times.*

Dialogue

Question 1. How can *syāt* mean 'in some respect'? Is it not a verbal form in the potential mood?

Answer. Just as the expression '*asti*' in the sentence 'the world is inhabited by the heroes' (*astivīrā vasundharā*), is an indeclinable (*nipāta*), exactly so in the expression '*syādvāda*' the word '*syāt*' is an

* P.C. Mahalanobi's article 'The Foundations of Statistics', published in Switzerland in *Dialectica*, Part VIII, No. 2, June 15, 1954.

indeclinable. It is not used to denote the potential mood. It is possessed of many senses, one of them being 'in some respect.'

Question 2. Both the sentient and the non-sentient are possessed of infinite number of attributes. What, then, is the line of demarcation between them, when it has been virtually asserted that everything has the nature of everything—a proposition which expresses the universal property of a real (both sentient and nonsentient)?

Answer. The attributes are of two kinds—generic and specific. By the specific attributes a substance is defined in its independent and discrete aspect. Sentience is one such specific attribute which belongs to the substance that is sentient and not to what is non-sentient. From the viewpoint of the attribute 'sentience' there is absolute difference between the sentient and the non-sentient. And this is why the sentient and the non-sentient are absolutely different substances. Every substance is possessed of infinite number of attributes. All the substances have their own separate identities due to their uncommon properties and so the Sāṃkhya-Yoga dictum that 'every thing is possessed of the nature of everything (*sarvam sarvātmakam*)' is not acceptable to Jainas, who do not admit the evolution of the physical cosmos from the single principle of *Prakṛti* (primordial matter).

The existence of sentience in a sentient being is natural and independent of anything else. In the non-sentient material particle or body there are attributes that are natural and intrinsic, viz. colour, smell, taste and touch. All attributes, momentary or durable, originating from the combination of soul and matter, are dependent on extraneous conditions and factors. A substance is possessed of infinite number of attributes on account of the combination of modes that are intrinsic as well as extrinsic.

Question 3. The Naiyāyikas and others also define the nature of an object by means of a determining characteristic, just as in the system of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) the nature of the real is determined by a specific attribute. What, then, is the difference between the two philosophies, as both of them admit a real as independent of anything else so far as its own nature is concerned? There must be a point of departure between the two which should characterise the Jaina thinker's standpoint as the proponent of relativity as implied in the conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

Answer. In the proposition 'the soul certainly exists in some respect', that is, in its aspect of sentience, the existence of sentience

is affirmed; that does not mean that existence alone is its own characteristic, but that non-existence also is an equally valid aspect of it. Here the question may arise that if the extraneous non-existence is a nature of the soul, then the colour etc. of physical objects should also be considered as the nature of the latter. The solution is obvious. That both existence and non-existence constitute the nature of a thing is attested by experience, just as smoke and fire exist in the same locus, say a kitchen. Existence and non-existence are similarly concomitant attributes, there being a natural relationship (*svabhāva-sambandha*) between the two. This in essence is the principle of relativity propounded by the doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

The nature of the substance does not follow from the doctrine of conditional dialectic. The substance is as it is by nature. One cannot explain why that is so. Philosophy does not create a real. It only explains it. And exactly this is the aim and purpose of conditional dialectic. The Jaina philosopher admits five special qualities on the basis of experience which are responsible for the postulation of five substances—

Quality	Substance
1. Motion	<i>Dharmāstikāya</i> (the substance which is the medium of motion)
2. Rest	<i>Adharmāstikāya</i> (the substance which is the medium of rest).
3. Accommodation	<i>Ākāśāstikāya</i> - Space (the substance which is the medium of accommodation).
4. Colour, smell, taste and touch	Matter
5. Consciousness	Soul.

(We have not translated the word '*astikāya*' in the above renderings. The above substances are called '*astikāya*' because they have extension and are conceived as consisting of space-points, countable, countless or infinite.)

All the qualities other than the above five are generic attributes. The distinction between them is explained by means of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

Question 4. It has been said that the sevenfold predication can be applicable with respect to each and every attribute of a substance. If so, is the non-absolutism (relativism) itself available to the system of

sevenfold predication ? If the reply is in the affirmative, the predication of negation (that is, the second among the seven propositions) would be a kind of absolutism. And in this way non-absolutism (relativism) would not be a universally applicable doctrine.

Answer. Ācārya Samantabhadra has explained non-absolutism (relativism) from the non-absolutistic standpoint itself. When the system of conditional dialectic is applied for the knowledge and exposition of an object in its entirety, non-absolutism (relativism) is proper and genuine. And when only a particular attribute is cognised and explained, the services of a particular *naya* (viewpoint) is requisitioned and that is a sort of absolutism, *ekānta* (singular viewpoint). The propounder of non-absolutism (relativism) admits both non-absolutism and absolutism in their proper perspective. This is why the system of sevenfold predication (*sapatabhaṅgī*) is applicable to non-absolutism (relativism) itself in the following manner.

1. There is absolutism in some respect.
2. There is non-absolutism in some respect.
3. There are both absolutism and non-absolutism in some respect.
4. There is indescribability in some respect.
5. There is absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
6. There is non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
7. There is absolutism, non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.

There is no contradiction in absolutism by itself. What is denied is only the absolutism that refutes the contrary viewpoint. Absolutism thus is twofold, viz. right and wrong. The absolutism that is right is *naya*, while the wrong one is pseudo-*naya*. Non-absolutism is not an obstinate and rigid doctrine because the admission of the co-existence of contrary attributes not attested by any valid source of knowledge does not fall within the purview of genuine non-absolutism. Thus non-absolutism is of two kinds, viz. right and wrong. The former is valid knowledge, while the latter is a sham simulation of it. The right non-absolutism has a universal application.³⁷

Ācārya Akalaṅka has subjected the substance '*jīva*' to the system of sevenfold predication as follows—

37. Tattvārthavārttika, I.6.

anekānto'pi dviidaḥ:-samyaganekānto mithyānekānta iti.
tatra samyagekānto hetuviśeṣasamarthyāpekṣaḥ pramāṇaḥ prarūpītar-
thaikadeśādeśaḥ. ekātmāvadhāraṇena anyāśeṣanirākaraṇapraavaṇaprapañdhirmith-
yaikāntaḥ. ekatra sapratipakṣānekadharmasvarūpanirūpaṇo yuktyāgamā bhyāma-
viruddhaḥ

*The soul exists (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.

*The soul does not exist (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.

The implication of the above two propositions is that the soul is a conscious substance only so far as its activity of consciousness is concerned. But it has also other aspects, such as the aspect of being a cognitum or an agent of will, and so on, which are the attributes quite apart from consciousness. In this way all such attributes that are not opposed to reason and logic are the subject-matter of the doctrine of non-abolutism.³⁸

Question 5. Is relativity itself subject to the system of sevenfold predication ? If so, the admission of an absolutistic truth would be inevitable.

Answer. An object is relative in some respect and non-relative (absolute) in another. Both these alternatives may be acceptable. From the standpoint of the instantaneous or spontaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*) a thing is absolutely independent of anything else. The substance of space is nothing but space from the standpoint of its instantaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*). A thing is a relative reality from the standpoint of extraneous and alien modes. Viewed from the standpoint of relativity the same substance of space is perceived as circumscribed by a jar or a canvas, etc. All the prolonged modes (*vyañjana-paryāya*) are relative aspects. There is not a single element in the cosmos that may be described as independent of anything else. But every substance is a synthesis of the absolute and the relative, which can never be absolutely disconnected. Such disconnection itself can be effected only relatively. The modes are intertwined and can never be disentangled, though the instantaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*) can be called independent in contradistinction to the prolonged modes (*vyañjana-paryāya*) that are relative.

samyaganekāntaḥ. tadatatsvabhāvavastuśūnyam parikalpitānekāntmakam kevalam vāgvijñānam mithyā'nekāntaḥ. tatra samyagekānto naya ityucyate. samyaganekāntaḥ pramāṇam. nayārpaṇādekānto bhavati ekaniścayapraṇatvāt, pramāṇārpaṇādanekānto bhavati anekaniścayadhikaranatvāt.

38. Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī, p. 79.

evamayam syājīva iti mūlabhaṅgadvayam. tatropayogātmanā jīvaḥ. prameyatvādātmanā'jīva iti tadarthaḥ. taduktam Bhaṭṭākalanādevaiḥ—
prameyatvādbhirdharmairacidātmanā cidāntmakāḥ/
jñānadarśanatastasmācetanā' cetanāntmakāḥ//
iti. ajīvatvaṃ ca prakṛte' jīvaṃvṛttiprameyatvādi dharmavattvaṃ, jīvatvaṃ ca jñānadarsānādimitattvamiti draṣṭavyam.

Anekāntavāda : The Principal Jaina Contribution of Logic

SUKHLALJI SANGHVI

The first and the foremost of the contributions—one that is the key to the rest—made by the Jaina savants to Indian Logic (*pramāṇa śāstra*) is the systematic exposition (*śāstrīya-nirūpaṇa*) of *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine of Non-Absolutism and (its corollary) *Nayavāda* or the Doctrine of Partial Truths.

There are two mutually distinct, fundamental standpoints (*dr̥ṣṭ i*) for looking at the universe—one is that which tends towards generalization (*sāmānya-gāminī*), the other that which tends towards particularization (*viśeṣa-gāminī*). The former starts with the observation of the similarities (*samānatā*), but it is gradually inclined to emphasize non-distinction (*abheda*) and finally views the universe as rooted in something one and single; hence it arrives at the conclusion that whatever is an object of awareness (*praṭīti*) is, really speaking, some one single element (*tattva*). Thus passing beyond the initial stage (*prāthamika bhūmikā*) of viewing similarities, the standpoint in question culminates in viewing essential identity (*tātvika ekatā*). Whatever element is here asserted to be the sole object of awareness is also declared to be the sole reality (*sat*). Owing to its excessive preoccupation with the one ultimate real, this standpoint either fails to take note of diversities or it takes note of them but dismisses them as empirical (*vyāvahārika*) or non-ultimate (*apāramārthika*) because according to it they are unreal (*avāstavika*). This applies to all diversity we are aware of, be it diversity in respect of time (*kālakṛta* ; as, for example, that between the antecedent seed and the subsequent sprout), or diversity in respect of space (*deśakṛta* :

as, for example, that between the simultaneously existing *prākṛtika*, i.e. physical, modifications like jars and cloths, etc.), or innate diversity irrespective of space and time (*deśa-kāla-nirapekṣa sāhajika* : as, for example, that between *prakṛti*, i.e. the root physical element, and *puruṣa*, i.e. the root conscious element, or that between one *puruṣa* and another).

As against this, the second standpoint sees dissimilarity (*asamānatā*) everywhere, and gradually searching for the root of this dissimilarity it finally reaches that stage of analysis (*viśleṣaṇa-bhūmikā*) where even similarity, (*samānatā*), nothing to say about identity (*ekatā*), appears to be something artificial (*kr̥trima*, unreal); hence it arrives at the conclusion that the universe is but a conglomeration (*puñja*) of several discrete existents (*bheda*) utterly dissimilar from one another. According to it, there really exists no single element (at the root of diversities), nor does there obtain any real similarity (between one existent and another). This applies to single elements like *prakṛti* which (allegedly) pervade all space and persist for all time, as also to single elements like atoms which (allegedly) are mutually different substances (occupying different points in space) but ones that persist for all time.

The above stated two standpoints are fundamentally different from one another, for one of them is based exclusively on synthesis, the other exclusively on analysis. These two fundamental lines of thought (*vicāra-saraṇi*) and the derivative lines of thought developing out of the two give rise to a number of mutually conflicting views on a number of topics. We thus see that the first standpoint with its tendency to generalization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'one, non-dual Brahman (Brahmādvaita)—the sole real element—occupying all space and time (*samagra-deśa-kāla-vyāpin*) and free from the limitations of space and time (*deśa-kāla-vinirmukta*)'. This doctrine, on the one hand, dubbed as unreal (*mithyā*) all diversity and all organs of knowledge taking note of this diversity, while, on the other hand, it asserted that the real-element (*sat-tattva*) lies beyond the reach (*pravṛtti*) of speech (*vāñi*) and logic (*tarka*) and is amenable to bare experience (i.e. experience untrammelled by speech and logic) (*mātra anubhava-gamya*). Likewise, the second standpoint with its tendency to particularization led to the foundation of the doctrine of 'an infinite number of discrete existents, each different from the rest not only as to its spatio-temporal location but as to its very nature'. This doctrine too, on the one hand, dubbed all non-distinction (*abheda*) as unreal while,

on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate existents lie beyond the reach of speech and logic and are amenable to bare experience. Thus both the doctrines in question did ultimately arrive at one common conclusion, viz. that whatever is revealed by speech and logic is a nullity (*sūnya*) while the ultimate reality is amenable to bare experience; but their ultimate objectives (*lakṣya*) being utterly different the two came in headlong clash and emerged as rivals to each other.

There also came into existence a number of lines of thought that either sprang from or were related to these two fundamental lines. Some of them accepted non-distinction (*abheda*) but only in respect of space and time or in respect of mere time, that is, not in respect of essential or substantial nature. Thus one line of thought did posit multiplicity of substances but regarded them all as eternal from the point of view of time and ubiquitous from that of space ; the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣavāda*) is an instance in point. Another line of thought came to attribute a comparatively greater extension to the sphere of diversity. Thus even while positing entities that are eternal and ubiquitous this line also posited a multiplicity of entities that are physical by nature (and hence occupying different points in space); the (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) doctrine of atomic-as-well-as-ubiquitous-substances (*paramāṇu-vibhu-dravya-vāda*) is an instance in point.

It was but natural that the standpoint of exclusive non-dualism (*advaita-mātra*) and exclusive monism (*san-mātra*)—a standpoint tolerant of no diversity in any respect—should lead to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of non-distinction (*abheda-mūlaka-vāda*). And this is what actually happened. Thus the standpoint gave rise to the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of non-distinction between an attribute (*dharma*) and that which possesses this attribute (*dharmin*), a quality (*guṇa*), and that which possesses this quality (*guṇin*), a substratum (*ādhāra*) and that which is supported by this substratum (*ādheya*), and so on and so forth. One the other hand, the standpoint of exclusive pluralism (*dvaita-mātra*)¹ and exclusive distinction (*bheda-mātra*) led to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of distinction (*bheda-mūlaka-vāda*). Thus it gave rise to the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda*, according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect; similarly, it gave rise to the

1. Here 'dvi' stands not for 'two' but for 'more than two'. Tr.

doctrine of absolute distinction between an attribute and that which possesses this quality, a substratum and that which is supported by this substratum, and so on and so forth. Thus we find that in the field of Indian philosophical speculation a number of mutually antagonistic views (*mata*) and systems (*darśana*) arose out of the fundamental standpoint of generality (along with its derivative standpoints) and the fundamental standpoint of particularity (along with its derivative standpoints). These views and systems, without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system, made it their prime concern to attack one another.

The doctrine of pre-existence (*sad-vāda*)—be it non-dualistic (as in Vedānta) or dualistic as in Sāṅkhya—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect; on the other hand, the doctrine of pre-nonexistence (*asad-vāda*)—be it applied to momentary entities as in Buddhism or to static and eternal entities as in Vaiśeṣika etc.—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *asatkāryavāda* (according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect).² Hence *satkāryavāda* came in clash with *asatkāryavāda*. Similarly, the theory of permanence-without-change (i.e. eternity : *Kūṭasthāī, kālika nityāī*) and all-pervadedness (i.e. ubiquity : *vibhūtā, daiśika vyāpakatā*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine of pre-existence dualistic or non-dualistic—came in clash with the theory of spatially as well temporally impartite, ultimate elements (*deśa-kāla-kṛta-niraṃśa-amśa-vāda*) that is, with the theory of impartite moments (*niraṃśa-kṣaṇa-vāda*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine rival to the doctrine of pre-existence. Now those who regard the entire universe as some single (*eka*), continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) element (*tattva*) as also those who regard it as a mere conglomeration (*puñja*) of impartite (*niraṃśa*) ultimate elements could achieve their respective aims only by maintaining that the ultimate real posited in their respective systems is incapable of definition and description through words (*anirvacanīya, anabhilāpya, śabdāgocara*); for if the real is capable of definition through words it can be neither some single, continuous element nor a multiplicity of impartite, ultimate elements, and this, in turn, is because definition puts an end as it were

2. By *sadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence we mean the doctrine that an entity exists always (or it is not a real entity) : by *asadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-nonexistence we mean the doctrine that a real entity—at least in case it happens to be a produced entity—exists only for an interval of time (possible for one moment). Tr.

to continuity (in one single form) as well as impartibility. Thus the theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*) arose as a natural corollary to the doctrine of one continuous real as also to the doctrine of impartite distinct reals. But this theory was taken exception to by the Vaiśeṣika logicians and others who averred that to describe every real entity (*vastumātra*) is not only a possibility but an accomplished fact. Thus arose the theory of definability (*nirvacanīyatvavāda*) that came in clash with the rival theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*).

In a like manner, some people upheld the view that it is dangerous to arrive at a final conclusion by means of an organ of knowledge—of whatever sort—unaided by reason (*hetu*) or logic (*tarka*); others, on the contrary, maintained that logic possesses no independent force, and that the Scripture, inasmuch as it does possess an independent force, is the senior most (*mūrdhanya*) of all organs of knowledge. Hence the clash between these two viewpoints. Again, the fatalist (*daiva-vādhin*) would say that everything depends on fate (*daiva*) and the human endeavour (*puruṣārtha*) is independently of no avail, the protagonist of human endeavour would maintain just the opposite view that man's endeavour is independently capable of delivering the goods (*kāryakara*). Thus each thought that the other was in the wrong. Likewise, one-sided view (*naya*) emphasized the importances of the denoted entity (*artha*) at the cost of denoting word (*śabda*), the other that of the denoting word at the cost of the denoted entity; and the two argued against each other. Similarly, some thought that absence (*abhāva*) is an independent entity alongside of the positive one (*bhāva*) while others that it is but of the nature of the positive entity, and thus developed the attitude of hostility between them. Furthermore, some thought that an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resulting piece of knowledge (*pramiti*) are utterly distinct (*atyanta bhinna*) from the knower (*pramātā*) concerned, while others that they are non-distinct (*abhinna*) from the later. Lastly, some emphasized that the sole means for attaining the desired (ultimate) result is action performed in conformity with the Varṇa-Āśrama rules, others insisted that knowledge alone will lead to (absolute) bliss, while still others maintained that devotion (*bhakti*) is the only instrument for realizing the *summum bonum*. Thus on a number of major or minor problems pertaining to metaphysics and ethics several such views had been vogue as were extremist (*ekānta*) and wholly antagonistic to one another.

On noticing this debating sport (*vāda-līlā*) indulged in by the advocates of the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*), the following question occurred to the teachers who were inheritors of the non-absolutist (*anekānta*; non-extremist) standpoint : Why are these doctrines—each claiming to be true—so much in conflict with one another ? Is it that *none* of them contains any element of truth, or that *each* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *some* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains the *whole* truth ? The cognition over this question furnished these teachers with a clue that would put an end to all conflict and reveal the whole truth ; the clue was the non-absolutist standpoint that forms the ground (*bhūmikā*) of the doctrine called *Anekāntavāda*. This standpoint enabled our teachers to see that all particular theory based on logic (*sayuktika*) is true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. However, when a particular theory, refusing to take into account the line of thought and the sphere of application (*śimā*) of the rival theory, imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint it turns blind to the truth contained in this rival theory. And the same thing happens with this rival theory (that is to say, it too imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint). Under these circumstances, justice demands that a theory be tested keeping in view its specific line of thought and its specific sphere of application, and in case it passes the test it should be treated as an aspect (*bhāga*) of truth; subsequently, a sort of necklace ought to be prepared with the various aspects of truth—uncontradictory of one another—acting as diamonds (*satyāṃśarūpa-maṇi*) and the idea of whole truth acting as the running thread (*pūrṇa-satya-rūpa-vicāra-sūtra*). These considerations impelled the Jaina teachers to synthesize (*samanvaya* ; *harmonize*), on the basis of their non-absolutist standpoint, all the theories that were then prevalent. And this is how their thought ran. When certain pure (*śuddha*) and selfless (*niḥsvārtha*) minds are cognizant of similarity culminating in identity and when certain other minds (no less pure and selfless) are cognizant of (diversity culminating in) impartite ultimate elements, how can we say that one of these cognitions (*prāṭi*) is valid and the other not ? If one of these cognitions is somehow treated as invalid the same logic will compel you to treat the other as equally so. Moreover, granting that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not, you will have to offer a logical explanation (*upapatti*) of what in our everyday dealings (*sārvajanika vyavahāra*) is taken as forming the

object of the cognition—of identity or of diversity as the case may be—dismissed as invalid. Certainly, a mere assertion to the effect that one of these cognitions is valid and the other will not mean a logical explanation of our everyday dealings, empirical (*laukika*) or śāstric (*śāstrīya*). Nor can you leave these dealings unexplained. So the monistic Brahmvādin's explanation of the phenomena in question will lie in treating as a product of ignorance (*avidyā-mūlaka*) all diversity and our cognition thereof, while the momentarist's explanation will lie in treating as a product of ignorance all similarity or identity and our cognition thereof.

These thoughts led advocates of *Anekāntavāda* to realize, in the light of their non-absolutist standpoint, that all cognition—be it cognition of identity or that of diversity—is after all valid (*vāstavika*). A cognition is valid in relation to its own object, but when it arrogates to itself the right to demonstrate the unreality of the object another cognition seemingly contradictory of itself it turns invalid. The cognition of identity and the cognition of diversity seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth (*pūrṇa-pramāṇa*). As a matter of fact, both these cognitions are valid so far as they go, but neither is the whole truth though each is a part (*aṃśa*) thereof. The total nature of reality ought to be such that these seemingly contradictory cognitions might reveal it in their respective ways but without contradicting one another and might both be treated as valid insofar as both go to reveal the total nature of reality. This synthesis, that is, the idea that the two cognitions in question have two different spheres to operate in (*vyavasthā-garbhita vicāra*), enabled the advocates of *Anekāntavāda* as to see that there is no real conflict between monism (*sad-advaita*) and pluralism (*sad-dvaita*), for the total nature of reality comprises identity as well as diversity, generality as well as particularity. For example, when we think of that huge mass of water and disregard its place, time, colour, taste, dimension, etc. it appears before us in the form of one single entity called ocean. On the other hand, when we take into account the place, time, etc. of this very mass of water we begin to see a number of oceans—small and big—instead of one gradually, we do not even perceive even a single drop of water but certain impartite elements like colour, taste, etc., and, eventually, they too appear as nought (*śūnya*). Cognition of the mass of water as one single ocean is valid, and so also is its cognition as (a conglomeration of) ultimate elements.

The cognition of one (single ocean) is valid because it views diversities (*bheda*) not as standing out separately from one another but as together exhibiting one common form ; likewise, the cognition of diversities-as-to-spatio-temporal-location-etc.—diversities which totally demarcate (*vyāvṛtta*) the elements concerned from one another—is valid because these diversities are actually there. Inasmuch as the mass of water is in fact one as well as a multiplicity, our cognition of it as one single ocean is as much valid as our cognition of it as a multiplicity of ultimate elements; but since neither of these cognitions grasps the total nature of reality, neither of them is the whole truth, though the two together do constitute the whole truth. Analogously, when we view the entire universe as one single real, in other words, when we take note of “existence” (*sattā*) which is common (*anugamaka*) to all diverse existents, we say that all reality is one and single ; for while taking note of the all-comprehensive (*sarvavyāpaka*) “existence” we are aware of no diversities demarcated from one another, and that, in turn, is because all diversities are here revealed as exhibiting one collective and common form. viz. “existence”. Hence the epithet “Monism” or “Doctrine of Non-dual Reality” (*sad-advaita*) attributed to this viewpoint. When we confine our attention to what is common to all existents and call the universe (‘one single real’ (*sat*) the denotation of the word “real” becomes so wide as to exclude nothing (i.e. no existing entity) whatsoever. However, when we view the universe as possessed of the mutually demarcated diversities of qualities and attributes, it no more appears in the form of one real (*sat*) but becomes a multiplicity of reals. In that case, the denotation of the word “real” undergoes corresponding limitation (for now we do not at all speak of real in general but only of this or that type of real). Thus we say that some reals are physical while some conscious; going further in the direction of noticing diversities we say that there are a number of physical reals and a number of conscious reals. Thus when we view the one all-comprehensive real as divided into mutually demarcated diversities, it appears before us as a multiplicity of reals. This is the viewpoint of “Pluralism” or the “Doctrine of Diverse Reals” (*sad-dvaita*). Thus the monistic and pluralistic viewpoints are valid in their respective spheres, but they will go to constitute the whole truth when they are combined together as complementary to each other (*sāpekṣa-bhāvena*). This then is the synthesis, arrived at from the non-absolutist standpoint, of monism and pluralism which are

generally supposed to be mutually antagonistic.

The same idea can be elucidated with the help of the illustration of trees and the forest. When the several, mutually different, particular trees are viewed not in the form of this or that particular tree but in a collective, general form designated "forest" the particular features of these different trees do not cease to exist but they are so much absorbed (*līna*) in the general feature—observed for the time being—of these trees as to appear to be non-existent. In this case we see the forest and it alone and our outlook may be characterised as monistic. Again, sometimes we take note of these trees one by one, that is, in the form of particular entities. Here we see the particular entities and them alone, and the general feature of these entities is so much absorbed in their particular features—observed for the time being—as to appear to be non-existent. Now an analysis of these two cognitions (*anubhava*) will suggest that neither can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other. Both are true within their respective spheres but neither represents the whole truth; for the whole truth lies in a proper synthesis of these two cognitions. Only such a synthesis can do justice to the two cognitions, viz. cognition of the forest in general and cognition of each, single, particular tree, both of which are uncontradicted (*abādhita*). The same holds good of the monistic and pluralistic world-views (that is to say, they do represent the whole truth only when properly synthesized).

The above was an account of the monism *versus* pluralism controversy in regard to features that might be spatial (*daśika*), temporal (*kālika*), or non-spatio-temporal (*deśa-kālāṭita*): there is a special controversy between the doctrine of temporal generality (*kālika sāmānya*) or eternalism (*nityatvavāda*) and the doctrine of temporal particularity (*kālika viśeṣa*) or momentarism (*kṣaṇikatva-vāda*). These two doctrines too seem to be mutually antagonistic, but the non-absolutist standpoint suggests that there is no real conflict between the two. Thus when an element (*tattva*) is viewed as being continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) throughout the three periods of time, that is, as beginningless and endless, it is certainly eternal (*nitya*), for in that case it is of the form of a continuous flow (*akhaṇḍa pravāha*) that has no beginning and no end. But when the same element—undergoing that continuous flow—is viewed as divided in terms of relatively large or small temporal units (*kāla-bheda*) it appears as having assumed a limited (*sīmīta*) form which lasts for this or that interval and which therefore has a beginning as well as an end. And in case the interval in

question is too brief to admit of further dissection by means of intellectual weapons (*buddhi-śāstra*), that portion of the element-in-continuous-flow which occupies this interval is called momentary (*kṣaṇika*) because it is the smallest possible. The words eternal and momentary are considered to be each other's antonyms (*viruddhārthaka*); for the connotation of one includes lack of a beginning and of an end (*anādiānantatā*). However, viewing from the non-absolutist stand-point, we can see that the same element which is called 'eternal' insofar as it is of the form of continuous flow may also be called 'momentary' insofar as it undergoes a change (*parivartana*) or a new modification (*pariyāya*) every moment. The basis of one viewpoint is the observation of beginninglessness and endlessness, that of the other the observation of beginnings and ends. But the total nature of a real entity comprises the lack of beginning and of an end as also the possession of a beginning and of an end. Hence the viewpoints in question, though true within their respective spheres, will yield the whole truth only when properly synthesized.

This synthesis, too, can be elucidated with the help of an illustration. The total life-activity of a tree—right from the beginning upto the time of fructification—completes its course only by flowing through the successive stages represented by the seed, the root, the sprout, the trunk, the branches and twigs, the leaves, the flowers, the fruits, etc. So when we view an entity as a 'true' we have in mind the total life-activity continuously flowing through these various stages. On the other hand, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements—like root, sprout, trunk, etc.—of this life-activity we have in mind but these various elements, each possessing a limited duration. Thus our mind takes note of the life-activity in question sometimes in one continuous form and sometimes in a discontinuous form, that is, element by element. On closer investigation it becomes evident that neither is the continuous life-activity either the whole truth or but a product of imagination, nor are the discontinuous elements either the whole truth or but a product of imagination.³ Even granting that the continuous life-activity absorbs within itself the totality of discontinuous elements or that the discontinuous elements absorb within themselves the total continuous life-activity, the fact remains

3. *That the continuous life activity is the whole truth and discontinuous elements but a product of imagination is the eternalist's position, that the discontinuous elements are the whole truth and the continuous life-activity but a product of imagination is the momentarist's position.* Tr.

that a real entity, viewed in its total nature, is continuous as well as discontinuous, and that therefore it is grasped only when both these aspects of its nature are (separately) taken note of. These two aspects are both real so far as each of them goes, but they become totally real only when synthesized. To view the tree as a beginningless and endless flow in time is to indicate it as an eternal entity, to view the tree as made up of (the successively emerging) elements is to indicate it as a transient or momentary entity. The transient constituent elements (*ghaṭaka*) are inconceivable without a substratum in the form of an eternal flow, and this eternal flow is inconceivable without those transient constituent elements. Thus the view that eternity is real while transience unreal and the view that transience is real while eternity unreal give rise to the eternalism *versus* momentarism controversy which, however, is eliminable from the non absolutist standpoint.

The non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability. For according to it, only that aspect of an entity's nature is amenable to description (*pratipādyā*) which can be made an object of convention (i.e. conventional attribution of words : *saṅketa*). Now even though a convention is established by *buddhi* (i.e. intellect) which is subtle in the extreme (*sūkṣmatama*), aspect of the nature of an entity; for there are innumerable (subtle) aspects of an entity's nature which are inherently incapable of description through words. It is in this sense that the one continuous real (*akhaṇḍa sat*) as well as the impartite moment (i.e. ultimate element) (*niramṣa kṣaṇa*) are indefinable, while the gross entities of medium duration (and extension) are capable of definition. Thus the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability—applied to the entire universe or to an element thereof—are true within their respective spheres and wholly true when taken together.

Nor is it self-contradictory to view a thing as a positive entity and also as an 'absence'. For a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits (*mātra-vidhimukhena*) or solely through its negative traits (*mātra niṣedhamukhena*). E.g. the milk is cognized as milk and also as not-curd, i.e. something different from curd. This means that the milk is of a positive-cum-negative nature (*bhāva-abhāva-ubhaya-rūpa*). Thus it is not self-contradictory to maintain that a thing is a positive entity and also an 'absence', for two different cognitions take note of these two aspects of the thing's nature. Similarly, the non-

absolutist standpoint resolves the controversy as to whether the members of other similar pairs (*dvandva*)—e.g. ‘attribute and the possessor of the attribute’ (*dharmā-dharmin*), ‘quality and the possessor of the quality’ (*guṇa-guṇin*), ‘cause and effect’ (*kārya-kāraṇa*), ‘substratum and superstratum’ (*ādhāra-ādheya*)—are identical with one another or different from one another.

When the authoritativeness (*āptatva*) and the validity-source (*mūla-prāmāṇya*) (of a verbal testimony) are in doubt, it is always well to decide an issue after examining (*parīkṣā*) the matter ratiocinatively (*hetuvāda-dvārā*); but in case the authoritativeness (of the testimony in question) is beyond doubt, resort to ratiocination only leads to an infinite regress and is to be discarded. In this latter case reliance on the Scripture (*āgamavāda*) has to be our sole guide. Thus both ratiocination and reliance-on-the-Scripture have a scope, but they apply to different subject-matters (*viśaya*) or to different sorts of exposition (*pratipādana*) of the same subject-matter. In one word, there is no conflict between the two. The same is the case with the doctrine of Fate (*daivavāda*) and the doctrine of Human Endeavour (*pauruṣavāda*), for there is no conflict between them either. In those cases where endeavour based on rational calculation (*buddhi-pūrvaka pauruṣa*) is an impossibility, problems can be solved only by the doctrine of Fate, but where endeavour of this type is possible, the doctrine of Human Endeavour succeeds. Thus the doctrine of Fate and the doctrine of Endeavour can be reconciled harmoniously, provided one keeps in view that the two cover different aspects of life.

The non-absolutist standpoint easily succeeds also in eliminating the opposition between the ‘doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause’ and the ‘doctrine of absolute absence of the effect in the cause.’ For according to it, the effect (*kārya*) is present as well as absent in the material cause (*upādāna*). E.g. even before it is actually turned into a bangle, a piece of gold has the capacity (*śakti*), to turn into a bangle; thus viewed in the form of a ‘capacity’ (*śakti*), that is, in the form of something non-distinct from the cause, the effect can be said to be present even before it is actually produced. However, even though present in the form of a capacity, this effect is not there to be seen (*upalabdha*), because the absence of necessary accessories (*utpādana-sāmagrī*) has prevented it from emerging into being, i.e. from being produced; in this sense the effect is absent (before it is actually produced). Again, after the bangle has disappeared and the material concerned turned into an earring, the bangle is doubtless not there to

be seen, but since even the gold turned-into-an-earring possesses the capacity to turn into a bangle, the actually absent bangle can be said to be potentially present in this gold.

The Buddhist's 'doctrine of mere conglomeration of atoms' (*kevala-paramānupūñja-vāda*) and the Naiyāyika's 'doctrine of an altogether novel composition' (*apūrva-avayavi-vāda*) come in conflict with one another. But the non-absolutist standpoint with its acceptance of *skandha*, which is neither a mere conglomeration of atoms nor something so contradictory of experience (*bādhita*) as a composite standing over and above its component-parts, properly resolves the conflict and works out a flawless synthesis of the two doctrines. Thus the non-absolutist standpoint has impartially synthesized, on so many questions, the current doctrines that were clashing with each other. And in the course of its doing so, the doctrine of *Nayas* (*nayavāda*) and the doctrine of *Bhaṅgas* (*bhaṅgavāda*) follow as a natural corollary; for a proper formulation of non-absolutism requires as its preliminary an analysis of the different stands and view-points, a demarcation of their respective subject-matters, and a determination of their roles concerning one and the same subject-matter.

No one corner of a house makes the whole house, nor do the different corners of this house lie in one particular direction. The view (*avalokana*) had of the house from one of the two opposite directions—like south and north, or east and west—is certainly not full but nor is it false. It is the totality (*samuccaya*) of the views had of the house from different possible angles which may be called a full view of the house. Thus the view had of the house from one particular angle is a necessary part of the total view of the house. Analogously, the formulation of thoughts and views (*cintana-darśana*) concerning the nature of an entity or of the entire universe is accomplished from various stands (*apekṣā*). And a stand is determined by a multiplicity of factors like the innate constitution (*sahaja racanā*) of the mind, the impressions (*saṃskāra*) received from outside, the nature of the object thought about, etc. Such stands—for thinking about the nature of things—are many in number. And since these stands form the basis or the starting point of the viewing process (*vicāra* ; *lit*, thought-process) they are also called 'angles of vision' (*drṣṭikoṇa*) or 'points of view' (*drṣṭibindu*). The harmonious totality (*sāra-samuccaya*) of the thoughts and views concerning a thing formed from different stands—however contradictory of each other in appearance—is called

the total view or the non-absolutist view of this thing. The view formed from a particular stand is a part of this total view, and though the different such views (i.e. the views formed from different particular stands) are (seemingly) contradictory of one another, they are really uncontradictory of one another inasmuch as they all find synthesis in the total view.

When a mind ignores and takes no account of diversities—qualitative (*guṇa-dharmakṛta*) or essential (*svarūpa-kṛta*) as well as numerical (*vyaktitva-kṛta*)—while confining its attention to mere continuity (*akhaṇḍatā*) the universe appears to it as one and continuous. Understood from this standpoint of non-distinction (*abheda*), the word 'real' means something one and continuous (and nothing more), and this type of partially true understanding of things is technically called *saṅgraha-naya* (where 'naya' stand for a partially true understanding of things). The view taken of the universe from the standpoint of diversities—qualitative as well as numerical—is technically called *vyavahāra-naya*, for here special importance is assigned to the diversities on which is grounded our everyday experience (*loka-siddha vyavahāra*). On this view, the word 'real' denotes not something one and continuous but things different and discontinuous. When this tendency to take note of diversities confines its attention to mere temporal diversities, and concludes that the present alone is real because it alone is capable of performing a function (*kāryakara*), that is to say, when the past and the future are excluded from the denotation of the word 'real', there results a partially true understanding of things which is technically called *rjusūtra-naya*. It is so called because it seeks to avoid the labyrinth (*cakravyūha*) of the past and the future while sliding along the straight line (*rju-rekhā*) representing the present.

The above stated three attitudes consider the nature of things without basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. Hence the three resulting understandings are designed *arth-naya*. But there are also possible attitudes which consider the nature of things basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. The understandings resulting from these attitudes are designated *śabda-naya*. Grammarians are the chief advocates of the various *śabda-nayas*, for it is on account of the divergent standpoints upheld by grammarians that one *śabda-nyaya* differs from others.

Those grammarians who regard all words as impartite (*akhaṇḍa*)

or etymologically underived (*avyutpanna*), certainly, do not base on etymology their distinction of the meaning of one word from that of another, but they too hold that words mean different things according as they possess different attributes (*dharmā*) in the form of gender, person, tense, etc. This type of distinguishing the meaning of one word from that of another is called *śabda-naya* or *sāmprata-naya*. On the other hand, those grammarians who regard all words as etymologically derived (*vyutpanna*) posit distinction between the meanings of even such words as are generally admitted to be synonymous ; this view, according to which (for example) the synonyms like 'śakra', 'indra', etc. have different meanings, is called *samabhirūḍha-naya*. Lastly, there is a view according to which a word applies to a thing not in case this thing *sometimes* satisfies the etymology of the word in question, but only in case this thing is for the time being satisfying this etymology.⁴ This view is called *evambhūta-naya*. Apart from these six logical *nayas* there is a seventh called *naigama-naya*. 'Nigama' literally means local convention (*deśa-rūḍhi*), and this seventh *naya* stands for the view which includes—in accordance with local conventions—all kinds of doctrines of distinction and the doctrines of non-distinction.⁵ These are the seven chief, (not all) *nayas*, and, really and generally speaking, whatever understanding of things results from the adoption of one particular standpoint rather than any other is the *naya* corresponding to that standpoint.

The Jaina texts also speak of the two *nayas* called *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya* ; however, these are not something over and above the abovementioned seven *nayas* but a mere broad classification (*saṃkṣipta vargīkaraṇa*) of and an introductory ground (*bhūmikā*) to these very seven *nayas*. *Dravyārthika-naya* is that line of thought which takes 'substance' (*dravya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is general (*sāmānya*), common (*anvaya*), non-distinctive (*abheda*) or unitary (*ekatva*) about things. The *nayas* called *naigama*, *saṃgraha* and *vyavahāra* are comprised with *dravyārthika-naya*. Of these, *saṃgraha-naya*, inasmuch as it takes note of pure non-distinction, is

4. E.g. 'go'—the Sanskrit word for cow—means 'that which moves'. Hence on this view, a cow cannot be called 'go' when it is not actually in motion. Tr.
5. More literally, '*naigama-naya*' may mean understanding based on the convention of the market-place. Really speaking, it is not a considered conviction concerning the nature of things but just an uncritical acceptance of whatever views are offered as and when occasion arises. There is also another interpretation of the word '*naigama-naya*', but that is not relevant in the present context. Tr.

the pure (*śuddha*) or basic (*mūla*) *dravyārthika-naya*: but even *vyavahāra-naya* and *naigama-naya*, which no doubt take note of certain distinctions, are invariably cognizant also of non-distinction of some type or other. Hence it is that these latter two *nayas* are also classed under *dravyārthika-naya*, but they are *dravyārthika-nayas* of an impure (*aśuddha*) or mixed (*mīśrita*) type (and not of the pure and basic type as in *saṃgraha-naya*).

Paryāyārthika-naya is the name for that line of thought which takes 'modes' (*pariyāya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is particular (*viśeṣa*), exclusive (*vyāvṛtti*) or distinctive (*bheda*) about things. The remaining four *nayas*—i.e. *rjusūtra* etc.—are comprised within *paryāyārthika-naya*. Consideration of distinctions by a neglect of non-distinctions starts with *rjusūtra-naya*, and hence the texts call this *naya* the *prakṛti* or *root-basis* (*mūla*) of *paryāyārthika-naya*. The remaining three *nayas*—i.e. *śabda-naya* (*sāmprata-naya*) etc.—are in a way the amplifications of this basic sort of *paryāyārthika-naya*.

Similarly, the line of thought which attaches sole utility to knowledge will be called *jñāna-naya* while that which attaches sole utility to action will be called *kriyā-naya*. In short, the total—i.e. non-absolutistic—view of the universe is unlimited (*niḥśīma*) because the *nayas* that form the basis of this view are unlimited (in number).

The multifarious views concerning one and the same entity that result from the adoption of the various stands (*apekṣā*), angles of vision (*dr̥ṣṭikona*), and approaches (*manovṛtti*) constitute the foundation of *Bhaṅgavāda* or the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment. When two views whose subject-matters are diametrically opposite of each other are sought to be synthesized, and with this end in view such (simple) judgments are formed as given expression to the positive as well as negative aspects of the (two) subject-matters in question, the result is a (complex) sevenfold judgement (*saptabhaṅgī*). The Doctrine of Partial Truths (*nayavāda*) is the basis of the Doctrine of Sevenfold judgment (*saptabhaṅgī*) and the latter doctrine aims at an all-comprehensive (*vyāpaka*) harmoniously synthesized—i.e. non-absolutistic- understanding of things. Just as inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*)—i.e. inference expressed in the form of verbal/propositions—is resorted to when one seeks to convey to others a piece of knowledge that he has come to acquire through some particular organ of knowledge, similarly, resort is taken to the

simple judgments that go to constitute a complex sevenfold judgment when one seeks to convey to others how certain mutually contradictory traits are harmoniously synthesized in one single whole. Thus the Doctrine of Partial truths (*nayavāda*) and the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment (*bhaṅgavāda*) are natural corollaries to the non-absolutistic standpoint.

True, in the Vedicist philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, etc. and so also in the philosophy of Buddhism, we often come across a tendency (*dr̥ṣṭi*) to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus synthesize its various aspects ;⁶ but the utmost insistence (*ātyantika āgraha*) that every aspect of *everything* must be viewed from every possible standpoint, and the unflinching faith that the consummation of all thought-process lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy. It was as a result of this insistence (and this faith) that the Jainas gave birth to those independent (*svatantra*), systematic disciplines (*vyavasthita śāstra*) called 'Doctrine of Non-Absolutism' (*anekāntavāda*), 'Doctrine of Partial Truths' (*nayavāda*), and 'Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment' (*saptabhaṅgī*), disciplines which became a part and parcel of their treatment of Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) and on which no other school produced even a single or even a minor text. Though an advocate of Vibhājyavāda (Doctrine of the Avoidance of Extremes) and *Madhyamamārga* (Middle Path), the Buddhist system, remained blind to the element of permanence exhibited by a real entity, and hence declared everything to be but momentary. Similarly, though actually employing the word "*anekānta*" to characterize their own standpoint,⁷ the Naiyāyikas could not help harping on the thesis that atoms, souls, etc. are absolutely unchanging (*sarvathā aparināmin*). Again, the Vedāntists, even while taking recourse to the various standpoints called 'empirical' (*vyāvahārika*) 'ultimite' (*pāramārthika*), etc., could not help insisting that all standpoints except the standpoint of *Brahman* (*Brahma-dr̥ṣṭi*) are of an inferior—or even utterly false—sort. The only reason for this anomaly seems to be that these systems did not imbibe the spirit of non-absolutism to the same extent as did the Jaina. Thus the Jaina synthesizes all the standpoints and, at the same time, grants that all these standpoints are equally competent and true so far as their

6. See *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, p. 2; *Siddhānta-bindu*, p. 119 seq.; *Vedāntasūtra*, p. 25; *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā*, p. 175; *Mahāvagga*, p. 6, 31.

7. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2.1.18.

respective spheres are concerned, Since the Jaina's non-absolutistic standpoint and the systematic treatises composed by him on the subject, concern themselves exclusively with the time-honoured philosophical controversies like identity versus difference, generality versus particularity, eternity versus transience, etc., it might appear, at first sight, that all this is repetitive, hackneyed, and something lacking in originality ; but the spirit of accepting (nothing save) the total (*akhaṇḍa*), living (*saḥjīva*), and all-sided (*sarvāṃśa*) truth—a spirit reflected in the standpoint and the treatises in question—which is so characteristic of the Jaina and which found entrance in Logic through him, is capable of successful employment in all the fields of life, and may on that account be regarded, not unduly, as a contribution made to (Indian) Logic by the Jaina savants.

The Anekāntavāda of the Jainas*

H.M. BHATTACHARYA

Anekāntavāda or the Doctrine of Many-sidedness of Reality of the Jainas is a distinctive contribution to Indian thought in so far as Realistic Metaphysics and Epistemology are concerned. The Jainas are direct realists and they depend for knowledge of the objective world on commonsense and experience. They believe that the universe is divided into two hemispheres as it were, one, the world of *jīvas* and the other, the world of *ajīvas*, or more generally speaking, the world of souls and the world of non-souls. The constitution of the soul is such that it must know the world or non-soul and the constitution of the non-soul is such that it must be known by the soul. The two worlds are self-existent and independent of one another but at the same time they must have, by their very constitution, inter-communication, making knowledge of the outside world on the one hand and bondage and release of the soul on the other possible. As realists the Jainas, like other realists, are pledged to this distinctness of soul and non-soul. Here, as elsewhere, they are guided by commonsense and experience which reveal unmistakably this dualism between the soul and the non-soul.

With this commonsense and realistic attitude the Jainas attempt to interpret the problems of knowledge and of the objective world ; and such attempt of theirs has given rise to the famous Anekāntavāda. The Jainas have come to the doctrine that the object of our knowledge has inexhaustible facets or aspects and any attempt to understand and interpret it from any one particular point of view is an epistemological blunder. They have come to this conclusion by a

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thorough and careful examination of the other Indian systems of thought, each of which, according to the Jainas, reveals but one aspect of the objective reality. Historically speaking, Anekāntavāda arose as a reaction against the two diametrically opposed views, namely the view of reality of the Vedāntists which makes it to be purely unchangeable, immutable and static, and the view of the Buddhists which takes the view of reality as change, movement, phenomena following one another without any noumenal background. The Vedāntist makes the Soul, immutable and all-pervading, as the sole reality admitting of no change, action and quality, and this is according to the Jainas one extreme in which only the pure *sattā* or Being is posited. The Buddhists take the other extreme which negates *sattā* and makes reality to be constituted of change, action, movement and phenomena. The Jainas criticise the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika as only one-sided views of the nature of reality as these philosophers consider objects separately either in terms of generality or in terms of particularity while the true nature of the object reveals that it is at the same time both general and particular. Generality grows out of the discovery of a common feature of the particulars which thus help us to derive the idea of generality and each of the particulars also shares in the generality to which they jointly contribute. In this way the Jainas make it clear to us that the proper understanding of a Real can never be acquired from any one viewpoint which confines itself to any one or other of the innumerable aspects it is capable of. The *Vastu* or Real according to the Jainas has many aspects ; so to do justice to the true nature of a Real, we must always avoid any one-sided representation of it.

The Jainas have come to this view by a deep analysis of the Nature of a Real. The Real is something permanent in the midst of changes. It is described as having two aspects. In one aspect it is something permanent and in the other aspect it is changeful, evolving qualities yet losing and replenishing them. A Real, therefore, by nature is what may be called substance-cum-attribute and permanence-cum-change. The Jainas further state that in considering a real we must take note of the fourfold condition which determines its Nature. These four conditions are substance, place, time and state, which again fall under two heads : its own nature and the nature other than its own. Each real will be an existent under its own nature i.e. it will exist in its own substance, in its own place, in

its own moment and in its own state. But it will be non-existent in substance other than its own, in place other than its own, in moment other than its own and in state other than its own. The Jainas have taken meticulous care in considering reals under these conditions both as their own and as foreign and concluded that applying these two opposite sets of conditions to reals, they may be regarded as of one character as well as of another character. Without going into further details of application of these conditions we might say that the general conclusion with regard to reals which the Jainas have arrived at is that reals necessarily are of manifold character. So any categorical statement in which we predicate only one quality of a subject in a judgment will represent only one aspect of the real to the exclusion of innumerable ones of which it is capable. Such a statement will thus be an expression of a merely partial truth. Such a one-sided categorical expression of only one aspect of a real, the Jainas have termed *naya*. A *naya* is thus a categorical judgment made with regard to an object by one who, in order to satisfy one's own particular purpose, makes such a judgment without removing the possibility of other judgments with regard to it. From what has been said it is not unnatural to suppose an infinite number of *nayas* corresponding to the infinite aspects, of which the real is capable. But the Jainas are wise enough to classify under the two heads, the permanent and the changeful aspects, in which, they tell us, reals are capable of being represented. These two are comprehensive enough to include all possible aspects of reals. Thus if the facts and phenomena of the world are understood in terms of their permanent and changeful aspects, then and then only we have fulfilment of our practical life. Similarly our practical life is served rightly only when we learn to look at things of the world as both general and particular and not as general or particular. The Jaina is of opinion that our knowledge of the Real can be valid only when such knowledge is consistent with and favours practice.

From the analysis of the different *nayas* as given by the Jainas, it is found that reals are possessed of an infinite variety of qualities, and the *nayas* are only so many different ways of expressing the relations of the infinite qualities with the real, though each of them is expressive of a partial truth of the matter. The *nayas* then are infinite, corresponding to infinite qualities of objects and to the infinite variety of relations in which these qualities stand to the reals.

So apparently a complete knowledge of things and their qualities is an impossible feat for an ordinary enquirer. According to the Jaina, complete knowledge is possible only by a Jina or Kevalin who has attained perfection in knowledge, faith and character by long and arduous self-culture. The Jaina thinks that different philosophers claiming complete knowledge with the help of their different *nayas* have given us a semblance of *naya* and not a valid *naya*. They have however dispelled the despair of an ordinary intellect as against that of the Sarvajña or All-knower by insisting that if we have recourse to the following seven-fold judgment or *saptabhaṅgī* by following each *naya*, then even we may hope to attain valid knowledge. But at the same time the Jainas point out that since no one judgment at best can give complete truth but only a partial one allowing for other partial truths, therefore they are in favour not of categorical but always of hypothetical judgments. And this they have provided for by adding *syāt* or 'may be' before every judgment. Following each *naya*, there will always be seven judgments and each of them will be prefixed with the term *syāt*. This is known as *saptabhaṅgī-naya* or *Syādvāda*. It appears that *Syādvāda* is the epistemic counterpart of the Jaina metaphysical standpoint of *Anekāntavāda*. This to my mind is the real picture of *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntavāda*. They are distinguishable but not separable. They go together but may not be identical. But many jaina authorities identified the two.

Now the sevenfold judgment runs thus :

- (1) may be it is existent
- (2) may be it is non-existent
- (3) may be it is existent and non-existent
- (4) may be it is indefinable
- (5) may be it is existent and indefinable
- (6) may be it is non-existent and indefinable
- (7) may be it is existent, non-existent and indefinable.

In this sevenfold judgment of *Syādvāda* what we must specially note is the significance of existent, non-existent and indefinable. The Jainas maintain as we have already stated, that every real is an existent in its own nature and a non-existent when considered not in its own nature but in a nature other than its own. So when we predicate the existence of a real, it includes the possibility of its non-existence being predicated of it. Its position and negation become thus necessary alternative predications. Then again,

position and negation may be predicated of a real either in succession or with simultaneity. It is easy to understand that in the first two judgments there is no question of succession or of simultaneity. The third judgment becomes possible when we predicate position and negation in succession because we can very well understand how a thing can be considered as existent in its own nature and then we can predicate negation of it afterwards when considered in its nature other than its own. But the more important question arises when we predicate position and negation not in succession but in simultaneity. If a real is both existent and non-existent at the same time, then we fail to determine its nature i.e. the real then becomes indeterminable or indefinable. So in the fourth form of the judgment where position and negation are simultaneous i.e. the real becomes both existent and non-existent at the same time, our positive and negative determinations cancel each other and the real becomes indefinable. But in the fifth form of judgment we find that the Jaina makes further determination of the indeterminable because it predicates existence of the indeterminable. It is interesting to note that in the Vedānta as well as in the Buddhist systems of thought we come across the indefinable form when the Vedānta speaks of *anirvacanīya* and the Buddhist speaks of *catuṣkoṭivinirmukta*. The *anirvacanīya* of the Vedantist is *māyā* and the *catuṣkoṭivinirmukta* of the Buddhist is Nirvāṇa. The indefinable of the Jainas as it occurs in the fourth form of judgment explains the nature of a real because in the explanation of a real the Jaina contends that it is a form in which every real appears to us under certain circumstances. From this analysis of the term indefinable in the fourth form of predication, it has been regarded by the Jaina as a distinct character of a real. The indefinable is not the result of juxtaposition of existence and non-existence but it stands for a character of the real which is inclusive of existence and non-existence but at the same time transcending them.

From this it is further clear that the indefinable as a distinct character of a real must have existence. So the fifth judgment becomes a necessary form of predication. In other words when it is predicated of an object that it is indefinable in the sense of a distinct character, then it must have an existence. In this way the Jaina claims to silence those who may contend that when a thing is indefinable, no further predication is possible. And as we know that

position and negation are applicable both in succession as well as in simultaneity, the sixth and the seventh judgments are perfectly justified. This gives us how the sevenfold predication or Saptabhaṅgī-naya of the Jainas has a sufficient reason for its formation and how it has opened a new line of epistemological approach to Reality.

But we should not forget to mention the further question as to why the judgments should be seven and seven only and neither more nor less. Vimaladāsa, the author of “Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgīṇī”, in his refutation of this objection has begun his polemic by reference to a very ingenious example. He asks us to consider the taste of a drink prepared from curd, sugar, chilly, pepper, etc mixed together. Now the taste of the drink is really indefinable in the sense that its taste and flavour are different from those of each of the ingredients, but that indefinable taste is quite a matter of our feeling and enjoyment. That this indefinable taste exists is clear from the fact that in it we feel in some from the taste and flavour of the ingredients like curd etc. Similarly in each fact of the indefinable are present the feelings of somewhat existence, somewhat non-existence, the successive feelings of existence and non-existence and the feeling of simultaneity of existence and non-existence. Then Vimaladāsa takes up the question as to why the number of judgments must be seven. The answer which he gives is that any enquiry into the nature of things arises out of doubt about it. Doubt begets enquiry. But doubt arises when generally there are two contradictory ideas. But in the case of doubt as conceived by the Jaina, there are really no rigid contradictories, the apparent contradiction being due to our neglect to see the fourfold conditions of substance, place, time and state, as the case may be. Anyway since there is apparent contradiction, that must be the source of doubt. Now taking existence and non-existence as such, there may be real contradiction between them, but the Jaina always warns us against this absolute contradiction and qualifies the statement of each of the contradictories by prefixing the term “somehow” and the traditional theory of contradiction as the source of doubt cannot arise between “somehow existent” and “somehow non-existent” but always between *somehow existent* and *absolutely existent*. The Jaina has elaborately shown that any real exists in its own nature and is non-existent in consideration of a nature other than its own and this ‘somehow’ character has been

indicated by them by the prefixed *syāt*. But a doubt does arise due to confusion between “somehow existence” and “absolute existence” and in order to remove this doubt the Jainas have formulated the sevenfold judgment. As the doubt of this kind are ultimately seven in number and not more nor less, the judgments also will be seven, no more nor less. So the contention of the Jainas that Syādvāda consists of seven judgments only.

Theory of Anekāntavāda*

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The *Jaina* theory of *anekāntavāda* or the manifoldness of truth is a form of realism which not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths. It is interesting as suggesting a criticism of present-day realism and indicating a direction in which its logic might be developed. It is proposed in the present paper to discuss the conception of a plurality of determinate truths to which ordinary realism appears to be committed and to show the necessity of an indeterministic extension such as is presented by the *Jaina* theory.

The truth that we actually know is a plurality of truths and philosophy rightly or wrongly, sets itself the problem of finding the *one* truth which either denies or in some sense comprises the plurality. Whatever differences there have been as to the actual conception of the truth, the rejection of the faith that there *is* one truth has generally been taken to argue a scepticism about the many truths that we claim to know. Some times however an ultimate plurality of truths has itself been taken as the one truth and the apparent contradiction has been sought to be avoided by taking it to mean only that there is *one cognition* of the plurality. Else-where the cognition of a fact is a further fact but here the addition of cognition as a fact to plurality as a fact yields us nothing but the plurality. The realistic or objectivistic equivalent of the unity of a cognitive act is the bare togetherness of the facts know; and the togetherness of cognition as a fact with the fact cognised is the exemplar of this relation.

The difficulty is about the objectivity of this bare togetherness.

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When two objects other than knowing are known together, they are ordinarily taken to be in some kind of whole, specific relation or unity. This cannot be said of object and its cognition as together. Objects also may however be barely together : the relation of a whole to its elements, of a relation to its terms or of a unity to its factors is nothing more specific than togetherness. This then is the fundamental category of realism and whole, relation or unity would be understood as particular cases of it. We propose to show on the lines of the *Jaina* theory that this category is itself manifold, being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which cannot be subsumed under a universal and do not make a unity in any sense. Togetherness, as ordinarily understood by the realist, means distinction of determinate positive truths. The *Jaina* category might be formulated as distinction from distinction which as will be shown has a definite range of alternative values, only one of which answers to the distinction or togetherness of the modern realist.

Prima facie there is a difference between the relation of a composite fact with its components and the relation of the components themselves. We may overlook for the present the different forms of the composite—whole, relation or unity—which imply varying relations to the components and provisionally admit composite truth as a single entity. Now there is no difference between the togetherness of any one component with the rest and that of any other with the rest : the components in their various combinations are together in exactly the same sense. Taking however the composite on the one hand with the components on the other, we find that the two sides can be only thought alternately : while one side is thought by itself, the other can be thought only in reference to it. If the components are taken to be given, the composite can be understood as only *their* plurality; and if the composite is given as one, the components are known as only *its* analysis. Each side can be given by itself as objective and so it is not a case of mere correlative *thoughts*. Neither side need be thought in reference to the other ; but while one is thought as distinct by itself, the other has to be thought as only together with or distinct from it. We have in fact a correlation here between ‘distinct in itself’ and ‘distinct from the other,’ between given position and what is sometimes called the negation of negation.

Is the necessity of thinking something *as other than its other*

merely subjective ? It would appear to be objective in the same sense and on the same grounds as the togetherness or bare distinction of positives admitted by the realist. Realism objectifies the subjective because it is *known* and is not simply transcendental. The question may be asked, is the distinction of subject and object, of knowing and the known, both taken to be facts—‘enjoyed’ and ‘contemplated’ respectively, to use Professor Alexander’s phrase—a fact of the former or of the latter category, subjective or objective ? Now just as knowing is known, the absolute difference of the two forms of knowing—enjoying and contemplating—is also known ; and if the unity of the knowing act be taken to correspond to objective togetherness, this absolute difference must also be taken to have its objective counterpart. Togetherness or bare distinction is the form of objectivity in general. The counterpart then of the difference of ‘subjective’ knowing or ‘enjoying’ from objective knowing or ‘contemplating’ would be distinction from objectivity i.e. from distinction. Thus both distinction and distinction from distinction should be taken by the realist as objective. These two however are not ordinarily distinguished : both are called by the same name—togetherness.

If however as shown these two forms of togetherness are fundamentally different, what is their further relation ? Now distinction from distinction has sometimes been taken as a determinate relation, as identity or some unique relation, like ‘characterising’ or adjectivity.. which also for our present purpose we may call a peculiar form of identity. The problem is accordingly about the relation of identity and distinction in the objective. We may consider two forms of identity as presented by the Hegelian and the *Nyāya* systems respectively. The *Nyāya* is avowedly a realistic system and the Hegelian theory may also in some sense be taken to be realistic. Realism proper, as we conceive it, has no place for the relation of identity in the objective except in a factitious sense, although it should—what it ordinarily does not—admit distinction from distinction as a specific category. The above two theories however admit both identity and distinction though they do not stress them in the same way. The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity while the *Nyāya* assigns priority to distinction. The *Jaina* theory admits identity only in the sense of indeterminate non-distinction ; and it takes the two relations to be coordinate without subordinating any one to the other.

In what sense does the Hegelian subordinate distinction to identity ? Now doubt he emphasises distinction to distinguish his concrete identity from abstract or formal identity but he does not admit—what a realist would admit—that an object can be distinct in itself and need not be in a comprising identity. The dialectic movement ends in an absolute identity, not in an absolute distinction. The thesis and antithesis at any stage are said to be reduced to 'ideality' in the synthesis, to be not only contained but transformed by it. The identity progresses in concreteness in the sense that it dissolves in itself a deeper and deeper difference ; but the absolute in the last resort is taken as the identity of the deepest differences, not as incommensurable bifurcations of an identity.

What however is this relation of *subordination* of distinction to identity ? Distinction is in some sense negated by the identity : it is said to be dissolved or reduced to 'ideality' in the identity. Not that it is negated in the sense an illusory percept is said to be negated by a true percept : difference or the rich variety of the universe is not an illusion. If then difference still retains some kind of being, what is the name of the relation between this being and the being of the identity ? Should it be called identity again, as apparently the Hegelian would call it ? Identity then would occupy two positions : the synthesis or the composite as we may call it is the identity *of* the different factors and is also identical *with* them, being thus at once a relation and a term.

The Hegelian ordinarily understands identity as mutual implication or correlation. If A and B imply one another, each being wholly intelligible by the other, they are said to be identical. In this sense a synthesis would be taken as the identity of its factors. Is the identity of the synthesis *with* the retained being of the distinction within it also to be understood in the sense of mutual implication ? The two implications that make up mutual implication must be envisaged as substantially different truths and must not be a purposeless repetition of each other in different verbal order only. If a synthesis and its factors be mutually implicatory, the synthesis implying the factors must mean something concretely different from the factors implying the synthesis. It cannot mean simply that the factors are *presupposed* by the unity ; for that means substantially the same thing as that the factors presuppose the unity. The two sides are but the verbal explications of the same fact viz. the thought of identity-in-difference

or synthesis. Synthesis implying the factors should mean then that the unity must break out *actually* into difference. In the last resort it will amount to saying that the Absolute should be *experienced*, not merely *thought*, as necessarily reproducing itself in actuality. But is the actual universe *experienced* as necessary? It is only thought to be necessary; and accordingly the implication by the Absolute of actual differences—the necessity of its self-reproduction—is not distinct as a substantial truth from the mere *presupposition* of the Absolute by the universe.

The identity then of a synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not an identity in the sense of mutual implication. If the relation be still called identity, it must be taken as simply intuited, as all identity is taken to be in the *Nyāya*. Apparently then the Hegelian, while subordinating distinction to identity, has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity, corresponding to the difference of thought and intuition, which cannot be reduced to further identity. This however is a contradiction.

A similar contradiction may be brought out in the *Nyāya* view. Here however we start with the priority of distinction to identity and we have to end, as will appear presently, by admitting an identity that is not distinct from any thing at all. Confining ourselves to positives, we have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of *Samavāya* or the relation of inherence. Without going into the subtle technicalities of the *Nyāya* in this connection, we may indicate that *Samavāya* is understood by it as the relation of attribute to its substratum and of a whole to its part. It is a relation of distinct objects and is regarded as what is presupposed by every other relation of existents. It is not a mere formal relation of identity: the distinction of the terms of this relation is taken to be real and to be in no sense superseded by it. Hence it is not *called* identity in this theory but it is pointed out that one term of the relation—attribute or whole—exists inseparably from the other—substratum or part, the inseparability being *eternal* although no term may be infinite or permanent. This eternal inseparability may accordingly be regarded as a form of concrete identity.

Now this identity is taken as knowable by perception, unlike the implicational identity of Hegel which is supposed to be known only by necessary thought. As a percept it is a distinct among distincts, not as in the Hegelian theory comprehensive of the distincts. Ultimately there are objects like the simple atoms distinct in themselves and not

inhering in anything beyond them. Other objects like attributes and wholes exist as distinct but inseparable from their substrata. Finally the relation *Samavāya* or this concrete identity is also a distinct object. Thus priority is assigned, as has been pointed out, in this system to distinction.

The relation of *Samavāya* implies three grades of distincts—objects that must be in some substratum, the substrata, and the relation itself. The question may be asked if relation is a distinct being in the sense in which the objects of the other two grades are distinct. These objects are distinct as the terms of the relation : objects which do not inhere in anything are still determinate as having attributes and wholes inhering in them. Not that the knowledge of a substance presupposes the knowledge of what inheres in it: it is known as distinct prior to the analysis. But in point of being, every object except relation must either have something inhering in it or itself inhere in something else or be in both these situations. Relation is not itself related to anything beyond, for then there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is a distinct existent only by self-identity or *sva-samavāya*.

Self-identity however is not a relation of distincts at all. Granting—what is not admitted by all—that *Samavāya* is known by perception, this self-identity or *Sva-Samavāya* is not a perceptible fact but is only an artificial thought-content. Self-related means unrelated in the objective. *Samavāya* is certainly known along with its terms but as a fact, it is only unrelated and cannot be even said to be definitely different from its terms. Can it then be determinate in itself ? It may indeed be conceded that the determinateness of a related term does not in point of being depend on its relations: the relation of a term *presupposes* an intrinsic determination in the term. But that need not mean that the term is itself unrelated and has relation only added to it. In point of being the relation of *Samavāya* is eternal and so the related term is never unrelated, though as a term it is distinguishable from the relation. Relation then as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate.

In the two conceptions of identity-in-difference above considered, the subordination of either relation to the other appears to lead to a contradiction. Shall we then take the relations to be merely coordinate ? We may take one type of such a view as

presented in a recent work on Logic by W.E. Johnson (Vol. I, chapter xii). In the last two views, a term A can be both identical with and other than B. The present view denies it and keeps to the commonsense principle that distincts cannot be also non-distinct. Yet identity as a relation is admitted : a term X, viewed in connexion with the distincts A and B, would be said to be identical as against the distinction of A and B. Identity of X here practically means its self-identity : it is not merely the thing X but a relation in reference to the distinction. Identity of X thus implies a distinction outside X viz. between A and B, not any distinction or plurality within itself.

The so called mutual implication of the identity and distinction of two terms M and N means according to this view their identity *in one respect a* and their distinction in another *b* ; the two relations are presented together, each being known independently. It amounts to saying that M and N are in the two relations the *same* two terms only in a factitious sense. They are two pairs of terms—*Ma, Na, and Mb, Nb*—presented together; and the identity of *Ma, Na*, means that they are only different symbols of P.

But what does symbol of P mean, it may be asked. Can we simply say that *Ma, Na* are P as in connexion with i.e. as distinct from and together with *Mb, Nb* respectively ? Apparently P has to be thought in two positions. The difference of symbols is not accidentally together with the identity P : it can not be got rid of and cannot in the last resort be taken to be merely *outside* the identity, like the difference of *Mb, Nb*. In other words, a new relation—other than the mere coordinateness of distincts—has to be admitted between P and its ultimate symbols or thought-positions. So far as the identity of P can be distinguished from this relation, it is only *P-ness* and not P ; and the relation itself is but the particularity of P. The identity of a determinate thing then disappears and gives place to a dualism of the abstractions—thinghood and particularity.

Ordinary realism starts with the determinate thing and would resist this analysis as artificial. But the alternative would appear to be to take the determinate thing as simply given, as implying no identity and to reject self-identity as only a meaningless phrase. What precisely is meant by 'simply given' ? It can only mean 'independent of all particularising or symbolising thought'. It is to assume that the distinct exists apart from distinguishing. If this is justified simply by the circumstance that the distinction between the subjective and the

objective is itself a known object, we come back to the old difficulty about distinction within the objective and distinction from the objective. Distinction from the objective, taken as itself objective, implies that knowing is known as distinct from the known i.e. as *as unknown*. If this is not a contradiction, knowing can only be understood as the *indefinite* that is known (i.e. is definite or objective) *as* the indefinite. The realistic equivalent of the relation of object and subject then is the relation of the definite and indefinite.

The objective indefinite has been admitted by some logicians with a realistic tendency e.g. by L.T. Hobhouse in his *Theory of Knowledge*. The content of simple apprehension which to him is the standard fact is at once definite and indefinite. What is apprehended is a definite with an indefinite background. The indefinite as apprehended is so far definite but it is definite *as* indefinite, not as superseding the indefinite. Yet to Hobhouse there is knowledge only so far as the content is defined by abstraction. The knowledge of the indefinite as such is not regarded as necessitating any modification of the forms of definite knowledge. The difference of the definite and the indefinite is not understood as other than the difference between two definites. There is the other obscure relation approximating to adjectivity or identity indicated by the phrase 'definite indefinite.' But this relation, if not denied, is not considered by him at all. The *Jaina* recognises both these relations explicitly and obtains from their contrast certain other forms of truth, simpler and more complex.

The obscure relation in the content 'definite indefinite' requires elucidation. If the indefinite is definite *as such*, is this definiteness an objective character ? To the realist, thought only discovers but does not constitute the object. Bare position corresponding to the simple positing act of thinking must then be objective. The indefinite is thought as *indefinite* and by the same logic the indefiniteness is also objective. The 'definite indefinite' is thus a fact but the two elements of it are incompatible in thought. The factual equivalent of this incompatibility would be disconnexion or *no-relation* : The elements cannot be said to be related objectively even in the way of distinction. Yet as the elements have to be thought together, their togetherness is to be admitted as objective in the same abstract sense. Here then we have *togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements*. We cannot deny a plurality nor can we affirm

a definite distinction : the relation is a magical alternation. This would be the *Jaina* equivalent of the relation of identity. We may call it non-difference, distinction from distinction or indeterminate distinction.

If the given indefinite is definite as indefinite, the given definite is definite as definite. The given definite thus turns out to be a manifold, in contrast with the given indefinite. If the adjective 'definite' in 'definite indefinite' be objective, it is also objective in 'definite definite' and distinguishable from the substantive 'definite'. We use the terms adjective and substantive only in a provisional way. The adjectival definite is objective thought-position and the substantive definite as contrasted with it is objective given-ness, or existence in general. As they are both distinct, their relation is definite distinction or differenced togetherness. Thus we have two modes of togetherness—differenced and undifferenced. The *Jaina* calls them *kramārpaṇa* and *sahārpaṇa* respectively—consecutive presentation and co-presentation, as they might be translated. To him the indeterminism or manifoldness of truth (*anekānta*) presents itself primarily in these two forms of difference and non-difference.

The two definites in the phrase 'definite definite' mean thought-position and given-ness. They answer precisely to the elements of the determinate existent—viz. particularity and thinghood—which we obtained from the coordinateness of identity and distinction. In order to avoid the apparently artificial analysis, the realist takes the determinate existent as merely given. It is indeed given but so is the indefinite also given and the contrast of the two brings out the circumstance that the determinate existent is manifold—the very analysis that was sought to be avoided. The determinate existent then implies the distinct elements and is at the same time distinct from them.

Such is the logical predicament that is presented everywhere in the *Jaina* theory. It may be generalised as a principle : the distinction from distinction is other than mere distinction and yet asserts the distinction. It is just the realistic equivalent of the simple statement that the subject is distinct from the object and *knows* this distinction, or as it may be put more explicitly, that the knowing of knowing is the knowing of knowing *as referring to the object*. As we have already suggested, the different basal categories of objectivity with which the different forms of realism are bound up answer to the different aspects

of the act of knowing. If knowing is a unity, the known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness. If knowing is itself a duality of 'contemplating' and 'enjoying', the known or the contemplated is a duality of distinctions and distinction from distinction. If finally knowledge is *of* the object, *refers* to the known, the known must present an equivalent of this *of-relation* or *reference*.

What is this *of-relation* ? It is the relation of knowing and its content, the knowing or assertive function which is sometimes identified with the function of meaning. It is a relation, not of two contents, but of content and no-content; of being and no-being—something that is neither the one nor the other and is intellitible only by the concept of *freedom that can neither be said to be nor not to be*. This freedom, stripped of its subjective associations, is but the category of indetermination. Distinction and identity infact—or as we call them, differenced togetherness and undifferenced togetherness (of particularity and thinghood)—are themselves related in the way of indetermination or alternation : particularity and thinghood are in *each* relation without being in the other relation *at the same time*. Identity is distinct from distinction and yet implies it i.e. is in alternation with it. There are thus three basal categories—viz. distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category, there are forms of realism that admit some kind of definite identity as distinct from distinction, and finally *Jaina* realism admits both in the form of indetermination, the identity being interpreted as indefinite.

The *Jaina* develops this category of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth. The indetermination is ultimately of the definite and indefinite. Now this yields two relations—definite distinction between them and indefinite distinction. But indefinite distinction between them is to our knowledge nothing other than the indefinite as a term of it : we do not know more of the indefinite than that it is indefinite. The most complex mode of truth then that we know is the definite distinction between the definite and the indefinite, or as we put it more explicitly, between the definite-definite and the definite-indefinite. Every other aspect of truth, as we shall see presently, is implied by it as distinct from and alternative with it.

Now the definiteness of the given indefinite, as has been shown already, though objective, sits lightly on the indefinite and is a detachable adjective. The conception of detachable definiteness being thus obtained, the given definite turns out to be a manifold, to be a togetherness or distinction of two definites—the detachable definite on the one hand or particular position which has no reference to existence or non-existence and givenness or existence in general on the other which as contrasted with the particular i.e. as characterless may be called its negation. No other negation is admitted by the *Jaina* to be objective : what is called absolute negation—one form of which is the contradictory—the negation of what it is not possible to affirm at all is to be rejected as not objective, as no truth at all. The definite-definite or the determinate existent may then be said both to be and not to be : particularity or pure position is its being and existence in general is its negation. There is no contradiction if we bear in mind that the being of pure position is not given existence but only what must be thought, what is objective in this sense. The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent *A* is in one respect and *is not* in another respect. This does not simply mean that *A* is *A* and is not *B* : it means that existent *A*, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity.

The determinate existent is, in the sense explained, being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the *Jaina* calls *kramārpaṇa*. The given indefinite—the ‘unspeakable’ or *avaktavya* as it has been called—as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than this ‘consecutive togetherness’ : it implies *sahārpaṇa* or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation in the above sense. It is objective as given : it cannot be said to be *not* a particular position nor to be *non-existent*. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence : it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood.

So far then we have obtained four modes of truth—being, negation, their distinction and their non-distinction—all implied by the distinction between the definite given and the indefinite

given. Now this distinction is itself a mode of truth : and as the definite given is taken to be being and negation or particularity and existence together, the indefinite may be considered as together with or distinct from each of these elements taken singly. It may be taken to *be* a particular i.e. to be together with position, and it may be taken to be many indistinguishable negations, to be the universal— existence—as itself a confusion of the negations of many particulars, as not-A, not-B, not-C.....indefinitely together. Thus we have altogether seven modes of truth—*bhaṅgas* as they have been called— viz. particular position or being, its negation or the universal— existence, position and negation as distinguishably together or determinate existent, these as indistinguishably together or the indefinite, this indefinite as itself a being or particular position, as many negations together, and finally as distinct from the determinate existent. If there be an eighth mode, it would be non-distinction of the definite and indefinite, which however is but the indefinite, nothing more specific than the fourth mode.

The value of these modes of truth for logic cannot be fully discussed within the limits of this paper. We may conclude by pointing out that these modes of truth are not merely *many* truths but *alternative* truths. The last mode may be regarded as implying the other modes but is not therefore in any sense a comprising unity. What is implied by a mode is a different mode. The implying relation in objective terms is but indetermination. The implying mode and the implied mode are at once distinct and indefinitely non-distinct. Truth as an indetermination or alternation of truths is but manifold possibility. Each mode of truth as alternative with the others is a possible though it has to be taken as objective.

There is the conception of indeterministic will to which there are many possibles, any of which can be really chosen by it. Here we have already the notion of manifold possibility as objective to the will. But the logic of this notion has not been sufficiently investigated, though the relations of objective possibles cannot be adequately expressed by the categories of ordinary logic. The *Jaina* theory elaborates a logic of indetermination—not in reference to the will—but in reference to the knowing though it is a pragmatist theory in some sense. As a realist, the *Jaina* holds that truth is not constituted by willing though he admits that the knowledge of truth has a necessary reference to willing, His theory of

indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, not doubt, but *toleration* of many modes of truth. The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance. What is presented and cannot be got rid of has to be accepted as truth even though it is not definitely thinkable or is thinkable in *alternative* definite modes.

Metaphysical View of Anekānta*

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Introductory

The non-absolutist realism of the Jains neither endorses absolute eternalism nor absolute fluxism, but explains both these extremes as real with reference to different aspects of the same reality.

While dealing with the quantum field theory in the first chapter, we had seen that the paradox of wave-particle-duality of light could be explained by the concept of complementarity introduced by Neils Bohr (one of the founders of the quantum theory). This concept states that both the wave-aspect and the particle-aspect of light are necessary to fully understand the nature of light. Light or anything else cannot be both wave-like and particle-like in the same context.

This precisely is the Jain position with regard to any two opposites. Neils Bohr visited China in 1937 and was deeply impressed by ancient Chinese notion of the polar opposites. Some other physicists also visited Far Eastern countries and India and were no doubt deeply impressed by *Vedānta*, and Buddhist philosophies. In the following discussion, we shall see that the Jain theory of Non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) offers the best explanation of wave-particle paradox. Unfortunately, however, the eminent physicists could not contact the Jain scholars who could have shown to them the excellent merits of *anekāntavāda*. In the last fifteen years, a number of books on modern physics have revealed the most striking parallels between some schools

* Microcosmology : Atom in the Jain Philosophy and Modern Science, J.V.B.I. Ladnun, 1991.

of Eastern mysticism and scientific concepts of space and time, cause and effect, etc. In such books, we find the mention of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc., but hardly anything about Jain philosophy. Through the brief discussion in the following pages, we hope to convince the scientists in general and the physicists in particular, that the study of Jain Philosophy deserves much more attention than it has received so far.

What is *Anekāntavāda* ?

Anekāntavāda is basic to the structure of Jain metaphysics. It seeks to reorient our logical attitude and asks us to accept the unification of contradictions as the true measure of reality. It is the key to unlock the mystery of the paradoxical Reality.

The law of *anekānta* affirms that there is no opposition between the unity of being and plurality of aspects. The identity of a real is not contradicted by the possession of varying attributes. No one can deny that light, for instance, produces multiple effects, viz., the expulsion of darkness, the illumination of the field of perception, radiation of heat and energy and so on. If a plurality of the energies can be possessed by a self-identical entity without offence to logic, why should the spectre of logical incompatibility be raised in the case of a permanent cause possessing diverse powers (i.e. producing diverse effects) ? The law of *anekānta* affirms the possibility of diverse and even contradictory attributes in a unitary entity, i.e., a thing is neither an absolute unity nor a split-up into an irreconcilable plurality. A thing is one and many at the same time—a unity and a plurality rolled into one.

Anekāntavāda also asserts that there is no contradiction between identity and otherness, as they are not absolute characteristics. The contradiction would be unsurmountable if the two opposites were affirmed to be identical in an absolute reference (i.e. same context). But the identity and otherness asserted by the law of *anekānta* are only partial and limited, and not complete and unqualified.

Thus *Anekāntavāda*—non-absolutism—is the law of the multiple nature of Reality. It corrects the partiality of philosophers of supplementing the other side of Reality which escaped them. Non-absolutism pleads for soberness and insists that the nature of Reality is to be determined in conformity with the evidence of experience undeterred by the considerations of abstract logic. Loyalty to experience and to fundamental concepts of philosophy alike make the conclusion inevitable that absolutism is to be surrendered. A thing

is neither eternal nor non-eternal, neither permanent nor perishable in the absolute sense but partakes of both the characteristics, and this does not mean any offence to the canons of logic.

Experience Vs. Pure (*a priori*) Logic

The Jains who are noted for their firmness and sobriety of outlook, maintain that if the nature of reality is allowed to be determined by *a priori* logic, in defiance of experience, the results would be fatal. Certainly logic is not competent to tell us whether anything exists at all. It is only perception which can assure us that anything exists.

Thus, the position that is adopted by the Jains is this : Pure logic, prior to and independent of experience is a blind guide to the determination of Truth. Logic is to rationalize and systematize what experience offers. All our knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. Even the knowledge that something exists is not capable of being derived from any other source. The existence and behaviour of things and their mutual relationship can be ascertained only on the basis of experience and the function of reason or pure logic is only to reduce the data of experience to order and system. To allow logic to work in vacuo and to dictate term to the data of experience to behave in a way different from their own is neither a sound philosophical procedure nor a safe course of thought. The unfettered exercise of logic in defiance of the testimony of experience, has been responsible for the hopelessly chaotic results achieved by metaphysical speculations. That philosophy has not made progress commensurate with the progress of science is due to the illegitimate freedom usurped by reason by de-position of empirical evidence. The laws of thought, if they are to be the laws of being and becoming must be propounded in a fashion that they may be really helpful to the progress of knowledge.

Mutation (*pariṇāma*)

Non-absolutism being the foundation of Jain Philosophy, mutation (change) is as much real as permanence. A substance is a substratum of infinite qualities. Nothing can exist without 'being in some determinate way' and the qualities of a substance means its existence in a 'determinate mode of being'. Thus, assert Jains, the qualities (*guṇas*) and modes (*pariṇāmas*) cannot be absolutely different from the substance nor can they be absolutely identical with it.

Change or modification is a fundamental characteristic of all that is real. The problem presented by unceasing mutability of existence is

one of the earliest as well as one of most persistent ones in the whole range and history of Eastern as well as Western Philosophy. There is an ominous hint of the central paradox implied in all mutability—namely, that only the identical and permanent can change.

This paradoxical thought has affected philosophy in different ways at different periods of its history. In the West, at the very dawn of Greek Philosophy, it was the guiding principle of the “Ionian physicists.” Later on, Parmenides and his Eleatic successors swung to the extreme view that change, being impossible in a permanent homogeneous substance, must be a mere illusion of our deceptive senses.

Later again, Empidocles sought to reconcile the apparent mutability of things with the criticism of Parmenides by the theory of regrouping of atom in space.

At a more developed stage of Greek thought, Plato drew the momentous distinction between two worlds or orders of being—the real, with its eternal unvarying self-identity, and the merely apparent, where all is change, confusion, and instability. In the Orient also, there have not been wanting attempts to get rid of the paradox by denying its truth. Vedantists, like the Eleastics, sought to escape it by reducing change itself to a baseless illusion. On the other hand, Buddhists (fluxists), like the disciples of Heraclitus, have evaded it by refusing to admit any permanent identity in the changeable, and they have not been entirely without imitators in the modern world.

Incessant change without underlying unity has had its defenders in the history of Metaphysics. The argument in favour of the doctrine that only incessant change is real seems to be the appeal to direct experience. In any actual experience, it is contended, we are always presented with the fact of change and transition, we never apprehend an absolutely unchanging content.

Now there can, of course, be no gainsaying these facts of experience, but the conclusion based on them evidently goes much farther than the premises warrant. Experience never gives us mere persistence of an unchanging content. Nor does it ever give us mere change without persistence. What we actually experience always exhibits the two aspects of identity and transition together. Usually there will be, side by side with the elements which sensibly change others which remain sensibly constant. And even the successive states of the changing content are not merely momentary, each has its own sensible duration through which it retains its character without perceptible changes. Experience, thus, entirely fails to substantiate the

notion of mere change apart from a background of permanent identity.

The positive disproof of the notion must, however, be found in its own inherent absurdity. Change by itself, apart from a background of identity, is impossible for the reason that where there is no underlying identity, there is nothing of change. All change must be change of and in something. And where you have not merely a change of perception but an actual perception of change, the case is even clearer. What we perceive in such a case is the two successive states being held together by the fact that they are successive states of some more permanent unity. Mostly you have not merely a change of perception, but an actual perception of change. What we perceive is the two successive states being held together by the fact that they are successive states of some more permanent unity.

Change, therefore, is a succession *within an identity*, the identity being as essential to the character of the object as the succession. In what way, then, must we think of this identity which is present throughout the whole succession of changes ? This question—how that which changes can be permanent ?—is similar to the old problem of quality and substance, how the many states can belong to one thing, considered with special reference to the case of states which form a succession in time. Thus, whatever is the true nature of the unity to which the many states of one thing belong, will also be the true nature of the identity which connects the successive stages of a process of change.

A group of states is the embodiment of coherent structure. The earlier and later stages of the process are differences in an identity precisely because they constitute one process. The succession of stages is thus welded into a unity which we express by saying that whatever changes possesses an underlying permanent identity of character.

Triple Characteristics of Real

In order to fully grasp the significance of Jain view regarding physical existence in the context of new physics, we think it is necessary to allow a little more space to discuss the character of Reality as asserted by the Jain philosophy of Non-absolutism. We, therefore, apologize to the readers for being repetitive to some extent.

We have seen in the previous sub-section that the Jain conception of Reality avoids the Scylla of fluxism and the Charybdis of illusionism. One cannot conceive of any other philosophy which can maintain realism against the onslaughts of idealists without endorsing the Jain conception. Existence, cessation and persistence are the

fundamental characteristics of all that is real. This concept of Reality is the only one which can avoid the conclusion that the world of plurality, which is the world of experience, is an illusion. Either the world is to be accepted as real or dismissed as an unreal appearance.

The affirmation of origination, cessation and persistence as the triple characteristics in the constitution of reals has to be substantiated. We have seen that change presupposes the persistence of an underlying permanence. So permanence is to be accounted as an element in a real together with change. But change means the cessation of a previous mode or attribute and the coming into being of a new mode. The affirmation of the triple characteristics has, therefore, nothing paradoxical about it. They are a natural deduction from the reality of change. The Jains believe in the dynamic nature of reals and in deference to the demands of reason and experience alike, they sum up the triple characteristics as the component factors of the constitution of Reality. One can avoid this triple characteristic only by the declaration of change as appearance, which is the position of the Vedānta. One must offer one's allegiance either to Vedantic monism or affirm the multiple nature of Reality, which is the teaching of Jaina *anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism).

Viewed from the Jaina standpoint, a real is a continuum through the infinite variation of its modes at every moment of its being. The continuum is a reality as much as the variation. Thus, there is unity as well as multiplicity in perfect harmony. The real viewed as identical with the changing modes is thus coming into being every moment and perishing every moment. That it comes to evolve a new mode implies that the previous mode has ceased to exist. So a real *qua* its modes is becoming something new by ceasing to be its old self. The birth of the new is thus the logical concomitant of the death of the old. The affirmation of the three apparently incompatible elements as making up the constitution of a real is thus the result of a logical analysis of a real as it is. Either pure (absolute) negation or pure (absolute) affirmation are the only alternatives left for acceptance. The former is the position of the Buddhist *Śūnyavādin* and the latter is that of Vedānta. Is the paradox greater in the Jain view than in the two other systems? Is the *Śūnyavādin* who dismisses the whole world of experience as an unfounded illusion, less paradoxical? Is the Vedantic view, which endorses the *Śūnyavādin's* repudiation of the whole world of pluralities, calculated to satisfy the abhorrence of paradox in a more satisfying manner? The paradox is only apparent as it alone provides

a satisfactory experience and thought. The criterion should be whether or not it succeeds to explain the world *as we know it*.

Again, the Jains assert the non-absolutistic position in respect of the relation of modes with substance. The mode is a mode of the substance because the identity of substance is focussed in it and is not annulled. So a mode is identical with substance in that respect. To take an example, clay is transformed into a jar, and so the former is regarded as the cause of the latter. The jar is different from clay, no doubt, but the jar could not be a jar unless it were the same substance as clay. The mode and the substance may be viewed as identical and also different, as they are both in one. Thus the consequences are not inevitable, as they are based upon exclusive identity and exclusive difference. But the identity is not exclusive of difference and *vice versa*, as both are the attested traits of Reality. If identity is to be asserted on the evidence of experience, difference also should equally be asserted on the strength of the same evidence. The compartmental way of looking at things leads to the affirmation of one and to the negation of the other. The besetting sin of philosophers has been the habit to put the telescope upon the blind eye and then to deduce that the other aspect is not real. The Jain Philosopher voices the necessity of using both the eyes and of seeing the obverse and reverse of the coin of Reality.

The triple characteristics gives out the internal constitution of Reality. A real persists through time and thus has these three—past, present and future—temporal determinations. So a real is real for all time. It was real in the past, is real in the present and will be real in future. A 'real' which has no past and no future is a fiction and a non-entity.

Let us sum up the results of our investigation into the nature of Reality. The Jain philosopher has proved that absolute unqualified affirmation of existence is not in conformity with the nature of Reality. He has also proved that absolute negation of existence is self-contradictory. He has further proved that fidelity to experience and thought demands that existence and non-existence both are to be accepted as equally valid traits in the make-up of a real.

In order to guard against the absolutist habit of believing existence and non-existence as whole-characteristics excluding each other from their respective orbit, the Jain philosopher prefaces each proposition by the limiting phrase 'in some respect' or 'in one particular aspect' (*syāt*). The insertion of this phrase is a warning against reading an absolutist sense into the predicates. It is true that the

two characteristics—'is' and 'is not'—are not capable of being expressed by one word at a time. The co-existence of these two predicables is sought to be implied by the phrase 'inexpressible' (*avācya*) by some others. But according to the Jains, the word 'inexpressible', used as a predicate, asserts a real characteristic of a real subject and the possibility of such predication means that a real is not entirely incapable of being described. So the predicate 'inexpressible' cannot be taken in its literal absolute sense. 'In some respect, a real is inexpressible' is the correct proposition.

The Jains assert that concepts and conceptual thoughts are not in opposition. It is exceedingly difficult to understand why the concepts should not be of service in the emergence of perceptual intuition. The Jains maintain that perceptual judgments are founded upon reality. Parity of reasoning requires that consciousness, with the aid of sense-organs and concepts, can give us the full knowledge of Reality as it is. The Jains do not regard the concepts as antagonistic to Reality. The concepts are as much the means, as the sense-organs and consciousness are, of gaining an insight into the nature of Reality. Thus, a real is not a particular alone, but particular-cum-universal, the universal as embodied in the particular. The real is, thus, amenable to verbal communication and to judgment alike.

Problem of Relation

In the previous sub-section, the problem of relation was discussed briefly. We shall now see how the reality of relation between substance and its qualities and modes, has always been an irritating problem in metaphysics, and has been thoroughly discussed by all the schools of Indian philosophy. It has also received serious attention of all Western philosophers too, since the time of Aristotle.

The reality of relation between substance and qualities is a fundamental concept for the Jains, and it is 'relation' which introduces order and coherence into the world. But the reality of relation has been denied by the Fluxists and the Vedantists in the Orient. In Western metaphysics, Kant and Bradley condemned 'the thing with its qualities' as self-contradictory. But such a conclusion goes clean against not only commonsense but against science. It is remarkable that the arguments of Kant and Bradley were anticipated by the ancient Indian philosophies several centuries ago. The Buddhist Fluxists' position has been summed up by Bradley in these forceful words :.....a relational way of thought.....must give appearance

and not truth. It is a make-shift, a practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible.”¹

The Jains refuse to be brow-beaten by such a flourish of abstract logic. If our intellect is not to be condemned to bankruptcy and if Reality be not declared to be a unfathomable mystery, an explanation must be found. We have already elucidated the Jain position regarding logic which clearly states that the denial of experience ends in unqualified scepticism, and if we are to believe and value the testimony of our experience, there is no possibility of denying the validity of relation. Unity of cognition, in spite of the numerical difference of contents (as in the cognition of a variegated carpet), is an attested fact and we have no reason to call in question its authenticity. “Why should there be a relation at all ?” is a question as absurd and equally unanswerable as “why consciousness should be consciousness and not different from it.....”.

“Reality”, assert the Non-absolutist Jains, “is the identity of an infinite multiplicity of aspects and modes. A real is a unity and diversity in one, and the relation involved is neither one of absolute identity nor one of absolute otherness but something different from both. It is *sui generis* (*jātyantara*) which does not permit of being determined by absolute criteria.”

If ‘identity’ satisfied a logical necessity, so also should this unique relation. Each is unique and ultimate and there is no reason to condemn it as appearance, when it is equally a given fact with identity or otherness. On the other hand, neither absolute identity, nor absolute otherness has any reality beyond abstractions of thoughts.

Jain View Compared with Western Philosophers’ and Scientists’ View

In the previous chapter, we have seen that matter (called ‘*puḍgalāstikāya*’ by the Jains) is the only substance which can be the object of sensuous cognition. At the same time, we have seen that *paramāṇu*, the ultimate atom of *puḍgala* and some kinds of material aggregates cannot be perceived by sense-organs. Nevertheless, all modifications of *puḍgala*—be it a single free ultimate atom (*paramāṇu*) or an aggregate composed of infinite number of *paramāṇus*—do possess the four qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. These qualities are also real and their existence does not depend upon the percipient. Besides these four innate qualities, *puḍgala*

1. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 28.

possesses innumerable other qualities which are all subject to incessant series of modes.

With these views, it is obvious that Jains will refute all types of philosophical idealism—subjectivism and solipsism. Being non-absolutists, however, Jains will almost always find points of agreement in the views of most schools of thought. We shall, therefore, compare Jain views with those of a few Western philosophers and scientists with particular reference to the existence of physical reality.

According to Sir Arthur Eddington, an eminent physicist, who calls his philosophy 'selective subjectivism', though the material world does exist objectively, it does not appear in our experience or observational knowledge. Thus, although he accepts the objective existence of matter in the realm of metaphysics, he denies such status to it in the realm of epistemology because he does not accept that sensory qualities exist objectively in matter.

This is in opposition to the Jain view. Jains' argument in rebuttal of Eddington's view is : if it is the consciousness that creates sensory qualities and if the matter itself is devoid of these qualities, how can a single object be perceived identically by different percipients with normal sensory equipments ?

Sir James Jeans, another eminent physicist, is also a supporter of philosophical idealism. According to him, "The objective and material universe consist of little more than 'construct' of our own minds. The universe is created by a pure mathematician who does not concern himself with material substance but with pure thought. His creations are not only created by thought but consist of thought. In his views both subjective and objective fall within what is inside our minds."

Jeans has accepted the reality of mind (psyche) which, according to him, is a non-physical reality. The Jain philosophy also, asserts that soul is a non-physical reality. Thus 'mind' of Jeans and 'soul' of the Jains being non-physical in nature, describe the same reality.

Jeans talks of 'Universal Mind' and 'Individual Minds'. The Universal Mind, according to him, is the creator and governor of the realm of matter as well as the individual minds. He believes that atoms out of which our individual minds have grown exist as thought in the Universal Mind.

The Jain view does not accept the existence of any such Universal Mind of which the individual minds are units of excrescences. According to the Jain view, all the souls are independent individual entities having real objective existence. Jeans has not given any reason

for his belief which is akin to the pantheistic view.

Now, as we have already seen, the Jain view concedes that the sensory knowledge of the phenomena of the universe may not be wholly objective, but it does not conform with Jeans' views in considering the phenomena of the universe as wholly subjective.

According to Jeans, the objective reality or the real essence of substance is beyond our knowledge. He, thus, seems to accept Kant's transcendentalism in which the thing-in-itself is considered to be transcendental. The Jain philosophy also declares that the ultimate essence of substances cannot be comprehended through the sensory knowledge and hence, at least in this respect, Jeans' view is consistent with the Jain view.

Lastly, we shall discuss the concept of substantiality. Jeans defines 'substantiality' as a 'purely mental concept measuring direct effect of object on our sense of touch'. Now, if it is so, i.e., if substantiality is not inherent in the substances, how do the objects (or substances) exist without substantiality? Also Jeans' discussion of the degrees of substantiality is not only equivocal but almost absurd. On the other hand, the Jain philosophy furnishes us with the crystal clear definitions of the terms substance, substantially, etc., and proves objectiveness of substantiality on logical and empirical grounds. Substantiality as a purely mental concept is definitely not acceptable to the Jain philosophy. Thus both views vehemently differ from each other on this point.

On the other hand, the eminent philosopher-scientist Sir Albert Einstein asserted the reality of atom and the objective existence of the external world. According to him, "Planck's determination of the true molecular size from the law of radiation (for high temperatures) convinced us of the reality of atoms."²

The dialectical materialism supports and corroborates the realist view saying 'the concept of matter epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind... Electrons, ether, etc., exist as objective realities, just as nature existed prior to man and organic matter...The absence of any other kind of mass in the electron except electromagnetic mass...corroborates the objective existence of matter. The electron is to the atom as a full stop is to the size of a building 200 ft. long, 100 ft. broad and 50 ft. high; it moves with a velocity as high as 270,000 kms. per second, its mass is a function of its velocity, it makes 500 trillion revolutions in a second.

Human reason has discovered...will discover still more...But this does not mean that nature is the creation of our mind or of an abstract mind, i.e. of Ward's God."³

It should not be assumed that all realist views are acceptable to Jains.

The materialists and the Jains—both agree in accepting the objective realism as well as the sensible qualities of matter. "Matter is a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." This definition of matter given by the materialists comes very close to the Jain definition of *pudgala* viz., '*pudgala* is that which possesses in itself the qualities of touch, taste, colour and odour. Even though the Jain philosophy denies the possibility of direct perception of the ultimate atom (*paramāṇu*) of matter through sensory means, it accepts the quality of '*mūrtatva*' being objectively existent even in *paramāṇus*. Also both recognise matter as an objective reality. In the words of Lenin "the sole property of matter with whose recognition philosophical materials is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, existing outside our mind."

The fundamental difference between the two views is regarding the ultimate reality of consciousness. According to the Jain view, physical order of existence (*ajīva*) and psychical order of existence (*jīva*) are entirely different substances. Consciousness is the characteristic of *jīva* (psyche), and, therefore, *ajīva* is devoid of consciousness. Only *jīva* is capable of a cognitive experience. Besides, passions, emotions, sensation of pleasure or pain, memory, experience, etc., are various manifestations of consciousness alone. Matter is devoid of consciousness and is therefore *ajīva*. Mutual transformation within the two orders of existence is, according to Jains, absolutely impossible. Matter, being entirely devoid of consciousness cannot under any conditions, be transformed into *jīva*. The Greek atomists believed that psychical order was created and composed of certain types of atoms (spherical, dynamic and smooth). Dialectical materialism does not accept the separate existence of psychical order at all. According to it, the entire existence is transformation of matter. The scientists' views are divided on the subject. Some of them accept the independent existence of two orders, while some of them agree with the views of the dialectical materialism.

Motion, Space, Time, Ether(s)

Each of the above concepts has been discussed in the preceding chapter. Here, we shall briefly compare the Jain views about these concepts with those of modern science.

Having accepted the reality of physical substance, the Jain naturally accepts the reality of motion. It has also obtained a good standing in the field of modern philosophy and modern science has also emphasized the importance and reality of motion in understanding the nature of physical existence. And, in order to accept the reality of motion of physical objects, the reality of space must also be accepted.

But motion in Jain doctrine is intimately connected with not only space, but also two other substances—positive ether (*dharmāstikāya*) as medium of motion and negative ether (*adharmāstikāya*) as medium of rest. We shall, therefore, be required to discuss all the three substances together with motion.

It may be recalled that we translated the terms *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* as positive and negative ethers respectively, because the classical physics had postulated the existence of medium of motion and called it ether. In the classical physics, the problem of motion was first dealt with by Gallillio and later on by Newton. Before them, Aristotlean tradition of absolute rest was generally believed. But Newton's theory got rid of the idea of absolute rest and introduced conception of a substance called the "ether", that was present everywhere, even in the empty space. Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light predicted that light waves travel at a certain fixed speed through ether. Light waves travelled through ether as soundwaves travelled through air. Between 1887 and 1905, the fate of ether was hanging in a balance. In the meanwhile, an important experiment carefully performed by Michelson and Morely suggested that there exists no such substance as ether. Finally, in 1905, Albert Einstein established that the whole idea of an ether was unnecessary, provided that one was willing to abandon the idea of absolute time.

The discoveries of modern science, the dual nature of matter, the standing wave-patterns of electrons are all associated with the reality of space and its contents. Now the space itself, according to Jains, has infinite extension and only a portion of it is filled in the other real substances. It is this finite portion which is the theatre of all the drama of cosmic dance. And the finiteness of the cosmos is due to the two other substances viz. media of motion and rest. Without these two, the systematic structure of the cosmos would have been a chaos.

Space-time

In physics, the concepts of space and time are so basic for the description of natural phenomena that their modification entails an alteration of the whole framework we use in physics to describe nature. The concepts of space and time underwent radical modification from the time of Aristotle to the present time.

In Newtonian physics, matter particles moved in a three dimensional absolute space filled with ether (medium of motion). It was an absolute space, always at rest and unchangeable. All changes in the physical world were described in terms of a separate entity called time, which again was absolute, having no connection with the material world and flowing smoothly from the past through the present to the future. These concepts of space, time and ether were the basis of physics for almost three centuries.

Both Aristotle and Newton believed in absolute time. That is, one could always measure the interval of time between two events and that it would be the same whoever measured it. Time was completely separate from and independent of space. This commonsense view worked well when dealing with apples or planets that move slowly but they don't work at all for things moving at or near the speed of light.

According to Einstein's relativity theory, space was not three dimensional and time was not a separate entity. Both were intimately connected and formed a four-dimensional continuum—"space-time". Furthermore, there was no universal flow of time. Concepts of an absolute space and an absolute time were, thus, abandoned and became merely elements of language for describing observed phenomena. Concept of ether was also given up.

Einstein's theory, moreover, says that three-dimensional space is curved and the curvature is caused by the gravitational field of massive bodies. Thus according to this theory, the universe is finite with *nothing* beyond it.

Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvāda*

Y.J. PADMARAJIAH

Anekāntavāda

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina metaphysics and *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda* (or *Saptabhaṅgī*) are its main arteries. Or, to use a happier metaphor, the bird of *anekāntavāda* flies on its two wings of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. It is beyond the scope of the present work to give a full exposition, not to mention an ample critical assessment, to even some of the most essential aspects of these three topics. The traditional viewpoints are, of course, presented in the old Prākṛta and Sanskrit works. But no sizeable literature, which is commensurate with the magnitude and importance of these problems, and which represents any significant effort for achieving a reorientation of these problems to the trends of modern thought, has yet come into existence although the need of such effort cannot be exaggerated. However, consistently with the aim of the present study that it should confine itself to certain important problems which have received inadequate or little attention, we may discuss, in the present chapter, how *anekāntavāda*—the theory of manifoldness or indetermination—manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. A glimpse into some significant implications of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* will also follow the inquiry into *anekāntavāda*.

As already shown, while repudiating the idealistic notion of the

* A comparative study of the Jaina theories of Reality and knowledge, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1986.

concrete universal, the theory of identity-in-difference, the metaphysical presupposition of *anekāntavāda*, animating all the spheres of Jaina philosophical thinking, recognises the objectivity of the material universe. The objectivity of the universe signifies the fact that the universe is independent of the mind of consciousness. This independence, or the duality of consciousness and the material universe, necessarily presupposes the principle of distinction, which exerts a compulsive force until the logical goal of this principle is reached in the form of the development of the Jaina concepts of reality and knowledge into the comprehensive scheme of *anekānta* realism. In other words, once the initial step is taken, namely the recognition of the principle of distinction as being at the root of the duality of the mind and the world, there is no stopping short of working out, to their logical conclusion, the consequences of the operation of the principle of distinction. The claim that *anekāntavāda* is the most consistent form of realism lies in the fact that Jainism has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge.

The first significant step to be taken, once the operative principle of distinction is accepted, is the postulation of a multiplicity of ultimate reals constituting the cosmos. The material or the objective world is constituted, according to Jaina ontology, by five ultimate reals : viz., matter (*pudgala*) space (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), the medium of motion (*dharma*) and the medium of rest (*adharmā*); and the mental or the subjective world consists of an infinity of independent minds, or spirits, in their conditioned or free existence. An analysis, on the physical as well as on the mental side, reveals, therefore, a multiple or pluralistic universe.

The other step, which along with the corollary to be referred to a little later in this chapter, fulfils the purpose of the ubiquitously operative principle of distinction, and which imparts the name of '*anekāntavāda*', after which the entire Jaina metaphysics is often known, is the postulation of manifoldness, or inherent complexity, within each of the reals in the universe. In other words, reality, according to Jainism, is not merely multiple but each real, in its turn, is manifold or complex to its core. Reality is thus a complex web of manyness (*aneka*) and manifoldness (*anekānta*). The central thesis of the Jaina is, according to a modern critic, "that there is not only diversity but each real is

equally diversified''.¹

The 'diversification' or manifoldness—also described as indeterminateness' or 'indefiniteness'—may be illustrated by the two instances of matter and space in the physical universe. Dealing with the atomic theory of matter and space in Jainism Hiriyanna observes : "The atoms, according to it (Jainism) are all of the same kind, but they can yet give rise to the infinite variety of things so that matter as considered here is of quite an indefinite nature. *Pudgala* has, as we know, certain inalienable features, but within the limits imposed by them it can become anything through qualitative differentiations. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist."² The material world evolves from the diversification of these homogeneous atoms into aggregates of earth, water, fire and air. It is pointed out that "Jainism also, like Upanisads, does not stop in the analysis of the physical universe at the elements of *prthvī*, etc. It pushes it further back where qualitative differentiation has not yet taken place. But while in the latter the ultimate stage is represented by the monistic principle of Brahman, here it is taken by an infinity of atoms."³ Indicating that the character of indefiniteness or indeterminateness is extended to the sphere of quality also the same writer further observes : "It is not qualitatively only that matter is indefinite. Quantitatively also it is regarded as undetermined. It may increase or decrease in volume without addition or loss."⁴ A further treatment of the notion of manifoldness of matter has been offered in the chapter on Relations, in connection with the problem whether an atom has, and if so in what sense it has, an infinite part (*amśa*), despite the fact it is impartite (*niravayava*) in its nature. In the course of the treatment of the problem we have met with an occasion to discuss the light which is shed on it by three thinkers, viz., Prabhācandra and McTaggart on the one hand and Abhayadeva on the other. Again, in the present instance of matter⁵, the brief hints hitherto given of the Jaina atomic theory sufficiently indicate the nature of indeterminateness

1. JPNM, p. 70

2. *OIP*, p. 212 f.

3. *Ibid.* The phrase 'an infinity of atoms' may be substituted, without being incorrect, 'an infinity of diversified atoms'.

4. *Ibid.* Cf. the following fragment of Empedocles in Greek philosophy : "Earth increases its own mass and Air swells the bulk of Air." Burnet's *Early Greek philosophy*, the edn. Adam & Charles Black, London, 1952, p. 212.

5. For a somewhat clearer view of the problem, this account of the indeterminateness of matter may be read in conjunction with the controversy regarding the *śavayavatva* or otherwise of an atom in an earlier chapter (ch. VII).

or manifoldness in reality.

Space or *ākāśa* is another example of a manifold real.⁶ Its manifoldness is connoted, as in the case of matter, by its possession of parts.⁷ According to Abhayadeva as well as Prabhācandra even an incorporeal or formless real may contain parts or divisions, as evidenced by the obvious instance of *ātman*,⁸ which contains cognitive and other powers. Abhayadeva points out further that to be divisible does not necessarily mean that the parts⁹ should be put together at some point of time prior to division. In other words the divisibility of space is a spontaneous feature.

The entire argument on the manifoldness of space, as well as of other reals, is developed by Abhayadeva in his polemic against the Naiyāyika view of *ākāśa*. According to the Naiyāyika *ākāśa* or 'ether'¹⁰ is one (*eka*)¹¹ or partless (*na nānā or niravayavi*) and, consequently, it is all-pervading (*vibhu*)¹² and eternal (*nitya*)¹³—the distinctions, therefore, like *ghaṭākāśa* and *maṭhākāśa* are, like the concepts 'here' and 'there', a superimposition (*upādhi*)¹⁴ upon that eternally unchanging medium.

But the Jaina believes in the genuine divisions of infinite

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6. Cf. *nanvanārabdhāmārtimaddravyāvayavatve gaganādīnām niravayavatva-prasakter anekāntatva ekatvavyāghātaḥ, na...TBV*, p. 641. For an explanation of the term *anārabdha*, occurring in this quotation, see *infra*, f.n. 9.
 7. *ākāśasya...sāvayavatvaṁ ghaṭāder ivopapannaṁ sāvayavamākāśaṁ himavat—vindhyāvaruddhavibhinnadeśatvāt/Ibid.*
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 642, lines 9-11; cp. *amārtasyāpyātmano jñānadyadhikarāṇatvaprattih/PKM*, p. 563.
 9. The term for the state in which the parts need not be put together prior to division is *anārabdha*.
 10. Besides *ākāśa* or 'ether' the Naiyāyika recognises another entity, viz., *dik*, which is translated as 'space'. But in actual fact it is *ākāśa*, not *dik*, which corresponds to the Jaina conception of 'space'.
 11. *nanvākāśamapi kiṁ pṛthivyādivannānā/netyāha—taccāikamiti/bhede pramāṇābhāvādityarthaḥ/Tarkadīpikā* on the *sū.* 14 of *TS* (text, p. 11) which runs as : *'sabdaguṇamākāśaṁ/ taccāikam vibhu nityam ca//*
 12. *ekatvādeva sarvatropalabdher vibhutvamāṅgikartavyanītyāha—vibhviti/Ibid.*
 13. *vibhutvādevātmavan nityamītyāha—nityam ceti/ Ibid.*
 14. Cf. "The epithet one implies that the mention of numerous *ākāśas* such as *ghaṭākāśa* and *maṭhākāśa* in common parlance is due to *upādhi* and cannot be real". *Ibid.*, Notes, pp. 127-128. Akalanka's term for '*upādhi*' is '*aupacāriki*' or '*adhyaṛopa*'. Calling the person 'Māṇavaka' a 'lion' because of the former's fierceness (*kraurya*) and bravery (*śaurya*) etc., is cited as an example of *upacāra*. Similarly, the attribution of *pradēśas* or parts to the partless medium of *ākāśa* is from the point of view of the Naiyāyika, a case of *upādhi*, or *upacāra* : *pradēśa-kalpanā niravayavatvādupacāriki simhavat/TRAG*, p. 202, *kā.* 9.

pradeśas which are as much objectively existent as the medium of which they are divisions. Were it not so, the two towns, say, Pāṭaliputra and Mathurā which, like the two mountains, the Himavat and the Vindhya,¹⁵ occupy different locations of space (*nānākāśapradesāḥ*), would, he affirms, tend to be at one location (*taddeśabhāvinyeva*) which is an absurd proposition.¹⁶

But the Naiyāyika may advance a more ingenious argument¹⁷ by stating that the *sāvayavatva* of *ākāśa* is like a monkey in relation to a tree (*kapivrkṣasamyogavat*). That is, the statement that 'the monkey is sitting on the tree' denotes that the monkey in question is sitting on the branch of the tree (*śākhāvacchedena*) but not on the tree itself, or rather on the root of the tree (*mūlāvacchedena*). This analogical argument indicates the truth that just as the idea of the tree in its relation to the idea of the monkey does not pervade the latter fully (*vyāpyavṛttitvam* or *sāmastyavṛttitvam*)¹⁸ but does so, if at all, only partially, so also does *ākāśa* pervade its so-called *avayavas* at best only partially. This partial pervasion of the tree in the monkey, or of the *ākāśa* in the parts, is described as *avyāpyavṛttitvam* or *avyāpyavṛtti*. This relation of *avyāpyavṛtti* aims at suggesting that, eventually, *ākāśa* does not directly possess the *avayavas*, or if it does possess any at all, it does so only in a remote and superficial way so that it would not be far wrong to say that the parts are almost unreal. The Jaina would, of course, turn the tables on the Naiyāyika by rejoicing that all the latter's verbal subtleties have not succeeded in ruling out a reference in the latter's argument—however indirectly it might be—to the *avayavas* with regard to *ākāśa*. It is, as a matter of fact, quite obvious that the Naiyāyika's analogy of the tree and the monkey would fall to the ground if the essential element of the branch of the tree is removed from it.

Another important consideration which undermines the Naiyāyika's thesis of indivisibility (*niravayavatva*) of *ākāśa* in the above argument of *kapivrkṣasamyoga* hinges on the relation of

15. Vide *TBV*, p. 642.

16. Commenting on his own *kā* (16), viz., *dravyāṅgām pratiniyatpradeśāvasthānāt*, Akalaṅka observes : *Ihānyeṣu ākāśapradeśeṣu pāṭaliputraṁ sthītam anyeṣu ca mathurā ato nānākāśapradeśāḥ/yasyaikāntenāpradeśam ākāśam tasya yaddeśe pāṭaliputraṁ taddeśa-bhāvinyeva mathurāpi syāt/lbid.*, p. 203.

17. This argument and the supplementary argument on *samyoga* as described in the following paragraph are elaborated on the basis of suggestive hints thrown in by Abhayadeva in the course of his commentary, See *TBV*, p. 602.

18. *vyāpyavṛttitvam tu samastyavṛttitvam/lbid.*

saṃyoga figuring in it. The sitting monkey is conjoined to the branch of the trees by way of *saṃyoga* or external relation. *Saṃyoga* is admitted by the Naiyāyika himself as a *guṇa*, and a *guṇa* in turn is admitted to need a *dravya* for its *āśraya*,¹⁹ or support. The support in the analogy under consideration is the tree and, correspondingly, the support for the *avayavas* of *ākāśa*, is evidently *ākāśa* itself. This means that the *avayavas* of *ākāśa* are not a case of either *upādhi* or *avyāpyavṛtti* as is evidenced by the grounds admitted by the Naiyāyika himself. Thus this as well as the previous argument as advanced by the Nyāya school presupposes, at any rate indirectly, the Jaina thesis of the *sāvayavatva* of *ākāśa*.

Akalaṅka also does not see eye to eye with the Naiyāyika on the question of impartite *ākāśa*. He is inclined to feel that the divisibility of *ākāśa* would be incompatible with the divisibility of a material object. In other words, the indivisible *ākāśa* is not a favourable receptacle of the divisibility of an object like a jar²⁰ (*dravyavibhāgābhāvāt*).

The last significant argument which is brought by Abhayadeva to bear upon the present issue concerns the Nyāya view of sound (*śabda*) as the special quality (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of *ākāśa*. It is a common place universal experience that a particular sound prevails (*vartate*) only at a particular place (*ekadeśe eva*) but not everywhere (*na sarvatra*) and that the sound consequently fades away (*vināśyati*) from where it is heard. If the Nyāya thesis of the partless—or unitary and , consequently, of the eternal—*ākāśa* were right, then every sound, for that matter even the distant word uttered by the divine Brahman (*brahmabhāṣitam*) would be straightaway heard by us²¹ everywhere (*sarvagatatvaṃ syāt*), and would remain everlasting (*nityam*).²² In point of fact even the usage (*vyapadeśa*) that “a particular sound prevails only at a particular place but not everywhere” would be evidently impossible under the conception of a

19. *saṃyogasya guṇatvena dravyāśritatvāt tadabhāve ca tadabhāvāt/Ibid. See also TS, sū. 4.*

20. Commenting on his own *kā. (5)*, *niravayavatvamupattiriti cen na dravyavibhāgābhāvāt*, Akalaṅka observes : *yathā ghaṭo dravyato vibhāgavān sāvayavaḥ na ca tathaiśāṃ dravyavibhāgostīti niravayavatvaṃ pravṛjyate// TRAG, p. 202.*

21. Cf. *yadi ca sāvayavaṃ nabho na bhavet tadā śrotṛakāśasamavetasya śabdasya brahmabhāṣitasāpyupālambho smadāder bhavet niravayavatikākāśrotṛasamavetatvāt/TBV, p. 641.*

22. *yadi ca sāvayavam akāśaṃ na bhavet, śabdasya nityatvaṃ sarvagatatvaṃ ca syāt/Ibid.*

partless *ākāśa*.²³ Besides even the established fact of the transitoriness of *śabda* would militate against the Nyāya conception of an all-pervasive (vibhu) *ākāśa*. Nor does the Nyāya belief in what might be described as the wave theory of sound²⁴—that is, the theory according to which sound is transmitted by waves—work without presupposing a divisible *ākāśa*. Hence the Nyāya view of *ākāśa*²⁵ points, according to Abhayadeva, to the Jaina thesis of the *sāvayava* nature of *ākāśa*.

Thus the Jaina view of *ākāśa* is that it is an objective real having infinite parts²⁶ or *pradeśas*²⁷ ('space-points') which signify its *anekānta* nature (*nānātvam ityanekāntaḥ*).²⁸

Lastly the soul or *ātman*, an individual centre of experience among an infinity of similar centres in the realm of consciousness, is the subjectivistic instance of manifoldness in Jainism. It is needless

23. na hi niravayavatva 'tasyaikadēse eva 'śabdo vartate na sarvatra' iti vyapadēśaḥ saṅgacchate/Ibid.

24. Cf. na ca niravayavatve akāśasya santānavṛtṭya āgatasya śabdasya śrotrenāpyupalabdhiḥ sambhavati anyānyākāśadeśotpattidvāreṇa tasya śrotṛavamavetasānupapattēḥ jalatarāṅganyāyenaparāparākaśadeśādāvaparaparāśabdōtpattiprakalpanāyam kathāṁ nākāśasya sāvayavatvaṁ/TBV, p. 642.

25. For a further reference to a few other consequences resulting from the Nyāya view of *ākāśa*, see *ibid.*, pp. 641-642.

26. *anontabhāgapramītam akāśadravyam*/ Brahmaḍeva's, *Dravyasāṅgrahavṛtti (Davva-saṅgaha)* by Nemicaṇḍra S. Chakravarti, ed. S.C. Ghosal, Arrah, 1917), p. 24.

27. A *paradeśa* or 'space-point' is 'the space occupied by an atom'. *PrSKU*, p. 17 (E. Tr.), f.n. 4. The *pradeśas* are, however, limited to 'physical space' (*lokākāśa*) only, the other part of *ākāśa* being a 'non-physical space' (*alokākāśa*). *Ibid.*

28. *Vide TRAG*, p. 203,, *gā.* 19 and the com. thereon.

The manifoldness of time is indicated not merely by an infinity of intrinsically real (*pāramārthika*) units called *kālāṇus* or 'time-atoms' which form the basis of the conventionally temporal (*vyāvahārika*) distinctions like the minute, the hour, the day, the year and so on, but also by the diverse effects which are brought about by the instrumentality of the *kālāṇus* which permeate the events in the universe. Cf. *so'nantasamayāḥ/TSVJ*, V. 40., "The Jaina Theory of Time", Y.G. Padmarajiah (a paper read in the Indian Philosophical Congress Trivandram, 1947) and *TRAG*, V. *sā.* 22, especially the *kā.* 14, and the comm. on both. For further light on the manifoldness in various senses, of *ākāśa* as well as on *dharma* and *adharmā*, the medium of motion and that of rest respectively, see *TRAG*, p. 210 ff., *sū.* 12, *kā.* 27 and its comm. It is, however, necessary to observe that the nature of manifoldness in the case of *dharma* and *adharmā* has not been very clearly developed, although their conformity to the supreme law of the entire reality as expressed in the celebrated formula of Umāsvāti, viz. *utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktāṁ sat*, has been clearly stressed. *Vide TB* on *ST*, p. 641 f., *gā.* 33.

to enlarge upon the manifold nature of an *ātman* since it is evident in every one of the infinite states (*anantabhāvas* or *pariṇāmas*) as well as in the multiple powers which are attributed to *ātman*.²⁹ There are at least two considerations which indicate the manifoldness of *ātman* : First, an *ātman*, like the Leibnizian entelechy, mirrors the the entire universe within itself as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors, or comprehends, is an infinitely complex one. Hence its experiential powers must be manifold, or commensurate with the complexity of the experienced universe. This is an implication of Vāddeva's idea that difference in the cognised (*viśaya*) signifies a (corresponding) difference in the cognition (*vikalpa*) concerned³⁰ as well as of the characteristically Jaina idea of relativity of knowledge, which signifies that "the full knowledge of everything is inextricably bound up with the full knowledge of everything and (*vice versa*)"

Secondly *ātman*, as conceived by the Jaina thinkers, is the exact antithesis of the Advaitic Brahman. The Advaitic Brahman, as pointed out on several occasions in the course of this work, is a monolithic conception, or an unredeemed identity. Being antithetical to this extreme Advaitic conception the Jaina notion of *ātman* is that of an infinitely diversified centre of experience.

The significance of manifoldness characterising the consciousness in the latter's function of apprehending the many-faceted universe has crystallized itself into the twofold dialectic of the *nayavāda* and the *sādvāda* to which reference will be made in the course of this section.

In our endeavour to trace the logical steps which have led the Jaina conception of reality to the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy, we have been able to observe that in consequence of recognising the force of the principle of distinction inherent in all realistic procedure, the Jaina has postulated an independent objective world as against the world of consciousness, and has proceeded to posit manyness in reality and manifoldness in each real. The progress from multiplicity of reals to manifoldness of each such real consists chiefly in advancing from the number to the nature of the reals. The last step, which completes the logical picture of this realistic procedure, is an implicit recognition of what may be called, after Kant, the Principle of 'Reciprocity', or of 'Interaction', or of 'Community', among the reals in the universe.

29. Cf. the *Vivṛti* and Prabhācandra's comm. thereon—NKC, Vol. II, p.686 and p. 689 respectively.

30. *viśayabhede hi siddhe vikalpabhedah sidhyati/SRK, p. 755.*

Except for an occasional hint here and there the principle of Reciprocity or Interaction is more implied than expressly stated or developed in Jainism. Nevertheless its necessity and importance are undoubtedly clear. It would not, therefore, be inappropriate if we approach Kant for an explicit formulation of this idea which is germane to the fundamental notion of *Anekānta* in Jainism.

It has been observed earlier that the *Anekāntavādin* postulates the interrelatedness of all reals in the universe, and, therefore, that one who has a total cognisance of one thing would have a total cognisance of everything and *vice versa*. The interrelatedness or relativity of nature evidently involves, at any rate in its narrow sense, the permeation of the relational factor in reality, but does not explicitly specify the dynamical element of interaction among the reals. It is this dynamical or active element which is provided for by the principle of 'reciprocity' or 'interaction', or 'community'³¹ (*commercium*).³²

Without 'the reciprocity of the manifold' the interrelatedness, therefore, becomes 'merely an ideal relation', whereas with it the inter-relatedness becomes a 'real one'. This is the significance of the description of reciprocity as "the action and reaction of quite different substances, of which each determines the other's state." Prichard's instance of the 'reciprocal influence'³³ between 'a lump of ice' and 'fire' clearly illustrates this idea of interaction.³⁴ Describing reciprocity as a 'double refraction...of objects upon each other', Caird refers to it, in Kant's own words, as "the condition of the possibility of the things themselves as objects of experience".³⁵

In Kantianism, as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'co-existence' or the interrelatedness of the substances, and explains the 'dynamical community' among them. This is in sharp contrast with the 'isolation of the individual substances' as found in the

31. Kant formulates this principle under his 'Third Analogy', as : "All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thorough-going community, that is, in mutual interaction." In his earlier formulation (first edition) Kant uses 'reciprocity' in place of 'community'. *KCPR*, p. 233.

32. This is one of the two Latin meanings of the original German 'Gemeinschaft'. See *KCPR* (1923), p. 381, f.n. 5.

33. For the slight difference in the meaning between 'influence' and 'community or reciprocity', see *KCPR*, p. 234.

34. *KJKP*, p. 303 f. The last sentence, in the description of the illustration (p. 304) refers to "the determination of the *unobserved states* coexists with the observed states".

35. *CPKE* (Vol. I), p. 535.

individualism of Leibniz or the momentariness of Hume and Buddhism.

The terms like *anyonyātmakatva*³⁶ (mutuality) or *anyonyavyāptibhāva*³⁷ (mutual pervasiveness), used by Abhayadeva and Haribhadra in the somewhat limited context of concrete real, correspond, at least in a limited degree, to the Kantian idea of 'reciprocity' or 'dynamical community' among the reals in Jainism. When we consider, however, the Jaina view of the universe as a fully interrelated or relativistic³⁸ (*sāpekṣa*) system of reals, which in turn are causally efficient³⁹ (*arthakriyākārī*) it is not difficult to see that the feature of Kantian 'reciprocity' is implicitly contained in the structure of reality as envisaged by Jainism.⁴⁰

In course of this brief enquiry into, and the illustration of, the steps in the development of the spirit of distinction involved in the theory of the *Anekānta* (the manifold or indeterminate) nature of reality we have observed that the notion of manifoldness not merely presupposes the notion of manyness or pluralism, but also contains the activist implication of reciprocity or interaction among the reals in the universe. Although manifoldness is the most significant step in the dialectical analysis of the Jaina conception of reality, it comprehends and presupposes the other steps within its scope as a logical necessity. That is, independence (of consciousness and the world), pluralism, interrelatedness and reciprocity or dynamism are component factors in the amplitude of the ontological as well as the epistemological significance of the relativistic notion of manifoldness or indetermination with which the entire reality is, according to Jainism, stamped (*syādvādamudrāṅkitam*).

Before proceeding, finally, to consider the theories of standpoints (*nayavāda*) and of the Conditional Predication (*syādvāda*) or the Sevenfold Dialectic (*saptabhaṅgīvāda*, as *syādvāda* is otherwise called), it is necessary to point out that the whole above account of the nature of *anekāntavāda*, has aimed at progressively demonstrating the

36. *TBV*, p. 645.

37. *AJP*. Vol. I, p. 132.

38. It has been dealt with elsewhere.

39. It has been described elsewhere.

40. The notion of a mere interrelated universe has an idealistic flavour. The Jaina is a thoroughgoing realist. This realistic spirit cannot, therefore, remain satisfied with a mere interrelatedness, but demands an impact or 'a double refraction', among the dynamic reals which influence or impinge upon one another proximately or remotely.

fact the *anekāntavāda* is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy.

The claim that *Anekāntavāda* is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy hinges mainly on the fact that it has allowed the maximum scope for distinction to play its role. It will take us far afield if we go closely into the problem of elucidating how the analytical function of distinction is inherent in any realistic procedure. This problem deserves to be specifically brought within the focus of the discussion of comparative Indian philosophical thought although some broader questions—like how the notion of *anekānta* is found, in some measure and form, even in some non-*anekānta*⁴¹ schools of

41. The reconciliatory spirit (*samanvayadr̥ṣṭi*) which consists in an endeavour to harmonise, by various methods, different or apparently conflicting views in a new synthesis, is found, in however imperfect a manner it may be from the Jaina point of view, among the several non-Jaina schools of philosophy. Some of the notable instances are : (a) the *Ajñānavāda* (agnosticism) of Sañjaya (vide B.M. Barua's *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta Univ., 1925), pp. 328-330; and *JSJ*, Pt. II, Intro. p. XXVIII-IX, (b) the *Vibhajyavāda* ('the Critical Method of Investigation' as contrasted with what the Buddha himself describes as the *Ekāntavāda*, or the one-sided method, in *Majjhimanikāya*, sutta 99, vide *NVVS*, Prastāvanā, p. 11) or the *Madhyamapratipada* (*sañyutta*, vide *PMHS*, Bhāṣāṭippaṇāni, p. 62 (of the Buddha which induced him 'to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration' (*JSJ*, Pt. II, Intro., p. XXIX); (c) the celebrated four-fold (*catuṣkoṭi*) antinomial method of the Mādhyamika founder, Nāgārjuna (cf. *atastattavaṃ sadasadubhayaṇubhavātmakacatuṣkoṭiviniṛmuktam śūnyameva/Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, Ed. V.S. Abhyankar, Govt. Oriental (Hindu) Series, Poona, 1924; see also pp. 572-3 in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, Ed. la Vallee Poussin, Bib. Bud., St. Petersburg, 1913); and (d) the critique, on the eight doctrines, of Gautama (vide ch. IV, *Ahnikā*, sūtras 14-43 in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras*, E.T. Ganganatha Jha, Poona Oriental Series, Poona, 1939). Despite the fact that these methods are treated in the respective systems with which they are severally associated, in the spirit and form resembling the *Anekāntavāda*, they have not been considered to be so fundamental and pervasive (*vyāpaka*) as they have been in Jainism. It is, therefore, no surprise that the early critics of *Anekāntavāda* like Dharmakīrti (see *PVD*, ch. III, *kās.* 180-1 and *MV* thereon, and f.n. 30, and Śāṅkara, the earliest commentator on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, make Jainism the target of their polemic against *Anekāntavāda*. This is done on an even more elaborate scale by Arcata also (*HB*T, pp. 104-107).

Furthermore, some schools like the *Bhedābheda*vāda, especially of Bhartṛprapañca whose system is even referred to as '*anekānta*' (vide *PMHS*, *Bhāṣāṭippaṇāni*, p. 62. f.n. 3); the *Bhātta-Mīmāṃsā* and the Sāṅkhya have an *anekānta* bias with respect to some of their methods and ideas. While criticising the concept of '*vaicitrya*' which is so vital to *Anekāntavāda*, Śāntaraksita significantly attributes it to the Mīmāṃsā (*Vipra*) as well as the Sāṅkhya (*Kāpila*) systems also

philosophy, a conscious, balanced and systematic treatment of it being a special feature of Jainism—have been noticed with some degree of attention by a few old writers⁴² and contemporary critics.⁴³ A brief attempt has, however, been made in the immediately preceding pages to show how the impelling logic of distinction, inherent in all realistic metaphysics, has led to the evolution of the Jaina conception of reality from the simple notion of dualism to the complex one of manifoldness or indetermination. All that is necessary for our purpose now is to indicate how this notion of manifoldness or indetermination is the most consistent and inevitable manifestation of the realistic spirit in Indian philosophy.

This fact, that the theory of manifold or indeterminate reality is the most significant form of realism in Indian philosophy, could be adduced from the following two considerations : First, that the Jaina conception of reality admits of the principle of distinction which is the universal and basic axiom of all realistic metaphysics. Having admitted it the Jaina view allows this principle to exercise its full logical function so that every detail of the universe, physical and mental, becomes an infinitely diversified fact of nature. Secondly, the Advaita absolute, which is the exact logical antithesis to the Jaina conception of the diversified real, does not admit of distinction in any form in its ultimate nature of pure being (*sat*), and, therefore, develops itself, inevitably, into a spiritualistic *ekāntavāda* par excellence. This fact proves, indirectly, that once the initial

(*kalpanāracitasyaiva vaicitryasyopavarṇane/ ko nāmātiśayaḥ prokṛto vipranirgranthakapilā//TSS, Kā. 1776*). Arcāṭa, who also chiefly attributes it to Jainism and criticises, describes it as 'vaicitryam' or 'vicitram' as : *vicitram hi rūpaṁ śabalamucyate; or, vicitratā ca nānāsvabhāvātā (HBT, p. 104)*. These considerations indicate the influence which the notion of *anekānta* has, unwittingly or otherwise, in various forms and degrees, on the systems other than Jainism in Indian philosophy. For two further references bearing on this thesis see the next two footnotes. For a brief treatment (with occasional references to, and quotations from the texts) of this topic with regard to the non-Jaina systems see *PMHS, Bhāṣaṭippanāni*, pp. 61-63, *NVVS, Prastāvanā, p. 11; ff.; and ST, Intro. 150-2*.

42. For instance, by Siddhasena Divākara, at several places in his *STP*, Ch. III; by Malliṣeṇa in his *SM*, pp. 16-17 (the systems referred to are those of the Svāyambhūvas and the Prakrāntavādins, or the Vaiśeṣikas. See the Editor's explanations of these terms in his Notes, pp. 45-58); and, by Guṇaratna in his *TRD*, pp. 237-244 (the systems referred to are those of Buddhism in general, as well as the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sauntrāntikas in particular, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhyas and the Mīmāṃkas).
43. See the end of f.n. 1, and *AGAM, Prastāvanā*, p. 90

assumption of distinction is allowed to operate—as it should be, since distinction is an irrefutable fact of reality—it leads to the Jaina view, as a logical necessity, of an indeterminate reality. In other words, the developments of the two contrasting conceptions of reality, the Jaina and the Advaita, reveal the truth that if we follow a strictly monistic hypothesis of Advaitism we must inevitably accept some kind of mentalism or spiritualism which asserts the identity of the knower and the known, or rather the reality of the knower and the falsity of the known which, consequently, is treated as a projection of the knower. It is, therefore, not a surprise that Advaitism in India, like its Hegelian counterpart in the West, received the characteristically subjectivistic interpretation of the *dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivāda* of Prakāśānanda, which has its counterpart in the Berkeleyan theory of *esse est percipi*. Alternatively, in order to avoid a mentalistic or subjectivistic orientation in our approach to reality, if distinction or objectivity is admitted to be real, *anekāntavāda* represents the most logical form which such a realistic procedure can take. Owing to the decisive significance of this issue the two considerations just outlined deserve a soine-what closer notice here. We may start with the second one first :

I. The Advaitic absolute is what may be described as a monolithic conception. It is also driven home to us, repeatedly, that its nature, like that of the Hegelian absolute is mentalistic or epistemic (*prāṭītikasattvam*).⁴⁴ Nothing else than it is real.⁴⁵ This pan-psychic reality cannot, in the nature of the case, admit of objectivity or an independent non-mental principle. Hence the question of distinction cannot arise in it. If it does, we have to find something which is to be distinguished from the absolute. There is nothing answering such a description. It is not possible to speak of a distinction in a real where there is no possibility of an actual separableness in some genuine sense. This is the story of all idealism. viz., that the real therein stages its duel with itself, or at best, its shadow; it enacts a play in which the *dramatis personae* consist of one character only; or it constitutes a musical scale

44. *Prāṭītikasattvam sarvasyeti siddham*/ p. 537. *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī (with three commentaries, etc. N.S. Ananta Krishna Śāstri, Bombay, 1917). *avidyayonayo bhavaḥ sarve'mī budbhuda iva/kṣaṇamudbhaya gacchanti jñānaikajaladhau layam*//*Ibid.* (quoted by the author from *Śruti*). *etat sarvam mana eva* (quoted in *Gauḍabrahmanandī, a com. on the above work Ibid.*, p. 537). *jagato manahpariṇāmatvamuktam Ibid.* Lastly, *asmadātmanah sarve prāṇah sarve lokah sarve vedāḥ sarvaṇi bhūtani* (quoted by *Nyāyāmṛtakāra Ibid.*, p. 538.

45. See the above f.n. particularly the second quotation.

which consists of one note only—namely, itself. Not merely this, it is also the duel as well as the participant in it; the play as well as the player; and the music as well as the musician. Hegel at least tries to integrate difference in the ascending order of his triadic dialectic but, eventually, with the same result as his Indian counterpart.

It may, however, be argued that Śaṅkara does recognise some kind of objectivity at the so-called empirical level of existence (*vyāvahārikasattā*). But he does so only as a mere 'epistemic' phenomenon which is not of the substance of the real in a straightforward way. His grand *tour de force* only proves the obstinacy of objectivity, which cannot be explained away even by his logical genius. Hence the term 'objective' in the so-called Objective Idealism is a misnomer. It attributes 'objectivism' to a philosophy of objectless reality.

Further, the mental realm, the realm of souls which are the centres of experience, should and does command its legitimate place and importance in any reasonable scheme of reality, but the total mentalization of the objective world by the schools of idealism imports into their scheme a kind of anthropomorphism. Had it not been for this Alexander would not have proclaimed his mission to "de-anthropomorphise" philosophy. Despite its length his statement on this question bears reproducing here. Writing under "The Spirit of Realism" he observes : "The temper of realism is to *de-anthropomorphise* : to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things: on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or arrogance of mind, and on the other to assign them along with minds their due measure of self-existence. But so deeply is the self-flattering habit of supposing that mind, in its distinctive character of mind, is in special sense the superior of physical things, so that in the absence of mind there would be no physical existence at all, that Realism in questioning its prerogative appears to some to degrade mind and rob it of its richness and value."⁴⁶

The mere magnification of the mental principle into a cosmic one and the description of its function as an act of objectivisation does not make the real either any the less mental or the more objective. The ghost of objectivity or independence cannot be laid by the magic of verbal trickery. It comes back in some kind of awkward form as an

46. "The Basis of Realism" (p. 1), an Address by S. Alexander to the British Academy in 1914.

'empirical' or 'epistemic' phenomenon or an 'antithesis'.

There is, therefore, nothing strange in the fact that the mind-ridden Absolute Idealism gave rise to the curious doctrine of *Dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivāda* or *Jñātasattāvāda* of Prakāśānanda and others, which affirms that a thing exists only when it is perceived. In this view the "blue", for instance, "and its awareness are one, and there is no external object apart from its cognition."⁴⁷ Alluding to this view an Indian critic observes: "The whole world is thus only a psychic modification and has no reality outside the mind."⁴⁸ Prakāśānanda himself observes: "The wise maintain the psychological ideality of the world, the ignorant its objective reality."⁴⁹

This view, in which 'spirit greets the spirit', or *dr̥ṣṭi* is *śr̥ṣṭi*, has its close parallel in the well-known Berkeleyan view *esse* is *percipi*. Referring to the relation of the 'unthinking things' of the objective world to this 'intuitive or self-evident' principle Berkeley observes: "Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."⁵⁰

Dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivāda and its close Western parallel have been mentioned here, not merely because they are a particular school of idealism but

47. P.N. Srinivasachari's *Aspects of Advaita* (Sri Krishna Library series, Madras, 1949), p. 16.

48. *Ibid.* See also pp. 97-98.

49. *Jñānasvarūpamevāhur jagadetadvicakṣaṇāḥ / arthasvarūpam bhṛāmyantaḥ paśyanteti kudr̥ṣṭayah //* The following line also expresses the same idea more pithily: *dr̥ṣṭireva bhavet śr̥ṣṭirdr̥ṣṭimate.*

These lines have been quoted in M.N. Sircar's *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture* (published by University of Calcutta, 1925), p. 126, footnotes 1 and 2. See also pp. 125-26 (the text).

Madhusūdana also observes: *imameva ca dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivādāmācākṣate asnīnīs ca pakṣe jīva eva svajñānavāsāj jagadupādānanimittam ca / dravyam ca sarvam prāṭītikam / Siddhāntabindu* (of Madhusūdana with a Com. by Puruṣottama, ed. P.E. Divan' GOS, Baroda, 1933), p. 29. See also *Advaitasiddhi* and Prakāśānanda's *Siddhāntamuktāvali* (E.T. by Arthur Venis, Reprint from the Pandit, Benares, 1890), p. 25 ff. (text).

Even the so-called 'opposite view' to this (*dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivāda*) viz., *sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭivāda*, also retains the character of mentalism in so far as it maintains that the world is "creation or emanation" from Brahman (see *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Pref. p. II, f.n. 1). The difference, if there is any at all, is that in *sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭivāda*, the world is supposed to 'precede' our knowledge of it, while in *dr̥ṣṭiśr̥ṣṭivāda* it is said to be concurrent with (because it is also the creation of) our knowledge. The difference, however, is not material owing to the fact that Brahman is only an extension of the individual psychic principle.

50. *Of the Principles of Human Knowledge* (Vol. I of *The Works of George Berkeley*, in 4 Vols., ed. A.C. Fraser, Oxford, 1901), p. 259.

because they represent the tendency of all idealism towards subjectivism.⁵¹ As a critic observes : “the forms of idealism like objective idealism and absolute idealism are only *attenuated forms* of subjective idealism and the true subject transcends the subject-object relation.”⁵² In his celebrated essay “The Reputation of Idealism”, G.E. Moore also is in full accord with this criticism. He characterises the notion of *esse is percipi*—conceding generously to the idealist that *percipi* need not mean ‘sensation’ only but ‘thought’ also, both of course being ‘forms’ of consciousness—as the ‘ultimate premise of Idealism’ in general.⁵³ Confirming his attitude to the same notion, he further observes : “I believe that Idealists all hold this important falsehood.”⁵⁴ His choice of this notion as the most vulnerable point for attack in idealism has considerably strengthened the realistic stand for objectivity or independence in the analysis of the nature of reality.⁵⁵

51. Cf Russell’s observation that “...very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called ‘idealists’” etc. *Problems*, p. 14: see also p. 37.

52. Srinivasachari in *Aspects of Advaita*, pp. 14-15 (the italics are mine). L.T. Hobhouse demonstrates this truth in a lucid and critical note wherein he analyses the positions of T.H. Green and B Bosanquet. See his *The Theory of Knowledge* (third ed. London, 1921), p. 537 f., f. n. 2.

53. *Philosophical Studies* (The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, 1951 (reprinted), London, pp. 7-8.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

55. The following witticisms make an interesting reading : It would be more appropriate, in this context, to substitute ‘percept’ wherever the term ‘idea’ occurs. So Beattie told Hume that the idea (or image) of roaring lion is not a roaring idea, and that the image of an ass is not a long-eared sluggish idea; and he put some ‘clownish questions’ to Berkeley in the same spirit, “Where,” he asked, “is the harm of my believing that if I were to fall down yonder precipice and break my neck, I should be no more a man of this world ? My neck, Sir, may be an idea to you, but to me it is a reality and an important one too. Where is the harm of my believing that if, in this severe weather, I were to neglect to throw (what you call) the idea of a coat over the ideas of my shoulders, the idea of cold would produce the idea of such pain and disorder that might possibly terminate in my real death ?” *A Study in Realism* (John Laird, C.U.P., 1920, Cambridge), p. 63.

Repudiating the claim that the Modern Einsteinian Theory of Relativity supports idealism, Russell writes under the heading ‘Realism in Relativity’; “It is a mistake to suppose that relativity adopts an idealistic picture of the world—using ‘idealism’ in the technical sense, in which it implies that there can be nothing which is not experience. The observer who is often mentioned in expositions of relativity need not be a mind, but may be a photographic plate or any kind of recording instrument. The fundamental assumption of relativity is realistic, namely, that these

II. Thus the Advaitic attempt at building up a structure of reality from which the independence of the objective world is explained away has been revealed, in our analysis so far, to tend towards some form of mentalism. Even if any other school of idealism attempts to bring anything in *ab extra* into the being of its ultimate realm the attempt would be foredoomed to failure in the same measure as its denial of self-existence to the objective universe. Nothing short of a forthright recognition of the independent and intrinsic nature of reality will ever succeed in avoiding the mentalization or spiritualization of the non-spiritual realm of reality.

Once the claim of independence as an integral part of reality is initially conceded, then, it becomes the thin edge of the wedge; that is, the operative force of the principle of distinction thus

respects in which all observers agree when they record a given phenomenon may be regarded as objective, and not as contributed by the observers." Bertrand Russell on 'Relativity', *Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.*, The Univ. of Chicago, 1950. See also his *The A.B. C. of Relativity* (London, 1925), pp-219-20.

Max Born, the great theoretical physicist, also offers a similar vindication of the 'reality' of the pre-existing external material world. Thus is done in answer to Herbert Dingle's thesis. Dingle puts to himself the fundamental question, viz. "What exactly is it that physicists are doing?" The answer: "That can be answered satisfactorily only in terms of experience, not of the external world." In his reply to Dingle, Max Born describes the former's viewpoint as "a standpoint of extreme subjectivism" or "physical solipsism" and endeavours to restore, by means of several technical and lay arguments, common sense to the relativistic, quantum, (for an unequivocal support of Max Plank to an external world "which is 'independent of ourselves', something absolute that we are facing..." see *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist*, 2nd ed., ed. P.A. Schilpp, New York, 1951, p. 136 f) and other theories of science and, thereby, to philosophy. (Vide H. Dingle's lecture to the British Association, 1951, on "Philosophy and Physics", 1850-1950, in *Nature* (London), Vol. 168, pp. 630-36, especially p. 634, para 2, and Max Born's article on "Physical Reality" in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (ed. T.M. Knox), Vol. III No. 11 for April 1953, pp. 139-149.) A.P. Ushenko is another fierce critic who joins issue with Dingle: "If I am asked to mention," he observed, "some particular metaphysics which clearly does not fit in with the theory of relativity, I should name solipsism." *Albert Einstein*, p. 613.

Yet another writer of today to whose views on the present problem Einstein himself has paid a serious attention is Henry Margenau. Margenau's argument for the reality or objectivity of the universe, under Einstein's theory, cannot be cited here, but merits our attention. Vide his article on "Einstein's Conception of Relativity" in *Albert Einstein* (see 4, pp. 252-57), and his recent work, *The Nature of Physical Reality*, The Graw-Hill Book Co. Inc., New York, the sections on the Reality of Data, Other Selves, pp. 297-9, and the Real World, pp. 299-305; and the entire chap. (21) on The Contours of Reality, pp. 448-67.

introduced in the real will work itself out, through various stages of increasing approximation like duality, plurality and reciprocity towards the *anekānta* view of reality. The dialectical evolution of these approximations or stages has been already traced out earlier in course of this section. According to the Jaina dialecticians the several schools which do recognise the independent objectivity of the world have inevitably, though often unwittingly, been confronted with the necessity of acknowledging the *anekānta* view, at least in some aspect of their conception of reality as well as of knowledge. The instances, which, among others include the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya, and the Vaiśeṣika schools, have already been mentioned elsewhere. He feels that they all have stopped short of consciously allowing the principle of distinction to reach its logical conclusion in an indeterminate approach to the problem. If the compulsive force of the spirit of *anekānta* is allowed to have its sway, then, according to him, reality would be infinitely diversified.⁵⁶ The optimum point of the restless force of distinction is represented in the inexhaustible diversification of every detail in the physical and the mental universe consistently, of course, with the equally enduring identities in nature. The theory of manifoldness is therefore the story of the gradual unfoldment of the implications of distinction which is at the heart of everything. If this cardinal truth is disproved, then the entire structure of the *anekānta* philosophy will collapse like a house of cards.

To summarise the entire argument : The essence of realism is the principle of objectivity, independence, or distinction. The alternative to the non-acceptance of this principle in reality is some form of idealism which is generically inadequate and has a tendency towards subjectivism. Acceptance of the intrinsic objectivity of the world marks the starting point of the functioning of distinction which progressively develops until the point of culmination is reached in the fact of the indeterminate and manifold nature of reality. It is in the logical necessity of the development from the initial simple state of distinction to that of infinite diversification of everything real, physical or mental, that the justification of the claim of *Anekāntavāda* as the most consistent form of realism lies.

56. The Vaiśeṣika comes nearest, particularly with respect to his atomism, to *anekavāda*, but he stops at the level of what may be described as mechanical pluralism, rather than in determinate relativism of the Jainas. Cf. *supra*, ch. on *Arthakriyākāritvam* and the Vaiśeṣika's *Ubhayavāda*.

Nayavāda

Anekāntavāda as a theory of reality, according to which reality is infinitely manifold, or relativistic in its determinations, has been observed to be inherent in the co-ordinate conception of identity-in-difference. It has also been pointed out, at the beginning of our treatment of *anekāntavāda* that the *nayavāda*, or the method of standpoints, and *syādvāda*, or the method of dialectical predications, are the two main wings of *anekāntavāda*. A brief attempt may be made, in this part, to bring out how the two theories, viz., *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, bring out and sustain the relativistic character of reality.

Logically, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* are two complementary processes forming a natural and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics. They form a scheme which is pre-eminently one of correlative methods⁵⁷ rather than of theories of reality although they both presuppose and explain the primordial notion that all reality is relativistic. *Nayavāda* is principally an analytical method investigating a particular standpoint of a factual situation according to the purpose and the level of equipment of the experient (*jñātr*). The particular standpoint thus investigated is one among a multitude of different viewpoints which, in their totality, reflect the full nature of the situation. *Syādvāda*, or *Saptabhaṅgī*, is, essentially, a synthetical method designed to harmonise the different viewpoints arrived at by *nayavāda*.⁵⁸

Making a further distinction between *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*

57. While dealing principally, with *nayavāda* Rao characterises 'Jainism' as follows : "It is essentially a method and an attitude." *The Half-Yearly Journal of the Mysore University*, New Series, Section A—Art, March 1942, p. 79.

58. Cf. "...each of the *nayas* comprehends things from only one particular standpoint, knowledge derived from a *naya* therefore is partial and incomplete. To comprehend things in all their aspects, therefore, a special mode or form must be found. This, according to the Jains, is their *Syādvāda* or the doctrine of many possibilities." *The Nyāyāvātāra* (Ed. by P.L. Vaidya, Bombay, 1928), Intro. p. XL. 1.

"The *nayas* refer to the parts of the things, whereas the *saptabhaṅgī* refers to the things as a whole; *nayas* have relation to analysis, whereas *saptabhaṅgī* relates to synthesis; *nayavāda* is the analytical method of knowledge, whereas *saptabhaṅgī* is the synthetical method of knowing a thing." H.L. Jhaveri's *The First Principles of the Jaina Philosophy*, London, 1910, p. 42. See also NKV, Intro. pp. 21-22. Also,

*nayānāmekaniṣṭhānām pravṛtteḥ śṛtavartmani/
sampūṛṇārthaviniścāyī syādvādaś rutamucyate//*

The *Nyāyāvātāra*, kā. 30. See also Siddharṣi's Comm. thereon.

Upadhye⁵⁹ maintains that the former is "primarily conceptual" and the latter "mainly verbal". Although not quite incorrect, this distinction is apt to be somewhat misunderstood if we are not aware of the background against which it is made. This is because the so-called 'primarily conceptual' method is also verbal, inasmuch as it not merely requires the aid of words for the expression of its various standpoints but also has as many as three, among its seven, standpoints which are exclusively concerned with the verbal problems, and are therefore designated as *śabdānayas*. Similarly, in contradistinction to the verbal elements of the 'conceptual' *nayavāda*, the 'mainly verbal' method of *syādvāda* is so much charged with the epistemological character that we might say that its verbal side is more instrumental than intrinsic in value. The term '*conceptual*' may, however, be applied to the four *dravyānayas*, under *nayavāda*, with relatively greater propriety. But under *syādvāda* no distinctions, such as the verbal modes of *syādvāda* and the non-verbal or the epistemological modes of *syādvāda*, can be made since all modes are both verbal and epistemological. This is so in spite of the fact that much care and exactitude are needed in the verbal formulation and manipulation of the modal judgments.

Leaving aside the epistemological content of the modal judgments for the moment, the description of all the modes of *syādvāda* as verbal also may give rise to a possible objection that such a description should not be applied to the mode which contains the 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*) as its predicate. For the 'inexpressible' is, *ex hypothesi*, a verbal failure insofar as it is incapable of a 'co-presentation' or a simultaneous expression of the positive and the negative traits of a real in a single attempt. Describing a mode as verbal when a signal verbal failure is inscribed on it would, therefore, be, according to the possible objector, paradoxically objectionable. Defferring a discussion of the modal predicate, the 'inexpressible', to the next chapter, we may briefly indicate here the line of argument the Jaina would take in answering the present objection. The Jaina answer to this objection, it may be noted, necessarily entails a reference to the third mode of *syādvāda* also :

59. He observes: "*Syādvāda* is a corollary of *Nayavāda* : the latter is analytical and primarily conceptual and the former is synthetical and mainly verbal". *PrSKU*, Intro. p. LXXXV. Incidentally (see *SJJ*, p. 17 and p. 52), it would be more correct to say, with Jacobi, the *syādvāda* is a 'logical complement' than a 'corollary' of *nayavāda*.

The predicate 'the inexpressible' does indeed record a signal verbal failure in expressing, at once, the great amplitude of the variegated reality as embodied in every factual event. But this failure is not due to the inherent unknowability, and, consequently, of the inexpressibility of reality, as in the case of the theories underlying the formulae like "sa eṣa neti neti" or "catuskoṭivinirmuktatvam" or "anirvacanīyatā". It is, on the contrary, due to the bewildering wealth of impressions directly pouring into the human mind whose limitations of powers are such that it cannot at once grapple with all the impressions by way of all-comprehending attention and precise expression. Hence the postulation of the predicate in question. The only verbal feature of the predicate is the symbol (*saṃjñā*) 'avaktavya' employed in designating the predicate. This symbol declares the inadequacy of the verbal machinery when confronted with such cognitive situations. But this does not mean that *avaktavya* is the last word in our cognitive venture and, consequently, that we are inescapably condemned to be cognitively overwhelmed and verbally dumb. What is not simultaneously expressible can be expressed by a gradual process in the order of the attention severally paid to the manifold features in the situation concerned. This fact introduces a sequential outlet (*kramārpaṇa*) for what would otherwise remain a 'paradoxically objectionable' position. In other words, if the mode of *avaktavya* were an absolute position (*sarvathaikāntadr̥ṣṭi*) it would certainly be 'a paradoxically objectionable' position, but since the mode represents a relative position (*kathañcidekāntadr̥ṣṭi*) it leaves room for a sequential alternative which guarantees a gradual unfoldment of the entire complex structure of the factual situation in hand.

Words have a vital role to play in the process of unfoldment of the complex or the simple meanings of reality in spite of their limitations as noticed under the 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*) mode. Communication of the meanings of reality either to us (*svārthaḥ*) or from us to others

60. Referring to this *śaktiḥ* or *yogyatā* Prabhācandra observes : *yogyatā hi śabdārthayoḥ pratipādyā pratipādakaśaktiḥ, jñānajñeyayor jñāpyajñāpakaśaktivai/NKC*, Vol. II, p. 538. See also *PKM*, p. 428, where also he writes to the same effect when commenting on the following *Paṛīkṣāmukha sūtra* : *sahajayogyatāsaṅketavaśādhi śabdādayaḥ vastupratipattihetavaḥ/Ibid.*, p. 427. (Here "śabdādayaḥ", or words etc., means words, gestures made by figures etc. (*angulyādivākya*) and any similar sigas.) In *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 541, the same writer again observes : *śaktis tu svābhāvīkī yathā rūpaprakāśane cakṣurādeḥ tathā arthaprakāśane śabdasyāpi/Vāḍideva* also makes similar observations on this question. See *SRK*, on pp. 702-3. A brief comment of Kumārila also is of interest in this connection : *sarvo hi śabdo'rtha-pratyayanārtham prayujyate (Tantravārtika, I. 3.8).*

(*parārthaḥ*) is said to inherent power (*svābhāvīkī śaktiḥ*)⁶⁰ in words. Devabhadra, for instance, observes that every specific meaning is resident in a particular word.⁶¹ Siddharṣi supports this idea from another angle by remarking that there are no objects (*artha*) without names.⁶² Maladhāri Hemacandra believes that everything cognisable is also expressible in some way.⁶³

The Jaina is, however, cautious in not stretching this belief in the natural power of words to the extent of advocating the identity (*tādātmya*) of essence between the word and its meaning. Had it not been so he would find himself an ally of Bhartṛhari and the other grammarian philosophers who maintain the doctrine of *śabdādvaitavāda*. According to the Jaina words are only expressive (*vācaka*) or, as Yaśovijaya puts it, suggestive (*jñāpaka*) symbols rather than productive (*kāraaka*)⁶⁴ entities of meanings. In other words, what is meant by the remark that a meaning resides in a word is nothing more than forcefully stating that the word has the natural power of expressing the meaning which is not produced by, or derived from, it. The meaning is eventually rooted in the nature of things in reality, but is conveyed to us through the natural expressive capacity of words.

The main purpose of introducing here the above brief discussion on the linguistic aspect of *syādvāda* has been to show how far *syādvāda* can be described as 'mainly verbal', or, for that matter, a 'verbal' method at all. The discussion indicates the undoubted necessity for a precise scheme of linguistic symbols (*vacanavinīyāsa*). But the scheme of linguistic symbols is only the grab of the modal judgments which represent a system of alternative and exhaustive aspects of truth of a particular factual situation investigated by *syādvāda*. The content being such judgments *syādvāda* is essentially an epistemological method. This pre-eminently epistemological character of it becomes more evident when we remember that the knowledge obtained by its use is conceived to be the human analogue of the perfect knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) attained by the perfect souls (*kevalins*), the difference between the two being that the one is mediate (*asākṣāt*) and the other immediate (*sākṣāt*).⁶⁵

61. *pratyarthaṁ śabdānivāsād iti/ Nyāyavatāra* (of Siddhasena Divākara, with Siddharṣi's *Vivṛti* and Devabhadra's *Ṭippaṇa*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, 1928, Bombay), p. 81.

62. *nirabhidhānārthavat/ Ibid.*, p. 80.

63. *kaścit tu gamyatayā sarvo'bhīlapyah./SHM, on gā. 143, VBJ.*

64. *śabdānām ca athajñāpakatvam na tu kāraakatvam/skl*, p. 250.

65. Cf. *syādvādokevalajñāne sarvatattvaprakāśane/bhedah śākṣādasākṣāc ca...// AMS, kā. 105.*

The purport of the entire argument is that the distinction between 'conceptual' and 'verbal' is a relative one, and therefore that when it is associated with the two methods under consideration, it should be done subject to the consideration outlined in course of argument.

The logical justification for the formulation of these two methods of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* consists in the fact that the immense complexity of the relativistic universe is too baffling for the human mind, with its limited range of preceptual and other capacities, to penetrate at once, into its full secrets. In the process of grasping the bewildering universe analysis, or *nayavāda*, naturally precedes synthesis, or *syādvāda*, and the two methods together offer an articulated knowledge of the universe. After this comparative estimate of the two methods we may now proceed to consider them in their natural order.

The Definition of Nayavāda

A *naya* is defined⁶⁶ as a particular opinion or (*abhiprāya* or *abhimata*) or a viewpoint (*apekṣā*)—a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth (*vastvaṁśagrāhī*) about an object (*vastu*)—as entertained by a knowing agent (*jñātr*).⁶⁷ A *naya* is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into, or interfere with the particular viewpoint under discussion. Although the other viewpoints do not enter into the perspective⁶⁸ of the particular

66. This is the general definition (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) of a *naya*. The specific feature (*vīśeṣa lakṣaṇa*) of each particular *naya* will be noticed later on.

67. To express the nature of a *naya*, in the words of Prabhācandra: *anirākṛtpratiapakṣo vastvaṁśagrāhī nayāh/PKM*, p.676. There are numerous variant forms of the definition of a *naya*. But they all express substantially, but often more elaborately, the whole, or a part, of the connotation so briefly indicated by Prabhācandra's definition. See, for instance, *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 606 f., f.n. 1, in which the editor has enumerated about as many as thirty such variant forms. In *AGAM*, pp. 142-3 (*tippanāni*) under '*naya*' the same editor has made a few editions to the forms. The following, not necessary found in the above-mentioned two-places, may, however, be cited here :

*arthasyānekarūpasya dhīḥ; pramāṇam tadarṁśadhīḥ/
nayo dharmāntarāpekṣī dumayas tannirākṛtīḥ//*

ASA on AMS, 1.47.

pramāṇapariicchinnasya anantadharmātmakasya vastunā ekadēsa-grāhinaḥ taditarāṁśapratiksepīṇo adhyavasāyavid eṣa nayāḥ/ JTBV, P. 21 (CF. *PNTA*, VII. 1, and *SRK* thereon, in *SRK*, p. 1044). *nayanīti nayāḥ. anekadharmātmakam vastu ekadharmeṇa nityamevedam anityameveti vā nirūpayanti/*" See *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 606 f., f.n. 1.

68. Cf. *audāsīnyaparāyaṇās tadapare cāmsē bhaveyur nayāḥ/ABHI*, p. 1853.

viewpoints under discussion they constantly, as it were, attack its frontiers, and await its reconciliation with them in the sphere of a fuller and more⁶⁹ valid knowledge which is the sphere of *pramāṇa*.

Theoretically the viewpoints from which an object or an event could be perceived are not merely numerous⁷⁰ (*anekavikalpa*) but infinite⁷¹ in number (*anantaparakāram*) because even the humblest fact of existence is infinitely manifold and therefore can be an object of various modes of analysis. But this way of looking at the subject is too broad (*vyāsa* or *vistāra*⁷²) or gross (*sthūla*) and, therefore, does not vouchsafe to us a compact view of reality on the basis of which we can develop a practicable analytical method by means of which we may

69. This phrase "more valid" is advisedly used here. This becomes clear when we notice the controversy, met with in Jaina works, as to whether the partial truth conveyed by a *naya* is as valid as the full truth conveyed by *pramāṇa*. Vidyānanda attempts an answer to this by employing an analogical argument, often repeated by writers since, in which he compares *naya* to a part of a sea which is *pramāṇa* (*TSU*, p. 118, *kā. 5* and the *īkā* thereon). See also *SRK*, pp. 1044-7. Insofar as the part is identical with the whole—it is identical since it is a legitimate part of the whole—a *naya* shares the validity, at any rate in some measure, of *pramāṇa*. But, insofar as it is different from the whole—it is different from the whole, in some sense, otherwise the part and the whole become indistinguishable—a *naya* is invalid. The conclusion implied is a simple one, viz., that a part (*naya*) is not eschewed by the whole (*pramāṇa*); that the whole itself would not be but for the combination of such parts; that the part is valid (*mānātmako nayah; nāpyasatyo nayah*) so far as it goes, and that it becomes invalid when its partial truth is taken to be the whole truth when it is called a *nayābhāsa*, or *kunaya*, or *durnaya*.

The above conclusion is generally agreed to in spirit if not in letter also, but most writers including Vidyānanda, Jinabhadra and his commentator Maladhāri Hemachandra, however, do not seem to accede to this conclusion whole-heartedly, although they do not eventually disagree with it (see *VBJ*, *gā. 2277* and *SHM* thereon). For some of expressions with which they describe the nature of *nayas* are more appropriate to the description of the nature of *nayābhāsas* or *durnayas*. For instance, *nayas* are said to be incapable of being *vastuno gamakāḥ* (*pratyekāvasthāyām tadagamakatvāt*). Further, they are said to be heretical (*mithyātmadrṣṭitvāt*), contradictory (*virodhato*, or *virodhitvāt*), inimical (*vairivat*) in their character.

Another factor which seems to confirm the attitude of Jinabhadra, more especially of his great commentator, is the quotation, by the latter, of a devotional verse, the second line of which is in tune with the view suggested by the two writers:

udadhāviva sarvasindhavaḥ samudīrñāstvayi nātha drṣṭayah /
na ca tāsū bhavān pradṛśyate pravibhaktāsu saritsvividadhīḥ //

See *VBJ*, *gā. 2266* and *SHM*, on 2265-6.

70. *jāvaiyā vayanavahā tāvaiyā honti nayavāyā / STP*, III. 47.

Jāvanto vayanapahā tāvanto vā nayāvi sahāvo / VBJ, *gā. 2265*.

vyāsato' nekavikalpā iti / PNTA, VII. 4 and the *SRK* thereon in *SRK*, p. 1047.

71. *nayāś cānantāḥ / SM* (text), p. 161.

72. See *PNTA*, VII. 4 and the *SRK* thereon.

tackle reality piecemeal and obtain partial glimpses of its truth. The view of reality, conceived under the great division consisting of two inclusive categories, viz., *dravyārthikanaya* or the substantive view, and *paryāyārthikanaya* or the modal (or the modificational) view, is however, considered to be an answer to the demand.⁷³ The categories are also called, briefly, as *dravyanaya* and *paryāyanaya* respectively. The view of reality conceived under the division is described as the concise (*saṅkṣepa* or *samāsa*)⁷⁴ one in contrast to the other (the broad) one.

By a process of further analysis the Jaina thinkers have been led to the formulation of the methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. They are enumerated in the following order of decreasing denotation⁷⁵ : *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.⁷⁶ Generally among these the first three are considered to be *dravyanayas* or substantive standpoints and the other four *paryāyanayas* or modal standpoints.⁷⁷ Reserving to a later stage⁷⁸ the consideration of the question whether the number of these seven ways of viewpoints can be reduced to six, or five, or even less, either by elimination of any of them, or by subsumption of some of them under the one or the other of the seven viewpoints, we may now proceed to point out, with illustrations, the nature and function of these seven viewpoints.

Naigamanaya (*the teleological or the universal-particular standpoint*)

Naigamanaya relates to the purpose (*saṅkalpa*)⁷⁹ or the end of a certain continuous series of actions which are represented by one or a few of their number. For instance, a person carrying fuel, water and rice, when asked "What are you doing ?" says "I am cooking" instead of saying "I

73. Cf. *dravyaparyāyarūpasya sakalasyāpi vastunaḥ / nayāvaimśena netārau sakalasyāpi vastunaḥ // Tattvārthasāra, kā. 38*. Vāḍideva brings out very clearly and elaborately, the progressive decrease in denotation, from every preceding *naya* to its succeeding one, in the course of as many as seven *sūtras* and his own comm. thereon. See *ONTA*, VII. 46-52 and the *SRK* thereon.

74. See *PNTA*, VII. 5 and the *SRK* thereon.

75. Cf. *pūrvah pūrvanayo bhūmaviśayaḥ kāraṇātmakeḥ / parah parah punaḥ sūkṣmagocaro hetumāniha // Nayavivaraṇa, kā. 98*.

76. See *TSUJ*, I. 33.

77. *dravyārtho vyavahārāntaḥ paryāyārthas tatoparaḥ / TSV*, p. 268.

78. See *infra*.

79. *arthasaṅkalpamātragrāhī naigamaḥ / TRAG*, p. 65, kā. 2.

anīspannārthasaṅkalpamātrarāhī naigama itī nigamo hi saṅkalpaḥ tatrabhavaḥ tatprayojano vā naigamaḥ / SRK, p. 1052.

am carrying fuel" and so forth. This means that the general purpose of cooking controls the entire series of actions which are represented by one or more of them such as carrying the materials or drawing water enabling us thereby to grasp the purpose which governs the individual factors relating to it. This is the aim or function of the *naigama*⁸⁰ standpoint.

According to another interpretation *naigamanaya* is described as the standpoint of the 'non-distinguished'.⁸¹ By the 'non-distinguished' is meant the absence of distinction or discrimination between the universal or the generic and the particular or the specific elements of the object under review. Accordingly, the meaning of the term *naigama* is analysed as 'not' (*na*) 'one' (*eko*) 'understanding' (*gamaḥ*), that is, not understanding or distinguishing either the generic element alone, or the specific element alone, but taking the object in its concrete unity.⁸² One of the instances given in illustration of this non-distinction is that of the term 'bamboo'. When we use this term in a statement such as "Bamboo grows here in plenty", from the 'non-distinguished' point of view, the distinction between the generic and the specific features of the bamboo is not within the focus of our attention, although it is undoubtedly at the back of our minds. This truth, namely, that when some aspect of concrete situation in reality is in the foreground of our attention the other aspects recede into the background, is one of the cardinal principles of the modern Gestalt, or Configurationist, school of psychology. Also, it holds good of not merely the 'non-distinguished' standpoint, but also of all the others under the present method.

Although the two interpretations of *naigamanaya*, the one emphasising its teleological character and the other its 'non-distinguished' character, are mentioned to be different, the difference between them does not seem to be always sharp and material. This is evident when we notice that the principle of non-distinction between the universal and the particular is inherent in, or, at any rate, is not repugnant to, the purpose governing the actions in the relevant context such as the above-mentioned instance of cooking. It must, however, be admitted that when a 'non-distinguished' instance like "the bamboo grows here in plenty" is viewed from the angle of the first interpretation the teleological element is not so

80. Cf. *SRK*, p. 1053 f. See also *Tattbārthvasārah*, *kā* 44.

81. *yadvā naikam gamo yo'tra sa satām naigamo mataḥ* / *TSV*, p. 269.

82. *NKC*, *Kā* 5.

evident, although it would not be an impossible idea to think of some instances wherein the two elements could go together. Taking both sides of the argument into consideration we may safely conclude that atleast in a considerable number of instances, the difference between the elements of teleology and non-distinction is a matter of difference in emphasis. This view does not, however, bar the possibility of even a radical difference between the two interpretations in a certain number of situations considered under the present standpoint.

The non-distinction of the *naigama* standpoint is not, as just indicated, absolute. It does imply distinction but in a relative sense only. If the distinction is asserted absolutely, then arises the fallacy called *naigamābhāsa*, of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika⁸³ system, which maintains an absolute distinction ((*atyantabhinnatva*) between its categories, is an illustration.

Saṅgrahanaya (*the class view*)

This standpoint concerns itself with the general⁸⁴ or the class character of a factual situation, unlike the *naigama* standpoint which includes the specific character as well. Just as *naigamanaya* is not hostile to the intermingled character of concrete existence, so also *saṅgrahanaya* is not repugnant⁸⁵ to the complementary feature of *viśeṣa* which is not included in it. *Saṅgrahanaya* marks a step further from *naigamanaya* in that it differentiates, in its analytical process, the common character from the universal-cum-particular complex which every real is. For instance, when, pointing to a tree at some distance from you, you observe to a stranger asking for direction, "turn left near the tree there", it is not relevant to the occasion to mention whether "the tree there" is mango, banyan, or any other, although "the tree" must be one of these. For there can be no universal without a particular,⁸⁶ or a genus without species, although in a particular context the mention of the former will serve the purpose in hand. Similarly, when we state that everything is *sat*⁸⁷ (being) it makes a perfectly understandable proposition, although it provisionally shuts out its necessary complement of *asat* (non-being).

83. See *PNTA*, VII. 12 and the *SRK* thereon. See also *Nayapradīpa*, p. 101, and *Nyāyāvātāra* (P.L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 82.

84. *sāmānyamātragrāhī parāmarśaḥ saṅgraha itī / PNTA*, VII. 13. See also the *SRK* thereon, as well as *TSV*, p. 270, *kā* 51.

85. See *NKV*, *kā*. 6.

86. *Ibid*.

87. *vīśvamekaṁ sadavīśeṣāditi / PNTA*, VII. 16.

Laying such an exaggerated emphasis⁸⁸ on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to *saṅgrahābhāsa*, a fallacy of which the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.⁸⁹

Vyavahāranaya⁹⁰ (the standpoint of the particular)

In contrast with the *saṅgraha* standpoint the *vyavahāra* standpoint specialises itself in being concerned with the specific features⁹¹ of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of fruit.⁹²

When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the *vyavahāra* standpoint (*Vyavahāranayābhāsa*) of which there can be no better example than the materialism of Cārvāka⁹³ in Indian philosophy.

The above three standpoints, viz., *naigama*, *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra*, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., *dravyārthikanaya*. This is so because these standpoints concern themselves with the durable side (*dravyasaṁsparśī*) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz., *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (*paryāyasaṁsparśī*) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (*paryāyārthikanaya*), the second of the two comprehensive categories.

88. *saṅgraho' pyaśeṣaviśeṣāviśeṣapratikṣepamukhena sāmānyamekaṁ samarthayamāno durmayaḥ.../ Nyāyāvātāra (P.L. Vaidya's edn.) p. 85.*

89. *saṅgrahābhīprāyapravrttāḥ servepyadvaitvādāḥ sāṅkhyadarśanam ca./ See also PNTA, VII. 17 and 18 and the SRK thereon. The reason why the Sāṅkhya system is instanced here is stated by Prabhācandra: vikāravikāriṇoḥ sāṅkhyastādātmyābhīyupagamāt / NKL, Vol. II, p. 629.*

90. This *vyavahāranaya* should be distinguished from another *naya*, bearing the same name and occurring in a different classification of *nayas* into *niscayanaya* (the true viewpoint) and *vyavahāranaya* (the conventional or empirical viewpoint). There is nothing common between the two except the name.

91. *viśeṣātmakamevārtham vyavahārdś ca manyate/ viśeṣabhīnam sāmānyam asatkaraviśeṣānavat //NKV, kā. 8*

92. *Ibid., kārikās 9 and 10.*

93. *PNTA, VII. 26. For two other instances see LTB, V, kā. 42 and the NKC thereon in NKC, Vol. II, pp. 631-5.*

Among the four *pariyāyanayas* only the first one, viz., *rjusūtranaya*, which will presently be dealt with, makes a direct ontological reference to an aspect of reality, viz., the aspect of flux (*pariyāya*). The other three are concerned with the verbal questions of the meanings of the modal side of the reality. On the basis of this distinction, viz., the aspect involving an ontological reference and the aspects involving verbal references, the standpoints are also classified as *arthanayas* (or *ārthatantra*), and *śabdanayas* (or *śabdatantra*), the former class including within itself the first four, and the latter class, the last three.⁹⁴

Jinabhadra, however, chooses to treat *rjusūtranaya* as one of the *dravyanayas* on the ostensible ground that it has a direct ontological reference like the other *dravyanayas*.⁹⁵ But this is not widely accepted. Now the treatment of the four *pariyāyanayas* or the modal standpoints may be resumed.

Rjusūtra (the standpoint of momentariness)

The *rjusūtra* standpoint relates to the momentary nature of a thing.⁹⁶ It is narrower than the *vyavahāra* standpoint in that it looks at a particular thing as the thing appears at a particular moment.⁹⁷ This standpoint is in operation when, for instance, we treat an actor, who is enacting the role of a king on the stage, as the king for the moment.

While recognising the importance and relative validity of this 'occurrent' aspect in the life of reality we are not expected to lose sight of the 'continuant' character of reality.

An over-emphasis⁹⁸ on the fleeting aspect of concrete reality has,

94. *tatrarjusūtraparyantāḥ catvāro'rthanayā matāḥ/trayaḥ 'śabdanayāḥ 'seṣāḥ 'śabdavācya'rthagocarāḥ// Nayavivaraṇam (by an unknown author, ed. Pannalal Caudhuri, Digambara Jaina Grantha Bhāṇḍra, Kāśī, Vira Saṃvat 2451), kā. 97. See also Tattvārthasāra, kā 43.*

95. VBJ, p. 2262, kā. 77.

96. Cf. *rjusūtraḥ sa vijñeyo yena pariyāyamātrakam/vartamānaikasamayaviṣayaṃ pariṣṭhyate // Tattvārthasāraḥ (by Amṛtacandrasūri, printed in the Prathamagucchaka, Śrī Digambara Grantha Bhāṇḍāra, Kāśī, Vira Saṃ 2451), kā. 47. See also JTBY, p. 22.*

97. Siddharṣi explains *rjusūṣūtranaya* as follows : *tatrarjupraguṇamakuṭilam aīṭānāgatavakraparityāgāt vartamānakṣaṇavivarti vastuno rūpam sūtrayati niṣṭānkītam darśayātīti rjusūtraḥ/Nyāyavatāra (P.L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 77. See also NKV] kārikās 11 and 12.*

98. For an elaborate criticism of the various schools of Buddhism, as illustrating this *nayābhāsa*, see TBV, (on STP, I, gā. 5), p. 317 ff.

according to *nayavādin*, led the Buddhist to treat this partial truth as the sole foundation of his conception of reality.

Śabdanaya (the standpoint of synonyms)

Among the remaining three *paryāyanayas* or the modal standpoints *śabdanaya* is the first verbal viewpoint. Besides referring to this specific viewpoint the term 'śabdanaya'⁹⁹ is involved as a collective designation for all the three viewpoints, including present one, because of the fact that all the three are mainly concerned with verbal problems. In order to distinguish the present verbal standpoint from the other two similar viewpoints we may specifically designate the present one as the viewpoint of synonyms since it is largely concerned with synonymous words.¹⁰⁰

The present standpoint of synonyms refers to the function of synonymous words which, despite their differences in tense, case-endings, gender, number and so forth, convey the same meanings.¹⁰¹ For instance, the word *kumbha*, *kalaśa* and *ghaṭa* denote the same object (*ekārthavācakāḥ*), viz., a jar which is one of the forms taken by clay. Similarly the words *Indra*, *Śakra* and *Purandara* denote one and the same individual in the same manner as the words *globe*, *orb* and *sphere* denote, despite their several differences, the same circular entity.

A misapplication of this standpoint by treating, for instance, two synonymous words as being utterly identical in their meanings is said to lead to the fallacy called *śabdanayābhāsa*. The *śabdādvaitavādin*s and a few other schools in Indian philosophy are said to have committed¹⁰² this fallacy.

Samabhirūḍhanaya (the etymological standpoint)

The etymological standpoint represents an advance upon the standpoint of synonyms although it is narrower in its scope than the latter. Its advance consists in the fact that it distinguishes the meanings

99. 'śabdāḥ samabhirūḍhaivambhūtau te 'śabdabhedagāḥ/Tatvārthasāra, kā. 42.

100. *tasmādeka eva paryāyaśabdanāmārtha iti śabdāḥ / Nyāyavātāra* (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 80. See also NKV, kā. 14, TSV, p.274, kā 87 and *Nayavivaraṇa, kārikās* 90-91.

101. *yo vartanam ca manyate ekārthe bhinnalingādinām/ sa 'śabdanayo bhanitah.// Laghunayacakram, kā, 40. Also : śabdaprṣṭhato 'ritha-grahaṇapraṇaṇaḥ śabdanayaḥ lingasaṅkhyākālakāraḥkapuruṣopa-grahavyabhicāvanivṛttiparatvat/ Dhavalāṅkā* (quoted in *GAM, ṭippanāni*, p. 147).

102. See *Nyāyavātāra* (P.L. Vaidya's edn.) pp. 82 and 90; and *NVUS, ṭippanāni*, p. 277.

of synonymous words purely on their etymological grounds.¹⁰³ The synonyms Indra, Śakra and Purandara denote, according to the conventional approach (*rudhiḥ, upacāraḥ*) of *śabdanaya*, the same individual whereas they do not so if their difference in their etymological derivation is taken into consideration.¹⁰⁴ Indra, for instance, signifies one who is 'all prosperous' and the other two names signify one who is 'the all powerful' and the 'destroyer of the enemies'¹⁰⁵ respectively.

"Hence the difference in the roots" as a critic remarks in this connection "must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings." Had it not been for this standpoint a jar (*ghaṭa*), in the opinion of an old writer, would become indistinguishable from linen (*paṭa*).

The truth of this viewpoint is based on the following two principles in the Jaina philosophy of language : The first principle is that whatever is knowable is also expressible. That is knowledge, or the meaning of anything in reality, is not possible except through the means of word.¹⁰⁶ The second principle is that, strictly speaking, there can be only one word for one meaning and *vice versa*.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, several words which are conventionally supposed to convey one and

103. *parāyāśabdabhedena bhinnārthasyādhirohanāt / nayāḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ syā...//* TSV. p. 273, kā. 76. *parāyāśabdeṣu niruktibhedena bhinnamartham samabhirohan samabhirūḍha iti/PNTA*, VII. 36, and *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 638. f.n. 1, the extracts from *Dhavalajīkā* and *Jayadhavalā*.
104. *śabdanayo hi parāyābhede'pi arthabhedamabhipraiti, samabhirūḍhastu parāyābhede bhinnārthānābhimanyate/JTBY*, p. 22. *Devasūri* also confirms this : *tannaikārthavacino dhyanayaḥ santi, rudhiḥ punaravicāritatadarthanamiti samabhirūḍhaḥ / Nyāyavatāra* (P.L. Vaidya's edn.) This writer contrasts *rudhita-śabdā* (conventional words) from *vyutpatti-śabdā* (words based on their etymological derivations). See *ibid.*, p. 74.
105. *śacipatireko'pyartha indanaśakanapuradāraṇabhedāt bhidyate/ indatītindraḥ / śaknotīti śakraḥ / puram dārayatīti purandara iti/ Tattvārthasūtra* (with Bhāskaranandi's *Sukhabodha*, ed. by A. Shantiraja Sastry, Mysore, 1944), p. 25.
106. Cf. *ye nirabhidhānā vartante arthāḥ teṣāṃ śabdāt parthakyena vastutvasiddhirīti cet na, nirabhidhānārthābhāvāi.../ itas' ca sarve'rthā vidyamānasavācakaḥ, arthavāt, ghaṭārthavaditi pramāṇāt.../ Nyāyavatāra* (P.L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 80. *Devebhadrā* also observes : *pratyātham śabdanivāsāditi/Ibid.*, p. 81. Referring to the interdependence (*anyonyapekṣā*) of word and meaning *Siddhasena Gaṇi* adds : *yadi yathā vyañjanam tathārtho yathā cārthāḥ tathā vyañjanam, evam hi sati vācyavācakasambandho ghaṭate anyathā na.. Tattvārthādhiḡamasūtram* (Kapadia's edn.), Vol. I, p. 24. On 'vyañjanam' and 'arthāḥ' he remarks : *vyañjanam vacakaḥ śabdāḥ, artho bhidheyo vācyāḥ/ Ibid.* See also *SHM on gā, 143, VBJ*, p. 90.
107. *śabdārūḍho'rtho'rthārūḍhaḥ tathāiva punaḥ śabdāḥ/Nayācāra* (Kā. 42).

the same meaning, have in actual fact as many meanings as the number of words, found there.¹⁰⁸ That is, this principle does not recognise any synonymous terms but maintains a determinate relation between a meaning and its word (*vācyavācakanīyama*). It may be contended that the non-recognition of synonymous terms under *samabhirūdanaya* contradicts the recognition of such terms under *śabdanaya*. The *nayavādin* does not see any contradiction between the two standpoints. This is so because, according to him, *samabhirūdanaya* applies stricter canons of etymological derivation and grammatical propriety than is done by *śabdanaya* which treats words in a rough and ready manner at the level of uncritically accepted conventions of usage. Since the two principles, just referred to, are going to be dealt with at some length in the process of their application to some important problems in *syādvāda*, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon their further implications here.

Evambhūtanaya (the 'such-like' standpoint)

Evambhūtanaya, or the 'such-like' standpoint, is a further specialised form of the application of the verbal method. It calls for a different designation for each of the different attitudes which the same object assumes under the different conditions. It is even more rigorous than the etymological viewpoint in that it treats the different attitudes of the object denoted by different designations as numerically different entities.¹⁰⁹ Purandara, for instance, should be accordingly to this *naya*, designated as such only when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his enemies. Similarly the designation Śakra is appropriate only when he is actually manifesting his prowess. A cow ceases to be a cow when she is not in actual motion; and the onomatopoeic designation of a *ghaṭa* would no more denote the *ghaṭa* when the *ghaṭa* is not producing the peculiar sound 'ghaṭ, ghaṭ'. Consequently, because of this insistence that designations should be derived from the different functional states of what is ordinarily known as the same object, Purandara becomes as different from Śakra as a cow is different from a jar.

Before concluding this chapter we may briefly notice the difference of opinions among the writers on *nayavāda* on the question

108. tato yāvanto'rthasya svābhīdhāyaka dīvanavaḥ tāvanto'rthabhedāḥ / Devabhadra on *Nyāyavatāra* (P.L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 81. See also the passages dealing with the principle of avaktavya under *syādvāda*.

109. See *PNTA*, VII. 40, and *NKV*, *kārikās* 17-18.

whether the number of *nayas*, viz., seven, can be reduced. There are mainly three traditions (*paramparās*) which are based on the number of *nayas* occurring in the classification adopted by each of them within the framework of reality which is conceived to be fundamentally *dravyaparyāyātma* (identity-in-difference) or *sāmānyaviśeṣātma* (universal-cum-particular). The first one adopts a classification of seven *nayas*. Our treatment of the subject has been used on this classification. The order in which the seven *nayas* have been treated in our account, viz., *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*, has also been recognised by this tradition. The second tradition adopts a classification of six *nayas* eliminating, from its classification, *naigamanaya* which is the first among the seven *nayas* recognised by the first tradition. The third tradition reduces the number from seven to five¹¹⁰ by subsuming *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evambhūtanaya*, the last two standpoints within the first classification, under *śabdanaya*, and thus treating them as two subdivisions of the latter.

Umāsvāti himself is largely responsible for the first¹¹¹ and the third traditions. For the concerned *sūtra* of his great work, *Tattvārthādhiḡamasūtra*, gives, in its Digambara version, the enunciation of the seven *nayas*¹¹² in their natural order, whereas the same *sūtra* gives, in the Śvetāmbara version of his work, the enunciation of only five *nayas*, treating the last two *nayas* as subdivisions of *śabdanaya*. All the Digambara writers and most of the Śvetāmbara writers also adhere to the former tradition.¹¹³ The latter tradition is confined to the relevant *sūtra* by Umāsvāti in the Śvetāmbara version of his work, as well as to the Bhāṣya which is ascribed to Umāsvāti himself by the Śvetāmbara writers. The second tradition, the tradition of the six *nayas*, is maintained by Siddhasena Divākara¹¹⁴ with his characteristic vigour and independent judgment.

Besides these three traditions there are four more views according to which the number of *nayas* is severally one, two, three or four. A

110. *naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ/Sabhāṣyatattvādhiḡamasūtraṅgi* (ed. by Motilal Laghaji, Poona, Vira Saṃ 2453), I. 34.

111. *naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdāsamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ/TSUJ*, I. 33.

112. See the above f.n.

113. See, for instance, *TSV*, I. 33, *TRAG*, I. 33, etc. The notable instances among the works of the Śvetāmbara writers, are *PNJA*, Ch. VII, *SRK* thereon, and *SM* (text) p. 161.

114. Cf. *ST*, Intro, pp. 141-2. Jīnabhadra Gaṇi also follows Siddhasena Divākara on this point. *Ibid.*

passing mention may be made of these views :

When our attention is focussed on the aspect of the generic universal (*mahāsāmānya*), viz., being (*sattā*), the entire gamut of reality, which, on a fuller analysis, is universal-cum-particular, appears as one¹¹⁵ pure and uniform existence. This abstract way of looking at reality is described as the pure and the absolute viewpoint (*suddhaniścayanaya*¹¹⁶). The *nayavādins* consider this standpoint as a class by itself. This is the first of the four views just referred to.

Reality may often be viewed either from the generic or the specific angle of vision. When it is the former we are said to be governed by the generic viewpoint of *sāmānyanaya*, and when it is the latter we are said to be governed by the specific viewpoint or *viśeṣanaya*. This classification¹¹⁷ is the same as the substantive (*dravyārthika*) and the modal (*pariyāyārthika*) viewpoints. This classification, which consists of two members, is the second of the four views.

Siddhasena Divākara suggests a classification of three standpoints although he generally accepts a classification of six standpoints. He does so by subsuming *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhuta nayas* under *rjusūtranaya*. This is because he considers *rjusūtranaya* as the foundation of the entire modal (*pariyāyāstika*) approach to reality and, therefore, the other three as its sub-divisions (*suhumabheya*).¹¹⁸ This reduction of four *nayas* to one, viz., *rjusūtranaya*, coupled with the further elimination of *naigamanaya*, leaves only three *nayas*, viz., *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, and *rjusūtra*.

Lastly, *Samavāyāṅgaṭikā* formulates a method by which we obtain a classification of our *nayas*. It divides *naigamanaya* into two subdivisions, viz., *sāmānyanaigama* (that which comprehends the universal aspect in reality) and *viśeṣa-naigama* (that which comprehends the particular aspect in reality), and subsumes them under *saṅgrahanaya* and *vyavahāranaya*, respectively. Further, it brings *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evambhūtanaya* under *śabdānaya* so that the resultant classification we obtain under this scheme consists of

115. Cf. *sāmānyādésatastāvadeka eva nayaḥ sthitaḥ*/ TSV, I. 33, kā. 2. This line is found in *Nayavivaraṇa* also : See kā. 18.

116. No material difference seems to exist between this viewpoint and one of the subdivisions of *saṅgrahanaya*, viz., *parasāṅgrahanaya*. Cf. *parasāṅgrahastāvāt sarvaṃ saditi saṅgrahṇāti*/ TSV, p. 271. Cf. also *PNTA*, VII. 15.

117. Cf. *Syādvādamāñjarī* (J.C. Jain's edn.), p. 323 f.

118. See *STP*, gā. 5 and the extensive comm. (TBV) thereon.

saṅgraha, *vyavahāra*, *rjusūtra* and *śabda nayas*.¹¹⁹

Thus we find that we can obtain many classifications, based on different methods, even within the framework of the substantive and modal categories and of the seven standpoints based on these categories. There are many minor classifications outside the scheme of the standpoints treated in this chapter. As a matter of fact there are several subdivisions under each of the standpoints dealt with here. Any attempt at cataloguing the numerous classifications and enumerating the more numerous subdivisions will be needlessly cumbrous.¹²⁰ For such an attempt, even if feasible, is not likely to give considerably more light on the nature, the significance and the function of the analytical method of *nayavāda* than can be done by a consideration of the most fundamental division of categories (viz. *dravyārthikanaya* and *pariyāyārthikanaya*) and of the seven viewpoints based thereon. Hence the present chapter has confined itself to the treatment of only the essential aspects of the subject.

The various standpoints outlined in course of this chapter offer an analysis of the manifold reality from their respective angles of vision. Such an analysis results in a wealth of partial truths which will be harmonised into a coherent scheme of knowledge by the employment of the synthetical method of *syādvāda*¹²¹ which will be dealt with in the

119. *naigamanayo dvividhaḥ sāmānyagrāhī viśeṣagrāhī ca / tatra yaḥ sāmānyagrāhī sa saṅgrāhe' ntarbhūtaḥ, viśeṣagrāhī tu vyavahāre / tadevaṁ saṅgrahavyavahāra-rjusūtrabśabdāditrayaṁ caika iti catvāro nayāḥ/Samavāyāyāngatikā* (quoted in J.C. Jain's edn. of *Syādvādamañjarī*, p. 324, f.n. 2) See also the following observation by Maladhari Hemacandra: *saṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtralakṣaṇaḥ trayo'tra nayāḥ vivakṣyante/ekastu 'śabdanayaḥ pariyāyāstikaḥ tadā catvāro mūlanaya bhavanti/ Comm. on VBJ, gā. 2264.*

120. For an account of such classifications and subdivisions (*upanayas*) of the various *nayas* see Devasena's *Laghunayacakram* and *Nayādhikaraṇa* (both printed in *Nayacakrādīśaṅgrahaḥ*, ed. by Vanīśidhara, Bombay, 1920); Amṛtacandra's *Tattvārthasāra*, Devasena's *Ālāpāpaddhati*, and *Nayavivaraṇa* by an unknown author (all these three works published in the *Prathamagucchaka*, Digambara Grantha Bhāṇḍara, Kāśī, ed. by Pannalal Chaudhari, Vikram Saṁ 1982); Yāsovijaya's *Nāyarahasya* and *Nayapradīpa* (included in a collection of works: *Adhyātmasāra*, etc., Nyāyācārya-Yāsovijaya-jikṛta Granthamālā, Bhavanagar, 1909); and the portions dealing with *nayavāda* in the standard works like UBJ and its comm., SRK, TSV, STP and its comm., and NKC.

121. The mutual necessity, or the complementary character of the two methods, viz., *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, as well as the corrective character of *nayavāda*, in relation to the dogmatic (*ekānta*) character of the 'closed' systems of philosophy (this aspect of the problem will be presently touched upon in the next paragraph) is suggestively expressed by Devasena as follows : *yasmānnayena vinā bhavati narasya syādvādapratipattiḥ// tamāt sa boddhavya ekāntam hantukāmena/Laghunayacakram, kā 3.*

next chapter. The complementary functions of the two methods, viz., *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, remind us of the oft-quoted parable of the elephant and the blind men. To express the same truth after Siddhasena Divākara's analogy *nayas* offer the discrete (*visañjutta*) or individual jewels (*maṇi*) which are strung together by means of *syādvāda*, into a necklace (*rajanāvāli*).¹²²

Further, the philosophy of standpoints is also a warning against, as well as a corrective to, the 'closed' or the 'architectonic' systems. Describing *nayavāda* as a 'philosophy of standpoints' a critic observes : "It is a revolt against the tendency in philosophers to build closed systems of philosophy. According to Jainism, the universe in which we live is an active universe, plastic and full of possibilities and no particular current of thought can fully comprehend it. In order to do justice to the complexity and variety of such a universe, thought must not be hurried to any easy terminus but must be allowed to follow its course freely and meander through the whole field of experience, crossing and recrossing it, so as to create a great confluence of standpoint rather than a closed system. The tendency ingrained in the philosophers to build architectonic systems is inimical to the adventure of thought.....Each philosopher approaching reality from a particular and a partial standpoint, looks upon the one he adopts as the only true standpoint. Jainism rejects the idea of the absolute which is playing havoc in the field of philosophy by creating absolute monisms, absolute pluralisms, and absolute nihilisms. By thus rejecting the absolute and the one-sided, it claims to save philosophy from the chaos of conflicting opinions. Without partiality to any one it promises to give us a theory of relativity which harmonises all standpoints."¹²³

Syādvad

In the course of our treatment of *nayavāda* or the theory of standpoints, it has already been observed that *syādvāda* is a method which is complementary to that of *nayavāda*, and that while *nayavāda* is analytical in character, *syādvāda* functions as a synthetical method.¹²⁴ That is, *nayavāda* analyses one of the standpoints under the aspect of identity (*dravyārthikanaya*) or of difference (*pariyāyārthikanaya*); and

122. See *STP*, I. *gāthas* 22-25.

123. G.H. Rao : *The Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University*, March, 1942, pp. 79-80.

124. *Supra*.

syādvāda further investigates the various strands of the truth delivered by a *naya*, and integrates them into a consistent and comprehensive synthesis. Each such strand is called a *bhaṅga* which is referred to, variously, as a mode, or a predication or an alternative or a possible truth. Describing the relation between the two methods Dasgupta observes : "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the *naya* doctrine with the *syādvāda* doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every *naya* there are as many alternatives as are indicated by *Syādvāda*."¹²⁵ The indeterminate or *anekānta* reality is thus analysed into various standpoints and each standpoint in turn is examined with respect to its various strands of truth and, finally, all the strands are woven together into the synthesis of the conditional dialectic. Owing to their function of analysis and synthesis the methods of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* may also be described as the disjunctive dialectic and the conjunctive dialectic, respectively.

Further, *saptabhaṅgī*, or the theory of sevenfold predications, is treated as synonymous with *syādvāda* owing to the fact that the number of possible or alternative truths under the conditional method of *syādvāda* are, as will be noticed hereafter, seven only.

The fact that the term '*syādvāda*' is often treated as standing for the entire Jaina philosophy is due to the great importance attached to the method of the conditional dialectic with which it (the term) is most intimately connected.¹²⁶ The controversy as to whether '*syādvāda*' is a synonym of '*saptabhaṅgī*' or of the entire Jaina philosophy is, therefore, a needlessly scholastic one¹²⁷ at any rate from the philosophical standpoint.

125. *HIP*, Vol. I, p. 181.

126. Cr. "The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called *Syādvāda*, to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jaina system itself." *Studies in Jm.*, p. 16.

127. In his introduction to *AJP*, Vol. I, p. X, Kapadia states that the term *syādvāda* is synonymous with the term *anekāntavāda*, and, therefore, is wider in its scope than the term *saptabhaṅgī* which is only a part of it. He is, however, not sure of his position although he had adduced a few authorities in his support. But as Jacobi suggests, as seen in the above f.n., *syādvāda* could be used in an inclusive sense of *anekāntavāda* owing to the paramount importance attached to *saptabhaṅgī* with which it (*syādvāda*) is primarily synonymous. Moreover, none of the authorities adduced by Kapadia decisively supports his thesis. There is at least one great and old authoritative writer, viz., Prabhācandra, who contradicts Kapadia's thesis. (Interpreting Akalanka's phrase '*syādvādeḥṣaṣṭasaptakam*', Prabhācandra writes :

Before we set forth the modes of *syādvāda* and their principal features, and, at the end, a few relevant criticism against the method as a whole, it would be helpful to remember here what has already been stated¹²⁸ with regard to the two groups of factors which, together, determine the nature of a real. The first group of such factors is the positive one referring to the material (*dravya*) of the make, the spatio-temporal setting (*kṣetra* and *kāla*) and the state (*bhāva*), like black or red, or big or small and so forth, of a jar (*ghaṭa*) which may be cited here as an example. The second group of factors is a negative one referring to the material, and so on, of things like linen (*paṭa*) which form the negative counterpart (*niṣedha-pratīyogī*) of the jariness (*ghaṭatva*) of the jar. The negative counterpart (*paṭatva*, etc.) is, as has already been noticed, as much constitutive of the full-fledged nature of the jar as the positive one. These groups of factors are briefly described in Sanskrit as *svadravyādicatuṣṭaya* and *paradravyādicatuṣṭaya*, respectively. They may be referred to, briefly, in English, as self-quaternary and other-quaternary. After these few preliminary observations we may now proceed to elucidate the nature and the modes of the method of the sevenfold predication.

Syādvāda¹²⁹ (The Conditional Dialectic) or Saptabhaṅgī (The Theory of Sevenfold Predication)

Syādvāda or *Saptabhaṅgī* is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (*bhaṅgāḥ*) affirm (*vidhi*), negate (*niṣedha*) or both affirm and negate, severally (*prthagbhūta*) or jointly (*samudīta*), in seven different ways, a certain attribute (*dharma*) of a thing (*vastu*) without incompatibility¹³⁰ (*avirodhena*) in a certain context

syādasūtyādi saptabhaṅgamayo vādaḥ/ See the comm. on LTP, *kā.* 51. in NKC, Vol. II, p. 655). But over and above all these considerations the reason why *syādvāda* is generally and rightly treated as synonymous with *saptabhaṅgī* is that the particle *syāt* invariably accompanies every *bhaṅga* (or mode) in *saptabhaṅgī*. It would, therefore, be perfectly natural to describe *saptabhaṅgī* alternatively as *syādvāda* or the doctrine of *syāt*. It is rather strange that this obvious reason has not even suggested itself to Kapadia.

128. *Supra*.

129. Although '*syādvāda*' is the most popular name it has various synonyms like *samhāravāda*, *sarvavastuśabalavāda*, *ākulavāda* *saṅkīrṇavāda*, *tadatattvavāda*, and *vibhajyavāda*. See *AJP*, Vol. I, Intro. p. IX and f.n. 5 thereon.

130. Incompatibility includes not merely consistency with the other modes, in the method, but also with the valid knowledge, perceptual (*pratyakṣ*) or otherwise (*parokṣa*).

(praśnavaśāt)¹³¹. That is, no modal assertion, or proposition,—simple or complex; affirmative, negative or both—can, at once, express anything other than an aspect (*prakāra*) of the truth of a thing. The full truth, or rather the synthesis of truths, can result only from a well-ordered scheme of propositions (*vacanvinyāsa*). Each proposition is therefore, relative to, or alternative with, the other proposition which, in their totality, present the full of the thing with respect to the particular attribute predicated of it. The Jaina maintains that *saptabhaṅgī* offers such a well ordered scheme in which the modes (*bhaṅgas*) are exclusive of one another, but are at the same time, in their totality, exhaustive of the many-sided truth of the indeterminate real under discussion.

It has just been noted that the term 'syādvāda' means conditional or relativistic dialectic and is synonymous with 'saptabhaṅgī'. We may examine, somewhat more closely, the meaning of this term owing to its well-merited importance in the system : The name 'syādvāda' is due to the prefix 'syāt' which is an invariable accompaniment of every predication. This particle 'syāt' which is treated by most of the Jaina writers as an indeclinable¹³² (*avyaya*) although, generally, modern writers—some of them perhaps unknowingly—consider it in its obvious sense of being a form derived from the Sanskrit root 'as' (to be) in the potential mood, third form, singular.¹³³ Another term equivalent to 'syāt' is 'kathañcit'¹³⁴ and no word or phrase in English is adequate to bring out precisely the significance of either word. Some of the suggested English equivalents like 'probably', 'may be',

131. Cf. Malliṣeṇa's definition : *ekatra jīvādaṁ vastuni ekaikasattvādidharma- viśaya-praśnavaśāt avirodhena pratyakṣādibādhāparihāreṇa prthagbhūtaḥ saṁuditayoś ca vidhiniśedhayaḥ paryālocanayā kṛtvā syācchabdālāñchito vakṣyamāṇaḥ saptabhaṅgī prakāraṇi vacanvinyāsaḥ saptabhaṅgīti gīyate/SM*, p. 142-3. Akalāṅka puts the same cryptically, as follows : *praśnavaśāt ekatra vastuni avirodhena vidhīpratiśedhakalpanā-saptabhaṅgī/TRAG*, p. 24.

The following two definitions are by Vāddeva and Vimaladāsa, respectively : *Ekatra vastuni ekaikadharmaparyanuyogavaśāt avirodhena vyastayoḥ samastayoś ca vidhiniśedhayaḥ kalpanayā syātkāraṅkitaḥ saptadhā vākya-prayogaḥ saptabhaṅgī/PNTA*, EV 14 in SRK, p. 716. *tallakṣaṇam tu praśnikapraśnājñāna-prayojyatve sati ekavastuvīśeṣyaka-aviruddhavidhīpratiśedhātma-dharmapra- kāra-ka-bodhajanaka-saptavākya-paryāpta-samudāyatvam/SBT*, p. 3.

132. See *infra*, p. 338, f.n. 3. see also *Nyāyakusumāñjali* by Muni Nyāyavijaya, ed. H.R. Kapadia, Bombay, 1922, p. 177. For the 'other several meanings' of 'syāt' as an indeclinable, see *AJP*, Vol. II, Intro. p. CXV, f.n. 2.

133. *OIP*, p. 163.

134. *S.M.*, p. 151 (text).

'perhaps', 'indefinitely' and so forth are inadequate, if not somewhat misleading. Its main significance lies in its emphasis on the indeterminate or manifold nature of the real which—like all other reals—comes within its purview. Indeterminateness or manifoldness means that the "reals cannot be determined as possessing only such and such attributes and not the rest". Discussing the spirit of *syādvāda* a modern critic observes : "It signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each viewpoint yields a different conclusion (*anekānta*). The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them for in its concrete richness it admits all predicates. Every proposition is therefore in strictness only conditional. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous".¹³⁵ A phrase which will approximately bring out this indeterministic significance of 'syāt' would be 'from a certain point of view', or 'in a certain sense', or some other equivalent form.

Another Sanskrit word which is used to suggest that each of the conclusions signified by the seven modes is exclusive—that is, does not encroach upon the province of the conclusions pointed out by the other modes—is 'eva' which may be translated as 'only' or 'certainly' (or in some equivalent form such as 'there is not doubt', or 'without doubt'). For instance, the first mode, *syādastyeva ghaṭaḥ*, means : "In a certain sense the jar exists without doubt." This sense of exclusion¹³⁷ (*vyāvṛtyartham*) seems to be more prominent than that of (*avadhāraṇārtham*) although the one implies the other and both the functions¹³⁸—which may also be described as restrictive force and the definitive (or deterministic) force, respectively—are inherent in the word.

The *syādvādins* warn us against allowing 'eva' to proceed beyond its prescribed limits of exercising the restrictive and deterministically

135. *OIP*, p. 163.

136. *Syādyāvayvamanekāntadyotakam / SM*, p. 151 (text).

137. In the words of Vidyānanda 'eva' is 'vyavacchedaprayojanah' *TSV*, p. 137. Contrast the difference in the emphasis of the two functions of the word in *JPN*, p. 147, and *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 178.

138. Cf. *avadhāraṇam ca atra bhaṅgenābhimatārthavyāvṛtyartham upāttam / itarathā anabhihitatulyataivāsya vākyasya prasajyeta, pratiniyatasvārthānabhidhānāt / taduktam vākye'avadhāraṇam tāvad anisārthanivṛttaye / kartavyo'yam anyathānuktasamatvāt tasya kutracit // SRK*, p. 717. For further elucidation of the idea contained in this passage as well as for the three distinction of 'evakāra' viz., *ayogabodhakatva*, *anyayogabodhakatva*, and *atyantāyogabodhakatva*, see *SBT*, pp. 21-29.

articulating influence on the mode within which it functions. That is, its force (*sāmarthyā*) is confined to the avoidance of intrusions from the other modes and to the bringing of a definitive articulation into the mode with which it is connected. If, on the contrary, it leads to the extreme position of setting up the particular mode or aspect, with which it is connected, as the sole manifestation of the truth of the object concerned, then it gives rise to an absolutism which does not recognise the fact that there are other aspects (*apekṣāḥ*) of truth, in the object, than the one reflected by it.

Schools which build up their systems on the foundation of some single concept or the other, which represents only one facet of the many-sided truth in reality, illustrate this narrow and dogmatic approach.¹³⁹ They are called *nirapekṣavādas* in contrast to *sāpekṣavāda* which is another name for *syādvāda*.

Thus whatever the aspect represented by a mode, under the conditional method of sevenfold predication the term '*syāt*' is an invariable accompaniment¹⁴⁰ of the mode for the very reason that it suggests that the determinate context of the mode is carved out as it were from the indeterminate richness of reality, and the term '*eva*' holds forth the determinate context in its clear outline.¹⁴¹ But it is necessary to note here that the two terms '*syāt*' and '*eva*' need not necessarily be stated explicitly in a modal proposition. They are always logically inherent in the nature of a modal judgment whether or not they are verbally specified.¹⁴²

Now the seven modes, or predications, and their characteristics may be treated with reference to the stock example of a jar (*ghaṭa*) and its negative counterpart (*niṣedha=pratiyogī*) linen (*paṭa*). In doing so we may first enumerate the seven modes, then explain the three primary concepts, viz., the being (*astitva*), non-being (*nāstitva*) and the

139. Cf. *kārtisnyaikadeśena ca tattvārthādhigamānupapateḥ/TSV*, pp. 142.

140. *sarvatra syātkāro' bhyupagantavyaḥ/NKC*, Vol. II, p. 692.

141. Cf. *syācchabdaprayoge sarvathaikāntavyavacchedena anekāntapratipat-terāsamabhavāt, evakāravacane vivakṣitārthapratipattivat/SBT*, p. 30. Cf. also the following *kā.* by Vidyānanda : *syācchabdādāpānyekāntasāmānyavabodhane/sabdāntaprayogo'tra viśeṣapratipattaye// TSV*, p. 136, *kā* 55.

142. *sāmarthyāc ca aprayoge'ritho gamyaḥ syādevakārayoḥ /* Quoted from *Siddhiviniścaya Tīkā* in *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 961, f.n. 6. *nanvaprāyukto'pi syācchabdo vastuno'nekāntasvarūpatvasāmarthyāt praṭiyate, sarvatraivakāravat, iti cet satyam / SBT*, p. 31. Also : *aprāyukto'pi sarvatra syātkaro'rthāt praṭiyate / vidhau niśedhe'pyanyatra kuśalās cet prayojakaḥ/LTB* and *NKC* thereon, in *NKC*, Vol. II, p. 692. See also *SM* (text) p. 143 f. and *TSV*, p. 137, *kā* 56 and the comm. thereon.

inexpressible (*avaktavyatva*), together with the elementary or simple propositions given rise to by them; and, lastly, point out the remaining complex¹⁴³ propositions which result from combining two or more simple ones.

The seven modes are:—

- (1) In a certain sense, the jar is (*syādasti*¹⁴⁴ *ghaṭaḥ*).
- (2) In a certain sense, the jar is not (*syānnasti ghaṭaḥ*).
- (3) In a certain sense, the jar is and is not (*syādasti nāsti ca ghaṭaḥ*)¹⁴⁵
- (4) In a certain sense, the jar is inexpressible (*syādavaktavyo ghaṭaḥ*).
- (5) In a certain sense, the jar is and is inexpressible (*syādastyavaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ*).
- (6) In a certain sense, the jar is not and is inexpressible (*syānnastyavaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ*).
- (7) In a certain sense, the jar is, is not and is inexpressible (*syādastināsti cāvaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ*).

The three fundamental concepts making up the seven predicates, in the seven modes, singly, in twos, or all together, are 'is' (*asti*), 'is not' (*nāsti*) and 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*). A predicate containing any one of them involves a simple judgment, and a predicate containing any two or all the three of them involves a complex judgment. Consequently, the first two modes, and the fourth mode, are assertions of simple judgments and the remaining four of complex judgments. These judgments, whether simple or complex, are always made against the background of the indeterminate reality which is suggested by the qualifying term '*syāt*'.

143. A slight departure from the procedure laid down here will be made in the case of the third mode (*syādastināsti*) which, complex proposition, will be treated jointly with the fourth simple proposition (*syādavaktavya*). This will be done in order to bring out the important difference between the concepts of 'consecutive presentation' (*kramārpaṇa*) and co-presentation (*sahārpaṇa*) involved in the two modes, respectively.

144. For brevity the adverb '*eva*' is dropped in all the modal statements here, but the indeclinable '*syāt*' is retained.

145. Some writers interchange the sequence between the third and the fourth modes, but this does not make any material difference. While dealing with the fourth mode, Vāḍideva observes, in this connection :—*ayam ca bhāṅgaḥ kaiścī tṛṭīyabhāṅgasthāne paṭhyate, tṛṭīyaścaītasya sthānena caivamapi kaiściddoṣaḥ, arthaviśeṣasyābhāvāt/SRK*, p. 719.

As a matter of fact the same ancient author, Kundakunda, states these two modes in a different order in his two works. Cf. *PrSKU*, II, 23, and *PSKC*, gā. 14.

Not being absolute or independent the concepts of the 'being' (*astitva*) and the 'not-being' (*nāstitva*) cannot be fully explained except in their mutual relation. Mere 'being' is fictitious without the co-ordinate element of 'non-being' and *vice versa*.¹⁴⁶ Each can, however, be described as an isolated aspect of, or abstraction from, a concrete real.

The first mode, represented by the proposition, "In a certain sense the jar is", asserts the existent or positive aspect of the jar. By virtue of the fact that the existence of the jar is inseparably bound up with the non-existence of linen (*paṭa*) etc. in it, what the proposition signifies is that for some reason at the moment of our making the assertion, our attention is being focussed primarily¹⁴⁷ (*pradhānatayā*) on the existent aspect of the jar. As already explained earlier¹⁴⁸ the existent aspect of the jar is to be understood in terms of its self-quaternary, and the non-existent aspect, in terms of the other-quaternary. If, on the contrary, the jar is understood to be capable of being the linen as well (*itararūpāpattyāpi*), then it will surely lose its very nature (*svarūpahānīprasaṅgaḥ*) as a distinctive existent¹⁴⁹, viz., a jar. This claim for a distinctive existence is guaranteed by the implicit understood term 'eva' in the proposition.¹⁵⁰

The second fundamental concept is 'non-being' (*asat*). It is embodied in the second predication, viz., 'the jar is not'. This concept is easier to understand after recognising the nature and function of its positive counterpart (*vidhipratīyogī*), viz., 'being' (*sat*). It is the

146. *vastuno 'stitvaṁ nāstitvenāvinābhūtam nāstitvaṁ ca teneti*: SM, p. 144 (text). This idea that a real is positive-negative complex is expressed by Candraprabhasūri as follows : *svaparātmanopādānāpohanavyavasthāpanādyam hi vastutvam/ Candraprabhasūri's Prameya-Ratna-Kośa*, ed. L. Suali, Bhavanagar, 1912.

147. *vivakṣāvasāc cānayoḥ pradhānopasarjanabhāvaḥ/SM*, p. 144 (text). *prathame bhāṅge sattvasya pradhānabhāvena pratītiḥ, etc. SBT*, p. 9. This idea is beautifully expressed by Amṛtacandra in the following stanza : *ekānakarṣaṇī*.....

148. See *supra*.

149. *syātkathañcit svadravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa astyeva sarvaṁ kumbhādi, na punaḥ paradravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa/tathā hi kumbho dravyataḥ pārthivattvenāsti, na jalādirūpatvena, kṣetrataḥ pāṭaliputrakatvena, na kānyakubjāditvena, kālataḥ śaiśvatvena, na vasantāditvena, bhāvataḥ śyāmatvena, na raktavādinā anyathā itararūpāpattyā svarūpahānīprasaṅga iti/SRK*, p. 717. For a discussion on *svadravyādicatuṣṭaya* and its negative counterpart see *supra*.

150. *tatra svarūpādibhiḥ astitvamiva nāstitvamapi syādityaniṣṭārthasya nivṛttaye syādastyevetyevakāraḥ/ tena ca svarūpādibhirastivameva na nāstitvamitya-vadhāryate/SBT*, p. 21.

negative (*niṣedha*) element in the determinate context of the concrete nature of the jar in the example. That is, despite its name 'negative element' this concept is a co-ordinate and constituent element in the full make-up of the jar. Negation¹⁵¹ constitutes a necessary element in reality. This important fact warrants the formulation of a distinctive conditional predication which is provided for in the second mode. The main significance of the second mode lies not in the false statement that the jar does not exist as the jar but in the irrefutable statement that the jar does not exist as linen or anything else. When we focus our attention exclusively (*pradhānatayā*) on this negative aspect of the jar, as we do under certain conditions, we are said to be viewing the jar in the perspective of the second mode. Non-existence in the second predication is not, therefore, a vacuous predicate but is the obverse of the existent side of the object. In other words, non-existence or 'non-being' is a determinate fact with a content and not a void. This is so because under the category of the 'non-being' all that should not figure within the 'being' of the jar is sought to be ruled out.

An objection of treating the present mode as a logical complement to the previous mode is that the two modes being mutually opposed, are self-contradictory. A refutation of this objection forms the subject of a specific account in an earlier chapter¹⁵² and, indeed, runs as an undercurrent throughout the body of this work. It is, therefore, sufficient to remember here that the two elements, constituting the two modes, are not merely non-contradictory—because, if they were, the qualification 'without incompatibility'¹⁵³ (*avirodhena*) in the definition of *syādvāda*, would be meaningless—but are mutually necessary complements in the real. Contradiction would arise if the opposition were between the two absolute assertions "the jar exists" and "the jar does not exist". The source of such a fault lies in the objector's mistake in construing the latter assertion, *viz.*, "the jar does not exist", as being equivalent to "the jar does not exist as a jar". The true interpretation of it should be that "the jar does not exist as linen, or water etc." There is surely no contradiction in the latter interpretation because of the fact that it is based on the assumption that the assertion is a relative (*kathañcit*) and determinate (*niyata*) abstraction from a

151. For a discussion on negation see *supra*.

152. See *supra*.

153. See *supra*.

complex and concrete real.¹⁵⁴

The third and the fourth modes may be treated jointly in order to bring out their difference more clearly. They are enunciated as : “In a certain sense the jar is and is not”, and “In a certain sense, the jar is inexpressible”, respectively. These two modes present the ‘being’ (*astitva*) and the ‘nonbeing’ (*nāstitva*) together. But there is a great difference in the presentation (*arpanābheda*) they make of the togetherness of the two modes. The third mode offers successive presentation (*kramārpana*) and the fourth one offers a simultaneous presentation (*sahārpana*) of the two concepts. These two kinds of presentation are also translated as “consecutive presentation” or “differenced togetherness”, and “co-presentation” or “undifferenced togetherness”.¹⁵⁵ Although the third mode appears to be one proposition, it entails, in actual fact, two propositions which are expressed as one owing to a certain verbal facility. But the verbal togetherness does not signify a logical compresence of the propositions, or the concepts they embody.

The fourth mode introduces the third primary concept, viz., the inexpressible¹⁵⁶ (*avaktavya*) in its predicate. Before dealing with the Jaina conception of the inexpressible and its difference from the consecutive predicate, in the third mode, it would be of some interest to trace the dialectical stages through which the concept of the inexpressible has evolved in Indian philosophy. An account of the evolution will not merely give us an estimate of the general significance of the concept, but also will indicate the relation in which the concept stands to similar concepts in other Indian schools. A brief account of it may, therefore, be attempted here.

We may distinguish four stages through which the concept of the inexpressible has passed in its evolutionary process. These stages, it should be noted, at the outset, do not necessarily represent a chronological order of development but a logical one.

154. For a refutation of a further charge that *syādvāda* brings about a situation of doubt (*samśaya viśayatvasambhava*) owing to the co-existence of the relative concept of the non-existence (*kathāñcīdasattvam*) with that of the existence (*kathāñcītsattvam*), see *SBT*, pp. 6-7 and *TRAG*, p. 26.

155. See *JTA*, pp. 45 and 47.

156. *avaktavya* is often translated as “the unspeakable” or undescribable. Commenting on the eminent suitability of this term ‘*avaktavya*’, in an attempt to express the two primary aspects of a real (*ghaṭa*) Akalāṅka remarks : *na cānyaḥ śabdaḥ tadubhayāt māvaśthātattvābhīdhāyī vidyate/ato’sau ghaṭaḥ vacanagocarātī tatvāt syādavaktavya ityucyate/TRAG*, p. 25. The nature and the importance of this concept, viz., *avaktavya*, will be hereafter clarified.

In the first place, we meet with a tendency in the *Rgveda* which is suggestive of a negative attitude to the problem. The seer, confronted with the mystery of the universe which reveals both *sat* (being) and *asat* (non-being), tends to feel that the universe is neither being nor non-being (cf. the primal state of reality, he says. "Then was not non-existent nor existent...." *Rgveda*, the "Song of Creation", Bk. X, Hymn 129. E.T. by R.T.H. Griffith). This somewhat naive and negative attitude that the real is neither being nor non-being may be described as one of *anubhaya*.

The next tendency is a positive one, and is represented by certain Upaniṣadic utterances like : "*sadasadvareṇyam*" ('The great Being' as 'being and not being', *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, H. 2. 1; *tathākṣāt dvividhāḥ somya bhāvāḥ prajāyante...Ibid.*, II.1. 1) and "*saṃyuktametata kṣaramakṣaram ca vyaktāvyaktam bharate viśvamīśaḥ*" (That which is joined together as perishable and imperishable, as manifest and unmanifest—the Lord...supports it all. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* I. 8). It conceives both being and non-being as inherent in reality. Owing to the positive character this tendency may be described as the *ubhaya* phase (in which *both* are real) of the concept.

Before touching upon the third phase in the evolution of the concept it is necessary to note two significant features in the above two tendencies. First, although both attitudes refer to the elements of being and non-being they suggest that two elements as being merely together. As yet there does not seem to be any attempt to weld the elements into a single complex mode. Nor has any definite awareness of the impossibility of expressing the two elements, simultaneously, in a single concept dawned upon these poet-philosophers. Secondly, the two elements are conceived to be mutually opposed rather than complementary.

The third phase is met with again, in certain other Upaniṣadic utterances like "*sa eṣa neti neti*" (*Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*, IV. 5. 15); "*yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*" (*Taittiriyopaniṣad*, II. 4); or "*naiva vācā na manasā prāptum śakyah*" (*Kāthopaniṣad*, II. 6. 12). In this phase there is a clear awareness of the unutterableness of the ultimate owing to the fact that an attempt at utterance is beset with contradictoriness. Hence, although this phase is also negative¹⁵⁷ like

157. Cf. "This world, O Kaccana, ...generally proceeds on a duality, on the 'it is' and the 'it is not'. But O Kaccana, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no 'it is not' in this world. Whoever, Kaccana, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no 'it is' in this world...." Quoted in H. Oldenberg's *Buddha*, (E.T. by W. Koey, 1882, London), p. 249.

that of the *Rgveda* it marks an advance upon the naïvete of the latter in so far as it is distinctly aware of the inexpressibility of the ultimate. In order to distinguish this logically sophisticated phase from the simple negative tendency of the *Rgveda* we may call this the stage of *avaktavya*, or *anirvacanīyatā*, after the Vedāntic usage. Not merely the modes (*koṭis*) of *sat* and *asat* but also the mode of *sadasat* are associated with *anirvacanīyatā*. Although *anirvacanīyatā* signifies unutterableness like the Jain notion of *avaktavyatva* it differs from the latter by insisting upon absolute (*sarvathā*) unutterableness. The specific term by which the Jaina refers to this *absolute* type of *avaktavyatva* is *avyapadeśya* which is in contrast with his own relativistic notion according to which *sat* and *asat* are jointly or consecutively (*kramārpanayā*) expressible (*kathañcidvyapadeśya*). Incidentally, one is reminded, here, of the fact that the Buddha's 'avyākṛtas' and Nāgārjuna's conception of the ultimate as being 'catuskoṭivīnirmukta'¹⁵⁸ are, after making allowance for the respective differences in the metaphysical tenets and, consequently, in the modes of expressing the concept of the inexpressible, cognate with the concept of *anirvacanīyatā*, or *avyapadeśya*, as the Jaina would call them.

Another important difference of this *anirvacanīya* view from that of the relativistic inexpressible of the Jaina, is that the former assumes *sat* and *asat*, singly or jointly, to be absolutely independent and contradictory while the latter assumes them to be relative and complementary. On the basis of this difference the former view is designated as *nirapekṣavāda* and the latter *sāpekṣavāda*. The attribution of absolute independence to *sat* and *asat* in their combination as *sadasat* paves the way for the development of the conception of the ultimate absolute (*brahman*) which utterly transcends words and eventually constitutes itself into the

158. The paradoxical situation involved in the absolute unutterableness (*anabhilapyatva*) of the position of *catuskoṭivīnirmuktatvam* comes in for a sharp polemic by Samantabhadra and his two commentators, Vasunandi and Akalanka. Samantabhadra contends that a strict insistence on the principle of 'anabhilapyatvam, should prevent its advocates from indulging in the description of what cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be described (*avaktavyacatuskoṭivikalpopi na kathyatām/AMS, kā. 46*). Consequently, referring to the distinctions (*koṭis*) like *sat*, *asat*, etc. in relation to 'the indescribable' (or possibly the Void or *Śūnya*) is like introducing an adjective or a qualification where there is no substantive or the qualified (*asarvāntamavastu syāt aviśeṣyaviśeṣaṇam/Ibid*). For the entire argument, see *ibid.*, *kārikās* 45-50 and the comms. *VVas* and *ASA* thereon.

transcendental realm of truth (*parasatya* or *paramārthasat*). In other words, the verbal and logical transcendentalism becomes the metaphysical transcendentalism which relegates the antinomies of *sat*, *asat* and *sadasat* to the intrinsically unreal empirical realm.

The last phase in the dialectical evolution of the idea of the inexpressible is represented by the relativistic (*sāpekṣa*) view of *syādvādin*. The distinctive features of relativism and complementariness in the Jaina view of the inexpressible have already been brought out while contrasting them with the absolutistic view of the *anirvacanīyavādin*. Instead of fighting shy of their supposed contradictoriness and other difficulties the Jaina treats the two elements of *sat* and *asat*, in their combination, as a necessary, inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience and, consequently, tries to assign them a place in the framework of his dialectical scheme of modal propositions.

In the above account of the four stages in the evolution of the notion of the inexpressible, in Indian philosophy, an attempt has been made to show the relation in which the Jaina notion of the inexpressible stands to the views of certain other schools about the same notion. Incidentally, certain general features like the relativism (*sāpekṣatva*) and the complementariness of the combining concepts of being and non-being, in the same predication, have also been brought out in the account. Now, the status and the significance of this notion, in the scheme of the conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*), as well as the manner in which this notion is to be differentiated from the consecutive concept involved in the third predication of the dialectic, are yet to be further elucidated. But such an elucidatory attempt presupposes a knowledge of the Jaina view of the relation between a word and its meaning, since the development of the concept of the inexpressible is directly based on that view. Hence a brief reference may be made to show how the Jaina treats language as a medium of the meaning of reality.

It is a well-known fact, in Indian philosophy, that Bhartṛhari, the author of the great classic on the philosophy of grammar, the *Vākyapadīya*, puts forth a well-finished, elaborate, and powerful thesis that “the whole order of reality, subjective and objective, is but the manifestation of word”.¹⁵⁹ Expression, according to him, is “the very

159. *JPN*, p. 111; also cf. *Vākyapadīya*, with Puṅyarāja's Comm. (Ed. by GaṅgādharaSastri Manavalli, Benares, 1887), I.119. The relevant *kā.* in *Vākyapadīya* is prefaced by Puṅyarāja as follows : *idānīm śabdasyaiva jagannūlatvaṁ prapañcayati*. Then follows the *kā.* beginning with : *śabdesvevāsṛitā śaktirviśvasyāsyā nibhandhanī* / Commenting on this Puṅyarāja further observes : *sarvā apyarthajātayaḥ sūkṣmarūpeṇa śabdādhiṣṭhānāḥ* /

essence of consciousness and , hence, all that exists. Therefore, whatever exists and whatever is thought of, is *completely expressible*.¹⁶⁰ This thesis represents an extreme viewpoint.

An antithesis of Bhartṛhari's viewpoint is presented by certain utterances of the Upaniṣads which, as noticed during the treatment of the third phase in the development of the indefinable,¹⁶¹ were, later on, developed into the well-articulated theories of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaitism, and similar ideas in certain trends of Buddhism. This antithetical view maintains that the ultimate is absolutely beyond the reach of words, and, when any attempt is made to 'reach' the ultimate through words they are found utterly to conceal, nay, even distort it.

Here again the Jaina strikes the balance between the two extremes and maintains that reality is both¹⁶² expressible and inexpressible, and, that there is no contradiction in holding this position since reality is so from different points of view.¹⁶³ It is in defence of this position that the Jaina view of the relation between a word and its meaning comes into the picture.

According to *syādvādin* one word expresses one meaning only. The relationship between a word and its meaning is designated by the Jaina as *vācyavācakanīyama* or *ekārthatvanīyama*¹⁶⁴ and, by some

160. According to Bhartṛhari " There is no cognition which is not interpenetrated with word. Thought is impossible without verbal expression. It is language that makes cognition illuminative of its objects." This item is beautifully expressed by the following celebrated *kā.* of Bhartṛhari : *na so'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamādṛte/anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāṣate//Nākyapadīya*, 1. 124, and for its E.T. see *JPN*, p. 111. For a similar importance attached to *Śabda* by the author of *Kāvyādarśa*, see *The philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* (P.C. Chakravarti, Calcutta University, 1936), p. 39, especially n. 2 thereon. This *philosophy of Grammar* as well as his "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus" in the *Journal of the Department of Letters*, Vol. XII, University of Calcutta, 1925, give an exposition of Bhartṛhari's general position in relation to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and others.

161. See *supra*, pp. 348-350.

162. Expressibility is a consecutive possibility and inexpressibility is an attempt at a co-presentation and, therefore, is a verbal impossibility.

163. Commenting on his own *kā.*, viz., *arpaṇabhedādavirodhah pīṭputrādīsambandhavat*, Akalaṅka writes : *tadyathā ekasya devadattasya jātikularūpasamjñāvyapadeśaviśiṣṭasya pītā putro bhrātā bhāgineya ityevamprakārāḥ sambandhā janyajanakatvādīśaktyarpaṇabhedāt na virudhyante/na hyekāpekṣayā pīṭeti śeṣāpekṣayāpīṭā bhavati/ śeṣāpekṣayā tu putrādīvyapadeśabhāk/na ca pītāputrādīkṛtam sambandhabahutvaṃ devadattaikasya na/virudhyate/advad astitvādayo na yānti virodham ekatra/ TRAG*, p. 26.

164. See *SBT*, p. 61.

non-Jaina writers, on the subject, as *nānāśabdavāda*.¹⁶⁵ Both these designations affirm their common essential conviction that a word, which appears to convey more meanings than one, is to be treated, not as one word, but as many words as the number of meanings it appears to convey.¹⁶⁶ We have already met with an expression of this attitude towards the present question under the etymological standpoint (*samabhirūḍhanaya*)¹⁶⁷ in the section on *Nayavāda*. For instance, the word 'gauḥ'—we say the 'word' in the singular in conformity to popular usage, we should say, in strictness, a multitude of words—is said to convey a cow (*paśu*), a *vāhika*, earth (*prthivī*), heaven (*svarga*), a point of compass, a word (*pada*), and 'a ray of light' (*kiraṇa*).¹⁶⁸ Similarly the English words like play, pound, file, etc. stand for more than one meaning. But the Jaina does not agree with the popular view that the very same word, among such words, can convey all the meanings associated with it by commonsense and listed against it by lexicographers. He believes,¹⁶⁹ with Bhāmaha,¹⁷⁰ that in spite of the

165. Although their actual designation is not used Vidyānanda expresses its meaning in the following statement : *śabdasya ca prativiṣayam mānatvāt sarvagunānām ekaśabdavācyaṭāyām sarvārthānām ekaśabdavācyaṭāpatteḥ śabdāntaravai-phalyāt/TSV*, p. 136.
166. Besides indicating this idea Vimaladāsa also points out the consequences of its violation : *nanu sarveśām padānām ekārthaniyame nānārthapadocchedāpattiriti cenna, gavādīpadasyāpi svargādyanekārthaviṣayatayā prasiddhasya tattvati'nekatvāt, sādṛśyopacārūdeva tasyaikatvena vyavaharaṇāt/anyathā sakalārthasyāpi ekaśabdavācyaṭvāpatteḥ arthabhedena anekāśabdaprayogavai-phalyāt/SBT*, p. 61.
167. See *supra* and *SBT*, p. 61, where the author writes : *yathaiva hi samabhirūḍhanayāpekṣayā śabdabhedād dhruvo'rthabhedah tathā arthabhedādapi śabdabhedah siddha eva/ anyathā vācyavācakaniyamavyavahāravilopāt/*
168. Four of these meanings are given in the Hindi Comm. on *SBT*, p. 61, and five of them (with the addition of the meaning, a 'word') are given in *JPN*, p. 117. *Vāhika*, though not given in either work, is widely referred to in *Vākya-padīya* and other works.
169. Prabhācandra puts forth this idea of one word for one meaning in a somewhat different form (substituting that simultaneous inexpressibility of the positive and the negative meaning of a word for a similar inexpressibility of more than one meaning of a so-called synonymous word) in a polemic against a particular theory of the import of words (*apohavāda*). Although the theory controverted is not specifically mentioned by him it is evidently the theory, sponsored by Ratnākaraśānti which propounds 'that a word denotes something positive, and at the same time differentiates it from all others. The two acts, one positive and the other negative, are', according to this theory, "simultaneous. It is not a positive action followed by negation nor is it a negative act followed by assertion.' (*SBNT*, preface, p.1). To quote the words of Ratnākaraśānti himself :

common structural and phonetic pattern the word 'gauḥ', when uttered or written against any one of the several meanings, is a specific symbol different from what appears to be —and structurally and phonologically is—the same symbol against another meaning connected with it. In other words, the word 'gauḥ' as meaning 'a cow' is different from the word 'gauḥ' as meaning a 'vāhika'. The fact that two or more meanings have the same linguistic symbol (*saṃjñā*) is, according to the Jaina, simply a matter of linguistic coincidence just as in the case of two persons, who are entirely different from each other in many respects, having the same name, say Devadatta. The farthest that the Jaina could go concerning the question of the occurrence of the same symbol against several meanings is that he can conceive every instance of its occurrence as being only similar (*sādrśyopacārādeva*)¹⁷¹, linguistically, to the other instances.

In the general position¹⁷² taken up by the Jaina on the problems of the philosophy of language our concern here is with the specific problem¹⁷³ of the relation between word and meaning

nāsmābhīrapoḥaśabdena vidhīreva kevalo'bhīpretah nāpyanyavyāvṛttimātram, kintvanyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānāmarthah/Ibid., p.3. This view is opposed to the widely accepted view of *apoha* which consists in 'mutual negation' (*parasparaparihāra* or *anyavyāvṛtti*, as referred to by Ratnākaraśānti in the above quotation) between point-instants (see Stcherbatsky's *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 157, f. n. 3). Criticising the above view, of Ratnākaraśānti, that one word (dhvani) may generate in us two cognitions (*vijñānadvaya*), one positive and the other negative, at once, Prabhācandra writes : *athaikenaiva gośabdena buddhidvayasya utpādāt na paro dhvanir mygah; na ekasya vidhikāriṇo niśedhakāriṇo vā dhvaner yugapat vijñānadvayalakṣaṇaphalānupalambhāt/vidhiniśedhajñānayoś ca anyonyam virodhāt katham ekasmāt sambhavah/ PKM, pp.431-2.* Bhāmaha is at one with Prabhācandra on this question. See the following f.n.

170. Bhāmaha, like *syādvādin*, holds that "no single word can have two fruits" or meanings, as is evidenced by the followed *kā.* quoted with approval by Prabhācandra : *nanu jñānaphalāḥ śabdā na caikasya phaladvayam/apavādaiddijñānam phalamekasya vaḥ katham/Ibid., p. 432.* Commenting on this *kā.*, quoted also by Śāntarākṣita, Kamalaśīla observes : *na hyekasya vidhikāriṇaḥ niśedhakāriṇo vā śabdasya yugapatvijñānadvayalakṣaṇam phalam/TSS., kā. 913,* and the P.thereon.

171. See *supra*.

172. The following works deserve attention for their treatment of the problems concerning the philosophy of language from the Jaina point of view : *PKM*, ch. III, pp. 391-465; *NKC*, Vol. II. ch. IV, pp. 530-604, ch. V, pp. 636-54, ch. VI, pp. 690-766.

173. Closely allied to this problem of word-meaning relation is the question whether the meaning of a word resides in the word as a natural power (*svabhāva*) or is associated with it as a mere convention. In the debate on this question the Mīmāṃsaka takes the former view and the Naiyāyika takes the latter view. In conformity with his reconciliatory attitude the Jaina takes the middle position

(*saṃjñāsamjñi-sambandha*). Having noticed that he favours the view that every distinctive meaning needs a distinctive word (*pratiniyatavācyavācakabhāva*) for its medium, we may now resume our treatment of the copresentative predicate of the inexpressible (*avaktavya*) and of its differentiation from the consecutive-presentative, in their respective modes, under the method of seven-fold predication.

If the above principle of one word for one meaning is granted, then the concept of the inexpressible in *syādvāda* lends itself to an easy grasp. The fourth mode, viz., "The jar is inexpressible", is an attempt to present the aspects of 'being' and 'non-being' in the jar, *at once* (*yugapat*), and, as *primary meanings*.

Although both these aspects are the inalienable features of the jar, a simultaneous attention to both aspects is a psychological and logical impossibility. Moreover 'being' conveys the meaning of one aspect and 'non-being' of the other. A conveyance of both meanings at once is incompatible with the established rule, viz., *vācyavācakaniyama*. To say that one word, like *avaktavya* in the present context, can convey both the meanings at once would not be correct, according to the Jaina, because of two reasons : first that no word can convey more than one meaning at a time, and secondly, even if it can, our mind can attend to them only in a successive order. A further mention of these difficulties incident to the concept will presently be made.

No such difficulties arise in the case of the third predication

between these two extremes. Accordingly, he believes that although meaning is natural potency of a word it needs the aid of convention for its discovery as well as its expressive use. "The power," it is said, "is natural, but is made effective only by convention. We have to learn the relation of words to facts and this shows that knowledge of convention is necessary for understanding the meanings of words. But the knowledge of convention is only a means to the discovery of the power of the word and does not make the postulation of power unnecessary or redundant." (*JPN*, p. 119). But whatever the relative proportions of the role played by power and convention, the stand taken by the Jaina with regard to the problem of word-meaning relation is consistently maintained (*cf. ekapadasya pradhānatayā anekadharmavacchinnabodhakatvaṃ nāsūti niyamasyoktatvāt/SBT*, p. 66. For a further discussion on how collective terms like army (*senā*), forest (*vana*) etc., and how terms expressing plural number, like trees (*vrkṣāḥ*) etc., can be explained in terms of the Jaina conception of word-meaning relation, see *SBT*, pp. 63-67. The relevant grammatical points, bearing on the explanation of these terms, especially the terms involving the plural number, are also mentioned by the way, often in opposition to Pāṇini's view on the matter (*ibid.*).

which is concerned with presenting, consecutively (*kramārpanayā*), the two aspects of 'being' and 'non-being', although it is expressed in the shortened form of a single proposition. It is because of this consecutive element that this mode is aptly called 'differenced togetherness' (or distinguishable togetherness) in contrast to the phrase 'undifferenced togetherness' (or undistinguishable togetherness) which signifies *avaktavya*. Both aspects are 'primitive', co-ordinate and mutually irreducible. Our mental (perceptual and other) as well as expressive (*bodhanasāmarthyam* and *vacanasāmarthyam*) faculties being ill-adapted for comprehending and asserting both of them at once in their primary togetherness (*ubhaya-prādhānyam*) we can grasp and assert them either successively or confess to our inability to do if asked to do it at a single stroke.¹⁷⁴ This is precisely what is done under the third and the fourth modes, respectively.¹⁷⁵

It is contended that the third mode is redundant, or superfluous, and, therefore, is unjustifiable¹⁷⁶ as a distinctive alternative in the dialectical scheme of conditional predications. The reason pleaded for this contention is that it does not exhibit any unique or novel feature of objective reality, being almost a mechanical conjunction of the two simple predicates contained, severally, in the first and second modes. While not denying the fact that it is a conjunctive predication, the Jaina does not agree with the contention that it is redundant. A conjunctive proposition embodies a judgment of consecutive togetherness which is no less a unique or distinctive moment of factual significance than any other, and, cannot, therefore, be expunged from a methodological scheme which pretends to synthesise, exhaustively, all possible moments, or alternatives, within its fold.

A similar consideration applies to the concept of the inexpressible. This concept confronts us with a logical, psychological, and verbal failure to embody, within any one symbol (*saṅketa*), the two fundamental aspects of reality, with equal prominence. This is indeed an inconvenient predicament inevitable in any effort to take in, in one sweep, the whole range of truth. But the inconvenient or the impossible is not necessarily illogical or untrue. Limitations in the range of human powers of thinking and expression entail such a

174. *iti sakalavācakarahitavādavaktavyam vastu yugapatsattvāsattvābhyām pradhānabhāvārpitābhyām ākrāntam vyavatiśṭhate/SM*, p. 145.

175. See *SBT*, p. 62. *PNTA*, IV. 15. and *SRK* thereon in *SRK*, pp. 718-719.

176. See *SBT*, p. 69 f.

failure. But even this failure is a necessary step to be reckoned with in the dialectical method of *syādvāda*. Being at once an inescapable and unique fact in our grappling with reality it cannot but be provided for as a dialectically possible or alternative position. K.C. Bhattacharya clearly expresses this position in the following words : "It (the inexpressible) is objective as given : it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence : it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principles implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood."¹⁷⁷

The remaining three¹⁷⁸ modes are derived from combining the three primary concepts in such a way that these three, combined with the four modes hitherto expounded, exhaust all the possible or alternative aspects of truth concerning the object in question (the jar in the present instance).

The fifth mode, viz., "In a certain sense, the jar is, and is inexpressible", asserts the truth of the 'being' of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the compresence (or co-presentation) of the being and the non-being of the same object.¹⁷⁹ This is a combined mode derived from bringing together the first and the fourth predicates in a complex expressed judgment.

The sixth mode, viz., "In a certain sense, the jar is not, and is inexpressible", asserts the truth of non-being of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the compresence of the 'being' and the 'non-being' of the same object.¹⁸⁰ This, again, is a combined mode

177. *JTA*, p. 48.

178. After mentioning the four 'ways' or 'steps' of the 'formula' (*syādvāda*) Hiriyama observes : "It may seem that the formula might stop here. But there are still other ways in which the alternatives can be combined. To avoid the impression that those predicates are excluded, three more steps are added. The resulting description becomes exhaustive, leaving no room for the charge of dogma in any form. : *OIP*, p. 165.

179. Cf. *yugapad asāṅketikenaikenaiva śabdena vaktum vivakṣitaḥ kumbhaḥ samś ca vaktavyaś ca bhavati, ghaṭo vaktavyaś ca bhavati tyarthah deśe tasya ghaṭatvāt, deśe cāvaktavyatvād iti/SHM in VBJ, gā. 2232.*

180. Cf. *tathā, ekadeśe paraparyāyair asadbhāvenārpito viśeṣito nyasmins tu deśe svaparaparyāyair śadbhāvāsadbhāvābhyām sattvāsattvābhyām yugapad asāṅketikenaikena śabdena vaktum vivakṣitaḥ kumbho sannavaktavyaś ca bhavati/ Ibid.*

resulting from bringing together the second and the fourth predicates in a complex expressed judgment.

The seventh and last mode, viz., “In a certain sense, the jar is, is not, and is inexpressible”, combines the consecutive presentation of the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’, conjointly with the co-presentation or compresence, of the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’ of the jar¹⁸¹. This mode is evidently a resultant of bringing together, within its fold, the third and the fourth predicates of the conditional dialectic.

Unlike the first two and the fourth predications, each of which contains a simple predicate involving one of the three primary concepts, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications are, severally, complex in structure, the last one being the most complex among them. This is so because they are assertions of complex judgments.

These are the seven modes each of which contains one alternative truth while all together contain the total truth¹⁸² of a situation in which any feature predicated of a real is investigated. The reason why the number of modes is neither more nor less than seven is because, it is believed, any complex situation is amenable to treatment by this seven-fold technique if one is an adept in using it. It means every conceivable problem¹⁸³ regarding a factual situation can be reduced to the terms of these seven angles from which it can be viewed. Any attempt to add or subtract a mode will be found to be impossible since addition finds the mode already there, among one of the existing seven modes, and subtraction will mutilate an essential limb from the

181. *Ibid.*

182. Jinabhadraṅgi sums up the complex position of *Syādvāda* in the following *gāthā* : *sabbhāvāsabbhāvobhayappio saparapajjao-bhayao/kumbhākumbhāvattavvobhayarūvāibheo so/VBJ., gā. 2232*. Explaining this *gā*. Maladhāri observes : *tathā hi—svaparyāyāiḥ, paraparyāyāiḥ, ubhayaparyāyāis ca sadbhāvena, asadbhāvena, ubhayena, cārpito viśeṣitaḥ kumbhaḥ kumbhākumbhā-vaktavyobhayarūpādibhedo bhavati—saptabhaṅgī pratipadyata ityarthāḥ / SHM in VBJ, p. 910*. In a similar manner Vidyānanda and Sāmantabhadra sum up the entire position in two and four *kārikās*. respectively. See *AMS*, 14 and 16; and *TSV*, p. 128, 49-52.

183. For instance, applying *syādvāda* to the postulation that reality is one we get the following conclusions : the reality is one (*syādekaḥ*); the reality is non-one or many (*syādanekaḥ*); the reality is both one and many (*syādekaścānekaśca*); the reality is inexpressible (*syādavaktavyaḥ*); the reality is many and also inexpressible (*syādekaścāvaktavyaḥ*); the reality is many and also inexpressible (*syādanekaścāvaktavyaḥ*) and, the reality is one, many and also inexpressible (*syādekaścānekaścāvaktavyaśca*).

scheme.¹⁸⁴ In the event of a fresh situation arising with regard to the same problem under a different setting it can again be dealt with by the application of this method. All the conclusions accumulating from the varied application of this method will, eventually, give us a conspectus of the complex truth with regard to a problem. The whole method, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions of reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge.

Now we may consider some important criticisms directed against *syādvāda*.

A few criticisms, considered by the critics directing them to be fatal to *syādvāda*, come from the *vedāntic* quarters, especially *advaitic* absolutism. This is inevitable since *advaitic* absolutism and *syādvādic* relativism are diametrically opposed to each other in their fundamental presuppositions. Although these criticisms originated with the founders of the *vedāntic* schools it would be better to see them (the criticisms) through the eyes of the modern exponents of *vedānta*. An elaborate refutation of them lies outside the limits of this work. A few remarks may, however, be made in answer to them inserting, here and there, some observations of the critics themselves who, to some extent, answer, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, their fellow-critics.

Hiriyanna, by no means an unsympathetic exponent even of Jainism, observes : "The half hearted character of the Jaina enquiry is reflected in the seven-fold mode of predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*), which stops at giving us the several partial views together, without attempting to overcome the opposition in them by a proper synthesis. It is all right so far as it cautions us against one-sided conclusions but it leaves us in the end...with little more than one-sided solutions. The reason for it, if it is not prejudice against absolutism, is the desire to keep close to common beliefs."¹⁸⁵ In another work of his also the same criticism is made with some more incisive touches on one or two points. One additional point mentioned there, on the authority of Bādarayaṇa,

184. Cf. *bhaṅgāṣṣattvādayassapta sainśayāssapta tadgatāḥ/jijñāsāssapta sapta syuḥ praśnāssaptottarāṇi ca* // quoted in *SBT*, p. 8. This refutes objections such as the one by Kumārila who feels that "When seven principles are admitted then there may also be a hundred" (*saptabhaṅgī prasādena śatabhaṅgyapi jāyate*) *PSKC*, p. 14 Chakravarti observes in this connection : "The complex nature of a real object or *dravya* is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven proposition." *Ibid.*, p. 12.

185. *OIP*, p. 172 f.

Śāṅkara, and other absolutists, is that "If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism."¹⁸⁶

From these observations we may elicit two points of criticism : The first one is that *syādvāda* is a form of "eclecticism" because it is "a mere putting together of the several partial truths"¹⁸⁷ without a proper synthesis". This is expressed even more trenchantly by a follower of Hiriyanna who, after characterising "The Jaina Philosophy of Relativity" as "refreshingly modern"¹⁸⁸ and as "a happy blend of naturalistic and spiritualistic, realistic and idealistic tendencies", observes: " 'Just the philosophy' is perhaps what many contemporary philosophers would say. But on close scrutiny, it fails to satisfy some of the deepest metaphysical and religious aspirations of mankind. Its fascination is the fascination of an *eclecticism*—a philosophy of compromise."¹⁸⁹ This is said to be "the central defect" arising from the relativism of *syādvāda*.

The second criticism of *syādvāda*, made by Hiriyanna, is that it (*syādvāda*) is "variety of scepticism". "Prejudice against absolutism", the reason imputed by Hiriyanna for such "scepticism", is even more conclusively advanced by Radhakrishnan, who, after mentioning "the strong points of the theory of knowledge of the Jainas and defending it against the attacks of the Vedantins" remarks : "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic."¹⁹⁰

After casually complementing *syādvāda* as the "most searching dialectic"¹⁹¹ Belvalkar gives such a twist to his statement of *syādvāda* that it is made to sound like scepticism or rather, the even more non-committal attitude of "agnosticism". He writes: "As is well-known, this theory denies the possibility of any predication : S

186. *EIP*, p. 69.

187. *Ibid.*, p. 68

188. "Anekāntavāda or The Jaina Philosophy of Relativity". G. Hanumantha Rao, *The Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University*, March, 1942, p. 79.

189. *Ibid.*, p. 87. f.

190. *IP*, Vol. I, p. 305.

191. "The Undercurrents of Jainism" (an article in the *Indian Philosophical Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1917, edited by A.C. Widgey and R.D. Ranade, Bombay), p. 33.

may be, or may not be, or may both be and not be, P. With such a purely negative or agnostic attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Śaṅkarācārya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says—‘As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthaṅkara (Jaina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate?’¹⁹²

Besides this charge of agnosticism Belvalkar manages to raise a fresh issue which, however, he links up with agnosticism. He remarks that ‘the dialectic (of *syādvāda*) could not have sprung up from the same teacher or one and the same philosophical background’.¹⁹³ This means that, according to him, *syādvāda* is incompatible with, or at any rate, does not naturally emerge from, the Jaina philosophy of identity-in-difference. Connecting this issue with his favourite charge of agnosticism he writes in his notes on *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, ‘Śaṅkarācārya, no less than the Sūtrakara.....succeeds in proving that, as a mere ‘*anaikāntika*’ (*sic*) theory of predication the Syādvāda must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself’.¹⁹⁴ Rao strengthens him by placing in his hands a further weapon in the form of charging *syādvāda* with ‘self-contradiction’. To quote Rao’s own words : ‘We see the tendency to please everybody and to compromise and in trying to compromise it involves itself in self-contradiction; the saviour of all systems is committing suicide’.¹⁹⁵ From this joint attack of Belvalkar and Rao emerges the third charge that *syādvāda* is contradictory to the Jaina philosophical position in general as well as that it is self-contradictory.

A systematically elaborate answer to each of these three charges, viz., eclecticism, agnosticism and contradiction including self-contradiction, lies, as already mentioned, outside the scope of this work. Moreover, if a glance is cast over the various chapters of this work, especially these last three parts, it will be seen that these criticisms have been met in spirit, if not in letter, according to the lights vouchsafed to the Jaina thinkers. We may, therefore, confine ourselves to a few remarks against each charge drawing upon, wherever possible,

192. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

193. *Ibid.*

194. *BBSB*, p. 181 (Notes).

195. ‘The Jaina Instrumental Theory of Knowledge’ (Proceedings of the *First Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1925, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1927), p. 135.

the remarks by the critics themselves who, on certain points, answer one another.

We may begin with the first criticism: Is *syādvāda* an eclecticism? Eclecticism is a "term applied to a system of philosophy or theology that strives to incorporate the truth of all systems, or the method by which it is made". "Since an eclectic system is a loose piece of mosaic work, rather than an organised body of original thought", it is said, "the term in philosophy has come to be one of reproach".¹⁹⁶

We may examine *syādvāda* in the light of the definition of eclecticism as given here. So far as the first statement in the definition of eclecticism is concerned, there is nothing objectionable to *syādvāda*. For *syādvāda* is a "system of philosophy" which, 'strives to incorporate the truth of all systems'¹⁹⁷ as well as "method by which it (that is, 'incorporating the truth of all systems') is made." The critics also do not grudge this claim on the part of Jainism but they are doubtful whether Jainism can provide an adequate answer to the charge that it is "a loose piece of mosaic work rather than an organised body of original thought". Further, even as regards this charge they are keen not so much on the point of *syādvāda* being a product of "an original thought" as on that of its being "a loose piece" in which the parts do not hang together in an organised or systematic closeness. This emphasis on the question of closeness should be the leading factor in our refutation of the present charge.

That the seven modes of *syādvāda* express "partial truths" which do not firmly hang together, as a logical necessity, is only the *prima facie* view of *syādvāda*. That their truths are severally partial is true. But from this it does not necessarily follow that they are an odd collection of arbitrary 'half truths' lacking in proper synthesis, or system. The fact that the truths presented by them are alternative truths

196. *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*, ed. by S.M. Jackson, New York and London, 1909, Vol. IV, p. 71.

197. The types of the absolute (*nirapekṣa*) doctrines repudiated by each of the seven modes may be gathered from the following passage: *sāmkyena yat sattvaikāntyam upāgatam tannivṛttaya ādyo bhāṅgaḥ / śūnyatvavādyupāgata-asattvaikāntyanivṛttaye dvitīyo bhāṅgaḥ/ kālābhedenā sattvasattve tārīkīkopāgate tadanaikāntyāya tṛtīyo bhāṅgaḥ/ vedāntinā anirvacanīyatvam upāgamyaṭe tadanaikāntyāya caturtho bhāṅgaḥ/ sattvavādinam prati sattvenānirvacanīyatvam pūrvapakṣiṇodbhāvitam, asattvavādinam prati asattvenānirvacanīyatvam pūrvapakṣiṇodbhāvitam, sadasattvavādinam prati tābhyāmanirvacanīyatvam pūrvapakṣavādinodbhāvitam, tadanaikāntyadyotanāya avaśiṣṭāstrayo bhāṅgaḥ/* Quoted in *BBSB* (Notes), p. 183.

which individually touch every aspect, and, together, all the aspects, of a situation in a systematic way has been borne in upon us, in some measure, in the course of the present chapter. A certain actuality, like the jar, an example with which the modes have been illustrated, is looked at from the possible seven angles and the deliverance of these modal judgments does represent a synthesis which is neither 'loose' nor unsystematic. Unfortunately no non-absolutistic system can provide the sort of idealistic 'synthesis' which "can satisfy the deepest metaphysical and religious aspirations of mankind". Under the absolutistic prescription a 'proper synthesis' can proceed from the sole real, viz., the absolute. But one fails to understand where the need for a 'synthesis' arises in the case of a secondless absolute. A 'synthesis' of any description is possible when there are more alternatives, loose or firm, than one. If it is so, it is impossible to understand the protests of the absolutists against any lack of synthesis when no synthesis at all is possible with a unitary absolute. By 'synthesis', therefore, the absolutist critics mean an obliteration of alternative truths in favour of the one asserted by the fourth mode in *syādvāda*. It is not a mere 'prejudice against absolutism'¹⁹⁸ but a deep difference in the approach of philosophical analysis that prevents *syādvādin* from throwing in his lot with a despotic absolute which brooks no rivalry from coexistent truths and, therefore, should raise no issue of synthesis. It is the love of a superficial reconciliation that lies at the back of the claim that *syādvāda* is a "halfway house to absolutism". Thus the synthesis achieved by *syādvāda* is one of discriminative unity rather than of a secondless unit which cannot be approached either by synthesis or by analysis. The conception of a unitary absolute has been, no doubt, a constant lure for mysticism and poetry. But the sphere of reality is often less lofty and very much less ethereal. Absolutism escapes from the harrowing problems of existence under the master excuse of the absolute. But it is through a tortuous process of analysis and synthesis that the secrets of elusive

198. Ascribing this 'prejudice' to the *syādvādin* has elicited a counter-charge of a 'speculative bias' from a critic in rather strong terms: "...And it would be the height of sacrilege to the system of Jaina speculation to attempt an unnecessary twisting of facts, to impose an absolute or monist interpretation on their conception of truth and reality, as has been done in some quarters, on the plea of pseudo-simplicity, or perhaps owing to speculative bias". Narimohana Bhattacharya's paper on "The Jaina Conception of Truth and Reality" (*Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1927*), p. 165.

reality grudgingly yield themselves. This is provided for by *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* respectively.

If by lack of 'proper synthesis' *syādvādin* does not instal an absolute at the centre as well as on the periphery of his philosophy and logic *syādvāda* pleads guilty to the charge and will be satisfied to remain an unrepentent sinner. The threat of its modes not hanging together does not baffle him since he is not unwilling to retain to some extent distinctiveness or even exclusiveness in the modal conclusions. He feels perhaps that the distinctions of the modal truths look to an absolutist eye grossly exaggerated. But they are bound together also by the unity of the dialectical principle under which the aspects of a factual situation are investigated and synthesised. *Syādvāda* may be an eclectic synthesis from the point of view of absolutism which demands a 'block' universe or a 'seamless coat' but is not unfaithful to the genius of its own philosophical position which demands a discriminative synthesis which it undoubtedly is. The next charge against *syādvāda*, viz., that it is "a variety of scepticism" or "agnosticism", may now be examined. A sceptical or agnostic philosophy or method is based on "the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable"¹⁹⁹. More particularly agnosticism is an attitude of "knownothingness". Therefore a sceptic is defined as "One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity, doubts the possibility of knowledge of any kind, who holds that there are no adequate grounds for certainty as to the truth of any proposition whatever"²⁰⁰.

It is not possible to see how *syādvāda* could be called sceptical or agnostic while it firmly repudiates any such association and has its genesis, at least partially, in an attempt to fight, as will be presently shown, the agnosticism (*ajñānavāda*) of Sañjaya. According to *syādvāda* each modal truth is valid so far as it goes, and, instead of being annulled, it is supplemented and transfigured, by the other six modal truths, all the seven truths together giving us a full range of the complex truth concerning a particular problem of a fact in reality. Each truth is as it were a single note in the full scale of seven notes which are severally distinctive, in respect of place and function, and, in their totality, interdependent and exhaustive. The aim of *syādvāda* being to achieve such a comprehensive synthesis which includes the specific cognitive manifestations it is not correct

199. *O.E.D.* under "scepticism".

200. *Ibid.* under "sceptic".

to describe the doctrine—either as a theory or as a method—as sceptical or agnostic. Often it is true that a doctrine leads to results contrary to those it intends to achieve. But *syādvāda* seems to be such a one to a superficial observer. Speaking of *anekāntavāda* in general, a writer makes the following statement which is fully applicable to *syādvāda* which is an essential method of *anekāntavāda*. “Unfortunately”, he observes, “it has been a neglected branch of study; it is often misunderstood or half-understood; that is why it is often adversely criticised”.²⁰¹ It is of paramount importance that a philosophical theory or method must be first understood in terms of its own canons or motives before it is subjected to any critical examination by alien criteria. From the exposition of *syādvāda* in the present chapter, as well as from the few remarks specifically made here, in answer to the present charge, one will find, at least in some measure, that the charge of scepticism is not well-founded. Because nowhere do we come across, in the accounts of *syādvāda*, the expression of the attitude of “know-nothingness” or of “the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable”.

In the light of these few observations on the non-sceptical attitude of *syādvāda* we find that Belvalkar gives a rather misleading twist to the nature of the method as a whole by stating the doctrine in such form as he has done.²⁰² As has already been

201. “References to *syādvāda* in the Ardhmāgadhī canon”, *Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, Dec. 1937*, Trivandrum 1940, p. 668.

202. An attempt to assess the historical claims of the different opinions on the development of *syādvāda* and its modes will take us far afield. However, for some information on these opinions, see *SM*; Intro. pp. LXXIV-LXXXVIII; *Syādvādamañjarī* (by Malliṣeṇa, Ed. with Hindi Tr. by Jagadīśacandra, Bombay, 1935) 26-29; *NVVS*, Prastāvanā, pp. 35-50; *AJP*, Vol. II, Intro. pp. CX-CXII; *PrSKU*, pp. LXXXVI-LXXXVIII; A.N. Upadhye's paper on “References to *Syādvāda* in the Ardhmāgadhī Canon”, *Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, Dec. 1937*, Trivandrum, 1940 pp. 669-672, and *The Canonical Literature of the Jainas* (H.R. Kapadia, 1941, Bombay), pp. 218-220.

Whatever might be the value of the opinions as to the nature, the extent and the sources of influence on the development of *syādvāda* and its modes, we may safely assert that, philosophically speaking, *syādvāda* was an inherent necessity in the system of *anekāntavāda*. This fact of its having been an inherent philosophical necessity need not invalidate the equally important fact that *syādvāda* enlarged its range in answer to a varied external demand. No doctrine or method, particularly the latter, can, after all, arise from an

remarked, even historically *syādvāda* arose in an appreciable degree, 'as a happy way leading out of the maze of the *ajñānavāda*' (agnosticism). This is expressed by Jacobi in the following passage : "Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents ? The subtle discussion of the agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the *syādvāda* must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the *ajñānavāda*. It was the weapon with which the agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahāvīra's creed convinced by the truth of *saptabhaṅgīnaya* ?"²⁰³

As regards the third charge, directed by Belvalkar, that *syādvāda* cannot spring from "one and the same philosophical background", and the supplementary charge, directed by Rao, that *syādvāda* itself suffers from "self-contradiction", we may allow the charge to be answered by three of their fellow critics themselves. Answering Rao and Belvalkar in order, of course unwittingly, Radhakrishnan observes : "Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja criticise the *Saptabhaṅgī* view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Rāmānuja he proceeds to say : "The Jains admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and identity in difference. The real comprehends and reconciles difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground"²⁰⁴ Then incidentally dismissing another point of criticism that "the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine is of no practical utility" or "an expression of personal opinion over which we need not linger", the same critic proceeds to answer the specific charge by Belvalkar: "Nor can it be contended"

atmosphere of a philosophical vacuum. The great critical philosophy and the critical method, of Kant, if it could possibly arise at all, would be little more than an idle speculation were it not for the rationalistic dogmatism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz as well as for the empiristic scepticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Any genuine growth in philosophical thinking is thus a story of action and reaction between vital ideas.

203. *JSJ*, Pt. II, Intro. p. XXVIII.

204. *IP*, Vol. I, p. 304.

he observes, “that the *Saptabhāṅgī* doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of the Jaina philosophy. It is a logical corollary of the *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Since reality is ‘multiform’ and ever changing, nothing can be considered to be existing everywhere and at all times and in all ways and places, and it is impossible to pledge ourselves to an inflexible creed”.²⁰⁵ Confirming Radhakrishnan on the second point of criticism, which is the main charge of Belvalkar, Hiriyanā briefly observes: “The thought underlying it (*saptabhāṅgī*) is inherent in the doctrine, although its clear enunciation seems to belong to the present period.” The same opinion is suggestively expressed by R.G. Bhandarkar also.

Incidentally Belvalkar’s misleading interpretation of ‘*anekāntavāda*’ as an ‘indefinite’ doctrine—which in turn means a shifting or evasive doctrine—is corrected by Hiriyanā’s correct description of it : Interpreting ‘*anekānta*’ as meaning ‘indeterminate in nature’ Hiriyanā remarks: “This does not, however, mean that it is altogether indefinite but only that it cannot be defined absolutely. It is this idea that is conveyed by the sevenfold statement as a whole and it expresses the nature of reality in several steps, because no single mode of doing so is adequate to it.”

We gather from a consideration of the present charge, as well as of the other two charges, that the critics advance contrary criticisms even on the same point, as well as from the same viewpoint, viz., monistic absolutism. The irony of the situation is particularly evident in the fact that contradictory arguments are presented on the very issue of alleged contradiction and self-contradiction in *syādvāda*. Among others there seem to be two important reasons underlying the misconceived criticisms of the critics on *syādvāda* : The first is that they do not note an explicit reference in the very definition of *syādvāda* to the important condition that the modal judgments should not be ‘incompatible’ (*avirodha*) not merely with the other modal judgments within the sphere of *syādvāda*, but also with ‘valid knowledge, perceptual, or otherwise’, in the entire sphere of experience. Had this been fully recognised Rao’s criticism on ‘self-contradiction’ would perhaps be not as strong as it is now. Then, ‘the Saviour of all systems’ would be found not ‘committing suicide’ but performing its

205. *Ibid.*, EIP; p. 67.

benevolent mission of saving the absolutisms from their excessive dogmatism.

The second reason is their failure to realise the true significance, place and function of negation in Jaina philosophy, in general, and in *syādvāda* in particular. Since this subject has been dealt with, at several places, it is needless to enlarge upon it any further.

In concluding this chapter it would not be out of place to quote a passage by R.B. Perry which bears a striking resemblance to *syādvāda* in suggesting a procedure which, as in *syādvāda*, is at once a critique on 'vicious intellectualism' (which brings in its train errors like 'exclusive particularity') and a positive programme of dealing with reality. Perry observes "...'vicious intellectualism'²⁰⁶ proceeds as though a conceptual truth about a thing were the exclusive truth about the thing; whereas it is true only so far as it goes. Thus the world may be truly conceived as permanent and unified, since it is such in a certain respect. But this should not lead us, as it has led certain intellectualists, to suppose that the world is therefore not changing and plural. We must not identify our world with one conception of it. In its concrete richness it lends itself to many conceptions. And the same is true of the least thing in the world. It has many aspects, none of which is exhaustive of it. It may be taken in many relations or orders, and be given different names accordingly. As it is immediately presented it contains all these aspects as potentialities for the discriminating and abstracting operations of thought. 'Vicious intellectualism' thus rests on the errors that I have already referred to as 'exclusive particularity' and 'definition by initial predication' : the false supposition that because a thing has one definable character, it cannot also have others and that because it has been named first for one of its aspects, the others must be reduced to it or deduced from it."

Continuing further, he writes : "Now the fault of 'vicious intellectualism' evidently lies in the misuse of concepts, and not in the nature of the concepts themselves. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that the abstractness of single concepts can be compensated for by the addition of further concepts, or by some conceptual system in which the presence and interrelation of many concepts is specially

²⁰⁶. 'Vicious intellectualism' is explained as follows : "To conceive a thing as *a*, and then assume that it is *only a*, is to be 'viciously' intellectual." (p. 234).

provided for. In this case the remedy for the shortcomings of concepts would be more concepts....”

Syādvāda gives, in its own way, such a ‘conceptual system in which the presence and interrelation of many concepts is specially provided for’. Or rather, the ‘concepts’, or to put the matter in terms of *syādvāda*, ‘the modes of truth’ are ‘not merely many truths, but alternative truths’ under the ‘conceptual system’ of *syādvāda*.

Anekānta, Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgi*

NATHMAL TATIA

Anekānta (Non-absolutism)

The real, according to the Jaina philosopher, is a variable constant. It is being and non-being (becoming included), unity and plurality (one and many), the universal and the particular rolled into one. If causal efficiency is the test of reality, the real cannot be an absolute constant, nor can it be an absolute variable. It must be a variable constant.¹ Similarly, absolute being and non-being, incompatible as they are with causal efficiency, cannot characterize reality. If being is the eternal cause-aspect of the real, non-being is its evanescent effect-aspect. The real is a synthesis of infinite potencies (*aneka-Śakti-pracita*) and also continues through change. It is thus unity and plurality or one and many rolled into one. The persisting and pervading nature of an entity is the universal and the ever changing mode the particular. The postulation of such pairs of characteristics by the Jaina philosopher has been responsible for the designation of his philosophy as *anekāntavāda* (theory of manifoldness of truth or non-absolutism). Let us study these pairs in some detail.

Being and Non-being

Being, in its universal aspect, pervades all reals, while in its personal character, it is the negation of that pervasion, that is, non-being.²

* Acharya Bhikshu Commemoration Volume.

1. For a detailed study of the problem of causation in absolutist philosophies, see JPN, pp. 25 seq.
2. Cf. TV, iv. 42 (15), p. 258 (lines 26ff.), where the conditions of 'position' and 'negation' are laid down.

Being, as personal, is the self-existence (that is, existence in respect of its own substance, space, time and mode) of a real and non-being is its non-existence (in respect of an alien substance, space, time and mode) which includes the negation of the modes of infinite past (*pradhvaṃsābhāva* i.e., non-existence after destruction) and of infinite future (*prāgabhāva* i.e., pre-non-existence) as well as absolute negation (*atyantābhāva* e.g., non-existence of colour in air) and infinite numerical differences (*anyonyābhāva* i.e., mutual non-existence or non-existence of identity of things). The denial of this non-existence would make the distinction of one thing from another impossible, and thus rob it of its individuality and determinate character.³ Non-being, therefore, is as much an element in the constitution of a real as being is. Universal being is uncharacterized indeterminate existence or pure affirmation which is the uniting bond of all determinate reals. Personal being is characterized and determinate existence, and is non-being in the sense of other than or distinct from universal being. This personal being is determinate self-existence of self-affirmation as distinct from, that is, as non-existence or negation of other determinates coordinate with it. Being and non-being, existence and non-existence, affirmation and negation, thus are the constituents of a real at every stage.

This analysis of a real is necessitated by an analysis of the nature of any ordinary experience. Our experience is at once positive and negative. A purely positive experience, being altogether incapable of defining its object, is either a case of confusion or an experience tantamount to 'no experience'. The postulation of a purely negative experience also leads to a similar contradiction. Negation means exclusion of a determinate fact from other such facts.⁴ But no such

3. For details see JPN, pp. 31 seq.

4. Cf. "there is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as 'not existing' than in the idea of this same object conceived as 'existing'; for the idea of the object 'not-existing' is necessarily the idea of the object 'existing' with, in addition, the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block." Bergson: *Creative Evolution* (London, 1954), p. 302. Although the Jaina philosopher does not agree with Bergson in regarding negation as a pseudo-idea and a mere species of affirmation, he is in perfect agreement with him in regarding negation as an exclusion of the negatum by positive facts other than it (viz. negatum) and to that extent as sharing the nature of an affirmation. He also does not agree with Bergson in admitting affirmation as 'a complete act of the mind' and negation but the half of an intellectual act, or which the other half is understood, or rather put off to an indefinite future? (Ibid., p. 303). For him each is equally incomplete without the other.

function can be fulfilled by a purely negative experience, as it does not claim any determinate fact as its object. This is obviously a contradiction.⁵ This positive-cum-negative character of experience is a proof direct of its object as a synthesis of being and non-being, existence and non-existence, as explained above. This is also corroborated by the fact that the affirmative propositions become fully significant only when supplemented by the correlative negative propositions and vice versa. Neither the affirmative nor the negative proposition, taken by itself, is capable of giving the intended sense in its fulness.

Here the problem of the relation between the real and its characteristics and between the characteristics themselves crops up. For the sake of convenience, the real may be called a 'substantive' and its characteristic an 'adjective'. What then is the relation between a substantive and its adjective, and also between one adjective and another belonging to the same substantive? The relation cannot be absolute identity, for then the two terms would merge into absolute unity, that is, the relation would annihilate itself. Nor can it be absolute difference, for this would leave the terms unrelated and the relation would be equivalent to 'no relation'. The Jaina philosopher seeks to solve the difficulty by postulating a peculiar kind of relation called 'identity-cum-difference' which is neither absolute identity, nor absolute difference, nor an artificial conjunction of the two, but a new type which is *sui-generis* (*jātyantarātmaka*).⁶ Accordingly, the real also as conceived by him, is neither absolute being, nor absolute non-being, nor an artificial synthesis of the two, but 'a focal unity of being and non-being, which cannot be reached by logical thought'—a unity which is 'immanent in the elements, but at the same time transcends them in that it is not analysable into elements'.⁷ This estimate of relation does not allow the terms to merge, nor to fall apart. The substantive owns its adjectives on account of its identity with them, and the adjectives preserve their individuality on account of their difference from the substantive. The adjectives do not fall apart on account of their identity with the substantive, and the substantive does not lose itself in its adjective on account of its difference from them.

The *Vaiśeṣika* philosopher has levelled the charge of truism

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5. न प्रमाणेनविधिमात्रमेव परिच्छिद्यते परव्यावृत्तिमनादधानस्य तस्य प्रवृत्तेः सांकर्यप्रसंगाद् अप्रतिपत्ति-समानताप्रसंगो वा । न प्रतिषेधमात्रं, विधिपरिच्छिन्दानस्य इदम् अस्माद् व्यावृत्तं इति ग्रहीतुम्—अशक्तेः SKh, IX, pp. 163-4.
6. See AJP, p. 65.
7. See JPN, pp. 114 and 115.

(siddhasādhyatā) against the doctrine of existence in respect of one's own nature and non-existence in respect of an alien nature and the charges of triviality and insignificance also follow from it. But the above evaluation of the nature of relation, implied by the doctrine, should be considered sufficient for the refutation of these charges. For the *Vaiśeṣika* philosopher, the relation of identity-cum-difference is quite novel, and the light that it throws on the nature of the real is quite momentous and significant.⁸ The real cannot be, as already shown, either absolute being-or absolute non-being. Here by 'absolute being' we understand what is eternal, positive and absolutely unamenable to change, and by 'absolute non-being' what is absolutely negative and devoid of all characterization. These are respectively the postulates of the Vedāntic monist and the Buddhist nihillist. Similarly, the real cannot be either 'pure being' or 'pure non-being'—the expression 'pure being' standing for 'being without becoming' or 'continuant without change' (change in the sense of real creative change and not mere actualization of the potential), and 'pure non-being' standing for 'becoming without being' or 'change without continuant'. These may respectively be regarded as the postulates of the *sāṃkhya* evolutionist and the Buddhist fluxist. The Jaina philosopher believes in being tolerant of non-being, and non-being tolerant of being.⁹ For him, in other words, being and becoming are informed with each other and go *pari passu*, one without the other is impossible.

Unity and Plurality or One and Many

From the above analysis of the real into being and becoming, it follows that it is also unity and plurality, or one and many. If the real as being is self-identical unity, i.e., one, the real as becoming is plurality, i.e., many. A positive entity (*bhāva*)—e.g., the self—is *ipso facto* plural, unlike negation (अभाव) which, being homogeneous, does not brook distinction or plurality within itself, and at least six distinct stages—*viz.* origination, continuity, transformation, growth, decay and lapse—can be distinguished in its process.¹⁰ Plurality, in fact, is plurality of aspects, and the multitude of concepts and the corresponding linguistic expressions, related to a single fact, is a proof

8. See AJP, pp. 90 Seq.

9. For the Jaina philosopher's arguments proving the absence of contradiction between being and non-being, vide *infra*.

10. TV, iv. 42 (4)

11. TV, iv. 42 (5)

of the reality of these aspects.¹¹ The unitary real ought to be regarded as plural also on account of its being an integration of numerous energies¹². Its temporal continuity and ever emerging novelty also argue its manifold character. "Strictly speaking," as has been observed by Professor Mookerjee, "a thing is neither an absolute unity nor split up into an irreconcilable plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time. There is no opposition between unity of being and plurality of aspects. The opposition would have been inevitable if the unity of a real varied with each aspect. But the varying aspects are affirmed of the self-identical subject and this proves that the unity is not affected by such predication. A thing is one and many at the same time—a unity and a plurality rolled into one."¹³

The Universal and the Particular

Reals are universals and particulars synthesized into one. The universal is the unitive bond running through the particulars and the Jaina philosopher has recognized two kinds of it, viz. the vertical universal and the horizontal universal. The self-identity of the real, running through its temporal process, is the vertical, and the bond that unites one real with others in space is the horizontal universal. Almost all later Jaina logicians however, under the influence of the Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti and others, have identified the horizontal universal with similarity which they regard as a quality different in different individuals. The disastrous consequences of this reassessment of the nature of a universal have been thoroughly examined by Professor Mookerjee in his celebrated work, 'The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism' and an impartial student of philosophy cannot but agree with his findings. We should stick to the original (earlier) Jaina position and should not accept an interpretation as faithful if it goes against the fundamental postulates of non-absolutism. Let us now study in brief the grounds for the admission of real as a unity of the universal and the particular.

A 'jar as jar' cannot be distinguished from another 'jar as jar' and this incapacity of thought to distinguish the two argues their identity in respect of the characteristic of jarhood. Although the two jars are separate in respect of their separate substantial, spatial, temporal and modal determinations, their identity *qua* jar cannot be got rid of. Identity, in the ultimate analysis, is an identity of characteristics

12. TV, iv. 42 (6)

13. JPN. pp. 29-30.

belonging to different entities. What cannot be distinguished in any particular respect must be accepted as identical in that respect. The 'colour as colour' of a coloured thing cannot be distinguished from 'colour as colour' of another coloured thing, and therefore the two colours must be regarded as identical, though they belong to two separate things and may also be two different colours, say red and green. Thus 'red' and 'green' are identical as colour and different as specific determinations of it.¹⁴ Mere spatial separateness of two entities does not prove numerical difference of their characteristics. There can be spatial separateness without numerical difference, e.g., between two distant parts of a patch of colour, and similarly there can be numerical difference without spatial separateness, e.g., between the colour and shape of the selfsame object. Thus there is nothing repugnant in admitting the relation of identity-cum-difference in respect of characteristics between any one entity and another. Neither identity without difference, nor difference without identity is possible. Now as the identity presupposes the universal and the difference the particular, the real is a synthesis of the two. In other words, the real is a 'concrete universal.' "Things are," observes Professor Mookerjee, "neither exclusively particulars, nor are they exclusively universals, but they are a concrete realization of both. The two elements can be distinguished by reflective thought, but cannot be rent asunder."¹⁵

This analysis of a real into universal and particular is significant in that it gives a penetrating vision of the interrelatedness of reals and their uniting bond. It should be understood that the two elements do not exhaust the real, but are mere indicators of the comprehensive and transcendent nature of it. "A real", again to quote Professor Mookerjee, "is neither a particular nor a universal in an exclusive manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold. A real is *sui generis*."¹⁶

We have now seen how the pairs of characteristics—viz. being and non-being, unity and plurality or one and many, the universal and the particular—unfold the nature of a real as a microcosm and

14. W. E. Johnson has proposed to call such comparatively indeterminate characteristics as colour and shape determinables in relation to such specific characteristics as red and circular which he calls determinates.—See his *Logic*, Part. I (Cambridge. 1921), p. 174.

15. JPN, p. 6.

16. JPN, p. 13

macrocosm in one. The Jaina philosopher's dual points of view (*nayas*)—viz. synthetic and analytic—also point to the same truth.¹⁷ The entire corpus of Jaina metaphysical literature is inspired by this dual approach, though the far-reaching implications of it are not always visualized, not unfolded in the light of the needs of ever progressing thought. The characteristics of being-cum-non-being, unity-cum-plurality, universal-cum-particular are certainly repugnant to the abstract ways of our logical thought and understanding, but none the less they are verdicts of plain experience and as such true measures of reality. The whole truth may not be understood, but there is no reason why we should be dissuaded from pursuing the way shown by our plain experience and capturing whatever vision the pursuit may provide. In this connection, the following remarks of Bradley regarding the knowledge of unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance are worth remembering. "Our complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail is no good ground for our declining to entertain it. Such a ground would be irrational, and its principle could hardly everywhere be adhered to. But if we can realize at all the general features of the Absolute, if we can see that somehow they come together in a way known vaguely and in the abstract, our result is certain."¹⁸

Syādvāda (Relativism)

A real, as shown, has pairs of characteristics which oppose (negate) each other, and we have also seen how this opposition is resolved in the uniqueness of the real. In order to exhibit the internal harmony of these apparently opposed characteristics and also to attain logical and linguistic precision, the Jaina philosopher has proposed to prefix the restrictive expression *syāt* (which means 'in some respect' or 'with reference to a particular aspect or context') to those propositions which have such conflicting characteristics as predicates. The expression *syāt* moreover brings out the relative validity of the predication and is thus a corrective against the absolutist ways of thought and evaluation of reality.¹⁹ And the practical application of non-absolutism which necessitates the invention of this linguistic tool for logical precision is known as *syādvāda* (relativism). To illustrate this application by a concrete example, let us take the eternal-cum-evanescent nature of the real. A real is eternal in respect of its substance (*dravya*) and evanescent

17. JPN, pp. 301 and 309.

18. *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 141-2.

19. Vide JPN, p. 132.

in respect of its modes (*pariyāya*). In other words, the characteristics of eternity and evanescence are to be predicated of the selfsame real with reference to its two different aspects, viz. the substantial and the modal. The real *qua* subject of a proposition, at every stage of its analysis, is found to be a unity of two 'opposite' elements and as the predicated characteristic can refer to only one of those two elements, it must be held to be true of only that element and by this very fact untrue of the other.²⁰ The predication is thus found to be only relatively true.²¹

20. Cf. "There is only one way to get rid of contradiction, and that way is by dissolution. Instead of one subject distracted, we get a larger subject with distinctions, and so the tension is removed. We have at first A, which possesses the qualities c, and b, inconsistent adjectives which collide; and we go on to produce harmony by making a distinction within this subject. That was really not mere A, but either a complex within A, or (rather here) a wider whole in which A is included. The real subject is A+D; and this subject contains the contradiction made harmless by division, since A is c and D is b. This is the general principle, and I will attempt here to apply it in particular. Let us suppose the reality to be X (a b c d e f g.....), and that we are able only to get partial views of this reality. Let us first take such a view of 'X (a b) is b'. This (rightly or wrongly) we should probably call a true view. For the content b does plainly belong to the subject; and, further, the appearance also—in other words, the separation of b in the predicate—can partly be explained. For, answering to this separation, we postulate now *another* adjective in the subject; let us call it β. The 'thatness', the psychical existence of the predicate, which at first was neglected, has now also itself been included in the subject. We may hence write the subject as X (a b β); and in this way we seem to avoid contradiction. Let us go further on the same line, and, having dealt with a truth, pass next to an error. Take the subject once more an X (a b c d e.....), and let us now say 'X (a b) is d'. This is false, because d is not present in the subject, and so we have a collision. But the collision is resolved if we take the subject, not as mere X (a b), but more widely as X (a b c d). In this case the predicate d becomes applicable. Thus the error consisted in the reference of d to a b; as it might have consisted in like manner in the reference of a b to c, or again of c to d. All of these exist in the subject, and the reality possesses with each both its 'what' and its 'that'. But not content with a provisional separation of these indissoluble aspects, not satisfied (as in true appearance) to have a α, β, and d δ—forms which may typify distinctions that bring no discord into the qualities—we have gone on further into error. We have not only loosened 'what' from 'that', and so have made appearance; but we in each case then bestowed the 'what' on a wrong quality within the real subject. We have crossed the threads of the connexion between our 'whats' and our 'thats'; and have thus caused collision, a collision which disappears when things are taken as whole."—*Appearance and Reality* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 170-1.

21. Cf. "We found that some knowledge was absolute, and that, in contrast with this, all finite truth was but conditional. But when we examine it more closely, this difference seems hard to maintain. For how can truth be true absolutely, if there remains a gulf between itself and reality? Now in any truth about Reality the word 'about' is too significant. There remains always something outside, and other than,

Relativism and Laws of Thought

Let us now see if this relativism of predication has any bearing on the traditional Laws of Thought, which, to be significant, must, besides being true measures of reality, formulate principles of valid predication.

The Law of Identity is the simplest of all possible laws of judgments and must, to be significant, set forth their minimum conditions, viz. meaning and truth. A judgment which has no meaning is no judgment, and a judgment whose truth cannot be ascertained is an idle gibberish.

In its bare form 'A is A', the law does not possess any significance and is apparently nothing more than tautology. If, however, it is taken to express the mere identity of the subject and the predicate, it goes only half way towards the acquisition of meaning, because it leaves out the difference without which the identity is unmeaning. In order, therefore, to invest the form 'A is A' with full meaning and truth, we should interpret the predicate A as a characteristic 'a' which is true of a part of the subject A. We now have the form 'A (a b...) is a' which is *meaningful*, because it exhibits in full the identity-cum-difference between the subject and the predicate, and also *true*, because the predicate belongs to the subject. In the language of the Jaina philosopher, the above form can be expressed as 'In one particular aspect, A is a'. The Law of Identity thus becomes significant if interpreted in the light of Syādvāda.

Here one important fact about judgment or proposition²² should be clearly understood. A proposition which is once true is always true. Certain logicians have denied this dictum, and their denial appears to be due to, in the words of Mr Johnson, "a confusion between the time of which an assertion is made, and the time to

the predicate. And, because of this which is outside, the predicate, in the end, may be called conditional. In brief, the difference between subject and predicate, a difference essential to truth, is not accounted for. It depends on something not included within the judgment itself, an element outlying and, therefore, in a sense unknown. The type and the essence, in other words, can never reach the reality. The essence realized, we may say, is too much to be truth, and unrealized and abstract, it is assuredly too little to be real. Even absolute truth in the end seems thus to turn out erroneous."—*Ibid.*, p. 482.

22. We agree with W. E. Johnson (*Logic*, Part I, p.1) in regarding a proposition as 'that of which truth and falsity can be significantly predicated' and also in refuting the view that the proposition is the verbal expression of the judgment as an error.

which an assertion refers; or as Mr Bosanquet has neatly put it—‘between the time *of* predication and the time *in* predication’.²³ Thus taking as example the proposition ‘The mango is green,’ we must say on the one hand that if the proposition is true at any time, it is true at all times; but on the other we must not say that if the predicate ‘being green’ is true of a given subject at one time, it will be true at all times. The time *of* predication, i.e., the time at which the judgment is made, is, relatively to the content of the judgment, a mere accident. The time *in* predication is the relation of the predicated characteristic to the subject. ‘Green,’ in the above example, is true of ‘mango’ at only a particular moment or duration of time of the latter’s existence, and thus the time here is an essential constituent of the subject of the judgment. With the change of this temporal context of the subject, the truth of the predicate may change. But this change has no effect on the time of judgment and hence also on its truth. The problem however concerns the nature of propositions in general and not the Laws of Thought in particular. We understand the laws as laws of truth or falsity of predicates only, and not, as some modern logicians have done in order to avoid the difficulties, as laws of the truth or falsity of propositions.

The Law of Identity is also formulated as ‘whatever is, is’, which may ontologically be interpreted to lay stress on the static character of things. But nothing, as shown, is static according to the Jaina philosopher, and so the formula is not acceptable to him.²⁴ The Vedantist would have no objection against this interpretation of the law, because he believes in reality as static.

The Law of Contradiction is symbolically expressed as ‘A is not both A and not-A’, and may be regarded as only the complement of the Law of Identity. It supplies something without which the Law of Identity is not logically complete or distinctly intelligible. If A is A, A cannot be not-A. In other words, ‘nothing can both be and not be.’

The Jaina philosopher has shown being and non-being as simultaneously true of a real and hence we cannot agree to the above interpretation of the law. Absolute being and absolute non-being are certainly exclusive of each other. But this is not the case with concrete being which alone is real according to the Jaina philosopher. Concrete

23. Johnson : *Logic*, Part I, p. 235. Also Bosanquet : *Logic* (2nd Edition), Vol. I, p. 203.

24. See JPN, pp. 8 Seq.

being is being tolerant of non-being. Absolute being and absolute non-being are only figments of abstract logic.

The field of application of the Law of Contradiction, therefore, should be ascertained by the observation of concrete cases in the real world. Characteristics which cannot exist together simultaneously are contradictorily opposed, and the law can be usefully applied to the cases of such characteristics. Thus a patch of colour cannot be red and green at the same time and hence red and green can be accepted as contradictorily opposed. But a variegated linen showing patches of different colours can be red and green at the same time (though of course in different parts), and the Jaina philosopher, unlike the Vedantist and the Buddhist absolutists, does not find any contradiction in this. Our experience is thus the sole determinant of contradiction and no abstract logical formulas can give an insight into the nature of the concrete things of the world.

The Law of Excluded Middle is symbolically represented as 'A is either B or not-B'. Interpreted in the plain sense, this law means that the negation of any predicate is an absolute alternative to it, that is, if one is false the other must be true. This means that falsehood can establish truth. But this discovery of truth is vague and practically useless, because one of the terms, viz. not-B, is indeterminate and absolutely incapable of giving a determinate fact which alone makes the predicate significant. This is a defect which makes the law trivial and insignificant.

The Laws of Thought are thus found to be vitiated by serious defects—all of which are primarily due to their aprioristic foundations. By the idealist philosophers the laws were used for the refutation of the positions of the realists who could never be convinced of the validity of these laws as instruments of the discovery of truth. "The difference between the realist and the idealist," in the words of Professor Mookerjee, "hinges upon this fundamental difference of view of the validity of the Laws of Thought—whether they are known empirically or *a priori*. It seems that the difference between them is irreconcilable, being more or less bound up with the innate difference of our predispositions and tendencies from self to self. The result is an uncompromising antagonism between our respective outlook and attitude."²⁵

25. JPN. pp. 15-6.

Opposition

The fountain-head of all this logical controversy is the estimation of the relation between being and non-being. The formulations of the Laws of Thought are inspired by the belief that there is innate opposition between being and non-being—an opposition which is absolutely incapable of dissolution. But the Jaina philosopher is unable to appreciate the *raison d'être* of this belief. Opposition (*virodha*), according to him, is exhausted by the following three types of relation, none of which can be shown to obtain between being and non-being.²⁶

The first type of oppositional relation is represented by the relation of destruction, which obtains between the destroyable and the destroyer, e.g., between snake and mongoose, or fire and water. The destruction in such cases is possible only when two coexistent positive facts come together into collision and the one overpowers the other. There is not such relation of destruction between being and non-being, as the two, according to the opponent himself, do not coexist in a common substratum even for a moment. If, however, the two are admitted to coexist in a common substratum, none would destroy the other, because both are equally powerful on account of their independent and equally powerful origin.

The second type is represented by the relation of non-coexistence, which obtains between characteristics originating at different moments of time; e.g., between greenness and yellowness of the selfsame mango at different moments of its existence. Yellowness in this context can only succeed greenness and can never coexist with it. This type of opposition also does not hold good between being and non-being. The characteristic of non-being cannot succeed the characteristic of 'being' in the same sense as yellowness succeeds greenness. Non-being cannot inherit the locus of being, because the locus of being has ceased to exist along with the cessation of being. And non-being without a locus is as understandable as square-circle. The logical difficulties of pure being and pure non-being have already been discussed.²⁷

The third type of oppositional relation is represented by the relation of obstruction, which obtains between the obstructed and the obstructor (*pratibandhya-pratibandhaka*); e.g., the conjunction of a fruit with its stalk obstructs the gravitation of the fruit towards

26. TV, iv. 42 (18).

27. Vide supra.

the earth. This type of opposition also is not possible between being and non-being. Being is not an obstructor of non-being, because the existence of being does not obstruct the existence of non-being. We have already seen how the object of our experience is a synthesis of being and non-being.²⁸

None of these three types of opposition can be discovered by pure thought unaided by empirical knowledge. The destructive opposition is observed when two positive facts actually collide, the opposition of non-coexistence is witnessed when one fact vanishes in advance in order to give place to another fact, and the obstructive opposition is admitted when one fact is found to resist the occurrence of another. We cannot admit any collision between being and non-being, as one of the terms, viz. non-being, is not a positive fact. Nor do they exhibit the opposition of non-existence, because neither being nor non-being can be conceived as vanishing in order respectively to give place to non-being and being. The obstructive opposition also does not obtain between being and non-being, because none of the two can obstruct the occurrence of the other. The opposition between being and non-being thus cannot be illustrated by any empirical example. In fact, pure being and pure non-being are themselves only imaginary creatures and consequently the question of their mutual opposition should not arise at all. Determinate being and determinate non-being alone are true. Such being and non-being are only two diverse characteristics synthesized into the unity of the real. There is not any kind of opposition between them, as there is none between the colour and the shape of the same thing. Opposition or contradiction, in fact, arises when there is mere conjunction and no real synthesis. Characteristics are not contradictory because they are diverse, for the real holds diversity in unity. "Contradictions exist", says Bradley, "so far only as internal distinction seems impossible, only so far as diversities are attached to one unyielding point assumed, tacitly or expressly, to be incapable of internal diversity or external complement. But any such fixture is abstraction, useful perhaps, but in the end appearance. And thus, where we find contradiction, there is something limited and untrue which invites us to transcend it."²⁹

28. Vide supra.

29. Appearance and Reality, p. 505.

Saptabhaṅgī (The Doctrine of Seven Ways of Predication or Seven Modes of Truth)

The Saptabhaṅgī (the doctrine of seven ways of predication or the seven modes of truth) is the logical consummation of the doctrines of non-absolutism and relativism described above. We have seen how a real is characterized by pairs of characteristics which are 'opposed' to each other. Now if we take any one of these pairs—say the pair of the characteristics, viz., existence and non-existence (being and non-being)³⁰—and examine the nature of the real, revealed by these characteristics as predicates, we find that there are just seven, neither more nor less, ways in which the characteristics can be predicated of the real, each way of predication revealing a new mode of truth. We have seen³¹ how a real is 'a focal unity of being and non-being (or existence and non-existence) which cannot be reached by logical thought'. Now as this unity transcends the reach of logical thought, it is also, for the purpose of predication, beyond the range of speech. In other words, a real is inexpressible or unspeakable (or indefinite from the standpoint of formal logic).³² We thus get a third characteristic, viz., inexpressibility (which, as shown, stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence), besides the two, viz., existence and non-existence. These are three quite independent characteristics. Now as the total number of combinations of three things taken one, two or three at a time is seven, the total number of predicates that can be constituted by various combinations of the three characteristics is also seven. These seven predicates are—(1) existence (2) non-existence, (3) existence and non-existence, (4) inexpressibility,³³ (5) existence and inexpressibility, (6) non-existence and inexpressibility and (7) existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. There cannot be any eighth combination without repeating the same characteristic twice.

30. The Jaina philosopher does not distinguish between being and existence, which are always concrete.

31. Vide supra.

32. Vide JPN, p. 115.

33. This fourth predicate is sometimes given as the third, and in that case the third is given as the fourth. See TV, IV. 42(15). In fact, the oldest source of these predicates, viz., the Bhagawatsūtra (X 11.10.469) assigns to it the third place and this is also the demand of the logic behind the dialectic of sevenfold predication. For the order followed by us, see TV, I 6(5). Both these orders of enumeration are followed by the Jaina logicians without discrimination. See also the note on this point by Professor Dalsukh Malvaniya in his Introduction (pp. 40 ff.) to his edition of the Nyāyavātaravartika Vṛtti of Śāntisūri (Singhi Jain Series, XX).

What is now to be examined is whether each of these seven predicates reveals a new mode of truth. This can be best done by examining the import of the seven predicates together with the significance of the propositions embodying them.

Import of the Seven Predicates

The first predicate is 'existence' which means 'existence in a specific context', that is, determinate existence. A jar certainly exists in its own context. (*Syādistighaṭaḥ*). It has its own substance, space, time, and mode. In one word, it has a determinate (personal) being. The determinate existence rebutes the possibility of absolute being and absolute non-being. This point has already been elaborated³⁴ and needs no repetition. The significance of the proposition follows from the unique import of the predicate.

It is however to be understood that none of the seven predicates denies the other predicates. Each predicate on the other hand implies the other six as equally important and true characteristics of the real. This implication is expressed by the word *syāt*³⁵ prefixed to every proposition, e.g., in *Syādistyevaghaṭaḥ* which means 'The jar certainly exists in its own context.' This should be carefully noticed in our exposition of the import of the predicates. The implication of *eva* (certainly) in the above proposition is the exclusion of the negation of 'existence.'

The second predicate is 'non-existence' which means 'non-existence in a specific context', that is, determinate non-existence. The jar certainly does not exist in another context (*syānnāstyevaghaṭaḥ*). This determinate non-existence rebutes the possibility of absolute non-being and absolute being.

The first predicate is concomitant with the second and the second is concomitant with the first. And this is the reason why both can belong to the same subject without conflict and opposition.

The third predicate is 'existence and non-existence' which means consecutive togetherness of existence and non-existence, that is, distinguishable compresence of the two. The jar exists and does not exist respectively in its own context and in a different context (*syādistica nāsticaghaṭaḥ*). This predicate gives a richer glimpse of the real than that provided by the first and the second. It is not however a mere combination of the two, but presents a complex character of the real—a

34. Vide Supra.

35. For further implications of *स्यात्*, vide Supra.

character which reveals the equipollence of existence and non-existence in the constitution of the real.

The fourth predicate is 'inexpressibility' which stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence. The jar is certainly inexpressible as having both existence and non-existence as its characteristics at the same time (*syad avaktavya eva ghaṭaḥ*). The third predicate revealed the equipollence of existence and non-existence. But this fourth goes further and gives a glimpse of the real as a unique synthesis of existence and non-existence—a synthesis which transcends the equipollence of existence and non-existence by dissolving them into a unity. This character of a real cannot be grasped by a definite concept and so is not expressible by a definite linguistic symbol which can express only what is positive or negative but never what is 'positive and negative rolled into one'.

This inexpressible or the unspeakable, that is, the indefinite is a peculiar concept of Jaina philosophy. In the words of Professor K.C. Bhattacharya, "The given indefinite—the 'unspeakable' of *avaktavya* as it has been called—as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than (the) 'consecutive togetherness' (expressed by the third predicate): it implies *sahārpaṇa* or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. It is objective as given : it cannot be said to be *not* a particular position (expressed by the first predicate) nor to be non-existent (expressed by the second predicate). At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence (expressed by the third predicate 'existence and non-existence')³⁶; it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood."³⁷

One formal difficulty about the term 'inexpressible' requires elucidation. In the third predicate—viz., existence and non-existence—the two characteristics are presented consecutively, while in the

36. This 'non-existence', according to Professor K.C. Bhattacharya, is 'universal existence'. Cf. JTA, p. 342, where he describes the second predicate as 'negation or universal existence'; cf. also, p. 341, where he says "...a determinate existence A is in one respect and is *not* in another respect. This does not simply mean that A is A and is not B : it means that existent A, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity."

37. JTA, pp. 341-2, The bracketed portions are ours.

fourth the *semāe* two are presented simultaneously (*sahārṣita*).³⁸ No difficulty is felt in conceiving two diverse characteristics consecutively. But if the same two are to be conceived at once as one concept, the difficulty arises, because the elements of existence and non-existence that are brought together to compose the concept are driven away as fast as we assemble them. This conceptual difficulty is reflected in the incapacity of language to express the two diverse characteristics at once. But this inexpressibility should not be taken to imply the unreality of the co-presented characteristics. Inexpressibility here means mere impossibility of any adequate verbal symbol to express the situation at once. It cannot imply the unearlity of the co-presentation of existence and non-existence. Inexpressibility does not prove unreality because expressibility is not the sole criterion of reality.³⁹ An *ad hoc* symbol also cannot express the situation, because that would also generate its corresponding concepts consecutively.⁴⁰ A compound word or even a full proposition also is of no avail on account of the same difficulty. It is because of this complete paralysis of speech to express at once their unique nature that the co-presented characteristics are called 'inexpressible'. 'Inexpressible' thus is a negative term which simply means 'not expressible in language' and nothing more.⁴¹ The proposition 'The jar is inexpressible', therefore, means 'The jar has a complex characteristic which is not expressible in language.' Vidyanandi has recorded a view which regarded the 'complex characteristic' as expressible at least by the term 'inexpressible' itself. But he rejects the view on the ground that if the term 'inexpressible' be admitted as capable of expressing the 'complex characteristic', any other word could be invested with that capacity by mere convention—a contingency which leads to self-contradiction in that it refutes the position that the 'complex characteristic' is inexpressible.⁴² The purely negative interpretation of the term 'inexpressible' however

38. Vide AM, 16; TSV, I.6 (verses 50-1). SBT, p. 60.

39. For detailed arguments see TSV. p. 140 ? कथं अवक्तव्यो जीवादिः... सत्माननिबन्धनत्वाभावाद् वाच्यतायाः .

40. सांकेतिकमेकपदं तद् अभिवातुं समर्थमित्यपि न सत्यं तस्यापि क्रमेणार्थद्वय-प्रत्यायने सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः—Ibid., p. 140.

41. वक्तव्यत्वाभावस्यैव एकस्य धर्मस्याऽवक्तव्यपदेन प्रत्यायनात्—Ibid., p. 141.

See JPN, pp. 122-3, where this view is ascribed to विमलदास, the author of SBT (pp. 69-70). But SBT has only reproduced TSV.

42. तच्च न सर्वथैवावक्तव्यमेव....सांकेतिकपदान्तरादिव विशेषाभावात्—Ibid., pp. 140-1. I have given only the central theme of the arguments.

raises a serious difficulty. It has been asserted by the great Jaina logician Samantabhadra that *if things were absolutely incapable of being expressed, the affirmation of the predicate 'inexpressible' would be illogical*.⁴³ This is in direct conflict with the negative interpretation. But Vidyānandi solves the problem by interpreting this assertion of Samantabhadra as follows: "*If things, that is, reals as characterized by individual characteristics (like existence and non-existence taken one at a time) as well as the reals as characterized by complex characteristics taken simultaneously (as in the fourth predicate) were all alike (admitted to be) absolutely incapable of being expressed, the affirmation of the predicate 'inexpressible' of any real would be illogical, because the real (as admitted) is characterized by the absence of expressibility, that is, is incapable of being expressed even by the term inexpressible*." The implication of this interpretation is that though expressibility is absolutely negated of the fourth predicate, it is affirmed of the other predicates which take one characteristic at a time. The absolute negation of expressibility thus also does not violate the general principle of the Jaina philosopher that any significant affirmation is concomitant with negation, and any significant negation is concomitant with affirmation.⁴⁴ A real is inexpressible in respect of the fourth predicate and expressible in respect of the other individual predicates. Expressibility and negation of expressibility are thus to be understood in different contexts. 'Admission of expressibility' and 'negation of expressibility' in respect of the same aspect of the real is on a par with the admission of 'existence' and 'non-existence' in the same respect, which is a case of self-contradiction.⁴⁵

The fifth predicate is 'existence and inexpressibility', that is, 'inexpressibility as qualified by existence (which was the first predicate)'. The jar exists (in its own context) and is inexpressible (*syādasti cāvaktavyaśca ghataḥ*). The proposition asserts the compresence of 'existence' with the 'inexpressible'. The jar is inexpressible (indefinite) *qua* a synthetic unity of existence and non-existence, but it is none the less expressible (definite) *qua* existent. In other words, the 'indefinite' as affirming itself is a 'positive definite'. Otherwise, the indefinite would turn out to be an absolute

43. अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्ना वाच्यमिति युज्यते—AM, 32.

44. अस्तित्वं प्रतिबध्येनाऽविनाभाव्यैकधर्मिणि ।

नास्तित्वं प्रतिबध्येनाऽविनाभाव्यैकधर्मिणि ।—AM, 17-18. For elucidation, see JPN p. 152.

45. TVS, p. 141 : कथमिदानीम् "अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते" इति उक्तं घटते...सर्वत्र स्याद्वादन्वयाय-विद्वेषितापत्ते । Also see JPN, pp. 123-4, and SBT, pp. 70-1.

affirmation. This fifth predicate is therefore significant in that it reveals the positive aspect of the fourth predicate.

The sixth predicate is 'non-existence and inexpressibility', that is, 'inexpressibility as qualified by non-existence (which was the second predicate)'. The jar does not exist (in other than its own context) and is inexpressible (*syānnāsti cāvaktavyaśca ghataḥ*). The proposition asserts the compresence of non-existence with the inexpressible. The jar is inexpressible (indefinite) *qua* a synthetic unity of existence and non-existence, but it is none the less expressible (definite) *qua* a non-existent. In other words, the 'indefinite' as negating what is other than itself is a 'negative definite'. Otherwise, the indefinite would turn out to be an absolute negation. This sixth predicate is, therefore, significant in that it reveals the negative aspect of the fourth predicate.

The seventh predicate is 'existence, non-existence and inexpressibility', that is, 'inexpressibility as qualified by existence-and-non-existence (which is the third predicate)'. The jar exists (in its own context) and does not exist (in other than its own context) and is inexpressible (*syādasti ca nāsticāvaktavyaśca ghataḥ*). The proposition asserts the consecutive presence of existence and non-existence with the inexpressible. The jar is inexpressible (indefinite) *qua* a synthetic unity of existence and non-existence, but it is none the less expressible (definite) *qua* existent and non-existent consecutively. In other words, the 'indefinite' as consecutive affirmation and negation is both a positive and a negative definite. This seventh predicate is significant in that it reveals the double character of the indefinite.

The Seven Predicates as Seven Exhaustive and Unique Modes of Truth

The Seven Predicates are Exhaustive.

We have now explained the import and significance of the seven predicates. We have also seen how the number 'seven' is derived by different combinations of the three predicates, viz., existence, non-existence and inexpressibility, and also that no further combination is possible without repeating the same predicate twice. Of the seven predicates, the first and second are simple, the fourth is complex, and the remaining four are compounds constituted by all possible combinations of the first, second and fourth taken two or three at a time. Now if it could be proved that the first, second and fourth predicates—viz., existence, non-existence and

inexpressibility—exhaust all possible elemental⁴⁶ predicates of a real, the conclusion would naturally follow that there are exactly seven, neither more nor less, predicates which can characterize a real in respect of the pair consisting of the characteristics of existence and non-existence. It should, however, be clearly understood in this connection that the seven predicates considered above merely exemplify the patterns which would be followed also by other heptads of predicates constituted by pairs of characteristics like permanence and impermanence, oneness and maniness, and so on. We should also here note that 'expressibility' cannot be regarded as an additional predicate, because the very act of affirmation or negation of a predicate implies it. 'Expressibility' together with its opposite 'inexpressibility' can, however, give rise to another heptad of predicates after the pattern illustrated by 'existence' and 'non-existence'.

To come to the main problem, let us see whether the triad—e.g. existence, non-existence and inexpressibility—exhausts all possible elemental predicates of a real. And for this purpose let us analyse the nature of our cognition.

Our simplest cognition or judgment exhibits two factors, viz., subject and a predicate, that is, a substantive and an adjective qualifying it. The substantive is the determinandum and the adjective is the determinans.⁴⁷ Thus the judgment 'This is jar' may be rendered as 'a particular real manifests the character (indicated by the adjectival import of the word) jar'.⁴⁸ Akalāṅka, in his

46. By 'elemental', we mean 'unitary'. The fourth predicate which is a 'complex' is also considered 'unitary' because it stands for the synthetic unity of the real.

47. These terms are borrowed from W.E. Johnson who defines them as follows: "We find that in every proposition we are determining *in* thought the character of an object presented *to* thought to be thus determined. In the most fundamental sense, then, we may speak of a determinandum and determinans: the determinandum is defined as what is presented *to be* determined or characterised by thought or cognition; the determinans as what *does* characterise or determine in thought that which is given to be determined. We shall regard the substantive (used in its widest grammatical sense) as the determinandum, and the adjective as the determinans."—*Logic* part I, (Cambridge, 1921), p. 9.

48. I am indebted to W.E. Johnson for this rendering of the judgment. The passage which has suggested the rendering is as follows: "The exclamatory judgment 'Lightning' may thus be rendered formally complete by taking as subject term 'a manifestation of reality'. Here I do not propose to take simply as the equivalent of the exclamatory judgment 'Reality is being manifested in the lightning', but rather 'A particular portion of reality manifests the character (indicated by the adjectival import of the word) lightning'.—*Logic*, Part I, p. 19.

Tattvārthavārtika.⁴⁹ has discussed in detail the possible meanings of the predicate 'jar', which we shall here briefly notice. He states the proposition in the accredited form 'In some respect, this is jar. Here the object represented by the substantive 'this' has two aspects—native (*svātma*) and alien (*parātma*)—which vary according to the intention of the cognizer or speaker. Thus (1) if the intended native aspect is the aspect expressed by the concept or the word 'jar' (in its usual sense), the alien aspect is the aspect expressed by the concept or the word 'non-jar'. In other words, the object in its native aspect is jar (*svātmanā syād ghaṭaḥ*), and in its alien aspect non-jar (*parātmanā syādagnaṭaḥ*).⁵⁰ The object thus is both jar and non-jar. The principle implied is that the object is a comprehensive fact which includes in itself the opposite characteristics like jar and non-jar. The object as determined by the particular characteristic cognized, that is, as determinandum is the native aspect, and the object as not so determined, that is, the non-determinandum is the alien aspect. Corresponding to the determinandum and the non-determinandum, there are also determinans and non-determinans. It is thus seen that the substantive and the adjective of a proposition have two aspects each—one positive, another negative. (2) If, again, the intended native aspect of the object is the aspect expressed by the word 'jar' as an *ad hoc* symbol, the corresponding alien aspect would be the aspect expressed by the word 'non-jar' as a symbol standing for the usual or any other conventional or attributed meaning of the word 'jar'. The upshot is the same as in the first analysis, viz., the object in its native aspect is 'jar' and in its alien aspect 'non-jar'. Similarly (3) if the intended native aspect of the object is the aspect expressed by the word 'jar' standing for the jar-particular, the alien aspect would be the aspect expressed by the word 'non-jar' standing for the jar-universal. Here also the object in its native aspect is 'jar', and in its alien aspect

Johanson's view of judgment or proposition, expressed here, is indebted to the views of Bradley and Bosanquet, as he himself has admitted in the following words : "Our conclusion, briefly expressed, is that any proposition *characterises* some fact, so that the relation of proposition to fact is the same as that of adjective to substantive. Bradley has represented a proposition as ultimately an adjective characterising Reality, and Bosanquet as an adjective characterising that fragment of Reality with which we are in immediate contact. In adopting the principle that a proposition may be said, in general, to characterise a fact, I am including with some modification what is common to these two points of view."—*Logic*, Part I, p. 14.

49. TV, I. 6(5).

50. तत्र स्वात्मना स्याद्घटः परात्मना स्याद् अघटः को वा घटस्य स्वात्मा, को वा परात्मा ? घटवद्बुधविधानप्रवृत्तिलिङ्गः स्वत्मा, यत्र तयोःप्रवृत्तिः स परात्मा पद्यदिः ।—TV, I. 6(5).

'non-jar'. Similarly (4) if the intended native aspect of the object is the aspect expressed by the word 'jar' standing for the jar-concept, the alien aspect would be the aspect expressed by the word 'non-jar' standing for the external jar-shape (*bhāhyo ghaṭākāraḥ*). In the same way, (5) if the intended native aspect of the object is the aspect expressed by the word 'jar' standing for its objective cognition (*Jñeyākāra*, that is, cognition *qua* contemplation, to use Professor Alexander's phrase), the alien aspect would be the aspect expressed by the word 'non-jar' standing for subjective cognition (*Jñānākāra*, that is, cognition *qua* enjoyment, again to use Professor Alexander's phrase). Thus here also the object in its native aspect is 'jar', and in its alien aspect 'non-jar'

This analysis of a cognition has clearly demonstrated that the object of our cognition is always a fact having two aspects—(1) the aspect that is determined by the predicate of the cognition and (2) the aspect that is not so determined. The object is jar, as well as non-jar, existent as well as non-existent, and so on. It is determinandum as well as non-determinandum, that is, determinate as well as non-determinate. This double nature of the real, obtained by analysis, is symptomatic of the fact that the real is a complex of opposites inexpressible by definite linguistic symbol. Thus the predicate 'inexpressible' is also obtained. The real, therefore, is found to be possessed of the triad of predicates—viz., existence, non-existence and inexpressibility—all of which are elemental in the sense that each of them presents a unitary characteristic. The analysis does not yield any fourth predicate which is elemental, and so the triad should be regarded as exhaustive.

Now, as the triad of elemental predicates is found to be exhaustive, it follows, on grounds already given, that there are exactly seven, neither more nor less, predicates which can characterize a real in respect of pairs of 'opposite' characteristics. Let us now see whether each of these seven predicates is a unique mode of truth.

The Predicates are Unique Modes

While discussing the import of the seven predicates, we showed also the significance of each one of them. And as uniqueness, in the ultimate analysis, is nothing but significantness, the unique character of each of the predicates is self-evident. What, therefore, needs a critical estimate here is whether the predicates are modes of truth. By 'a mode of truth' we understand 'a true mode of the real'. The Jain philosopher, as a

realist, believes in the direct cognition of the real and for him, therefore, the judgment 'This is jar' is a judgment about the real. Consequently, he accepts a significant predicate which is not vitiated by any error as a true mode of the real. And as such the seven predicates stand for seven unique modes of truth.

The Seven Propositions—Their Forms, Significance and Mutual Relation.

There are, as shown, seven significant predicates or modes of truth (*bhaṅgāḥ*) and as each mode—though obtained by an analysis of any simple cognition or judgment and established by reflective thought—is *prima facie* subject to doubt because of its dialectical nature, there can be seven kinds of doubts (*samśayāḥ*) about them. The seven doubts give rise to seven forms of curiosity (*jijñāsāḥ*), which, in their turn, give rise to seven questions (*praśnāḥ*). The seven questions require seven answers (*uttarāṇi*), and the seven propositions, therefore, are asserted to meet the requirement.⁵¹

The accredited forms of the seven propositions—e.g., *syādastyeva ghaṭaḥ* and the like—have been given while discussing the import of the predicates and hence need no repetition. Their individual significance has also been discussed. The only important problem, therefore, that remains to be examined is the significance of the seven propositions in general and their interrelation.

A proposition is a sentence which expresses what is either true or false,⁵² and what is expressed is its significance. True and false propositions are equally significant: if true, they express facts; if false, they fail to do so. The seven propositions are significant because expressive, and true because what they express are, on reflection, found to be facts. They are also not mere truisms, because they express truths which are not ordinarily recognized as such. These truths again are necessary, universal and constructive—necessary because neither experience nor logic contradicts them; universal because they are true of all reals; constructive because they give a synthetic view of reality. The propositions

51. भंगः सत्त्वादयः सप्त संशयाः सप्त तद्गताः । जिज्ञासाः सप्त सप्त स्युः प्रश्नाः सप्तोत्तराण्यपि ।
—Quoted in SBT, p. 8 See TV, iv. 42 (15) and TSV, p. 132 where all the five heptads of भंग ? (अस्तित्व, नास्तित्व etc.), विप्रतिपत्ति (संशय), जिज्ञासा, प्रश्न and वचन (उत्तर) are given.

52. Cf. Aristotle : " 'Every sentence has meaning' not as being natural means by which a physical fault is realised, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are proposition as have in the either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false."—*De Interpretation*, 17a.

are also interrelated, and make a system. Existence and non-existence are mutually concomitant and they together qualify the same object.⁵³ All the seven propositions follow logically from this dictum. In fact, the very first proposition, when logically unfolded, leads to the other six as a matter of necessity. Each proposition taken singly is also significant in that it “constitutes”, in the words of Professor Mookerjee, “an estimation of reality, which has been either advocated by a school of philosophers as a matter of historical fact or is capable of being entertained as a possible evaluation.”⁵⁴ But an isolated proposition, according to the Jaina philosopher, does not give the whole truth. It may, on the contrary, give an untruth, if taken as negation of other truths; and it can at best, provided it only asserts itself without negating others, give a partial truth, that is, *naya* which is described as neither truth nor untruth.⁵⁵ The Jaina philosopher, therefore, rejects the validity of the isolated propositions because they stand for extremisms, and knits them together into a system which is known as non-extremism or non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*).

Pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī and Naya-saptabhaṅgī

Pramāṇa stands for the ‘whole truth’ and Naya, as just stated, is ‘neither truth nor untruth, but only a partial truth’; in other words, if the pramāṇa is a comprehensive view of reality, the *naya* is only a partial view of it⁵⁶ in the sense that it takes into consideration only a particular aspect of the whole situation. In its widest sense, the term

53. अस्तित्वं प्रतिबर्धनाऽविनाभाव्यैकधर्मिणि ।
विशेषणत्वात् साधर्म्यं यथा भेदविवक्षया ॥
नास्तित्वं प्रतिपेर्धनाऽविनाभाव्यैकधर्मिणि ।
विशेषणत्वाद् वैधर्म्यं यथाभेद विवक्षया ॥—AM, 17-8.

54. For further details, see JPN, pp. 166 seq.

55. Cf. नाऽप्रमाणं प्रमाणं वा नयो ज्ञानात्सको मतः ।
स्यात् प्रमाणैकदेशस्तु सर्वथाऽप्यविरोधतः ॥ TSV, p. 123.

In this connection one may read with interest the following note of Bradley: “And hence it follows also that every ‘part’ of this whole must be internally defective and (when thought) contradictory. For otherwise how from one to others and the rest could there be any internal passage? And without such a passage and with but an external junction or bond, could there be any system or whole at all which would satisfy the intellect, and could be taken as real or possible? I at least have given my reason for answering this question in the negative. We may even, forgetting other points of view, say of the world,

Thus every part is full of vice,
yet the whole mass a paradise.”—

Appearance and Reality, P. 510.

56. See TSV, p. 118 (verse 3).

pramāṇa means 'valid knowledge', sensuous (consisting of *mati* and *śruta*) as well as supersensuous (consisting of *awadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*).⁵⁷ But the concept of validity, when analysed, is found to include 'comprehensiveness' without which knowledge is not completely valid. A *pramāṇa* thus turns out to be a comprehensive knowledge, though there are admittedly different grades of such comprehensiveness, ranging from the most perfect in the *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience) to the most imperfect in the lowest type of *mati-jñāna* (sense-perception). Knowledge as a natural function of the self is inherently comprehensive. This comprehensiveness however lapses as soon as the knowledge is influenced by the abstractionist tendencies of logical thought and language. The lapse in its turn may either halt at the assertion of a particular position without negating (but only implicitly recognizing) the truth of other plausible views, and thus give rise to what has been called *naya* (or more accurately, *sunaya*); or, it may lose the balance and climb down further by asserting a particular

57. For an idea of मति, श्रुत, अवधि, मनःपर्याय and केवलज्ञान, see my *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* Ch. II.

58. Cf. धर्मान्तरादानोपेक्षाहानिलक्षणत्वात् प्रमाणनय-दुर्नयानाम्—AS, p. 290 (The passage belongs to अष्टशती). Also see सन्नतितर्क, I 21 et seq. Also cf. अन्ययोग्यवच्छेद, 28 :

सदेव सत्स्यात्सदिति त्रिधार्थी ।
मीयेत दुर्नीति-नय-प्रमाणैः॥

According to the last quotation, the proposition forms of दुर्नय, नय, and प्रमाण are respectively सद् एव (a real is existent only), sat (a real is existent) and स्यात्सत् (a real is existent in some respect).

In this connection, the views of वीरसेन are worth mention. According to him, a *sunaya* (नय in the above quotations) gives prominence to a particular aspect and must have स्यात्—it does not matter whether it is expressly stated or taken as understood—in its propositional form, while a *durnaya* is a proposition which asserts the exclusive truth of a particular aspect as in the proposition सद् एव (धवला Vol. IX, p. 183). Both *sunaya* and *durnaya*, however, give rise to a comprehensive knowledge inasmuch as the knowledge is ipso facto comprehensive and cannot be fragmentary. (जयधवला, Vol. I, p. 204 : दुर्नय-वाक्याद् अपि *sunaya* वाक्यादिव श्रोतुः प्रमाणमेवोत्पद्यते, विषयीकृतैकान्तबोधाभावाद्) A *sunaya* expresses the real in its entirety through a particular aspect. This expression of the real in its entirety is known as सकलादेश which is प्रमाणाधीन, that is, under the dominance of प्रमाण. The fragmentary expression of the real, on the other hand, is known as विकलादेश and is embodied in proposition like अस्त्येव, नास्त्येव, and so on, which are *durnayas*. The विकलादेश is नवाधीन, that is, under the dominance of *naya*. (जयधवला, Vol. I, pp. 201-4). These observations of वीरसेन leave us in darkness regarding the line of demarcation between a *sunaya* and a *pramāṇa* inasmuch as both of them are found to be सकलादेश. The problem of विकलादेश has also been left obscure by वीरसेन. Akalanka has prescribed the use of the expression स्यात् even in the case of विकलादेश (TV, IV, 42, 17) and therefore he regards it as *sunaya*. But according to वीरसेन, the विकलादेश,

position as the only truth intolerant of other truths and thus give rise to what is known as *durnaya* (wrong view).⁵⁸ The contingencies of *naya* (*sunaya*) and *durnaya* arise only when a knowledge situation is sought to be expressed in or understood through inadequate logical categories and linguistic symbols, which fail to express the knowledge in its pristine comprehensiveness unless their significance is rightly analysed. A right analysis leading to a comprehensive logical understanding and linguistic expression is called *syādvāda*,⁵⁹ and what leads to only a partial apprehension and expression is *नय*. In other words, while the *syādvāda*⁶⁰ is a complete logical estimate and linguistic expression of the real, the *naya* is only a partial logical estimate and linguistic expression of it. Now as the logico-linguistic analysis of reality is the subject matter of *śrutajñāna*, the *syādvāda* and the *naya* are regarded as the two aspects of the latter.⁶¹

A brief reference to the private-cum-public character of *pramāṇa* and *naya* and a further distinction between the two may be made here. A *pramāṇa* or a *naya* in its private character is knowledge or intuition⁶²

though giving rise to *प्रमाण*, is nevertheless, in its propositional form, a *durnaya*.

The distinction between *sunaya* and *प्रमाण* is of course very meagre. A *sunaya* must recognise the reality of aspects other than the one expressed by itself, and in this respect its distinction from *प्रमाण* is nothing but formal. The element of neutrality or indifference (*उपेक्षा*) towards other plausible aspects as the distinctive feature of a *sunaya* is also not very important, because ultimately the indifference in the present context must be taken as conscious of other plausible aspects, and this consciousness is tantamount to an assertion of other aspects. The distinction thus, if any is only quantitative and not qualitative. The problem of *विकलादेश* may also be viewed from a different angle. *विकलादेश* is of course an imperfect way of expression and as such it may be viewed as erroneous. The error must find place in its propositional expression and hence the proposition like *अस्त्येय*, *नास्त्येय* and so on, as vehicles of its expression may be justified. The observations of *वीरसेन* might have been influenced by those weighty considerations, and probably he did not think it necessary to dilate on these details which obviously follow from his above statements.

59. For further information about *syādvāda* and the meaning of the term *syāt*, see supra.

60. Cf. *स्याद्वाद-केवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्व प्रकाशने*—AM, 105.

61. Cf. *नयानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तेः श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।*

सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वादश्रुतमुच्यते ॥

न्यायावतारसूत्र, 30.

Also cf.

उपयोगी श्रुतस्य द्वौ स्याद्वादनयसंज्ञितौ ।

स्याद्वादः सकलादेशो नयो विकलसंकथा ॥—*लघीयस्त्रय*, 62.

Truly speaking, *श्रुतज्ञान* stands for the whole scripture, *स्याद्वाद* for the central non-absolutistic philosophy of the scripture, and *naya* for the specific philosophical propositions that are knit together into the scripture.

62. We have used this term in the sense of pure cognition uninfluenced by any logical abstraction.

and in its public character, it is verbal expression conveying the intuition.⁶³ Each of the five pramāṇas—viz., mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala—thus has two aspects, viz., intuitional and verbal⁶⁴ and the verbal aspect, being representative of the intuitional, is as much comprehensive as the latter. The natural comprehensiveness of the verbal expression, however, lapses with the latter's association with logical categories and growth into linguistic symbols which the human intellect invents for a better understanding of the nature of reality, though the result is quite the contrary. The categories and symbols are further knit together into various theories which crystallize into mutually opposed schools of thought. The Jaina philosopher⁶⁵ includes all these conflicting schools of thought under śrutajñāna which may be right (samayak) as well as wrong (mithyā). The right śruta again may be either pramāṇa or naya. It is pramāṇa if it is comprehensive, and naya if it is only partial. The implications of the terms 'comprehensive' and 'partial' have already been explained and need no further clarification. The other four jñāna—viz., mati, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala—are, however, necessarily comprehensive inasmuch as logical categories and linguistic symbols do not play any significant part in their case. Their intuitional comprehensiveness is not disturbed by the vagaries of conceptual thought and the defects of abstract linguistic symbols. Of these four, the kevalajñāna is the most perfect inasmuch as it knows its object completely in all its details. The other three are imperfect in that they are capable of knowing only a limited number of objects with a limited number of attributes and modes. But, in spite of this, they are regarded as comprehensive because of their direct touch with the object and freedom from the association of false opinions and doctrines which destroy their natural freshness and purity. The case of śrutajñāna, however, is quite different. It is knowledge derived from verbal expressions and artificial concepts engendered by them, which, on account of their inherent

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63. Cf. मत्यादि-ज्ञानं वक्ष्यमाणं, तदात्मकं प्रमाणं स्वार्थं । शब्दात्मकं परार्थं । श्रुतविषयैकदेशज्ञानं नवो वक्ष्यमाणः सं स्वार्थः, शब्दात्मकः परार्थः —TSV, p. 128.
64. पूज्यपाद does not recognize the verbal or the public (परार्थ) character of any knowledge (प्रमाण) except श्रुत-ज्ञान. See his सवार्थसिद्धि on TS. I. 6.
65. Cf. अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम्-न्यायान्तारसूत्र, 29, with Siddharsi's विवृति which says- अनेनानेकान्तमन्तरेण संवेदनप्रसरव्यवच्छेदं दर्शयति, भ्रांत संवेदानामप्यनेकान्तो-द्योतनपटिष्ठतया प्रवृते :यदा संवेदनसामान्यमप्यनेकान्तविरहेण न प्रवर्तितु उत्सहते, तदा तद्विशेषणभूतं प्रमाणं एकान्ते प्रवर्तिष्यते इति दूरापास्तावकाशा एवैषा वार्ता. Also cf. प्रमाणं समस्तवस्तुस्वरूपपरिच्छेदात्मकं मत्यादि, नवास्तु एकांशावलंबिनः—तत्त्वार्थभाष्य-टीका, Vol. I, p. 53.

limitations, present a hazy or even a distorted view of the object, and an intellectual effort is needed to clear the haziness or rectify the distortion. The recapture of the full original intuition hidden under logical categories and linguistic symbols is the function of śruta *qua* pramāṇa (also called syādavāda), to understand the standpoint and intention which inspire a particular statement of facts is the function of śruta *qua* naya⁶⁶ and the blind insistence on the distorted view is durnaya.

But how can our language overcome its inherent limitations and express the original comprehensive intuition in full ? A word (predicate) can express only one characteristic (attribute or mode) at a time and number of characteristic can be expressed only consecutively (krameṇa) by a number of words. The simultaneous (yaugapadyena) expression of all the characteristics of a real in its entirety (sakalādeśa) is beyond the capacity of language, and hence the problem of the expression in language of the original comprehensive intuition arises. The Jaina philosopher has tried to solve the problem by a device which is symptomatic of his non-absolutistic position. From the substantial (dravyārthika) standpoint, a word expressed a characteristic in its aspect of identity with the other coordinate characteristics, and this ontological identity (abhedavṛtti) among the characteristics of a real is taken as the basis for the extension of the import of a word to all the other coordinate characteristics; from the modal (paryāyārthika) standpoint, on the other hand, a word expresses a characteristic in its aspect of difference (individuality) from the other coordinate characteristics, and here the basis of a similar extension of the import of the word is metaphorical identity (abhedopacāra) among the characteristics of the real.⁶⁷ The extension of the import of a word is thus found to be possible on the basis of identity, either ontological or metaphorical according to the standpoint of the speaker. And the expression syāt is used to manifest the intended extension of the import of the predicates of the propositions.⁶⁸ Each of the seven propositions of the saptabhaṅgī can thus, if so intended, be

66. Cf. नयोज्ञातुरभिप्रायः—लघीयस्त्रयः, 52

जावइया वयणवहा तावइया होन्ति नयवाया—सन्मतितर्क, III, 47.

स्याद्वादप्रविभक्तार्थविशेषणकोनयः—AM, 106.

67. Cf. यदा अभिव्रमेकं वस्तु एकगुणरूपेण उच्यते, गुणिनां गुणरूपम् अन्तरेण विशेषप्रतिपत्तिरत्नम्बन्तु, एकोहिजीवोऽस्तित्वादिष्वेकस्य गुणस्य रूपेणाऽभेदवृत्त्या अभेदोपचारेण वा निरंशः समस्तोवक्तुमिष्यते, विभाग-निमित्तस्य प्रतियोगिनो गुणान्तरस्य तत्रानाश्रयणात्, तदा सकलादेशः। कथमभेदवृत्तिः कथं वा अभेदोपचारः ? द्वयार्थत्वेनाश्रयणे तदव्यतिरेकाद् अभेदवृत्तिः, पर्यायार्थत्वेनाश्रयणे परस्परव्यतिरेकेऽपि एकत्वाध्यासेऽपि, ततश्चाभेदोपचारः—TV, iv, 42 (14). II/14

68. Cf. अद्यथा स्याच्छब्दोऽयं अनेकान्तार्थस्य द्योतकः। द्योतकश्च वाचकप्रयोग-सन्निधिन्तरेणाऽभिप्रेतार्थाविद्योतनाय तात्पर्यमिति तद्द्योत्यधर्माद्यार्याभिधानाय इतरपदप्रयोगःक्रियते। अद्य केनोपात्तोऽनेकान्तार्थोऽनेन द्योत्यते ? उक्तमेतत्तु अभेदवृत्त्या अभेदोपचारेण वा प्रयुक्तशब्दवाच्यताम् एवात्कन्दन्ति इतरे धर्मा इति—IV, iv, 42(15).

made to mean the whole truth in its own peculiar way through the individual characteristic (e.g. existence, nonexistence and the like) directly expressed by its predicate.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the Jaina philosophers have enumerated eight distinct factors—viz., time and the like—which are conceived as differentiating limits as well as integrating bonds of the characteristics of a real and as such respectively conditions of the consecutive and simultaneous expression of these characteristics.⁶⁹ Thus (1) time is a differentiating limit, because a unitary entity cannot *prima facie* possess a number of different characteristics at one and the same time, and if it is found to do so, its unity is dissolved into plurality, there being as many entities as there are characteristics. This is the finding of the analytic standpoint. In the synthetic standpoint, on the other hand, time is an integrating bond. The plurality of characteristics is found to be somehow bound into a unity by means of simultaneity. Similarly, (2) self-identity (*ātmarūpa*) of a characteristic is a differentiating limit, because it differentiates one characteristic from another. It is a uniting bond as well in view of its reference to an entity which is the common referend of all other coordinate characteristics. (3) The substratum, likewise, is regarded as a differentiating limit in respect of its aspect that varies with each of its characteristics and as an integrating bond in respect of its aspect that is the constant reference of all those characteristics. In the same way, (4) the relation (*sambandha*) of identity-cum-difference that obtains between an entity and its characteristics functions as a differentiating limit when taken as a relation of difference, and as an integrating bond when taken as a relation of identity. Similarly, (5) the influence exerted by each characteristic upon an entity, viewed as an isolated event, is the differentiating limit and the same influence *qua* a common function of all characteristics is the integrating bond. (6) The substance-space, likewise, viewed as an inelastic space-point of a particular characteristic is a differentiating limit; but, viewed as a common locus of the coordinate characteristics, it is an integrating bond of those characteristics. In the same manner, (7) the association⁷⁰ between an entity and its characteristics can be viewed as a differentiating limit as well as an integrating bond. Lastly,

69. तस्य शब्देनाभियानं क्रम-योगपद्याभ्याम् । ते च कालादिभिर्भेदाभेदाप्यगात्—TV, 42 (Varttikas 12 and 13).

70. This *samsarg* is different from *sambandh* (the fourth factor mentioned above) in that the former stands for 'difference qualified by identity' while the latter for 'identity qualified by difference.' In other words, in *samsarga* the element of difference is prominent while in *sambandha* the element of identity is salient.—SBT, pp. 33-4.

(8) the verbal symbol (śabda) standing for a characteristic is a differentiating limit in so far as it is expressive of that particular characteristic, but, in so far as it is an expression for the thing possessed of similar characteristics, it is an integrating bond.⁷¹

The possibility of the simultaneous expression of all the characteristics of a real in its entirety being thus established, the concepts of *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* and *naya-saptabhaṅgī* can be easily understood. Each of the seven propositions of the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* stands for the whole truth. As a member (*bhaṅga*) of the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* the proposition 'A jar certainly exists in its own context (*syādastyeva ghaṭah*) is intended to be expressive of all the characteristics of the jar in its entirety (*sakalādeśa*). And this is the case with each of the other six propositions also. Each of these seven propositions expresses the whole subject by means of the particular characteristic predicated in it. The comprehensive character of each of the seven propositions does not make the six propositions other than itself redundant, because each stands for the whole truth in its own peculiar way through a particular characteristic which is directly expressed by the predicate—the remaining characteristics being indirectly implied (by the predicate)⁷² Thus, for instance, if in the first proposition 'A jar certainly exists in its own context', the predicate 'existence' directly (*prādhānyena*) expresses the substantial continuity of the jar, it indirectly (*guṇabhāven*) implies the modal discontinuity of the same thing.⁷³ In the second proposition the position is reversed, that is, the modal aspect is directly expressed and the substantial aspect is indirectly implied. The meanings of the other five propositions are to be expounded on similar lines.

The same septad of propositions (*saptabhaṅgī*) can be viewed as *naya-saptabhaṅgī* if the predicate of each of the propositions is intended to stand for the characteristic which is directly expressed by it without any intention of affirming or denying the indirectly implied characteristics other than the one directly expressed. The intention of affirming the other characteristics indirectly implied would make the proposition a member of the (*saptabhaṅgī*) while the intention of denying the same would make it a case of *durnaya* (untrue proposition), and this is why a proposition, in order to be a member of

71. See TSV, p. 136.

72. Cf. यथैवं स्यादभूस्त्येव जीव इत्यनेनैव सकलादेशेन जीवद्रव्यगतानां सर्वेषां धर्माणां संग्रहाद् इतरेषां भंगानामानर्थक्यमासजतिः नैष, दोषः गुणप्राधान्यव्यवस्था. विशेषप्रतिपादनार्थत्वात् सर्वेषां भंगानां प्रयोगोऽर्जकम्—TV, iv. 42 (15).

73. Cf.तथा, द्रव्यार्थिकस्य प्राधान्ये पर्यायगुणभादे च प्रथमः—Ibid.

the *naya-saptabhaṅgī* must be inspired by the intention of asserting the particular characteristic only, without any further implication, positive or negative.

The use of the expression *syāt* (e.g. in *syādastyeva ghaṭaḥ*) is to be made both in the propositions of the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* and those of the *naya-saptabhaṅgī*. It may however be dropped if its meaning is otherwise apparent. In the case of the propositions of the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* the expression *syāt* does the positive function of implying simultaneously (*yaugapadyena*) all other possible characteristics that are true of the subject, while in the case of the propositions of the *naya-saptabhaṅgī*, the same expression does the negative function of prohibiting the denial of these characteristics. The cognitive attitude in the first case is 'indefinite', that is, without any artificial definiteness, while the cognitive attitude in the second case is 'definite', that is, with a definiteness which tends to define the object without denying its 'indefinite' character.⁷⁴

Vidyānandi who agrees with the above distinction between a *pramāṇavākya* (i.e. a *sakalādeś* in proposition of the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* (and) *naya-vākya* (i.e. a *vikalādeś* in proposition of the *naya-saptabhaṅgī*), records a number of views on the subject and rejects them as untenable.⁷⁵ Thus there were thinkers who regarded the proposition, which predicated more than one characteristics of the subject, as a *pramāṇavākya*, and the proposition, which predicated only one characteristic, as a *naya-vākya*. But according to this view, the first, the second and the fourth propositions of the *saptabhaṅgī* would be cases of *naya-vākya* and the remaining four propositions only would be cases of *pramāṇavākya*, and this is obviously a consequence which no Jaina philosopher would admit as acceptable. There was again the view that a proposition about pure substratum (*dharmimātra*) is *pramāṇavākya* and that about a characteristic (*dharmamātra*) is *naya-vākya*. But this is also untenable, because a pure substratum or a pure characteristic is incapable of being expressed by a proposition. There was a third view which regarded the seven propositions, when taken severally, as so many *naya-vākyas* and the same, when taken jointly, as a *pramāṇavākya*. But this also is absurd, because a number of partial truths cannot together make up the whole truth. Truth is a

74. For further elucidation of the problem, see fn. 3, § 29. Cf. सकलादेशोहि यौगपद्येनाशेषधर्मात्मिकं षटादिरूपमर्थं कालादिभिरभेदवृत्त्याऽभेदोपचारेण वा प्रतिपादयति, सकलादेशस्य प्रमाणरूपत्वात्, विकलादेशस्तु क्रमेण भेदप्राधान्येन भेदोपचारेण वा सुनयैकान्तात्मिकं षटादिरूपमर्थम् प्रतिपादयति, विकलादेशस्य नयरूपत्वात् । SBT, p. 32.

75. See TSV, pp. 137 ff.; also SBT, pp. 16-19.

unitary whole and cannot be taken as composite of discrete parts. The part of a whole must itself be a whole. Abhayadevasūri, in his commentary on the Sanmatitarka prakaraṇa of Siddhasen Divakar mentions a view which regarded the first, the second and the fourth propositions of the saptabhaṅgī as sakalādeśin (i.e. pramāṇavākya) on account of their reference to the whole subject by virtue of the unitary character of their predicates, and the remaining four as vikalādeśin (i.e. nayavākya) on account of their reference to the individual aspects of the subject by virtue of the multiple character of their predicates.⁷⁶ This is also untenable because of the unnecessary distinctions it makes between the identical subject of the seven propositions.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AJP.....अनेकान्तजयपताका of Haribhadra.
 AM.....आप्तमीमांसा
 AS.....अष्टसहस्री of विद्यानदि
 JPN.....The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism by Dr. Satkari Mookerjee.
 JTA.....The Jain Theory of अनेकान्त in 'Studies in Philosophy' Vol. 1.—By K.C. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1956.
 SBT.....सप्तभंगीतरंगिणी of विमलदास.
 SKH.....पट्टखंडगम.
 TSV.....तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवार्तिक
 TV.....तत्त्वार्थवार्तिक (ed. by Pt. Mahendrakumar न्यायाचार्य).

76. See सन्मतितर्क-प्रकरण, Vol. 3, pp. 445-6 (Ahmedabad, samvat, 1984).

Non-Absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*)*

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

We have elucidated the logical background of Jaina philosophy and we have shown that the Jaina evaluation of the Laws of Thought differs *toto caelo* from that of the idealists, which gave an ultra-intellectual orientation to philosophical speculation. The Jaina pleads for soberness and insists that the nature of reality is to be determined in conformity with the evidence of experience undeterred by the considerations of abstract logic. Loyalty to experience and to fundamental concepts of philosophy alike makes the conclusion inevitable that absolutism is to be surrendered. A thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor non-eternal, in absolute sense, but partakes of both the characteristics; and this does not mean any offence to the canons of logic. The dual nature of things is proved by a *reductio ad absurdum* of the opposite views. Thus the law of causation, whether in the moral or in the physical plane, is divested of its *raison d'être* if absolutism is adhered to. An absolute real can neither be a cause nor an effect. An effect already in existence has no necessity for a cause, and an eternal cause unamenable to change is self-contradictory, inasmuch as an eternal cause would produce an eternal effect. But both the terms 'eternal cause' and 'eternal effect' have no meaning. It may be contended that the issue does not affect the position of the Vedāntist or the Absolute Negativist (*Śūnyavādin*) since they do not believe in the reality of causation. But the contention is not sincere as they believe in it on this side of transcendental realisation. And their plea, that truth is of one

* The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism : A critical study of Anekāntavāda, Motilal Banarsidas, Varanasi, 1978.

sort in the plane of theoretical and practical activity, and of another kind in the transcendental plane, seems to be a make-believe. We postpone the consideration of the metaphysical issue to a subsequent chapter, and it should suffice for the present to observe that these two metaphysical systems have gained a haven only by making a holocaust of all our cherished beliefs and ingrained convictions. Whatever may be their logical merits they have failed to carry conviction to an enormous number of men and women who respectfully decline to be satisfied with their negative findings, whether qualified or unqualified. As regards the position of the advocate of flux (*Sautrāntika*) the difficulty alleged does not find a satisfactory solution from him as well. In this system all existents are believed to be momentary in duration. A moment is the indivisible atom of time which stands absolutely detached and discrete from its antecedent and consequent units. If an existent can occupy only such a moment, it cannot function as a cause. Exercise of causality is possible either in succession or non-succession, but both are incapable of being predicated of a momentary real. A 'momentary' has no duration and consequently no succession. Simultaneous production of effects is also not admitted by the Buddhist fluxist. Moreover, absolute affirmation of a characteristic, reality or unreality, eternity or non-eternity, implies by the very force of its inherent opposition the negation of the opposite characteristic. So if a thing is affirmed to be real or momentary the predication is not of a simple characteristic, but of a complex one. The thing is not only real but not not-real, not only momentary but also not not-momentary. This militates against the absolutist standpoint of predication of simple characteristics.

If things were real in an absolute sense there would be no causation, as it is possible if only an event which was non-existent is brought into existence. But an existent by its very nature, that is to say, irrespective of such external conditions as time, space and the like, is not in need of the services of a cause. If, on the contrary, the effect were unreal in an absolute sense it could not any more be called into existence, since an unreal fiction such as a barren woman's son or a square circle is never found to leap into existence. The *Śūnyavādin* may contend that the whole show of causal order is only an appearance and the effects that are seen to be produced are as unreal as the so-called fictions. No reliance, again, can be placed upon experience, they would plead, as experience in dream also exhibits the same characteristics as so-called normal experience; and the

objects perceived or inferred are nothing but chimeras. So the objection on the ground of the failure of causation is futile so far as the sceptics are concerned. But this denial of causation again involves a difficulty. If the perceived objects in dreams were unreal and so uncaused events, why should they cease to exist, or, to put it the other way about, why should they appear at all ? So experience, normal or abnormal, would have no *raison d'être* in the *Śūnyavādin's* scheme of metaphysics. If nescience is held out to be the cause of such appearance, the question would naturally arise whether nescience *per se* is real or unreal. If it were unreal, there would be no causal activity and consequently no appearance. Even if the order of experienced objects be declared unreal, there must be a cause of this order of appearance. A real cause is necessary even for the production of unreal experience. The optic illusion of the double moon has its cause in the positive disorder of the eye, which is real as any thing. So the dilemma is inescapable, whether the order of causality is held to be real or unreal in an absolute manner. If the effect were real irrespective of time and place and conditions of causality, there would be no necessity for positing a cause. If it were unreal, no amount of causal activity could bring it into existence. If, again, it were uncaused, there would be no time in which the effect would be existent or non-existent.

The same deadlock emerges even in the philosophy of flux. The *Yogācāra*, who denies extra-mental reality, seeks to explain our experience of the phenomenal world on the analogy of dream experience. But he believes that consciousness, which is the only reality according to him, is in a state of perpetual flux. It is momentary and so ceases to exist at the next moment, when it is replaced by another consciousness-unit. The previous unit produces the subsequent unit and the chain of consciousness-units goes on for eternity, being governed by the law of causation. So the law of causation is the very corner-stone of *Yogācāra* metaphysics, as it is of the *Sautrāntika*,¹ both being agreed upon the fluxional nature of reality and the law of causation as the supreme ruling principle of the order of reality. The difference between the two lies only in the denial or affirmation of extramental reality. But the law of causation cannot be supposed to operate in the case of momentary entities. Of course

1. For a through-going exposition of the *Sautrāntika* philosophy the reader is referred to my work, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, published by the University of Calcutta.

the Buddhist would maintain that the previous moment is the cause of the subsequent moment and causation presupposes only this sequence and nothing more. The absence of the cause at the moment of the emergence of the effect is no bar to the operation of causality, as synchronism of the cause and effect is not relevant. If synchronism were determinant of causality one would not search for the cause in the previous event. And between two synchronous events nobody commits the fallacy of regarding one as the cause of the other, as between the two horns on a cow's head. But the Jaina philosopher maintains that neither sequence nor synchronism alone can account for the law of causation, but that both combined give us the correct estimate of the operation of causality. That the relation of cause and effect does not hold good between two co-existent facts, such as the two horns on a cow's head, is admitted by the Jaina also. But the absence of synchronism between the cause and the effect at the moment of the latter's emergence would make the effect independent of the cause. The effect was not in existence when the cause was in existence and it comes into existence when the cause has ceased to exist. So if the effect is independent of the cause when it comes into existence and is not found to be dependent upon the cause either before or after, the bearing of the cause upon the effect becomes a fiction. The previous existence of the cause is absolutely irrelevant. If an effect could come into existence even in the absence of the cause at the moment of its origin, there is no logic why it would not come into being at other moments when the cause is absent likewise. It has been contended by the Buddhist fluxist that if a permanent cause enduring for more than a moment could produce an effect, why should it not go on producing like effects for all the time of its existence? If the 'permanent' comes to lose the causal power at a subsequent moment, the possession of power at one moment and the loss of power at another moment would entail the coexistence of two contradictory attributes in the former, and this is incompatible with its integrity. The supposed permanent would be split up into two—in other words, there would be no one entity but as many as the varying attributes and causal operations. The Jaina philosopher, however, refuses to be convinced by such tactics of abstract logic.

The identity or otherwise of a real is to be accepted on the verdict of uncontradicted experience and the possession of varying attributes or powers is not incompatible with the identity of a thing.

Even the Buddhist cannot deny that the selfsame real, e.g., light, produces diverse effects, viz., the expulsion of darkness, the illumination of the field of perception, radiation of heat and so on. Certainly the diverse effects cannot be produced by the selfsame causal energy. If a plurality of energies can be possessed by a self-identical entity without offence to logic, why should the spectre of logical incompatibility be raised in the case of a permanent cause possessing diverse powers? The Jaina solves the difficulty by means of the law of *anekānta*, which affirms the possibility of diverse attributes in a unitary entity. Strictly speaking, a thing is neither an absolute unity nor split up into an irreconcilable plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time. There is no opposition between unity of being and plurality of aspects. The opposition would have been inevitable if the unity of a real had varied with each aspect. But the varying aspects are affirmed of the self-identical subject and this proves that the unity is not affected by such predication. A thing is one and many at the same time—a unity and a plurality rolled into one. This view of the nature of reality avoids the fallacy of uncaused production, which is insurmountable in the other philosophies. The cause is both non-synchronous and synchronous with the effect—the former before the origin of the effect and the latter at the time of its origin. Nor does the non-emergence of any further effect in the presence of the cause after the production of the first effect occasion a difficulty. The nature of things is to be determined in consonance with their behaviour as observed with normal human faculties. When the cause is not seen to produce an effect more than once at a time, it must be postulated that the cause undergoes change of power, and the change of power is not incompatible with the identity of the causal entity as it is certified by the unchallengeable verdict of experience. That experience is the ultimate determinant of contradiction or non-contradiction and not a *priori* logical considerations is to be admitted even by the Buddhist, who swears by logic in season and out of season whenever it suits his convenience. The Buddhist idealist holds that cognition assumes the form of cogniser and cognised in one. The same cognition is transformed into the likeness of an object, which becomes the content, and in its role as pure cognition it functions as the cogniser. This is the epistemology of perception of the Sautrāntika realist, according to whom the direct object of cognition is never the external object, but the content as part and parcel of the cognition. The external object is a matter of inference.

according to the Sautrāntika. Barring this difference of metaphysical position, both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra are agreed on the dual character and the dual role of cognition. In the case of non-perceptual cognition also the same dual role is asserted with equal emphasis. The content, which is identical in being with the cognition, is believed to stand for the unperceived object, e.g., the fire as inferred from smoke, and the cognition in its cognitive capacity is assumed to be the cogniser. The opposition of the cogniser and the cognised is evident, but still their coalescence in the selfsame cognition is believed to be a fact and that without spelling a contradiction. If the contradiction is denied on the strength of the undisputed testimony of experience, the same solution cannot be discarded in the case of cause and effect, as experience is unmistakable in its verdict in this case also. This is not the only advantage in the Jaina position. It gives us a satisfying explanation of the law of causation, the belief in which is irresistible for all human beings and is the *conditio sine qua non* of all scientific and practical activity. The absolutistic standpoint of the other schools of thought fails to offer any explanation. The heroic course adopted by the Vedāntist and the Śūnyavādin does not again commend itself as the only alternative metaphysical explanation. The result is identical. Both the fluxist and the Vedāntic idealist fail to render a realistic explanation of the law of causation, as the condition of causal operation, succession or non-succession² which are the necessary concomitants of time-continuum, are denied, and the chain of cause and effect is reduced to the position of an intellectual construction. The Jaina theory avoids the fallacies incident to extremism as the cause is both permanent and fluxional and the effect is both existent and non-existent. The point will be elaborated later on.

Again, if things were held to be existent in an absolute sense, that is to say, if existence were their only characteristic and non-existence were denied as ideal fiction, the result would be equally disastrous. There would be no distinction of one thing from another. Everything would be everything else having nothing to distinguish them. Secondly, there would be neither beginning nor end for anything. Thirdly, nothing would be possessed of an individuality. In other words, things would be nothing—entity would be reduced to non-entity. We propose to demonstrate how the absurd issues alleged

2. For the elaborate exposition of succession and non-succession as the condition of casual operation I refer the reader to my book *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Chapters I and IV.

above follow inevitably on the denial of non-existence as a characteristic feature of things. Now, non existence is recognised to be of four types, viz., (i) absolute non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of colour in air (*atyantābhāva*); (ii) pre-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of the effect in the cause (*prāgabhāva*); (iii) post-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of an effect after destruction (*pradhvamsābhāva*); and (iv) mutual non-existence or numerical difference or non-existence of identity of things (*itaretarābhāva*). If existence were the whole nature of things, there would be no non-existence anywhere; and in the absence of the fourth type of non-existence, all entities would be lumped together into one thing, viz., Existence. The Sāṅkhya does not believe in the reality of non-existence. But in that case the enumeration of the different categories and the evolution of the categories from primordial *Prakṛti* in a descending scale and the dissolution of each succeeding category into its immediate predecessor would have no meaning. The existence of a second entity implies that the first is distinct and different from the second and this presupposes the reality of mutual non-existence. The emergence of lower and later categories from the preceding ones presupposes that they were not existent before at least in their developed form. The presupposition of such unprecedented emergence is the second type, viz., pre-non-existence. And the retrograde course of evolution, in which the lower categories are said to be re-absorbed into the higher one, presupposes that they cease to exist at any rate in their finished form. This presupposes the third type of non-existence. And the non-existence of Primordial Matter (*Prakṛti*) in the Spirit (*puruṣa*) and of the latter in the former is evidently an admitted fact, and this necessitates the postulation of the first type of non-existence. Thus, non-existence cannot be denied by the Sāṅkhya without stultifying the whole scheme of ontology propounded by him. But the Sāṅkhya might maintain that the denial of non-existence on his part does not entail these consequences. He does not believe in the reality of non-existence apart from and independent of the reals as the *Vaiśeṣika* does. The denial of non-existence thus amounts to the negation of independent non-existence. But if non-existence be regarded as a formative element in the nature of reals he would have no objection to its reality with all its four varieties. But this is also the position of the Jaina and of the Mīmāṃsists. If, however, such be the position of the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsist, they should no longer characterize reals as existent only. Things, on the contrary, should be characterized

as existent-and-non-existent. What the Jaina objects to is the uncritical, simple characterization of reals in terms of existence as opposed to non-existence. The nature of reals is always a complex of existence-cum-non-existence. As regards the affirmation of non-existence as a separate and independent category by the later exponents of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the Jaina, too, does not subscribe to it. According to the Jain non-existence is as much an element in the constitution of a real as existence is. Accordingly a real can be said to exist or not to exist. The predication of existence and non-existence in respect of the same subject, though under different circumstances, is proof of the dual nature of reals.

But the aforementioned consequences of the denial of non-existence would not affect the validity of the position of the Vedāntist. The Vedāntist denies all difference and distinctions. The plurality is only an illusory appearance called into existence by the inherent nescience of individual selves. there is no plurality of selves either. The difference between self and non-self is also a fiction. But the question may be legitimately posed to the Vedāntist: 'How would you establish your position ? You deny all differences, but by what instrument of knowledge would you substantiate your denial ? Certainly not by perception, nor by inference, nor by scripture, as all these instruments of knowledge record only positive findings. The Vedāntist, however, does not bank upon any one of these accepted instruments of knowledge. He maintains that the non-existence of difference is only a necessary deduction from the failure of the opponent to establish the existence of difference. All the arguments that can be advanced by the opponents would be shown to be inconclusive. After all, the experience of plurality is the sheet-anchor of the opponent. But this experience of plurality is not incompatible with the unity of the Absolute Brahman, which is divested of all differences, intrinsic and extrinsic. Consciousness, undifferentiated into modes and attributes, is the only reality, and experience of plurality is only an illusion. It is common knowledge that space is one and devoid of all differences and distinctions taken by itself. But the person suffering from a defect of sight would see it divided into lines. It is a truism that this experience of linear divisions in space is only an illusion. So there is no inherent impossibility in the association of plurality with the Absolute Brahman on the part of a person whose power of vision is infected with the defects induced by nescience.³ The

3. *yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto naraḥ saṅkīrṇam iva mātṛābhir bhinnābhir abhimanyate, tathe 'dam amalam Brahma nirvikalpaṁ avidyayā kaluṣatvam ivā' pannaṁ bhedarūpaṁ prapaśyati.* Attributed to Bhartṛhari.

contention of the Buddhist idealist who believes in the multiplicity of consciousness-units has no substance. He believes in the unity of each consciousness-unit, but denies the subject-object polarization as due to the association of contents. The contents of consciousness are held to have no reality apart from consciousness. Thus when one becomes aware of blue, the awareness of blue does not establish the independent existence of blue. The 'blue' is only a content of consciousness and is non-different from it. It is due to the inherent proclivity of our thought movement for the belief in the separate existence of the content that the latter is not felt is identical with consciousness. To be more precise, the manifestation of consciousness informed with an apparent content has no *raison d'être* outside the separatist tendency of our thought-activity, which is the legacy of false knowledge or ignorance from which we all suffer. But the Vedāntist would urge that if the appearance of a content as an *other* to consciousness be only an illusion as admitted by the Buddhist idealist, then why should one consciousness be held to be different from another consciousness? The difference is felt owing to the difference of contents associated. But when contents are illusory and their association is only a false appearance, why should the difference of contents be made the ground of assertion of difference in consciousness? The difference of subject and object, the cognizer and cognized, in the same consciousness-unit is a felt fact. But still the experience of the two poles is not believed to argue a real difference in the consciousness-unit on the ground that the difference is only illusory. Parity of logic and consistency of argument demand that the difference of contents, illusory as they are, should not affect the unity of consciousness as such. Not only this. The affirmation of absolute identity between consciousness and content on the part of the Buddhist idealist would, on the contrary, make it impossible for him to meet the criticism of the Buddhist Śūnyavādin who would deny the reality of consciousness and its content alike. If consciousness is identical with its content, which is admitted to be a false appearance, why should not consciousness also be regarded as a false appearance? Certainly between two things held to be identical, one cannot be regarded as real and the other as unreal. If a content is denied independent reality on the ground that it is never cognised outside and apart from consciousness, such also should be the case with consciousness, which is never felt apart from a content. If the variation of contents and the unvariant continuity of consciousness be the proof of the superior status of consciousness, why should the

Buddhists believe in the multiplicity of consciousness-units ? Moreover, the relation of content and consciousness cannot be regarded as one of real identity, as the difference of content from consciousness is felt in experience. So not only identity but also difference are equally felt facts and as this is not compatible with real identity, the relation is held to be one of illusory identity by the Vedāntist, since identity-cum-difference is according to him a contradiction in terms. And illusory identity of different contents thus cannot split up the identity of consciousness.

The Vedāntist would thus successfully deny the reality of non-existence, as the absurdities alleged are not regarded as absurdities, but as a true estimate of things. The Vedāntist also banks upon the failure of the opponent to prove the reality of difference and other types of non-existence which are the presupposition of plurality. But this is not his only resource. He maintains that there is no proof in support of the reality of non-existence. If perception were competent to envisage non-existence, there would be no occasion for taking note of existence. For one existent there is an infinite number of non-existents pitted against it. For instance a pen is one entity, but the number of not-pens is practically infinite. If one were to perceive the non-existence of not-pens in order to perceive a pen, there would be no occasion for the realization of the latter perception, as the percipient would be occupied for all his life with the perception of the non-existence of not-pens, whose number is admittedly unlimited. It might be contended against this argument that the mode of perception as observed does not lead to any such consequence. The non-existence of a thing is perceived only when the negatum in question is recalled. So only those things are cognized to be non-existent, which are recalled by the percipient on the occasion. As he does not recall all the possible things that are non-existent on the occasion of perceiving the non-existence of a particular fact, but only the negatum whose non-existence is the object of perception, the charge of infinite number of perceptions of non-existence falls to the ground. But the Vedāntist would not accept the explanation, which makes perception dependent upon memory. Moreover, perception, dependent upon memory, would not give a novel experience.

The Vaiśeṣika, who believes in the perception of non-existence, would assert this amounts to a refusal to face the evidence of the psychology of perception as a whole. There are cases of perception which are independent of the services of memory, no doubt. But the

perception of a thing as conducive to the attainment of a desired end is certainly dependent upon, and preceded by, memory. One perceives a mango in the dish and at once proceeds to eat it. This is made possible only by the memory of the sweet taste of mangoes experienced in the past. The perception of non-existence, as it occurs to a man of extraordinary powers acquired by the practice of *yoga*, is certainly independent of the aid of memory. The mystic would see everything, existence and non-existence both, in one act of intuition. But by a person of limited powers like us non-existence can be perceived only with the aid of memory. So there is no difficulty. But this defence has not satisfied the Vedāntist. In the first place, he maintains together with the Buddhist that perception is never a judgment. Perception gives us the knowledge of a thing as it is, uninterpreted by concepts. But the perception of non-existence would be a judgment as it is always cognized as non-existence of this or that. In the second place, the memory in question may be either of the negatum or of the non-existence. On the latter alternative, there would arise a vicious infinite regress. If the knowledge of non-existence be a case of memory, it would necessitate the postulation of a previous knowledge of non-existence. But as the latter would also be equally an act of memory, there would be no end of recollections. If, on the contrary, the cognition of non-existence at any stage is accepted to be independent of memory, why should the cognition under consideration be made dependent upon the same? If, however, the recollection of the negatum is made the condition of the perception of negation, that also would give rise to a difficulty in another direction. Recollection, implicit or explicit, is certainly found to be an aid in the case of recognition. Here the object of perception is remembered to have been seen in the past and is then cognized to be identical with the perceived object. In recognition the two objects are same or similar and so memory is of help. But in the case of perception of non-existence one thing, *viz.*, the negatum, is recalled and another thing, *viz.*, its non-existence, is perceived. So the two situations are not similar. It should be recognised that perception is concerned with existent things and so cannot have jurisdiction over non-existence. The perception of non-existence is thus a false belief. Not only is non-existence incompetent to be perceived, it cannot be known by inference also. Non-existence is a non-entity and as such has neither an effect nor a characteristic, on the evidence of which it could be inferred. The absence of perception of a

perceptible is held to be the source of such knowledge. But this is also a pretence. What is seen is the empty locus and this is believed to be the knowledge of non-existence. The knowledge of non-existence in all cases is found on analysis to be an intellectual construction arising on the perception of something else; and as the independent existence of non-existence is only a contradiction in terms such intellectual constructions are to be definitely recognized as unfounded illusions.

The Jaina philosopher would submit that the elaborate arguments of the Vadāntist may have succeeded in refuting the reality of non-existence as an independent category. But however successful may be his argument, he must believe in the difference of things. If he is to engage in a debate with an opponent and has to convince him by argument he must employ the logical syllogism, which consists of three terms. The difference of terms and of their logical value has also to be recognized by him. This implies that the denial of non-existence even as part and parcel of a real is only an academic pastime with him and not a sincere conviction.

The denial of pre-non-existence again would entail the existence of effect from the beginningless time and that of post-non-existence would make the effect continue unbroken without end. But origination and destruction of effects are experienced facts. Origination means the coming into existence of an event which was not in existence before and destruction means that an effect ceases to exist after having come into existence. If neither origination nor destruction can be repudiated without doing violence to experience, the reality of the two types of non-existence must be accepted, as without them the two phenomena referred to cannot be understood. The Sāṅkhya philosopher maintain that things are neither produced nor destroyed. A non-existent cannot be made existent and an existent cannot be made to cease to exist, because a thing cannot surrender its nature and yet continue to be the same thing as before. So he interprets origination as manifestation of a pre-existent effect and destruction as relapse of the manifest into the unmanifest state, which was its characteristic before origination. So nothing is produced or destroyed. The logical consequence of such a theory is the doctrine of absolute existence of things. But, as has been pointed out above, the absolutist position cannot be maintained by the Sāṅkhya without falsification of his whole scheme of metaphysics. Of course the denial of non-existence as an extrinsic principle does not

involve any untoward consequence, but its denial as a formative element in a real has been shown to lead to absurdities. Consistency demands that the Sāṅkhya too should admit that there is a difference and intrinsic difference at that between a manifested and an unmanifested real. The 'unmanifested' and the 'manifested' should be recognized as possessed of different characteristics and so strictly speaking as not entirely identical. They are identical and different both—identical in so far as it is the same substance and different in so far as it undergoes a change of characteristic. This is the Jaina position of non-absolutism; and if it is accepted by the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsist, as they seem to show their leanings in its favour, in the entire extent of reality, there would be no difference between them and the Jaina. But on occasions both the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsist lapse into the absolutist attitude and the Jaina thinks this to be an error on their part.

The unqualified affirmation by the Sāṅkhya of the identity of the cause and the effect is due to defective use of language or misconception or both. Whatever be the meaning of such assertions, the issue is clear, viz., that the cause and the effect are not entirely identical, but different also. If the effect were entirely identical with the material cause, there would be no occasion for the exercise of activity to bring it into existence. The Sāṅkhya may contend that the activity is not futile as it brings about manifestation of an unmanifest effect. But manifestation is a novel thing and if it is held to be identical with the thing manifested, there would be production of a novel effect. If it were different, the manifestation would not relate to the effect. So the pre-existence of the effect is to be understood as having a partial reference. The effect is pre-existent in so far as it is the same substance with the cause and pre-non-existent in so far as it is a new phenomenon. The identity again of the cause and the effect is not to be understood in all its aspects. In other words, the identity is limited in its reference. The effect is partially identical with the cause and different in other respects. This is the position maintained by the Jaina and it has been shown to be inescapable. The escape is possible only by having recourse to the heroic line of action adopted by the Vedāntist who repudiates causality as illusory appearance. An elaboration of the absurdities inherent in the absolutist stand adopted by the Sāṅkhya in respect of causality and by the Mīmāṃsist in respect of the eternity of word-essence is uncalled for. There is no *via media* between non-absolutist realism of

the Jaina and the Vedāntist idealism. The Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsist are only half-hearted realists. Whether they are conscious of the implications of their views is not a matter of importance in an objective study of philosophical problems. But the absolutist attitude taken with regard to causation or to the eternity of word is fraught with grave difficulties, which can be avoided either by the adoption of the non-absolutist standpoint of the Jaina philosophers or by unqualified repudiation of the phenomenal world as made by the Vedāntist.

The problem of the eternal existence of word has been alluded to by us. It is a pet theory of the Mīmāṃsist. The Mīmāṃsist believes that the 'word' is eternal and ubiquitous. The exercise of the vocal organs is necessary only to make it articulate and amenable to perception. But the question can be decided by a dilemma. Is the quality of articulateness eternally existent in the word or not? On the former alternative the activation of the vocal organ would be uncalled for and the occasional absence of perception of word would be unaccountable. It has been held that the vocal activity is needed to break the veil which prevents its cognition. But the hypothesis of veiling is understandable and may have justification only if it induces a state which is different from the state when the veil is removed. This means a difference either in the word or in the percipient consciousness or in the vocal organ. But all these three are eternal entities and veiling would be incompatible with the absence of change in them. The problem is entirely on a par with that of causation. It may not be inappropriate to remark that word according to the Jaina is a material stuff like earth. It exists even when it is not heard. The material stuff undergoes a change in order to become perceptible. So the Jaina is not in uncompromising opposition to the Mīmāṃsist view of the eternal existence of word, whether perceived or unperceived. But there is a vital difference in this that the Jaina does not maintain that the word-stuff is unchangingly real, which is the position of the Mīmāṃsist. But unchanging existence is a philosophical anomaly. That there is a change of character in a perceived word from the unperceived one is obvious. The only course open to the Mīmāṃsist is this; either he must surrender his theory of unchanging existence and qualify it in the manner of the Jaina, or declare the change and together with it the word, as the substrate of change, to be illusory appearance. As he cannot follow the latter course, he must frankly accept the non-absolutist position.

In the previous paragraph we have shown how the acceptance of non-existence as an element in the make-up of reals is inescapable in the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsist. But the problem cannot be regarded as solved unless the formidable array of arguments of the Cārvāka materialist, who denies the reality of non-existence on entirely different grounds, is disposed of. Non-existence as a separate objective category has been denied by the Jaina. It is believed to be an objective real, but only so far as it is an element in the constitution of a real. But hitherto no light has been thrown on the nature of non-existence as a positive fact. But unless we are enabled to form a clear conception of its nature and function the postulation of non-existence will remain a vague assertion. To get down to the brass tacks of philosophy, we propose to take up the question of pre-non-existence and post-non-existence. The constitution of entities is believed by the Jaina to be dynamic. It changes every moment. But change does not mean that one thing is succeeded by another *in toto*. In that case the concept of change have no meaning. It is the presupposition of change would that the identity of the thing undergoing change is maintained in spite of the change that happens to it. It changes and persists in the same act. Change has no meaning without persistence and the contradiction between change and persistence is only apparent. Let us apply the results attained to the consideration of the problem. Production of an effect implies that a change has taken place in the causal stuff. But the stuff has been undergoing change for all the time whether the effect in question was produced or not. So not mere change but change of a distinctive character can account for the production of a particular effect. To be explicit and precise, it must be held that for every different effect there is a corresponding differential change in the causal stuff, which is directly and unconditionally responsible for the emergence of the effect. If pre-non-existence be the cause of the effect, as admitted by the advocate of non-existence, then it is to be equated with the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff. But if the pre-non-existence of the effect consists in the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff, the absence of this particular phase in the infinite past history of the causal stuff would entail the existence of the effect in question even before its production. It is held that effect is the negation of its pre-non-existence. Now if the pre-non-existence of the effect is distinctively identified with the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff, there is no room for denying that such

antecedent phase was not in existence before. And when the absence of pre-non-existence entails the existence of the effect, its existence during the infinite past career of the causal stuff cannot be prevented by any logic. The consequence is that the Jaina is confronted with the issue of the beginningless existence of the effect to prevent which he trotted out the theory of pre-non-existence. So the admission of pre-non-existence and its denial lead to the same consequence. It may be argued that though the series of antecedent phases prior to the immediate phase do not constitute the pre-non-existence of the effect, still the issue of the previous existence of the effect cannot materialize, because the antecedent phases are numerically different from the effect, and numerical difference is as much a bar to the production of the effect as pre-non-existence is. But in that case the postulation of pre-non-existence is superfluous, as the numerical difference of the series of antecedent phases would prevent the emergence of the effect before its time. One might reply that the postulation of pre-non-existence is made in deference to the dictum that the effect is the negation of pre-non-existence. But since the negation of such pre-non-existence is found in the whole antecedent history of the cause the issue of the pre-existence of the effect is unavoidable. A different approach may be made to find a way out of the *cul de sac*. It might be maintained that the immediate antecedent phase may be regarded as the pre-non-existence of the effect and the effect may be regarded as the destruction of the pre-non-existence. As the phases previous to the phase called pre-non-existence do not constitute the destruction of the pre-non-existence, the question of the pre-existence of the effect does not arise. But the defence smacks of the Buddhist position which holds the destruction of the previous moment and the origination of the next moment as equivalent. The Jaina cannot consistently adopt this position as he maintains that pre-non-existence is devoid of a beginning. Being unbounded by a previous time-limit it cannot be identified with the immediate antecedent phase, which is bounded by all that goes before and comes after. If, in the alternative, it is held to be distinct from all the previous phases of the causal stuff as identification with any one phase would raise all the difficulties, the pre-non-existence would not be an element in the being of the cause, which is the Vaiśeṣika position, and it has been found to be unacceptable.

The beginningless existence of pre-non-existence may how-

ever be asserted to be a fact with reference to its identity with the causal substance, as the substance *quâ* substance exists from eternity. But this seems to be a poor defence. If pre-non-existence be given a beginningless status on the basis of its identity with beginningless substance, it would be regarded as destitute of end also, as substance *quâ* substance has no end. But in the case of endless persistence of pre-non-existence there would be no occasion for the emergence of the effect, as the effect can come into existence only on the cessation of pre-non-existence. So pre-non-existence as a part of existent has no logical sanction. Nor can it be held to be an independent category, as there is no proof of it. It may be contended that such judgments as 'the jar was not existent before its origination' are cognisant of non-existence. But the contention falls through as judgments like 'There is no post-non-existence in pre-non-existence' have also reference to non-existence, but nobody believes in the existence of non-existence in another non-existence, as such belief would involve an infinite series of non-existences. If it is held that the series of non-existences are not numerically different, but one and the same, the four types of non-existence would become one indistinguishable fact—a consequence which cannot be accepted by the advocate of objective non-existence.

It has been argued by the Vaiśeṣika that the above criticism may be successful against those who believe non-existence to be identical with existence. But non-existence is a separate principle, as it is always determined by a positive entity. Non-existence is always understood as non-existence of positive reals, e.g., the non-existence of pen or chair has chair and pen as its determinants. The determinatum is of a different order of being from the determinant and so non-existence as a different principle is to be admitted. But the argument has no cogency. A quality is a determinant of a substance, but the two are equally positive. It is thus not proved that the determinant and determinatum must be of different kinds of being. The objectivity of pre-non-existence will be exploded by the following dialectic. Pre-non-existence may be conceived to have both a beginning and an end; secondly, it may be conceived as having a beginning, but no end; thirdly, it may lack both the limits—that is to say, it may have neither beginning nor end; fourthly, it may have no beginning but may have an end. In the first alternative, the production of effect prior to pre-non-existence would not be barred out. In the second, there would be no

subsequent production as pre-non-existence is without end. In the third, there would be no effect at any time as pre-non-existence is eternal. The fourth alternative is no doubt the accepted position. But the question may be pertinently raised whether pre-non-existence is one self-identical fact with reference to all effects or its number varies with the number of effects. If it be one, it would cease when even one effect is produced and there being no other pre-non-existence to preclude their production, all possible effects would emerge simultaneously at that moment. Of course the contingency does not arise if each effect is supposed to have a separate pre-non-existence corresponding to it. But it would occasion another difficulty. Let it be true that each effect has its own pre-non-existence, which ceases when the effect comes into being. But has the pre-non-existence in question an independent ontological status or is it dependent upon the positive real to which it relates? An independent pre-non-existence cannot be regarded as non-being, as non-being is by your very definition a determinant of being and an independent principle cannot be determinant of anything. Let it be supposed that it is dependent upon a positive real. But the only entity upon which it can be supposed to depend is its relative negatum. But the negatum is *non est* while pre-non-existence persists and the latter ceases to be when the negatum comes into being. So the relation of dependence or independence of pre-non-existence in regard to the negatum is unthinkable. But there is a third possibility which may avoid the alleged difficulties. Let pre-non-existence be one and its diversity be supposed to be a relational characteristic with no ontological status. So the contingency of simultaneous emergence of all possible effects on the cessation of pre-non-existence does not arise, for relational diversity will continue as effects will come into being in succession. But if the diversity of pre-non-existence be only relational and not real, then there would be no logical necessity for postulating four types of non-existence. One non-existence in relation to time-divisions, prior and posterior, may appear as pre-non-existence and post-non-existence. The same non-existence, again as related to all the divisions of time, past, present and future, will assume the role of absolute non-existence and that of mutual non-existence with reference to the mutual relation of diverse reals. But if one non-existence may function as diverse types of non-existence, in spite of the lack of intrinsic diversity, why should not reality as

such play the role of non-existence? The Jaina and the Mīmāṃsist have made out a plausible case for non-existence as a part of reality. But as there is no proof of the existence of non-being in all its varieties apart from reals, it stands to reason that positive reals alone should be supposed to account for the different concepts of non-existence. There is no necessity that all our concepts should be grounded in objective reality and as regards non-existence the opponent has been compelled to concede that varieties of non-existence are more or less unreal constructions. The Cārvāka would conclude that non-existence as such as a metaphysical fiction, uncritically hypostatized as an objective fact on the evidence of concepts, which do not stand the test of critical analysis. Non-existence, whether as a part of positive reals or an independent fact having no logical sanction, should be boldly asserted to be a fiction, pure and simple.

The Jaina does not believe that the Cārvāka has made out an unimpeachable case for the unreality of negation. The idea of negation is there, and there is no reason why it should be an ungrounded illusion. It is not an illusion, as it is not invalidated by the testimony of subsequent experience. Whether one may like the idea or not, one cannot get rid of it as much as one cannot get rid of the idea of existence. If non-existence be a metaphysical fiction, there is no reason for preferential treatment of existence. Both should be discarded or accepted without reservation. Of course the Vaiśeṣika view of independent non-existence is riddled with difficulties. But non-existence as an element in the make-up of positive existents should be regarded as factual. The objections of the Cārvāka are not insurmountable. Of course, the position would be hopeless if the sceptic's objections were backed by logic. Let us examine whether the difficulties are real or only conjured up by sophistry. Let it be granted that the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff constitutes the pre-non-existence of the relevant effect. Yet, the consequence alleged, that there would be continuous existence of the effect throughout the past except at the last moment when the immediate phase comes into being, would not arise. The difficulty raised by the Cārvāka, if sincere is due to the oversight of the difference between post-non-existence and other types of non-existence. The effect is the negation of pre-non-existence, whereas the immediate antecedent phase of the cause is the pre-non-existence of the effect. It was not in evidence in the past and

so the question of its post-non-existence before its emergence and consequently the emergence of the effect before its time have no *raison d'être*. There is the absence of pre-non-existence and of the effect both in the past, and there is not incongruity in it. The effect is incompatible with the presence of pre-non-existence and not with its absence. The absence of the pre-non-existence in the past history of the cause is itself an instance of pre-non-existence and thus if the infinite past series of pre-non-existence be regarded as one whole, the continuity of pre-non-existence in the past, which is the import of the dictum that pre-non-existence is without beginning, is established. The same result is reached even if pre-non-existence be asserted to be identical with the causal substance. The causal substance is without beginning. The issue of endless continuity of pre-non-existence would not arise, since the identity of pre-non-existence is maintained with the causal substance only in so far as it is bereft of the effect. And as there is no time in the past when the causal substance is destitute of the absence of effect, the continuity of pre-non-existence in the infinite past is assured. Again as the substance qualified by the absence of the effect ceases to be when it comes to be vested with the effect, which is only a modification of the causal substance, the pre-non-existence *qua* the qualified substance also ceases. The endless continuity of the effect would not therefore be possible. It is to be distinctly recognized that there is a vital difference between the causal stuff as qualified by the absence of the effect and the same as qualified by the presence of the effect. The absence of the effect previous to the emergence of the effect is of the nature of pre-non-existence and not numerical difference (*itaretarābhāva*), and the same again subsequent to the effect is of the nature of post-non-existence and not again numerical difference. The objections raised by the Cārvāka on the basis of numerical difference are therefore absolutely irrelevant. The pre-non-existence of the effect in the past and its post-non-existence in future are not jeopardized in any event whether the said pre-non-existence is regarded as identical with the immediate antecedent phase or with the causal substance as one whole.

We now propose to consider another problem raised as a side-issue in this connection. Let it be granted that the Jaina has succeeded in proving that pre-non-existence is continuous throughout the infinite past. But in that case it would not be liable to cessation,

as a thing which is without a beginning is of necessity without an end also. Even if exception is made in the case of non-existence as done by the Vaiśeṣika, the rule is inflexible so far as existent things are concerned. The Jaina makes out both pre-non-existence and post-non-existence to be entitative in character and this exposes him to the charge advanced. But the Jaina does not believe in the universality of the rule that whatever is beginningless is also endless or vice versa. The Vaiśeṣika contention is not endorsed as non-existence apart from and independent of an entity is held to be a fiction. But everybody, who believes in the salvation of souls, must admit that the unblest condition of the transmigratory soul is brought to an end on the cessation of bondage despite the fact that it is without a beginning. The converse of the proposition that whatever is endless is also without a beginning is also not true. Salvation is endless. Nobody believes that a saved soul again returns to the cycle of birth and death. But though endless it is not without a beginning. It is an event in the history of a soul and thus is a definite chronological fact. The rule breaks out in this instance again.

The conclusion is inevitable that pre-non-existence is a fact and a positive fact at that, the denial of which entails the absurdity of the continuous existence of the effect in the infinite past. There is no incongruity in the fact that though positive it should be construed in terms of negation. It is true that the negative judgment 'there was no jar in the past' arises only on the emergence of the jar. It is also true that the pre-non-existence of the jar is a positive real, being regarded as identical with the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff or the causal stuff as a whole. But it is not necessarily true that a positive fact is always interpreted by an affirmative judgment or that it is repugnant to a negative judgment. The vacant ground is referred to by the negative judgment *viz.*, 'There is no jar on the ground', although the content of the judgment is nothing more than the positive fact, the ground.

We shall conclude the present chapter by adverting to the problem of post-non-existence and happily it will prove a lighter task as all the formidable difficulties have been disposed of in the course of the dissertation on pre-non-existence. Post-non-existence is also a positive real. It is identical with the phase of the causal stuff which arises on the emergence of the effect. The emergence of the effect implies the cessation of the previous phase. To take a

concrete example. When a jar is shattered to pieces by the stroke of a club, it is replaced by potsherds. There is a change in the material cause, *viz.*, the clay-substance. It was previously of the shape of the jar and upon the destruction of the jar it assumes the shape of potsherds. The clay continues as a substance despite the change of shapes. Shapes are but passing phases and their appearance and disappearance do not affect the identity of the causal substance in which they occur. The disappearance of the previous phase does not imply that the cause ceases to exist—which is the position of the Buddhist fluxist. The appearance of the subsequent phase is construed as the disappearance of the previous phase. So post-non-existence is nothing but the immediate subsequent phase, just as pre-non-existence has been found to be identical with the immediate previous phase. The immediate previous phase *qua* pre-non-existence is the cause of the subsequent phase *qua* post-non-existence. And though post-non-existence as identical with the subsequent phase does not and cannot persist through the endless course of time and ceases to exist on the appearance of a third phase, still the cessation of post-non-existence would not entail the resurrection of the defunct *negatum*. This will be evident from a consideration of the relative character of cause and effect. The emergence of effect is possible only on the disappearance of the antecedent phase of the cause and so there is opposition between effect and cause. It is the effect which is hostile to the cause provided the cause and effect are understood as passing phases. But the cause even as the passing phase is not hostile to the effect, as emergence of the cause is not in any way dependent upon the cessation of the effect. The cause, on the other hand, is conducive to the emergence of the effect. Since the emergence of the cause is not identical with the cessation of the effect, though the emergence of the effect is identical with the cessation of the cause, the cessation of the effect would not entail the re-emergence of the defunct cause. But what about the dictum that post-non-existence is endless? The dictum can be justified by the same line of argument as applied in the case of pre-non-existence. Though the particular non-existence as identical with a phase of the causal substance cannot continue in future, the post-non-existence of the first non-existence and that of the second and third and so on to infinity will continue unhampered. And the infinite chain of post-non-existences in future will each

typify the non-existence of the defunct cause. Thus the endlessness of post-non-existence will be assured, even when the causal relation is understood to subsist between the passing phases. But if the whole causal substance irrespective of the passing phases is considered as one identity which it is in virtue of its character as substance, the problem of endless continuity of post-non-existence will find an easy solution. The substance continues as substance even after the disappearance of the passing phase known as post-non-existence.

An example may elucidate the point we are maintaining. The jar is transformed into potsherds and potsherds may again be transformed into a mass of powder. The potsherds represent the post-non-existence of the jar and the powder represents the post-non-existence of the potsherds. But the emergence of the mass of powder would not entail the revival of the jar on the ground that the potsherds constituted the post-non-existence of the jar. So though the clay-stuff will continue without end, it will never come to be re-invested with a defunct phase. It is a wholesome truth which it will be wise for us to remember that there is not revival in the scheme of things. There may be emergence of a similar phenomenon and this may be mistaken for the revival of the past event. What is past is irrevocably gone. We may expect a better state of things or a worse state of things, but there is neither stagnation nor revival. This is a momentous truth, which has its value not only for the professional philosophers, but also for reformers and philanthropists. A correct realization of this philosophical truth will save much useless lamentation for the past and will put the reformer in a correct perspective. Instead of trying to restore the old order of things, the reformer should address himself to bring about a better and happier state of affairs. This does not mean that the past has no lesson for us. The laws of nature, spiritual and material alike, are eternal verities and the past will be a source of inspiration and enlightenment if it is studied as the field of verification of these laws. The study of history should enable us to avoid the mistakes and disappointments of our ancestors by understanding the root-causes of their failure. The past failure lay in the failure of understanding the laws of nature and the discovery of the truth will serve as a warning against the repetition of past errors. The knowledge of the achievements and glories of our ancestors should help us and inspire us with hope for the future, as by the

pursuit of the same causes and effects, by observance of the same discipline and avoidance of past errors we may be enabled to achieve, though not a new heaven on earth, at least a better and worthier world. It is some comfort that philosophy in spite of its dry dialectic and forbidding use of logic is not without a lesson for the practical man of the world. The Jaina conception of the dynamic constitution of reality and the eternity of existence may be applied in the various fields of human activity to ensure our progress towards the *summum bonum*, which is the goal of our destiny.

The Dialectic of Sevenfold Predication

The Jaina affirms that an existent is possessed of an infinite number of attributes, and though the knowledge of infinite attributes is not attainable on this side of omniscience, the affirmation or negation of a predicate is not untrue. The affirmation or negation gives only a slice of the existent, but that does not afford a reason to doubt its authenticity. The most characteristic contribution of Jaina thinkers lies in their formulation of the theory of sevenfold predication, which for its originality and novelty roused the philosophical conscience of India at the time of its promulgation. We do not undertake the baffling task of tracing the chronological landmarks in the evolution of this theory and we deliberately address ourselves to the purely philosophical interest and value that this theory possesses in so far as it has been interpreted by philosophers of the Jaina school from the medieval ages down to very recent times. Our interest is purely philosophical and we leave the historical problem to be tackled by other scholars. The Jaina asserts that even the knowledge of a single attribution in respect of a substance must assume the form of seven modes, if it is to be free from obscurity and inadequacy. The sevenfold predication is, thus, a representation of this sevenfold conception and is expressed in a set of seven distinct propositions from which the knowledge of mutually consistent predicates, affirmative or negative, in respect of one subject is derived. The full predication of an attribute, it is asserted, requires seven distinct propositions and an additional proposition is superfluous and the suppression of any one results in incomplete knowledge. But why should the number be seven, neither more nor less? The answer is that each proposition is an answer to a question, possible or actual. And only sevenfold query is possible with regard to a thing. The questions are seven because our desire of knowledge with regard to any subject assumes seven forms in answer to our doubts, which are also seven.

Doubts are seven because the attributes, which are the objects of doubt, are only of seven kinds.⁴ So, the sevenfold assertion is not the result of a mere subjective necessity, which has nothing to do with the objective status of attributes. All assertions are in the last resort traceable to an objective situation, which actually possesses seven modes or attributes as an ontological truth.

The seven attributes are, thus, real properties in a subject and they are stated as predicates in seven different propositions (*bhāṅgas*). The assertions derive their genesis from an initial doubt which is occasioned by the *prima facie* opposition of the positive and negative attributes. Take a concrete example of the attribute of existence, and we can illustrate the sevenfold proposition. Does a pen exist or not ? This is an instance of doubt, since the opposition of existence and non-existence is self-evident. The predicates, it should be remembered, are but the expressions of real attributes. The full formulation of the predicates will assume the form as follows : (1) existence (in a specific context); (2) non-existence (in another specific context); (3) successive occurrence of both the attributes; (4) inexpressibility; (5) inexpressibility as qualified by the first predicate; (6) inexpressibility as qualified by the second; (7) inexpressibility as qualified by the third. These are seven attributes which are expressed by seven propositions. The same rule holds good of any other attribute. The seven propositions distinctly stated will be as follows : (1) The pen exists (in a certain context); (2) the pen does not exist (in another context); (3) the pen exists and does not exist (respectively in its own context and in a different context); (4) the pen is inexpressible (*qua* having both existence and non-existence as its attributes at the same time); (5) the pen exists (in its own context) and is inexpressible; (6) the pen does not exist (in other than its own context) and is inexpressible; (7) the pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible. All these assertions are to be understood as subject to the conditions which objectively demarcate the attributes. Thus, existence can be predicated of the pen only in relation to a definite context. The pen exists in so far as it is a substance and a specific substance at that, that is to say, in so far as it is a pen. Thus, existence can be predicated of it conformably to reality only by qualifying it by a necessary proviso indicated above. Again, the pen exists in its own space which it occupies and in the time in which it is known to

4. bhāṅgāḥ sattādayaḥ sapta, saṁśayaḥ sapta tadgataḥ, jijñāsāḥ sapta, sapta syuḥ praśnāḥ, saptottaraṇy api, SBHT, p. 5.

endure. Further, the pen has a particular size, colour and shape and so on. The pen is not the pen if it is abstracted from these attributes which give it a definitive individuality. Thus, substance (*dravya*), attribute (*bhāva*), time (*kāla*) and space (*kṣetra*), form the context, in relation to which an attribute, existence etc. can be predicated. As has been observed more than once, the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite, and, thus, the predication of the opposite attribute is also a logical necessity. The existence of a pen is necessarily bound up with its non-existence in an other context. So both are to be predicated. But a question naturally arises. If existence and non-existence are understood in relation to definite contexts, then there is not only no opposition between them, but one is the necessary concomitant of the other. Such being the case, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding them, and in the absence of doubt, no enquiry is felt and, consequently, no answer is necessary. Where then is the psychological necessity which was propounded as the basis and occasion of the sevenfold predication? The answer is that the opposition in question is not between existence and non-existence as part-characteristics, but between unqualified existence and qualified existence. The affirmation of existence is, thus, necessary in order to rebut the possibility of unqualified existence irrespective of time, place, substance and attribute, which give the predicate a determinate reference. Thus, the assertion of the first proposition is logically necessary and significant. And if, again, we are to take the opposition to refer to the opposite of existence, *viz.*, non-existence, there would not be any difficulty either, as non-existence, too, is to be understood in an unrestricted reference. The assertion of determinate existence in the first proposition, thus, rebuts the possibility of absolute non-existence or absolute existence.

The second proposition is also significant as there is opposition between determinate non-existence and absolute non-existence or absolute existence. It can be shown in this way that each predicate is asserted in response to a logical necessity, *viz.*, the exclusion of its opposite. It may be contended that the opposites under consideration *viz.*, absolute existence or absolute non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existent is known to have absolute existence or absolute non-existence as its characteristic. Thus, the opposite in question is unreal and the exclusion of an unreal opposite is not necessary, as an unreal fact cannot be the object of doubt. But the contention is not true to psychology. Though absolute existence or non-existence be

not real facts, it cannot be denied that a thing may be conceived as existent or non-existent without reference to their ontological context. Though not ontologically real, absolute existence or non-existence is conceivable, and doubt as a psychological fact has reference to this conception. So, the charge of lack of logical necessity for the sevenfold proposition is not founded upon a fact. The opposition is a logical relation and it is not necessary that the opposite must be of the same ontological status. The very fact, that absolute existence is opposed to even limited non-existence, and absolute non-existence is not compatible even with limited existence, shows that the relation is true, though as a matter of fact, absolute existence and absolute non-existence are not ontologically real.

The Vedāntist, who holds absolute existence to be the only reality, cannot believe in the reality of non-existence, absolute or qualified. Similarly the *Śūnyavādin* who does not believe in any existence, absolute or limited, cannot but regard absolute non-existence as standing in opposition to existence. The opposition between existence and non-existence has, thus, a logical or psychological value and does not involve the reality of the terms in opposition. It is enough if the other opposite is conceivable. In point of fact, opposition may hold between two ontological facts or between an ontological fact and an unreal fiction, provided it is psychologically conceivable. The first two propositions in the sevenfold chain of predication are, thus, logically valid and psychologically necessary inasmuch as they serve to exclude absolute existence or absolute non-existence from their respective loci. The insertion of the qualifying phrase 'syāt.' which emphasises the relative truth of the predication, is dictated by a twofold necessity of, firstly, furnishing a necessary proviso and, secondly, a corrective against the absolutist ways of thought and evaluation of reality.

In the evaluation of the necessity and justice to the assertions in the chain of sevenfold predication, which the Jaina thinks to be the universally valid form, whatever be the predicates, we shall have to take into consideration two facts, one logical and another ontological. The logical criterion is satisfied by considering whether the assertion is in response to a genuine desire for knowledge of a fact and the ontological criterion is the consideration whether the assertion is true of the fact. The word fact is to be understood in the present context as standing for anything possessed of a characteristic. In the first proposition 'the pen exists,' existence is predicated of the pen. The

existence is a determinate characteristic having reference to a definite context. But is there any necessity for this assertion ? Does not the factuality of the pen carry the assurance of existence by itself ? The answer is simple. The proposition in question may be viewed as analytical and synthetical according to our intellectual equipment and psychological interest. If perfect knowledge were possible, the assertion would be redundant for such a person, as nothing is unknown to such an omniscient person; but philosophical enquiry is instituted only for the benefit of persons who are aspirant for perfect knowledge, but have not reached the level. A perfect man, who knows all things and each thing as possessed of characteristics which follow from the very nature of each, will regard all assertions as analytical. But the consummation is not the possession of imperfect human beings like us, for whom the growth of knowledge is a slow process proceeding by stages, and for such each stage is a discovery attained after a laborious investigation of the nature of reality. It is not necessarily true that existence is understood only as a part of the connotation of the subject, since there has been a class of thinkers who call in question the reality of all things in an unrestricted reference. Again, 'existence' by itself is not capable of being understood in a uniform sense. Existence may be absolute or relative and, as such, there is room for misconception. Moreover, the assertion of all predicates is subjected to a question, which has been made a peg upon which the idealist and the sceptic hang their respective theories. Is the predicate a real characteristic of the subject, which belongs to it in its own right, or a characteristic which is foisted upon it from outside ? In the first alternative, the predicate is useless as it does not assert anything new. In the second alternative, it is false as it does not belong to the subject of which it is affirmed. But the question is neither fair nor sincere. The necessity of predication lies in the subjective necessity of attaining knowledge of an objectively real characteristic. The very fact that there has been a difference of views among philosophers about the authenticity of the predication shows that the problem is not so simple as the question seems to indicate. The predicate 'existence' may be a part of the connotation of the subject, but it is discovered only after the meaning of the assertion is understood and verified. So the proposition is synthetic before it is ascertained and verified, and is analytic after such discovery. The sceptic ought to be satisfied by the answer that all propositions are analytical to an omniscient soul, but synthetical to an enquirer of

truth, who has his doubts and difficulties about everything.

The Jaina asserts that unguarded predications have been a source of confusion and misconception in the history of philosophical speculations; and in the interests of precision of thought and clarity of our conception it is imperative that the predicates should be so asserted that the chances of misconception are eliminated as far as possible. It is for this reason that he adds the corrective proviso *syāt* to every assertion, which serves as a warning-post. But it is certain that whatever attribute may be predicated, it must not be understood to exclude the other attributes. Every predicate involves the concomitance of its opposite, and we shall see that the compresence of the two gives rise to a different attribute. Each predicate in the sevenfold proposition is distinct and different from the rest and so none of the propositions is superfluous. That the first predicate is different from the second is obvious. 'Existence' and 'non-existence' are not the same attribute. The combination of the two, successive or synchronous, gives rise to a distinct attribute and so also the combination of the these derivative attributes with the original attributes of the first two modes is the occasion for the emergence of novel attributes. But however much we may vary the combination, the number of attributes and consequently the number of propositions will neither be more nor less than seven. It is to be remembered that the seven attributes stated as seven predicates in the seven propositions are numerically different from one another, and, secondly, that whatever ways of permutation and combination may be resorted to, the number of the attributes and of the consequential modes will remain constant. We now propose to substantiate the thesis stated here in dogmatic form by arguments.

Assuming for the present that the seven propositions state seven numerically different attributes, it may be questioned why the combination of the first and the third, and of the second and the third, modes should not give rise to different attributes in their turn. The successive occurrence of the first two attributes, positive and negative, is believed to evolve that third attribute, and it is quite conceivable that the same law of synthesis should operate in the combination of the first and second attributes respectively with the third, which is believed to be distinct and different from the first and second. If this possibility is conceded, we should have two other additional attributes and, consequently, two other additional modes and propositions. In answer to this question the Jaina avers, that the

assertion of the first and third attributes, either successive or synchronous, does not evolve a novel attribute is obvious from the consideration that the combination of the first and third attributes involves false tautology. The first proposition states existence as the predicate and the third asserts a combination of existence and non-existence as two distinct individuals. The combination would imply the addition of another 'existence'. But neither experience nor reflection reveals the reality of two existences in the subject. The combination may result in such a proposition as 'The pen exists and exists and does not exist'. But the assertion of existence twice is useless, as the pen does not appear to have more than one existence. It may be contended that the existence of the pen, as qualified by the pen-character, and the existence of the pen, as qualified by the character of the stuff of which it is made, are different and so the assertion of the two existences is neither illegitimate nor unnecessary. But the contention is hollow. Granted that the existence of the pen *quâ* pen and its existence *qua* 'wood' are different, the latter existence as contrasted with its non-existence *qua* earthy substance would necessitate another sevenfold proposition. The upshot is that the predication of double existence in the same reference is logically impossible as it is ontologically false. It is maintained that the sevenfold predication as generated by a psychological and a logical necessity, which are based upon an ontological situation, and further that the predicates, in their different combinations, are to be understood in reference to the same context and not different contexts. The apparently 'identical pen' in reference to different material, as *e.g.*, the pen made of the wood and the pen made of steel, is only identical in one reference, but as concrete existents they are not absolutely the same. In the sevenfold predication, the subject and the predicate are to be understood as standing for the same ontological facts, subject to the same universe of discourse. The subject 'pen' in all the seven propositions is the same pen, of the same material, and not of different material. The combination of the first and third propositions is, thus, not logically factual. The combination of the second and third modes is equally a logical impossibility. The non-existence of the pen as other than pen is one identical attribute and the addition of another non-existence is logically false and ontologically unreal. It follows that the emergence of two other additional modes as the result of the synthesis of the first and second modes with the third alternately is not possible, logically and ontologically, and,

consequently, the number of propositions cannot be multiplied.

But a difficulty may be raised with regard to the last three modes, which arise from the synthesis of the first three modes consequently with the fourth mode. The fourth predicate is inexpressibility, which is but the abbreviated formula for the simultaneous co-existence of the positive and the negative attributes asserted in the first two propositions. 'The pen is inexpressible' is but an abbreviated assertion of the attributes of existence and non-existence at the same time in the same subject. Such being the case, the combination of the first and the fourth modes is not any more possible than in the case of the first and the third modes. The fifth mode is but the synthesis of the first and the fourth, but this should be impossible in view of the impossibility of the coincidence of two existences. The sixth mode should also be regarded as an impossibility, as the coincidence of two non-existences in the same reference is ontologically impossible and logically absurd. The seventh, again, being a combination of the first, second, third and fourth modes is vitiated by the same defect. But the difficulty raised is unreal. The simultaneous compresence of the positive and negative attributes, e.g., of existence and non-existence, is not a mere summation of the two attributes, existence plus non-existence, nor is the expression, 'inexpressibility' only an abbreviated formula for the combination of the such attributes. The compresence of the two opposite attributes is no doubt a fact, but the very compresence of the two attributes engenders a novel attribute, which is incapable of being expressed by human language. The inexpressibility is a synthetic attribute, different from its elements, and, so, the combination of the first, second and third attributes is neither ontologically impossible nor logically absurd. We shall subject the concept of inexpressibility to a further scrutiny when we shall discuss its difference from the third attribute.

To be brief, the import of the seven propositions may be asserted as follows. The first proposition asserts 'existence' as the principal predicate, the second asserts 'non-existence'; the third both existence and non-existence in succession, the fourth 'inexpressibility'; the fifth inexpressibility as qualified by 'existence', the sixth affirms the same as qualified by non-existence; and the seventh asserts inexpressibility as qualified by the successively occurring existence and non-existence. The assertion of the predicates only serves to emphasise the prominence of the attributes as psychologically felt. It is a matter of attention and interest that stress is laid upon one, but it

never means that the precedence accorded to it excludes the other attribute. The affirmation of existence in the first proposition does not exclude 'non-existence', which is stated in the second proposition, but implies it. We shall deal with the matter at greater length later on.

A question may be raised. If 'inexpressibility' be a distinct attribute, why should not 'expressibility' be considered another different attribute being its opposite ? If so, the assertion that attributes are of seven kinds only falls to the ground and, consequently, there should be eight modes of predication. But the Jaina does not think that expressibility is a novel attribute. That a thing is expressible as existent or non-existent is implied in the first two propositions, and, so, the predication of expressibility would not serve an additional purpose. And if for the sake of argument 'expressibility' be regarded as a novel attribute different from existence and non-existence and so on, still this would not cause a difficulty, as the attribute 'expressibility' together with its opposite 'inexpressibility' would give rise to a new sevenfold predication, as was seen to be the case with the attribute of existence and non-existence.

We have seen that the number of propositions cannot be multiplied further than seven. But is it not possible to reduce the number ? Are the attributes, whatever be their logical status, ontologically different ? But the attributes, existence and non-existence, are not ontologically different. A pen is existent *qua* pen and non-existent *qua* not-pen. But ontologically the existence of the pen is not different from its non-existence as not pen. The difference is only relative and as such is only an intellectual construction. The difference, though psychologically necessary, does not argue the ontological reality of two attributes. So, the first two propositions are not logically necessary, since either of them is adequate to account for the other. With the collapse of the first two propositions as logically superfluous, the rest of the propositions will fall to the ground automatically as they are founded upon the former in the ultimate analysis. It is submitted in reply that the position, no doubt, follows from the denial of negation as a factual characteristic, but the denial of the factuality of negation has been shown to lead to absurdities. It will suffice to observe that 'existence' is always determined by the self-identity of an entity and non-existence has reference to another entity in respect of another identity. So, the determinants of existence and non-existence are different and,

consequently, the determined should also be held to be different. Existence, undetermined by reference to the individuality of different entities, is only a blank abstraction. The existence of the pen is determined by its self-identity, and the self-identity in the very act of determining its existence implies its non-existence in the role of another entity possessing an identity different from it. Thus, it is the self-identity of an entity that determines its existence and the non-existence is determined by other-identity. Without these determinants, existence and non-existence are but nonsensical terms. It is the diversity of determinants which constitutes the diversity of the entities and the difference of existence and non-existence as ontological facts. If existence and non-existence were not ontologically different, a pen should be existent as not-pen as it is *qua* pen and should be non-existent *qua* pen as it is non-existent *qua* not-pen. That the difference between existence and non-existence, as entailed by the difference of determinants (*avacchedaka*), is real and factual difference can also be deduced from an analysis of the import of the positive and negative propositions. There is a material difference between the propositions 'The jar exists on the ground' and 'the jar does not exist on the ground.' The first proposition asserts the presence of the jar and the second asserts the absence of the jar, on the ground. If there were no difference between presence and absence, absence of the jar could be asserted even when the jar was present. But this is not possible and this is proof of the difference of existence and non-existence. The Buddhist insists on the triple characteristic of a logical probans as the ground for inferring the probandum. The probans, *e.g.*, smoke, must be shown to exist in the subject (minor term) and in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) and to be absent from the heterologue. If there were no difference between existence and non-existence, the triple character would be impossible.

The result may be summed up as follows. The first two propositions are significant and neither is a reduplication of the other. But what is the *raison d'etre* of the third proposition? The third proposition only states the successive occurrence of the two predicates noticed above. Suppose that a jar and a chair are successively perceived in a room and we assert the existence of the two entities therein. But the two are not different from each one of them. If 'two' is but a summation of the units, the third proposition is nothing but a summation of the first two. But the Jaina here would appeal to experience. That the combination of two units gives rise to

a separate entity is a matter of experience. Take for instance the word 'go'. It is nothing but the successive occurrence of two letters 'g' and 'o'. That the word 'go' is different from both 'g' or 'o' is a matter of perception. If the distinctive unity of the word 'go' were not a fact, and it were identical with the constituent letters, the pronunciation of 'g' or 'o' would be sufficient for communicating the meaning of 'go'. It cannot be, therefore, denied that the successive presence of two things gives rise to a third thing, which has a distinctive individuality from the constituent elements. We can elucidate the matter by adding further examples. A garland of flowers has no existence outside the flower-units, no doubt. But it cannot be denied that the garland is different from the flower-units, as the latter, outside the juxtaposition that gives rise to a garland, do not serve the purpose of a garland. It is a matter of experience, and not of pure logic, that the combination of two units gives rise to a distinct third, which is both different and non-different from the constituent units. The Jaina is emphatically empiricist here as elsewhere, when the nature of existence of an entity becomes the object of a doubt. The Buddhist and other idealistic logicians would scent a contradiction in such cases, but this is only another instance of the incompetency of pure logic to deal with the nature of existents *a priori* and independently of experience.

The third proposition, it has been seen is not a mere reduplication of the first two. That the combination of the predicates of the two propositions is a different predicate is, we trust, not open to sincere doubt. Let us now consider whether the fourth proposition is logically necessary. The logical necessity of the fourth proposition can be established if the simultaneous presence of two attributes can be shown to evolve an attribute distinct from the attributes predicated in the third proposition. The fourth predicate 'inexpressibility', it is urged, is but the abbreviated formula for occurrence of the positive and negative attributes. The third predicate also states the presence of these two. The difference between the third and fourth predicates consists in the difference of time of their occurrence. But is the difference of time a proof of an ontological difference? Let us consider the proposition, 'There are pen and paper on the table.' Our knowledge of the presence of pen and paper, in so far as it is derived from the knowledge of the proposition, is no doubt derived in succession. But this is due to the exigency of attribution, which cannot take place in one and the same time. It is obvious that the difference in the time of our cognitions cannot argue an ontological

difference. The presence of the two in one substratum is a fact which does not admit of a difference in the nature of their existence, though there may be a difference in the time-order of their cognition. The difference is at most subjective. Some exponents of the Jaina dialectic have tried to meet the objection on logical grounds. They assert that though there may be no ontological difference between the third and the fourth predicates, the logical difference between them cannot be denied. The difference is a matter of formal logic, and this is not incompatible with the lack of objective material difference. After all, the sevenfold predication is only a series of formal predications, the validity of which is to be determined by canons of formal consistency. The demands of formal consistency can be satisfied by the application of the test of redundancy. The fourth proposition would be redundant, if its import were self-identical with that of the third in form. But the identity of formal import is not present in these two propositions. This will be apparent from the consideration of the import of two propositions we have given in the beginning of the present chapter. 'The pen exists and does not exist' is the third proposition and 'the pen is inexpressible' is the fourth proposition. The predicate 'inexpressible' is but the abbreviated formula for the simultaneous presence of 'existence and non-existence' in the subject, 'pen'. Even admitting that there is no material difference between the successive presentation and the simultaneous presentation of the two attributes in the selfsame substratum, the difference in the formal import of the two propositions is not liable to doubt. In the third proposition, the principal predicate is non-existence, and existence is only its adjectival adjunct. In the fourth proposition the predicate consists of both existence and non-existence having co-equal status and prominence. In the latter proposition 'existence' is not a mere appendix to non-existence, which is the case in the third proposition. Thus there is no logical redundancy and this is the logical warrant for their separate assertion.

But this defence of the fourth proposition on grounds of formal logic has not commented itself to all. The difference must be ontological and objective, otherwise the sevenfold predication would be only a matter of subjective necessity, which should not have validity apart from its foundation in objective truth. Moreover, this formal defence would not preclude the admission of two other propositions in addition to the seven. The order of predication may be reversed in the third and seventh propositions, and this should

occasion two other propositions, the predicates having different formal import. Thus instead of asserting existence and non-existence in the order noted above, one may assert non-existence first and existence next, e.g., the proposition may be stated as 'The pen does not exist and exists.' Here the element of non-existence is given the formal status of an adjective to 'existence', and, so, its logical import is different from that of the third. In the seventh proposition the same reversal of the order of the two elements, existence and non-existence, would yield a different formal import. If formal logic were the determinant of the sevenfold predication, the introduction of the two additional propositions resulting from the admitted formal difference of import cannot be debarred by any logic. The difference of the predicates in the third and fourth propositions must be shown to be based upon a material difference, or either of them has to be expunged. Later exponents of the sevenfold dialectic are emphatically of the opinion that the difference is material and objective and not formal or subjective. The third predicate asserts the co-equal primacy of the two predicates taken together and the fourth predicate stands for a new attribute different from both. Let us examine the import of the predicates of the seven propositions *seriatim*, and the material difference of the attributes will become apparent.

The first predicate 'existence' is true, as the reality of the subject in its own context cannot be denied. The pen is really existent in so far as it is its own self. But this does not give us full insight into the nature of the pen. The pen is pen only because it is not not-pen. It can have a determinate existence only by virtue of its non-existence as anything else than pen. This attribute is asserted in the second proposition. Thus each of the two attributes belongs to the pen. But each by itself does not lay bare the individuality, but the two together do. The compresence of the two, again, does not exhaust the nature of the pen. It is equally a felt fact that the compresence gives rise to a novel attribute, which derives from the two and at the same time is different from both of them. The attribute, engendered by the synthesis of the two attributes, is different inasmuch as it not only contains the two elements but transforms them. The synthesis of the opposite attributes, existence and non-existence, stated in the third proposition, is only a synthesis of togetherness. But the fourth predicate goes further than this togetherness, inasmuch as it asserts an attribute which not only is a compresence of the two, but a novel attribute in which the two attributes are dissolved into one. A concrete

example may illustrate the truth of our contention. A beverage is made of several ingredients, sugar, curd, spices, and so on. It is a matter of perception that beverage has a self-identity of its own different from that of the ingredients. The beverage is a unit—an organic whole. Likewise the synthesis of the two attributes, existence and non-existence, gives rise to a novel attribute, which transcends the two and at the same time comprises them as distinct elements in its being. It would be a mistake to suppose that this novel attribute, which cannot be grasped by a definite concept and, so, inexpressible by a definite linguistic symbol, is the exclusive characteristic of a real. That inexpressibility or indefiniteness is a factual characteristic, and that it emerges on the synthesis of the opposites is a truth which cannot be denied without stultifying experience. But this does not mean that the 'indefinite' or the 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*) annuls the distinctive individuality of the elemental attributes, existence and non-existence. We must appeal to experience to determine the nature of existents; and, as has been set forth in the first chapter, reliance on abstract logic in this matter is more often than not a source of error and positive misconception. The indefinite or inexpressible is felt together with the definites, existence and non-existence. The pen is indefinite, but is felt as definite *qua* existent and non-existent at the same time. The fifth proposition asserts the compresence of 'existence' with the indefinite, the sixth affirms the compresence of non-existence, and the seventh completes the modes by affirming the consecutive presence of the two, with the 'indefinite.'

The indefinite or the unspeakable is a characteristic concept of Jaina philosophy. The Vedāntist has proved that the nature of existents, as revealed to empirical knowledge, is a complex indefinite, which cannot be characterized either as real, or unreal, or both, or neither. By reality the Vedāntist understands logical being, which does not admit of lapse or negation in time, space and its uniformity. Phenomenal reals have reality in their own context and are *non est* outside this context. So, they cannot be regarded as having reality in their own right. In the ultimate analysis, phenomenal objects are unspeakable as real or as unreal, since reality, absolute and unconditioned, is lacking in them. The very fact that they are non-existent elsewhere and elsewhere is proof of their lack of reality in their own nature and right. But they are not unreal fictions, as they are objects of experience while fictions are not. Thus, they are unspeakable and indefinable as real or unreal. The Vedāntist

concludes from these premises that the phenomenal objects are the creations of ignorance, cosmic or individual, and are unreal in the absolute sense. The Jaina admits the truth of the premises. But does not think that the Vedāntist conclusion is inevitable. The Jaina does not admit that reality is free from determinations. It is experience alone that can give us insight into the nature of reality, and experience acquaints us with determinate existents. Indeterminate or universal existence is only a matter of abstract thought. It has been said in the beginning of this chapter that the opposition of determinate being with indeterminate being is the starting point of the sevenfold dialectic. It has also been made clear that indeterminate being is only a logical thought and not an ontological fact, and that the relation of opposition does not presuppose the co-ordinate status of the opposites in the ontological order. The Jaina agrees with the Vedāntist that reals are indefinites, but this does not afford a logical warrant according to the Jaina for declaring them to be unreal appearance, engendered by ignorance. It is not untrue because it cannot be expressed by a single positive concept. We have to take it as it is, although it refuses to fit in with the logical apparatus, as employed by traditional philosophy. I take the liberty of quoting the pregnant observations of Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya and present them in spite of their difficulty to the reader without any comments. Prof. Bhattacharya with his microscopic vision has seized hold of the secret of Jaina thought and no better elucidation seems possible. "The determinate existent is ...being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the *Jaina* calls *kramārpaṇa*. The given indefinite—the 'unspeakable' or *avaktavya* as it has been called as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than consecutive togetherness;⁵ it implies *sahārpaṇa* or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. ...It is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence, it represents a category by itself. *The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if is not understood.*"⁶

5. The matter of predication of the third proposition.

6. *The Jaina theory of Anekānta-Vāda* by prof. K.C. Bhattacharya, p. 13. (The italics are mine.)

Section II

We now propose to discuss the import of each term of the propositions. Each term is logically significant and the significance of the terms contributes to the significance of the proposition as a whole. Let us consider the first two propositions. The first proposition is : 'The jar exists certainly in a context (*syād astyeva ghaṭah*). The formal definition of the first proposition may be propounded in the following terms. It is an affirmative proposition which asserts a positive fact without negating other characteristics in respect of a subject. In the example given the jar is the subject and 'exists' is the predicate, which is a property of the jar. The second proposition may be formally defined as follows: 'It is a negative proposition importing negation of a certain property without negating other characteristics.' 'The jar does not certainly exist in another context'. In the original proposition in Sanskrit two qualifying prepositions, viz., *syāt* and *eva* are employed. It is difficult to find exact equivalents of these two terms in English. We have tentatively rendered *syāt* as 'in a context' and *eva* as 'certainly'. We are conscious of the inadequacy of the English terms to connote the sense that the original terms signify. But the elucidation of the meaning of the terms will serve to preclude misconception and so we do not wait for exact equivalents. In our opinion the term *syāt* is untranslatable. Let us examine the logical value of the terms of the first proposition. The particle 'certainly' (*eva*) is logically necessary inasmuch as it serves to exclude an undesirable consequence. The existence of the jar is to be understood as existence in reference to its own context constituted by its own individuality and specific spatio-temporal setting, and not in reference to a different context. The particle 'certainly' (*eva*) is calculated to exclude this contingency. It helps to clarify the import of the predicate that it relates to the subject in reference to a particular context and not in a different reference. The negative implication is derived from the use of the particle *eva*, which we have tentatively translated as 'certainly.' It has a restrictive force and this should be understood as the meaning of the English equivalent. The exact implication of *eva* in the proposition is the exclusion of the negation of 'existence'. The predicate 'existence' is affirmed of the subject, and this affirmation can be significant, only if the predicate belongs as a matter of necessity to the subject. The element of necessity is indicated by the adverb 'certainly' (*eva*). It means that the predicate is a necessary concomitant of the connotation of the

subject, though not a part of it. It may be a synthetic proposition and the predicate may be a new attribute. But the very fact of predication implies that the attribute is not absent in the subject. The adverb 'certainly' implies that the attribute predicated is a necessary concomitant of the connotation of the subject, though not a part of the implication of the term, and the negation of the opposite follows from the necessity of the relation that is emphasised by it (*eva*).

The term *syāt* is untranslatable. It means that the subject possesses a manifold of attributes. In the proposition *syād ghaṭo 'sty eva* the particle *syāt* implies that the subject is a manifold of attributes of which the predicate is one as a matter of fact. That the predicate is one of the attributes possessed by the subject and that as a matter of necessity is implied by the term 'certainly' (*eva*). The full meaning of the first proposition may thus be stated as follows : "The jar is a substance of which 'existence' is one attribute as a matter of necessity among the pluralit of attributes that belongs to it." The phrase 'as a matter of necessity' implies that the predicate is never absent in the subject. It may be urged that the element of necessity is falsely introduced inasmuch as the opposite of existence, viz., non-existence, is also predicated of it in the second proposition. And the form of the proposition being the same, existence and non-existence, both being predicates, would belong to the subject as a matter of necessity. This seems to be a case of self-contradiction. But the Jaina does not find any contradiction in the two predicates belonging to the same subject, as existence and non-existence are determinate. If they were indeterminate, the contradiction would be inevitable. And the contradiction would again be irresistible if existence and non-existence were affirmed of the subject in the same reference. The jar is existent as a jar and non-existent as other-than-jar. There is no contradiction here. But if the jar were affirmed to be existent and non-existent both as a jar, the contradiction would be apparent. As in the first two propositions existence and non-existence are predicated in a determinate sense, there is no contradiction between them.

It is worthy of remark that the qualifying phrases *syāt* and *eva* are not absolutely indispensable for logical precision. It is necessary for those who have not realized the indeterminate nature of reality. Reals are indeterminate in the sense that they cannot be determined as possessing only such and such attributes and not the rest. The

particle *syāt* is employed only to emphasise this truth. But it is not necessary for a person who is aware of the manifoldness of reals. Similarly the particle 'eva' is redundant. They are employed only to guard against a customary misconception, and if such misconception be not present, they are not logically necessary. But a logical discourse is always aimed at persons, who are in doubt, but inquisitive for truth, and with regard to such persons the logical form has its significance and necessity.

Let us now sum up the results of the analysis of the import of the individual terms and determine the total import of the propositions. The import of the first proposition is thus to be stated as follow : "The jar is possessed of existence as determined by its own nature and so on." The second proposition means 'The jar is possessed of non-existence as determined by other individuality and so on.' The existence and non-existence that are predicated of the subject are determinate. 'The jar used as the subject in the proposition is only illustrative. We can substitute any existent for it and the predicate will relate to it. And as regards the predicates, 'existence' or 'non-existence,' they are also specific instances and can be replaced by any other attribute. The principle governing predication is that an attribute is necessarily concomitant with its negative. Whatever attribute, quality or action, may be predicated, it can be true of a subject only in reference to a context. The jar, for instance, exists in so far as it possesses the nature of jar and does not exist in the nature of a pen. Existence is determined by non-existence and vice versa. We have seen in the second chapter that non-existence is a case of other-existence. The jar is the non-existence of the pen and vice versa. Existence without reference to and independent of individual entities is only an abstraction of thought. 'A' can have existence because it has not existence as 'B.' Existence is always concrete and as such is defined and determined by other concrete existence. In other words, existence cannot be separated from what exists, though it is distinguishable in thought. What is said of existence also holds good of other attributes. A real is possessed of infinite attributes and these cannot be separated from the real. They are one with the real in the sense that they have no existence apart from and independent of the real, in which they are embodied. Thus all attributes are determinate in the sense of having determinate being. And determinate being means being in a particular reference outside which it is simply *non est*. So being and non-being are correlates and the predication of one

implies the predication of the other.

It follows then that the negative proposition is as much true as the affirmative one. It has been contended by others that being or existence⁷ constitutes the nature of a real and non-being only relates to another real. The import of the predicate in the proposition 'The jar exists' is that existence is a part and parcel of the reality of the jar. 'The jar does not exist' is really an apparent proposition, having only a formal similarity with the affirmative proposition. The predicate 'non-existence' does not in reality belong to the jar as a jar, but to what is not jar. The Jaina is also agreed that the negation of the attribute has reference to something else. The jar really exists as jar and *not as pen*. So negation of existence can have reference to the pen and other things which are not jar. If the non-existence of pen were an attribute of the jar, the colour, shape and other characteristics of the pen should also be the attributes of the jar. But this is absurd. The Jaina, however, does not think that the two cases are similar or that the contention is tenable. The colour, shape and other qualities of the pen are the exclusive properties of the pen and so cannot be predicated of any thing else. But non-existence-as-pen is an attribute of the jar. The jar has a self-existence and a self-identity which is inseparable from its non-existence-as-pen. As has been said above, existence has no objective status apart from the concrete real, and since one real is distinguished from another real, the existence of one is *ipso facto* distinguished from that of others. That one existence is distinct from another existence means that the two are not identical, that is to say, each has an identity of its own, which can be understood fully in reference to another existence. To know is to distinguish. A thing can be known fully as it is in itself only when it is known to be what it is not. It is really difficult to determine the status of the element of negation in the knowledge of a real—whether it is antecedent or consequent to the knowledge of the positive aspect. But the question of precedence is not material. It is undeniable that conception of a real is a complex of a positive and a negative aspect. The Jaina does not seem to be wrong when he insists that the determinate cognition of a real as what it is and as what it is not is a matter of intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous according to the nature of the object. It has been said in the fourth chapter that conceptual knowledge according to the Jaina

7. The Jaina does not distinguish between being and existence, which are always concrete.

is as much derived from objective reality as sense-intuition is.

Another consideration may be put forward in favour of the Jaina contention. 'The jar does not exist' is a proposition which has the same formal consistency as the affirmative proposition has. If non-existence be a characteristic, it must have a substratum of its own. The Naiyāyika would have us believe that it belongs to what is not-jar, since existence as pen and the like is denied of the jar, and the jar's non-existence is equivalent to the negation of existence as pen. But that only shifts the difficulty and does not solve it. The coincidence of non-existence and existence in the pen again would raise the same difficulty. The pen is a pen because it is not not-pen, that is to say, jar and the like. The negation of not-pen, is thus as much an element of its being as the pen-character is. The Jaina again substantiates his position by a different line of approach. He examines the implication of the substantive-adjective relation and arrives at the same result. 'Whatever is an adjectival determination is necessarily concomitant with its opposite. The predicate is an adjectival determination. The predicate is concomitant with its opposite.' This is a perfect syllogistic argument and is also materially true. Take any proposition and the truth will be obvious. 'The pen is red' is a proposition with 'red' as the predicate. Now, the predicate 'red' has significance only, because it is a determinate attribute, which it is by virtue of its negation of the opposite, not-red. Many things may be not-red, but the negation of not-red would apply only to what is red. The implication of the proposition 'the pen is red' is that 'the pen is not not-red as distinguished from diamond.' Not only is the law true of positive attributes, but it equally holds good of negative attributes also. 'The pen is not red,' though apparently a negative proposition, has a positive implication. The pen has some colour, which we know to be different from red. Even in what is held to be an absolutely negative proposition, *e.g.* 'Air has no colour,' the negation of colour has a positive implication in that colour is existent in some other substance. If we now apply the law to the cases under consideration, we shall see that the propositions 'The jar exists' and 'the jar does not exist' are rather complementary to one another and not inconsistent. Existence, being a predicate and an adjective, must be concomitant with its opposite, non-existence, and similarly non-existence, being a predicate, will be concomitant with existence.⁸ The Vedāntist

8. *astitvaṃ pratiṣedhyaṇā' vinābhāvyekadharmiṇi. nāstitvaṃ pratiṣedhyaṇā'*
vinābhāvyekadharmiṇi.
 AS, verses 17 & 18.

complains of contradiction in the coincidence of existence and non-existence in one substratum. But the Jaina is emphatic in his repudiation of the charge. There is no incompatibility, as the existence of a thing *qua* itself and non-existence *qua* others are not unperceived. It is non-perception of co-existence, which is the determinant of contradiction, but this is conspicuous by its absence here. It is not a fact that existence is incongruent with non-existence, or that one supersedes the other as light does darkness. We have fully discussed the nature and scope of the Law of Contradiction in the first chapter and the arguments need not be reproduced here.

The justification of the first two propositions in the chain of sevenfold predication has drawn us into a discourse on the subject-predicate relation. But the position adopted by the Jaina involves him in open conflict with the Naiyāyika and we cannot avoid adverting to the controversy even though it may necessitate a digression.

The Naiyāyika believes in certain facts which are always existent and their opposites are inconceivable. For example, 'expressible,' 'cognisable' 'knowable' are attributes which are not inapplicable to anything and as such have no opposites. They are universally predicable. But as they have no opposites the Jaina's position that all predicates are concomitant with their opposites cannot hold good in these cases. Is there anything which is inexpressible or unknowable ? To assert that A exists and is inexpressible or unknowable involves self-contradiction, inasmuch as the very assertion of it as A presupposes its being known and the act of assertion constitutes its expression. This is certainly a plausible argument against the Jaina position. But the plausibility will not bear scrutiny. 'Knowability' is a definite concept and it can have a meaning only if it negates its opposite. If a thing is called knowable by virtue of its being cognised by an accredited instrument of cognition, then of course fictions are not knowable. So the opposite of 'knowable' will not be wanting. If, however, 'knowable' be taken to stand for 'thinkable,' then also such expressions as "square circle" are available as the examples of 'unthinkable.' The question can be decided by a dilemma. Is the expression 'unknowable' unmeaning ? It cannot be entirely meaningless, as nobody would then care to assert it or feel called upon to rebut it. So the opposite of 'knowable' is not absent. Further if we descend from the realm of abstract speculation

to the field of concrete reals, we shall have to acknowledge that the proposition, 'The jar is knowable' affirms the predicate in a determinate sense. The jar is knowable as a jar and not as a pen. Here the 'pen' will stand as its opposite. So all concepts, in so far as they have meaning, will have their opposites. The Naiyāyika's advocacy of purely positive attributes thus cannot create a difficulty from the Jaina standpoint. The fact can be made further clear from the consideration that the Naiyāyika would not have an occasion to make such assertions as that there are purely positive attributes, if there was no possibility of dispute. The Naiyāyika may succeed in exposing the inconsistency in the position of the opponent who would deny it. But the very necessity of logical defence shows that 'unknowable' may be logically untenable, but psychologically possible. As regards 'expressibility' the Jaina does not think it to be without its opposite. This has been made clear in our treatment of the concept of inexpressibility in Chapter V. We have seen that the law that the predicable attribute has its negative concomitant holds good also in the case of so-called purely positive attributes. We must consider the cases of fictions, *e.g.*, sky-flower, a barren woman's son, square circle, phoenix, centaur and the like. Nobody would commit the absurdity of supposing that they are existent in any reference. These absolutely unreal fictions are logically predicable, but they have no positive concomitant, which they should have if the law of the mutual implication of opposites were universally true. But the Jaina would not take these fictions as purely negative ideas. If they are thinkable, they exist as thought constructions, though not as objective facts. Viewed from this point of view their objective non-existence is found to be commensurate with conceptual existence. It is not maintained that the negative concomitant should have coordinate status—an objective non-existence having subjective existence as its implicate or vice versa will equally meet the requirements of the law. And if we look deeper, coordinate status of the positive and negative concomitants can also be discovered in these cases. These fictions are complex constructions of incongruous elements. Both square and circle, sky and flower, a barren woman and a son, are objectively existent facts. But their combination is only non-existent. So the concomitance of existence and non-existence is found to hold good in these cases also.

The law of concomitance of opposites is only a deduction from the Jaina conception of determinateness of existence and as such

holds good of all reals, irrespective of their role in logical thought. We have applied the law to predicates, but that is only by way of illustration. Predicate or subject, the law holds good of all facts. The conception of determinate existence is in direct opposition to the Vedāntist position of one universal existence which admits of no negation. It is again opposed to the Fluxist position that non-existence is only a fiction. A determinate existence is a complex of existence and non-existence, both being real elements of it. The first proposition is thus in need of being supplemented by the second—each being an incomplete description taken by itself. Let us now elucidate the import of the propositions in the light of the results of our speculations. 'The jar exists' would thus be correctly interpreted as 'X (the jar) is the substratum of existence as determined by the nature of jar'. The existence predicated of the jar is thus determinate and we mean this when we further amplify the original proposition, 'The jar exists,' by adding the restrictive clause 'as jar' to it. The second proposition is 'The jar does not exist' which is further amplified as 'The jar does not exist as pen and so on.' The non-existence of the jar is determined by the pen and the like which stand for the whole class of not-jar. The negative particle 'not' in connection with the verb means 'non-existence' and the latter is determined by the pen and like. The non-existence predicated would thus be determinate. The full import of the second proposition thus amounts to the following—'The jar is the substratum of non-existence as determined by the nature of pen-and-the-like.' A non-existence is identical with the reality in which it subsists, the non-existence of pen and the like would be identical with the jar. The propositions only affirm the truths which have been established by us in the second Chapter.

We have repeatedly asserted that existence and non-existence are always determinate. Existence is determined by the specific nature or individuality of the subject (*svārūpa*) and non-existence is in its turn determined by the nature or individuality of things, which are different from the subject (*pararūpa*). There are also other determinants of existence and non-existence, viz., substance (*dravya*), location (*kṣetra*), and time (*kāla*). What are we to understand by these determinants? To return to the example given, 'The jar exists,' the predicate 'existence' is said to be determined by the nature of the jar. But what is the exact significance of the expression 'nature' of the jar? The Jaina answers the question in his characteristic way. It is not

necessary according to him to enter into a metaphysical discourse to determine the nature of the jar. It all depends upon the universe of discourse. By 'the nature of the jar' one can understand the connotation of the term, which, in terms of ontology, is the uniform attribute or attributes that characterize all jars, and by 'the nature of others' one can understand the connotation of the terms expressing pen and the like. The existence of the jar would thus be determined by the attributes which invariably present themselves to our mind when we think of the jar. The result is the same. A jar exists so far as it possesses the attributes which we associate with it in our thought. If a jar were to exist as partaking of the attributes of a pen, the jar would not be distinguishable from the pen. And if, again, it did not exist as possessed of the attributes which characterise it just as it does not exist as possessed of the attributes of pen and the like, it would be a non-entity like a sky-flower. The nature of a real is, however, composed of an infinite number of attributes, which cannot be fully comprehended by the limited intellect that mankind normally possesses. But that does not make our knowledge unreal or false, though undoubtedly it must be incomplete as we are at present constituted. Any attribute that we comprehend in a real will be a real part of its nature. What is necessary in a philosophical discourse is that we must stick to it throughout. Thus, one is at liberty to think of the jar as a name, as a substance, or as a mode. And in affirming its existence we must remember that the predicate belongs to the subject in respect of the nature in which we understand it. The predication of non-existence likewise will have reference to a nature other than this. It is quite legitimate again to take the jar in a very restricted sense, for example, as possessed of a distinctive magnitude. The affirmation of existence of the jar would then be determined by this magnitude and the negation of existence would then be determined by other magnitude, which it does not possess. The logical consequences will be the same in spite of the variation of our conception, as the affirmation and negation of existence will have reference to the particular conception. Thus, if the jar as possessed of the name, or the mode or magnitude were not to exist *qua* these determinations like the pen, it would be a non-entity, and if it were again to exist in respect of opposite determinations, it would not be distinguishable from things which possess the latter determinations. We do not think it necessary to multiply instances. What is necessary is to recognize the metaphysical truth that things are possessed of an

infinte plurality of attributes and the predication of one among these attributes is not false, though it is admittedly incomplete as a description of the nature of the subject. Every one of these attributes is true, but it would be a mistake, which is however traditional, to suppose that these alone constitute the nature of things.

We are now to consider the nature of other determinants, viz., substance, time and location, which we have referred to. The word 'substance' (*dravya*) here stands for the material or stuff of which it is made. The substance of the jar is thus clay. It exists as made of this material and is non-existent in respect of another material, e.g., gold. The proposition 'the jar exists' is thus to be completed by the insertion of the qualifying phrase 'of clay'. The jar of clay exists and not the jar of gold. That the material stuff is a necessary determinant of the predicate is obvious from the consideration that it has the same logical consequences as the first determinant notified above. Thus if the jar were to exist in respect of another material, it would not be possible to assert that the jar is of clay and not of gold. A rich man may have a jar made of gold. But the gold jar would not be the same thing as the clay-jar. The difference is due to the difference of the material, though shape, size and function may be similar. The difference of material is only an instance of the difference of substance. The jar exists in clay and has no reality outside it. The same truth holds in the case of qualities also. The qualities must inhere in their respective substances and outside these substances, they have no being. Even in the case of those qualities which are known to inhere in more than one substance, the determination of the existence of these qualities by means of substance is also not wanting. Conjunction and disjunction, for instance, are qualities which relate to two things. It requires two things to be conjoined together and two again for one to be disjoined from the other. Though one substance cannot determine the existence of these qualities, the two together as their substrates will have the determining influence. Conjunction and disjunction can have existence only in their own substrates and not in others. Thus, the third substance will determine their non-existence. If these attributes were to have indeterminate substance, that is to say, if they could be supposed to exist in other substances than those in which they actually exist, the predicate of determinate conjunction or disjunction would be impossible. And if again they were not to exist even in their own substrates as they do not, in fact, in different substrates, they would be non-existent fictions.

Similarly, location is to be taken into account as determinant of the existence of things. The jar exists on the ground and not on the wall. The ground will be the specific location of the jar and the wall will be the location of other than jar. If a jar were to exist both in its own location and in the location of other things, the jar would not be a determine existent. And if it were not to exist even in its own location, it would not exist anywhere, as it admittedly does not exist outside its own location. Location is thus a determinant of the existence of things, which are what they are by virtue of their possession of specific locations, which cannot be interchanged.

Time again is a determinant of existence. The jar exists in its own time and not in other time. The jar's own time is the present time and other time is the past or the future. If time were not a determinant of its existence, the jar could exist in the past and the future and thus would be an eternal substance. By the 'present time' we must understand the duration of time during which a jar endures. It has an upper and a lower limit constituted by its origin and its end. The upper limit separates the past from the present and the lower limit furnished by the end of the jar constitutes the future. Certainly it is absurd to suppose that the jar can exist in all these three divisions of time, or to suppose that it does not exist in its own time as it does not in the past and the future. The Vedāntist denies the reality of these determinations, but the denial of determinations is itself a case of determination. But unless a person is prepared to acquiesce in the Vedāntist's conclusion, or the Śūnyavādin's conclusion that nothing exists, he will have to accept the findings of the Jaina on the reality of these determinations. The full import of the proposition 'the jar exists' is thus to be elucidated as follows : 'The jar is the substratum of existence as determined by the nature of the jar, its substance (of clay), its present time and its own location.' The non-existence of the jar would likewise be determined by reference to time, place and substance.

The affirmation of the universal proposition, that the nature of reals is determined by the fourfold internal determinant as what it is and by the fourfold external determinant as what it is not, raises a problem about these determinants themselves. Are the determinants determinate ? If so, they must have internal and external determinants. And the same question will be raised regarding the second set, which again will require a third set of internal and external determinants, and the third set will require a fourth set and so on to

infinity. The universal necessity insisted upon will lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* and the denial of this necessity at any stage will amount to surrender of a fundamental doctrine. It may be maintained on the analogy of the final self-determined stage that reals may be self-determined. The Jaina meets the problem by taking his stand upon concrete realism. He refuses to accept the solution that experience determines the nature of things as it is without reference to any determinant, external or internal. In the determination of the nature of reals the Jaina banks upon the testimony of experience, but he refuses to be a party to deliberate or undeliberate twisting of it. It is experience which envisages a real determined as existent and non-existent by its internal and external determinants respectively. If *a priori* considerations were depended upon in the determination of reality, there would be no check and no uniform standard. A real is to be accepted to be what it is found to be in experience. The dictum 'Things are determined by their proofs'⁹ cannot be denied. If the knowledge of the determinant required another determinant, we would admit its necessity. If it did not require such determinants, we would not insist upon it. If the determination of the nature of the determinant actually depends upon another determinant, that need not cause a difficulty. A thing has a nature of its own and if the determination of the nature actually requires another nature of its own and that is found in experience, the first nature will be determined. And the second nature may or may not have a third nature. What is determined by another or is determined by itself has to be discovered by experience. The matter can be explained by reference to concrete facts. The specific nature (*svarūpa*) of a self (*jīva*) is to change into mental states and this mental change assumes one form as cognitive activity. Thus cognitive activity will be its internal determinant and the subsence of cognitive activity will be its external determinant. This determinant again has its specific determinants. Thus cognition is of two kinds—mediate or non-perceptual and immediate or perceptual. The nature of immediate cognition is its lucidity (*vaiśadya*) and that of the mediate is the lack of lucidity. Immediate or perceptual cognition has again two varieties—perfect and imperfect. Perfect perception is cognisant of the complete nature of all things and imperfect perception takes note of parts of things. It is thus a matter of experience whether a

9. vastuno hi yathaivā 'bādhitapratītis tathaiva svarūpavyavasthā, mānādhinā meyasiddhir iti vacanāt. SBT, p. 34.

determinant has another determinant. If a determinant is found ultimately to be self-explanatory and self-determinant, there is no reason whatsoever to question its validity.

The contention that everything should be regarded as self-determined on the analogy of such determinants is a piece of hollow sophistry. Now, consciousness is found to reveal itself and its objects. Will it be a sound argument to maintain that brute material facts should be self-revelatory like consciousness ? The nature of reals should be determined to be exactly what they are found to be and not otherwise. Fire is hot and water is cold, though both are substances. Is it sound logic to argue that fire should be cold like water, as both are substances ? The difficulty raised by the opponent regarding the nature of determinants is thus found to be imaginary. As regards external determinants, there is absolutely no problem, since the number of reals being infinite and their nature being distinct and different in each, the nature of one can be easily distinguished from that of others. It cannot be maintained that things may be numerically different, yet they may have the same nature. 'A' is different from 'B' because 'A' has a nature different from that of 'B'. Either it has to be said that there is no plurality of things, or their different nature is to be conceded. Even if more than one entity is admitted, the second will determine the first and the first will determine the second externally. The difficulty about external determination is thus non-existent. And as regards internal determination we have shown that the difficulty is a figment of pure logic.

Another problem and we shall finish with the first two propositions. Let us examine the relation of subject and predicate in the first proposition. Let the proposition be 'The self exists.' Is 'existence,' the predicate in the proposition, different and distinct from the subject, 'self' ? Or, are they identical ? If the subject and predicate meant the self-identical thing, the relation of subject and predicate, substantive and adjective, and the relation of coincidence of the predicate with the connotation of the subject in the subject (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) would not be possible. The subject and the predicate denoting the same things would be two synonymous terms and the proposition would be tautologous. The statement of either the subject or the predicate would be sufficient. Of course it is possible to regard all propositions as analytical in character. But we do not solve the problem by such terminological devices. An analytical proposition is a proposition nonetheless. If the predicate did not mean

anything different from the subject and vice versa, it is patent on the face of it that there would be no proposition. The problem is, 'Is a proposition possible' ? We see that it is not possible if the subject and the predicate are of self-identical import. The self-same difficulty is confronted even in what are called synthetic propositions. Let the proposition be 'The pen is red.' It is a synthetic proposition inasmuch as the predicate, 'red,' stands for a quality which does not follow from the connotation of the subject. But the question may be raised, does red mean the same thing as the subject ? Are they identical in meaning ? If the answer be in the affirmative, the objection of tautology stands unrefuted. Apart from this difficulty which is common to all propositions, the propositions 'the pen exists' or 'the self exists' are instances, in which the problem is further aggravated by grave difficulties. The predicate 'existence' is to be asserted of all entities and if the relation of the predicate to the subject were 'identity' all entities would become identical, being identical with a self-same predicate, 'existence.' This will be manifest from analysis of the proposition we have taken for consideration, *viz.*, 'The self exists.' The self is identical with existence, which is identical with all that exists. The result is, the self would be everything. This is the conclusion of the Vedāntist, but a realist would not take it to be true.

Identity cannot then be the relation between the subject and the predicate in a proposition, because of its untoward consequences, one logical and another ontological. The logical consequence of this view is the fallacy of tautology and the ontological consequence is the abolition of diversity and pluralism. Vedānta deduces these very consequences as evidence of the unreality of diversity, but a realist cannot be a party to it. Let us then consider the other alternative. Let the relation between the subject and the predicate be one of difference. 'The pen is red' is a proposition. If the pen were different from 'red,' it would not be red, and if 'red' were different from the pen, it would not be affirmed of it. But the difficulty is accentuated in a pronounced form in the proposition, 'The self exists.' If the self were different from existence, it would have no existence and it would be a fiction. And as has been observed before, existence being a universal predicate, each and every thing would be a fiction, being the subject of 'existence' and being different from it like the self. The consequence will be nothingness of the universe—the conclusion of *śūnyavāda*. The consequences are equally fatal to logic and realism. But it is equally difficult to maintain that the relation of the subject

and the predicate is neither numerical identity nor numerical difference, since the two are contradictorily opposed and the denial of one involves the affirmation of the other according to the Law of Excluded Middle.

The Naiyāyika solves the problem by means of 'inherence' (*samavāya*). He would have it that though existence be different from the self, the former can be in the latter by relation of *samavāya* or inherence. Existence inheres in the self, though numerically different from it. But *samavāya* or inherence is a logical fiction apart from identity-cum-difference, which is the Jaina position. We shall examine this *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* concept in a separate chapter and shall see that it is only a device of philosophical escapism. The Jaina meets the difficulty by practically denying its reality. The difficulty is a creation of abstract logic, which the Jaina has condemned. The relation of the subject and the predicate is neither identity alone nor difference alone, but both together. If 'existence', as the predicate, were identical with the subject, the subject would be absolutely existent, and if it were different, the subject would be absolutely non-existent. But concrete reals are neither absolutely existent, nor absolutely non-existent. They are existent and non-existent both. If the predicate 'existence' be taken to stand for the whole substance, being concurrent with it, the relation can be taken to be identity. Existence as an attribute has no objectivity apart from the subject and is inseparable from it. Inseparability is concomitant with identity. The identity of a real is inseparable from it. And only that is inseparable from a real which constitutes its identity. Existence is inseparable from the self or the pen, because it constitutes its identity. But though inseparable and so identical, it does not constitute the whole of the identity. The pen and the self are both identical with existence, but still they are different and diverse, because existence is only a part of their being. We have to admit that the subject and the predicate are identical and different both, because we cannot get rid of the two, unless we are prepared to escape into the strangle-hold of Vedānta or to court intellectual death which the nihilism of *śūnyavāda* holds out as a temptation.

Section III

We have completed the survey for the first two propositions and discussed all the relevant problems in connection therewith. We now propose to survey the remaining propositions. 'The jar exists and does

not exist (in their relevant contexts)' is the third proposition. Herein the two attributes, existence and non-existence, are successively predicated of the subject, 'jar'. It has already been established that the two attributes together form a different attribute from each of them and the resulting attribute is not a mere mechanical juxtaposition of two separate attributes, predicated respectively in the first and the second proposition. We shall further discuss and evaluate the objections that have been advanced by the absolutist philosophers against the entire system of predication at the end of the chapter. The import of the predicate and of the subject has been fully discussed and that makes further discussion of the import of the proposition unnecessary. As regards the fourth proposition, the crux of the problem centres upon the predicate 'inexpressible' and we have discussed threadbare all the problems involved in the concept in the preceding chapter. It will be sufficient to observe here that the fourth proposition may be defined as one in which the attribute of inexpressibility is predicated of the subject. But inexpressibility is not the sole and sufficient characteristic. It is only one among many. That it is a different attribute from the predicates of the first, second and third propositions has been fully made out and we do not see anything to add to what has been said already.

The Jaina prefaces all the propositions by the word 'syāt,' which indicates that it is only a partial characterization. Our previous investigations have made the task of explaining the remaining propositions rather an easy affair. The fifth proposition asserts the compresence of two attributes, existence and inexpressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to the subject *qua* a substance in respect of its internal determinations. The 'inexpressibility' is an attribute which relates to the substance standing in the relation of identity and distinction to its changing modes. The subject, so far as it is identical with and immanent in the changing modes which are continually passing from being into non-being, is certainly not expressible by a word. It is also beyond the realm of logical thought, but is to be apprehended in intuitive experience alone. Logic can show only the possibility of such a concern. The sixth proposition stresses the negative aspect together with the attribute of inexpressibility. Each one of these attributes has been proved to be true of the subject and the compresence of the two is also a matter of fact. The seventh proposition asserts 'existence-cum-non-existence-cum-inexpressibility.' It gives a fuller

and more comprehensive picture than the preceding ones, but does not supplant them. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of these attributes, which are separately asserted in three propositions. It has been shown that synthesis is not a mere summation, but entails the emergence of a new attribute different from the three elements. The seventh predicate is thus not a reduplication. It is one and three attributes at the same time. If it were three, it would be superfluous. But the unity is not secured by superseding the elements. The elements are preserved intact with all their individuality and it is through their co-operation that the seventh attribute is evolved into being.

Each of the seven propositions has been examined and none being found to be unnecessary in virtue of the predicates being in each case new and real. The predicates from the third onward are synthetic in character, but their separate individuality has been proved. Each proposition constitutes an estimation of reality, which has been either advocated by the school of philosophers as a matter of historical fact or is capable of being entertained as a possible evaluation. The Sāṅkhya believes in one *Prakṛti*, the prius of the material world. It is a substance which is undergoing constant change into modes and attributes. But still the plurality constituted by the modes is ignored and the unity is thought to be the sole characteristic. The assertion of the first proposition would explain the Sāṅkhya position. But this is only a partial and incomplete representation of reality.

The Jaina supplements it by the second proposition, and the remaining modes, being consequential, would *ipso facto* be true. The Buddhist fluxist concentrates his attention on the aspect of change and declares it alone to be the character of reality. The second proposition would represent his position. This is corrected by the introduction of the first. The Sāṅkhya represents one extreme by upholding the unitive character of substance, whereas the Buddhist advocates the other extreme by asserting the plurality constituted by the changing modes to be the sole reality and dismissing the unitive substance behind them. The Jaina asserts the reality of both in one, as each is attested in uncontradicted experience. The *Sūnyavādin* finds it impossible to reconcile the unchanging substance with its changing modes and he thinks being and non-being to be mutually contradictory. But he does not fail to recognize the factuality of both, though he characterizes it as inexpressible, and inexpressibility or

logical indefinability is according to him the proof of the unreality of things. We have found that things are not absolutely inexpressible and how the advocacy of inexpressibility, as the sole and whole character of reality, leads to self-contradiction. Inexpressibility is a real characteristic which is not susceptible of being dismissed as a false appearance, since it is not sublated by a subsequent corrective experience like an error of perception. Nor does the cognition of inexpressibility involve a logical error, as we have shown.

The Vedāntist rightly shows that inexpressibility is invariably associated with the being of a real, but he is convicted of extremism by the Jaina for asserting the element of being as the sole and exclusive character of reality and for construing the element of inexpressibility as proof of the unreality of empirical facts following the lead of the *Śūnyavādin*. Jain logic does not endorse this interpretation, since it finds no contradiction in the coincidence of being and non-being. The coincidence of being and non-being in a real is certainly not capable of being grasped by a single concept or a linguistic symbol; but that is not proof of its unreality, but of the limitation of human language and conceptual thought. The Jaina accepts each one of the conclusions of these philosophers, as representative of a different aspect of reality. He does not repudiate their findings as false, but he insists that the fallacy of these philosophical positions lies in their exclusiveness and extremism. These philosophers taught true doctrines, but they erred by insisting on their discoveries being the exclusive nature of reality. The Jaina profits by their speculations and in his comprehensive philosophy finds room for them all. Each taken by itself is a true evaluation, but inadequate. He charges the philosophers with inadequacy and extremistic outlook, which, he thinks, is due to their preoccupation with their findings and impatience to look at the other side of the shield. The Jaina makes the extremes meet in his system of thought and calls his own philosophy by the name of non-extremism and non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). The non-absolutism of the Jaina is not the result of negation of absolutes and extremes, but of comprehension of them in a system. The empirical reality of the Vedāntist called *vyāvahārikasattā* is the absolute truth of the Jaina, and the latter refuses to accompany the Vedāntist in his philosophical excursion into the transcendental plane, which the Jaina thinks to be an airy abstraction hypostatized, as it lacks the sanction of experience, which is the only proof of existence.

The theory of sevenfold predication may be regarded as a logical elaboration of the position of the Jaina that each position is concomitant with its negation, or which is the same thing, that position is inconceivable without negation. This logical theory is in its turn derived from Jaina ontology that reality is determinate. We have shown that determinate reality is the focal point in which being and non-being coincide. Absolutism consists in maintaining either being or non-being as absolute truth and in holding that one is in absolute opposition to the other. The Vedāntist and the *Śūnyavādin* are paragons of absolutism. The former holds being, absolute and undetermined by non-being, as the whole truth, whereas the Buddhist nihilist accepts non-being as the only truth. The Jaina is non-absolutist in that he accepts both as the true determinations of the real, which is unique and common, particular and universal, positive and negative, rolled into one. But is this non-absolutism absolute and universal? The proof of non-absolutism is the sevenfold predication. Does the sevenfold predication apply to non-absolutism itself? If it does apply, non-absolutism will be concomitant with its opposite, which is the subject-matter of the second predicate. The first proposition will be 'non-absolutism exists' and the second proposition will be 'non-absolutism does not exist.' The negation of non-absolutism is equivalent to the affirmation of absolutism. Thus the universal advocacy of non-absolutism is vitiated by self-contradiction in that it ends in affirming absolutism. Non-absolutism is either absolute or non-absolute. If it is absolute, non-absolutism is not universal, which is the position of the Jaina, since at any rate there is one real which is *absolute*. If non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not absolute and as such it is not the universal truth. Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus simply evaporates. The same result is attained from a further consideration of the implication of the second predication, which has been shown to amount to affirmation of absolutism. This absolutism, being in its turn, non-absolute, would require another absolute as its opposite, and the latter again another and so on to infinity. If sevenfold predication be not applicable to the truth of non-absolutism, the former would not be universal, which is again a contraction of the Jaina position.

The Jaina holds non-absolutism to be the universal truth and as such it is not exempt from application of the sevenfold predication, which is the sole criterion of non-absolutism. The application of the

test does not, however, lead of self-contradiction as alleged above. It has been observed, at the outset of the present chapter, that opposition is a logical relation and it is not necessary that the opposite must be of the same ontological status. It is enough if the other opposite is conceivable. Such being the case, the opposite of the non-absolute is not inaccessible. In point of fact, the absolute is of two types, *viz.*, the true absolute and the false absolute and similarly also, the non-absolute is true and false. The true absolute is one of the infinite attributes that are actually present in a real and is envisaged by cognition as it is without implying the negation of the remaining attributes. Such cognition, which takes stock of one attribute without implying the negation of other attributes that are actually present in it, is called 'partial knowledge' or *naya*. *Naya* is not false though it is partial knowledge, provided it takes stock of a real attribute without asserting or implying the negation of other attributes. Such an attribute or such partial cognition is regarded as the 'true absolute' (*samyagekānta*). But when one attribute is apprehended as constituting the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes which are really present, such attribute and such cognition are example of 'the false absolute' (*mithyaikānta*). Thus there are two types of partial knowledge—one true and the other false. The true nature of a real as consisting of an infinite plurality of attributes is, however, apprehended by a valid knowledge which is called *pramāṇa*. Such valid knowledge, which takes stock of the several attributes, existence and non-existence also, which are the real properties of the real, is the 'true non-absolute.' The false non-absolute is illustrated by that kind of knowledge, which takes stock of attributes, which are not really present in the object. It is non-absolute in the sense that it does not affirm one attribute only as constitutive of the whole nature of the real, implying the negation of the other attributes. It is the opposite of absolutism, which consists in the affirmation of one attribute to the exclusion of others. But it is false in that the attributes in question are unreal. So the non-absolute also admits of two varieties—one false and the other true.

Let us apply the results attained to the problem raised, *viz.*, whether sevenfold predication applies to the truth of non-absolutism. The 'true non-absolute' has been found to have its opposite in the 'true absolute' and the sevenfold predication can start on with these two opposites. 'It is absolute'; 'it is non-absolute'; 'it is both'; 'it is inexpressible' (as the two opposites together cannot be thought by a

single concept or expressed by a single word); 'it is absolute and inexpressible'; 'it is non absolute and inexpressible'; 'it is absolute, non-absolute and inexpressible.' It does not require any further proof to assert that the application of sevenfold predication to the universal truth of non-absolutism does not involve the consequences of self-surrender or infinite regression, which were believed by the opponent to be unavoidable. The non-absolute is constituted of absolutes as its elements, and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes. If it be permitted to employ an imagery, the non-absolute may be compared with a tree and its absolute elements with the branches and members of the same. As the tree disappears if the branches and members are taken out, the non-absolutue would similarly vanish if the absolute elements were not there.

We have established the sevenfold predication with the two attributes, existence and non-existence. Though we have repeatedly asserted that the attributes in question are only illustrative in character and our selection of these two was inspired by the recognition of the fact that the two attributes were the elemental characteristics of things, we now propose to add two more typical illustrations for the sake of easy understanding of the comprehensive scope of the doctrine. Let us take two pairs of attributes, permanent and impermanent, one and many, and illustrate the sevenfold predication with them.

The jar is permanent and 'the jar is impermanent' are the two elemental propositions and the predication is true of reality. The jar *qua* the unitive substance is continuous through all the modes and as such is permanent. The substance of the jar is again earthy material, which is ever present. From the point of view of the material substance, the jar is again a mode of it. So the affirmation of permanence in respect of the jar *qua* its material substance is true. The jar, again, as immanent in its modes and attributes, is identical with the latter and from the point of view of such identity the jar is as impermanent as the modes are. The construction of the derivative modes being quite consequential, it need not be discussed in detail. The import of the first proposition may be stated as follows : The jar is possessed of the attribute, permanence, so for as it is determined by its substantive character. The second proposition may present a problem according as the interpretation of the predicate may differ. 'Impermanent' may mean the attribute, 'absence of permanence,' or it may be interpreted as 'different from permanent.' The first

interpretation does not present any specific problem as it is quite on a par with the attribute of non-existence. There is no difficulty that permanence and impermanence may co-exist in one substratum in respect of different determinations, viz., as substance and as changing modes. There is absolutely no contradiction between the attributes as they relate to different facts, e.g., permanence relates to the substance and impermanence to the modes. The contradiction would arise if both the predicates were to relate to the self-same thing, that is to say, if permanence and impermanence were affirmed in respect of the substance or of the modes in the same reference. But that is not the case and so the propositions are not incompatible. But a real difficulty occurs if the second interpretation is followed. The jar is a unit and cannot be both permanent and impermanent in the contemplated sense. 'The jar is permanent' means 'the jar is identical with 'the permanent' and 'the jar is impermanent' means 'the jar is different from 'the permanent.' The jar, which is permanent, cannot have 'difference' from 'permanent', since difference is an attribute which subsists in the whole of a real. It is not a part-characteristic like 'conjunction' (*saṃyoga*) or attributes derived from conjunction, red or blue. A jar may be red and non-red, red in one part and non-red in another part. These attributes are called part-characteristics, since the locus of one is not the locus of the other (*avyāpyavṛtti*). But difference is not a part-characteristic, as it belongs to the subject as a whole. Difference or identity, on the other hand, are whole-characteristics (*vyāpyavṛtti*). If 'A' is different from 'B', it can be so if 'A' as a whole would be different, in other words, if it has an identity unshared by 'B' in any aspect.

The Jaina however does not believe in whole-characteristics at all and the denial of whole-characteristics is only a corollary of the dictum that the positive is the correlate of the negative.¹⁰ 'Difference' would not be a determinate attribute, if it did not negate its opposite. An indeterminate attribute is only a contradiction in terms. The Jaina asserts that difference being a determinate characteristic must be concomitant with its opposite, otherwise it would cease to be an attribute at all. Such being the case, difference and identity, so far as they are determinate characteristics, must be co-existent in the same substratum, and this knocks out the Naiyāyika's differentiation between whole-characteristic and part-characteristic and the difficulty based upon it. The hollowness of

10. *astūtvam pratīṣedhyenā 'vinābhāvy ekadhāriṇī* AMI, Chap. I, verse 17.

the Naiyāyika's contention can be demonstrated further by the examination of concrete instance. Conjunction is a part-characteristic even according to the Naiyāyika. Suppose a monkey is perched on a branch of a tree. It is to be said then that the tree is conjoined to the monkey in the top and not conjoined in the root. The 'conjoined' is a different attribute from the 'non-conjoined.' There is nothing repugnant about it, if one asserts on the strength of this difference that the conjoined tree is different from the non-conjoined tree. The soldier in uniform is different from the same soldier in civilian dress. The same person as a judge of the High Court is different from the man in a private capacity or in a different capacity, say, as Vice-chancellor of a University. It is sometimes found that the grant sanctioned by the same person as the official Head of a University is negated by the same person as Governor of a Province. We regard such a procedure as an oddity or even as a case of contradiction. But logically speaking there is no contradiction, as functional identity and personal identity are two things. We shall clarify this point further in a subsequent chapter, when we shall deal with the problem of inherence (*samavāya*) as relation.

Let us consider the pair of 'one' and 'many' (in the sense of other than one') and see how the sevenfold predication unfolds itself. 'The jar is one' and 'the jar is many' are the basic propositions. The 'oneness' is true of it, as the unitive substance, which owns up the modes and manyness, is the underlying entity of the modes themselves, which are identical with the substance. The substance and the modes are not different. And this identity of the substance with the modes constitutes its plurality. Both unity and plurality are true of each real. The Buddhist affirms the truth of the modes and on the basis of the identity of the substance with each mode, asserts the plurality as the only reality. The result is the doctrine of flux. The Vedāntist declares the modes to be unreal appearance in and over the unity. Both appeal to experience in support of their contentions, but as their logic stands in the way, the opposite aspect is repudiated as illusory. But the Jaina accepts the two together as constitutive of the true nature of reality and does not believe them to be incompatible, as they do not relate to the self-same thing, but to two different things, viz., substance and modes. The identity of the two is felt in experience equally with the difference of the modes and the unification of the plurality is certified by perceptual intuition. But are these determinations,

unity and plurality, capable of being predicated of *all* taken as one ? It is the position of the Jaina that a determination is concomitant with its opposite. But what about the universe—the totality of existents ? Is the totality an ideal unity and a real plurality ? If the position be this, it follows that the unity being a subjective construction, plurality will be true character of the totality of existence. So instead of a universe, we shall really have a pluri-verse. We postpone the discussion of the problem to a subsequent chapter, as we cannot do justice to the paramount importance which it possesses by dealing with it as a side issue. We may state in a dogmatic form that the Jaina takes the totality of existence as a unity with the plurality of existents preserved with all their individuality. The universe will be found on examination to be a unity of plurality exactly on a par with the individual, which is an epitome of the macrocosm, being a unity and a plurality in one and at the same time, though in a different reference.

The universality of sevenfold predication with regard to all that exists cannot be called in question. Even the totality of existents does not prove an exception, as it is also one and many. It is one *qua* the universal being and many in reference to the plurality of things. So the sevenfold predication with the predicates, unity and plurality, is true of the totality as it is of the individuals themselves. As regards the individuals, all of which are undergoing change into modes, the plurality of the modes and the unity of the substance in each individual are attested truths and the sevenfold predication is the legitimate form of their evaluation.

We have discussed all the problems that were raised in connection with the specific instances of sevenfold predication and we have considered the objections advanced by the opponents regarding specific attributes. We now propose to consider the objections that have been advanced, not against specific predicates, but against the theory as a whole. In the first place, it is urged that the theory of sevenfold predication is only a quibble (*chala*). Whatever is existent is affirmed to be non-existent, whatever is permanent is asserted to be impermanent, in the sevenfold predication. It is only a jugglery in words and a despicable sophistry as it continually shifts the ground whenever confronted with a difficulty. But the charge is unfounded as the definition of a verbal quibble does not apply to it. A quibble consists in alleging a contradiction in the assertion of a person by putting a construction upon his words different from the

intended sense.¹¹ It is resorted to when the assertion is susceptible of a double construction. In Sanskrit vocabulary which is exceptionally rich in sense, the occasions for quibble are numerous. The stock-in-trade example of quibble is the proposition 'The man has a new (*nava*) blanket.' The word for 'new' is *nava*, which also signifies the number 'nine'. The opponent charges the speaker with contradiction by taking the word '*nava*' in the sense of 'nine.' He says that the assertion is false. 'The man has not even two blankets, how can he have nine blankets?' But there is no ambiguity in the Jaina propositions, nor is the assertion of existence and non-existence intended in different senses. The Jaina, on the contrary, scrupulously defines the meaning of his words and he insists on the uniformity of the sense of the same words occurring in the different propositions. The charge of 'quibbling' is the unkindest and the most frivolous accusation that can be conceived of against the Jaina position.

In the second place, it is alleged that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certitude. The concurrence of opposite attributes in the same substance is impossible, yet the sevenfold predication asserts existence and non-existence, identity and non-identity, permanence and impermanence, of the same subject. This can only mean that the assertor is not sure of his position and is in doubt about the truth of either of the opposite attributes. What is doubt but this cognition of opposite attributes? Take, for instance, the notorious case of doubt. 'Is it a man or an inanimate tree'? Doubt arises since the mind is confronted with two conflicting alternatives, man and tree, in respect of a self-identical entity, which cannot both be true. Similarly in the sevenfold predication, the assertion of existence and non-existence, which are mutually opposed, in respect of the same subject cannot but produce a doubt in the mind of the person to whom it is addressed. But the allegation is not well-founded upon truth. The conditions of doubt are not present in sevenfold predication. The conditions of doubt are three, *viz.*, the cognition of attributes common to the alternatives, the non-cognition of distinctive attributes, and the recollection of the distinctive attributes. An analysis of the instance under consideration will prove the truth of the assertion. A man sees at dusk a tall object ahead and owing to insufficiency of light cannot observe the specific attributes of the tree, *e.g.*, nests of birds upon it, the hollow in the trunk and the like, or of a human being, such as

11. *aviśeṣābhīhite 'rthe vaktur a bhīprāyārthāntarakalpanā vākchalam NS 1.2.12.*

movement of hands and feet, the head-dress and so on. The object may be a man or a branchless tree, and whichever it is, it must have the attributes in question. But the attributes escape observation, though the man recalls them. He knows what is a man and what is a tree. But owing to the lack of perception of the specific determinations of either, he is in a fix and his mind oscillates between them. In the case of sevenfold predication, on the contrary, existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations, internal and external, and the cognition of these determinations makes doubt impossible. The cognition of common characteristics, when it is accompanied by the absence of the cognition of specific determinations, causes doubt, but not when such determinations are cognised. There can therefore be no room for doubt in sevenfold predication.

It has, however, been contended that though the conditions of doubt as enunciated above may not be present in full, there are certainly other conditions of doubt present in it. In the first place, there is divergence of opinion regarding the truth of the opposite attributes. Secondly, the Jaina must advance reasons in support of each of the opposite attributes and the consideration of such reason must result in doubt, as one set of reasons will offset the other, and so neither existence nor non-existence can be asserted with certitude. But the second contention is also hollow like the first, since it is inspired by misconception. It is assumed that the predicates, existence and non-existence, are mutually opposed and so they would cancel each other. But the predicates are neither indeterminate nor have they the same reference, which would make opposition inevitable. Existence has reference to the identity of the substance, which never suffers lapse in spite of the evanescent modes which happen to it and non-existence has reference to these modes, either defunct or unrealised. It may have reference to a distinct identity also. So there is no opposition, which would be irresistible, if the predication of opposite determinations were in the self-same reference. Fatherhood and sonship are opposed in the same reference. The same man cannot be the son and father of 'A.' But he can be the son of 'A' and father of 'B' and there is no contradiction, since the reference is different. A sound probans (*hetu*), e.g., smoke, is existent in the kitchen and the hill and is non-existent in the lake. There is no opposition here and so also in sevenfold predication, as the opposites are asserted to be true not in the same reference, but in a different reference.

A charge-sheet of eight counts has been drawn up against the theory by another school of philosophers and this demands an examination and an answer. (1) The first charge is contradiction. It is asserted that affirmation and negation of the same attribute in respect of the same subject are not logically possible, since this would make self-contradiction inevitable. Existence is a positive attribute and non-existence is the negation of existence. The two are mutually repellent like heat and cold. (2) The second charge is consequential. The two opposites cannot exist in the same substratum and if existence and non-existence were predicated of the self-same subject, the identity of the subject would be split up into two—one as the substrate of existence and the other as the substrate of non-existence. (3) The third charge is that it makes infinite regress an unavoidable consequence. The Jaina position is that every real has a double character—one positive and another negative. Thus, jar, pen, table, chair and so on are all possessed of a double character, since they are both existent and non-existent according to the Jaina theory. Now 'existence' and 'non-existence' are real attributes and as such each of them must have a double character. Existence will have existence and non-existence in its turn, and the second element of existence will have again existence and non-existence and so on to infinity. What is true of existence will be equally true of non-existence, as the postulation of an endless series of non-existences and existences will be necessary in the latter case also. (4) The fourth charge is the consequence of 'confusion' (*saṅkara*)¹² A thing will have existence and non-existence in the same manner. What is existent will be non-existent and what is non-existent will be existent. This is a case of confusion which consists in the overlapping of all things in one substratum. (5) The fifth charge is 'transfusion' (*vyatikara*),¹³ the opposite of confusion. If existence were to occur in the very manner in which non-existence occurs, existence would be transfused into non-existence, and if non-existence were to have the same manner of incidence with existence, it would become existence. This is transfusion which is defined as the mutual transference of locus. (6) The sixth charge is the consequence, 'doubt.' If a real were existent and non-existent both, it could not be determined definitely as existent or as non-existent. The result is doubt! as to which it is. (7) The seventh charge is 'indetermination,' which is the result of

12. sarveṣāṃ yugapat prāptiḥ saṅkaraḥ. SBT., p. 42.

13. parasparaviṣayagamaṇaṃ vyatikaraḥ Ibid., pp., 42-43.

doubt. (8) The eighth charge is the inevitable consequence which is deduced by the nihilist that nothing is real, as every phenomenon is asserted to be possessed of both existence and non-existence—which is impossible.

This formidable catalogue of charges against the doctrine of non-absolutism, which is established by sevenfold predication, is really not so formidable as it appears at first sight. The fundamental charge is the allegation of self-contradiction and the remaining counts are only consequential. If the charge of self-contradiction can be shown to be unfounded and unreal, the disposal of the consequential charges will be a matter of methodical deduction. We have fully discussed the nature of opposition in the first chapter in connection with our critique of the Laws of Thought. The inflated list of objections recorded in the chargesheet is only an elaboration of the concept of contradiction as endorsed by formal pure logic; but it has been established that a *priori* conception of opposition is untenable. It should, we think, suffice to say that the criterion of opposition is absence of proof of the co-existence of the opposites. In other words, it is from experience and not from pure thought that we should derive our notion of opposition. We have shown how the denial of this fundamental truth has divided idealists and realists and driven them to hostile camps. The only consistent logical conclusion of the *a priori* concept of opposition is the philosophy of Vedānta as taught by Śaṅkarācārya. Śaṅkara succeeds in denying the plurality with their relations by the application of the Law of contradiction, based upon the difference and opposition of being and non-being, which he thinks to be absolute.

But if we can persuade ourselves that *a priori* reasoning independent of experience is incompetent to yield insight into the nature of real and their relations, we cannot accept the findings of idealists. The Jaina is a realist and if Vedānta is the paragon of idealistic thought, as James has observed, Jaina philosophy is with equal propriety and truth entitled to be called the paragon of realism. If experience be the ultimate source of knowledge of reality and its behaviour, we cannot repudiate the plurality of things. The admission of plurality necessitates the recognition of the dual nature of reals as constituted of being and non-being as fundamental elements. One real will be distinguished from another real and this distinction, unless it is dismissed as error of judgment, presupposes that each possesses a different identity, in other words that being of one is not the being of

the other. This truth is propounded by the Jaina in that things are real, so far as they have a self-identity of their own unshared by other (*svarūpasattā*), and they are unreal in respect of a different self-identity (*pararūpasattā*). If being were the only character of reals to the exclusion of non-being, all reals would have the self-same being—in other words, there would be only one real, which is the conclusion of Vedānta. If non-being were the only character of reals, they would not be real even in their own self-identity, as the presupposition of self-identity is being, which is denied in the proposition. This is exactly the conclusion of *śūnyavāda*. Jaina thought steers clear of the Scylla of monism and the Charybdis of nihilism by accepting the deliveries of experience as the final truth. Of course experience must not be contradicted by subsequent experience if it is to be an authentic source of knowledge. But the crux of the problem lies in the very conception of contradiction and the Jaina refuses to capitulate to the Vedāntist or the Nihilist, who are adherents of pure logic.

The logic of Jaina is empirical logic, which stands in irreconcilable opposition to pure logic, and the advocates of the latter have to part company with the advocates of the former. If one were to pose the difficult question, "Which of the two, realism and idealism, possesses the final truth? We can only advise him usefully by testing his logical convictions. "If you are a believer in absolute being or absolute non-being and in the absolute opposition of the two, you will find satisfaction either in Vedānta or Śūnyavāda. If, however, you have no such preformed faith, study the different systems of thought and understand the logic upon which they are founded, and you will arrive at your own conclusion in accordance with your logical sympathies that you will come to develop. If you come to believe in the truth of pure logic, you will become an idealist by faith. If, on the other hand, you are convinced by the contentions of realistic logic, you will be a realist. The form and nature of your philosophy will be determined by the strength of your convictions either way."

The Jaina position in logic, it can be expected, cannot be rejected by realistic philosophers. But as a matter of historical truth, realists also are not agreed in their views upon the nature of reality, although they are at one in rejecting the idealist's interpretation of logical truth. As regards the quarrel with the idealists, we do not want to act as umpire—an ambitious task which we leave to future prophets to adjudge. The realist can only show contradiction in the position of the

idealist, which the latter does not believe to be a contradiction, and the idealist can show similar contradiction in the realist's position, which is believed by the latter to be the true description of the nature of reals as they are. I may be permitted to quote in this connection what I have said elsewhere about the differences of philosophers. "There is no reason to be optimistic that one day all philosophers will sink their differences and profess one philosophy. Philosophy is not so much a question of conviction or carrying conviction as it is a question of mental attitude and outlook of thought and habit of thinking. It will be therefore better and more consonant with truth to say that the task of philosophers is rather conversion than logical conviction. The phenomenon of rival schools of thought holding contradictory views and constantly fighting with one another, however unphilosophical it may appear, will not be a thing of past history, because the fundamental attitudes of mind, the bias of our thought movement, cannot be changed or destroyed."¹⁴

We have already alluded to the truth that the differences among realists are not less fundamental with regard to the interpretation of experience and thought. The Jaina deduces the conclusion that a real is constituted of being and non-being from the determinate nature that it possesses. The Naiyāyika also believes that existence are determinate, but declines to accept non-being as a factor of reality. The Naiyāyika believes in the opposition of being and non-being like the idealist and hence does not agree with the Jaina in respect of his assertion that reals are existent-cum-non-existent. It is contended by him, "The proposition 'A' is not 'B' or 'A' has not being as 'B' does not admit of the construction that 'A' has non-being of 'B' as an element of its being, which is the Jaina conclusion. The negation of 'B' relates to 'B' and not to 'A'. The proposition 'A' is not 'B' or 'A' has not the being of 'B' cannot be regarded as the equivalent of the proposition 'A' is not. What we seek to establish is that the identity of 'B' is absent in 'A' just as we assert non-existence of jar on the ground. The 'negation' is a determination of the jar and not of the ground and the legitimate form of assertion is 'the jar does not exist on the ground' and not 'the ground does not exist.' Similarly we should assert 'B' does not exist (in 'A') and not 'A' does not exist.' But the second proposition of the sevenfold predication just takes this illegitimate form."

The contention of the Naiyāyika seems to have much

14. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 93-94.

plausibility, but it will not stand scrutiny. The non-existence of the jar is interpreted by the Naiyāyika as the attribute (*dharma*) of the jar. The non-existence of pen in the jar is similarly held to be an attribute of pen and not of the jar. The Jaina holds the opposite view. The dispute can be terminated by the determination of the substratum of negation. Negation will be the attribute of the substratum of which it subsists, just as 'redness' is the attribute of its substratum. In the proposition "The jar does not exist (*qua* pen)" the non-existence of pen is predicated of the jar and the Naiyāyika takes exception to it. The question can be put as follows : 'Is the non-existence of pen a property of the pen or of the jar' ? The first alternative is not entertainable. If the non-existence of pen were a property of pen, the pen would cease to be pen. It cannot be maintained that what is a property of a thing does not exist in that thing. If negation as the property of the pen would subsist in the jar, why should not the other properties of the pen exist in the jar ? The first alternative must then be rejected and it must be admitted on pain of contradiction that the negation of pen is an attribute of the jar and not of the pen. And it is this truth which is asserted in the second proposition. What the Jaina seeks to establish is the truth that the assertion of existence yields only the knowledge of a part-characteristic, which is completed by the assertion of non-existence. Non-existence of the pen does not belong to the pen, as that would make it a non-entity. The truth can be elicited by the question, 'Does not the pen exist as pen ?' To say that the pen does not exist even as pen is a contradiction in terms. The non-existence of the pen is then to be asserted as its non-existence *qua* not-pen. This is the Jaina position and no purpose can be served by twisting its plain meaning. The predication of existence and non-existence being thus necessary, the conclusion is undeniable that a real is existent and non-existent both.

But the Naiyāyika is not prepared to accept the Jaina interpretation so easily. It is contended by him that non-existence should be regarded as the attribute of the negatum. The meaning of the second proposition 'the jar does not exist as pen' is that the pen does not exist in the jar and it is plain that the non-existence belongs to the pen, which is non-existent. The non-existence is asserted of the pen and not of the jar. But here the Naiyāyika only lays emphasis upon one aspect of a complex situation. The Jaina does not deny that the pen is negated. The point at issue is the relation of attribute and substantive. The Naiyāyika admits that in the proposition 'The jar

does not exist on the ground,' the non-existence of the jar is an attribute of the ground, which is the substratum of the non-existence in question. The non-existence of pen in the jar is exactly on a par with the case. And if the non-existence of the jar can be accepted as an attribute of its locus, why should an objection be raised regarding the non-existence of pen being an attribute of the jar, which is the import of the second proposition. We shall show in a subsequent chapter that all relations, irrespective of their apparent distinctions, are reducible to the relation of identity-cum-difference and the predicate is always a term which stands in this relation of identity to the subject. Non-existence of the pen is affirmed in the jar and thus stands in a relation to the latter, and is thus a predicate of it.

It is seen that from whatever angle of vision one may approach the problem of negation, one cannot avoid the conclusion that non-existence is a real attribute of the existent. The Naiyāyika sets out to demonstrate the impossibility of the co-existence of non-existence and existence in an entity, but ends in asserting non-existence as the attribute of another existent, viz., of the negatum. While he denies that non-existence of the pen is an attribute of the jar, he asserts that it is an attribute of the pen. But the pen cannot be non-existent as pen and existent as pen both—as that makes contradiction inevitable. It must then be admitted that non-existence can relate to the pen as determined by not-pen. The positive-cum-negative character of reals is the unavoidable conclusion even for the Naiyāyika. As we had an occasion to observe that it is only the Jaina who is the only consistent realist, and his *confreres*, the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsist, have at times succumbed to the temptation of pure logic. The present case is only an illustration of the truth of our assertion.

But an objection of a formal nature has been raised. Granted that reals are positive-cum-negative in nature, still the form of the propositions as adopted by the Jaina is not correct. The propositions should be of the form, 'The jar exists' and 'The pen does not exist' and not 'the jar does not exist.' The negation of pen has always this form with the negatum as the subject, though as a matter of ontological fact, the non-existence of pen may be regarded as an attribute of the jar. The Jaina does not attach undue importance to formal disputes. He will be satisfied if the Naiyāyika accepts the Jaina position that reals are possessed of a double nature, positive-cum-negative, and abandons his wavering allegiance to the absolutist interpretation of the Law of Contradiction. As regards the

form of verbal representation, the Jaina would only appeal to convention, that is followed. The form of propositions is not necessarily determined by philosophical truth. Take for instance the proposition 'John is cooking.' What is the meaning of the subject, John? Do we mean that John is only a physical organism, or a spirit, or an embodied spirit? According to the difference of import the subject should be stated differently in conformity with the objective truth. But no sane man, unless there is a special necessity for definition of the subject, raises any difficulty on the score of ontological truth regarding the form of proposition. It will suffice if the proposition is understood in the intended sense. As regards formal propriety the Jaina will only point to the large volume of usage and the time-honoured custom as his apology.

It may be claimed that the Jaina has succeeded in establishing his position that reals are existent and non-existent both. But if there still be left a lingering doubt or hesitation and further demonstration needed, it can be supplied by the following consideration. The Naiyāyika agrees that the pen does not exist in the jar.¹⁵ The non-existence of pen is asserted to subsist in the jar. But such assertions must remain vague and obscure unless the nature of subsistence is determined in precise terms. Is the 'non-existence' in question numerically different from the jar in which it is asserted to subsist? If it is different, it must be supposed that the non-existence is non-existent in its substratum. In other words, the identity of the jar and the identity of the non-existence being different, the latter must be non-existent in the former and vice versa. But the same problem will arise in the case of every subsequent non-existence and there will be no end of the process. The vicious infinite is not the only absurdity of the supposition. The second non-existence of the first non-existence will be equivalent to affirmation, according to the dictum 'Negation of negation is the original position.'¹⁶ And, thus, this will be a case of self-contradiction, since the assertion of non-existence of the pen terminates in the affirmation of its existence. If, on the other hand, the non-existence of the pen be not different from the jar, the jar will have to be regarded as identical with non-existence, just as it is admitted to be identical with existence—the position advocated by the Jaina.

15. We have used 'pen' in the sense of pinness or pen-character for the sake of brevity and for avoiding a clumsy expression.

16. *abhāvavirahātmatvaṃ vastunaḥ pratiyogitā*, NKU, Ch. III. 2.

The aforesaid duality is repudiated by Prabhākara, the great Mīmāṃsist, who denies the reality of non-being. It is maintained by him that being is an indivisible simple characteristic of a real and non-being is only the self-same *being* as understood in reference to another real. It is 'being' all the same and all the while and non-being is only another name of it. The difference of nomenclature, however, does not presuppose a factual difference in the make-up of a real. The Jaina affirmation of being and non-being as elements in the real is thus an assumption based on the assumption of numerical difference of non-being from being, which is not a fact. But the Jaina thinks this contention to be based upon an unsound principle, which, if admitted, will lead to the abolition of many an accredited characteristic of reality. It is true that a *real* generates a positive cognition of 'being' *qua* its self-identity as determined by its own context and the same *real* gives rise to the idea of 'non-being' in reference to another real in another context. If the difference of conditions and relations be a reason for denying the objectivity or numerical difference of the contents of cognition, we do not see how 'being' can be asserted as an objective characteristic in preference to non-being, both being equally conditioned. Moreover, such attributes as fatherhood and sonship of the same person understood in relation to different persons would also be unreal, or be the same. Again, number will be an ideal creation, or there will be no difference of number as one, two, three and so on. A thing is one in its own self and thus has oneness as its determination; and the same thing together with another thing becomes two and thus comes to have the number 'two' as its determination. It cannot be thought for the reasons assigned that the attribute of number is an ideal creation or the different numbers are not really different. Being and non-being have no doubt the same substratum, but the sameness of substratum does not argue the sameness of the attributes. Nor again can it be maintained that being and non-being are identical with their substratum and hence identical with each other. In that case, the different numbers would be the same number having the same substratum and having the same relation of identity to the same substratum. Nor can the difference of 'number' or other relative attributes, as fatherhood etc., be preserved by virtue of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), as inherence will be found to be only a name for identity-cum-difference (*tādātmya*).

There is, then, no logical justification for supposing that being and non-being are numerically identical. It ought to be accepted on

the contrary that difference of relations and conditions is the cause of real difference of ontological status. The criterion of difference is the opposition of character and the proof of such difference is the difference of conditions¹⁷ and this twofold criterion is fully applicable to the case of being and non-being. That being has a character which is the opposite of that of non-being and that the two are entailed by different conditions does not require proof, as the opponent also cannot deny them. The Jaina position that being and non-being are essential elements of the nature of a real should be taken as established. We have considered the various objections advanced by thinkers of opposite schools and it cannot be denied that the Jaina has met them with considerable force of logic. As regards the charge of contradiction involved in the compresence of being and non-being, which constitutes the main plank in the platform of the rival philosophers, the Jaina simply declines to accept the charge as authentic. We have considered the problem of contradiction in the first chapter and therein we have dealt with the four types of oppositional relation. The Jaina has made out that none of these types is applicable to the case of being and non-being, as both are perceived elements in a real. The Jaina has further made out that experience is the ultimate determinant of contradiction and the compresence of being and non-being is endorsed by experience. The Jaina has further resolved the opposition of reason and empirical knowledge. We do not think it necessary to enter into arguments that we have produced in the first chapter. We had to deal with the concept of opposition repeatedly as occasion required and we are perfectly sure that the careful reader of the present book does not stand in need of being pumped with the arguments that the Jaina advances in support of his position and in answer to the animadversions of his opponents. Suffice it to say that being and non-being are true elements of reality, which is determinate in all cases. The Jaina does not believe in indeterminate being and indeterminate non-being, which are according to him abstractions of formal logic. The opposition of indeterminate being with indeterminate non-being, on which the idealistic logician banks, has thus no force against the Jaina realist. The Jaina is an empiricist in the matter of determination of the nature of reality and it seems absolutely certain that in so far as the plain delivery of experience is taken into consideration the Jaina stands on

17. *sa eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca*—Quoted in the KP, Ch. V.

unassailable grounds. It cannot be denied that the idealist also appeals to experience, but he subjects experience to critical analysis and examination. Uncriticised experience is suspect in idealistic philosophy. But the realist also has his own canons of criticism and he applies them to experiential data like the idealist. But there arises a fundamental difference in the results of the interpretation of experience by both the schools. It is no use making a complaint against the discrepancy of interpretation, which we must face as a necessary evil. The differences, on the contrary, should impel us to probe deeper and deeper into the problem. Differences of philosophy are not, to my mind, an unmixed evil. Criticism seems to be the very life of philosophy and it is necessary that we must stand by our convictions until we are made to see the drawbacks in our position by the criticism of the opponent.

To return to our problem, the Jaina is emphatic that the charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in a real is a figment of *a priori* logic; and his dismissal of this fundamental accusation entails the collapse of all other charges, which are consequential upon the truth of contradiction. As regards the charge of *regressus ad infinitum*, it has been disposed of before. It will suffice to say that a real is a manifold of infinite plurality of attributes, and the infinity of attributes, which is the consequence of the charge, is true and authenticated by logic. So the charge does not invalidate the Jaina position.

We have finished our survey of the sevenfold predication and we have given serious thought to its implications and the criticism thereof. The dialectic of sevenfold predication is not easy to understand. It is not surprising that the doctrine has been misunderstood even in India. The critics of Jaina non-absolutism have not shown a critical grasp of this abstruse theory and their criticism has been rather shallow and superficial. It cannot be expected that the idealist logician will accept the logical theory of the Jaina realist. But the pity is that its implications were not sought to be understood even by those schools of thinkers who had much in common with the Jaina. The affinities of Jaina thought with other schools of thought are pronounced and momentous. Barring the Monists of Śāṅkara's school and the Buddhist Nihilist (*Śūnyavādin*), almost all schools of Indian philosophy, particularly those who have realistic leanings, have consciously or unconsciously followed the logic that is advocated by the Jaina. We do not propose to enter into the tangled problem of

chronological priority and the consequent problem of influence of one school upon the other. It must be admitted that the systematization of Jaina philosophical thought and logic is rather a later phenomenon. We are concerned with the Masters of Jaina thought, who, as a matter of historical fact, flourished after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This has been a source of advantage to Jaina thought. It had the opportunity to study afresh the implications of the philosophy of non-absolutism called *anekāntavāda*, which seems to date back to a far remote past. But in spite of the chronological posteriority of the Jaina Masters, it must be admitted that the Jaina theory of sevenfold logical predication is the most original contribution of Jaina thought, which cannot be traced to the influence of other schools. In philosophy and other fields of abstract thought it is by no means the truth that the first is always the best or the most original. What we seek to emphasize is not the question of obligation this or that way, but the points of agreement among the different philosophies and their implications. It is undeniable that the Jaina siezes hold of these points of agreement and makes them proof of the inevitability of the truth of *anekānta* and not of personal or communal triumph.

The Sāṅkhya believes in one *Prakṛti*, the prius of the world of plurality, material and mental, standing in opposition to *Puruṣa*, the eternal, unchanging spirit. This *Prakṛti* is the unity of three principles, called *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which are mutually opposed in respect of their nature and functions. The compresence of three opposite principles in the unity of *Prakṛti* can be upheld only by the canons of non-absolutist logic as systematized by the Jaina. It is not suggested that the Sāṅkhya is indebted to Jaina thought. But the position of the Sāṅkhya is only an illustration of the validity of Jaina logic, no matter whether the Sāṅkhya is conscious of it or not. Moreover, the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the identity of substance in the midst of its changing modes is another illustration of the doctrine of identity in difference, which is another synonym of *anekāntavāda*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, which swears by the infallibility of the Law of Contradiction as interpreted in absolutist logic, advocates a number of universals of the second grade in contradistinction to the highest universal, 'existence'. Now these secondary universals, e.g., substance-universal, quality-universal and action-universal, exercise a double function, which is mutually opposed. Substance-universal synthesizes all substances and at the same time separates them from other universals. So also the universals of the same grade. As regards

the universals of lower grades, viz., man-universal, cow-universal, horse-universal and the like, they also eminently discharge the opposite functions of unification and differentiation. These universals are therefore called universal-cum-particulars. This constitutes evidence of the truth of the synthesis of opposites, which the Jaina propounds to be the universal truth.

As regards the Buddhists of Dignāga's school, who are the loudest in their protestations of the inviolability of the Law of Contradiction, they, too, are constrained to admit the validity of non-absolutism in exceptional cases. In the perceptual cognition of variegated colours in carpet, the unity of the content *qua* a carpet and the plurality *qua* colours are admitted to be present together. Besides, the plurality of contents of the cognition and the unity of the cognitive act are affirmed to belong to a self-identical situation. The confession of the unity of the plurality is only an unconscious tribute to Jaina standpoint and if it is construed as corroboration of non-absolutism by the Jaina, we cannot accuse the latter of dogmatic zeal. The Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra believe in the plurality of powers of a single entity and this is an admission of the synthesis of plurality in one—which is the characteristic Jain position.

The Cārvāka materialist holds consciousness to be the product of four elements, earth, air, water and fire. The product is not numerically different from the elements, as that would make it a separate principle; nor is it identical severally with each, as in that case even jars and tables would possess spirit. It is thus one and the four at the same time. This is only a confirmation of *anekāntavāda*. The affinities of Mīmāṃsist logic and ontology with the Jaina theory are too pronounced to be ignored. The Mīmāṃsist believes in the dual nature of reals, constituted by being and non-being as elements, and is thus at one with the Jaina. The later Vaiṣṇava philosophers, who believe in unity and plurality both and in their ultimate synthesis, cannot but endorse the Jaina logical standpoint. As regards the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, it also has to fall back on non-absolutist logic on occasions. One instance will suffice. According to Prabhākara all cognitions are cognisant of three elements, the content, the act of cognition (that is to say, their own identity), and the self as the knower. Accordingly all cognitions are held to be judgments by him of the form 'I know this.' The synthesis of three in one constitutes an endorsement of the Jaina logical standpoint. The purpose of this long schedule of affinities with other

schools of thought is to show that the doctrine of the manifoldness of truth called *anekāntavāda*, which is proved by the application of the logical form of sevenfold predication, is not the outcome of logical aberration or abnormality of thought-proclivities, as the critics profess it to be. The logic of non-absolutism, as illustrated by sevenfold predication, seems to be the only kind of logic, that should be followed by realists. The refutation of the commonplace charges of indetermination and doubt against the theory should entitle it to serious consideration. The Jaina has succeeded in establishing that sevenfold predication is not a frivolous estimation of truth. And if I have succeeded in driving home this truth, I shall consider that I have accomplished a difficult task and fulfilled a sacred duty, which we owe to the philosophers of old, who are our own kith and kin spiritually and ethnologically.

Anekānta and the Problem of Meaning*

S.M. SHAHA

The Doctrine of Anekānta :

The doctrine of Anekānta is the heart of Jaina ontologý, epistemology and logic. It claims the indeterminateness of reality, its knowledge and its verbal expression. If reality is infinitely manifold, logically there must be infinite ways of intellectually cognizing it and verbally expressing its infinite aspects. This presupposition enables one to harmonize various apparently contradictory descriptions of reality. This doctrine of Anekānta also serves as a beacon in studying the epistemological problem of the meaning of 'Meaning'.

Four types of meaning

In India, various schools of philosophy including those of the Sanskrit grammarian and rhetoricians have devoted much thought to the linguistic prolem of meaning and have evolved different theories to explain the semantic aspect of language. As to the meaning, it is supposed that a word or a sentence may convey the primary or metaphorical or suggested meaning. In addition to these three types, some Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and rhetoricians postulate Tātparya or the sentence-meaning as the fourth type. Some consider it to be independent of the first three, while others associate it with any one of them. Out of these four types of meaning, the suggested and purposive meanings are severally indeterminate, relative and, hence, anekāntic in nature. But, in case of the primary and secondary meanings the

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principle of Anekānta or indeterminateness is involved in selecting either of them as per the context requires.

Suggestive Meaning

Of all the four types of meaning, the suggestive meaning is the most indeterminate. It depends on a number of contextual factors such as time, place, occasion, intention, intonation, gestures etc. of the listener or the spectator. It varies from person to person and context to context. Unlike primary and metaphorical meanings it includes various socio-cultural meaning and even an emotive element also. It is well known how numerous meanings are evoked in the minds of different persons by the stock example of suggestive meaning namely, *gato'stam arkaḥ* i.e., the sun is set. Though grammarians, scientists, logicians and philosophers, interested more in the accuracy, precision, clarity and objectivity of meaning, prefer the lexical or primary meaning to the suggested one, the very indeterminate and infinite potency of the suggested meaning has rendered it more competent than the primary meaning for expressing both the aesthetic and mystic experiences embodying fine literature and profound philosophy respectively. Thus, Bergson¹ in his *Introduction to Metaphysics* says, "Language is incapable of apprehending and expressing reality. But language may be used in another way, not to represent, but to bring the hearer to a point where he himself may transcend language and pass to incommunicable insight. It is a dialectical ladder which, when we have ascended, may be kicked away." This insight and intuition cannot be expressed directly by words, but they can be communicated through the power of suggestion.

Tātparyavṛtti or Sentence-meaning

Thus, from the foregoing the anekāntic nature of the suggested meaning becomes obvious. The same may be said in respect of even the Tātparyavṛtti or sentence-meaning. There is a difference of approach between the *abhihitānvaya* theory of sentence-meaning advocated by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and *anvitābhidhāna* theory of sentence-meaning propounded by Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. The former holds that the unitary meaning of the sentence is indirectly conveyed through the recollection of the meaning of the words that comprise it, while the latter takes the view that the unitary

1. *Indian Theories of Meaning (=ITM)*, K. Kunjuni Raja, Adyar, Madras, 1963, p. 293.

meaning directly arises from the collection of the words.² We need not enter further into the controversy. Here it suffices to state that those (like Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha etc.) who refer to Tātparyā as a separate *vṛtti* or function of words hold that the intention of the speaker or the general purpose of the utterance obviously gives a united, purposeful sentence-meaning. Here the dependence of meaning on the intention of the speaker (i.e. what he intends to be understood by the listener) or the general purport of the sentence involves the element of Anekānta or indeterminateness, because so far as the intention of the speaker is concerned, it is associated with different psychological context.

It is possible for the same sign to belong to different psychological context; a word may mean different things in different cases. Even the same thing can be examined from different angles without exhausting its characters; but from the linguistic point of view we are only concerned with so much of the thing as is required to elucidate what the speaker intended the listener to understand.³ Even though what is in the mind of the speaker at the time of utterance is something subjective and not capable of being subject to an objective analysis, the idea intended to be conveyed to the listener by the speaker could be determined to a great extent with the help of contextual factors. Thus, as in the case of suggested meaning the dependence on contextual factors⁴ while interpreting the sentence-meaning is indicative of Anekāntic element in the Tātparyāvṛtti. It is true that the Mīmāṃsakas even use the term Tātparyā for the purport of a passage dealing with a particular topic, and refer to six *liṅgas* or indications by which it could be obtained objectively without any reference to the speaker or author. But in our opinion, whether the real purport of the passage is identical with or different from the intention of the author is immaterial. The very dependence of interpretation on the contextual factors such as six *liṅgas* (as consistency in meaning between the introduction and conclusion [*upakramopasamhārau*] etc), is indicative of anekāntic nature of the Tātparyāvṛtti or sentence-meaning.

Primary and Secondary or Metaphorical Meanings

Now let us examine the anekāntic nature of the primary and secondary

2. *Ibid.* p. 194.

3. *Ibid.* p. 182.

4. *Ibid.*

or metaphorical meanings. We restrict our query to the domain of Philosophy only and that also particularly the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta and the Jain systems.

Mīmāṃsā System

The Mīmāṃsā divides Veda into two parts : *vidhi* and *arthavāda*. *Vidhi* refers to the supra-mundane affairs and has to be interpreted literally, that is, in the primary sense while the *arthavāda* portion roughly refers to the matters of ordinary experience. It has no logical significance. It merely reiterates facts otherwise already known. Its purpose is to flatter a man into doing good actions or to frighten him out of evil ones. Taken independently the *arthavāda* has no use. It ought to be taken as a corroborative statement of *vidhi* or action or injunction. Hence, the *arthavāda* portion is to be interpreted liberally, that is, in a secondary, metaphorical or figurative sense. Thus, the Mīmāṃsā lays down canons of interpretation in connection with determining what portion falls under these two heads, namely, *vidhi* and *arthavāda*, the primary and secondary meanings respectively. It holds that only *vidhis* or injunctions are directly authoritative, for they teach us what to do and what not to do. Sentences which merely state something are of no use, for nobody gains thereby anything. Hence, all the *arthavādas* are authoritative only in so far as they form a unitary passage with command-sentences. For example, the *arthavāda*, 'vāyu is a swift deity' forms a unitary passage with the injunction, 'one who wants prosperity should touch a goat relating to vāyu', because taken independently the *arthavāda* has no use, while taken as a corroborative statement of the injunction, it praises the god Vāyu and suggests that a rite in connection with god is highly praiseworthy.⁵

Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, action is the guiding principle of interpreting a particular word or a sentence and ascribing to it a primary or a secondary meaning. In this respect they attach importance to the contextual factors as well as to the purport. Even they maintain that an action consists of parts; and words conveying it may also be divided into parts, if necessary, to express its idea. Consequently, it follows that not only the meaning but even the form of a word may also be indeterminate in nature. For example, the word 'svāhā' may be divided into *sva*, *ā* and *hā* meaning 'the soul (*sva*), leading to or associated with (*ā*), an exclamation of satisfaction (*hā*).

5. *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta (=RRAD)* Murthy K. Sacchidananda, Motilal Banarsidass, Reprint, 1974, p. 68.

Hence, the word 'svāhā' expresses the satisfaction of the soul with action, with the result that it can continue to act. Similarly, if we divide the word *dāna* into parts—*ḍ*, *ā* and *na*, the meaning would be sacrifice (*ḍ*) associated with (*ā*) the senses of knowledge; it would signify 'the sacrifice or proper function of the senses of knowledge', and the idea becomes different from that of a gift.⁶ These examples illustrate one of the Mīmāṃsā methods of interpretation which ascribes a special meaning to a common word by dividing it according to the context, purpose and purport. This evinces the anekāntic or indeterminate aspect of the Mīmāṃsā concept of meaning. The canons of interpretation laid down by the Mīmāṃsakas are of a great value not only to those who want to understand the Veda aright but to all who are engaged on the work of finding out the exact import of fixed texts like legal code.⁷

Advaita Vedānta

Bādarāyaṇa's flexible usage of the primary and secondary meanings while interpreting Upaniṣadic passages and thereby reconciling even contradictory philosophical views is one more significant dimension of his anekāntic philosophy. In the *Brahmasūtra* he uses terms like *mukhya*, *pradhāna* etc. for denoting the primary meaning while *bhākta*,⁸ *gauṇa* or *gauṇī*⁹ in the sense of secondary meaning. Thus, for example, in the sūtra *carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktas tadbhāvabhāvitvāt*,¹¹ he contends that the mention of these words (birth and death) with relation to moving and the stationary bodies is in a primary sense while it is to be taken in a secondary sense with reference to the individual souls inhabiting them. The very idea that a meaning of a particular statement may either be primary or secondary according to the intention of the author as well as the context indicates its anekāntic or indeterminate or relative nature. We may cite one more example. In the aphorism *gaunyasambhavāt*¹² Bādarāyaṇa contends "If it be argued that the seeing is in a secondary sense, we say, not so, owing to the use of the word self". The Sāṃkhya wants to ascribe

6. *Mīmāṃsā*... (= *Mīmāṃsā*), Thadani N.V., Bharat Research Institute, Delhi, 1952, p. 273.

7. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, (= *EOIP*), Allen and Unwin, London, 1969, p. 140.

8. *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa (*BS*), II. 3.15.

9. *BS* I. 1. 6.

10. *BS* III. 4. 6.

11. *BS*. II. 3. 16.

12. *BS*. I. 1. 6.

figuratively 'seeing' to the insentient Pradhāna which is referred to by the word existence and which is supposed to be the primordial cause of the universe. Bādarāyaṇa objects it by discarding the secondary meaning of 'seeing' in favour of primary meaning and thereby he asserts that Brahman and not the Prakṛti is the primordial cause of the universe.

From Bādarāyaṇa when we come to Śāṅkara we find that Śāṅkara uses profusely the concept of primary and secondary meanings while interpreting the aphorisms of the *Brahmasūtra*. He employs the following terms in the sense of secondary meaning : *guṇavāda*,¹³ *guṇānuvāda*,¹⁴ *guṇavṛtti*,¹⁵ *guṇavidhi*,¹⁶ *guṇavidhāna*,¹⁷ *gauṇa*,¹⁸ *gauṇatva*,¹⁹ *gauṇī*,²⁰ *gauṇīkalpanā*,²¹ *gauṇārtha*,²² *gauṇavṛtti*,²³ *gauṇabuddhi*,²⁴ *bhākta* or *bhakta*,²⁵ *upacāra*,²⁶ *aupacārika*,²⁷ *upacāradarśana*,²⁸ *amukhya*,²⁹ *lakṣaṇā*,³⁰ *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*,³¹ *lakṣaṇāśrva*,³² *lakṣaṇārthopalabdhi*,³³ *lakṣaṇīka*,³⁴ *lakṣaṇīkatvasiddhi*,³⁵ *arthavāda*,³⁶ *arthavādakalpita*,³⁷ *arthavādamātra*,³⁸ etc. while in the context of the primary meaning the terms used are

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13. *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa with Śāṅkara's *Bhāṣya* (=BSSB), I, 1.3; III. 1.7; III. 3. 42; III. 3. 6; III. 2. 3; IV. 1. 3; IV. 1. 5; IV. 3. 12 etc.
14. *Ibid.* I. 3. 33.
15. *Ibid.* I. 1. 6.
16. *Ibid.* III. 3. 19; III. 3. 56; III. 3. 58.
17. *Ibid.* III. 3. 19.
18. *Ibid.* I. 1. 4; I. 1. 6; I. 1. 7; I. 1. 22; II. 3. 3; II. 3. 5; II. 3. 7; II. 4. 1; II. 4. 2; II. 4. 3; III. 1. 4; III. 1. 25.
19. *Ibid.* I. 1. 6; I. 1. 7; II. 3. 5; II. 3. 7.
20. *Ibid.* IV. 3. 8.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.* II. 3. 15.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.* I. 1. 5.
29. *Ibid.* I. 1. 7; I. 1. 8; I. 10. 12.
30. *Ibid.* III. 1. 22; III. 2. 21; III. 3. 7; III. 4. 20; IV. 1. 6; IV. 2. 1.
31. *Ibid.* III. 3. 9.
32. *Ibid.* I. 4. 11.
33. *Ibid.* III. 3. 30.
34. *Ibid.* II. 1. 9; III. 1. 10; III. 1. 6.
35. *Ibid.* II. 4. 17.
36. *Ibid.* I. 3. 32; III. 3. 38; III. 4. 2; III. 4. 28; III. 4. 31.
37. *Ibid.* I. 1. 7.
38. *Ibid.* III. 3. 42; III. 3. 49.

mukhya,³⁹ *mukhyatva*,⁴⁰ *mukhyārtha*,⁴¹ *mukhyasambhava*,⁴² *mukhyārthatvopapatti*⁴³, etc. For example, Śaṅkara, while commenting on the aphorism *param jaiminir mukhyatvāt*⁴⁴ contends that according to Jaimini the primary meaning of the term *param* is the Supreme Brahman and the secondary meaning is the inferior brahman.

He further adds that between the primary and secondary meanings one readily understands the primary alone. Again, while commenting on the aphorism *carācaravyapāśrayas tu...*⁴⁵ Śaṅkara argues that the words birth and death are used figuratively in the context of individual souls while primarily in respect of the material bodies which the souls inhabit. Thus, Śaṅkara's interpretation of the aphorisms of the *Brahmasūtra* in the light of the primary and secondary meanings is indicative of anekāntic element involved in them. In passing we may add that the Advaita Vedānta school following Śaṅkara has thoroughly developed the concepts of purport and primary as well as secondary meanings while interpreting the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas such as 'That thou art' etc. For example, Sureśvarācārya, Vācaspati, Vidyāranya, Prakāśātman, Dharmarāja and Madhusūdana consider the mahāvākya 'That thou art' to be the purport of the Upaniṣads. They further make distinction between the primary and the secondary meaning and try to interpret the mahāvākyas by ascribing either of it to them. Sureśvara is in favour of ascribing *lakṣaṇā* to them while Dharmarāja rejects it.⁴⁶ We need not enter into further details here. It suffices to state that their very difference of opinion with regard to the meaning of mahāvākya evinces the indeterminate or anekāntic nature of meaning in general.

Jaina System

Finally we shall turn our attention to the treatment of the primary and secondary meaning in Jaina system. The Jaina logicians, rhetoricians, grammarians and philosophers have dealt with different aspects of meaning right from the early centuries of Christian era. For example, in the field of epistemology, the theories of *Nayavāda*, *Syādvāda* or

39. *Ibid.* I. 1. 4, 8; III. 3. 29; III. 3. 43; III. 1. 7.

40. *Ibid.* I. 1. 16; I. 3. 14; I. 4. 9; II. 3. 5; II. 4. 17; IV. 3. 12 etc.

41. *Ibid.* I. 1. 22.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.* III. 1. 24.

44. *Ibid.* IV. 3. 12.

45. *Ibid.* III. 3. 16.

46. *RRAD*, p. 94.

saptabhaṅgi, *Nikṣepa* etc, deal with the problem of meaning and knowledge thoroughly. The terms *śabdanaya* and *arthanaya* are indicative of the linguistic views of the Jainas reflected in epistemology. Even to present a mere outline of their multifarious endeavours is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we shall discuss in brief Kundakunda's position with regard to the primary and secondary meanings.

Kundakunda on Primary and Secondary Meanings

Kundakunda in his monumental philosophical work *Samayasāra* elucidates the empirical self from the empirical standpoint and the transcendental self from the transcendental standpoint. Since the empirical standpoint deals with the impure, accidental, pervert, superimposed and unreal condition of the mundane self, its statement may yield the figurative, metaphorical and secondary meaning. Again, since this accidental impurity is caused by the material body, the material qualities like colour, smell, touch, taste etc. are superimposed on or transferred to the self. And consequently, all non-self properties are figuratively affirmed of the self.⁴⁷ Thus, for example Kundakunda says that from the empirical standpoint soul and body are certainly one and by lauding this material body which is really separate from the soul, one may think that the soul occupying it is lauded and adored. But, from the real standpoint the qualities of body are not found in the perfect soul. He who lauds the attributes of the perfect soul, really lauds the perfect soul,⁴⁸ for just as admiring the city can never become admiration of the king, so by lauding the qualities of body the attributes of the perfect soul are never lauded.⁴⁹ Again, from the practical standpoint the remark is made of (king's) military forces; "The king has gone out" (although not) the king only but also his military forces are gone out with him.⁵⁰ Common people, seeing someone looted in the way, say, "The way is looted", but no way whatsoever is really looted.⁵¹ Similarly, seeing the karmic matter in the soul it has been said from the empirical standpoint, "This colour is of the soul".⁵²

From the few example cited above it is obvious that

47. *Samayasāra* (=SS); verse 61.

48. *Ibid.* verses 31-34.

49. *Ibid.* verse 35.

50. *Ibid.* verse 52.

51. *Ibid.* verse 63.

52. *Ibid.* verse 64.

Kundakunda's statement of a practical standpoint may suggest the secondary meaning while his statement of transcendental or real standpoint may convey the primary meaning. It is needless to say that Kundakunda's doctrine of standpoint is a corollary of the theory of Anekānta or indeterminateness of reality, knowledge and meaning.

Conclusion

To conclude, we may observe that a word or sentence may possess multivalence or multi-levels of meaning. Like the manifold, indeterminate and relative reality, its knowledge as well as verbal expression may also be manifold, indeterminate and relative. It is for our practical purpose only that we fix the meaning of a particular word or a sentence according to the context, the intention of the speaker, the general purport and so on. However, meaning is as inexhaustive as reality itself.

The Development of the Doctrine of Anekāntavāda*

JAGDISH CHANDRA JAIN

Anekāntavāda is a *fundamental doctrine* which forms the key-note to the philosophy of the Jainas. It is defined as the doctrine of many-sidedness which proves the validity of two contradictory statements from the point of view of two different standpoints. For example, "let us take the antithesis of the swift and the slow. It would be nonsense to say that every movement is either swift or slow. It would be nearer the truth to say that every movement is both swift and slow, swift by comparison with what is slower than itself, slow by comparison with what is swifter than itself. And so with the other antithesis¹. *Anekāntavāda* is a *synthetic process which reconciles* all the vexed questions of abstruse speculation which seem mutually conflicting, and helps us to acquire true knowledge. Different philosophies according to their personal, racial and historical endowment reflect different temperaments. The doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* or many-sidedness, taking a comprehensive view of all, shows that the different representations do not tell us what a thing is in itself but only what it is to us. In other words, according to this principle, the *truth is relative to our standpoints*.

This doctrine of *anekāntavāda* finds the most important place in Jainism and on this very foundation other doctrines of the Jainas are built up. Not only this, but when this doctrine is viewed from the historical point of view, it is proved to be very ancient and popular. It is for this reason that considerable importance is given to it in the

* Review of Philosophy and religion, 5/2, 1964

1. E. Holmes : *In the Quest of Ideal*, p. 21.

Vedic, Buddhistic and the Western philosophies.

In a hymn of the Ṛgveda (X. 129.1) it is said that “then was not non-existent nor existent.” Commenting upon the above Sāyaṇa writes: “Although the existent and the non-existent are different in nature, yet there is a possibility of their existing simultaneously.”² In other words, admitting that *Brahman* is neither existent nor non-existent and is beyond description, in the Ṛgveda it is accepted that in one and the same substance two contradictory aspects can exist together.

In the earliest group of the Upaniṣads, *Brahman* is described as possessing opposite qualities. For instance, the Ātman is said to be subtler than the subtle and greater than the great; it moves, yet it does not move; and it is far as well as near.³ In the epic age, we find reference to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* in the Mahābhārata⁴ Nilakaṇṭha commenting upon it enumerates the famous seven *bhaṅgas* of the *syādvāda*.⁵

Now coming to the fifth century B.C, in Buddhistic period, we come across a sect called Ājīvika. “They declared that of a thing beyond our experience the existence and non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence can neither be affirmed nor denied.”⁶ Finding some similarity between the doctrines of the Agnostics and of the Syādvādins, Jacobi concludes that “in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahāvīra has established the *syādvāda* which served to silence some dangerous opponents.”⁷ Undoubtedly the above statement of the learned scholar is thoughtful and requires considerable attention. To make the point more clear, in the words of Prof. Barua who follows the same view, we can say that “to avoid error Sañjaya contended with the four famous negative propositions: A is not B; A is not not-B; A is not both B and not-B; A is neither B nor not-B. It is with regard to the self-same questions that Mahāvīra declared from these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from these alternatives you are certainly led to error.”⁸ This is quite true. But thereby we cannot

2. यद्यपि सदसदात्मकं प्रत्येकं विलक्षणं भवति तथापि भावाभावयोः सहवस्थानमपि संभवति ।

ef. also *Sukla yajurveda samhitā*, XVI. 23. 32.

3. *Kaṭha UP.* 2. 20; *Iśā*, 5; also cf. *Praśna*, 2. 5;

Taittirīya, 2. 6; *Śvetāśvatara*, 3. 17; *Tripāḍavībhūti-Mahānārāyaṇa*, Ch. 11, etc.

4. *Sānti-Parvan*, 238. 6.

5. आर्हतमतमाह—एतदिति तैर्हिस्यादस्ति । स्यान्नास्ति । स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च । स्यादवक्तव्यः । स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः । स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यः । सादस्ति नास्ति चावक्तव्यः इति सप्तभंगीनयः सर्वत्र योज्यते ।

6. S.B.E. Vol. XLV. p. xxvii.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Barua : *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921, p. 401.

deny the existence of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* in Jaina philosophy before Sañjaya. We quite agree with the view that the doctrine of *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅginaya* may be a later development in Jainism, but the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*, the first and the most fundamental teaching of Mahāvira seems to have been at the root of *Syādvāda*. The reference in the Jain conons of the Śvetāmbaras are in favour of this view.

Further, when we pass to the various systems of Indian philosophy we find that here the ideas similar to the doctrine of the 'many-sidedness' find a very important place. For instance, we come across the doctrine of *Kṣarākṣarabhāvanā* in the Upaniṣadas⁹ and the *Bhagavadgītā*¹⁰, *Utpādasthitibhaṅgavāda* in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*,¹¹ *Parināmavāda* in the Sāṃkhya, Anirvacanīyavāda in the Vedānta, and the doctrine of *Madhyamamārga* in Buddhism.¹²

Now when we turn to Western philosophy, instances of the ideas similar to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* can be multiplied. In Greek philosophy, first of all, in trying to solve the riddle of permanence and change, Empedocles, the Atomists and Anaxagoras declared that absolute change is impossible. So far the Eleatics are right. But at the same time we see things growing and changing. Thus stating that "the original bits of reality cannot be created or destroyed or change their nature, but they can change their relation in respect to each other,"¹³ they concluded in favour of relative change. When we read the dialogues of Plato we find that everything which we originally suppose to be one is described as many and under many names; and when we speak of something, we speak not of something opposed to being, but only different.¹⁴

Coming to modern philosophy, Hegel was the first philosopher who expounded that contradiction is the root of all life and movement, that everything is contradiction, that the principle of contradiction rules the world. To do a thing justice, we must tell the whole truth about it, predicate all the contradictions of it, and show how they are reconciled and preserved.¹⁵ Bradley has described similar ideas. According to him everything is essential

9. *Śvetāśvatara* 1. 8.

10. *Ibid.* 15. 16.

11. *Mīmāṃsā Śloka-vārtika*, p. 619.

12. For further references see '*Darśan aur Anekāntavāda*' by Hamsaraj Sharma.

13. Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 31.

14. *Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. iv. pp. 361, 383.

15. Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 465 ff.

and everything worthless in comparison with others. Nowhere is there even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter. Thus, he says, that there is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight.¹⁶ Joachim expresses the same thing when he says that no judgment is true in itself and by itself. Every judgment as a piece of concrete thinking is informed, conditioned to some extent, constituted by the appreciative character of the mind.¹⁷ Such and similar ideas are expressed by Prof. Perry,¹⁸ William James,¹⁹ John Caird,²⁰ Joseph,²¹ Edmond Holmes²² and many others.

Lastly, we turn to the Jaina literature itself. A great logician, Mallavādin, quotes a passage from the *Bhagavati* where Mahāvira replying to his disciple Gautama, describes Āman both as consciousness and not-consciousness (taking in view the different standpoints).²³ There are other passages in the *Bhagavati*²⁴ and *Jñātādharma-kathā*²⁵ which indicate the form in which the doctrine of *Syādvāda* existed in its infancy. In the ten *Niryuktis* of Bhadrabāhu there is no mention of the *Saptabhaṅginaya*.²⁶ Even in the works of Umāsvāti, who is honoured by both the sects of the Jains, we do not find the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, *Saptabhaṅginaya* although the materials are there²⁷ and it was ripe time for the appearance of this doctrine.

It is for the first time in the works of Kundakunda, a Digambara Jaina, that the seven *bhaṅgas* are enumerated only in one *gāthā*.²⁸ From this time onward begins a very important period in the

16. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 487.

17. *Nature of Truth*, ch. III, pp. 92-93.

18. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, chapter on Realism.

19. *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, ch. xxi, p. 291.

20. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*, p. 219.

21. *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 172-3.

22. *In the Quest of Ideal*, p. 21.

23. सर्वनयानां निबंधनत्वात् । किमस्य निबंधनमिति चेत् । उच्यते । निबंधनं चास्य 'आया भन्ते नाणे अन्नाणे' इति स्वामी गौतमस्वामिना पृष्टो व्याकरोति 'गौदमा नाणे नियमा' अतो ज्ञानं नियमादात्मनि । ज्ञानस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकेण वृत्त्यदर्शनात् । 'आया पुण सिय नाणे सिय अन्नाणे' ।
Nayacakra Ms. Jaina Sāhitya Saṁśodhaka.

24. 1. 3, p. 55; 12. 10. p. 592.

25. Ch. V. p. 177.

26. Dr. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *History of Indian Logic* p. 167 mentions a verse of the *Niryukti* which contains a reference to *Saptabhaṅginaya*, but it is wrong. Cf. also Das Gupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 181.

27. For example see *Sūtras* 1. 6. 33; 5. 30, 32.

28. *Pañcāstikāya* I. 14, *Pravacanasāra*, 2. 23.

history of Jaina philosophy. In the words of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana "during the era of tradition there existed no systematic Jaina treatise on logic, its principle being included in the works of metaphysics and religion. With the commencement of the Historical period in 453 A.D. there grew up, among the Jainas of both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, a band of scholars who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great interest and enthusiasm."²⁹ It is during this period that we meet for the first time two great logicians—Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra. By introducing a systematic study of logic they laid the foundation of logic among the Jainas for the first time. Both of them were brilliant scholars who acquired a great prominence in their epoch. Siddhasena and Samantabhadra composed works where they elaborately discussed logical principles and gave an authoritative exposition of the Syādvāda doctrine. Their review of the contemporary schools of philosophy and the declaration that "all the heretical doctrines combined form the true Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda",³⁰ a synthetic and comprehensive view, is really very remarkable in the annals of the Jaina tradition.

Then we come to Mallavādin and Jinabhadraṅgi. The former is called vādin or logician, and it is said that defeating the Buddhists in a dispute he reestablished the Jaina faith.³¹ Jinabhadra is called a great authority on the sacred literature of the Jainas. He almost followed the method of Siddhasena.

After this in the eighth century A.D. again we come to two great exponents of Jaina philosophy who spread the Jaina principles far and wide and thereby contributed much to the uplift of the Jaina religion. They are Akalaṅka and Haribhadra. They were most celebrated writers on Jaina logic. Akalaṅka is called 'the crest gem of the circle of all logicians', while Haribhadra is described as having protected the word of the Arhats like a mother, by his 1,400 works. Logic had gained a very important place during this era. Akalaṅka and Haribhadra devoted themselves to the study of Jaina logic, they entered into discussion with their opponents, and thereby they carried the Jaina mission. It is for the first time that we come across a very minute and scholarly description of the doctrine of Syādvāda.³² The important treatment of the six

29. *History of Indian Logic*, p. 172.

30. *Sanmatitarka* 3-69; 3-47.

31. Unfortunately no work of Mallavādin has come out as yet.

32. *vide Rājavārtika*, I. 6. 5, p. 24 ff.

systems of Indian philosophy in the *Saddarśanasamuccaya* and its popularity among the scholars preserves the fame of Haribhadra even now.

Afterwards, we come to the great logicians Vidyānanda and Abhayadeva. Both the learned Jainas gave a very prominent place to logic (Jaina nyāya) in Jaina philosophy. Here we find a synthetic review of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mimāṃsā and Buddhist philosophy. Vidyānanda in his works *Aṣṭasāhasrī* and *Śloka-vārtika* expounded the various logical principles of the Jainas together with the special criticism of Kumārila, a famous logician. Abhayadeva, on the other hand, is the author of a treatise on logic called *Vādamahārṇava* or the 'Ocean of Discussions' a commentary on the *Sanmatitarka*. He is described as a lion who roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic.

Coming to the twelfth century, we meet Vālideva and Hemacandra, the well-known figures in Jaina literature. The former was a great debator and it is said that as a debator he seemed to have no rival. To establish the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, he wrote *Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra* and a voluminous exposition of it, called *Syādvādaratnākara*. Hemacandra is a most celebrated author on Jainism. He composed thirty-two verses called *Anyayogavyavacchedikā*, a beautiful exposition of the six systems, in a very lucid and charming language.

Last of all, we come to Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, a man of extraordinary talent. He was a distinguished logician and he has written more than one hundred works. He has preserved a critical survey of all the Indian systems with special reference to Śiromaṇi, the greatest exponent of Modern logic of Navadvīpa.³³

After this in the eighteenth century there begins the period of transition and decline in Jaina philosophy.

However, the development of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda has a very important and unique place in the history of Jaina literature. One of the most peculiar characteristics of the Jainas was that they had the capacity of absorbing anything good from outside and of giving it a new form. Their strong protest was against social and philosophical exclusiveness. They took a most comprehensive and synthetic view of all existing philosophies of their time. A Jaina Pandit is aptly said to view every other

33. Yaśovijaya, S.C. Vidyabhusana. *History of Indian Logic*. P. 218.

philosophy in a sympathetic way just as a mother looks at her baby.³⁴ “Truth is one and there are various ways of approaching it,”—this is really a great truth propounded by the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* which leads us to understand the truth comprehensively and at the same time shows the liberal and all-compromising spirit of Jainism.

34. *Adhyātmopaniṣad*, I. 61.

The Rudiments of Anekāntavāda in Early Pali Literature*

BHAGCHANDRA JAIN

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina philosophy. Reality possesses infinite characters which cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one another. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint (anekāntavāda) with its two wings, Nayavāda and Syādavāda.

Rudiments of Anekāntavāda are traceable in the Buddha's approach to questions. Pāli literature¹ describes how he answered a question in four ways. The four ways are :

- (i) Ekamṣa-vyākaraṇīya (answerable categorically);
- (ii) Paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīya (answerable by putting another question);
- (iii) Thāpaṇīya (questions that should be set aside);
- (iv) Vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya (answerable analytically).

The Buddha, who adopted these techniques in answering numerous metaphysical and ethical questions put to him by various disciples and disputants, himself claims to be Vibhajjavādin². The

* Nagpur University Journal, 17/12, 1967

1. A. ii. 46; Milinda Pañha, iv. 2.5. Also see A. i. 197. :
Ekamṣa-vacanaṃ ekam vibhajja-vacanaṃ param
Tatiyaṃ paṭipuccheyya catutthaṃ pana thāpaye.
2. M. ii 46.

Sūtrakṛtāṅga of the Jainas requires the Jaina monk to explain a problem with the help of Vibhajjavāda³. It shows that the Jainas as well as the Budhists followed the analytical method of explanation.

It is possible that the earliest division of the above questions was into (1) Ekamsa-vyākaraṇīya-pañha, and (2) Anekamsa-vyākaraṇīya-pañha corresponding to the Jaina classification of two kinds of statements—ekamsika dhamma and anekamsika dhamma. Later, the latter class would have been sub-divided into the (1) Vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya and the (2) Thāpanīya. Paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīya is a sub-class of vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya⁴.

A point to be noted here is that the Buddha used the word “Anekamsa” in his preachings. For instance, in reply to a question asked by Poṭṭhapāda, the Buddha says “I have taught and laid down doctrines (of which it is possible to make) categorical (assertions) and I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is not possible to make categorical assertions.” (ekamsika pi.....mayā dhammā desitā, paññattā anekamsika pi...mayā dhammā desitā paññattā⁵). Here “Anekamsika” like “Vibhajjavāda” is similar to Anekāntavāda” of Jaina. The etymology and meaning are also similar. But the difference between these two theories is that the Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative (anekāntika) truth, while Buddhism does not accept that all non-categorical statements (anekamsika) can be true or false from one standpoint or another. Anekāntavāda, unlike Anekāmsikavāda, conceives of the possibility of knowing reality from one or more standpoints. Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra, a Buddhist philosopher in the Hetubinduṭīkāloka, summarized this concept as follows : “Syācchabdo” nekāntavacano niyatosti tena syādvādo anekāntavādo yadvā syādakṣaṇīkaḥ ityādi....⁶. A developed form of this doctrine is referred to in later Sankrit Budhist philosophical literature. This theory continued to develop still further upto the time of Kundakunda.

Nayavāda

Nayavāda or the theory of partial truth is an integral part of the conception of Anekāntavāda, which is essential to conceive the sole nature of reality (vastu nayati prāpayati saṁvedanākoṭimārohati). It provides for the acceptance of different viewpoints on the basis that each reveals a partial truth (vastvaimśagrāhī). about object. Naya

3. Vibhajjavāyaṇ ca vyāgarajje, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1. 44. 22.

4. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 292.

5. D. i. 191

6. HBT. p. 284

investigates analytically a particular standpoint of the problem (abhiprāyaviśeṣasya⁷). But if the problem is treated as the complete truth, it is not Naya, but Durnaya or Nayābhāsa or Kunaya⁸. For instance, "It is" is Naya, and "It is and is only" is Durnaya, while "it is relatively (syāt)" is an example of Syādvāda.

Naya can be as many as there are ways of speaking about a thing (jābāiḥ vayanāpahā tāvāitya hontinayavāyā⁹). This infinite number of nayas has been reduced to seven, viz. (i) Naigama (figurative), (ii) Saṅgraha (general or common), (iii) Vyavahāra (distributive), (iv) Ṛjusūtra (the actual condition at a particular instant for a long time), (v) Śabda (descriptive), (vi) Samabhirūḍha (specific) and (vii) Evambhūta (active).

The first four nayas are Sabda Nayas and the rest are the Artha Nayas, for thoughts and words are the only means by which the mind can approach reality. These seven nayas have been also divided into two categories. Dravyārthika or Sāmānya (noumenal or intellectual intuition relating to the substance), and Paryāyārthika or Viśeṣa (phenomenal view relating to the modifications of substances). The first three nayas are connected with the former division and the rest to the latter. In the scriptural language these are named the Niścayanaya (real standpoint) and the vyavahāranaya (practical standpoint).

The Theory of Naya in Buddhist Literature

Pāli literature indicates some of the characteristics of Nayavāda. The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kālāmas. The ten ways are (i) anussavena, (ii) Paramparāya, (iii) Itikirāya, (iv) Piṭakasampadāya, (v) Bhavyarūpatāya, (vi) Samaṇo na guru, (vii) Takkihetu, (viii) Nayahetu, (ix) Ākāraparivitakkena, and (x) Diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiya¹⁰. Out of these, the eighth way, viz Nayahetu is more important for our study. Here Naya is a method of a statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgement (nayena neti, S. ii. 58 anayena nayati dummedho, J. iv 241). The Jātaka says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint (nayaṁnayati medhāvī, J. iv. 241). In about the same

7. Nayo jñāturabhiprāyaḥ, L.T. 55, Anirakṛtapratipakṣo vastvaṁsagrāhī, jñāturabhiprāyo nayaḥ. PKM. p. 676.

8. Sadeva sat syāt saditi tridhārtho. Miyeṭ durnitinayapramaṇaiḥ. SM. 28.

9. SP. 3. 47.

10. A. ii 191-193.

meaning. *Naya* is used in Jaina philosophy, as we have already seen. This *Nayahetu* of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jaina influence of *Naya*, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of *saccas*, viz. *Sammutisacca* and the *Paramatthasacca** which are used in about the same sense as *Paryāyārthika naya* and *Dravyārthikanaya* or *Vyavahāranaya* and *Niścayanaya*. The words “*Dunnaya*” is also found in Buddhism used in identical way.¹¹

The *Suttanipāta* indicates that the *Sammutisacca* was accepted as a common theory of the Recluses and the *Brāhmaṇas*¹², and the *Paramatthasacca* was treated as the highest goal¹³. These two *Saccas* are characterised as *Nītattha* (having a direct meaning), and *Neyyattha* (having an indirect meaning¹⁴). The *Commentary* on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* says that there is no third truth (*tatiyaṃ n’upalabbhati*). *Sammuti* (conventional statement) is true because of convention and *Paramattha* is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realities :

Dve saccāni akkhāsi Sambudho vadatam varo.

Sammutim paramatthañ ca tatiyaṃ n’upalabbhati.

Sanḷetavacanam saccam Lokasammutikāraṇam.

*Paramatthavacanam saccam dhammānam tathalakkhaṇam*¹⁵.

On the other hand, it is also said that there is only one truth, not second (*ekam hi saccam na dutiyamatthi*¹⁶). This contradictory statement appears to give an impression that even in Buddhism the nature of things is considered through some sort of relativistic standpoint which is similar to the theory of *Nayavāda* of Jainism.

Buddhism was aware of the conception of the *Nayavāda* of Jainism, since the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*¹⁷ refers to the several *Paccekasaccas* (individual truths) of the several Recluses and *Brahmaṇas*. If it is so, the conception of *Paccekasacca* (partial truth) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the *Nayavāda* of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism.

* *Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānaṃ dharmadesanā.*

Lokasammutisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ. M.K. Aryasatya Parikṣā

11. A. iii. 178; *Netti*, 21; J. iv. 241.

12. S. N. 897, 904, 911, Cf. *Milinda Panha*, 160.

13. S.N. 68, 219.

14. *Dve’me Tathāgataṃ Abbhācikkhanti, Katamaṃ dve ? Yo ca Neyyattham suttantaṃ nitattho suttanto ti dipeti; yo ca nitattham.*

15. A. A. i. 95; Cf. *Kathavatthu, Aṭṭhakathā*, 34.

16. SN. 884.

17. A. ii. 41; v. 29.

The Theory of Syādvāda

We have observed in our discussion on Nayavāda that it is not an absolute means of knowing the nature of reality. The further examination of truth is attempted by the theory of Conditional Dialectic or Syādvāda. The nayavāda is analytical in character, while the Syādvāda is synthetical in method. The latter investigates the various standpoints of the truth made possible by *naya* and integrates them into a consistent and comprehensive synthesis. It reveals the certainty regarding any problem and not merely the possibility or probability.

Syādvāda Conception in Pāli Literature

The rudiments of the Syādvāda conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of Syādvāda are found in the different philosophical schools.

Vedic literature records negative and positive attitudes towards problems. The R̥gveda which is supposed to be of the earliest period, preserves the rudiments of this doctrine in the Nāsadiya Sūkta. It manifests the spiritual experience, of great sage, who describes the nature of the Universe as :

*Nāsadāsinnō sadāsīt tadānīm nāsīdrajō na vyomā paro yat.
 Kimvāvarīvaḥ kuha kasya śarmanambhaḥ kimāsīdgahanam
 gabhīram.
 Na mṛtyurāsīdamṛtam na tarhi na rātryā ahna aśīt praketaḥ.
 Anīdavātam svadhayātadekam tasmādhanyatna paraḥ
 kimcanāsa*

“There was not the non-existent nor the existent : there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond, What did it contain : Where ? In whose protection ? Was there water, unfathomable, profound ? There was not the becon of night, nor of day. That one breathed, windless by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond.”¹⁸ This indicates inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatva*) about the nature of the universe.

The Upaniṣadic period presents this speculation in a more concrete form by taking a positive step. The Chāndogyopaniṣad represents the idea that being (*sat*) is the ultimate source of existence,

18. R̥gveda, x. 129. Tr. Macdonell, A Vedic Reader for students, p. 207-8.

while some Upaniṣads uphold the view that Non-being is the source of Being (asad vā idam agra āsīt tato vai sat ajāyata¹⁹). On the other hand, some Upaniṣads assert that it is both, being and non-being (sadasadavareṇyam²⁰), and some later Upaniṣads maintain that Non-being cannot be expressed by using a particular name and form (asad avyākṛta nāmarūpam²¹).

Thus the concept of Syādvāda found in Vedic literature commences from polytheism and goes on to monotheism and is later replaced by monism. This indicates that the theory was not rigid. The later developed Vedic philosophical systems were also influenced by this idea and they conceived the problems from different standpoints with the exception of that of complete relativism.

The Naiyāyikas,²² though they used the word “anekānta”²³ could not support the Anekāntavāda entirely and they accepted the atoms, soul, etc., as having absolute unchangeable characters. The Vedānta philosophical attitude also runs on the same lines. Even considering a thing through empirical (vyāvahārika) and real (pāramārthika) standpoints, it asserts that all standpoints are inferior to the standpoint of Brahman²⁴.

The Syādvāda conception is found in a more developed form in Buddhist literature. The Brahmajālasutta refers to sixty-two Wrong-views (micchādiṭṭhis) of which four belong to the Sceptics. They are known as “Amarāvikkhepikā” (who being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and ell-wriggling) on four grounds²⁵. The commentary of Dīghanikāya presents its two explanations. According to first, Amarāvikkhepikā are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives the meaning that like a fish named Amara, the theory of Amrāvikkhepikā runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion²⁶.

The first of the four schools is defined thus : “Herein a certain recluse brāhmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good (Kusalam) or this is evil (akusalam). It occurs to him : I do not

19. Chāndogyop. vi. 21-2., TUP. II 7 : abso see the CUP. III. 19.1.

20. MUP. 2. 2. 1.

21. CHUP. III. 19.1 !.

22. Sāṅkhyapṛavacanabhāṣya, p. 3.

23. Nyāyabhāṣya. 2.1.18.

24. Vedāntasāra, p. 25.

25. Santi....eke Samanabrāhmanā amarāvikkhepikā, tatha tatha pañham puṭṭhā samaṇa vācāvikkhepam apajjanti amarāvikkhepam catūhi vatthūni, D. i. 24.

26. Amarādiṭṭhiyā vācāya vikkhepo ti Amarāvikkhepo. Aparā nayo Amarāvināma macchājāti. Sa umajjana nimajjanodivasena....vucati., DA. I. 115.

understand what is good or evil, as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions, or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry (vighāto) and worry would be a moral danger to me (antarāyo). Thus, through fear of lying (musāvādabhayā) and the abhorrence of being lying, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and ell-wriggling, saying : I do not say so, I do not say this, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say “no no”)

Idha... ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā idaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ ti nappajjānāti, idaṃ akusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajjānāti. Tassa evaṃ hoti. Ahaṃ kho idaṃ kusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajjānāmi idaṃ akusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajjānāmi. Ahan c’eva kho pana idaṃ kusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ appajjānanto, idaṃ kusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ appajjānanto idaṃ kusalam ti vā vyākareyyaṃ idaṃ kusalam ti vā vyākareyyaṃ tathā me assa chando vā rāgo vā doso vā paṭigho vā taṃ mam’ assa musā. Yaṃ mam’ assa musā so mam’ assa vighāto. Yo mam’ assa vighāto so man’ assa antarāyo ti. Iti so musāvādabhayā musāvādaparijegucchā n’ev’idaṃ kusalam ti vyākaroti na pana idaṃ akusalan ti vyākorati, tatha tatha pañham puttḥo samaṇo vacāvikkhepaṃ apajjāti amaravikkhepaṃ : Evaṃ ti pi me no. Tathā ti pi no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me no ti²⁷.

According to this school, it is imposible to achieve knowledge which is a hinderance to heaven or salvation (Saggassa c’eva maggassa ca antarāyo).²⁸ The second and the third school of sceptics do not assert anything to be good or evil through fear of involvement (upādānabhayā) and a fear of interrogation in debate (anuvyogabhayā).

The fourth school of sceptics followed the philosophy of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to him. His fourfold scheme or the fivefold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which are as follows²⁹.

27. D. i. 24-5.

28. DA. i. 155.

29. Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā mando hoti momuho. So mandattā momuhattā tathā tathā puttḥo samaṇo vacāvikkhepaṃ apajjāti amaravikkhepaṃ.....maraṇā. D. i. 27.

- (i) evaṃ pi me no (I do not say so).
- (ii) tathāpi me no (I do not say thus).
- (iii) aññathāpi me no (I do not say otherwise).
- (iv) no ti pi me no (I do not say no).
- (v) no no ti pi me no (I do not deny it).

This formula is applied with regard to the answering of several questions as³⁰ :

- (i) atthi paro loko (there is another world) :
- (ii) natthi paro loko (there is not another world):
- (iii) atthi ca natthi ca paro loko (there is and is not another world):
- (iv) natthi na natthi paro loko (there neither is nor is not another world).

The commentary presents two explanations of the meaning of this formula. According to the first explanation, proposition (1) is an indefinite rejection or denial (aniyamitavikkhepo). Proposition (2) is the denial of specific proposition, e.g. the denial of the eternalism (asassatavāda) when asked whether the world and the soul are eternal. Proposition (3) is the denial of a variant of (2) e.g. the rejection of the semi-eternal theory (ekaccasassatam), which is said to be somewhat different from (annathā) Proposition (4) is the denial of the contrary of (2) e.g. the denial of the nihilist theory (ucchedavādam) when asked whether a being (tathāgato) does not exist after death. Proposition (5) is the rejection of the dialectician's view (takkivādam) of a double denial, e.g. denying the position if asked whether a being neither exists nor does not exist after death.

According to the second explanation, proposition (1) is the denial of an assertion e.g. if asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (2) is the denial of simple negation, e.g. if asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what you are stating is different from both (1) and (2) e.g. if asked whether his position is different from both (1) and (2) (ubhaya annathā) he denies it. Proposition (4) is a denial that you are stating a point of view different from the above e.g. if asked whether his thesis (laddhi) is different from the three earlier points of view (tividhena pi na hoti), he denies, it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e.g. if asked whether his thesis is to deny everything (no no te laddhi ti), he denies it. Thus he does not take his stand (na titṭhati) on any of the logical alternatives (ekasmim pi pakkhe).

30. D. i. 58-59.

Both these explanations show that the fifth proposition of Sañjaya's philosophy is the rejection of denial. Therefore only four propositions of the theory remain. They can be compared with the first four predications of the Syādvāda theory of Jainas³¹ :

- (i) Syādasti (relatively it is).
- (ii) Syānnāsti (relatively it is not).
- (iii) Syādasti nāsti (relatively it is and is not).
- (iv) Syādavaktavyam (relatively it is inexpressible).

Observing this similarity several scholars like Keith³² are ready to give the credit to Sañjaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logical problems. On the other hand some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahāvira has established the Syādvāda (Jain Sūtras, Pt. 11. Uttarādhyana and Sūtrakṛtāṅga, SBE., Vol. 45, p. intro p. xxvii). Miyamoto asserts in his article "The Logic of Reality as the Common Ground for the development of the Middle Way" that Sañjaya's system is quite close to the Buddhist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible"³³

These views are not quite correct. As a matter of fact, the credit should not go only to Sañjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Śiṅka referred to four groups of such schools Kriyāvādins, Akriyāvādins, Ajñānavādins and Vainayikas. These are further sub-divided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (nava padārthas) of Jainism³⁴. These schools were mainly concerned with four questions. They are as follows :

- (i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states (sati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti ?);
- (ii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states (Asati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti ?);
- (iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states (sadasati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti ?);
- (iv) Who knows whether the arising of psychological states is inexpressible (avaktavyo bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti ?).

31. DA. i. 115: See, Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 136.

32. Keith writes : "He (Sañjaya) seems as an agnostic to have been the first to formulate the four possibilities of existence, non-existence, both and neither.....". Buddhist Philosophy, p. 303; P.T. Raju also supports this view stating 'the principle seems to have been first used by Sañjaya :—an article "The Principle of Four-Cornered negation in Indian Philosophy.

33. Buddhism and Culture, ed. Susuma Yamuguchi, Kyoto, 1970, p. 71.

34. Asiasayam Kriyānam Akriyāvādan hoti culasie.

Ānaniya sattathi veniyana-Sūtra Kṛtāṅga.

These questions are similar to the first four Syādvāda predications. The main difference between the predications of the sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubt or deny the logical problems altogether whereas the latter assert that they are true to a certain extent.

Makkhali Gosāla and Syādvāda

Makkhali Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect and an earlier companion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta has contributed to the development of the Syādvāda conception. He considered problems through the three-fold standpoints, called Trirāśis, a short version of Saptabhaṅgīs.

On the basis of the Nandisūtra commentary, Basham observes : “the fact that the Ājīvika heretics founded by Gosāla are likewise called Trairāśikas, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz. living (jīva), not living (ajīva) and both living and not living (nojīva) : world, not world and both world and not world : real, unreal and both real and unreal, in considering standpoints (naya) regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus, since they maintain three heaps (rāśi), or categories, they are called Trairāśikas.” Further he says, “the Ājīvakas thus seem to have accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of Saptabhaṅgi, as in the orthodox Jaina Syādvāda and Nayavāda³⁵”.

This reference indicates that the Ājīvikas were aware of the Saptabhaṅgi of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilleke remarks on this reference : “But judged by the fact that the three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the Sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold scheme of the Jainas, it would appear to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jaina Schemes, with which the Ājīvikas could not have been acquainted when they evolved theirs”. Further he says, “In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and Jain texts the very doctrine of the Trairāśikas, which seems to have necessitated the three-fold scheme, is mentioned, thus making it highly probable that it was at least earlier than the Jain scheme”. He accounts for this view by

35. Tathā te eva Gośāla-pravartita Ājīvikāḥ pasandians Trairāśika ucyante, yatas te sarvaṃ vastu tyātmakam icchanti tad yathā jivo jivo jivajivś ca loko lokālokaśca, Sadasat sadasat. Nayacintayam dravyastikam paryāyastikam ubhayāstikam ca. Tatas tribhi rāśibhis caranti iti Trairāśikāḥ—Nandi Comm., fol. 113, quoted Weber Verzeichniss, ii. p. 685. Cf. Samavāya Comm. fol., 129. History and doctrines of the Ājīvikas, p. 275. Also see for reference Uttarādhyayana. 3.9. Priyadarśini Tikā, p. Vol. 1. P. 742.

saying that “while the earliest stratum of the Pāli Nikāyas knows of the four-fold scheme, one of the earliest Books of the Jainas Canon, the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, which makes an independent reference to this Trairāśika doctrine, does not mention the seven-fold scheme, although it is aware of the basic principle of Syādvāda” (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 156).

Here Jayatilleke tries to prove that the three-fold scheme appears to be earlier than the Jaina scheme. He gives a reason in support of his view viz, the Sūtrakṛtāṅga does not mention the Seven-fold scheme. I too hold the view that the three-fold scheme had come into existence earlier than the four-fold scheme. Dīghanaka Paribhāṅga, who seems to be a follower of Pārśvanātha tradition, also maintains, as we have already found, this scheme.

As regards the absence of the reference in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, it should be remembered that it is not totally unaware of the basic principles of Syādvāda, as Jayatilleke himself accepts. It is said that “the wise man should not joke or explain without conditional propositions”³⁶. He should ‘expound the analytical theory (vibhajjavāyaṃ ca vyāgarejja) and use the two kinds of speech, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise’³⁷. Further it does not deal with the Jaina Philosophy. It is a concise compilation of the Jaina doctrines as well as others of that time. It was, therefore, not essential to deal with Syādvāda in detail. Kundakunda, who flourished in first century B.C. or in the beginning of the Christian era, described the Saptabhaṅgī himself in the Pañcāstikāyasāra. He says that “Dravya can be described by the seven-fold predication : (i) siya atthi or syādasti, (ii) siya natthi, or syānnāsti, (iii) siya uhayam or syādasti nāsti, (iv) siya-avvattavva or syādavaktavya (v) siya atthiavattavya or syādastyavaktavya, (vi) siya natthi avvattavva or syānnāstyavaktavya, and (vii) siya atthi natthi avvattavva or syādastināstyavaktavya :

*Siya atthi natthi uhayam avvattavvaṃ puno ya tattidayam
Davvaṃ khu satta bhaṅgaṃ adesavasena sambhavadi*³⁸.

This means the Syādvāda and its predications were well known at

36. Na yā vi panne parihasakujjā, na yā siyāvāya viyāgarejja, SūKr. 1. 14. 19.

37. Saṅkejja yā saṅkitabhāva bhikkhū, vibhajjavayaṃ ca viyagarejja. Bhāsādukam dhammasamujjhitechīm, vyāgarejja samaya supanne. SūKr 1.14 22.

38. Pañcāstikāyasāra, 14. Jaina Āchāryas give other interpretations also of seven Bhaṅgas. For instance, Dr. Upadhye (Pravacanasāra, intro. p. LXXXV mentions an interesting verse from the Jayadhavalā commentary :—

Kathancit kencit kascit kutaścit kasyacit kvacit.

Kadācic ceti paryāyāt syādvādaḥ saptabhaṅgibhiḥ.

the time of the Buddha, and upto the time of Kundakunda they were developed still further.

The Buddha and Syādvāda

During the Buddha's time there were certain philosophical points which became the subjects of violent debate. Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyst, like the Jainas³⁹. In the *Dīghanikāya* the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (*ekamsika*) and non-categorical (*anekam sika*) assertions⁴⁰. The theory of Four Noble Truths is an example of the former, while the theory of *Avyākatas* is of the latter.

Here the terms "ekamsika" and "anekamsika" are very similar to *ekāntavāda* and *Anekāntavāda*. The former is concerned with the non-Jaina philosophies and the latter with the Jaina philosophy. The difference between the Buddha's and Nigaṇtha Nātaputta's standpoints is that according to the former's conception the non-categorical assertions are not true or false, from some standpoint or another, unless we analyse them further, while the latter upholds the view that all the statements are relatively (*syāt*) correct, i.e. they contain some aspect of the truth. The theory of *Avyākata* does not consist of any such quality.

The Buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as outlined below :

- (i) *atthi* (it is).
- (ii) *natthi* (it is not).
- (iii) *atthi ca natthi ca* (it is and it is not).
- and (iv) *n'ev'atthi na ca natthi* (it neither is, nor is not).

This four-fold scheme has been used in several places of the Pāli Canon. For instance :

- (i) *Chinnaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāgaṇirodhā atth'aññāma, kiñcī ti ?* (Is there anything else after complete detachment from the cessation of the six spheres of experience ?).
- (ii) *Channaṃ.....natth'annaṃ kiñcī ti ?*
- (iii) *Channaṃ atthi ca n'atthi c'annaṃ kiñcī ti ?*
- (iv) *Channaṃ.....n'ev'atthi no n'atth'annaṃ kiñcīti ?*

Miyamoto⁴¹ observes that the seven-fold scheme of the Jainas is

39. *Vibhajjavāyam ca viyāgarejja*, *SūKr.* I. 14. 22.

40. *Ekamsika pi...maya dhammadesitā paññatta, anekamsika pi desitā, paññitā*, D. i. 191; Cf. *Vibhajjavādo...aham...nāham...ekamsavādo*, M. ii. 197.

41. "The Logic of Relativity as the Common Ground for the Development of the Middle Way". *Buddhism and Culture*, Ed. Susuma Yumuguchi, Kyoto, 1960, p. 80.

equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner :?

- (i) Syādasti=I
- (ii) Syānnāsti=II
- (iii) Syādastināsti=III
- (iv) Syādavaktavya
- (v) Syādastyavaktavya
- (vi) Syānnāstyavaktavya=IV
- (vii) Syādastināstyavaktavya

But this observation is not perfectly right, since the Jainas pondered over the problems more profoundly than the Buddhists. It would be more appropriate if we think of the first four propositions of the Buddhists.

But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina Scheme, all the seven propositions could be true from relative standpoints, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true. The propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism.

It is more problems that the Buddha's "Catuṣkoṭi" formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sañjaya, although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of Jainas. Such formulas, it must be remembered, were commonly accepted at that time by teachers with different attitudes.

The Pāli Canon considers Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda as a combination of both Uccedavāda and Sassatavāda. Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta presented his views in contradictory ways⁴². As a matter of fact, he could not understand the real nature of Syādvāda. We know that Jaina philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism nor absolute nihilism, but eternalism-cum-nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding Sassatavāda and Uccedavāda, there are no explicit references to Syādvāda in the Pāli Canon. The absence of direct reference does not mean that the Syād-vāda conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nātaputta at that time. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of Syādvāda, which might have belonged to the tradition of Pārśvanātha.

In the course of a discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition and converted later into the Nātaputta's religion, that his former statement is not in keeping with

42. MA. ii. 831.; DA iii. 906.

the latter, nor the latter with the former (na kho te sandhiyati purimeṇa vā pacchimaṃ pacchimeṇa vā purimaṃ)⁴³. Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction (svātmavirodha) as an argument against Syādvāda. This has been a repeated criticism against Syādvāda by opponents of different times.

Likewise in the course of a conversation held between Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and Citta Gahapati, the latter blames the former for his self-contradictory conception. He says : If your former statement is true, your latter statement is false, and if your latter statement is true, your former statement is false (sacepurimam saccam, pacchimaṃ te micchā, sace pacchimaṃ saccam purimaṃ te micchā)⁴⁴

Another reference found in Pāli literature helps us to understand the position of Syādvāda. The Dīghanakha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya mentions three kinds of theories upheld by Dīghanakha paribbājaka. They are as follows⁴⁵:—

(i) Sabbaṃ me khamati (I agree with all views).

(ii) Sabbaṃ me na khamati (I agree with no views).

(iii) Ekaccaṃ me khamati, ekaccaṃ me na khamati (I agree with some views and disagree with other (views)).

The Buddha criticises Dīghanakha's views in various ways, and expresses his own views towards the problem. Dīghanakha's views are similar to the predications of Syādvāda, and represent its first three bhāṅgis as follow:—

(i) Sabbaṃ me khamati=Syādasti

(ii) Sabbaṃ me na khamati=Syānnāsti

(iii) Ekaccamme Khamati, ekaccaṃ me na khamati
=Syadastināsti

Now the problem is to consider to which school of thought Dīghanakha belonged. According to the commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya, he is said to be the holder of the view of Uchedavada⁴⁶, which is a part of Syādvāda in the opinion of Buddhaghosa⁴⁷. He might

43. M. I. 232.

44. S. iv. 298-99.

45. M. i. 498 ff.

46. MA. iii. 294.

47. *Āvuso tvam accacena Sassatam ti, ganhapesi. Evam dve pi jane eka laddike akatva bahu-nānā-niḥḥena ugganḥānetvā kālam akāsi, tassa sarirakiccam taktva sannipatita aññam aññam peccimou—'kass' avuso ecariyo saram ecikhi ? ti 'Sassatam' ti. Aparo tam patibācetra 'Mahyam saram ecikhi to' aha. Evam sabee : Mahyam saram acikhi....DA. ii. 906-7. MA. ii. 831.*

have belonged to Sañjaya's school of Paribbājakas who were followers of Pārśvanātha tradition converted later into Nātaputta's religion before he joined the Buddha's order. Dīghanakha was a nephew of Sañjaya. It seems therefore that he was a follower of Jainism. This inference may be confirmed if Dīghanakha can be identified with Dīghatapassi of the Upālisutta of Majjhima Nikāya, who was a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

In the above propositions of Saccaka, Citta Gahapati and Dīghanakha Paribbājaka, we can trace the first three or four predications (including Syādavaktavya) of Syādvāda conception of Jainism.

It is not impossible that the term "Syāt" had been used by Jainas in the beginning of each predication to justify correctly the other's views on the basis of non-absolutism. The word "syāt" (siya in Pāli), which indicates the definite standpoint towards the problems, is also used in the Cula Rāhulovādasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where the two types of the Tejodhātu are pointed out in definite way⁴⁸. It seems that this word "syāt" originally belonged to Jainas and was later used by the Buddhists in a particular sense. The defect of self-contradiction in Syādvāda conception of Jainas is a criticism levelled against it by the Buddhists. It happened so, only because of ignorance of the meaning of Syāt. As a matter of fact, the Jainas had concentrated their attention on the matter of controversial points in different theories of the then philosophers and had tried to examine their views from different standpoints. By this method, the Jainas could figure out the real nature and consider the problem in a non-violent way.

48. See B.C. Jain on the Refutation of Syādvāda in Buddhist Literature : Anekāntavāda and Buddhist Philosophers, Vidharbha Samsodhana Maṇḍala Vārśika, 1966.

References to Syādvāda in the Ardha-Māgadhī Canon*

A.N. UPADHYE

The approach to reality adopted by Anekānta-vāda strikes an original note in the history of Indian logic. If rightly grasped, Anekānta-vāda prepares a percipient for an all-sided apprehension of reality. The object of knowledge has to be realised as itself and as related with all others : the Anekāntavāda aims to achieve this purpose in a successful manner. Unfortunately it has been a neglected branch of study ; it is often either misunderstood or half-understood : that is why it is often adversely criticised. Many points connected with Anekānta-vāda require to be cleared by studying the original texts.

It has been usual with us nowadays that an idea, an institution or a doctrine should be studied historically detecting its various stages of development as gleaned from the available tracts of literature. Many religious institutions and philosophical doctrines are subjected to this method of study, and Syādvāda cannot be excepted. It is really an useful line of study but very often its value is overstated. It is remarked¹ that "Syād-vāda or Saptabhaṅginaya may be a later development in Jainism but the doctrine of Anekānta-vāda, the first and the most fundamental teaching of Mahāvīra, seems to have been at the root Syādvāda. The references in the Jain conons of the Śvetāmbaras are in favour of this view." The statement appears to mean much, but it is not so clear. Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgī are

* Proceedings and Transactions of the 9th All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, 1937.

1. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 181.

accepted as synonyms, and Anekānta-vāda is said to precede Syādvāda in time. This last remark possibly means that the Jaina canon of the Śvetāmbaras does not refer to Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī.

So far as the pro-canonical texts of the Digāmbaras are concerned, Kundakunda, who is one of the earlier author-saints, mentions, as I have shown elsewhere,² full fledged Syādvāda in *Pañcāṣṭikāya* and *Pravacanasāra*; and the former work gives the name Śaptabhaṅgī. Turning to the Svetāmbara canon, it has been already pointed out³ that the three primary predications are mentioned in *Bhagavatīsūtra* or *Viyāhapannatti*. As yet the Ardhamāgadhi canon of the Svetāmbaras is not exhaustively studied in all its details. Quite recently, however, that great German orientalist, Dr. Walther Schubring of the Hamburg University, has given to us an authentic resume of the entire Ardhamāgadhi canon in his '*Die Lehre der Jainas*.'⁴ He states that the basic material for Syādvāda is already there, but the complete structure, which is later on known as Anekānta, is not explicitly found there.

The Sanskrit commentators do help us in interpreting the texts of the Ardhamāgadhi canon, but at times we have to ignore their explanations, when they are not satisfactory, and try to construe and interpret certain passages on comparative and philological lines of study. I purpose to draw the attention of scholars to a couple of passages, which, I think, refer to Saptabhaṅgī and Syādvāda by these names.

(i) The Vācaka family of religious teachers, to which Nāgahastin and many other famous personages belonged, is thus glorified in *Nandisūtra*, verse No. 30 :

“वहुउ वायगवंसो जसवंसो अज्जनागहत्थीणं ।
वागरणकरणभंगियकम्मपयडीपहाणाणं॥”

The second line is explained by Malayagiri in this manner :

“कथंभूतानामित्याह—व्याकरणकरणभङ्गीकर्मप्रकृतिप्रधानानाम्, तत्रव्याकरणं संस्कृतशब्दव्याकरणं प्राकृतशब्दव्याकरणं च प्रश्नव्याकरणं वा, करणं पिण्डविशुद्धादि, उक्तं च—‘पिंडाविसोही समिई भावण पडिमा य इदियनिरोहो । पडिलेहणगुणिओ अभिग्गहा चेव करणं तु॥’ भङ्गी भङ्गबहुलं श्रुतम्, कर्म प्रकृतिः प्रतीता, शब्देषु

2. My Introduction to *Pravacanasāra*, p. 87.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

प्ररूपणमधिकृत्य प्रधानानाम्”॥

The term *bhaṅgiya* or *bhaṅgī* in the above passage, I think, refers to Saptabhaṅgī; and Malayagiri’s interpretation ‘*bhaṅga-bahulamśrutam*’ possibly means the same. The second line mentions various branches of study rather than the names of particular texts. This excludes the possibility of interpreting *bhaṅgī* as the name of a text, now obsolete and lost.

(ii) In the 14th chapter of *Sūyagaḍam* we have the following warning to the pious monk :

“नो छायए नो वि य लूसएज्जा माणं न सेवेज्ज पगासणं च ।
न यावि पन्ने परिहास कुज्जा न यासियावायं वियागरेज्जा॥19॥”

We are concerned with the phrase ‘*na yāsiyāvāya viyāgarejja*’ which Śīlāṅka explains in this manner :

“तथा नापि चाशीर्वादं बहुपुत्रो बहुधनो [बहुधर्मो] दीर्घायुस्त्वं भूया इत्यादि व्यागृणीयात् ।

So far as Ardhamāgadhī and Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī are concerned, the normal equivalent of *āśīs* is *āśī*, and another form *āśīsā*⁵ is noted by Hemachandra. With Hemachandra’s illustration that *siāvāo—syādvādaḥ*⁶ in view, it is more reasonable to render that passages thus : *vyāgrṇīyāt*, i.e., he should not explain anything which is not (conforming to) Syādvāda. We know from many early Jaina stories that Jaina monks were not prohibited from giving blessings in the form of *dharmalābha*. Thus it is more consistent to interpret the phrase *yāsiyāvāyam as ca asyādvādam* than as *ca āśīrvādam*. Śīlāṅka would not object to author’s mention of Syādvāda in this context, as it is clear from verse No. 22 which runs thus :

“संकेज्ज यासंकियभाव भिक्खू विभज्जवायं च वियागरेज्जा ।⁷
भासादुय धम्मसमुट्टिण्हिं वियागरेज्जा समया सुपन्ने॥”

The phrase *vibhajjavāyam* etc. is explained by Śīlāṅka in this manner :

“तथा विभज्यवादं पृथगर्थनिर्णयवादं व्यागृणीयान्, यदि वा विभज्यवादः स्याद्वादस्तं सर्वत्रास्खलितं लोकव्यवहाराविसंवादितया सर्वव्यापिनं स्वानुभवसिद्धं वदेत्, अथवा सम्यगर्थान्विभज्य पृथक् कृत्वा तद्वादं वदेत्, तद्यथा—नित्यवादं द्रव्यार्थतया पर्यायार्थतया त्वनित्यवादं वदेत्” etc.

5. *Prākṛtavāyākaraṇa* VIII, ii. 174.

6. *Ibid.* VIII ii. 107.

7. *Ibid.*

Even though it may be disputed whether Vibhajjavāda meant Syādvāda at the time when *Sūyagaḍam* was composed,⁸ this much is certain that Śīlānka accepts the possibility of Syādvāda being mentioned in this context. So we may accept that verse No. 14 mentions Syādvāda according to which the monk is expected to explain the various topics.

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8. Dr. Jacobi translates the phrase thus : 'he should expound the Syādvāda', and adds in a footnote : The Sapatabhaṅgīnaya or seven modes of assertion are intended by the expression in the text (SBE vol. 45, p. 327). We cannot, in this context ignore another important significance of the word Vibhajjāvāya or Vibhajjavāda. Literally it means 'explanation (*vāidaḥ*, from *vād* to speak, to propound) by division or analysis (*vibhajya* from *bhaj* with *vi*) ; and in the Pāli cannon an answer in detail is called Vibhajyāvādin (*Keith : Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, p. 152). In *Majjhima nikāya* Buddha declares that he is a Vibhajyāvādin and not an Ekāmsāvādin, indicating thereby 'that his method was analytic and not synthetic' (*N. Dutt : Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools* pp. 249-50). The term Vinhajyāvādin means 'one who distinguishes or discriminates referring specially to a method of philosophical discussion (*E.J. Thomas : History of Buddhist Thought* p. 39). As reported, when Theravādins described Buddha as a Vibhajyāvādin to Aśoka, it only means that the term was not a party designation as yet in the days of Aśoka but implied only the peculiar philosophical approach. According to the later Chronicles Vibhajjavāda is the name of a school and it is identical with Theravāda; both following the same canon and the tenets (*Kern : Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 111). Some of the lists of Buddhist schools have been drawn up in the 5th or 6th century A. D., though they contain older elements (*E.J. Thomas : Ibid.* p. 38).

When the passage from *Sūyagaḍam* of Sūtrakṛtāṅga asks a Nirgrantha monk (the title of the chapter being Gamthajjhayaṇe) to explain in conformity with Vibhajjavāda, in all probability this passage must have been composed at a time when Vibhajjavāda had not become a term of party designation. The ideas underlying Mahāvīra's Anekāntavāda and Buddha's Vibhajjavāda appear to have been similar; and as contemporaries living in the same part of India their methods of explanation must have been similar though not identical. Even to-day Pāli and Ardhamāgadhi canons show many points of similarity so far as expressions and exposition are concerned. Buddha's differentiation of Vinhajyavāda from Ekāmsāvāda, noted above, reminds us of Jaina differentiation of Syādvāda from Ekāntavāda. So Śīlānka has sufficient justification in paraphrasing Vibhajjavāda as Syādvāda. Siddhasena uses two words *vibhajjavāda* as Syādvāda. Siddhasena uses two words *vibhajjamāmanā* and *Vibhajjamāṇā* and *vibhajjavāyam* in *Sammatitarka* I. 14 and III. 57; both the terms are used with reference to Anekānta, though Abhyadeva's commentary on III. 57 is not so consistent.

An Analysis of 'syāt' in Syādvāda*

M.P. MARATHE

Many scholars have acknowledged the importance of the role that Syādvāda or *Saptabhaṅgī* plays in the exposition and explanation of central tenet of the Jaina Philosophy. In the elaboration of the doctrine of *Syādvāda* the expression 'syāt' is rendered by such corresponding expressions as 'possibly', 'may be', 'it is possible, probable 'perhaps' etc. The point of such rendering and their explanations is that some kind of modal predicate or possibility is involved in the doctrine. But, unfortunately, hardly any effort is made to analyse and explain the kind of possibility that is involved in such a doctrine. It is the object of this paper to focus attention on this issue. The entire paper falls into four main sections : the first deals with the brief statement of the various kinds of possibilities which western philosophical and logical discussion have brought to forefront, the second attempts to offer interpretation of 'syāt', the third focusses on the question of the kind of possibility or possibilities that such an interpretation of 'syāt' embraces and the final section discusses some of the important consequence this explanation leads to.

I

Starting from Aristotle many philosophers and logicians have concentrated their attention on elaborate explanation of such modal predicates as necessity, possibility, impossibility etc. Of late, logicians like von Wright have also been maintaining that modes are principally of four kinds : Alethic modes or modes of truth, Existential modes or

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modes of being, Epistemic mode of modes of knowing and Deontic modes of obligation. The entire discussion is very important. But we need hardly concentrate on it here. For *Syādvāda* in particular and Jaina Logic and Philosophy in general do not talk about every modal predicate but rather about one modal predicate viz. possibility. Even if we decide to focus our attention only to one mode viz. possibility, we might not have to, as will appear latter, take into account all kinds of possibilities. We shall, therefore mainly concentrate only on the mode of possibility.

Various kinds of possibilities considered during the development of modal notions in Western thought may be grouped under these heads : (i) the Absolute possibility (ii) the Relative possibility (iii) the Epistemic possibility (iv) Possibility understood as ability capacity, disposition or what Aristotle called potentiality, (v) Technical or etiological possibility and (vi) Possibility as minimal probability. The first again is of two kinds : (a) Conceptual or apriori and (b) nomological, physical or real. Similarly, the relative possibility can be considered under (a) and (b) above.

We shall presume the general sense in which these modal notions are understood in modern philosophical thought. However, some discussion about them may be useful to us for the consideration of the concept of 'syār'. First, the notion of possibility as minimal probability is not usually employed in technical language, although in our ordinary language we are familiar with such a notion. Secondly, not only the absolute nomological possibility can be subsumed under absolute conceptual possibility or the relative nomological possibility can be subsumed under relative conceptual possibility but also the relative conceptual and nomological possibilities are definable in terms of the absolute conceptual and nomological possibilities respectively. Thirdly, the major controversies that have arisen recently are about the possibilities of the first and fourth kind. Again, the way sometimes its explanation is given, the fourth kind of possibility is tied to an important presupposition about both the world and things in it. Lastly, possibility of the third kind presupposes the possibility of the fourth and sixth kinds but not vice versa.

In connection with the discussion of possibility in Aristotle Hintikka¹ has argued that the Aristotelian broad notion of possibility really embraces two important kinds of it within its fold: (a) 'possibility proper' or what we would term today to be conceptual

1. Hintikka, J. : *Time and Necessity*, 1973, Oxford.

possibility and (b) possibility as contingency. The latter kind of possibility, again is of two kinds : (a) Possibility that is short of necessity and (b) the one that is descriptive of something indeterminate. This kind of possibility is generally expressed in the form of 'thus' or 'not thus' without prevalence of either one of the alternatives. Hintikka has further argued that although Aristotle mentions and uses both these kinds of possibilities yet no sharp distinction between them is made by first and that the second kind of possibility is according to Aristotle connected with generation or change of a thing while the first is not. The first kind of possibility of these comes to be stated in terms of what Quine calls 'eternal sentences' while that of the latter kind in terms of what Quine calls 'occasion sentences'. All these earlier considerations about possibility as also the points Hintikka has made have an important bearing on the discussion of possibility or possibilities indicated by 'syāt'.

II

Although there is an important relation between *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* yet it should be borne in mind that the two are distinct. Similarly, although there is an important relation between *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda*, one should not be confused with the other.² The point, however, is made to avert the possible confusions of mixing between them.

The expression '*Saptabhaṅgī*' suggests a set of seven formulae.³ Each one of such formulae is prefixed by the expression 'syāt'. It is on account of this perhaps that the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī* is also known as *Syādvāda*. The expression 'syāt', as mentioned in the beginning of the paper, is rendered and understood in a particular way; i.e. in the sense of a modal predicate or modal notion.

It may be admitted that the expression 'syāt' is used by grammarians in different ways i.e. as a form of 'as' and as *Avyaya*. In the context of *Syādvāda* these two uses seem to be important. Several scholars have used it as *Avyaya* (indeclinable or grammatical particle).⁴ In the sense of potential *liṅ*, however, *Syāt* is left understood by some texts. This sense is clear, however, not only from dictionaries but also from reliable Jaina philosophical texts.⁵

2. It would not be possible, in the paper, to deal in details with the relation between *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda*.

3. Vāhideva Sūri : *Pramāṇanayatatvālokālaṅkāra* : IV. 14

4. *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa*, VII. p. 848.

5. Monier-Williams, M. : *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 1273.
Vimaladāsa : *Sptabhāṅgītarāṅgi* : p. 16.

It is urged that although the word 'syāt' is understood in the sense of *anekānta*, *vidhi*, *vicāra* etc. yet in the context under consideration, viz in the context of *Saptabhaṅgi*⁶ it is only to be understood in the sense of *Anekānta*. *Anekānta* means that a given object or thing is (potentially) beset with many *dharmas*.⁷ The grammatical particle (*avyaya*) *syāt* is indicative (*dyotaka*) of this. *Syādvāda* as a doctrine arises from this consideration. *Syādvāda* thus, essentially is that abhyupagama in which it is maintained that (any) one thing is beset with many *dharmas*, invariable or variable (*nityānitya*).⁸ Understood in this way *Syādvāda* emphasises that different dharma can be predicated of a given thing.

There is, however, another equally important, sense in which the word *syāt* is used. In this use it is the potential third person singular of the root 'as'.⁹ But it is not merely the grammatical consideration that brings this sense to the foreground. Equally important are the philosophical and modal considerations. 'Syāt' in this sense brings out symptomatically (*pratirūpakah*) that a thing is a collection or conjunction (*Nipātaḥ*) of *dharmas* potentially it is beset with.¹⁰

If both these interpretations of the expression 'syāt' are brought to bear upon each other then two important consequences seem to follow, the fuller implications of which will become clear as we proceed, and they are : (a) *Syādvāda* is the explanatory foundation of *anekāntavāda*, the explanatory frame in terms of which *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine according to which a thing can have many *dharmas* without contradiction,¹¹ becomes significant and meaningful; and (b) *Syādvāda* is connected with potentiality, capacity or dispositions of a thing which actualize. Such actualized dispositions are given either right with the emergence of a thing (*sahabhāvīdharmas*), in which case they are called *guṇas* or as those which happen to be actualized collectively or sequentially (*kramabhāvī*) in course of time. In the latter case they are called *Paryāyas*. Both these interpretations have important consequences in the context of the Jaina Philosophical explanation, but more of it later.

6. Vimaladāsa : op cit p. 16.

7. *Op cit*

8. *Abhidhānarājendrakōṣa* : Vol. VII, p. 848.

9. Monier Williams : *Op cit*

10. Devabhadra : *Nyāyāvātāravṛttiṭippaṇa*, 30

11. Vimaladāsa : *Op cit*.

III

In order, for us, to determine the kinds of possibilities that are involved in the doctrine of *Syādvāda* we shall have to understand the expressions, *Dharma*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The nature of a *Dravya* can be understood only in the light of these expressions. To me it appears that the Jaina philosophers use the term *Dharma* for any potential feature of a thing. We need to assume that totality of such *dharmas* are given to us as dispositions. *Guṇa*, on the other hand, means for them the actual feature of a thing. But such a feature shall be either of the nature of a differentia or proprium, other features of a thing are given along with it. *Paryāyas*, again, are those features of a thing which are actualized through a thing undergoing a change. Such features are actualized either simultaneously or successively in course of time. These features could be of the nature of accidents—inseparable or separable.¹²

In Jaina philosophical texts, it appears that, the terms *Padārtha*, *Dravya*, *Tattva*, *Vastu* and *Sat* are used almost interchangeably. This leads to a number of problems. But we need not bother about them here. It is for this reason, perhaps, that what is said about a *dravya* becomes *inter alia* applicable to a *vastu* or *sat*.¹³ We shall understand these terms broadly in the sense of any physical thing.

One striking point about a thing that is brought out in one definition of it is that it has three kinds of characteristics: (a) emergence (*Utpāda*) (b) decay or degeneration or change (*vyaya*) and (c) some kind of permanence (*dhrauvya*.)¹⁴ that becomes the basis of re-identification and recognition of it. Such a definition of a thing reveals a general, although important, feature of a thing. Such a thing further has two kinds of features (on the plain of actuality): (a) *guṇas* or those features that are given to us experientially along with the thing itself and are, as stated above, of the nature either of differentia or proprium, and (b) those features which the thing has only contingently. They, as argued earlier, could be of the nature of accidents. We describe a thing either in terms of *guṇas* or *paryāyas* or both.¹⁵ Since any feature

12. *Abhidhānarājendrakōṣa* : Vol. III, p. 510.

13. *Tattvārthādhiḡamasūtra*, V. 37 V. 29.

Pramāṇanayattattvālokāṅkāra : VII, 9.

Nyāyāvātāra, 29

Syādvādamañjarī, 22.

14. *Mallīṣenasūri* : *Syādvādatāmañjarī*, 22.

15. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 29.

that is epistemically given to us is given in course of time and since epistemically any descriptive statement about a thing presuppose maximally the totality of such features that are either collectively or alternatively given to us in course of time, either along with the emergence of a thing or in course of its life-history, a thing is also defined as the one that has many (literally innumerable) such factures.¹⁶ The reason being that a thing can change and through a change can come to have newer and newer features and never shall we be in a position to say that a thing has so many features and not more. A statement about a thing can be made only with reference to the given occasion. If we make a statement about a thing independently of the stipulation of occasion it would hardly be informative in the genuine sense of the term.

A thing does not have those and only those features that are given to us in experience. Better it is to say that a thing either has at least these features which it is now having or those which it would have in the course of time. Thus a thing potentially has not only those features that are actualized but also those which were or will be actualised. That is, a thing potentially has all the features, whether they are actualized or not. This is how a thing is also defined as that which is beset with totality of all features potentially.¹⁷

If we bring to bear these three descriptions of the nature of a thing upon one another then it turns out that the possibilities that we can envisage with regard to a thing fall readily into two groups: (a) epistemic possibilities—the ones which figure in the descriptive statement about a thing, and (b) possibilities understood as capabilities, abilities or dispositions. Here capacities or dispositions or potentialities are understood perhaps as a sub-visible structure of a thing. Unless a thing has potentialities they will never be actualised. It is in this sense that dispositional possibilities are prior to epistemic possibilities. But, contrarily, all our statements about dispositions of a thing are anchored in epistemic possibilities and which are, therefore, prior to possibilities as potentialities. But the features a thing comes to have either as differentia or otherwise are those and only those, it is maintained by Jaina philosophers and logicians, which it must have as dispositions. It is in this sense that epistemic possibilities presuppose possibilities as potentialities.

One important question arises here. Granting that there are

16. Umāsvāti : *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, V. 37

17. Kundakunda : *Pravacanasāra*, I. 49.

possibilities, what kind of possibilities are they ? In this connection four alternatives stand out prominently : (a) possible events, both specific and otherwise, (b) possible courses of events. (c) possible kinds of individuals and (d) possible individuals or particulars. Out of these, in the context of *Syādvāda*, the first two are ruled out simply because they are basically technical possibilities. Although they are explainable in terms of nomological possibilities, to the extent to which they are at heart etiological or causal possibilities and to the extent to which Jainas are talking about physical objects independently of causal chain in the context of *Syādvāda*, these possibilities are out of question. The basic issue the *Syādvāda* is concerned with is to describe a thing vis-a-vis the features it has and these are given alongwith other features the thing comes to have in course of time, either simultaneously or in succession. This issue is different from the issue of the explanation of the either emergence of a thing or the features. It is in this context that etiological possibilities will figure. More importantly, however, we should understand that every genuine characterization of a thing consists in giving a determinate value of determinables; and for this determinables need not at all be conceived as causally enchained possibles. But what about the last two ? In some text it is argued that the expression 'syāt' is envisaged to bring forward the possibilities in the sense of such objects as a *ghata*.¹⁸ But an object may be considered as a kind of individual or as an individual or a particular. Now, out of these the former is ruled out at least so far as the contention of some texts is concerned. The reason for this is that same text adds that such an entity, which is potentially beset with many *dharmas*, must be the one that is existent.¹⁹ But this view does not seem to be uniformly borne out by all scholars or Jaina philosophers would not have an objection, it seems, to the acceptance of the kind of individuals. In this case, however, the possibilities that would figure in our consideration would not be existential possibilities but nomological possibilities although they are explicable in terms of conceptual possibilities. But the issue being of the description of a thing absolute conceptual possibilities are out of questions, as such statements would be descriptively impotent and irrelevant. The conceptual possibilities would figure on the level of explanation and justification of descriptive statements. But that is quite different a story.

Even then a question may be posed that can we not say that

18. Vimaladāsa : *Saptabhangitarānginī*, p. 16.

19. *Op cit.*

although the Jaina thinkers do not expressly deal with formal possibility in the context of the descriptively significant statements, might they not be dealing with relative possibility? This alternative too is ruled out. For the question of relative possibility arises only where we talking about a thing either with reference to another thing or a prior state of itself. The descriptive statements in terms of possibility that Jainas envisage in the context of Syādvāda are too relative statements and are, by the very nature of the case, supposed to be about a particular thing alone independently of the reference to another thing or its prior state. Hence the case of relative possibility, too, is ruled out.

Out of the two kinds of possibilities Aristotle talks of the Jain philosophers are not talking about what Hintikka calls 'possibility proper' or logical possibility. They are rather considering possibility of the kind of contingency. Such contingency they further understand in both of its senses : either the one that is short of necessity or the one that is descriptive of an indeterminate.

The kind of statements that bring out possibility in the sense of contingency that Jaina philosophers envisage are also those in which contingency is understood in the sense of two features of a thing going together or their compatibility, a notion weaker than that of consistency of two *dharma*s or *guṇa*s or *pariyāya*s. Further, it is important to remember that possibilities that are under consideration in the frame of *Syādvāda* are those that come to the foreground with respect to emergence, or degeneration or change of a thing. This is why, perhaps, eternal sentences are considered to be out of question and occasion sentence are emphasized upon.

The entire programme that Jaina logic envisages to put forward in terms of its doctrine of *Syādvāda* needs to be considered in a still wider perspective. In contrast to the view of the modern logicians, the Jaina logicians seem to hold that although a given sentence may express the same proposition on different occasions, yet in spite of the fact it is the same proposition, its truth-value changes with time. The propositions that are considered relevant in the context of *Syādvāda* are descriptive propositions. As sameness of a thing does not preclude it from undergoing change and taking on different features similarly although it is the same proposition that is expressed on different occasions, this in itself should not prohibit it from taking different truth values. That things change, in spite of retaining their identity, is a fact. Thus things assume different features in course of time. Correspondingly, on the plane of propositions, Jaina logic seems to hold, that although

propositions are the only bearers of truth-values yet they are bearers of not the same but perhaps of changing truth-values. It accepts change both of truth-value of a proposition and features of thing. On the plane of things it seem to argue that things or *dravyas* are the only entities that can take contrary *guṇas* or *pariyāyas* on different occasions and yet retain their identity at least which can form basis of re-identification and and recognition of them. That is why temporally indefinite sentences are taken to be paradigms of informative sentences. In saying this they indeed are in a great company of such masters as Aristotle. The reason for this seems to be that temporally indefinite sentences about a thing are the proper vehicles of communication. This contention obviously presupposes that knowledge properly so called must come ultimately in terms of direct acquaintance.

This position, moreover, seems to propound that correspondence between proposition and facts is the basis of assigning truth values to propositions. Things change and take on new features. Such changed things cannot be matched with older propositions and yet get truth value truth. In order to be able to cope with the situation of things changing their features and our being able to describe them by means of propositions which not only bring out new features of a thing but also take truth-value truth we shall have to take either one of the following two courses : (a) frame altogether new propositions or (b) allow older propositions to change their truth-values. Without ruling out the first alternative completely the Jaina logicians seem to maintain that to be able to cope with such a situation propositions should also be taken to be changing their truth-values. Either changed proposition or propositions with changed truth-value correspond with changed things and this is how they take truth-value truth. Thus correspondence is the crux of the problem and changing thing is the reinforcing situation. Both these taken together seem to thrust on them acceptance of the change in truth-value of a proposition. This is what Jaina logicians seem to advocate. It is perhaps this which they intend to convey when they say that truth-value of no descriptive proposition is fixed in so far as things change.

The contention that truth value of a proposition changes, however, raises two important issues : (a) what is the basis of drawing a line of demarcation between sentences and propositions ? and (b) If it is maintained, and it is so maintained by Jaina logicians, that a thing has number of potentialities, then how to account for change in the truth-value of a proposition ? For whereas insistence on number of

potentialities would demand an assumption of number of propositions descriptive of them, a change in the truth-value would demand that number of propositions available at our disposal is a limited one. Perhaps a distinction is sought to be made between propositions descriptive of potentialities and those descriptive of actualities, the latter being treated as genuinely descriptive of the nature of a thing. Obviously the number of the statements of the latter kind is limited. If this phenomenon is connected with changing things then change in truth-value seems a possible alternative. But still, why not frame a new proposition ? In spite of the fact that Jaina logicians admit temporality within the fold of their logic what would be their reaction to this problem is very difficult to say. But we need not bother further about this issue here.

One thing, nevertheless, is clear. The doctrine of the change of truth-value neither amounts to the doctrine of relativity, nor scepticism nor again to the notion of historical relativity. For the position of an historical relativist is different from that of the one who holds possibility of change in truth-value of a proposition. What historical relativist is out to maintain is that we do not have any absolute truths simply because we do not have any absolute criterion of truth. The one, on the contrary, who argues in terms of changing truth is not at all bothered about change in the criterion of truth. That is, he is not saying the truth value changes because our criterion of truth changes. What he focusses his attention on is change in object about which we are making a statement. Since things change, he seems to argue, the truths we have discovered will have to undergo change too for we shall have to rediscover the truths about the changed thing although the criterion of truth, viz. correspondence which Jaina philosophers accept, is retained. For him, in this way, discovery of truths about changing things is a never-ending and yet not a hopeless and fruitless programme.

The entire contention of Jaina logicians seems to be based on the presupposition that the dispositions that a thing has happened to be actualized in course of time. Every genuine possibility is actualized in time. It is not necessarily the case that each possibility is realized but it can be assumed to be realized without contradiction. They hold that everything has a 'sub-visible structure of dispositions' that are, as Quine maintains, 'its build-in enduring structural traits'; yet the typical sentences used to express human knowledge in the form of descriptive sentences are not 'eternal or standing sentences' but rather what are called 'occassion sentences.' Although the general philosophical

opinion is that the former kind of sentences are superior, Jaina logicians seem to maintain that the sentences of the latter kind are the ones to which we assent or from which we dissent. Such assent or dissent is further determined by the feature or features of the occasion on which they are uttered. Such sentences are temporally indefinite to make explicit the full sense of which we have to employ such expressions as 'now' etc. even if, therefore, it is assumed that there is a correspondence between grammatical and logical form of a sentence, yet it requires stipulation of occasion. Independently of such stipulation of occasion our assent to or dissent from is impotent, misleading and even logically indefensible.

IV

Our investigation so far has made it clear that out of the many kinds of possibilities Jaina logicians do not consider technical possibility in the context of *Syādvāda*. The cases where casual consideration are predominant an account of technical or etiological possibilities is significant. But such considerations are unimportant from the point of view of descriptive statements about a thing, the proper context of *Syādvāda*. It is for this reason that such possibilities are beside the point in this context. Similarly, the possibility as minimal probability, too, is nowhere considered. Further, absolute conceptual possibility is not expressly and explicitly employed, although it is possible to say that it is presupposed for explanation of nomological possibility. In the context of *Syādvāda* three kinds of possibilities are clearly acknowledged : possibility as potentiality, epistemological possibility and nomological as well as existential possibility. Etiological possibility that figures in the causal explanation falls outside the perview of *Syādvāda*.

Jaina logicians and philosophers believe that this world is full of things of *dravyas* and hence accept, it seems, what A.O. Lovejoy calls the Principle of Plenitude. In this they are in great company of Aristotle and Leibnitz. They further hold that dispositions are actualized in course of time. Possibilities for them, thus figure on two levels : potentiality and actuality. Potentialities are give in order of being, but not necessarily in order of knowing. Actualities are given in order of knowing. This is how they become epistemic possibilities. All our statements, descriptions, and interpretations to which one can assent or from which one can dissent, are and should be occasion sentences and not eternal sentences, although former are explainable in

terms of latter. Jaina logicians and philosophers, however, do not clearly draw a line of demarcation between possibility proper and contingency, for neither on the level of potentiality nor on the level of epistemic possibility can this distinction be drawn. The distinction comes to the foreground, that is, not on the level of truth-conditions but on the level of explanation of the way truth conditions are presumed to be given to us. This is indeed an important consideration and a detailed account of it would require consideration of three main issues : (a) total-truth values acknowledged, (b) the kinds of truth-conditions envisaged and (c) the way truth-conditions are presumed to be given to us. These considerations, although important in the full context of *syādvāda*, must be set aside here because our purpose here is to analysis 'syāt' and the possibilities it brings to the fore.

In conclusion it can be said that Jaina logicians and philosophers acknowledge, in the context of *syādvāda*, possibilities of potency, epistemic and nomological along with existential possibilities. Outside the context of *syādvāda* etiological possibilities too are acknowledged. They seem also to accept conceptual possibilities in the context of explanation although not for describing. Moreover, in the case of descriptions, according to them, no distinction can be drawn between possibility proper and contingency understood in any sense.

Syādvāda*

S.H. DIVATIA

The theory of Syādvāda requires to be carefully studied in view of the impact of relativistic theories in science and philosophy (particularly epistemology).

Philosophy has been defined as an unusual attempt to think persistently. It is the thinking consideration of things. It has withstood the attacks of all atheistic, positivistic and sceptical philosophies. Philosophical problems have the unusual knack of rearing their heads again and again. To put it in Prof. Wisdom's words, "One goes on chasing philosophical hares all the time".

The Jaina view of philosophy is unusually broadminded. It is neither exclusive identity nor exclusive difference. They have attempted a bold compromise risking the charge of contradictions from their opponents. It is a philosophy of even-mindedness.

The Jainas have a beautiful story to tell of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men put thier hands on the different parts of the elephant and each tried to describe the whole animal from the part touched by him. Thus the man who caught the ear said the elephant was like a country-made fan, the person who caught the leg said the elephant was like a pillar, the holder of the trunk said it was like a python, the feeler of the tail said that it was like a rope: the person who touched the side said the animal was like a wall, and the man who touched the forehead said the elephant was like the breast. All the six quarrelled, each one asserting that his description alone was correct. Only he who can see the whole elephant can say

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what the elephant was like. So each standpoint according to Jaina is relative only.

The theory of Nayavāda (the theory of standpoints) and the theory of Syādvāda are complementary to each other. Nayavāda is analytic in character, syādvāda is synthetic. (At least it functions as a synthetic method though it looks analytic). That is, Nayavāda analyses one of the standpoints under the aspect of identity or of difference and Syādvāda further investigates the various strands of the truth delivered by a naya, and intergrates them into a consistent and comprehensive synthesis. Each such strand is called a bhaṅga (a mode, or a predication). It might also be called a possible truth. Describing the relation between the two methods Dasgupta observes, "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the Syādvāda doctrines is therefore this, that for any judgement according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by Syādvāda". The indeterminate or Anekānta reality is thus analysed into various standpoints and each standpoint in turn is examined with respect to its various strands of truth and finally all the strands are woven together into the synthesis of the conditional dialectic owing to their function of analysis and synthesis. The methods of Nayavāda and Syādvāda may also be described as the disjunctive dialectic and the conjunctive dialectic respectively.

The next question is : Is Syādvāda synonymous with saptabhaṅgīnaya. Some say it is synonymous because the number of possible or alternative truths under the conditional method of syādvāda are seven only.

Kapadia is of the opinion that Syadvada is wider in scope than the term Saptabhaṅgi and is synonymous with the term Anekāntavāda. But many philosophers take the two as synonymous.

The doctrine of Syādvāda is so crucial to Jaina philosophy that syādvāda is often treated as standing for the whole of Jaina philosophy.

The late Dr. Y.J. Padmarajiah in his book "A comparative study of the Jaina theories of Reality and Knowledge" defines Syādvāda as follows "Syādāda or Saptabhaṅgī is that conditional method in which the modes or predications affirm, negate or both affirm and negate severally or jointly in seven different ways, a certain attribute of a

thing without incompatibility in a certain context that is no modal assertion or proposition on—simple or complex, affirmative, negative or both—can, at once express anything other than an aspect of the truth of a thing”. The full truth or rather the synthesis of truths can result only from a well ordered scheme of propositions. Each proposition is therefore relative to, or alternative with, the other propositions which in their totality present the full of the thing with respect to the particular attribute predicated of it. The Jainas maintain that *saptabhaṅgī* offers such a well ordered scheme in which the modes are exclusive of one another, but are at the same time, in their totality, exhaustive of the many-sided truth of the indeterminate real under discussion.

Thus *Syādvāda* or *sapta-bhaṅgi* is the theory of relativity of knowledge. It is a dialectic of the seven steps.

The word ‘*syāt*’ means probable, perhaps, may be. *Syādvāda* is often called the theory of probability but as C.D. Sharma says it is not a theory of probability in the literal sense. “Probability suggests scepticism and *Jaina* view is not scepticism”. The word ‘*Syāt*’ should be translated as ‘relatively’ or in a certain sense’. It is treated as an indeclinable. It is significant that even the linguistic philosophers are fond of saying now-a-days. ‘In a certain sense you are right and in a certain sense you are not’.

‘*Syāt*’ thus means that Reality is manifold. The real cannot be determined as possessing only such and such attributes and not the rest. Discussing the spirit of *Syādvāda* a modern critic observes, “It signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view and that each standpoint yields a different conclusion. The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them for in its concrete richness it admits all predicates”. Every proposition is therefore in strictness only conditional. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous. (I think, to this the Absolutist will reply that truth is not given in propositions. As Bradley says. “Thought must commit suicide in order to grasp Reality).

Padamrajiah observes, “It is this conception of reality as extremely indertminate in nature that is suggested or illumined by the term *Syāt*. A phrase which will approximately bring out this indeterministic significance of *Syāt* would be ‘from a certain point of view’ or ‘in a certain sense or ‘some other equivalent form’. My own belief is that the word

'Syāt' cannot be rendered into English without losing some of its meaning.

Schools which build up their systems on the foundation of some single concept or the other which represents only one facet of the manysided truth in reality illustrate this narrow and dogmatic approach. Sāpekṣavāda is another name for Syādvāda.

Statement of the Theory

When we say 'This table exists' we cannot mean that this table exists absolutely and unconditionally. Our knowledge of the table is necessarily relative. The table has got innumerable characteristics out of which we can know only some. The table exists in itself as an absolutely real and infinitely complex reality, only our knowledge of it is relative. (Prof. Moore would say the table exists in an absolute sense. What he is not sure of is the analysis of the prop 'The table exists). For us the table must exist in its own matter as made of wood, in its own form as having a particular shape, length, breadth and height at a particular space and at a particular time. It does not exist in other matter, other form and at other space and time. So a table is both existent and non-existent viewed from different standpoints and there is no contradiction in it. (C.D. Sharma—A critical survey of Indian Philosophy).

Seven forms of judgement are distinguished in Jaina logic. Each judgement is relative and therefore it is preceded by the word 'Syāt'. This is Syādvāda or Sapta-bhaṅgī naya. The seven steps are as follows :—

- (1) Syādasti—Relatively, a thing is real.
- (2) Syānnāsti—Relatively, a thing is unreal.
- (3) Syādsticanastica—Relatively a thing is both real and unreal.
- (4) Syādavaktavya sticanastica—Relatively a thing is indescribable.
- (5) Syadasti ca a vaktavyam ca—Relatively a thing is real and is indescribable.
- (6) Syānnasti ca avaktavyam—Relatively a thing is unreal and is indescribable.
- (7) Syādasti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam—Relatively a thing is real, unreal and indescribable.

From the point of view of one's own substance everything is, while from the point of view of other's substance everything is not.

We know a thing in relation to its own matter, form, space and time as a positive reality, while in relation to other's matter, form, space and time it becomes a negative entity. When we affirm the two different standpoints successively we get the third judgement—a thing is both real and unreal (of course in two different senses). If we affirm or deny both existence and non-existence simultaneously to any thing, if we assert or negate the two different aspects of being and non-being together, the thing baffles all description. It becomes indescribable i.e. either both real and unreal simultaneously or neither real nor unreal. This is the fourth judgement. The remaining three are the combinations of the fourth with the first, second and third respectively.

Criticism of Syādvāda

The Jaina theory is unique. Its logic cannot be incorporated either into two-valued logic (truth and falsity) or many-valued logic (truth and falsity or doubtful). The law of double negation also does not apply here. The linguistic philosophers will also say that if Syat is translated as 'probably' then 'it is probable that' is written in metalanguage but if it is translated 'relatively' then it becomes part of the object language. My own view as indicated above is that it is translated into 'relatively, in a certain sense'. Then every proposition is conditional, you have to state the conditions and presuppositions of every sentence that you utter of have it in mind. The charge of pedantry can be levelled against the Jaina logic.

Next I will deal with the controversial question of 'Is the absolutist criticism of Syādvāda justified ?

It is natural that the absolutist should criticise syādvāda because absolutism (especially the advaitic variety) and syādvāda relativism are diametrically opposed to each other in their fundamental presuppositions. Hiriyanna observes, "The half-hearted character of the Jaina enquiry is reflected in the seven-fold mode of predication (Saptabhaṅgī) which stops at giving us the several partial views together, without attempting to overcome the opposition in them by a proper synthesis. It is all right so far as it cautions us against one-sided conclusions but it leaves us in the end with little more than one-sided solutions. The reason for it, if it is not prejudice against absolutism, is the desire to keep close to common beliefs (Hiriyanna-Outlines of Indian Philosophy). Elsewhere also Hiriyanna makes the caustic comment that if all our knowledge concerning

reality is relative, they say (the old critics like Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja etc.) the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit at least one absolute truth and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view reality and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.

Another critic says that Jaina philosophy is a philosophy of compromise only. It offers no solutions. At best it is a pseudo solution to a pseudo problem. The problem is pseudo problem because two levels of thinking are confused the ontological level and the propositional level.

Dr. Radhakrishnan sums up the absolutist position when he remarks in his book 'Indian Philosophy' "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute) and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic'".

Belvalkar doubts whether the dialectic sprung up from the same teacher. It does not, according to him spring naturally from Jaina philosophy.

Another critic says, "We see the tendency to please every body and to compromise and in trying to compromise it involves itself in self-contradiction the saviour of all systems is committing suicide". (The Jaina Instrumental Theory of Knowledge, Rao).

Padmarajiah in his Jaina theories of Reality and knowledge answers the critics by saying that the seven modes of syādvāda express 'partial truths' which do not firmly hang together as a logical necessity is only the prima facie view of syādvāda. That their truths are severally partial is true. But from this it does not necessarily follow that they are an odd collection of arbitrary 'half truths' lacking in proper synthesis or system. The fact that the truths presented by them are alternative truths which individually touch every aspect, and together, all the aspects, of a situation in a systematic way. A certain actuality, like the jar, an example with which the modes have been illustrated, is looked at from the possible seven angles and the deliverance of these modal judgements does represent a synthesis which is neither 'loose' nor unsystematic.

Absolutism cannot be refuted, it dies old age. Since its assertions are unverifiable, further comments on the systems are unnecessary. Syādvāda raises an important point that truth is

best stated in a series of conditional propositions and truth can be shown, not said. Bertrand Russel once defined philosophy as substitution of articulate hesitation for inarticulate certainty. To that extent syādvāda has real relevance for modern times. Indeed it is true to the spirit of modern times viz., relativism. Its idiom is surprisingly modern.

The Conception of Syādvāda

R.C. PANDEYA

It is necessary to know the philosophical question to which Syādvāda provides an answer. Nowhere in the Jaina philosophy there is an explicit mention of this question except the statement to the effect that ordinary statements assert or deny absolutely whereas the fact is that reality is multifaceted. In other words, the Syādvāda is linked with the ontological theory called *anekāntavāda* and it stands or falls along with that ontology. If Syādvāda is a theory in logic, as many people have accepted, then we are justified in demanding autonomy for it; it should be able to stand on its own force, without invoking the support of a theory about reality. If this cannot be done then we are obliged to call Syādvāda an extension of the *anekānta* ontology. An ontological logic is an ontology applied to the way of thinking committed to that ontology; it would not be an analysis and criticism of thought in general. This kind of logic is obviously circular in the sense that here we take into account that thought which is basically the same as we would have liked it to be ; thus here we have a pertinent question : Is Syādvāda a system of logic or it is an extension of an ontology to the realm of logic ? The second alternative seems to be the case, if the Jaina texts are of any value. But then what about those modern writers who see in Syādvāda a system of multi-valued logic ? It seems that either these writers in their enthusiasm forget the fact that for the Jainas Syādvāda is nothing but a version of the *anekānta*-ontology or in their thinking logic, as a system of theories, need not be autonomous.

Ontological neutrality of a logical system is a necessary prerequisite for its universal acceptability. It is a different matter that a particular system of logic owes its origin to a particular ontology; what is essential for it, however, is that it ought to be applicable to almost

all the situations where consistent thinking operates. Efforts are constantly made to weed out such extralogical factors that might have stealthily crept into the formulations of a system of logic, with a view to obtain as perfect a system as could be possible. This is how logic grows as a science. Syādvāda has not grown that way; no effort has ever been made to so view it and to apply it to situations outside the scope of enkānta.

Those who have upheld Syādvāda have attempted an evaluation and refutation of those philosophical positions which do not subscribe to the theory that reality has infinite number of facets (ananta-dharmaka). The main argument of Jainas against non-Jaina philosophies is that the latter being too rigid cannot admit of the possibility of opposite or alternative philosophical positions. Thus, for example, for the Nyāya even the possibility of the Buddhist position is not conceivable, whereas the Jainas would like to entertain such possibility. Moreover, apart from this inter-philosophical problem of the possibility of the alternative standpoints, there are intra-philosophical problems. For example those who stick to the position that only one formulation could be correct, any alternative formulation would be out of order, would find it difficult to make two statements about one and the same thing, viz. they cannot assert both the following statements about one and the same object i.e., 'This is a ring' and 'This is a piece of gold'. They seem to think that the assertion of the former would exclude the possibility of all other assertions; thus if 'p' stands for the former the latter would, being other than 'p', be 'not p'. Thus if both the statements are true of particular object then we ought to make a provision for the assertion of both 'p' and 'not-p' or at least be prepared to grant the possibility of an alternative statement being true. The Jainas have also argued from the fact of change and continuity. If A changes into B, B though a new entity is also a continuation of A, in some sense. Thus B is B and also, in some way, A, i.e. not-B. If continuity between A and B is not accepted then they would fall apart and there would be no sense in saying 'A has changed into B'. The Jainas conclude that since there is more than one way of describing one and the same thing (vastu) and each such description is true in its own right, we have to accommodate all these views in a harmonious way, syādvāda provides an answer to the question : how can different statements about one and the same thing and theories about reality be accorded the status of truth ?

An examination of this criticism is warranted, we have to see

whether the Jaina criticism is valid and whether the question to which syādvāda seeks to provide an answer is a genuine question. Later on we may further enquire whether syādvāda does or can provide the desired answer.

The basic assumption of the Jainas in criticizing other philosophies is that the acceptance of one philosophy or assertion of one statement necessarily excludes all other philosophies or statements. In other words they seem to think that the assertion of 'p' would amount to the assertion of 'not not-p' i.e. rejection of 'not-p'. Incidentally this is what the Buddhist theory of *apoha* does. The Jainas forget, yet the Buddhists subscribe to the fact that the truth of a statement and the assertion of its truth are to be distinguished. If at a particular moment I assert the truth of a statement 'This is a ring', I do not imply that the statement 'This is a piece of gold' is false. One assertion can cancel only another assertion; truth is independent of any assertion. Similarly, when a person constructs a theory he does not imply that other theories are *false*, for theories are neither true nor false; they are either adequate or inadequate to explain all the facts or, they are self-consistent or inconsistent. Each succeeding theory claims to present a better explanation than the preceding one. Thus the assumption of the Jainas that the assertion of one statement invariably makes all other statements false and for ensuring the possibility of truth of other statements Syādvāda is essential is not warranted. The fact is that the assertion of one statement leaves the possibility of truth of other statements open. To ensure this Syādvāda is not needed.

The Jainas have also recognised the possibility of two contradictory statements together being true; they have criticized all those philosophies which subscribe to the law of contradiction. If I see a blue pen, my statement 'This pen is blue' is both true and is asserted to be true. This means, as the Jainas have pointed out, that any other statement (e.g. 'This pen is not-blue' or 'This pen is black' and so on) about the same pen would be false. Obviously any objection to this position entails the rejection of the recognised logic of negation. One such objection is based on the ground that there is a possibility of such statements to which truth or falsity cannot be ascribed at the moment, e.g. statements about the future. Objection to the law of contradiction in this case arises from within the logic itself. In those cases where the law of contradiction is challenged not from within the system of logic itself but from an ontological standpoint, one has to examine the basis of such an ontology. Discarding contradiction would then be not a

logical necessity. The objection to contradiction being a valid law of logic raised by the Jainas rests on the view that a thing may become what it is not at the moment, or it is something different from what a person sees it to be, or different persons in different positions and different climes would see it differently, and it may be one thing with reference to its own substance, time and nature but may become something else in the context of other substances etc. Obviously the Jainas link truth of a statement with substance, time, etc; they would reject any view regarding timeless truth. They would not agree with those who hold proposition to be timelessly true. To them a statement is *made* true or false in accordance with the nature and relative position of the thing it is about. Truth can be made and unmade depending upon how things fare. This position is open to a host of objections. But one that strikes it hard is about the identity of the subject in two statements having different predicates. It is thought that 'This pen is blue' is about the same pen as 'This pen is not blue'. Can we identify a pen, or for that matter any object, in isolation from its characteristics ? The Jainas have to answer this question in the affirmative in order that they are able to say that since 'this' in both the statements stands for one and the same thing, both the statements should be taken to be true. In fact the Jaina definition of reality as a thing having innumerable facets, a dictum of the *anekānta theory*, rests on the identity of subjects among diverse predicates. Ordinarily the two statements mentioned above would be taken to be about two different pens ; no contradiction would be involved and no Syādvāda will be needed for that. The need would be manifest once 'This pen' in both the statements is taken to be identical. One could raise the question as to what makes us call this particular object as 'pen' and the Jainas would say that both are pens because "Thisness" is common to both. Apart from our objection to the notion of thisness being identical we may ask about the scope of thisness. How far can we go using "This" rather than "That" ? In other words, when do we cease to talk of 'This pen' and begin to say 'That pen' ? The Jainas would say that in relation to its substance etc. it is 'This' but in relation to other substance etc. it would be 'That'. But would it then not amount to saying that 'This' and 'That' are interchangeable ? If so, then for the Jainas 'This pen is blue' and 'That dog is mad' would be the two statements about one and the same thing. The story of six blind men and the elephant indicates this possibility. In short, if the identity of the subject is taken to be the sole guide for accepting all the different statements having different predicates as

true, then we have to find a way of determining the identity of a subject without bringing in the characteristics (dharmas) it possesses. But nothing which could determine this identity would be different from the characteristics a thing possesses, including the relation it has with a substance, time and nature. Thus in order to be able to reject contradiction we need a theory denying all the possibilities of predication (as in the Advaita Vedānta or the Theory of Svalakṣaṇa); if predication is a possibility, as the Jainas themselves hold, no effort would be strong enough to save such a theory from contradiction. Syādvāda in that respect is selfcontradictory.

The distinction between *naya* and *pramāṇa* drawn by the Jainas is really the distinction between a categorical statement and the statement allowing the possibility of all other statements. A *naya* is the way people use language ordinarily and a *pramāṇa* is the way they ought to use it prefacing every statement with 'Syāt' (may be). The statement 'The pen is blue', it is to be necessarily presumed, would not serve this purpose, which the other statement 'Syāt, the pen is blue' is expected to serve. But, then, we are justified in asking as to why this recommendation should be followed : why a Syāt statement is to be preferred over other statements without 'Syāt' ? Apparently while drawing a distinction between *naya* and *pramāṇa* the Jainas have in mind the fact that a categorical statement excludes all contradictory and contrary statements. But in that case would a Syāt-statement (S-statement, hereafter) exclude or not exclude a non-S-statement ? Obviously the answer has to be in the affirmative as long as the distinction between *naya* and *pramāṇa* is maintained. But what would be the negation of an S-statement ? Let us compare two pairs of these two types of statements with a view to see how negation functions in each case. Thus :

- (i) The pen is blue.
The pen is not blue.
- (ii) Syāt, the pen is blue.
Syāt, the pen is not blue.

In (i) negation denies truth to the affirmative statement. In other words, here negation negates the truth value of the affirmative statement and in that process also affirms the truth of the negative statement. In (ii) 'Syāt' neither affirms nor denies truth value of a statement, for if the statement 'the pen is blue' or 'the pen is not blue' be true in its own right the function of 'Syāt' would become superfluous. In that case Syāt would be only a kind of mental attitude

one ought to hold with regard to any affirmative or negative statement. In this respect a S-statement would be like a belief-statement. But then you cannot recommend a particular attitude towards a statement and this attitude cannot figure in logic as a constant factor. Moreover in a S-statement negation does not and cannot negate 'Syāt'. Obviously 'Syāt, the pen is not blue' cannot be restated as 'It is not-Syāt that the pen is blue', as we do say 'It is not true that the pen is blue'. Here the restatement would be 'Syāt it is not true that the pen is blue', and for that matter it would also be correct to say "Syāt, it is true that the pen is blue'. Therefore in a S-statement 'Syāt' is not concerned with truth or falsity of the 'statement to which it is attached'. But what about the full S-statement 'Syāt the pen is blue' ? We cannot ascribe truth-value to this full statement although a part of it may be true, because in that case the whole statement would be exclusive and that would defeat the very purpose of Syādvāda. So a S-statement has to be without any truth-value; it is neither true nor false. Since a S-statement neither affirms nor denies there would be no contradiction between affirming and denying statements. So 'Syāt, the pen is blue' would not exclude 'The pen is blue', nor would it be contradicted by 'The pen is not blue'. Similarly 'Syāt, the pen is blue' and 'Syāt, the pen is not blue' can very well go together. In the light of this analysis one can safely conclude that *pramāṇa* 'a S-statement' is not opposed to *naya* 'a non-S-statement'. the former does not exclude the latter. But it must always be kept in mind that a *naya* has truth value whereas a *pramāṇa* does not have it. They are distinct but *pramāṇa* and *naya* can coexist.

A S-statement can coexist with a non-S-statement by overcoming the contradiction between affirmation and negation within the non-S statement. Therefore within a S-statement you can have both *p* and not-*p* together. It is in this limited sense that a S-statement includes rather than excludes non-S-statements. We have also seen that negation cannot significantly apply to a S-statement. But there may arise a real conflict between a S-statement and a statement of exclusive assertion or denial, what is called *durnaya* in Jaina texts. A *durnaya*-statement is of the form 'X is nothing but a'...Here 'nothing but' would be significantly used only when it is meaningful to say that *x* is *b* or *c* or *d*, and out of all the possibilities only one is ascribed to it in a given situation. The possibility of other predicates than the one asserted (*anyayoga*) and exclusion of all of them except the one asserted (*vyavachheda*) is the function of 'eva' which characterized all *durnayas*. In fact the phrase 'nothing but' is convertible into 'not other

than'. 'This pen is blue' can be restated as 'This pen is nothing but blue' or 'the colour of this pen is not other than blue' or 'It is not the case that this is not blue'. Syādvāda would accept 'This pen is blue' (a *naya*) but would oppose any move to restate it in any of the forms given above. For the Jainas transition from affirmation to the negation of the other, i.e., the negation of the thing negating the affirmed, is not warranted. In other words they would object to the definition of affirmation in terms of double negation. Similarly a negative statement like 'This pen is not blue' cannot be restated in terms of three negations. In order to understand Syādvāda it is necessary to find out the reason for this.

When we say 'Syāt, X is a' it is implied that X may be a, b, c, ... etc., i.e. it is possible to ascribe unknown number of predicates 'to X equally unknown number of contexts and for the present one of them is being predicated of X. Had it been the case that by definition no other predicate, in no other conceivable context, could be ascribed to X then 'Syāt' would be useless, nay 'Syāt, X is a' would become contradictory. So also 'X is a' would become a tautology. There are two conditions for any S-statement to be significant : (a) the possibility of more than one context in which one and the same statement can be significantly made and (b) the possibility of more than one predicate being significantly used with a subject. Let us consider the first condition first. In one context we may say 'This pen is blue' which, according to the Jaina texts, would mean that with reference to its own substance, time and nature a particular pen is blue; but with reference to other substance, time and nature it may be something else. Context for them is to be identified in terms of substance, time and nature and affirming or denying statements is singling one context out of many possible contexts. One may talk of John in the context of size and shape, in the context of relations (i.e. father of, son of, brother of etc.) in the context of social standing and achievements etc. But even within a single context, say of relation, it is possible to have more than one way of talking about John. He may be a father, son, brother and husband and all these descriptions would be in order within one and the same context and no one description should necessarily exclude the possibility of other descriptions. If John is the father of James it does not mean that he cannot be the son of Rosa. In order to ensure that one affirmation does not tend to exclude other possible descriptions or statements, within the same content or in other contents, a statement is to be prefaced by 'Syāt.' Thus 'This pen is blue' leaves the possibility

for other statements also being true, but its so called restatement as 'This pen is nothing but blue' denies the possibility of any other statement being true. In this sense there is a contradiction between simple affirmation (in the sense of singling out one of the many possible contexts) and exclusive affirmation (in the sense of singling out one context and denial of all other contexts). 'Syāt' would mean, then, simple affirmation or *naya* (to which 'Syāt' is added to ensure that it does not exclude other possibilities) in contrast to exclusive affirmation or *durnaya*. Affirmation is the act of singling out one and not the exclusion of other possibilities, likewise negation would be singling out a context other than that of the thing's own substance, time and nature and not the exclusion of other possibilities. In other words, truth and falsity are not to be defined in terms of exclusion of one another.

In fact Syādvāda would not be concerned with the question of truth at all; we have seen that a S-statement has to be truth-neutral. It is futile to demand a definition of truth or falsity from Syādvāda. Syādvāda represents a formal programme whereby you can distinguish an exclusive statement from non-exclusive statement and it is a recommendation to use all the statements in non-exclusive sense. The scheme of Saptabhaṅgi is therefore to be taken as a device for converting an exclusive statement into a non-exclusive statement. In this operation it takes the advantage of the logic of the word 'Syāt' but it stops at that point. It does not propose to investigate into the logical behaviour of S-statement with regard to their relations and the rules, if any, of derivation and so on. It is evident from reading the Jaina texts that in the treatment of inference they never bring in Syādvāda; they follow the same rules, of course with minor variations, as Nyāya has with regard to inference. In the first place this fact shows that the Syādvāda is not intended to be a system of logic; it takes each individual statement at its face-value. Secondly, theoretically it may also be not possible to construct a system of logic for S-statements. The reason being that by insisting on the possibility and desirability of all kinds of statements being collected together the Jainas have denied themselves any instrument whereby they could evaluate a statement. If all the possible statements have Syāt-value one cannot justifiably prefer one set of statements over another. They cannot, for example, insist that 'X is red; therefore, X is coloured' is a better construction than 'X is red; therefore, X is fragrant.' These both sets of statements would have Syāt-value in Syādvāda. Therefore within Syādvāda itself

no system of logic is possible and the Jainas have recognised this fact by treating inference without reference to 'Syāt'.

To sum up, Syādvāda is primarily an ontological theory and its impact would be felt only among rival ontological theories. It seeks to answer a question concerning the nature of reality and in this process it succeeds only in giving us a tool whereby we can confirm the anekānta-theory.

It would be wrong to see into it a system of multivalued logic. A Syāt-statement is value-neutral and it lacks in any tool that can be used to eliminate a non-Syāt statement. A S-statement is all inclusive and there is no way of constructing a system of logic taking it as a base. Therefore those who take pride in stating that Syādvāda is an Indian version of multi-valued logic are misguided.

A Side-view of Syādvāda

P.B. ALHIKARI

The name *syādvāda* is, as is well-know, applied in a general way to indicate the Jaina position in philosophy. The term is by itself a bit enigmatic, the meaning of which is, for this reason, misunderstood, and so the system to which it is applied has been open to much adverse criticism. The word does not mean to give by itself any information regarding the metaphysical view of the school. It was introduced simply to emphasise some general aspect of their epistemological position. The term, when rightly understood, will appear, however, to stand for a philosophic truth of high importance, emphasising, as it does, the natural limitations of human knowledge and speech. The wonder is that an expression of such high significance and truth should have been subjected to unjustifiable criticism at the hands, not of ordinary writers, but of thinkers of very great learning and penetration like even our Acharya Śhankara himself. It is not my purpose here to show in detail how this doctrine was worked out and enlarged, possibly by later writers, into those of *Saptabhāṅgī* and *Nayas*. I shall confine myself simply to the general aspect of the position and its implications.

Jinendra Mahavira is supposed to be the first teacher of the doctrine of *syādvāda*, though it is questioned whether he was the originator to it. Suri Haribhadra, for instance, calls him simply “स्याद्वाद-देशकः” (*Syād-vāda-desśkah*)—the teacher of *syādvāda*. As a matter of fact, it may be questioned, and rightly questioned, whether a truth needs any originator, though it may require at times an expounder. Our revered Vardhaman is, at least, the first exponent of the doctrine in the present cycle of the Universe under the view of Jaina Cosmology. The promulgation of a doctrine like this one, at a period

when the Jinendra prevailed, must be considered, however, to be of high significance in the history of Indian Thought. While other systems stand each for a well-rounded compact view of the Universe, Jainism, as represented by its *syādvāda*, finds in them all a side-view only, which can be relatively true at the most but not absolutely. This is the fundamental position of the Jaina theory of knowledge, and it is this which was, to my mind, meant to be emphasised by the exponents of the doctrine, by the short term that has furnished a fulcrum to many a controversy and criticism.

The position meant would appear, however, to be very aptly suggested by the very cursed term. The particle *Syāt* in the expression literally means *perhaps*, which, when applied to any piece of knowledge, means *perhaps true*. This does not imply that there is absolutely any doubt about the knowledge. It means simply *partially true*, as it has been well put by some writer. The position of Jainism is not here a sceptic one, as it might otherwise be supposed to be by the literal interpretation of this particle *Syāt* in the phrase. On the contrary, it emphasises by the particle one of the soundest truths about our intellectual achievements, namely, that any ordinary human way of knowledge is bound to be partially and not entirely, relatively and not absolutely, valid. And so any system of human creation, claimed to be perfectly and absolutely true, is necessarily bound to be defective, if not wholly erroneous, when judged by the impartial and wider view of things. This is the fundamental lesson the doctrine teaches, and as such it may be said to be negative. But does it not give expression, by the term, to a profound truth about our intellectual pursuits? What does the history of philosophy, or of science, or of any other intellectual pursuit of man, for the matter of that, show so unmistakably but this sound truth? We all move on, inevitably as it seems, altering our old way of thought and creating new ones in their place, giving up some elements of the old and replacing them by others, according to our limited standpoints and outlooks, but still far away from the distant ideal of perfect truth. In speaking of the ideal here, we are lead on to what may be called the positive aspect of the doctrine in question here. Does the doctrine really have anything positive about it? It has, at least by implication.

The doctrine of *syādvāda* relates, as it has been pointed out above, primarily to human ways of knowledge which are, it maintains, necessarily imperfect. The truth-value of such knowledge is but partial and relative. The doctrine means, therefore, that to attain perfect

knowledge we have to rise above the ordinary human ways. But can we do so ? Jainism claims emphatically, as other systems do, that we can. But that is an ideal which can be realised only when we have been completely rid of the influences, both physical and mental, which colour and cloud our soul. For the soul, according to the Jaina position, is by its essential nature the seat of perfect knowledge. The influences which bind it to narrow and imperfect views of things are foreign to it. In its pure nature, the soul of every living being is a divinity in itself. But this divinity is still inchoate in us because of the influences. It has to be made real by our personal efforts. The perfect knowledge which Jainism places before us as the ideal can arise only when the soul comes to itself by the purging out of the foreign influence. This is the condition called by them “*Samyaktva*”—a condition that has already been attained by their *Kevalins*—the *Tirthankars* and the *Gaṇadhara*s, and it is a condition that lies open to all of us to attain. Jainism thus offers a hopeful ideal to man without any distinctions of race, caste or creed. The catholic nature of its philosophic religion is plain here. The ideal, again, is pre-eminently an intellectual one, characterised, as it is by them, by perfect knowledge alone. The soul, when it attains its native condition of *mokṣa* does not go on existing eternally as an unconscious substance, as the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika or the Mimāṃsaka would have it, nor as pure consciousness as the Sāṃkhya or the monistic Vedantin would say, but as enjoying the infinite bliss of perfect knowledge of the entire universe and every part and event of it—“*सम्यक्ज्ञानदर्शन*” In this respect, therefore, the position of Jainism is also characteristically different from that of the other systems of our land.

The one consequence of this position is that their metaphysical system is claimed to have originated, not in the ordinary ways of human thought and knowledge, but from one who attained the perfect condition of a *Kevalin*—characterised by infallible and absolute knowledge of things. No wonder, therefore, that the orthodox of their faith should be so intolerant of other positions claiming to be perfectly true !

The Doctrine of Syādvāda : Examination of Different Interpretations

ARVIND SHARMA

I

Syādvāda is a cardinal Jain¹ doctrine 'to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jain system itself'.² The doctrine is thus often explained in modern expositions of Jainism or Jain philosophy.³ The purpose of this paper is to critically examine some of these presentations.

II

It is perhaps best to begin by making a brief statement of the doctrine

1. Sometimes the form Jaina is also met with (see R.C. Zaehner, ed., *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths* [Boston : Beacon Press, 1968], p. 261).
2. Hermann Jacobi 'Jainism' in James Hastings, ed., *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* VII (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons), p. 468.
3. Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, *The history of Jainism* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970 [first published 1915]), p. 92; M. Hiriyana, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), p. 163 ff; S.N Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 179 ff; Nalinaksha Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Book Agency, 1960), pp. 31-32; P.T. Raju, *The Philosophical Traditions of India* (University of Pittsburg Press, 1971), p. 100; S. Gopalan, *Outlines of Jainism* (New York : Halsted Press, 1973), p. 151 ff; Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Sources of Indian Tradition*, Vol. I (Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 70-71; Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ed., *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I (Calcutta : The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1958), pp. 428-429; Chandradhar Sharma, *A critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (London : Rider & Company, 1960) p. 51.

itself. The doctrine of *syādvāda* represents one aspect of the Jain doctrine of Manysidedness of *anekāntavāda*. And 'Implicit in the epistemological relativity of *anekāntavāda* is a recognition that the world is more complex than it seems, that reality is more subtle than we are inclined to believe. Our knowledge is less certain than we think'.⁴ Indeed 'The Jains think that reality is so complex in its structure that...its precise nature baffles all attempts to describe it directly and once for all; but it is not impossible to make it known through a series of partially true statements without committing ourselves to any one among them exclusively. Accordingly the Jains enunciate its nature in seven steps, described as the *sapta-bhaṅgī* or "the seven-fold formula"'.⁵ These steps are :

- (1) Somehow a thing is.
- (2) Somehow it is not.
- (3) Somehow it both is and is not.
- (4) Somehow it is indescribable.
- (5) Somehow it is and is indescribable.
- (6) Somehow it is not and is indescribable.
- (7) Somehow it is, is not, and is indescribable.⁶

Thus 'For example, we may say a jar is somehow, i.e., it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like... Thus we have the correlative predicates "is" (*asti*) and "is not" (*nāsti*). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*); for existent and non-existent (*sat* and *asat*) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the 7 propositions, or *sapta bhaṅgas*, of the *Syādvāda*'.⁷

4. Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 72.

5. M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

6. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book of Indian Philosophy* (Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 261.

7. Hermann Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 468. The word *syāt* in *syādvāda* needs to be understood carefully. It has the sense of 'somehow' (*ibid.*, p. 468) rather than 'may be' (Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 70; S. Gopalen, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-253). For a modern discussion of this point see Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (University of Calcutta, 1968), pp. 83, 86; for a medieval discussion see Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*, Chapter III. It may be added that 'earliest mention of the doctrine of *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* probably occurs in Bhadrabāhu's commentary (433-357 B.C.) *Sūtrakṛtāṅganiryukī*' (S.N. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 181, fn. 1). For more on its origins see Wolfgang Beurlen, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

It is easy to see that the basic building blocks in this whole structure are the first two, the positive and negative statements. The third and fourth predicates are arrived at by combining the first two first successively and then simultaneously.⁸ and the 'remaining three are the combinations of the fourth with the first, second and third respectively'.⁹ It will therefore be often helpful to concentrate on the manner in which the fundamental positive and negative predicates are understood in the modern presentations of this doctrine to examine these presentations critically.

III

One of the earliest presentations of the doctrine in modern times was made by Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar.¹⁰ Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, speaking of Jain *anekāntavāda* in general and *syādvāda* in particular, remarks that 'the *locus classicus* of its exposition to which all Jains immediately refer you is in Dr Bhandarkar's *Search for Jaina Manuscripts*, from which they always quote it in full'.¹¹

'You can', the famous passage runs, 'affirm existence of a thing from one point of view (*Syād asti*), deny it from another (*Syān nāsti*); and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (*Syād asti nāsti*). If you should think of affirming both existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be so spoken (*Syād avaktavyah*). Similarly under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible (*Syād asti avaktavyah*); of non-existence (*Syān nāsti avaktavyah*); and also of both (*Syād asti nāsti avaktavyah*). What is meant by these seven modes is that a thing should not be considered as existing everywhere, at all times, in all ways, and in the form of everything. It may exist in one place and not in another, and at one time and not at another.'¹²

The presentation is fair as far as it goes but seems to be flawed in one respect. The last three predicates are stated as : the affirmation of

8. M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p. 165; Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

9. Chandradhar Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 54; also see P.T. Raju, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

10. R.G Bhandarkar, *Report on the Search of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1883-4* (Bombay, 1887); also see Wolfgang Beurlen, tr., *Walther Schubring, The Doctrine of the Jainas* (Delhi; Motilal Banrasidass, 1978 [first edition 1962]), p. 165, fn. 1.

11. Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

12. *Ibid.*

existence is not possible... of non-existence...and also both. The expression *syād asti avaktavyaḥ* has thus been taken to mean : the affirmation of existence is not possible. It has been read as a single syntactical unit. It seems, however, that it should be read with a (mental) comma after *asti*. It would then translate as: May be is, and is inexpressible¹³; rather than as 'is inexpressible as is', the way Bhandarkar seems to take it.

Dr. S Radhakrishnan outlines this Jain doctrine thus:

The view is called Syādvāda, since it holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, or may be a *syād*. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness. It does not deny the possibility of predication, though it disallows absolute or categorical predication. The dynamic character of reality can consist only with relative or conditional predication. Every proposition is true, but only under certain conditions, i.e. hypothetically.

It holds that there are seven different ways of speaking of a thing or its attributes, according to the point of view. There is a point of view from which substance or attribute (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is and is not, (4) is unpredicable. (5) is and is unpredicable, (6) is not and is unpredicable, and (7) is, is not and is unpredicable.

- (1) *Syād asti*. From the point of view of its own material, place, time and nature, a thing is, i.e. exists as itself. The jar exists as made of clay, in my room at the present moment, of such and such a shape and size.
- (2) *Syād nāsti*. From the point of view of the material, place, time and nature of another thing, a thing is not, i.e. it is not no-thing. The jar does not exist as made of metal, at a different place or time or of a different shape and size.
- (3) *Syād asti nāsti*. From the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain sense it does not. We say here what a thing is as well as what it is not.
- (4) *Syād avaktavya*. While in three we make statements that a thing is in its own self and is not, as another successively, it becomes

13. Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 71. In several formulations the particle *ca* is introduced after *syādasti* which clarifies the point (see Chandradhar Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54; M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p. 164).

impossible to make these statements at once. In this sense a thing is unpredicable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of other-nature are both together in the jar, still we cannot express them.

- (5) *Syād asti avaktavya*. From the point of view of its own quaternary and at the same time from the joint quaternary of it-self and no-thing, a thing is and is unpredicable. We note here both the existence of a thing and its indescribability.
- (6) *Syād nāsti avaktavya*. From the point of view of the quaternary of the no-thing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and no-thing, a thing is not and is also unpredicable. We note here what a thing is not as well as its indescribability.
- (7) *Syād asti nāsti avaktavya*. From the point of view of its own quaternary as well as that of no-thing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and no-thing, a thing is, is not and is indescribable. We bring out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.¹⁴

The presentation of the doctrine by Radhakrishnan is fair on the whole, especially as he assesses even the views of such 'Hindu' critics of the doctrine as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja from the Jain point of view.¹⁵ However, it should be noted that the example used by Radhakrishnan differs slightly from the traditional illustration in which typically an object (say jar) is spoken of as not existing by way of being another object (say cloth). The objects considered are thus generically distinct. In his illustration Radhakrishnan compares two distinct objects belonging to the same class, and describes a jar of clay as not existing as made of metal. Thus it will be noted that whereas in the traditional description two different classes of objects were considered, Radhakrishnan takes two distinct objects belonging to the same class, i.e. a clay-jar and a metal-jar, into account. If one were to move further in this direction then one could compare one clay-jar with another clay-jar and state that a clay-jar exists as a clay-jar but not as *another* clay-jar. If one were to move still further in this direction then could one state of the same clay-jar that the clay-jar can be seen as existing at this point in time and not at another? According to Jainism a substance possesses *both* 'as essential unchanging character *guṇa* and an

14. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1923), p. 302.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

16. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

accidental, changing character *pariyāya* or *pariyaya*'.¹⁶ Radhakrishnan is aware of this aspect of the situation but occasionally seems to overlook it when he maintains that Syādvāda is the 'logical corollary of *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Since reality 'is *multiform* and *ever* changing ...'¹⁷ it seems that the traditional illustration of *syādvāda* seems to be weighted more towards the multiform nature of reality rather than to the fact that it is ever changing.

IV

The presentation of the doctrine by Nalinaksha Dutt may be examined next. He writes :

In Jaina philosophy no definite statement (*syādvāda*) can be made about any object, not even about the highest truth. Every object is subject to three momentary states, viz. origin (*uptpāda*), continuity (*sthiti*) and decay (*vināśa*). The object in its state of continuity may be regarded as the substance (*dravya*) while in the other two states it is subject to change (*pariyāya*). According to the Jaina teaching an object is permanent from the standpoint of continuity (*Sthiti*), but it is impermanent (*anitya*) from the other two standpoints. Every object has got to be determined from different standpoints, as it has several aspects and so there can be no absolute statement regarding the nature of an object. This is known as the Jaina doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. In order to have a true knowledge of an object, its examination is necessary from various aspects and it is by this means alone that the perfect knowledge can be attained. For the sake of practical application, *Anekāntavāda* has been condensed into seven number (*saptabhaṅgī-*), i.e., *examination from seven different standpoints, e.g., a being is (i) permanent; (ii) impermanent; (iii) both permanent and impermanent; (iv) indescribable; (v) permanent and indescribable; (vi) impermanent and indescribable; (vii) both permanent and impermanent and also indescribable.*¹⁸

This presentation of the Jain doctrine causes several difficulties. Firstly, the Jain statements refer to the *existence* of a thing, not its *permanence*. Secondly, not only is no distinction drawn between *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*¹⁹, room is left for confusing *syādvāda*

17. S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 304, emphasis added. Radhakrishnan also seems to translate *syāt* as 'may be' (*op. cit.*, p. 302). This could be misleading, as will be shown later.

18. Nalinaksha Dutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

19. S.N. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-181.

with *nayavāda* by the use of the expression 'standpoints'.²⁰ Finally, in analysing the Jain concept of *dravya*, *sthiti* or the permanent element in a substance is associated with the first predicate by Nalinaksha Dutt. But the first predicate does *not* seem to distinguish between the components—permanent or transitory of a single substance of *dravya* but rather between substances. For example, we may affirm (1) that an object, say a knife, exists as a knife. We may further say (2) that it is not something else, say a fork.²¹

V

S. Gopalan formulates the seven propositions of *syādvāda* as follows :

- (1) May be, Reality is (*Syāt asti dravyam*)
- (2) May be, Reality is not (*Syāt nāsti dravyam*)
- (3) May be, Reality is and is not (*Syāt asti ca nāsti ca dravyam*)
- (4) May be, Reality is indescribable (*Syāt avaktavyam dravyam*)
- (5) May be, Reality is and is indescribable (*Syāt asti ca avaktavyam dravyam*)
- (6) May be, Reality is not and is indescribable (*Syāt nāsti ca avaktavyam dravyam*)
- (7) May be, Reality is, is not and is indescribable (*Syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam dravyam*).²²

This formulation of *syādvāda* presents two problems. The first relates to the translation of *syāt* as *may be*. Although this is fairly common,²³ and '*syāt* means "may be" '²⁴ yet it is 'explained by *Kathamchit*, which in this connection may be translated "somehow".²⁵ Without being dogmatic on this point,²⁶ there is room for suggesting that 'somehow' may be a better translation as it prevents the Jain doctrine from appearing unduly sceptical. Secondly, the rendering of *dravyam* as Reality with a capital R generates the impression that Jainism believes in the existence of one Reality. But Jain philosophy is 'realistic and pluralistic. There is a plurality of objects and *jīvas* (*Atmans*) and all of them are real, and the objects of our knowledge are also real' They 'are not mere ideas'.²⁷

20. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

21. A.L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India* (Fontana, 1975), p. 504.

22. S. Gopalan, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

23. See M Hiriyanna, *op. cit* p. 164; etc.

24. Hermann Jacobi, *op. cit* p. 468.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A Moore, eds., *op. cit*, p. 261.

27. P.T. Raju, *op. cit*, pp. 100-101.

The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti*, and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam*). For example, we say a jar is somehow, *i.e.* it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truism is to guard against the assumption of the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things.²⁸

In other words, Jainism accepts the reality of plurality, that is, a plurality of realities. Actually S. Gopalan is aware of this. He points out immediately after unfolding the seven propositions that 'any object in the world represents Reality (though in a limited way)' and further that 'the proposition "The pot does not exist" does not signify "The pot does not exist as pot"'. It means merely that the pot does not signify "The pot does not exist-as pot". It means merely that the pot does not exist as cloth (*paṭa*) or as anything else'.²⁹ It is the actual formulation of the seven predications which seems to leave room for misunderstanding.

VI

Hiralal Jain presents the Jain doctrine of *syādvāda* as follows:

Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda ... comes to this that we may make seven assertions, seemingly contradictory but perfectly true, about a thing: It is (*syādasti*); it is not (*syān-nāsati*); it is and is not (*syādasti-nāsti*); it is indescribable (*syādavuktavyam*); it is and is indescribable (*syādasti ca avaktavyam ca*); it is not and is indescribable (*syādasti nāsti ca avaktavyam ca*) and it is, is not and indescribable (*syādasti nāsti ca avaktavyam ca*). A man is the father, and is not the father, and is both—are perfectly intelligible statements, if one understands the point of view from which they are made. In relation to a particular boy he is the father; in relation to another boy he is not the father; in relation to both the boys taken together he is the father and is not the father. Since both the ideas cannot be conveyed in words at the same time, he may be called indescribable; still he is the father and is indescribable; and so on ... Thus, the philosophy of Anekānta is neither self-contradictory nor vague or indefinite; on the contrary, it represents a very sensible view of things in a systematized form.³⁰

One obvious difficulty with this presentation is the identification

28. Hermann Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 468.

29. S. Gopalan, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

30. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

of *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*.³¹ One less obvious difficulty lies with the example. Two points deserve attention in this context. The first is that familial examples seem to be the favoured ones in modern Jain circles. Thus Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, writing about *syādvāda* in 1915 noted: 'The example pandits gave the writer to illustrate this important doctrine was that one and the same man is spoken of as father, uncle, father-in-law, son, son-in-law, brother and grandfather'.³² The second point is that such an example may constitute an extension of the doctrine. The classical illustrations relate to objects such as pot etc. rather than to persons.³³ And when the second proposition is asserted regarding an object, say pot, and it is said the pot does not exist then what is meant is that it does not exist as another object say cloth. The jar *is* but the jar *is not* cloth. This statement holds for the object but in case of the example of the father the statement will have to be modified thus: A is P's father would be: A is *not* C's father. So far so good. But let the first two statements about an object be phrased thus: The jar is not *itself* cloth. This statement holds for the object but in case of the example of the father the statement will have to be modified thus: A is B's but is not his own father! Thus the illustration, though apt, causes difficulties. On the other hand it does seem to extend the scope of the operation of the doctrine.³⁴

VII

Some scholars make a fairly accurate presentation of the doctrine but

31. *Anekāntavāda* embraces both *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* and this presentation of *syādvāda* seems to contain elements of *nayavāda*.

32. Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 92. Examples, however, are not restricted to family relationships, U.D. Baroda, for example, provides the following illustration (*Ibid.*):

Let us suppose that an agnostic denies the existence of soul in all ways. To him the Jaina *Syādvāda* would answer that as soul is a substance, it exists. Soul exists in itself and its modifications, but it does not exist in other substances such as matter (*puṅgala*), & c., and also other substances do not exist in soul. So, from this point of view, soul does not exist. But soul sometimes exists, and also does not exist at different times. But the soul cannot be spoken of, if we think of affirming its existence and non-existence, at the same time and from the same point of view. Similarly, under certain conditions, viz. when the state of existence (i.e. *astitva*) itself cannot be spoken of, i.e. *exists* and *exists and does not exist* cannot be spoken of at the same time, we are unable to affirm that existence is possible, that non-existence is possible, and that both existence and non-existence are possible. Thus *Syādvāda* teaches the fundamental theory that everything in the universe is related to every other thing.

33. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 260-268.

34. For the use of the father-son relationship in Buddhist logic see Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1971), p. 220.

the examples they cite to illustrate the doctrine seem to be potentially misleading. Thus A.L. Basham writes:

- (1) We may truthfully affirm a given proposition (*syādasti*). Thus when in winter I come home after a walk in the open air, I may say that my room is warm.
- (2) But from another point of view it is possible to negate the same proposition (*syannāsti*). Thus someone who has been sitting in the same room for some time may say with equal truth that it is not warm.
- (3) Hence it is possible to predicate the truth of a proposition and its negation at one and the same time (*syādastināsti*). The room is both warm and not-warm.
- (4) But the true character of the room, which we have seen is from different points of view warm, not-warm, and warm-and-not-warm, may be said to be indecribable (*syādavaktavya*). Its true character, *sub specie aeternitatis*, eludes us.³⁵

In this example heat and cold have been simultaneously predicated for the same room. But Malliṣeṇa, while commenting on Hemacandra, and discriminating *syādvāda* from contradiction states 'Where two things are mutually exclusive, such as cold and heat, there is contradiction which is defined as the impossibility of their existing together'³⁶, so that the example of heat and cold becomes somewhat suspect. Moreover, the experience of heat and cold is related to the subjective experience of the person in the example and this too makes

35. Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

36. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., *op. cit.*, p 266. The entire passage runs as follows:

This is the meaning : Where two things are mutually exclusive, such as cold and heat, there is contradiction which is defined as the impossibility of their existing together. But such is not the case here, because existence and non-existence occur by reason of the non-universal nature of both. For in a pot, existence does not exclude non-existence, because [if it did] existence even in other forms would result. And so there would be no status as objects of other objects except that [the pot], because of the accomplishment by it alone of [all] actions to be effected by [all] the objects in the three worlds. And non-existence does not exclude existence, because [if it did] non-existence [of an entity] even in its own form would follow. And so, universal emptiness would follow because of absence of matter. There would be a contradiction in case existence and non-existence were referred to the same aspect. But that is not so here, because in whatever part existence is, non-existence also is not in *that* part. However, existence belongs to one aspect, and non-existence belongs to another aspect. For existence [of an entity] is in regard to its own form and non-existence in regard to another form.

the example suspect as according to Jain philosophy 'Our judgments about things are relative—but relative to or dependent upon not simply the mood of the judging mind but upon the relational characters of the many-sided reality itself'.³⁷ It seems that *syādvāda* is to be associated with the plurality of objective reality rather than the whimsicality of subjective notions.

VIII

It could perhaps be plausibly suggested that such examples represent (legitimate) extensions of the doctrine. The same could perhaps be said of P.T. Raju's remark, made while discussing the 'doctrine of seven-fold predication ... called *syādvāda*'.

The Jainas would say that from the point of view of microscopic perception, germs exist; and that they do not exist from the point of view of ordinary perception.³⁸

It needs to be borne in mind, however, that in its classical formulation non-existence is not related to the non-existence of the object itself but its non-existence as *another* object. That is to say, a jar is not said to non-exist as a jar, but as a piece of cloth.

Modern illustrations sometimes tend to exemplify *syādvāda* in such a way that the case of predications of the non-existence of the object includes the possibility of it not existing by *itself* in some sense and not necessarily in the sense that it does not exist as *another* object. The concept of non-existence has been taken in the sense of possibility of the co-existence of different aspects in the same object, such as could lead one to assert the existence of the opposite of the first predicate. Thus A may exist as a father but he can also exist as someone's son so that it can be said of him: (a) He is a father; (b) He is not a father; and so on. However, on the strict application of *syādvāda* one would have to say (a) He is his child's father; (b) He is not the father of someone else's child.

Similarly, another modern tendency is to illustrate *syādvāda* by indicating the possibility of change *through* time. On the strict application of the doctrine, one should speak of things as they are at a point in time; the classical formulation seems to be static rather than dynamic. Here again the same development occurs which was noted earlier—non-existence is predicated about the object *itself* and not in relation to its non-existence as another object at a point in time. Here

37. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

38. P.T. Raju, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

the object is seen as possessing subsequent other existence rather than non-existence, if earlier it was seen as possessing co-existence rather than non-existence. Thus M. Hiriyanna remarks :

If we consider for example an object A, we may say that it *is*, but it *is* only in a sense, viz, as A and not also as B. Owing to the indefinite nature of reality, what is now or here A, may become B sometime hence or elsewhere.³⁹

This statement seems to be somewhat questionable. *Syādvāda* does not seem to be based as much on the possibility that clay may become cloth as on the fact that clay is not cloth.

IX

It appears then that the following statement of the doctrine represents the correct traditional understanding of *syādvāda*, in modern terms :

The logical doctrine of Jaina philosophy forms the most important aspect of that school. The fundamental principle of this logical doctrine implies the possibility of a positive and negative predication about the same thing. This doctrine is generally referred to as *asti-nāsti*, *is and is not*. According to Jaina logic, affirmative predication about a thing depends upon four conditions—*sva-dravya*, *svakṣetra*, *svakāla*, and *svabhāva*, i.e. its own substance, its own locality, its own time or duration, and its own nature or modification. Correspondingly, the negative predication about the same thing is conditioned by the four things of an opposite nature—*paradravya*, *parakṣetra*, *parakāla*, and *parabhāva*, i.e. other substance, other locality, other time, and other nature. This ornament is made of gold, and it is not made of any other metal—are two obvious predications about the same gold ornament, the affirmation (*asti*) from the point of view of itself (*svadravya*) and the negation (*nāsti*) from the point of view of other substance (*paradravya*). Similarly, it may be said, Socrates was born in Athens, and he was not born in Rome—affirmative predication from *svakṣetra* and negative predication from *parakṣetra* point of view, both referring to the same individual. Likewise, we may affirm the historical period of an individual when we refer to his proper time in history (*svakāla*), and deny his relationship to any other period of time (*parakāla*). Tennyson lived in the Victorian age and he did not live in the Elizabethan period. In the same way, the last condition, *bhāva* or mode may be explained. Charles I died on the scaffold, and he did not die in his bed. ...

39. M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

.....Based upon this principle is the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*, the seven modes of predication. In order to speak of some-thing in relation to its own substance or locality, time or mode, negation or *nāsti* is to be used. If both the aspects are to be spoken of, then both *asti* and *nāsti* are to be used, but one after another. Again, if both the aspects, affirmative and negative, in the same predication, are to be expressed, it becomes inexpressible by language—it is *avaktavya*. These are the four initial modes of predication in the group of *saptabhaṅgī*. By attaching the fourth term 'avaktavya' to each of the first three, we arrive at the seven modes of predication : *asti*, *nāsti*, *asti-nāsti*, *avaktavya*, *asti-avaktavya*, *nāsti-avaktavya*, and *asti-nāsti-avaktavya*. These are the only seven possible modes of predication that we can have.⁴⁰

40. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 428-429. For a more austere statement of the doctrine in classical terms see Wolfgang Beurlen, tr., *op. cit.*, pp164-165 : 'The *sapta-bhaṅgī* says that an object (a *ghaṭa*, of course) seen from a chosen standpoint (*syāt*) can be signified (1) as existent, (2) as non-existent and (3) as both existent and non-existent (the former seen under its own aspect and the latter under alien ones). The three corresponding formulae are : *syād asty eva*, *syān nāsty eva*, *syād asti nāsti ca*. The two statements of (3), however, can be made by letting the one follow the other, whereas they cannot possibly be made simultaneously. Under this aspect the object (*ghaṭa*) (4) defies description : *syadavaktavya eva*. The remaining three sentences are identical with the first three by adding *avaktavya*. This means to say in sentence (5) that a thing exists but that, apart from this positive quality with reference to another thing. It has a negative quality as well, and that it is impossible to express both qualities simultaneously : *Syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca*. Sentence (6): *syān nāsti cāvaktavyacaś* is just the reverse on the basis of non-existence. Sentence (7), finally, *ca* expresses that an object as in (3) can be taken either as positive or negative, though not simultaneously but only successively : *syād asti nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca*. The wording rendered follows Vimaladāsa's *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī* (p.2); except for some slight difference it represents the backbone of the Syādvāda literature'.

Syādvāda Theory of Jainism in Terms of a Deviant Logic*

FILITA BHARUCH AND R.V. KAMAT

Introduction

Syādvāda, the doctrine of the relativism of judgments states that all actual and possible assertions in regard to an object are relative and therefore conditionally true or false. An individual's judgement about a thing or event need not only be valid for anyone other than the subject himself, but is also conditioned by its relationship to a point of space and time, and by its mode and substance.

Pramāṇa or complete judgement describes the object in the phenomenal world with all its possibilities which are stated by the Jainas^{1 and 2} as follows :

- (i) May be, it is (Syādasti);
- (ii) may be, it is not (Syān-nāsti);
- (iii) may be, it is and it is not at different times (Syād-asti-nāsti);
- (iv) may be, it is and it is not at the same time which means that it is indescribable (Syād-avaktavya);
- (v) may be, it is and yet indescribable (Syād-asti avaktavya);
- (vi) may be, it is not and also indescribable (Syān-nāsti avaktavya);
- (vii) may be, it is and it is not also indescribable (Syād-asti-nāsti avaktavya).

* Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 2, April 1984.

1. S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 298-308 (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1977).
2. S.L. Pandey : *Whither Indian Philosophy*, pp. 49-61, (Darshana Peeth, Allahabad, 1978).

The above seven possibilities comprise the theory of Syādvāda (Saptabhāṅgi naya) and describe an object X of the phenomenal world subject to the factors of space, time, mode and substance from seven standpoints. However, the above seven predications must be consistent with the facts of objective reality and be based on the principles of affirmation and negation. We note that an object is conditioned by the factors of space, time, mode and substance, hence the affirmation and the negation of proposition regarding it are to be assigned suitable truth-values. Also, *since the third, fifth, sixth and seventh, predications involve the concept of simultaneity and nonsimultaneity*³ (which accounts for the object being conditioned by time), we have changed the meanings of the connectives 'and' and 'or'. As a matter of fact, we have introduced two varieties of 'and'; one symbolised by '∧' (simultaneous conjunction), the other 'and' is symbolised by '∨' (non-simultaneous conjunction). As for the connective 'or' symbolised by '∨' we shall use the meaning assigned to it by Reichenbach⁴ in his 3-valued logic introduced by him to describe various anomalies in quantum mechanics.

Logical Analysis of Saptabhāṅgi-naya

Malliṣeṇa⁵ distinguishes a pramāṇa from a durnaya and a naya. According to him, a pramāṇa is always true and for which we assign the truth-value T, but a durnaya is always false for which we assign the truth-value F. The truth value of a naya (incomplete judgement) is different from the truth-value T or the truth-value F hence it is intermediate between these two truth-values. This gives rise to a third intermediate truth value I.

According to Vadi Devasuri's Pramāṇa-naya-Tattvālokālaṅkāra, (3 loc cit.) the above seven predications can be interpreted as follows :

The first predication consists of an affirmative statement. This may mean that an object *exists in some respects*. The expression 'in some respect' is to be taken in the context of various factors like space, time, substance and mode. For instance, the substance of an object X could be related to the material of which it is made. The space relates

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3. Vadi Devasuri : *Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokālaṅkāra* (English translation and commentary by Dr. H.S. Bhattacharya) (Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay).
 4. H. Reichenbach : *Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1948).
 5. Mallisena : *Syādvāda Mañjarī* verse no. 28.

to the spatial location of X. The time of existence of X is the present time at which it exists. The mode of X describes its configuration.

Let us represent, the first affirmative predication by a proposition P which takes a truth-value T.

The second predication consists of a negative statement that 'in some respect' an object X is non-existent. Here the word 'may be' (syād) or 'in some respects' is crucial in respect of assigning the truth-value to this predication. To elucidate that the object X may not exist with reference to either space, time, substance or mode we note that on account of restraint 'in some respects' we shall consider the connective of negation ($\bar{\ }$) as a 'complete' negation and not as a 'dimetrical' negation in the sense of Reichenbach.⁶ Let us represent the second predication by the proposition $\bar{\ } P$ which takes the truth-value I, as shown by the following truth-table :

(Reichenbach 4 loc. cit.)

Truth-Table No. 1

P	$\bar{\ } P$
T	I
I	I
F	T

The third predication consists of affirmative and negative statements conjunctively made one after another. Since the affirmative proposition P and negative proposition $\bar{\ } P$ are taken *conjunctively one after another* we assign the truth-value T to the non-simultaneous conjunction of the affirmative proposition P and the negative proposition $\bar{\ } P$. We denote this non-simultaneous conjunction of P and $\bar{\ } P$ by the notation (P° $\bar{\ } P$).

The fourth predication consists of affirmative and negative statements made *simultaneously*. Since an object X is incapable of being expressed in terms of existence and non-existence at the same time, even allowing Syād, it is termed 'indescribable'. Hence we assign to the fourth predication which is the simultaneous conjunction of the affirmative proposition P and the negative proposition $\bar{\ } P$, the indeterminate truth-value I and denote the statement corresponding to

6. R. Sinari : "A pragmatic Critique of Jaina Relativism", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Jan. 1969.

the fourth predication as $(P \wedge \neg) P$.

The fifth predication consists in an affirmative statement conjoined with an indescribable statement at the *same time*. We denote this fifth predication by $P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$.

Referring to the column for simultaneous conjunction in the truth-table that follows :

Truth-Table No. 2

A	B	$A \circ B$	$A \wedge B$	$A \vee B$
T	T	T	T	T
T	I	T	I	T
T	F	T	I	T
I	T	T	I	T
I	I	T	I	I
I	F	F	F	I
F	T	T	I	T
F	I	F	F	I
F	F	F	F	F

We see that since P takes the truth-value T by the first predication and $(P \wedge \neg P)$ is assigned the truth-value I by the fourth predication, the proposition $P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$ takes the truth-value I.

The sixth predication consists of a negative statement conjoined with an indescribable statement at the *same time*. We denote this sixth predication by $(\neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$. Referring to the column for the simultaneous conjunction (\wedge) in the table given above, we see that since $\neg P$ takes the truth-value I by the predication and $(P \wedge \neg P)$ is assigned the truth-value I by the fourth predication we see that the proposition $\neg P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$ takes the truth-value I.

The seventh or the last predication consists of an affirmative and negative statements made non-simultaneously conjoined simultaneously with affirmative and the negative statement conjoined simultaneously. This statement is denoted by $(P \circ \neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$. Referring to the columns for the connectives for simultaneous

conjunction and for non-simultaneous conjunction in the truth-table No. 2 and noting that P takes the truth-value T by the first predication and $\neg P$ takes the truth-value I by the second predication. We see that $(P \circ \neg P)$ takes the truth-value T (third predication) and $(P \wedge \neg P)$ takes the truth-value I (fourth predication). The seventh predication thus takes the truth-value I according to the same truth-table.

Hence, we see that the *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* of the Jainas is a table of seven statements which are derived from a true statement by the operations of negation, non-simultaneous and simultaneous conjunctions that are denoted by \neg , \circ , \wedge respectively.

Let us consider P as a true statement then the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* can be represented as follows :

- (1) P (assertion of P)
- (2) Not P ('complete' negation of P) denoted by $\neg P$
- (3) P and non-simultaneously not P (non-simultaneous conjunction of P and $\neg P$) denoted by $P \circ \neg P$.
- (4) P and simultaneously not P (simultaneous conjunction of P and $\neg P$) denoted by $(P \wedge \neg P)$.
- (5) P and simultaneously (P and simultaneously not P) denoted by $P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$.
- (6) Not P and simultaneously (P and simultaneously not P) denoted by $\neg P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$.
- (7) (P and non-simultaneously not P) and simultaneously (P and simultaneously not P) denoted by $(P \circ \neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$.

Pictorially we can depict the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* as follows with the truth-values to the right :

	P	(T)
	$\neg P$	(I)
	$P \circ \neg P$	(T)
O	$P \wedge \neg P$	(I)
X	$P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$	(I)
OBJECT	$\neg P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$	(I)
	$(P \circ \neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)$	(I)

An object X can be viewed from any one of these seven standpoints. However, since the totality of all these seven possibilities comprises the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* (Complete judgement of the phenomenal world in terms of seven possibilities), the disjunction,

denoted by \vee , of these seven predication should lead to a tautology. We can represent this disjunction as follows :

$$\begin{aligned} & (P \vee \neg P) \vee (P^\circ \neg P) \vee (P \wedge \neg P) \vee \\ & [P \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)] \vee [(\neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)] \vee \\ & [(P^\circ \neg P) \wedge (P \wedge \neg P)]. \end{aligned}$$

As we have noted earlier, the seven predications, conjoined by the disjunction above, take the truth-value T, I, T, I, I, I, I respectively. Referring to the column for the disjunction in the truth-value No. 2 and noting that the disjunction is associative as can be easily checked using the same truth-table, we see that the disjunction of all these seven predications is indeed a tautology taking the truth-value T.

Conclusion

Accordingly the seven-fold argument of Syādvāda theory of Jainism which is supposed to exhaust all the possibilities of describing the objective reality and lead to a complete description (pramāṇa) of the phenomenal world in terms of an always true statement can be represented as a tautology with respect to our deviant logic.

The Jainas were not unaware of the fact that the relativism they were propounding suggests a verdict of disfavour of all knowledge obtained and obtainable by us in the phenomenal world. For a world which is divisible into an ever inexhaustible number of points of view and whose entirety we never comprehend is just inaccessible to empirical sensibilities or rational statements. Does this suggest that we require an infinite-valued deviant logic to represent the Jaina epistemology or perhaps it is beyond the scope of logic ?

Jainas' Syādvāda and Bradley's view of Judgment*

BRIJ KISHORE PRASAD

It seems somewhat paradoxical to find in Jainas' theory of judgment very much the same epistemological standpoint concerning the nature of objects as in that of Bradley, for, as regards their metaphysical and ontological views are concerned, both stand poles apart. The Jainas are realist and relativistic pluralist believing, on the one hand, not only in the reality of objects seen and perceived independent of any conscious effort, but at the same time believing in the real existence of many objects. Bradley, on the other hand, is an idealist of a very rigorous type who, contrary to what Hegel and other traditional idealists have been doing, would not tolerate even the identification of objects in the phenomenal world with thought, but would believe in merging all aspects of the universe into one infinite and homogeneous whole of experience or the sentience. However, the views of Jainas and Bradley concerning judgment or any proposition expressing truth and falsehood with respect to some phenomenal reality are very much identical.

Let us first refer to Jainas' view of *Anekāntavāda* according to which there are not only innumerable types of realities both material and spiritual, but their character too is such that no categorical statement regarding their appropriate nature can be considered true and proper. Since every aspect of the universe possesses infinite number of both positive and negative character, it is utterly impossible to say anything regarding its nature which would be true unconditionally. The simple reason for holding such a view is that human knowledge is so

* Indian Philosophy and Culture, 17/1, 1972.

limited and conditional that to transcend the region of what appears to the sense would be beyond human resources unless one is omniscient (*Kevali*) being. Thus very like the Einsteinian view of truth, things and objects in the universe are true relatively, i.e. relative to the particular space and time. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we may say that "it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone".¹

Evidently it is only in relation to different standpoints that things and objects, though possessed of infinite determinations (*anantadharmāmakan Vastu*), can be said to have a particular quality or character. This view which believes in the reality of such a character is technically known as *naya* and is considered to be most catholic in view of the fact that it does not disregard or reject the views of other thinkers like the Buddhists or the Advaita-Vedāntins, who would lay stress either on the impermanent and transitory character of being or on its unchangeable and permanent character. In this sense the Jainas' view of *naya* is an attempt to reconcile the conflicting claims of the epistemological thinkers giving a death blow to their dogmatic approach towards things and their nature that what they think or hold is alone true and real. Thus 'the nature of being (*Sat*) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both.'² This being the case whatever assertion is made with respect to a thing can be true and real relative to a particular universe of discourse or such other factors as space, time or quality and each assertion should, therefore, be understood only in reference thereto. In short, all affirmations made from whatever standpoint (*naya*) cannot be regarded as absolute and can be true in some (*Syādasti*) or 'may be it is' sense.

Bradley, on the other hand, considers judgment as a means where with the aid of ideas we express the truth or falsehood in relation to certain fact. These ideas, contrary to what the empiricist thinkers consider, are the expressions of certain meaning which we derive only by the analysis of the judgment itself and in this sense, therefore, they are the results of the adjectives made loose from

1. Dasgupta, S. N.—A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 175-176.

2. Ibid, p. 175.

their substantive. Thus 'when we talk of an idea which is the same amid change, we do not speak of that psychical event which the mind has fixed, and which is not in any sense an event in time. We are talking of the meaning, not the series of symbols'.³ And it is because of this emphasis on meaning that no judgment in Bradleian sense is just what it stands for and instead of being unique and particular, it transcends the given and it may mean other than what we aim at. This is why Bradley has been very much particular about this peculiar nature of judgment when he says : 'Judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content.....to a reality beyond the act'.⁴

Every judgment attempts to qualify the real as it appears in perception and in this respect there is always a reference of some ideal content to a reality. Our act of judgment 'attaches the floating adjective to the nature of the world'. But such an act hardly makes the judgment as something unique and particular in the sense that inspite of all its actuality and uniqueness the judgment ceases to qualify the real in the true sense with the result that the judgment can never be particular. For the essence of reality or fact is to be 'substantial and individual' and this 'not given directly in any truth whatsoever. It can never be stated categorically'.⁵ For instance, to say that 'Caesar is sick' is not to say that Caesar is nothing other than sick, for 'he is a common bond of many attributes, and is therefore universal'.⁶

Thus though it seems that the contents in many cases remain 'fixed and defined by a complex of relations which the judgments imply'⁷ and hence everything present or termed as this', 'now' or 'here' signifying something 'unique and self-contained' affirms 'absolute, final and unalterable truths', yet no view regarding the matter of facts can be held to be absolute. As Bradley argues :

'You cannot at once translate feeling into judgment and leave feeling untransformed; and what is lost in the translation is the positive uniqueness which you demand....And since your truth fails and must fail to contain the positive meaning, your truth is defective and is self-condemned.'⁸

The reason for such a view is not sufficient to give to our

3. Bradley, F.H.—The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, Oxford 1967, p. 6.

4. Ibid, p. 10.

5. Ibid, p. 46.

6. Ibid, p. 191.

7. Joachim—The Nature of Truth, Oxford 1937, p. 105.

event an exclusive place in its series. For it may seem that a fact or an event has a unique place within a single unique order or that it has a particular character or quality, yet that fact can never be so considered and its 'nature becomes general and ceases forthwith to be what we mean by particular'.⁹ Joachim too confirms this view when he says : 'No judgment is ever entirely severed from a larger background of meaning, though the background may be relatively obscure'.¹⁰

In this respect Bradley considers the absolute view of 'perfect truth and sheer error' as arising out of the wrong conception of the nature of things that 'separate facts and truths are self-contained and possess independent reality'.¹¹ And even if we refer to the 'mathematical truths' or 'universal judgments of science, similar difficulty is experienced, though they seem to express 'necessary connection of content'. For instance, when it is asserted that $2+2=4$, it is meant that the addition of such units as two and two must necessarily be four; and similarly 'Hydrogen is lighter than air' seems to give an absolute meaning regarding the truth of this fact. It is true, Bradley suggests, that 'mathematical Truths' as well as truths concerning the 'universal judgments of science' are based upon certain conditions and under those conditions the results which follow acquire meaning suggestive of pure truth and utter falsehood. But when we have passed beyond the world of 'special science' and have referred our judgment to things beyond what is there, which influence the function of life and finally limit our vision that we are ultimately compelled to reject the absolute view regarding truth. For, in scientific thinking, what is needed is the elimination of all irrelevant matters from the contents of judgments to make them thoroughly complete and consistent so as to give a meaning which may be wholly true. But this way of judging is based entirely on the abstraction of fact and event from all else, and this necessitates our thinking to remain confined to simple entities presented to us without any consideration of the context. But "such a background is focussed and concentrated, more or less, in every judgment which one makes, or again in every judgment which one accepts from another person".¹² In this respect, the meaning of any judgment is dependent

8. Bradley, F.H.—*Essays on Truth & Reality*, Oxford 1962, p. 262.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 261

10. *The Nature of Truth* Oxford, 1939, p. 113.

11. Blanshard, B.—*The Nature of Thought*, Vol. II, Allen & Unwin, 1964 p. 319.

upon our concrete thinking, which is possible not by abstractions of entities out of the whole, but by viewing them in their context or the conditions under which they occur. And it is mainly because of the lack of vision or awareness of the situation, which is vaguely involved in every act of judgment that Bradley conceives all judgments as relative and conditional.

Thus very like Jainas' doctrine of *syādvāda* every assertion can be true only relatively or conditional to certain space and time which factors are always implied with the result that 'all judgments will rest on supposal. It is all hypothetical, itself will confess that what directly it deals with, is unreal'.¹³ Thus an affirmative judgment, 'the jug is' may mean in Jainas' sense an affirmation of being (*syādasti*), and it may also mean the negation of being (*syānnāsti*), as they argue :

"That 'the jug is' means 'this jug is here' which naturally indicates that 'this jug is not there' and thus the judgment 'the jug is' (i.e. is here) also means that 'the jug is not there'.....and this justifies us in saying 'may be that in some sense the jug is', and 'may be in some sense that the jug is not'.....Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite."¹⁴

In this context it would not be out of place to mention that Russell too seems to support the view held by the Jainas. For while believing in the existence of objects in the physical world, Russell does not accept the identification of an object with the sensation of it in view of the fact that between an object and the sensation we have an enormous factors like light-waves or ether-waves besides the effect of the change in space and time all of which go to falsify our judgment regarding the nature of things seen and perceived. The result has been that different people see the same object as of different shapes or colours according to their point of view. Thus circular coin, for example, though we should always judge it to be circular will look oval unless we are straight in front of it,¹⁵ and this makes a difference between what is appearance and that which is real. If such be the case that there would always be a difference between an object in the physical space and our knowledge of the same, it would rather be inappropriate to hold that any view regarding the nature of an object would be true absolutely.

12. Op. cit. p. 92.

13. Bradley, F.H.—The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, Oxford 1967, p. 47.

14. Dasgupta, S.N.—A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge 1963, p. 180.

15. Russel, B.—The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1959, p. 29.

In view of the above discussion it would be clear that the Jainas were not blind in holding such a view regarding the nature of objects in the physical space on grounds of commonsense realism, but that they had vision of things and what they believed was based on a most scientific and cogent basis. For, who could deny that 'affirmations or judgments according to any *naya* or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute' considering the fact that 'even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame things may be held to be true from other points of views'. Speaking from a practical point of view, since both according to Jainas and Bradley most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made with respect to it from whatever standpoint can never be absolute. "Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say 'the poor man has no riches'.....Thus in some relation or -other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it'. (Op. cit. p. 176) This gives a clue to the real nature of being which the act of our judgment fails to qualify in the right and proper sense so as to give a meaning which may become categorical, positive or absolute without exception.

Syādvāda and the Modern Scientific Theory of Relativity*

SHANTI PRAKASH ATREYA*

In India the knowledge of philosophy and science, even in the most ancient times, was on such heights that it has not been attained by the modern science even today, inspite of its great advancement and achievements in the field of knowledge. Indian seers beautifully tackled and solved nearly all the problems of life of the individual and society. It is really very surprising and painful that Indian scholars and scientists never tried to enter into the vast treasure of ancient Indian knowledge. Now time has come to look into our vast field of ancient knowledge. It becomes our sacred duty to study our ancient literature.

Let us take Syādvāda, the Jaina theory of Relativity, the nucleus of Jaina philosophy which has not lost its importance even today. It is a living theory of philosophical world from most ancient times and as such, it is continuing even now in its fullest brightness. Prof. Albert Einstein's "Theory of Relativity" is a great contribution to the modern scientific world, which got a universal acceptance in the field of science. Now let us take comparative study of ancient Jain Syādvāda and modern theory of Relativity.

Syādvāda and the theory of Relativity both are taken to be synonymous, though both the theories originated from two different places. The theory of Syādvāda includes the theory of Relativity and is wider than it in all respects. No doubt Einstein's theory of Relativity is a great revolution in the field of Mathematics and science. It has

* Vedic Path, Vol. 33, 1981

changed its concepts but it has not yet reached its maturity. Even now it is in its undeveloped stage of thought. Researches and studies on the theory of Relativity are going on and it is growing slowly. This theory of Relativity is taught to the students of Mathematics in M.A. classes. Syādvāda the Jaina theory of Relativity is perfect in itself. It is much wider and comprehensive than the Einstein's theory of Relativity. Both these theories are complex and therefore misunderstood even by the great scholars. They are not so simple as seen ordinarily.

Syādvāda is composed of two words "Syāt" and Vāda. Here the word "Syāt" means 'kathanchit i.e., from a certain point of view or from a certain angle of vision' and word 'Vāda' denotes the system of thought. We may call it as 'Apekshāvāda' or 'Sāpekshāvāda'. Thus it is the Jain theory of Relativity. According to Jain Philosophy every thing has many pairs of opposites. Every thing is of many pairs of opposite qualities just like existent and non-existent; one and many, eternal and non-eternal etc. In the absence of these opposite qualities things also cannot exist. Every thing has got its own form, place, time and nature which are different from the form, place, time and nature of others. In respect to his own form, place, time and nature one thing is existent and in respect to other's form, place, time and nature the same thing is non-existent.¹ Thus from the one point of view a thing is existent and from the other point of view the same thing is non-existent. The same thing is existent and non-existent both. As for example, pot is non-existent from the point of view of cloth and it is existent from the point of view of pot. Now it is clear that every thing is full of various contradictory qualities existing in various relative conditions. There are innumerable contradictory relations of thing at one and the same time. One thing is big and small, one and many, eternal and non-eternal etc., at one and the same time.

Every thing has got its existence, beginning, and end all the three aspects.² Existence of a thing presupposes beginning and end both. There can be no existence without the beginning and end. The beginning and end can never be without existence. Each one is essential for the existence of the other two. All the three aspects go together for the concept of a thing. In essence everything is eternal and in respect to its modes everything comes into existence and again reaches its destruction. We may put it that a thing is

1. Sadeva.vyavasthate, Aptamimamsa.

2. Utpadavyaya dhrauvyayuktam sat. A.T.S. 29.

indestructible and permanent in respect to its root, substance and its root nature, but it is destructible with respect to its capacity of modification or change every moment. There can be no destruction without its existence and beginning. Without existence and destruction there can be no beginning. Jain neither accepts momentarism nor eternalism only. Let us take an example of golden ring. When we destroy the golden ring and change it into necklace then there is an end or destruction of the golden ring and beginning or birth of a necklace but as gold it is eternal or has got permanent existence. In the same way every thing is one and many at one and the same time. Pot in respect to pot is one but in respect to its atom it is many. Thus we must note that there is nothing wrong in having these opposite qualities in a thing all at one and the same time. But there is wrong in not having them all at one and the same time. Opposition is seen due to ignorance of the real knowledge of the nature of things. One and the same person is husband and not husband, father and son both at the same time. The same man is not father and husband only but he may be at one and same time uncle, nephew, son, friend, enemy, secretary, president etc., also, there is nothing wrong in it. He is father of his son and son of his father, uncle of nephew and nephew of his uncle and so on. He is husband of his own wife, not of all the ladies of the world. He is father of his own son and not the father of the whole of the world and so on. Thus there is no absolute truth. Every statement is relative. We see contradictions only due to our ignorance like the concepts of blind men about the elephant. All our conflicts are due to our limited knowledge. All the things of the world are related to one another without any exception. By saying Indian we have the concept of non-Indian, by the concept of man we at once have the concept of non-human. Thus by the knowledge of one we get the relative knowledge of all the other remaining things. Due to this relativeness in mind Mahavir said that who knows one object with all its qualities and attributes, he knows all the things and who knows all the things with all their qualities he knows one.

By all this it becomes clear that every thing is having infinite number of attributes and has got infinite number of relations with all other things. Only Kevalī the Universal observer can have direct knowledge of a thing with all its qualities and relations. We ordinary persons can know every thing in relation to time, space and our own angle of vision only. At one time we can know only one quality. Taking

into account this, Jain thinkers have dealt with seven aspects of a thing in which all the infinite number of aspects are included. According to Jain philosophy out of these infinite number of aspects of a thing the knowledge of one aspect is called *Naya*. In this way there are infinite number of *Nayas* which are included under *Dravyārthik Naya* and *Paryāyārthika Naya* (Absolute point of view and Empirical point of view). From the Absolute point of view also a thing can be seen from three different aspects and Jain thinkers named them as (1) *Naigam Naya* (2) *San̄grah Naya* (3) *Vyavahāra Naya*. The point of view of the general and the individual both at the same time is dealt with in *Naigam Naya*, the general point of view is dealt with in *San̄grah Naya* and the individual point of view is dealt with in *Vyavahar Naya*. In the same way *Paryāyārthik Naya* is also divided into four *Nayas* according to the four points of views. The first *R̄jūsutra Naya* denotes the point of view of momentary present attributes, the second *Śabda Naya* denotes word and its meaning, the third *Samabhirūḍha Naya* denotes the meaning according to the root of the word and fourth *Evambhūta Naya* denotes the action according to the meaning of the root word. All the infinite number of *Nayas* come under these above-mentioned seven *Nayas*:—really a thing is different according to different place, different time, different situations and different individual's mental conditions.

This Jain theory of Relativity is really a very grand and noble one by understanding which dogmatism, wrong concepts, conflicts, senseless prejudices, selfishness, partialities and one-sidedness vanishes by itself. By understanding the concept of relative truths there remains no misunderstanding in any way.

Syādvāda can be explained to an ordinary person in a very simple manner. A Jaina thinker in explaining *Syādvāda* raised his little finger and the next one and asked which is bigger. The ring finger is bigger no doubt, was the answer. He then raised only the ring and the middle finger and then asked which is smaller, the answer was the ring finger. He then said it is *Syādvāda*. The same finger is bigger and smaller both. Thus there is nothing absolutely bigger or smaller. Every thing is relatively smaller or bigger. This is the Jaina theory of relativity. It is not so easy as you see by this example. This Jaina theory of *Syādvāda* is so difficult that it is beyond the reach of even many great scholars.

Einstein's theory of Relativity is also so difficult that it is not

clear even to the great scientists. Its complexity is clear by the example given in the book *Cosmology old and New*. "If two people meet twice they must have lived the same time between the two meetings. This is true from one point of view and not from another. It all depends whether both of them have been staying at home or one has travelled to a distant part of the Universe and then came back in the interim."³

If a man standing on the sea shore no doubt in comparison to the man in the ship he is not moving but as due to movement of the ship, the man on the ship is moving so is the man on the sea shore is also moving in relation to the sun due to the movement of the earth round the sun on which he is standing. In the same way all the movements are relative. This very thought is in both Jain philosophy (Syādvāda) and Einstein's theory of Relativity. According to both every thing is relative. A man standing, is not moving in respect to the man walking but the standing man is also moving with the movement of the earth. The motion and rest are the relative terms. There is nothing like a absolute Motion or absolute Rest. Sun in respect to earth is not moving but in respect to other stars it is moving and so on as there are infinite number of solar systems. Thus we see that all things are only relative in motion and rest. Einstein beautifully said, "Nature is such that it is impossible to determine absolute motion by any experiment whatever."⁴ In *Cosmology old and New* we find an example explaining beautifully the Motion and Rest. It is said, "Suppose this room is a lift. The support breaks and down we go with ever increasing velocity, falling freely like a stone. Suppose I am inside that lift and I perform the experiment of dropping an apple held in my hand. Remember that the lift and all things contained in it are falling freely all the while. To my surprise I shall see that the apple cannot fall any more than it is already doing, owing to the free fall of lift. The apple remains poised in my hand."⁵ In the same way concept of time may also be explained as "Two revolving galaxies (a and b) which are at a distance of thousands of light years, exploded and out of them two new stars were created. The spectators sitting in each galaxy will feel that these events are immediate but there being a distance of thousands of light years, between the two, the spectator in 'a' will call the event in 'b' as

3. *Cosmology Old and New*. p. 206.

4. *Mysterious Universe*, p. 78.

5. *Cosmology Old and New*, p. 40.

happening after thousands of years: while a second sepectator in 'b' will similarly feel the explosion at its own place as immediate and the event in 'a' to have happened after thousands of years. Thus about these explosions no absolute time can be determined but only a relative time, can be stated"⁶ Thus from this it becomes clear that when the persons on 'a' and 'b' meet, their conclusions, though will be correct from their own points of views but will be contradictory to each other.

Albert Einstein explained his wife the theory of Relativity in a very simple way, "I will give you example. When a man talks with a beautiful girl, he feels that an hour is just like a minute but if the same person is asked to sit on a hot oven, he will feel every minute like an hour."

Similar thought we find in Yogavāsiṣṭha also, "Painful night is felt like the thousands of years and pleasurable night is felt as less than even a second. In dream we have the experience of thousands of years within a second only." It is clear now that time and place both are relative according to Yogavāsiṣṭha, Jaina and Einstein. Prof. Einstein clearly said, "We can only know the relative truth, the Absolute truth is known only to the universal observer."

Syādvāda very clearly states that one and the same thing can be seen from infinite points of views. They all are true relatively. All the contradictory views are true from their own points of views. Words cannot express all the aspects of a thing at the same time. Thus Jain philosophers used the word "syāt" to express this, which means '*kathañcit*.' The same thing is existent and non-existent both and to express this Jain thinkers used the word "Syāt." There are seven types of conclusions which are called *saptabhangi*. This method of obtaining knowledge is called by the Jain Philosophy "*The Theory of Syādvāda*". There are infinite number of opposite qualities in a thing, therefore, there are infinite number of Saptbhanges. This theory is compared with the *Keval Jñana* and taken as exactly like it.

Exactly in the same way Einstein also explains his theory of relativity. According to both, Truth is only relative and there is no Absolute Truth. Einstein clearly said that all the definitions of Mathematics are true as they are not absolutely true but relatively

6. Viśva kī Rūparekhā Adhyāya, pp. 62-63 (First Edition).

7. Dukhītsya nisakalpaḥ sukhītsyaiva ca kṣaṇaḥ kṣaṇaḥ svapne bhavet kalpaḥ kalpaśca bhavati kṣaṇaḥ—Yogavāsiṣṭha 3.60.22.

true. Absolute truth is only a thing of Imagination. All our measurements are only relatively true.

In the end I must say that we must have a critical and comparative study of Syādvāda and the modern scientific theory of Relativity, though the latter is in its developmental stage while the Jain theory of Syādvāda is in its perfect stage. This study will bridge the gulf of Philosophy and Science by bringing them nearer to one another.

Syādvāda and Relativity*

Z.V.KOTHARI

[For non-scientist-philosophers, philosophy of relativity is synonymous with the philosophy of Einstein or with the philosophy of Modern Science. But it will be interesting to note that in modern physics there are two schools with different epistemological approach to science—school of Einstein and the school of Niels Bohr. Bohr's approach is positivistic, while Einstein's is not. "Strangely enough the positivistic conception of physics had been stimulated by Einstein's pioneer work in the theory of relativity... but he was not ready to admit that one must abandon the goal of describing physical reality and remain content only with the combination of observations." ('*Einstein—His Life and Time*' by P.P. Frank (1949) p. 259). Einstein's opposition to positivistic approach puzzled many, but there it is.

The author of this article has rightly stated elsewhere that—

"Both doctrines stress the relativity of standpoints in examining the object or its attributes" and all through the article this theme is elaborated.

But according to Syādvāda (as reported by the author). "It is impossible for the finite mind to have knowledge of complete truth and, therefore, relative truth itself is complete knowledge for him:" while that is not so according to Einstein. Having recognised the relativity of standpoints but having full faith in the existence of an absolute world-condition which the scientist wishes to describe, Einstein devised a language which would be commonly used by all observers to describe the same world-condition.

* Vidya, 4/1, 1961.

And he was quite logical in holding such a belief in the existence of reality as it is *thought* and not as it is *observed*, because, as the author has pointed out, according to Dr. Radhakrishnan, the theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute.

This brings us to the famous controversy between Einstein and Bohr. The author of this article has quoted Bohr in the last para of his article. But this quotation is from an argument by Bohr against Einstein's philosophy. According to Einstein, we are only spectators in the great drama of existence and it is our endeavour to describe unequivocally the acts of this drama. According to Bohr, we are both spectators and actors in the sense that our very act of observation influences the drama of existence. The phenomena of the quantum world are so delicate and fine that our instruments of observation would interfere with the phenomena during our very act of observation and thus we would be observing the phenomena as disturbed by our observation. In this sense Bohr describes us as both spectators and actors. Against this Einstein believes that our instruments of observation may not be sharp enough today, but he has faith that some day these instruments will be made sharp enough so as not to disturb the observation of the delicate quantum phenomena. But then Bohr argues that the mathematics, which the modern quantum theory is using, actually puts a limit to the fineness of our instruments of observation and so the controversy continues.

It should, however, be noted that Bohr's ideas cannot be regarded as being on the lines of Syādvāda because of the following basic difference between the two:

According to Syādvāda, there is no uncertainty whatsoever about the various judgements by different observers (This article). But Bohr's ideas are pivoted round an uncertainty principle introduced in modern science by the basic limitation in the fineness of our instruments of observations.

This, in brief, will indicate the position of the two principal schools of scientific philosophy vis-a-vis Syādvāda.]

It would be really interesting to observe the similarities between two theories—one of which has been very recently enunciated in the West and the other, a theory which was promulgated centuries ago in the East. There are noticeable similarities in these doctrines which flourish in two different parts of the globe.

The Theory of Relativity, first put forth by the famous scientist

Einstein in an Essay in the Year Book of Physics in 1905, spread like lightening to all fields of thought, it "struck the mind of man here, there and everywhere, illuminated the natural sciences, coloured the philosophies, touched the novelists and the artists and played round the roots of social theory."¹ The Theory has been widely hailed as the most radical and paradoxical since the days of Copernicus.² It became a stumbling block to classical Physics, shook the foundations of classical Mechanics; its consequences extend far beyond physics. The eminent British philosopher *Bertrand Russell* in his 'The ABC of Relativity' writes, "It is generally recognised that he (Einstein) has revolutionised our conception of the physical world."³ Professor *A.N. Whitehead* points out that "The doctrine of Relativity affects every branch of natural science not excluding the biological sciences."⁴

After a great deal of opposition and criticism, the Theory of Relativity has been firmly established on clear and distinct mathematical principles. In spite of its abstruse nature and mathematical technicalities, the new conception as it seemed to strike at the root of our most solid notions, Relativity, a novel conception of the world, primarily a new system of physics demanding a revolutionary change of our views as regards matter, motion, energy, space, time and gravitation and elusive to our rigid ways of thinking, will become quite habitual and perhaps common place only to future generations, when rigid notions useful in ordinary life would be got rid of. A man in the street is familiar with the name of *Einstein* as it has some thing to do with the atomic bomb. Beyond this, it is simply a synonymous for the abstruse.

Syādvāda and Ahimsā—Ahimsā not only of physical life but also of intellectual outlook—are the corner-stones of Jainism. Syādvāda is a peculiar and distinctive doctrine of Jaina philosophy. It is an approach, a method, a device by the aid of which a thing is observed in its innumerable aspects from different points of view. "It

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1. Arthur Eddington : 'The Nature of the Physical World' (Introductory Note, p. VII).
 2. "The Theory of Einstein constitutes a revolutionary advance, comparable with that due to Copernicus, and seems equally likely to affect the direction of mathematical, physical and philosophical development."
(George David Birkheff : 'The Origin, Nature and Influence' of Reality'—Preface.)
 3. Russell : 'The ABC of Relativity', p. 1.
 4. 'The Principle of Relativity', p. 3.

is," says Warren, "a method of knowing or speaking of a thing synthetically."⁵ The nature of concrete things is extremely complex, they possess innumerable attributes and relations. "There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness. It does not deny the possibility of predication, though it disallows absolute or categorical predication. The dynamic character of reality can consist only with relative or conditional predication. Every proposition is true, but only under certain conditions, i.e., hypothetically."⁶

The apprehension of an object or a thing as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that from a particular standpoint is what is technically called 'naya' in Jainism. Every aspect or attribute of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of a thing. Hence 'naya' is a means of insight into the nature of reality. Theoretically, they are infinite in number since the attributes the Reals may possess are infinite but usually they are spoken of as seven. There are many different ways in which they are classified. According to one scheme, there are seven nayas, four of which refer to meanings or objects and the remaining three refer to words.⁷ "These nayas," says Prof. A. Chakravarti, "have an important place in the Anekāntavāda of the Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not in our every-day-speech but also in the language of the metaphysics and relation, universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background would result in practical inconvenience and physical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the anekānta aspect. Multi-faced reality may lead to 'multitude of descriptions.' Everyone of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant.

5. Warren : 'Jainism', p. 20.

6. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan : 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. I, p. 302.

7. The seven nayas are : Naigama, Saṅgraha, Vyavahāra, Ṛjusūtra, Śabda, Samabhirūḍha, Evambhuta naya.

'Naigamasangraha Vyavahāraṛjusūtrasabdā Nayāḥ (34) Adyaśabdau dvitribhedau (35) (Tattvārtha Sūtra)

The above mentioned seven nayas are found in the Agamas and in the Digambara books, while Siddhasena Diwakar accepts the last six leaving the first; viz., Naigama.

Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that this is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty frame work, then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient.⁸

Finite beings as we are, we do not have an immediate knowledge of an object in all its innumerable aspects that a Kevali (one who has attained Kevela Jnāna, i.e., an omniscient being) possesses. Such is the implication of the Theory of Relativity also. *Albert Einstein* says, 'We can only know the relative truth, the Absolute truth is known only to the Universal Observer.'⁹

Let us refer to certain examples that are given by Syādvāda and Relativity. We already had occasion to refer to one classical illustration of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each of these men laid their hands on a different portion of the elephant and tried to picture the whole animal as a winnowing fan, a big round pillar and so on. Here we see the case where the partial description of an animal leads to partial truth and this is due to defective perception but only the man who perceives the whole can recognise each of their descriptions as a partial truth. So too it is with our empirical knowledge. It is relative to the standpoint which one adopts in determining characters of the things perceived and so becomes fallacious if taken as absolute and entire. It is said that once two knights began to quarrel with each other because each maintained that the side he saw was the whole truth. Syādvāda or "the science of Assertion of Alternative Possibilities" is corrective of the fallacy into which the knights fell. Tom Smith, for example may be a son with reference to his father John Smith; he may be a father with reference to Willy Smith. Thus we see that two apparently contradictory attributes or characteristics of the same person, thing or event may be found to be true, if the trouble is taken to bear in mind the point of view adopted.

Prof. Albert Einstein makes use of illustrations. Let us refer to the event which, we say, is taking place today or just now or again that two events are simultaneous. "In pre-relativistic physics, time and space were separate entities. Specifications of time were independent of the choice of the space of reference. The Newtonian mechanics was relative with respect to the space of reference, so that, e.g. the statement that two non-simultaneous events happened at the

8. 'Panchāstikāya-Jaina Logic' (P. LXII-LXIII).

9. 'Cosmology—Old And New', p. 201.

same place had no objective meaning (that is, independent of space reference). But the relativity had no role in building up the theory. One spoke of points of space, as of instants of time, as if they were absolute realities. It was not observed that the true element of the space-time specification was the event specified by the four numbers X_1, X_2, X_3, t . The conception of same thing happening was always that of a four-dimensional continuum but the recognition of this was obscured by the absolute character of the pre-relativity time. Upon giving up the hypothesis of the character of time, particularly that of simultaneity, the four dimensionality of the time-space concept was immediately recognised.¹⁰ In other words, in old fashioned physics, the event or events were defined in the three dimensional Euclidean continuum, i.e. were determined by assigning three co-ordinates. It is necessary to understand the meaning of the word 'continuum' in order to grasp properly *Einstein's* picture of the Universe as a four dimensional space-time continuum. A continuum is something that is continuous. A ruler which is divided into inches and fractions scaled down to 1/16 of an inch is a one-dimensional space continuum. Theoretically, the interval separating any two points may still be further divided into an infinite number of arbitrarily small steps. We can take the surface of the sea as the illustration of a two-dimensional continuum. Latitude and longitude are the co-ordinate points which a sailor has to take into consideration to fix his position in his two-dimensional continuum, but an air- plane pilot to guide his plane successfully has to take into consideration his height above the ground besides longitude and latitude. The continuum of an air-plane pilot constitutes space as perceived by us, i.e., the space of our world is a three-dimensional continuum. In order to describe any physical event involving motion, we have not only to indicate its position in space but also to state how position changes in time. The flight of an air-plane can be pictured in a four-dimensional space-time continuum. So time is the fourth dimension. In any objective description of the universe the time dimension can no more be detached from the space dimension, though in our minds we tend to separate these dimensions the separation is purely subjective. The world is space-time continuum. All measurements of time—seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.—are really measurements in space relative to the sun, moon and stars; and conversely

10. Einstein : 'Meaning of Relativity', pp. 30-31.

measurements in space—latitude, longitude are dependent on measurements of time.

What Einstein emphasises is that there is neither absolute (independent of space of reference) relation in space, nor absolute relation in time between two events, but there is absolute (independent of the space of reference) relation in space-time. Considered from this four-dimensional space-time-continuum we must regard X_1, X_2, X_3, t as the four co-ordinate of an event in the four-dimensional continuum. To understand that the event which we say, is taking place just now, may not be so in different system; or again the two simultaneous occurrences of one and the same system may not be so in different systems, we should turn to the modern science of Astronomy. According to it, light travelling at the rate of 186, 284 miles (186 usually taken for convenience sake) a second, takes about 8 minutes to come to earth from the Sun but requires about 4.5 hours to travel from the sun to the Neptune as the distance from the Sun to the Earth is less than that from the Sun to the Neptune. The Sun and its eight planets and many asteroids and comets constitute our solar system, being a little colony amidst the immensely larger group of stars which we call 'Universe' and which the Astronomers refer to us the galaxy or the Gallic system. The distance of the Sun from the Earth is nearly 9,30,00,000 miles, and of stars from 4 light years to millions or even hundred and fifty millions of light years.¹¹ Thus our Earth is relatively near the Sun, and that is why the same event or the simultaneous events of the one system might seem to be occurring at different times in different nebulae. Thus the difference of views would be relative to the observer; and at the best, knowledge thus derived is only relative.

Saptabhaṅgī or the Doctrine of Seven Modes of forms occupies a very prominent place in Jaina logic. It means "a statement in seven different ways (Saptabhiḥ Prakāraih) of affirmation and negation with the use of the word Syāt (Syāchchabdālāñchitah), singly or jointly (Pṛthagbhūtaayoḥ Samuditayośca) without inconsistency such as that arising from conflict with Pratyakṣa as the result of inquiring (Prašnavāśāt), about each of the different predicates (Dharma of a thing such as Satva (existence), etc."¹²

In other words, it is the use in seven different ways of

11. A light year is the distance travelled by the light in a year. Light travels at the speed of 1,86,000 miles per second.

12. A. B. Dhruva : 'Syādvāda Mañjari'—Notes, p. 244.

judgements by which the different aspects of a thing can be affirmed and negated, severally and jointly, without self-contradiction. It explains every object or its attributes with reference to Svadavyakṣetrakālarūpa (own matter, place, time and form). Let us take a pot (ghaṭa) for example. A ghaṭa exists or is sat (real) with reference to its sva (own) dravyakṣetrakālarūpa; but does not exist or is asat (unreal) with reference to para (alien) dravyakṣetrakālarūpa. These 'is' and 'is not' (Asti and nasti) are relative; and it is from these two main that the remaining five, viz., syādaasti nasti syādavaktavya, syād nāsti avaktavya and syād asti nāsti avaktavya (relatively is and is not; relatively indescribable, relatively exists and unprelicable, relatively is not and indescribable and relatively is, is not and is indescribable) are derived.

"This doctrine," says *Dr. Radhakrishnan*, "insists on the correlativity of affirmation and negation. All judgements are double-edged in their character. All things are existent as well as non-existent (sadasadcitmakam). A thing is what it is and is not, what it is not....A thing which has nothing from which it can be distinguished is unthinkable. The absolute, devoid of distinctions within as well as without is truly unthinkable. For all things which are objects of thought 'are' in one sense and 'are not' in another."¹³

The critics point out that it is impossible for the contradictory attributes to co-exist in one and the same thing. Rāmānuja writes, "Contradictory attributes such non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, any more than light and darkness."¹⁴ It is time that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense but the Jains point out that the reality is complex and possesses innumerable attributes or aspects and so various judgements are true with regard to *different* view-points. *Dr. Bhandarkara*¹⁵ writes, "Being is not simple as Advaitins assert but complex and any statement about it is only part of the truth....what is meant by these seven modes is that a thing should not be considered as existing elsewhere, at all times, in all ways, and in the form of everything. It may exist in one place and not in another and at one time and not at another". So it becomes clear that it is not

13. *Dr. S. Radhakrishnan* : 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. I. pp. 393-4.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

15. *Dr. Bhandarkara* : 'Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in Bombay Presidency During the Year 1883-84', Bombay, 1887, p. 956.

‘Wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction,’ ‘Wanton paradox or a purposeless pun’.

It is sometimes branded as scepticism. Is it then expression of doubt or a mode of scepticism ? We must say at the outset that the charge is altogether unfounded due to the fact that there is no uncertainty whatsoever and that the various judgements are the result of the innumerable characters that the thing possesses. *Each assertion* is quite distinct and certain. Let us consider what *Hegel* and *Bradley* have to say in a similar context. *Hegel* says, “Reality is now this, now that; in this sense it is full of negations, contradictories and oppositions: the plant germinates, blooms, withers and dies; man is young, mature and old. To do a thing justice, we must tell the whole truth about it, predicate each of its contradictories and show how they are reconciled and preserved in the articulated whole which we call life of the thing.”¹⁶ *F.H. Bradley* writes, “Everything is essential, and yet one thing is worthless in comparison with other....” “Nowhere,” he continues, “is there even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter. There is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight,.....”¹⁷

According to *Joachim*, there is no judgement true in itself and by itself. “Every judgement,” says he, “as a piece of concrete thinking, is informed, conditioned and to some extent constituted by the apprecipient character of the mind....”¹⁸ He illustrates this point thus, “To the boy, who is learning the multiplication table, $3^2 = 9$ possesses probably a minimum of meaning. But to the arithmetician $3^2 = 9$ is perhaps a shorthand symbol for the whole science of Arithmetic as known at the time.”¹⁹ *Edmund Holmes* (In the Quest of Ideal) says : “Let us take the antithesis of the swift and the slow. It would be non-sense to say that every movement is either swift or slow. It would be nearer the truth to say that every movement is both swift and slow, swift by comparison with what is slower than itself, slow by comparison with what is swifter than itself.” (p. 21).

Sir Arthur Eddington Speaking about the relativity of distance says, “A distance as reckoned by an observer on one star is as good as

16. Thilly : ‘History of Philosophy’, p. 480.

17. Bradley : ‘Appearance and Reality’, p. 487.

18. Joachim : ‘The Nature of Truth’, p. 93.

19. Ibid.

the distance reckoned by an observer on the other star. We must note them to agree; the one is a distance relative to one frame, the other is a distance relative to another frame. Absolute distance, not relative to some special frame is meaningless." He says further, "A more familiar example of a relative quantity is 'direction' of an object. There is a direction of Cambridge relative to Edinburgh and another direction relative to London and so on. It never occurs to us to think of this as a discrepancy, or to suppose that there must be some direction of Cambridge (at present undiscoverable) which is absolute."²⁰ We shall cite one more example from *Eddington*, "You receive a balance-sheet from a public company and observe that the assets amount to such and such a figure. Is this true ? Certainly; it is certified by a chartered accountant. But is it really true ? Many questions arise, the real values of items are often very different from those which figure in the balance-sheet. I am not especially referring to fraudulent companies. There is a blessed phrase 'hidden reserves' and generally speaking the more respectable the company the more widely owes its balance-sheet deviate from reality."²¹

Lord Mahāvīra answered hundreds of questions on the basis of relative standpoints. He even explained the most fundamental problems of the universe in similar manner. Whether the atoms are permanent or not, he points out, they are and are not. They are permanent (nitya) with reference to substantiality (Dravyatya) but changing (anitya) with regard to its outward form.²² The same is said by the Lord with regard to Ātmā.²³

Albert Einstein speaks in a similar tone as regards natural states. He says, "Nature is such that it is impossible to determine absolute motion by any experiment whatever,"²⁴ In the words of *James Jeans*, "Rest and motion are merely relative terms. A ship which is becalmed is at rest only in a relative sense—relative to the earth; but the earth is in motion to the sun, and the ship with it. If the earth

20. 'The Nature of the Physical World', p. 36.

21. *Ibid*, p. 43.

22. Paramaṇu poggaleṇam bhante, Sāsae asāsae ? Goyamā, Siyasāsae Siya asāsae, Se kenathenam bhante, evam buchchai, siyasāsae, siya asāsae ? Goyam, Davvathayāe sāsae vannapanchavchim Jār siya sāsae,

—Bhagwati S'atak, 14-34.

23. Jivaṇam Bhante, kim sāsaya asāsaya ? Goyamā, Jīva siya sāsaya siya asāsaya. Se kenathenam bhante, Evam buchchai jīva siya sāsaya siya asāsaya ? Goyamā, Davvathayāe sāsaya bhāvathāyae asāsaya,

—*Ibid*, 7-2.

24. James Jeans : 'The Mysterious Universe', p. 78.

stayed in its course round the sun, the ship would become at rest in relation to the sun, but both would still be moving through the surrounding stars. Check the sun's motion through the stars and there still remains the motion of the whole galactic system of stars relative to the remote nebulae move towards or away from one another with speeds of hundreds miles a second or more; by going further into space. We not only find standard of absolute rest, but encounter great and greater speed of motion.'²⁵

There is no fixed standard in the Universe to judge the absolute motion of the earth or of any other moving system. Motion is a relative state; it can be detected only as a change of position with respect to another body. It is meaningless to speak of the motion of a single object removed from all the others.

Thus it becomes clear that according to the theory of Relativity, every object and every planet is static as well as moving. So too say the Syadvadins analogously of the world and the atoms. The atoms are both nitya and anitya, the world is eternal as well as changing (Sāśvata—Aśāśvata). It is surprising to note how similar is the device, the method, approach in these two theories—of the East and the West. Both these doctrines stress the relativity of standpoint in examining the object or its attributes. Reality is so complex and over intelligence so finite, limited that what we can have at the best is only relative truth and not absolute, eternal, indivisible truth. Truth is, in reality, only one; only thing is that there are different ways of attaining it. In other words, reality is many-sided and approaches to it are multifarious. It is impossible for the finite mind to have knowledge of complete truth and, therefore, relative truth itself is perfect knowledge for him.

Here the opponents may put fourth an objection and point out that what Syādvāda can offer is only relative or half truth and not the Ultimate eternal truth. *Dr. S.Radhakrishnan* remarks, "The theory of relativity (Syādvāda) cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute.....The Jainas admit that things are one in their universal aspect (jāti or kāraṇa) and many in the particular aspect (Vyakti or Kārya). Both these, according to them, are partial points of view. A plurality of reals is admittedly a relative truth. We must rise to the complete point of view and look at the whole with all the wealth of its attributes. If Jainism stops short with plurality which is at the best a relative and partial truth and does not

25. *Ibid*, p. 79.

ask whether there is any higher truth pointing to one which particularises itself in the objects of the world, connected with one another vitally, essentially and immanently, it throws overboards its own logic and exalts a relative truth into an absolute one.’²⁶ It seems to some that Syādvāda is an easy compromise which does not overcome the contradictions inherent in the opposed standpoints in a higher synthesis. It takes care to show that the truths of science of every-day-experience are relative and one-sided; but it leaves us in the end with the view that truth is a sum total of relative truths. A mere putting together of half-truths definite-indefinite cannot give us the whole truth.

Answering the charges, it should be pointed out that Syādvāda is (to use *Warren's* words) ‘the method of knowing or speaking of a thing synthetically’. Syādvāda itself is not truth but is a guide that helps us to reach the highest truth. By the aid of this doctrine, we can reconcile the contradictions that arise in ordinary experience. Besides relative truth, Jainism recognises Absolute what it terms Kevaljñāna by possession of which one would know truth²⁷ or have the perfect knowledge of all the objects in their entirety. Perhaps we may say the former is empirical truth (vyāvahārika-satya); while that latter is transcendental truth (pāramārthikasatya). In empirical realm, what we can have at the most is only relative truths from various view-points, as truth possesses numberless aspects (Anantadharmatmakameva tattvam); and there is no contradiction in the synthesis of contradictory concepts, viz., sattva, asattva and akartavya of one and the same subject as the opposites (i.e. different predicates) refer to different aspects of the same subject (upādhibheda). When we cannot have the Absolute Eternal Truth, these relative truths have significance.

We meet ‘asti-nāsti (is, is not) in *Albert Einstein's* Relativity Theory also. We shall take the weight of an object for instance. We say ordinarily that a certain object weighs 154 lbs., but relativity doctrine would point out it ‘is’ and ‘is not’ so. An object which weighs 154 lbs. at the equator would weigh 155 lbs. at north or south pole. This is due to difference of distance. Still more change of weight would be found when the velocity and position are taken into consideration. We may refer here to the famous illustration of the

26. Dr. S. R. : ‘Indian Philosophy’, Vol. I pp. 305-6.

27. Einstein too recognises this. Eddington says, We must look for absolute things which are then in the world, but things presented are mostly relative at their first sight.

'man in the lift'. Suppose that the man is in the lift with an apple in his hand and that the support breaks and down goes the man with ever-increasing velocity, falling freely. The man now tries to drop the apple held in the hand. The apple cannot fall more than it was doing already. It should be remembered that all the things contained in the lift are falling along with the lift. Consequently the apple remains poised by his hand. So he would think; but the observer outside the lift would regard the falling of the apple due to the law of gravity. Thus for the 'man in the lift' is that 'apples do not fall'. The Newtonian Law of gravitation is altogether absent in his scheme of laws of Nature. It should be borne in mind that *Einstein* accepts that law of gravitation for the observer outside here for the sake of illustration only.

The difference in weights of the object and in views with regard to Natural Laws in the above illustrations judgements which are nonetheless true if we only bear in mind the stand point from which they are made. A certain thing may be large in comparison with some subject say *X*, but it is small with regard to another say *Y*. Thus the same thing is said to be large and small but in comparison with different objects *X* and *Y*. Largeness and smallness of a thing is thus relative to the points of view adopted.

Eddington says, "I think we often make a distinction between what is true and what is really true. A statement which does not profess to deal with anything except appearances may be true, a statement which is not only true but deals with the realities beneath the appearances is really true."²⁸

Einstein even challenged the measurements and the length of classical dynamics. The lengths (distance between points in rigid bodies) usually measured in classical dynamics by a rod not independent of the system of co-ordinates adopted according to *Einstein's* view. *Einstein* showed that the change of directions makes for the difference in lengths. Thus lengths are relatively true in their own systems. The same is true of the movement relatively to the vast distances, it proceeds very slowly in the universe.

Thus the weights, lengths, motion are all relative to the points of view from which they are seen. None of them is absolute, i.e., cannot be regarded in the same way in different systems. Time, space, causation, motion, duration, mass, force, etc., are all relative and have

28. 'The Nature of the Physical-World', p. 43.

no absolute significance. They are not attributes of physical realities but are relations whose value changes with the observer's attitude to the object.

It now becomes clear that we can have relative truths on the basis of various points of view adopted. These relative truths are neither untrue, i.e. erroneous, nor imperfect. They are the result of what we experience in reality. In other words, they are the facts of experience and so cannot be denied. They are "complete truths from the stand-points adopted. When the modern scientists have come to accept the relativity of measurement only, we meet in Syādvāda truth itself divided into several kinds. In Sri Panhavaṅṅa Sūtra, we come across the ten division of truth itself. These ten divisions are : Janapada satya, Sammata satya, Nāma satya, Sthāpanā satya, Rūpa satya, Praṭīti satya, Vyavahāra satya, Bhāva satya, Yoga satya, and Upamā satya. We shall not go into their details. Moreover if somebody disagrees with the fact that an orange is small with reference to coconut and big with reference to grapes and says that the two contradictory aspects big and small cannot be predicated of one and the same thing or objecting to these two different kinds of judgement, he may say that both cannot be true, then we should ask him what is absolutely true with respect to orange except that it is small as well as big, from two different aspects ? Is it then not true to say that the orange is small and big with regard to two different things is 'complete', perfect, truth from the respective standpoints ?

We already referred to the criticisms and charges against Syādvāda. It is not that *Einstein's* theory of relativity did not meet any severe criticisms. It also has been criticised as 'arrant non-sense' or as 'a very silly basic error in Logic'. But in spite of the severe opposition and adverse criticisms, it has come to be established on solid foundations.

Finally one may ask as to what exactly is similar or common between these two doctrines of different hemispheres. One is purely physical (Bhautika), the other is purely spiritual (Adhyātmika). It is true that *Einstein's* Relativity is connected mostly with physics and that Syādvāda is the unique and central feature of Jaina darśana. But we should remember that Syādvāda is as much concerned with pudagala (matter) as with Atma (soul) and also that though Relativity is not extended beyond the science of physics, it need not be restricted to its own sphere. In fact Syādvāda as well as theory of

Relativity are the devices to determine the real nature of things. They are not phantoms of imagination or phantasm of mind but quite reliable practical devices of life. And here lies the similarity. It is not as we said earlier, that Syādvāda is only Ādhyātmika, as pudagala (matter) has a place in it as Atman has. Thus the subject of *Albert Einstein's* Relativity doctrine and of Syādvāda is common, viz., the study of material things from the atoms (paramāṇu) to the universe (Brahmāṇḍa). Moreover, the ever-widening gulf between philosophy and science has been bridged very successfully with the advent of this new theory of physics. In his 'Foundations of Indian Culture', *Śri Aurobindo* has remarked : "Even science itself is constantly arriving at conclusions which only repeat in the physical plane and in its language, truths which ancient India had affirmed from the standpoint of spiritual knowledge and in the language of Veda and the Vedānta." Can we not then say that Syādvāda, an important philosophical doctrine has reappeared in the realm of physics in the form of the theory of relativity which strikes at the root of all our conventional ways of representing the universe and its laws ? At least, it is to be accepted that Syādvāda is an important approach to truth, as is shown by the Relativity theory which has been firmly established on mathematical principles. The difference between the two is that Syādvāda has been formulated thousands of years ago; while Relativity principle has been very recently enunciated in the realm of physics by Einstein. But the underlying principle of investigation of truth, an approach to Reality in both is one and the same.

In man's struggle to understand the manifold of nature, we come across more and more exact systems distinguished by constantly increasing mathematical accuracy, yet it cannot be said that the results arrived at are final, rather they are starting points for new investigation. With the advancement of scientific thought it becomes increasingly clear that there is no mystery of the physical world which does not point to a mystery beyond itself. As *Lincoln Barnett* remarks, all high roads of the intellect, all by-ways of theory and conjecture lead ultimately to an abyss that human ingenuity can never span. With expansion of man's horizon, the fact that as the physician *Neils Bohr* puts it, "we are both spectators and actors in the great drama of existence" becomes more and more evident. Man is thus his own greatest mystery. The value of Syādvāda lies in this that it refuses to regard

the truth from any one particular angle as absolute, it lays stress to think about the fact from as many sides as possible. Syādvāda and Relativity are the devices which are helpful in our incessant quest for truth and so for as they assist us in determining the true nature of things, they shall continue to have importance in science and philosophy.²⁹

29. Gardner Murphy in his 'Main Currents of Modern Thought', Vol. 9, makes a significant observation : "We are in a position to verse a great many questions, to verse questions so grave and fundamental that we began to wonder if we even have a method for approaching an ultimate solution."

The Syādvāda & World Peace

V.G. NAIR

What can Jainism do for world peace is a question which is prominent to answer, at this critical moment when the world is standing on the crossroads of materialism and spirituality. Today the world is being tossed about in the storm of aggressive imperial motives, which is a heavy danger for world-peace. So let us concentrate our thought on the world peace.

Trumpet Call of Peace

Although the clouds of hatred and war are hovering over the whole world and the destructive bombs are being dropped to destroy innocent life, yet we are fortunate to hear the trumpet call of peace and the whole world is now out to celebrate the Anniversary of a Buddha's enlightenment. Here lies the hope for the humanity, for, it shows that the common people of the world are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of spiritual values of life and are feeling drawn towards the light that dawned from the East thousands of years ago for the enlightenment and emancipation of mankind. *Tirthankaras* and Buddhas preached a whole Truth and led the world towards the Goal of Nirvāna.

World Led by Fraction-Men : A Danger

The world requires these whole and holy personalities, the omniscient Teachers and their blessed teachings once again. But the pity is that we find today only "*Fraction-men.*" The world is too full of such men. Our World Jain Mission's representative in U.S.A., Mr. Wayne H. Steele, is right in emphasizing the truth when he writes : "Many, if not

most, of our law-makers and judges and other public officials (in whose hands our lives and fortunes lie) are fractionmen. Many, if not most, of our teachers (even including many college professors of full rank) and preachers; many, if not most, of the writers of our books, magazines, and newspapers; of our platform and radio speakers; of our movie directors and theatrical managers; of our reformers; of our counsellors, on whom we rely for advice in emergencies (as high school principal or a 'successful' friend of the family, etc); in short, many of the leaders of our race are fraction-men. Many a life tragedy is owing to these "good, well meaning" people. They are men who should, of all men, be whole-men, men of complete basic knowledge of life and the environment. But they too often are not, depressing though the fact may be. Instead of following Philosophers and well balanced professors, men of whole knowledge, we allow fraction-men to lead us and rule us, although our very life and happiness depend on it. Undoubtedly, it is because we ourselves are such fraction-men that we do not have, as yet, any standards or conceptions for recognising a whole men."

Wars are no Remedy and Cannot Bring Peace

Friends, it is a problem which confronts the whole world. We are led by fraction men, who are mad after their cramped views and selfish motives of acquisition and fashion. They are quivering like cane with the fear of various nations, because they themselves are not sincere and loving to them. Out of this false fear they are engaged in getting their respective nations ready and competent in latest nuclear and other barbarous weapons. But we have seen that last two world-wars which were said to have been fought in order to establish peace, have not brought peace. The peace is still a golden apple of Hercules, which can only be achieved by peaceful but Herculean efforts based on blessed *Pancha Śīla*. Fire cannot extinguish fire, so wars can never end wars. They create fractions and fights. So let us all endeavour to end this havoc of fraction. It is the first ingredient factor for worldpeace.

The Method of Synthesis.

In this critical state of things, Jainism offers an humanitarian method of synthesis. The Tirthaṅkaras taught this sublime method thousands of years ago and unfurled the flag of universal spiritual unity on which were written the golden words, *Ahimsā Paramo Dharmah*

(Non-violence is the highest religion). Lord Varddhamāna was the last of these blessed Tīrthānkaras, who proclaimed:—

“*Eyante nirvekkhe no sījahi viviha bhāvagam dabbam,
Taṃ tahāvā aneymāidi bujjhahā siya aneyantam.*”

“If one ignores the various other attributes of a substance and sticks to one aspect only, one will never realise the truth of it. Therefore it is necessary to grasp fully well the significance and meaning of *Anekānta* (logic), as defined by the prefix *syād* (somehow)”

The Jain conception of *Anekānta* (manysided viewpoints), in fact, is essential to end the fractions which rise owing to self-conceit of only one-sided knowledge of a thing or problem. Fraction-men never think in a relative aspect of a question: unfortunately they are swayed by their particular motives and halftruths. This creates a chaos in intellectual world and results in different kind of ‘isms’-as we see today rampant in the whole world. On the other hand, the principle of *Anekānta* teaches us the right method to realise whole truth in its varied aspects and thereby understand the viewpoints of others. We cannot ignore the reality which points out that every living being is self-centered and he is independent to think and act. The peculiarity of *Anekānta* is that it rationalises the thought and equips it with the spirit of synthesis. Therefore the *Anekānta* principle of Jain thought offers the key to the hidden realms of truth in various systems of thought and to whole truth of reality: thus it is an unfailable instrument for world peace and world unity. It will create a society of rational men, instead of fraction-men, who having realised the oneness of life in the midst of diversity, will act and serve not only human beings but every living being. *Anekānta* if practised will turn the Fraction-men into Cosmic-man.

Confluence of Religious Thoughts

The Jaina tradition is very instructive in this respect. We learn from it that some people approached Lord Mahāvīra, who was a contemporary of Śākyamuni Gautama and was called *Sarvajña* (omniscient) *Sarvadarśi* (Allseeing) Nigantha Nātaputta by the Buddhists, when He was staying on Mt. Vipula at Rājagṛha and questioned him on the utility of religious discussion. The purport of the Lord’s reply was that they are always welcome in order to realise the whole truth, but the condition is that they should be carried on in a friendly spirit simply to realise the truth of reality. It is indeed bad to strive for the glory of one’s religion and try to belittle the religions of others. The Jains have

never spread their religion at the point of sword. Those who did so never realised the truth. The best method of discussion according to the teachings of Mahāvira, is to consider a problem in its three aspects, viz. (1) *sva-samaya-vaktavyatā* to establish one's own viewpoint, (2) *para-samaya-vaktavyatā* to establish the opposite viewpoint; and (3) *tadubhaya vaktavyatā* to synthesise and establish the viewpoints of both on a rational basis.

Here I would like to refer to the opening proceedings of this seminar. We have the great Āchārya Tulsī amidst us, who gave us to understand that Jainism could not be spread all over the world owing to some restrictions on the movements of Jain monks. While on the otherhand our learned friends Dr. Nag and Prof. Harimohan Bhattāchārya gave us to understand that Jainism once reached beyond the borders of India., Here if we apply *Tadubhaya Vaktavyata*: We can reconcile these viewpoints. Certainly it is difficult for Jain monk to move about easily; but since the Jain monk is inspired by the उत्साह गुण enthusiasm of the soul, he is ever enthusiastic to do a right effort श्रम for his own good and for the good of all. Āchārya Tulsī himself have set on example of it by covering a distance of 200 miles in a few days only in order to bless us with his learned discourse. Moreover we remember also that there is a rule for Jain monks which restricts their stay at a place for longer period: the Jain monks should remain moving for the sake of Dharma. Our *Purānas* are full of examples in which Jain monks are mentioned to have gone all over the world. It is the reason that we find some evidence of the prevalence of Jainism beyond India, in Ceylon, Afghanistan, China and Greece. We, the Digambara Jaina, on the day of *Kṣamāvanī*, read *Phoolmālā* which mentions that Jains came from China and Mahāchina to take part in it. In such cases the *Anekānta* logic is of great help. But we must also remember that this principle can only be applied to those thoughts which are based on any aspect of Truth and it will reconcile them only.

Irrational Ideas Cannot be Reconciled

As a matter of fact, if a certain viewpoint is not based on any aspect of truth it cannot be reconciled. Ignorance and fear are the factors which keep the man away from the realisation of truth. Ahimsā, according to Jainas, is the very characteristic of soul and one should not be afraid of it in any sphere and tune of life. It creats harmony in life, while *himsa* destroys the same. Vegetarianism is an outer form of Ahimsā: So it is instrumental to create harmony and peace in the world; for through it

the world could accumulate the good karmas. On the contrary *himsa* in any form violates the harmony of life and atmosphere as well, which results in chaos and warfare. Vegetarianism is an essential factor for creating an harmonious feeling and to end the animal instinct in man. So the fear that vegetarianism might enhance the problem of food is baseless and it cannot be reconciled.

Reconciliation of Philosophical & Other Viewpoints

How useful is this principle for the reconciliation of different viewpoints, is evident from the example of a discussion of soul under its purview. The Jain belief is that the soul is *nitya* (eternal) and *anitya* (transitory) at the same time in its worldly existence. The Buddhists hold that it is everchanging and non-eternal. The theory of *anattā* is the acceptance of soul but in a negative form. Because we find clear references to Soul in the saying of the Buddha. For instance while on his way from Banaras to Uruvela the Buddha met a youngman who was searching his mistress and enquired of her from him. The Buddha's reply is remarkable. He said, "What think ye ? Were it not better ye sought the self (*attānamgaveseyathā*) rather than the woman ?" (Vinaya i. 23) But in Buddhist philosophy great stress is given on the everchanging-becoming aspect of it. Here if we consider both viewpoints under the light of *Tadubhaya-Vaktavyatā* we can reconcile them. In this synthetical process, one has to take into consideration two different viewpoints. viz: *dravyārthika*: (realistic) and *paryāyārthika* (practical), which are called *nyayas* in Jainism.

Now according to the realistic viewpoint, the soul is eternal, because its uncompounded simplicity does not permit of change; hence the philosophers who hold this belief are right if they consider the soul in its essentiality. On the other hand, those who believe that the soul is ever changing are also right from the practical viewpoint, since the soul loses its purity because of desires and ambitions and because it is imprisoned in the body as a result of one's actions. Jain thought, thus, reconciles the two extreme views and offers the message of immortality and self-perfection, which is similar to the one found in R̥g Veda: "That which is immortal in mortals and possessed of truth is a god and established inwardly as an energy working out in our divine powers. Become uplifted, O Strength, pierce all veils, manifest in us the things of the Godhead."

Thus Jainism furnishes the only platform where all the different viewpoints could meet and reconcile with each other, so far as

rationally possible. So we may style it as the “Confluence of Thoughts.”

Sevenfold Logic

If we cling to *Ekāntavāda* (onesided absolutism) we only create fractions; but if we adhere to *Anekāntavāda* we would be creating harmony and unity. This logic of Jainas has been developed in the sevenfold *Syādvāda* logic—the different forms of predicative judgment, regarding the same object and is as follows:—

1. *Syād-asti*: somehow a substance exists. (Positive).
2. *Syān-nāsti*: somehow a substance does not exist. (Negative).
3. *Syād-asti-nāsti*: somehow a substance exists and does not exist (Synthetical).
4. *Syād-avaktavyam*: Somehow a substance is indescribable (i.e. it is impossible to describe a thing without adopting any particular standpoint or the thing is beyond sense perception).
5. *Syād-asti avaktavyam*: somehow a substance exists but is indescribable.
6. *Syān nāsti-avaktavyam*: somehow a substance does not exist and is indescribable.
7. *Syād-asti nāsti-avaktavyam*: somehow a substance exists and does not exist and is indescribable.

According to *Syādvāda* logic everything is related with every other thing and this relation involves the emergence of a rational quality. Relation is possible only if the terms are dependent on one another and dependence is always mutual. Thus Jain Logic is helpful in creating a cosmic outlook.

East and West

World is one from its very existence; but when we view it from the negative i.e. *syānnāsti* viewpoint we find it divided into East and West. Comparatively East and West though differ in outer aspects of culture etc., yet the basic spirit of the both is the self-same humanity. Third viewpoint synthesises them and the past history of East and West is a witness to this fact, because we find them both inter-related to each other since a hoary antiquity. But if we turn to consider this question according to the fourth viewpoint, we cannot demarcate the line of East

and West: it is indescribable because a East can easily be fused in West in consideration to outer limits. Under the relative consideration the cultures of East and West can be inter-mingled, though one lays great stress on spirituality and the other on materialism. Spirituality is as good a reality as materialism and they possess their importance and utility in their own spheres. They are neither good nor bad. Ofcourse their application to life is what matters. Considering the both cultures under the light of the fifth standpoint, they do exist in their peculiar form and utility but their precise sphere of existence and domain is indescribable; hence it is wrong to presume that both cannot be reconciled. From the sixth standpoint the same truth has been emphasised but in a negative indescribable mode. The seventh standpoint offers us an universal outlook of synthetical nature. It is obvious from it that Eastern and Western cultures do exist equally in their human spheres and are different in certain respects, yet the demarcation of their spheres and their outer application is indescribable. The human nature is the same in all climes and in all times. Therefore they can be interfused in each other as being two aspects of human nature which is a quality in itself. Thus we can develop the outlook and spirit of a cosmic-man in ourselves by adhering to the rules of the Jain logic.

University of Ahimsa And Anekānta

As a matter of fact, *Syādvād* logic saturated with cooling principle of Ahimsā is applicable to solve every problem of humanity and it can be applied in order to end the present crisis of the world. Peace is something which the people of the world eagerly want, but which they do not know how to secure. Fear and ignorance are the causes which kindle that flame of hatred in man's heart and fractions cause war. Jainism provides two remedies for it which are Ahimsā and Anekānta. The nations of today would do good to humanity if they acquire the Right Knowledge in the light of *Syādvāda* logic, which enlightens men about the apparent difference and reconciles them under the garb of spirituality. This would lead the nations to observe Ahimsā and make them aware of the real kinship of all souls. Then and then alone the world will abound with whole men; who will eagerly support the principle of *Pañca Śīla* in international matters.

Dr. Kalidas Nag, a vetaran advocate of Ahimsā and worldpeace, realised the importance of the teaching of Ahimsā and Anekānta and moved the first Conference of Ahimsā held at Indore under the

auspicious of the world Jain Mission ten years ago, to adopt the resolution for the establishment of a University of Non-Violence. He asserts again the same demand when he writes : “And now that peace is again threatened by another disastrous global war, we may seek world co-operation in the cause of Ahimsā. The finest monument to the memory of the architect of Indian freedom would be a University of Non-violence maintained by the University Grants Commission and supported by the Gāndhī Smāarak Nidhi. It would benefit not only India and Asia but the whole world hankering after peace and security, both denied us by our exploiting economics and bellicose politics. Both these disruptive forces could be controlled, if we could plan a broad humanistic education with non-possessiveness (*aparigrha*) and Non-violence (under the right knowledge of Anekānta) as guiding principles. May the world listen to the eternal Voice of India. *Ahimsā Paramo Dharmah* (Non-violence is the supreme virtue).”



