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
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**ST PRINCIPLES** ❀  

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**OF THE**  

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**JAINA PHILOSOPHY** ❀



BY

**Hirachand Liladhar Jhaveri.**



*Jaina Vividha Sahitya Shastra Mala No. 5.*

THE  
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE  
JAINA PHILOSOPHY

BY  
HĪRĀCHAND LĪLĀDHAR JHAVERĪ

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY  
L. D. BARNETT, M. A., LIT. D., (LONDON).

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**Second Edition.**

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VIRA SAMVAT }  
2444.

PRICE TEN ANNAS.

{ A. D. 1918.

PRINTED BY

Pt. Atma Ram Sharma at the George Printing Works and Published  
by Pt. V. G. Joshi, the Hon. Manager of Shree Jaina Vividha  
Sahitya Shastramala Office, Benares City.





अ० सौ० मिसिस माणिकवाई हीराचंद भवेरी;

जन्म संवत् १९३७ ]

[ देहोत्सर्ग सं० १९६६.

To  
MANEKBAI,

*My deceased and ever-lamented Wife,  
who, after having helped me for the last  
fourteen years in the prosecution of my  
studies and having unselfishly encouraged  
me to visit England in order to further  
extend my knowledge, breathed her last  
during my absence, this little Book is  
most sorrowfully and most affectionately  
dedicated.*

H. L. JHAVERI.



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# PREFACE.

*(To the Second Edition.)*

The very name of the SHASTRA-MALA clears our aim. We think that a succinct summary of Jaina Metaphysics and Logic in English, as that of Mr. H. L. Jhaveri deserves a wide circulation. We now, therefore, with the kind permission of Mr. Jhaveri, place the Second Edition of his First Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, before the public. We do not dare to praise this little book at this stage any more, as so many western scholars have already spoken about its usefulness. If this publication renders any service to the students of the Jaina Philosophy, our attempt will have become fruitful.

BENARES :  
*January 1918.* }

V. G. JOSHI,  
Hony. Manager,  
SHREE V. J. S.  
*Shastra Mala.*

## PREFACE.

(*To the first Edition.*)

THIS little book will explain itself. How I came to write it, may here be fittingly mentioned. While taking what is known as 'the Indian Course' of study, as arranged by Professor Lees Smith, M. A., M. P., at the London School of Economics (University of London), as a student of the Jain community of India, I received from home a sad communication, the announcement of the premature death of my beloved wife; and without completing my work in London I was about to return home, when a friend, consoling me, urged that *all that happens is for the best*. In a few days the same maxim came to me from my GURU CHARITRAVIJAYAJI in a letter of consolation. I began to think how good could be brought about on the occasion of my bereavement; from conversation with some of my European friends, it seemed that an outline of the Jain Philosophy was wanting in English, and a publication such as the present would be of some use. I thereupon compiled this little book in my time of mourning. If anyone is at all benefited by reading it, then some good will have grown out of my misfortune, and the maxim will have been confirmed.

I informed my GURU PRAVARTAKA SRI KANTI-VIJAYAJI of my proposed work, and to assist me he favoured me with a copy of the *Nayapradipa*, and made some kind suggestions as to the nature of the book to be produced; for these things I am deeply grateful to him.

I have to acknowledge with thanks the assistance given me by Mr. F. W. Thomas, M. A., Ph. D.; Professor Hermann Jacobi, Ph. D., of Bonn, a most eminent authority on the Jain Philosophy; and a French scholar, Monsieur Armand Guerinot, Docteur es Lettres, all of whom kindly read through my rough notes and made useful suggestions, adding their opinions on the little book, which opinions will be found quoted elsewhere.

I sincerely thank Mr. L. D. Barnett, M. A., Litt. D., who has kindly written a small introduction and has read the proofs. Further, my sincere thanks are due to Mr. (and Mrs.) Herbert Warren for their help in the compilation.

Any hints for improvements will be thankfully received. The reader's indulgence will excuse any errors or shortcomings.

HIRACHAND L. JHAVERI.

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  
(UNIVERSITY OF LONDON).

June, 1910.

## INTRODUCTION.

In several important respects the theology of the Jain Church differs from the other great Hindu schools, representing a more ancient and in some cases an independent standpoint, which has a peculiar interest to the student of the history of thought. The divergence is strongly marked in the case of the Jain system of logic, which has a peculiar character of its own. The three pillars of Jain doctrine are the classification of being, the *Saptabhangi* or sevenfold mode of predication, and the *nayas* or modes of conception. The second of these seems to have been discovered by Mahavira, the founder of modern Jainism for whose dialectical warfare it furnished a powerful weapon, and the third may be attributed in its principles to him, while the first was apparently derived from the earlier school of Parsvanatha, on which Mahavira based his doctrine. A succinct summary of this scholastic system has hitherto been wanting in English, and Mr. Jhaveri's able attempt to supply the need will, I trust, meet with the success that it deserves, both in Europe and in India.

L. D. BARNETT.

LONDON.

*June 7, 1910.*

# OPINIONS OF SOME OF THE WESTERN SCHOLARS.



INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY,  
WHITEHALL, S. W.,  
*May 18, 1910.*

I have read with interest your Introduction to the Jain Metaphysics and Logic, and I think that its publication would be very useful to European and Indian Students, and to other persons wishing to become acquainted with the outlines of the system, which they would hardly find elsewhere so completely expounded.

(Sd.) F. W. THOMAS.



BONN.  
*May 25, 1910.*

. . . . .  
. . . . .  
My impression is that your treatise gives a correct and clear exposition of the principal tenets of Jain Philosophy, and that it will be very useful to European readers interested in the matter . . . . .

(Sd.) H. JACOBI.

19, RUE DE BOULAINVILLIERS,  
PARIS XVI.

*Sunday evening, May 29, 1910.*

. . . In my opinion this small book will be of great utility to every student of Jainism. It is very clearly composed and written. Especially the Logical methods of knowledge (*Syadvada* and *Nayas*) are of interest.

(Sd.) A. GUERINOT.

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LONDON, 1910.

This little book on the Jain Philosophy is the first that has been published in Europe by a born Jain. It has had the approval of the four distinguished Western scholars who are mentioned in the preface, and should be of value to students of philosophy and of Jain literature both in the West and in the East.

(Sd.) HERBERT WARREN.

---

PARIS.

*July 5th, 1910.*

“Has become a very pretty, charming, and fairly printed small book.

.....It is most clearly composed and will be useful. I like chapters III-VII much."

(Sd) Dr. A. GUERINOT.

---

GLASGOW,  
*July 28th, 1910.*

".....the book of Mr. Jhaveri. I am very much delighted to have such a book in hand.....I think that he has dealt with the outline of our Jain Philosophy in a very succinct and nice summary."

(Sd.) BANARSI LAL GARR.

---

PISA, ITALY.  
*August 17, 1910.*

"...but Mr. Jhaveri's book (for which I thank you very much) waits at Florence, where I shall return in October. Then I will read it and write a notice upon it in the Giornale of our Asiatic Society."

(Sd.) P. E. PAVOLINI.

---

UPSALA, SWEDEN.  
*August 20th, 1910.*

"I found it a very good introduction to the study of Jain Philosophy.....I beg you to bring my best



compliments to Pandit H. L. Jhaveri. I hope I can at sometime send him some better reward for his courteousness.

(Sd.) Dr. J. CHARPENTIER.

---

8, NORTH MOOR ROAD,  
*Oxford, 1st September 1910.*

“I have read Mr. Jhaveri’s First Principles” with the greatest interest. The lucid way in which he has been able to compress in such a small space the Metaphysics and Logic of the Jains is quite admirable.”

“Jainism deserves to be as widely known in Europe as Buddhism.”

(Sd.) Dr. RUDOLF HOERNLI.

---

FLORENCE,  
*August 1910.*

“I have looked it over and found it useful and interesting.”

(Later from Montagnana) *September 29th, 1910.*

“It is very interesting. It is besides the first (and well made) attempt of the kind. I shall give notice of

it in the next "Bolletino Bibliografia" of "Reveta deyli Studi Orientali" of Rom."

(Sd.) Prof. A. BALLINI.

---

St. PETERSBURG.

*September 10th, 1910.*

"I read it with the greatest interest. I wrote this "gentleman (Mr. Jhaveri) a letter to-day."

(Sd.) Dr. N. MIRONOW, Ph. D.

---

BUTI, PISA, ITALY.

*September 1910.*

"...the most valuable little book.....Especially the सप्तमही-नय it is explained with a clearness which I have never found in other works."

(Sd.) Prof. F. Belloni Filippi.

---

GROSSBANCHLITY.

*October 1910.*

".....is a very lucid and practical treatise on the matter it deals with."

(Sd.) Dr. J. HERTEL.

## **Journal Asiatique, Septembre-Octobre 1910.**

H. L. JHAVERI.

*The first Principles of the Jain Philosophy.—Londres, 1910.*

M. Jhaveri est un esprit clair. Son petit livre, fait de notions précises et nettes, constitue une excellente introduction à la métaphysique et à la logique jainas.

\* \* \* \* \*

Il est modest et sans prétentions. Mais il contient beaucoup de choses, et d'excellentes choses. Il sera utile à tous ceux qui le liront. Les uns, familiers avec les doctrines jainas, seront heureux de les y trouver formulées avec précision. Les autres y puiseront des notions sûres et facilement assimilables.

————— A. GUERINOT.

## **From Journal Asiatic, September-October 1910.**

H. L. JHAVERI.

*The first Principles of the Jain Philosophy.—London, 1910.*

Mr. Jhaveri is a clear thinker. His little book makes some clear notions and constitutes an excellent introduction to the Jain Metaphysic and Logic. . . .

\* \* \* \* \*

It is modest and without pretentions; but it contains many beautiful and excellent things. It will be useful to those who will read it. Those familiar with the Jain doctrines will be pleased to find them so precisely formulated. Others will get sure and easily assimilable notions about them.

A. GUERINOT.

## WORKS CONSULTED.

THE NAYAPRADIPA.

THE SYADVADAMANJARI.

THE SAPTABHANGI TARANGINI.

THE TATTVARTHADHIGAMASUTRAM.

THE NAVATATTVA.

THE KARMGRANTHA.

# THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY.

ॐ

नमोऽर्हत्सिद्धाचार्योपाध्याय सर्वसाधुभ्यः ॥

---

अन्तरङ्गं महासैन्यं समस्तजनतापकम् ।

दलितं लीलया येन केनचित्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥ १ ॥

समस्तवस्तुविस्तारविचारापारगोचरम् ।

वचो जैनेश्वरं वन्दे सूदिताखिलकल्मषम् ॥ २ ॥

( सिद्धिर्षिः )

---

उदधाविव सर्वसिन्धवः

समुदीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ दृष्टयः ।

न च तासु भवान् प्रदृश्यते

प्रविभक्तासु सरित्स्ववोदधिः ॥

( सिद्धसेनदिवाकरः )

## CHAPTER I.

### ON SUBSTANCES OR **Dravyas**.

ACCORDING to the Jain philosophy the universe is not created and not kept in order by any one individual being or authority (God). Every soul after having reached its highest state (*moksha*) is called in Jainism *Paramatman*, which can be roughly translated by the English word 'God.' The highest being is a person, and not an impersonal, characterless or qualityless being.

In the Jaina philosophy that which forms the universe is substance (*dravya*).

Substance may be defined, from several points of view—

1. Substance (*dravya*) is that which ever exists. As substance the universe is without beginning and without end.

2. Substance (*dravya*) is that which is the subject of qualities (*gunas*) and modifications (*paryayas*).

3. Substance (*dravya*) may be defined as that which has origination, destruction, and permanence.

4. Substance (*dravya*) is that which performs special functions.

The first definition is from the point of view of the unchanging nature of substance (the *dravya* point of view); e.g. a soul which is now embodied as a cat may in its next life be embodied as a dog, man, insect, or what not. Yet in spite of these changes the individual soul is as soul the same all the time.

The second definition is from the point of view of the modifications (*paryayas*) of substance. ('Modifications' will be explained in the chapter on *Paryayarthika-nayas*.)

The third definition is from the point of view of both the unchanging and the changing natures of substance, taken together. When the unchanging nature of any substance is considered, it is the permanent (*dravya*) point of view; and when the origination and destruction of things are considered, then it is from the point of view of the changing nature of substance (*paryaya*) point of view. (See the chapter on *Paryayarthika-nayas*.)

The fourth definition is from an ordinary practical point of view. (This point of view is illustrated under the *Evambhuta-naya*.)

Substances are classified under the six heads given below.

Any given substance or thing (*dravya*) has qualities

common to itself and to other things (*samanya-guna*), and natures common to itself and to other things (*samanya-svabhava*); also any given substance or thing has qualities peculiar to itself (*visesha-gunas*) and natures peculiar to itself (*visesha-svabhavas*). These are omitted here for brevity.

Qualities belong to things (*gunin*), natures belong both to qualities (*gunas*), and things (*gunin*).

The six kinds of substances are—

1. *Dharmastikaya* ;
2. *Adharmastikaya* ;
3. *Akasastikaya* ;
4. *Pudgalastikaya* ;
5. *Jivastikaya* ;
6. *Kala*.

The termination *astikaya*\* in the first five substances means that the substance is a collection of indivisible, inseparable parts [*paradesas*]. The sixth [*kala*] is not really a substance, but for the sake of convenience it is considered as such, though only figuratively.

1. *Dharmastikaya* is a kind of ether which acts as the fulcrum of motion. It enables animate beings [*jiva*] and inanimate things [*ajiva*] to move; that is

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\* The word *kaya* means a collection of *pradesas*, or parts. *Astikaya* means that which has a collection of parts.



to say, it is the accompanying cause [*hetu*] of the motion of moving beings and things, as water is to a swimming fish.

2. *Adharmastikaya* is a kind of ether which acts as the fulcrum of rest. It enables beings and things to be at rest in the sense of not moving; so it is the accompanying cause [*hetu*] of the stationariness of beings and things which are at rest, as a tree is to a fatigued traveller.

*Akasastikaya*, space, is that which gives their place to other substances. It contains the other substances, but does not itself need to be contained; that is to say, its nature is to contain other substances, but not to be contained. It is extended in all directions without any limit.

4. *Pudgalastikaya*, or inanimate, inorganic, insentient matter, is that substance which has the property of being increased and decreased. It exists in various forms. All these forms are made up of atoms; the atom, therefore, is the substantial [*upadana*] cause of all *pudgala*. Each of these atoms is a unit in itself, not made up of any other units, and is eternal.

5. *Jivastikaya*, or sentient being. It is that substance whose characteristic is knowledge [*chetana*]. It has the nature of knowing all things, in all places,

and at all times. In the embodied living being, however, this knowledge is largely obscured by a number of foreign energies [*karma*], which the living being has in combination with itself from infinite time past, and which, during its sojourn in this mundane world, it is continuously generating. These energies keep it [soul] in the mundane world, preventing it from existing as a free being. It generates these energies by reason of its contact with matter. This is discussed in the chapter on the *Tattvas*.

6. *Kala*, or time, is figuratively a substance [*dravya*]; it is that which is the cause of the oldness or newness of a thing, or anteriority or posteriority of a thing's condition. Time is a substance only by attribution [*upachara*] from the practical [*vyavahara*] point of view, because it is measured by the duration of the states of substances.

As mentioned above (5, *Jivastikaya*), the characteristic quality of the soul (and it is true also of our other qualities) is obscured by the soul's bondage with certain energies foreign to itself (*karmas*), which keep the soul in an embodied state. Now, an embodied state suggests a free or liberated state. Regarding these two possible states of the soul, there is the fact that souls (*jivas*) do exist; there is the fact that inanimate matter (*pudgala*) exists: souls draw matter

towards themselves (*asrava*), and assimilate the matter into their own being (*bandha*); thus the embodied state of the soul is perpetuated. Now, if soul and matter are to be entirely and permanently separated from each other, the influx of matter into the soul must be stopped [*samvara*], the matter already in combination with the soul must be removed [*nirjara*] and this accomplished, soul is for evermore free and in the full enjoyment of all its own natural qualities [*moksha*]. These seven points—*jiva*, *ajiva*, or *pudgala*, *asrava*, *bandha*, *samvara*, *nirjara*, and *moksha*—form the seven basic principles of life [*tattvas*].

The *tattvas* are concerned with the relation of that *dravya* which is called soul to matter. •

## CHAPTER II

### ON PRINCIPLES OR **Tattvas**.

THE seven principles are—

1. Living beings or souls (*jiva*);
2. Matter or that which is not soul or living being [*ajiva*];
3. The inflow of matter into souls or living beings [*asrava*];

4. The absorption of matter into the soul [*bandha*].
5. The stopping of the inflow of matter into the soul [*samvara*];
6. The gradual removal from the soul of the matter already in combination with the soul [*nirjara*];
7. The complete removal of matter from the soul, or in other words the absolute liberation of the soul [*moksha*].

If merit [*punya*] and demerit [*papa*], the results produced by the varying combinations of soul and matter, be considered as separate principles instead of being included, as they are here, under *bandha*, there will be nine principles. Some maintain that there should only be two principles—[1] soul and [2] everything that is not soul; the other principles being readily included in either of these two; but, as it is here our purpose to consider the two conditions of soul, *viz.* embodied and liberated, we must enumerate at least seven, if not nine.

Souls in their mundane condition are combined with non-soul or matter; we have to consider the path by which matter comes towards or flows into the soul [*asrava*]; the way in which these two, matter and soul, combine with each other [*bandha*]. Hence, in order that the soul may be finally and absolutely liberated,

the inflow into it of the matter must be stopped [*samvara*]; then the matter already in combination with the soul must be gradually removed [*nirjara*], and when this is accomplished the soul has become free from matter [*karma*]. This condition of the soul is known in the Jain philosophy as *moksha* or *nirvana*.

The last five of the above-named seven principles are but the different states produced by the varying degrees of combination and separation of the first two, soul and non-soul.

*Jiva*, which is translated sometimes 'living being' and sometimes 'soul', is defined as 'knowing being'; its differentia is knowledge, or consciousness, or awareness. *Jiva*, or the soul, has eight natural qualities which are not found in other substances; they are—

1. Unlimited knowledge [*jnana*];
2. Unlimited undifferentiated knowledge [*darsana*];
3. Freedom from pain and pleasure [*avyabadha*];
4. Right conviction, right knowledge, and right conduct [*samyaktva*];
5. Eternal life [*akshaya-sthiti*];
6. Formlessness [*arupi*];

7. Equality of status, *i. e.* neither high-born nor low-born [*aguru-laghu*];

8. Infinite capacities of activity [*virya*].

The qualities of the soul are infinite or innumerable, but only these eight are mentioned here because the subject of discussion here is the eight *karmas*. The qualities of the soul are, in the mundane world [*samsara*], obscured by the foreign elements or energies in combination with the soul [*karmas*]. There are eight *karmas* which respectively obscure the above-named eight qualities of the soul. These eight *karmas* are enumerated under *bandha*.

Living beings or souls (*jiva*) are divided into (1) embodied (*samsarin*), (2) liberated (*mukta*). The embodied living beings are again subdivided into; (a) stationary beings, like vegetable lives, etc. (*stha-vara*), having only one sense, the sense of touch (*sparsa*), and (b) moving living beings (*trasa*), having two or more of the five senses. There are further subdivisions, but to avoid prolixity they are not given here.

The second class of beings, those who are liberated, are figuratively divided into fifteen classes according to the nature of their final embodied condition.

The second principle is non-soul (*ajiva*), the

characteristics of which are, in all respects, the opposite of souls.' It is subdivided into: *dharma*, *adharma*, *pudgala*, *akasa*, and *kala*. These have been explained under the heading of substance (*dravya*); see Chapter I.

The third principle is the inflow or 'letting in' or 'intake' of matter into living beings (*asrava*). It is defined as an influx of auspicious (*subha*) and of inauspicious (*asubha*) forces (*karmas*). The letting in of auspicious forces takes place when the soul or living being (this doctrine applies to animals, etc., as well as to man) feels love or hatred rightly for beings or things. As a result of this kind of 'intake' the being experiences material happiness and welfare. The 'letting in' or 'intake' of inauspicious forces takes place when the being wrongly feels love or hatred towards beings or things. It results in unhappy and painful experiences for the being. From a worldly point of view the letting in of auspicious forces (*subhasrava*) is superior to the letting in of inauspicious forces (*asubhasrava*); but both are inferior to the pure natural state of the soul (*moksha*), which comes about as a result of the complete destruction or removal from the soul of every foreign force (*karma*) whether good or bad in a worldly sense. Neither of these two leads to this final condition (*moksha*); on the contrary, either prevents it.

The fourth principle is the bondage of the *karmas*. It is defined as the mutual combination with each other of the soul and matter (*jiva* and *puḍgala*). This fourth principle is called *bandha* in Sanskrit. *Bandha* is the assimilation by the soul of matter which becomes *karma* or a force foreign to the soul's nature. This assimilation occurs by reason of the influence of certain causes upon the soul, viz. [1] delusion or false belief [*mithyatva*]; [2] anger, greed, etc. [*kashayas*]; [3] non-restraint, self-indulgence, or lack of self-control [*avirati*]; [4] carelessness [*pramada*]; [5] and certain other activities [*yoga*]. These five things are the means by which the assimilation of matter so as to produce *karma* takes place [*Tattvarthadhigama*, chap. viii, sutra 1].

This bondage of the soul to matter is fourfold in its nature, according to—

1. The quality of the resulting force [*prakriti-bandha*];
2. The duration of its staying with the soul (*sthitibandha*).
3. The strength or intensity of it (*anubhava-bandha* or *rasa-bandha*);
4. The quantity or mass of it (*pradesa-bandha*).

The first of these (the *prakriti-bandha*) has refer-



ence to the quality of the *karma*. In the same way that a thing may have the quality of being sweet or bitter, etc., so the qualities of the *karmas*, or forces produced by the soul's assimilating matter to itself, are that they obscure knowledge, etc. There are eight of those qualities which are primary qualities (*mula-prakriti*) of those foreign forces or *karmas*—

1. The quality of obscuring true knowledge, as a cloud does the sun (*jnanavaraniya-prakriti*);

2. The quality of obscuring undifferentiated knowledge (*darsanavaraniya-prakriti*);

3. The quality or nature of obscuring the blissful nature of the soul, resulting in the delusion of pleasure and pain (*vedaniya-prakriti*);

4. The quality of making the mind suspicious of, or disliking, the truth, and the quality of creating passions, anger, greed, etc. (*mohaniya-prakriti*);

5. The quality of producing rebirths (*ayush-prakriti*);

6. The quality of producing specific appellations (*nama-prakriti*);

7. The quality of taking the living being to high or to low family surroundings (*gotra-prakriti*);

8. The quality of putting obstacles in the way of

acting rightly when there is the desire to act rightly, giving, etc. (*antaraya-prakriti*).

The eight primary qualities of the forces in the living being correspond to eight forces *karmas* that obscure the eight natural qualities of the soul mentioned before. These eight *karmas* are—

1. Knowledge-obscuring *karma* (*jnanavaraniya-karma*);

2. That force (*karma*) which is in us which obscures undifferentiated cognition (*darsanavaraniya-karma*);

3. The third is that force in us which results in the feeling of either pleasure or pain (*vedaniya-karma*); it obscures the bliss-nature;

4. The fourth is that force (*karma*) in us which obstructs the formation of right belief and right conduct, etc. (*mohaniya-karma*);

5. The fifth is the force in us which determines the duration of any particular life-period in the embodied state; it prevents the continuity of the state of life (*ayush-karma*);

6. The sixth is that *karma*, or force, in us which gives us the various factors of our objective personality, and obscures the nature of the soul which is to be 'without bodily form (*nama-karma*);

7. The seventh is that *karma*, or force, in the living being which brings it to particular family surroundings, whether high or low; it obstructs the equality of the status (*gotra-karma*);

8. The eighth is a force in the living being which acts as an obstacle to doing something good, giving, enjoying good things, etc., when there is the desire to do so (*antaraya-karma*).

These eight primary things (*prakritis* and *karmas*) are subdivided into 158 kinds—the first class into five, the second into nine, the third into two, the fourth into twenty-eight, the fifth into four, the sixth into 103, the seventh into two, and the eighth into five. (Umasvati-vachaka, in this *Tattvarthadhigama Sutra*, chap. viii, sutra 6, divides the *nama-karma* into only forty-two kinds instead of 103).

All these qualities and forces of matter assimilated by the soul have been explained at length and in full, in their various relations to the soul, in works called the six *Karmagranthas*; the *Kammappayadi*; *Tattvarthadhigama Sutra*, chap. viii; and in other works on the subject.

The length of time that these qualities (*prakritis*) stay with the soul is called the *sthiti-bandha*.

The intensity of the soul's experience of the result

of the *karma* during its continuance with the soul is *anubhava-bandha*.

The mass or quantity, or the association of the *karma* with every particle of the soul, is called *pradesa-bandha*.

There are three modes of regarding the *karmas* in their combination with the soul—(1) The dormant *karma* that is in the living being before it manifests itself (*satta*); (2) the new *karmas* being combined with the soul (*bandha*); (3) *udaya*, the actual rising up or activity of the *karma*, or that the being experiences the result of the *karma*.

There is a fourth mode (*udirana*), which is the process of bringing the *karma* into operation earlier than it would naturally come into operation.

The fifth principle is the stopping of the influx of matter into the soul (*samvara*). This can be done by certain disciplines called in Sanskrit 'three *Guptis*', 'five *Samitis*', ten kinds of duties of an ascetic (*dharmas*) twelvefold meditation (*bhavana*), by observing five kinds of *charitras*, by enduring twenty-two *parishahas*, and practising twelve *tapas* or austerities. These are not given in detail here, for the sake of brevity.

The sixth principle (*nirjara*) is defined as the partial destruction of *karmas*. This is effected by

observing twelve kinds of austerities (*tapas*). This *nirjara* is twofold—(1) *sakama* and (2) *akama*. The first consists in observing the means of working out the *karmas* with the desire of attaining some high ideal; the second is effected through the natural decay of *karmas*.

The seventh principle is absolute deliverance [*moksha*]. It is defined as the absolute destruction of every *karma*. There is no material body in this state. The soul remains with its pure natural qualities.

Anything can be spoken of in seven different ways, each implying the remaining six ways, so this is true of the before-mentioned six substances and seven principles, and forms the subject of the next chapter, *Saptabhangi*.

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### CHATER III.

#### • ON **Saptabhangi** OR THE SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATION.

**SAPTABHANGI** is the use, in seven different ways with the words *syat* and *eva*, of statements of affirmation and negation severally and jointly without inconsistency, when inquiring separately into the different qualities of a thing.

The seven ways are as follows :—

1. *Syadastyeva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does exist ;

2. *Syannastyeva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does not exist ;

3. *Syadasti nastyeva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does exist and also that in a certain sense it does not exist (*i. e.* when the *paryayas* of another thing than those of a jar are considered) ;

4. *Syadavaktavya eva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense it is impossible to describe a jar ;

5. *Syadasti chavaktavyaschaiva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does not exist that it is impossible to describe it in one moment ;

6. *Syannasti chavaktavaychaiva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does not exist and that it is impossible to describe it in one moment ;

7. *Syadasti cha nasti chavaktavyaschaiva ghatah.* There is no doubt that in a certain sense the jar does and does not exist, and that it is impossible to describe it in one moment.

1. In the first way of making statements one speaks about what the thing is ;

2. The second way of speaking about a thing is to say what it is not ;

3. The third way is first to say what the thing is and then what it is not ;

4. The fourth way is to mention the indescribable nature of the thing ;

5. The fifth way is to say what the thing is, the thing being indescribable in one moment ;

6. The sixth way is to say what the thing is not, being unable at one and the same moment to say both what it is and what it is not ;

7. The seventh way is first to say what the thing is and then what it is not, as these cannot both be expressed at one and the same moment.

1. In the first way the existence of a thing is taken into consideration ;

2. In the second, non-existence of a thing is thought about ;

3. In the third, both the existence and non-existence are considered in consecutive order, *i.e.* one after the other ;

4. In the fourth way of making statements that which is considered is the inexpressibility at one and

the same moment of what the thing is and what the thing is not ;

5. In the fifth, while asserting the inexpressibility at one and the same moment of what a thing is and what it is not, yet 'what it is' is taken into consideration ;

6. In the sixth, with the assertion of the inexpressibility at one and the same moment of those qualities which are present in the thing, and of those qualities which are absent in the thing, the qualities which are absent in the part in question are taken as the subject of consideration ;

7. In the seventh, with the assertion of the inexpressibility at one and the same moment of the qualities which do and of those which do not exist in the thing, the present and absent qualities of the part in question are predicated consecutively.

*Syat* is the third person singular of the potential mood of the verb *as*, to be. Here it is used as an adverb, and means 'in a certain sense.'

Let us take an example of the first way of making a statement about a thing : *syadastyeva ghatah*. Such statements can be scrutinized (examined) from four points of view, *viz dravya* (the substance of which the thing consists), *kshetra* (the place where the thing is),



*kala* (the time or period of the thing's existence), and *bhava* (the attributes of the thing). Thus, the jar does exist in so far as it consists of earth (clay) and not of any other substance. The jar does exist in England and not in any other place. The jar does exist at the present time, which is summer, and not any other season. The jar does exist as red and not as of any other colour. From this it is clear that in a certain sense and so far as its own attributes are concerned the jar exists in these four respects.

Second way of speaking: *syannastyeva ghatah*. When you take the above four points of view of any other substance or thing into consideration, the jar does not exist in these four respects.

What is non-existence? That which is existence in the presence of a thing is non-existence in the absence of it. For example, the jar has been proved to exist as regards its substance, place, the time of its existence, and its attributes: and when the jar is broken by a stick or otherwise, then non-existence of the jar is proved, because in the case of things which perish, existence itself is the cause of subsequent non-existence.

Third way of speaking: *syadastyeva syannastyeva*. Everything, when thought of in respect of its substance (*dravya*), place [*kshetra*], time of existence [*kala*], and

attributes [*bhava*], does in a certain sense exist; and when the substance, place, time, and attributes of other things are thought of, the thing itself does not exist. So in this third way of speaking two natures of the thing [existence of the thing and non-existence of other things] are considered, first one and then the other. For example, the jar is a jar and is not cloth.

Fourth way of speaking: *syadavaktavyah*. This fourth way of speaking denies the possibility of mentioning at one and the same moment what the thing is and what it is not. The necessity for this way of speaking is that these two natures [what it is and what it is not] exist in a thing at one and the same time [or simultaneously], but it is impossible to express them simultaneously; when we see that there are two trees, a mango-tree and an orange-tree; they both exist simultaneously, but they come to our knowledge, first one and then the other, and not simultaneously.

Fifth way of speaking; *syadastyeva syadavaktavyah* [*ghatah*]. In this mode of speaking it is what the thing [jar, for instance] is that finds expression, and the reason for adding *avaktavyah* is that when we are proving what a thing [jar, for instance] *is*, we wish to mention also that the thing has simultaneously negative attributes [is-not-ness], but that it is impossible to express them simultaneously. There *is* a jar here; but, as it is impossible to say simultaneously

both what it is and what it is not, the word *avaktavyah* is inserted in the statement.

Sixth way of speaking : *syannastyeva syadavaktavyah (ghatah)*. In this mode of speaking it is what the thing [jar, for instance] *is not* that finds expression. And the reason for adding *avaktavyah* is that when we are proving what a thing [jar, for instance] *is not*, we wish to mention that the thing has at the same time positive attributes [is-ness], but that it is impossible to give them expression while we are proving what the thing is not.

Seventh way of speaking : *syadastyeva syannastyeva syadavaktavyah (ghatah)*. In the seventh mode of speaking one expresses first what the thing [jar, for instance] is, and then what it is not ; and one adds that it is impossible to express both what it is and what it is not simultaneously. When one is talking of the attributes of a thing there is existence, and when one is talking of the attributes of another thing there is non-existence in the first thing, but it is impossible to express them both at the same time.

There may be many things that may be said of a thing [jar, for instance] besides its present and absent attributes ; but whatever is predicated of a subject may always be predicated in these seven possible ways. The possible ways of speaking about a thing's attributes will always be seven in number.

For further details the reader is referred to *Syadvada Ratnakara*, *Saptabhangitarangini*, etc.

Anything, can be considered in various aspects or from various standpoints, so therefore can the before-mentioned six substances and seven principles. These aspects or standpoints form the subject of the following chapters on *nayas*.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ON **Nayas** OR METHODS OF COMPREHENDING THINGS FROM PARTICULAR STANDPOINTS.

A **NAYA** is the standpoint of the knower; it is the knowledge of one of the attributes of a thing possessing innumerable attributes, and forms part of the aggregate of the natures of a thing.

A *naya* always predicates *one* of the innumerable qualities of a thing, but never denies the rest. If it denies the rest, or any of the qualities not in consideration, then it is called *nayabhasa*, a fallacy of *naya*, that is, a *naya* which appears to be correct but is not so in fact.

The *nayas* refer to the parts of the thing, whereas the *saptabhangi* refers to the things as a whole; *nayas* have relation to analysis, whereas *saptabhangi* relates

to synthesis; *nayavada* is the analytical method of knowledge, whereas *saptabhangi* is the synthetical method of knowing a thing.

*Nayas* are divided into [1] aspects relating to the substance or permanent nature of the thing (*dravyarthika*) and [2] aspects relating to the condition or changing nature of the thing [*paryayarthika*].

That which has substance [*dravya*\*] as its cause, or that of which the purpose is served by substance [*dravya*], is called *dravyarthika*.

The subdivisions of the *dravyarthika-naya* are—

1. The first subdivision is that aspect of a thing or substance by which one knows that the substance has its own qualities and modifications, *i.e.* if one knows a substance, one knows its qualities and modifications too. This subdivision of the first class of aspects is called *anvaya dravyarthika-naya*.

2. The second subdivision is that aspect by which one knows that the thing's existence is proved by knowing the substance that it is, the place where it exists, the period or time of its existence, and the condition [*bhava*] of the thing. For instance, a jar is clay; England might be it, place of existence; if made in winter, then winter would be its timerelation;

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\*The description of *dravya* is given under *dravyas*; see Chapter 1.

and if it were red, then red would be its condition. The name of this second subdivision of the first class of aspects is called *svadravya-grāhakadravyarthikā-naya*.

3. The third subdivision is that aspect by which one knows that the non-existence of a thing is proved by knowing the substance, whereabouts, time-relation and condition of other things. For instance the jar above mentioned has in it the non-existence of cloth as its substance, the absence of Ireland as its whereabouts, the non-existence of the past and of the future as its time of existence, and it has in it the non-existence of blackness as its condition of colour. The name of this third subdivision of the first class of aspects is *paradravya-grahaka dravyarthika-naya*.

4. The fourth is the aspect of a substance by which one knows the existence of the substance (*dravya*) by its predominant quality amongst its innumerable qualities. For instance, the predominant quality or characteristic of the soul is knowledge. The soul has other qualities too, but knowledge is a quality which is found only in souls and not in any other substance. The name of this fourth subdivision of the first class of aspects is *parama-dravya-grahaka dravyarthika naya*.

5. In the fifth one thinks of the substance, or

thing (*dravya*), in its pure state without regarding its outward condition. For instance, in this way all living beings (*jivas*) are thought of as pure souls (*sudhatmas*) like the liberated beings (*siddhas*). In this case the particular modifications (*paryayas*) of the being which are due to *karma* are disregarded. The name of this fifth subdivision of the first class of aspects is *karmopadhi-nirapeksha-suddha dravyarthika-naya*.

6. In the sixth it is the permanent nature of the substance (*dravya*) that is thought of, leaving aside all thought of its change from one thing to another. Any substance is eternal, and, although it changes its modification, it is the unchanging nature of the substance that is thought of in this sixth aspect. A ball of knitting wool, though knitted into a sock and thus having changed its modification, can be thought of as wool. The stuff, though changed from one thing to another, is still permanent and is not destroyed. The name of this sixth subdivision of the first class of aspects is *utpada-vyaya-gaunatve satta-grahaka-suddha dravyarthika-naya*.

7. In the seventh one takes the view that the substance (*dravya*) is not separate from its modifications and natures (*paryayas* and *svabhavas*). Its name is *bheda-kalpana-nirapeksha-suddha dravyarthika-naya*.

8. In the eighth one regards the substance as it

actually is in its present phenomenal state. For instance, a red-hot piece of iron can be called fire, although it is a piece of iron; also in the same way a soul can be called what it actually is (a cat, a man), although it is essentially a pure soul. Souls are pure, but, when they are under the influence of *karma*, they can be called what the *karma* actually makes them, cat, man, etc.; an angry being, etc. The name of this eighth way of comprehending a thing is *karmopadhi sapeksha-asuddha dravyarthika-naya*.

9. In the ninth one considers a substance or thing as permanent, while regarding it as changing from one thing to another at a given moment. For example when a gold necklace is broken and made into bracelets, the gold remains permanent, the necklace is destroyed, and the bracelets come into existence (are originated). The name of this is *utpada-vyaya-sapeksha-satta-grahaka-asuddha dravyarthika-naya*.

10. In the tenth one conceives the qualities of a thing as distinct from the thing endowed with these qualities. For example, 'knowledge,' etc., are the qualities of the soul: if some one wished to assert that, as in 'John's book' book is separate from John, so in the soul's knowledge 'knowledge' is distinct from soul, he can do so under this tenth subdivision of the first class of aspects. The name of this tenth



subdivision is *bheda-kalpāna-sapeksha-asuddha dravyarthika-naya*.

## CHAPTER V.

### ON MODIFICATIONS (**Paryayas**).

WE now come to the subdivisions of the second class of aspects.

A modification (*paryaya*) is that which has the characteristic of changing form, that is, the old modifications of a substance are destroyed and new ones are produced. A *paryaya* is that which is the subject of production and destruction: a chair, for instance, is a *paryaya* of matter (*pudgala*); it came into existence and will in time go out of existence.

There are two kinds of modifications. (*paryayas*)—

1. Modifications of the essential qualities of a thing or substance. For instance, colour is a quality of matter. The colour of the sea is sometimes green. The sea always has colour, but it is not always green. Green is a modification. The name of this kind of modification is *sahabhavin paryaya*.

2. Modification of the foreign qualities of a thing. 'Muddiness' would be a quality of water due

to something in the water foreign to its nature. Modifications of muddiness would come under this heading. Anger, melancholy, pleasure, pain, are foreign qualities of the soul due to *karma*. Modifications in these would be this second kind. Its name is *karmabhavin paryaya*.

Besides this division of modifications (*paryayas*) into the above two kinds, they may be divided into four, and these four as applied to living beings (*jiva*) are—

1. That modification (*paryaya*) of an embodied being which is the sign of the pure nature of the being. For instance, the pure nature of the soul is to be a liberated being (*sidha*), and there is a sign of this nature in the last embodied state of the being. The name of this kind of modification (*paryaya*) is *svabhava-dravya-vyanjana paryaya*.

2. Modifications of the soul's qualities when in its pure state. For instance, knowledge, one of the attributes of the soul, is changing all the time, and the changes in the knowledge are called *paryayas*. The name of this class of *paryayas* is *svabhava-guna-vyanjana paryaya*.

3. Those modifications which signify something unnatural in the being. This class of modifications

is what shows that there is some element in the being which is foreign to its nature. The name of this class of modifications (*paryayas*) is *vibhava-dravya-vyanjana-paryaya*.

4. Those modifications which signify some unnatural condition of the being. For instance, sensuous knowledge is, from the point of view of omniscience, an unnatural condition of the living being. This class of *paryayas* is called *vibhava-guna-vyanjana paryaya*.

These four kinds of modifications (*paryayas*) are applicable to inanimate matter (*pudgala*) as follows:—

1. Atoms (ultimate indivisible atoms of inorganic matter) are examples of the first kind of modifications as applied to insentient matter. The Sanskrit name of this kind of modification is *svabhava-dravya-vyanjana paryaya* (of *pudgala*).

2. One kind of colour (*varna*), one kind of smell (*gandha*), one kind of taste (*rasa*), and two non-contradictory ways of affecting the sense of touch (smooth and cold, for instance), these are instances of the second kind of modifications as applied to matter. Its Sanskrit name is *svabhava-guna-vyanjana-paryaya* (of *pudgala*).

3. A collection of two or more atoms is an example of the third kind of modifications as applied to

matter. Its Sanskrit name is *vibhava-dravya-vyanjana-paryaya* (of *pudgala*).

4. When one kind of taste is transformed into another (if sugar, for instance, is made salt) it is an example of the fourth kind of modification as applied to matter. It is called *vibhava-guna-vyanjana-paryaya* (of *pudgala*).

## CHAPTER VI.

### ON **Paryayarthika-Nayas.**

PARYAYARTHIKA-NAYA is that which has *paryaya* for its cause ; or that of which the purpose is served by *paryaya*.

It is divided into six classes as follows :—

I. The first division of the *paryayarthika-naya* deals with the modifications in a condition which has neither beginning nor end. For example, certain mountains, like Meru, wherein the intermingling of the changes in its substance never takes the substance beyond the space occupied by the mountain ; hence the position occupied has neither beginning nor end. Its Sanskrit name is *anadi-nitya-suddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

2. In the second division we comprehend modifications in a condition which has a beginning but no end. For example, the 'omniscience,' etc., of the liberated beings; it has a beginning but no ending, as the condition of these beings is permanent. Its Sanskrit name is *sadi-nitya-suddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

3. In the third division one comprehends the destruction and origination of the same modifications (*paryayas*), but their permanence is not thought of. Under this division one thinks that when the modifications are being destroyed at every moment they are taking other forms, but at the same time he does not consider the permanent nature of the modifications. It is called in Sanskrit *satta-gaunatvena-utpada-vyaya-grahaka-anitya-suddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

4. In the fourth one comprehends a *paryaya* having the nature of origination, destruction, and permanence at one and the same moment. In this division the word *asuddha* is necessary; *paryaya* (modification) is that which has no direct reference to its permanent state, and as under this division the permanence is considered it is called *asuddha*, i. e. not pure. In Sanskrit it is called *satta-sapeksa-nitya-asuddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

5. In this fifth division of the *paryayarthika-naya* one considers the pure nature of the substance under

consideration, disregarding the apparent characteristics produced by reason of some external or foreign substance. For example, one would consider an embodied being (man, cat, etc.) as a liberated being, the natural characteristics of the soul alone being taken as the subject of consideration, the apparent characteristics (of man, cat, etc.) produced by reason of foreign elements in the being being disregarded. Its Sanskrit name is *karmopadhi-nirapeksha-nitya-suddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

6. In this sixth division one considers the false and perishable nature of modifications as they exist under the influence of *karmas*, e. g. the soul in its embodied state has birth and death under the influence of the *karmas* or elements in the soul foreign to its pure nature. In Sanskrit it is called *karmopadhi-sapekshanitya-asuddha-paryayarthika-naya*.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ON THE SEVEN **Nayas**.

THE distinction between *dravyarthika-naya* and *paryayarthika-naya* is that the *dravyarthika-nayas* consider the permanent nature of things; the *dravya*, being permanent, as existing for ever; whereas the *paryayarthika-nayas* consider the perishable nature of things, the *paryayas* being most probably perishable.

The *dravyarthika-nayas* are subdivided into three, viz.—

1. The non-distinguished (*naigama*);
2. The general (*samgraha*);
3. The practical (*vyavahara*).

The *paryayarthika-nayas* are subdivided into four, viz.—

1. The straight expression (*riju sutra*);
2. The verbal (*sabda*);
3. The subtle (*samabkirudha*);
4. The 'such like' (*evambhuta*).

There are thus seven classes of standpoints, aspects, or modes of comprehending a thing (seven *nayas*.)

The 'non-distinguished' (*naigama*)† standpoint is the mode of comprehending a thing in which an object is considered as having both (1) general and (2) specific qualities, that is to say, no general qualities without accompanying specific qualities, and no specific without accompanying general qualities. For example, when one speaks the words 'a mango-tree' he indicates certain qualities which are peculiar to a mango-tree, and indicates at the same time other

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†The *naigama* is called 'non-distinguished' because it does not distinguish between generic and specific qualities as the two following *nayas* do.

qualities which a mango-tree possesses in common with other trees.

1. General qualities are those which are common to all the individual members of a class, *e.g.* the qualities of a tree.

2. Specific qualities are those which are peculiar to an individual member in the class and, are not found in the remaining members of the class, *e.g.* the qualities of a mango-tree.

The false non-distinguished standpoint (*naigāma-bhasa*) is when these two properties, *viz.* the generic and the specific, are thought or claimed to be actually separate, *e.g.* when in conceiving the soul one makes an actual separation of the existence (*sat*) and the consciousness (*chetana*), *i.e.* of the general quality (existence) and the specific quality (consciousness).

The 'collective' *samgraha* standpoint conceives a thing as though it had generic qualities only. This division of *dravyarthika-naya* asserts that there is no specific apart from generic qualities. For example, were there no trees, a mango-tree would not have existed.

The fallacy of this standpoint (*samgrahabhasa*) occurs when one asserts that a thing is real if it possesses the generic qualities alone, absolutely deny-



ing its specific properties, e. g. a mango-tree is a real mango-tree because it is a tree.

3. The practical (*vyavahara*) mode of comprehending a thing is when only the particular qualities are taken into consideration. This standpoint denies the existence of generic qualities without specific qualities. For instance, if one asks a man to bring a plant, the man will bring a particular plant, there being no plant in general.

The fallacy made with this standpoint (*vyavahara-bhasa*) is when one considers that the attributes of a thing are absolutely separate from the thing, or that qualities and substance are absolutely separate from each other.

4. The straight expression (*riju-sutra*) is when one considers a thing as it exists in the present, without reference to its past or future. This standpoint recognizes the object in its present state only. It argues that there is no use in the thing being conceived in its past or future state, practical purposes being served only by considering its present condition. And this *riju-sutra* method insists upon the actual thing itself (*bhava*), not recognizing the name by which it is called (*nama*), nor pictorial or modelled representations of the thing (*sthapana*), nor does this standpoint recognize the substantial cause out of which the thing is created (*dravya*).

These points will be seen in the following examples: a man's having been Lord of Paradise in his previous life is of no use to him in his present life. In the same way if, owing to certain causes (*karmas*) latent in a man, he will in his future life be born with a body as strong as that of Hercules, still he cannot enjoy the benefit of that body now. The fact that a beggar is *called* a king does not make him a king. The *image* of a king does not perform the duties of a king, and the king was not king when heir to the throne.

The fallacy in this *riju-sutra* case arises when one absolutely denies the reality of substance; for example, when one only believes in the modifications that perish every moment (*paryayas*), denying the substance (*dravya*) which is the basis of the modifications, as in Buddhist philosophy.

5. The 'verbal' (*sabda*) standpoint is that mode of comprehending a thing by which one recognizes the use of a word in its conventional sense, while the etymological sense may be quite different. This mode maintains that the synonyms all mean one and the same thing. For example, jar, pot; or again, behaviour, conduct, demeanour; or again, chief, leader, head; or again, globe, orb, sphere; or again, cloister, convent, monastery.

The fallacy or misapplication (*sabdabhasa*) of this standpoint arises when one fails to admit the difference of meaning that a given word may have at different dates or ages.

6. The subtle (*samabhirudha*) standpoint is the mode of comprehending a thing in which one nicely distinguishes between synonyms, that is to say, one uses the most appropriate word on the ground of its etymology; *e. g.* the Sanskrit words Indra, Sakra, Purandara, etc., conventionally all mean Lord of Paradise, but they have distinct etymological meanings. So also the words *kumbha*, *kalasa*, *ghata*, which conventionally all mean the same thing, but have some distinction.

The fallacy of this standpoint (*samabhirudhabhasa*) occurs when one asserts that synonymous words signify altogether different things, *e. g.*, that Indra, Sakra, and Purandara are as different as an elephant (*karin*) is from a horse (*turanga*), or, to take the usual Sanskrit example, that pitcher (*kumbha*), pot (*kalasa*), and jar (*ghata*) are as different from each other as chair, desk, and table.

7. The 'such like' (*evambhuta*) standpoint is the mode of comprehending a thing by which one applies to things such names as their actual condition allows. This *paryayarthika-naya* does not recognize a thing by

its name unless it is actually performing the function denoted by the name, *e. g.* a man cannot be called a lion unless he acts as a lion.

The fallacy (perversion) of this point of view (*evambhutaḥśa*) is when one absolutely denies the thing simply because it does not exercise the properties implied by the name, *e. g.* John is not a man (thinking animal), because he is not thinking at the present moment.

The first four of these seven *nayas* relate to things (*vachya*), and the last three relate to words (*vachaka*).

Umasvati in his *Tattvarthadhigama sutra* (sutra 34 of the first chapter) divides the *nayas* into five classes, including the *samabhirudha* and *evambhuta* in the *śabda*. He divides the *śabda* into—

1. *Samprata* (suitable);
2. *Samabhirudha* (subtle);
3. *Evambhuta* (such like).

*Samprata* deals with the conventional meaning without any reference to the derivation.

These *nayas* are fully explained in the commentary on *Viśeṣaśāstra*.

FINIS.



