FOOD AND FREEDOM

THE JAINA SECTARIAN DEBATE
ON THE NATURE OF THE KEVALIN

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It is hardly controversial to say that Jainism has been ill served by western students of South Asian religions. Whilst the last twenty years or so have seen a massive increase in the description and interpretation of Hinduism and Buddhism as both textual and living entities, there has been no comparable attempt to explore Jaina civilisation, and its vast literary heritage, its history and contemporary institutions have been largely ignored. Certainly there has been a persistent interest in the religion on the part of a small number of continental scholars, concerned in the main with the elucidation of canonical texts, but British and American researchers have not emulated this, R. Williams’ monograph on the medieval writings describing the idealised behaviour of the laity being the only comparatively recent work by an English speaking scholar to deal seriously with the Jaina religion.1

The reason for this neglect deserves consideration. It is true that few western libraries possess specialist collections of Jaina literature but as such collections do exist in India, this is not an insuperable obstacle. When they have been studied, Jaina texts are sometimes castigated for their aridity,2 but such judgements do little more than reflect an unwillingness to come to terms with a different idiom. If tedium be a criterion, and it should not, then Jaina literature is never any more tedious than Buddhist Abhidharma texts which have received serious consideration by western scholars. To my mind, this neglect of Jainism can be traced, with some plausibility, to a perception of the religion which is best exemplified in Mrs Sinclair Stevenson’s book, The Heart of Jainism.3 Written from a background of Christian missionary work in Gujarat, this work, published over seventy years ago (being recently reprinted in India), is still frequently cited in bibliographies and, as a standard secondary source, exemplifies what may not unfairly be regarded as a general attitude towards Jainism in the English-speaking world. The title of Mrs Stevenson’s book is heavily ironic: for her, the ‘heart’ of Jainism is that it has an empty heart, the very nature of the religion ensuring that there is a spiritual vacuum.
at its centre, a fact of which, she assures us, its adherents are aware. The closing chapter of ‘The Heart of Jainism’, in which this view is adumbrated and the inevitable unfavourable comparison with Christianity made, undoubtedly seems somewhat dated today but the detailed, if often highly inaccurate, picture presented in the rest of the book of the apparently relentless asceticism of Jaina monks and the grim and cheerless probity of the lay community which supports them has, I feel, served to engender and sustain a highly resilient prejudice according to which Jainism is seen as grey and unappealing, as austere as its followers who are themselves negligible in number and therefore in interest, its tenets less profound than those of Buddhism, its mythology less spectacular than that of Hinduism. Even anthropology, which has done so much to broaden our awareness of South Asian religions, appears to confirm these stereotyped judgements, being content to define Jainism as functionally the equivalent of a Hindu caste, a conclusion which may well be true but which has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. It is not too extravagant to suggest that the only memorable statement ever made about Jainism by an anthropologist is Lévi-Strauss’s somewhat frivolous comparison of the ornate Jaina temples in Calcutta with high-class Victorian bordellos.  

It surely cannot be denied that our appreciation of the universe of discourse of South Asian culture is diminished if due consideration is not given to the role played by Jainism, as the development of South Indian history makes clear. The evidence of literary, epigraphical and archaeological remains, as well as the statements of Chinese travellers, are obvious testimony to the hold which Jainism had over South India for almost a millenium, at least among the noble and mercantile classes. Unfortunately historians have given little real explanation of how such a situation came about and all too often tend to write as if Jainism’s sole function in this area was to serve as a convenient repository of ‘negative’ values against which the so-called Hindu ‘renaissance’ could react. Yet important questions remain to be answered. If Jainism, as an ostensibly atheist religion, was initially attractive because the basic characteristics of southern religion were ‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘humanism’, ‘then how did the transcendent goals towards which Jainism is firmly oriented fit into such a belief system?’ Alternatively, if the main attraction to its many noble followers, such as kings and their feudatories, was a socio-political one in that Jainism was both aryan and capable of providing an alternative ideology of kingship, what were the institutions, mythical or otherwise, which supported and validated a Jaina kingdom? I do not suggest that there are necessarily easy answers to these questions but it nonetheless seems obvious that our picture of a significant period of ancient and medieval Indian civilisation will remain incomplete until serious investigation into Jainism’s contribution to it is undertaken.
In this paper, I propose to deal with a question which should cast light on Jainism for two reasons: firstly, because it involves the kevalin, the figure who by his spiritual attainments stands at the centre of the religion and secondly, because, as a subject of sectarian debate, it was conducted in purely Jaina terms. The point at issue was whether the kevalin experienced hunger and thus needed to consume food. The participants in the debate were members of the two main divisions of the religion: the Śvetāmbaras, the ‘White-clad’ and the Digambaras, the ‘Space-clad’.

According to Śvetāmbara tradition, there have occurred eight schisms or, more literally, denials, evasions (nihavā) of the faith. The first of these dates back to the days of Mahāvīra himself (6th century BC), the twenty-fourth “ordemaker” (tīrthaṅkara), whose son-in-law Jamāli denied that an action which was in the process of being performed was the equivalent of an action which had been completed, a notion which was extremely important for the Jaina explanation of the operation of karma. For the great Hemacandra, writing in the twelfth century AD, Jamāli is no more than an example of somebody who is aware of the correct state of affairs but is deluded into saying exactly the opposite, and indeed the first seven of these heresies, involving as they did fairly straightforward matters of interpretation of metaphysical points of the doctrine, could quite easily be corrected by the simple expedient of showing their illogicality. However the eighth heresy, which involved a disagreement over correct practice, had serious implications, orthopraxy being, as always, more important than orthodoxy in the Indian context. For the Śvetambaras, the eighth schism arose some six hundred and nine years after Mahāvīra’s nirvāṇa with an apostate monk called Śivabhūti. This personage, who had become a monk for the wrong reasons in the first place (the result of a fit of pique after being locked out one night by his mother-in-law), and in the wrong manner (ordaining himself), hears his preceptor preaching about those monks who followed the jinakalpa way (i.e. those who emulated the tīrthaṅkaras) which could involve the abandonment of clothes. Despite his teacher’s assurance that this practice had finished soon after Mahāvīra’s death, Śivabhūti in arrogance decides that he himself is worthy of imitating the tīrthaṅkaras and gives up the wearing of clothes. Rejected by his preceptor, he persuades his sister, a nun, to adopt nudity and follow him, the hapless girl finally being persuaded of her error by a prostitute worried about the effect on trade. It is Śivabhūti and his immediate followers who are the founders of the heretical Digambara sect.

According to Digambara tradition, the Śvetāmbaras are no more than backsliders, the descendents of a section of the community who remained in the north during a famine while the rest of their co-religionists migrated to the south, the northern monks subsequently taking to the heretical practice of wearing clothes. How, the Digambaras ask, could a monk of true religious
aspiration cover himself with robes which represent shame and worldly possessions, both of which should have been renounced?

The traditional stories which purport to explain how the schism came about are useful for defining general attitudes but very little else. The significant feature of these accounts is not so much their undoubted lateness (the earliest literary version of the Digambara story seems to be the one found in the tenth century Hariṣeṇa’s Brhatkathākoxa)\textsuperscript{12} but more specifically their posteriority to the Council of Valabhī which took place in either 453 AD or 466 AD\textsuperscript{13} when the final, official version of a collection of old texts which can for convenience be designated ‘canonical’ was produced.\textsuperscript{14} It is the rejection by our group of this canon and the editorial process which gave rise to it which should be considered the truly important factor leading to the division of the community. As Jainism moved out of its original heartland in the Ganges basin and spread throughout India, its lines of communication must have been extended enormously, with the result that certain aspects and interpretations of behaviour about which tradition was ambiguous or unconcerned, such as the wearing of clothes by monks.\textsuperscript{15} may have been fixed among certain groups of monks and ignored by others. It was the final stabilising of a previously fluid oral tradition by a sizable proportion of the community whose authority, in the last resort, probably rested on little more than residence in areas within range of the scene of the council, which is the pivotal factor responsible for the rise of a fully self-aware Digambara sect, unwilling to accept a body of scriptures which had clearly been manipulated and loyal to the orthopraxy sanctioned by the tradition which it regarded as authoritative.\textsuperscript{16}

It is both easy and difficult to assess the nature of relations between the two groups after the division had taken place. On the doctrinal level, there was virtually complete accord, with the Digambaras playing a vital role in the shaping and articulating of a general Jaina standpoint with a view to controverting the Hindus and the Buddhists.\textsuperscript{17} Unfortunately, owing to lack of evidence, we are restricted in our ability to form a clear impression of how the two sects interacted on the social level. The question of orthopraxy, however, must always have been a source of disagreement and literary references make clear that there was on occasion serious antipathy between members of the two groups. The story of the monk Datta told by the eleventh century Śvetāmbara, Jayasimhasūri, in his Prākrit story collection, the Kathākṣaprapakaraṇa\textsuperscript{18}, is symptomatic of this. Datta is sent on an errand to a neighbouring village by the preceptor of his monastic group. On arriving at the village in the evening, he cannot obtain lodging and so enters a Digambara temple to spend the night there. Some Digambara laymen see him going in and, ‘becoming inimical to him for no reason’ (nikkāraṇavēria), secretly hire a prostitute and send her off to seduce him. But Datta does not respond to her
blandishments during the night and instead wins her over by his
imperturbability. She informs him why she has been sent and he tells her to
go to sleep and thus earn her fee. He then burns all his monastic regalia with
the aid of a lamp and taking up an old peacock feather whisk which is lying in
the temple assumes the guise of a Digambara monk. The next morning, the
laymen gleefully summon the villagers to witness a Śvetāmbara monk
consorting with a prostitute but, when the temple doors are opened, it is the
naked Datta who appears with his arm around the girl. The assembled
crowd shout out, ‘This is a Digambara (khavanaya) consorting with a
prostitute!’; to which Datta asks why they are laughing at him alone, for
other Digambara monks spend the night with prostitutes. Then the laymen
are mocked by the villagers: ‘You are not in possession of the doctrine taught
by the omniscient ones’ (pakkho savvannuppanno).

The point of this story revolves around monastic behaviour, with correct
discipline being equated with orthopraxy,¹⁹ and the Digambaras play a part
normally reserved in Jaina kathā literature for the hated Buddhists. More
interesting still, since an actual historical event is involved, are the accounts
of the famous debate between the Śvetāmbara Vādidevasūri and the
Digambara Kumudacandra which took place in Anahilla-paṭṭan in Gujarat
in 1125 AD under the auspices of the Caulukya monarch Jayasimha
Siddharāja, an event which clearly caught the imagination of the
Śvetāmbara community, judging by the frequency of its depiction on
manuscript covers.²⁰ There are two extended accounts of this event, that of
Prabhācandra (13th century) in his Prabhāvakacarita²¹ (‘Deeds of the
Eminent’) and that of Meruturīga (14th century) in his Prabhādvacintāmaṇi
(‘Wishing-stone of Stories’).²² Both writers are Śvetāmbara, Meruturīga’s
account being an episode in his panegyric of the idealised Jaina king,
Siddharāja, while, for Prabhācandra, the debate is the climax of his
hagiography of Vādideva. There can be little doubt that Kumudacandra’s
personality and behaviour are viciously travestied by these writers in the name
of sectarian polemic but, at the same time, it seems clear that he succumbed to
the greater cogency of the Śvetāmbara’s argument. Kumudacandra came
from Karnāṭaka, the Digambara stronghold, and his aim was to engage
prominent Śvetāmbaras in Gujarat in debate, the result of which would
determine whether Gujarat adopted the Digambara version of Jainism or not.
Prior to the debate, the ‘Goddess of Speech appears to Vādideva and advises
him to ‘put forward as a net an introduction of the eighty-four ensnaring
dilemmas dealing with the controversy with the Digambaras of the great
commentary on the Uttarādhyayana, terrible to disputants as a vampire’.²³
Not only is Kumudacandra arrogant and brutal (he and his followers have
previously harassed Vādideva’s sister, a nun), he is also ignorant. At the outset
of the debate he tentatively puts forward his views about the topics in dispute
between the two sects, whether the enlightened need food, whether monks can wear clothes and whether women can attain salvation, but Vādideva overwhelms him with traditional, time-honoured Svetāmbara arguments. In desperation, Kumudacandra tries to silence his opponent by magically inserting a ball of wool into Vādideva’s throat but he finally has to admit defeat when he is proved to be ignorant of Sanskrit grammar and, expelled by the king, he slinks off to die of shame. Thus, we are told, the Śvetāmbara doctrine became the ‘official’ Jainism of Gujarat and Vādideva ‘established an alms-house for kevalins and their right of eating’.  

The point of this last remark is that Vādideva proved conclusively that the kevalin experiences hunger and therefore needs to take food. Nothing is said of the arguments used, other than that they were those of Śāntisūri, the commentator on the Uttarādhyāyana-sūtra (the Prabhāvaka-carita does give us some information about the Śvetāmbara’s tactics over the question of nirvāṇa for women) and it might be concluded that the problem is marginal, with the rejection of both the Valabhi canon and monastic wearing of clothes being the central issues for the Digambaras, the controversy over the kevalin merely serving to define sectarian differences more precisely. However, it does seem unlikely that any question which touched upon the nature of the enlightened man could ever be peripheral and a consideration of the comparable Buddhist situation should alert us to the importance of this matter for Jainism. Early Buddhist texts often make passing reference to various pains and illnesses which afflicted the Buddha during his lifetime: backache, dysentery and so on. The inevitable question asked by later Buddhists who regarded such scriptural statements as significant was how the Buddha, a perfect being, could be subject to such distress. There were a variety of attempts to come to terms with this problem (e.g., he was still under the influence of some kinds of karma), the end result being the Mahāyāna conclusion that the illnesses of the Buddha were not real since his body was merely a manifestation of the dharma-kāya, the totality of all the qualities which make up a Buddha. The Jaina discussion about the kevalin had different ramifications, but more than a millenium of sectarian polemic over whether he experiences hunger and how any food that he might take affects his state of enlightenment demonstrates that this is a matter which lies at the very heart of the Jaina religion. 

There are innumerable descriptions and definitions of the kevalin in Jaina literature. The precise meaning of the term is ‘possessing that (knowledge) which is isolated, unique’. There is no real controversy about the nature of kevala knowledge between the sects and, postponing an account of how it comes about, it can best be defined both as ‘omniscience’ in the literal sense of that knowledge which enables its possessor to know all substances in all their possible modifications including their temporal aspects and, more indirectly,
'the final consummation of moral, religious and spiritual life'\textsuperscript{29} or simply 'self-knowledge.'\textsuperscript{30} It is important to establish the difference between the \textit{kevalin} who is the enlightened and perfect man and the \textit{tirtha\-nkara}. A \textit{tirtha\-nkara} is not only a person who has attained \textit{kevala} knowledge but is also one of the twenty-four figures who make a \textit{tirtha}. This word may be taken in the sense of 'ford (across the river of rebirth)'\textsuperscript{4} but in canonical terms it is more than that, the \textit{tirtha} being both the doctrine and the community.\textsuperscript{31} A \textit{tirtha} maker is a \textit{kevalin} who appears at periodic intervals to establish a community by preaching the doctrine whereas a \textit{kevalin} is merely an exalted member of the community.\textsuperscript{32} While there are famous \textit{kevalins} in Jain tradition such as Bāhubali, the son of the first \textit{tirtha\-nkara} Rśabha and the first individual of this world-age to achieve liberation,\textsuperscript{33} and Jambū, one of Mahāvīra's closest disciples and the last individual of this world-age to achieve liberation,\textsuperscript{34} it nonetheless seems clear to me that when the Śvetāmbara and Digambara polemicists discuss whether the \textit{kevalin} takes food, they are implicitly referring to the \textit{tirtha\-nkara} and attempting to define the nature of the promulgator of the true doctrine.\textsuperscript{35}

One of the most informative accounts of the \textit{kevalin} (in the guise of \textit{tirtha\-nkara}) and his qualities is the \textit{Sirivīratthui}, the eulogy of Mahāvīra which occupies the sixth chapter of the first book of the \textit{Sūyagādhamgasutta},\textsuperscript{36} one of the oldest and most authoritative texts of the canon. In this passage, Jambū is depicted as asking Sudharman, another of Mahāvīra's close disciples, to describe their master, and the twenty-seven verses in which Jambū is exorted to conquer \textit{samsāra} in the same way as Mahāvīra gives an excellent general description of the \textit{kevalin} and his attributes. Here I single out the more significant elements of the account. Mahāvīra is a being of limitless knowledge and insight (\textit{aṇamtanaṇī ya aṇamta\-damsi}) but at the same time a human being who lived in the world (\textit{cakkhu\-pahe thiya}).\textsuperscript{37} Knowing everything in all quarters of the universe, he is firm, serene and beyond the constraints of life.\textsuperscript{38} He is the equal of Indra in brilliance\textsuperscript{39} and Mount Meru in might.\textsuperscript{40} Through his knowledge, insight and morality, he has destroyed all karma and reached liberation.\textsuperscript{41} He extirpated anger, pride, greed and deceit.\textsuperscript{42} Having put away all worldly things, he did not consort with women nor eat at night.\textsuperscript{43} To hear the law preached by such a one ensures either deliverance or rebirth in heaven.\textsuperscript{44}

It is impossible to give a hard and fast dating for the first establishment of the idea that such a highly developed individual did not suffer hunger or need to take food. Although the Śvetāmbara canonical texts, perhaps understandably, do not evince any particular interest in the \textit{kevalin}'s food consumption, there are references which show that, for Mahāvīra in particular, eating was something perfectly natural. The best known is the episode described in the fifteenth chapter of the \textit{Bhagavāisutta}\textsuperscript{45} where the \textit{tirtha\-nkara} is depicted as
recuperating after his duel of yogic power with the Ājīvika leader, Makkhali Gosāla. Mahāvīra tells one of his disciples to stop a laywoman in a nearby village from cooking two pigeons for him and instead get her to prepare a cock which has just been killed by a cat; on eating this, he recovers. While the point of this story is doubtless to demonstrate Mahāvīra’s superhuman ability to be aware of an event taking place some distance away, there is no question that Mahāvīra, many years after his enlightenment, is portrayed as taking food, irrespective of the later Śvetāmbara refusal to believe that this could have been meat. Another reference to Mahāvīra’s eating occurs in the description of the preliminaries to his debate with the brahman ascetic, Khandaga Kaccāyana, when the excellent condition of Mahāvīra’s body seems to be ascribed to the fact that he is eating regularly (viyadabhō), that is, not engaging in fasts. Silent testimony to the kevalin’s eating is provided, as the Śvetāmbara polemicians saw, in a text like the Kappasutta which refers to the first tirthaṅkara, Rṣabha, following an increasingly lengthy period of fasting as he approached final release, the clear implication being that he took food at other times. While the Digambaras would reject such passages as symptomatic of the corruption of a canon whose authority they refuse to admit, there is no doubt that the Śvetāmbara texts state unambiguously that the kevalin eats food to support his body, although they say nothing of hunger.

The first general statements expressing dissatisfaction with this state of affairs are to be found in the works which Digambara ācāryas produced in the first centuries of the Christian era, writings which were ultimately to serve as a substitute canon (the real one supposedly having disappeared) and which are still regarded as authoritative today. According to the Samayāsāra (v.225) of Kundakunda (second-third century AD), ‘desirelessness implies possessionlessness and so the “knower” does not require food or drink,’ while in another verse of Kundakunda’s (Pravacanasāra 1.20), which was taken by medieval commentators as implying that the kevalin does not feel hunger, it is stated that the kevalin does not experience bodily happiness or unhappiness. According to another early text, the Kasāyapāhuḍa, the kevalin has no reason to eat: it does not improve his knowledge because there is nothing greater than kevala knowledge, it does not involve some form of physical restraint because that has now been finished with anyway, and it has nothing to do with meditation because there is no longer anything for him to meditate upon.

If these statements, which do not attempt to argue for their position and are somewhat ill defined, are the seeds from which the later Digambara standpoint grew, then the watershed for establishing the exact notion of the kevalin is Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhiṣṭhānaśūtra (= TS; approximately second century AD). This work, which, although of almost certain Śvetāmbara provenance, is esteemed by all Jainas, summarises in aphoristic form the basics of Jaina epistemology, metaphysics, cosmography and practice. The rival sectarian
perceptions crystallise around sūtras nine to seventeen of the ninth chapter of the TS, which deal with the parīṣahas, the endurances or troubles which afflict the monk prior and subsequent to his enlightenment. In the words of TS 9.8, ‘the parīṣahas are to be endured so as not to deviate from the religious path and in order to cancel out karma’. This notion goes back to the Āyāramgasutta, one of the oldest portions of the canon, which describes (1.8) the various uncomfortable and unpleasant experiences to which Mahāvīra was exposed and which he overcame before he attained enlightenment; ordinary monks are supposed to draw courage to endure the rigours of the renouncer’s life from this. Other parts of the canon give a standardised list of twenty-two parīṣahas on which TS 9.9–17 bases its description. TS 9.9 lists these parīṣahas: hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquitos, nakedness, distaste for the religious path, women, continual moving about, sitting in solitary contemplation, lying down to sleep on uncomfortable ground, insult, violent behaviour, the obligation to beg for one’s food, not getting alms, disease, discomfort caused by the pricking of grass or straw while asleep, lack of personal cleanliness, the possibility of pride when one is praised for one’s behaviour and of depression when one is not, the possibility of being proud because of one’s insight, the possibility of being proud because of one’s scriptural knowledge and the possibility of distress because of one’s lack of spiritual attainment. TS 9.10–17 goes on to state that these afflictions are experienced according to the particular spiritual stage the individual has reached and the type of karma he has eliminated. TS 9.11 and TS 9.16 taken in conjunction state that the kevalin experiences only eleven parīṣahas out of the twenty-two, namely, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquitos, moving about, sleeping in discomfort, violent behaviour, disease, pricking of grass and lack of personal cleanliness; in other words, the kevalin only suffers physical vexation and not psychological distress, these afflictions all being caused by the type of karma known as vedaṇīya, that is, feeling-producing.

As we shall see, much of the debate about the kevalin’s hunger and food intake centres around the status of feeling-producing karma. Although Jainism’s dilutions upon karma and its subdivisions form the most complex, and sometimes rebarbative, area of its scholastic literature, the basic schema is fairly straightforward. There are two main groups of karma which affect the condition of the embodied soul: those which harm (ghātīyā) and those which do not harm (aghātīyā), both groups being regarded as a form of spiritual bondage which is brought about, according to TS 8.2, by the soul attracting karmic matter as a consequence of the possession of passions (kaśāya). The harming karmas are four: ‘the deluding’ (mohāṇiya) which brings about attachment to false views such as Buddhism and the inability to lead a spiritually correct life; ‘that which obscures knowledge’ (jñānāvarāṇīya) which at one extreme obscures the proper operation of the mind and at the
other extreme obstructs the omniscience which belongs to the soul at its purest level; 'that which obscures perception' (darśanāvaranīya) which hinders the perception coming in through the sense organs and the various kinds of knowledge,⁵⁸ and 'the hindrance' (antarāya) which obstructs the energy (vīrya) which is one of the soul's main characteristics when free from karma. The four non-harming karmas are, as their name suggests, essentially not deleterious to the soul: 'feeling-producing' (vedaniya) which determines whether the soul experiences pleasant or unpleasant things; 'name' (nāman) which defines the nature of the soul's next existence; 'life' (āyus) which establishes how long the next existence will be and 'family' (gotra) which defines whether the circumstances under which the soul is reborn will be conducive to the spiritual life. Now, as TS 10.1 emphatically describes kevala knowledge as arising from the destruction of the harming karmas alone,⁵⁹ it follows that the kevalin is still in possession of feeling-producing karma and as TS 9.11 and 9.16 state that the kevalin experiences eleven afflictions brought about by feeling-producing karma, of which hunger is one, it is thus established that the kevalin experiences hunger and so has to take food.

The history of commentary upon the TS is largely the history of Digambara commentary. Although Śvetāmbara commentaries do exist, none of them is remotely as influential as the interpretations of the three great Digambaras: Pūjyapāda (6th century AD), Akalanka (8th century AD) who incorporates the bulk of Pūjyapāda's commentary, and Vidyānanda (9th century AD) all of whom, using Umāsvāti's aphorisms as a basis, produced sophisticated statements of the Jaina position, valid (with the exception of the three main points of disagreement) as much for Śvetāmbaras as Digambaras, and thus established the grounds on which Jainas could engage in debate with their intellectual opponents. Obviously, these commentators had to confront TS 9.11 which states categorically that the kevalin experiences hunger but contradicts the statements of the early Digambara texts that the kevalin is totally beyond worldly pleasure and pain and so does not need to eat. Akalanka's explanation of TS 9.11 which I now give is representative of the standard Digambara view.⁶⁰

It makes no sense to say that afflictions such as hunger which depend upon feeling-producing karma affect the kevalin for the simple reason that feeling-producing karma no longer has any efficacy, since the necessary concomitant elements which would make it function, that is, the harming karmas, no longer exist. Just as poison, when its destructive power has been removed by spells and medicine, does not kill when used, so feeling-producing karma, although still existing, for the man who has burnt away the fuel of the harming karmas by the fire of his meditation and in whom the four infinite qualities⁶¹ are thus unimpeded, loses the strength of its concomitant elements, the harming karmas, and is thus incapable of bringing about any
effect within that same man in whom a succession of auspicious karmic matter is now accumulating without interruption. So the kevalin does not experience hunger. There is no need to insert a negative into TS 9.11 as some Digambara manuscripts do. Hunger and the other ten afflictions can be said to exist metaphorically within the kevalin on the analogy of meditation; for just as the term ‘meditation’ may be applied to the kevalin who has removed all the hindrances to knowledge, whose knowledge is complete and who, because he possesses the rewards arising from the destruction of the dust of karma, no longer practises deep concentration, so the kevalin may metaphorically be said to experience the eleven afflictions because there still exist material (dravya) afflictions which result from feeling-producing karma, although there no longer exist spiritual (bhāva) afflictions involving the actual experience of hunger etc. In other words, the kevalin does not experience any psychological or spiritual distress from hunger.

Elsewhere, commenting upon TS 2.4, Akalanīka describes exactly how the kevalin’s body is supported: after completely destroying the type of karma called 'gain-hindrance' (lābhāntarāya), the kevalin gives up eating, and then matter (pudgala) which is the cause of the maintenance of bodily strength, not common to other men and peculiar to the kevalin, extremely auspicious, fine (sūkṣma) and infinite, comes into contact with his body at every instant. This is called ‘gain which arises from the destruction of karma’ (kṣāyikalābha).

Akalanīka’s basic position is clear: feeling-producing karma may still exist in the kevalin but it certainly cannot give rise to any effect, whether hunger or anything else, for that would require the presence of the harming karmas. Since the main precondition of the kevalin’s state is that he has got rid of the harming karmas, he therefore cannot experience hunger and so does not need to eat.

The evolution of this Digambara standpoint must have taken some period of time, doubtless being debated many times in gatherings of monks prior to its articulation by the commentators on the TS, but it can probably be assumed that it was the prestige of scholars such as Pujyapāda and Akalanīka which prompted a formal Śvetāmbara response as embodied in the texts which have come down to us. Between the eighth and ninth centuries AD, there were three writers in particular who attempted to repudiate the Digambaras and confirm the canonical claim that it was proper and necessary for the kevalin to eat. Abhayadeva (8th century) in his commentary (vyākhyā) on the fifth century Siddhasena Divākara’s Sanmatitarka (= SMTV) treats the subject of whether the kevalin eats in the context of a broader discussion of the structure of kevala knowledge, thus viewing it from an epistemological perspective. The famous canonical commentator Śilānika (9th century) deals with the problem in his explication (ūkā) of the mnemonic verses (nījuttī) which introduce the third section of the second book of the Sūyagadāmagasutta (=
SNT) describing the general nature of nourishment (ähāra). Śākaṭāyana (9th century), the third polemicist, was a member of the Yāpaniya Sangha, a sect which flourished in the south for some time before finally disappearing in about the fourteenth century. The distinguishing feature of the Yāpaniyas is that, from the point of view of orthopraxy, they followed Digambara behaviour in rejecting the wearing of clothes by monks (although not in inhabited areas); doctrinally, however, they accepted the Śvetāmbara canon as well as Śvetāmbara views on the salvation of women and the kevalin eating. Śakaṭāyana wrote two independent treatises (prakaraṇa) on these last two topics: the Strīnirvāṇapraśāna and the Kevalibhukti-prakaraṇa (=KBHP). All three of these writers represent their opponents as having a more elaborate position than that adumbrated by Akalanka and it is likely that the Digambara commentators on the TS presented no more than a skeletal outline of a much more complex thesis. Although the views of Abhayadeva, Śīlānka and Śakaṭāyana do not always overlap, the thrust of their arguments is identical and I have therefore created a composite Śvetāmbara statement from their writings.

The Śvetāmbara approach to the kevalin becomes more comprehensible if consideration is first given to the precise difference between the kevalin, the man who has attained enlightenment and the chadmaṭṣṭha (Ardhamāgadhī chaumattg) literally ‘the man situated in bondage, covering’ in other words the ordinary monk (also called āsmadādi, ‘a person like us’) who is still subject to the effects of harming karma. All kevalins, tīrthaṅkaras or otherwise, have been chadmaṭṭhas, for Jainism holds that the path towards omniscience and ultimate liberation is a rigidly gradualistic one in which the individual who has entered into the correct way of looking at things (samyaktvā) rises through various stages of spiritual development (guṇasthāna) until he reaches the thirteenth stage and becomes a kevalin-with-(mental and physical) activity (sayogikevalin) which is essentially the same as the Hindu jīvanmukta. The fourteenth and final stage, that of the kevalin-without-(mental and physical) activity (ayogikevalin) lasts an extremely short time, immediately after which the soul becomes free of karma and body and rises to the top of the universe. Obviously there must be a fundamental difference between the first twelve stages of, admittedly, gradually diminishing imperfection and the thirteenth stage of the kevalin and, from the canon onwards, we find these differences described in karmic, and therefore, epistemological terms. Quite simply, the chadmaṭṭha’s knowledge is incomplete because of the continuing influence of the harming karmas and, therefore, the soul’s full potential is not realised. No matter how far the chadmaṭṭha has cultivated higher forms of knowledge such as clairvoyance (avaddhi), his attainments are insignificant in the light of kevala knowledge which completely transcends them; the kevalin, however, is completely beyond the operation of the human senses and is thus
able to perceive such, from the *chadmastaḥ*’s point of view, invisible things as the five fundamental entities. In other words, the thirteenth *gunaḥastāna*, the state of being a *kevalin*-with-activity, is the environment where the harming karmas, which cloud knowledge and insight and to which the *chadmastaḥ* is still subject, are extirpated and have no effect.

A further indication that the *kevalin*’s status is far beyond that of the *chadmastaḥ* is the former’s possession of thirty-four miraculous attributes or ‘eminences’ (*atiśaya*). Four of these are inborn, inasmuch as they are the result of name-karma formed in the previous existence, and reflect the purity of the *kevalin*’s body: physical beauty and fragrance, fresh breath, flesh and blood as white as cow’s milk and invisible eating and evacuation of food; eleven arise from the destruction of the harming karmas and demonstrate the *kevalin*’s ability to influence for the better his immediate surroundings, while the remaining nineteen are divine reflexes of his attainment of omniscience. But these attributes, impressive though they may be, merely serve as adjuncts to the basic fact that the *kevalin* ‘knows and sees’ (*jañāt pāsai*) in a manner completely different from the *chadmastaḥ*.

On the basis of these factors, there would seem to be very little grounds for equating the *kevalin* and the *chadmastaḥ* in any way. However, the Śvetāmbaras hold that, despite these differences, the physical structure of the two figures is essentially the same. The *Panṇavaṇaśutta*, one of the subsidiary canonical texts (*upāṅga*), which was almost completely incorporated into the highly prestigious fifth *aṅga*, the *Bhagavaṇśutta*, describes in its twelfth and twenty-first chapters the nature, structure and function of a series of bodies of which, for the purposes of the debate on the *kevalin*, the significant one is called *audārika* (Ardhamāgadhī *orāliya*), that is, the gross, earthly body. All creatures possessing senses, with the exception of gods and hell-beings, from the lowest earth-being to the *tīrthaṅkaras* themselves, have an *audārika* body of flesh and blood born from the womb which, while varying in size and form, has the same basic structure as other *audārika* bodies. The variations between *audārika* bodies depend upon name-karma, the most powerful type of body being given the designation ‘with structure (held together) by bolts, collars and mortices’ (*vajraṇgabhaṇaḥrācaṃhānaṇa*) which allows the *kevalin* to withstand the fierce bodily heat generated by his hard ascetism. Nonetheless, despite the vast differences in spiritual attainment and strength of body, the *kevalin* and the *chadmastaḥ* are physiologically the same (with the exception of the three attainments (*atiśaya*) of the *kevalin*: his skin and blood as white as milk, his eating and evacuation of food are invisible and his hair does not grow); if the *chadmastaḥ*’s body operates or is sustained in a certain way, then so logically must be the *kevalin*’s.

Mere possession of an *audārika* body, however, is not sufficient grounds for eating, nor need it be assumed that there must occur, in some way, diminution
either of the body's efficacy (śakti) or the soul's life-karma; rather there are other, innate reasons. Firstly there is the quality of development (paryāpti) which is responsible for the growth of the body and senses through the agency of digested food; that such a process of digestion does take place is guaranteed by the fact, attested in the canon, that all souls (with the exception of one-sensed creatures) possess a particular subtle, digestive-body (taijasa) which is responsible for this activity. In addition, karmic factors come into play, for the kevalin, as mentioned above, has bound life-karma in his previous existence which ensures a long life in his final birth; such a period of existence will need to be sustained by the taking of food, for it is a matter based on authoritative knowledge (pramāṇa) that human bodies cannot exist without food. But the most important factor is the continued existence in the kevalin of feeling-producing karma which is the cause of the soul's experience of pleasant (sātā) and unpleasant (asātā) things. This type of karma ensures that, during the entire state of being of a kevalin-with-activity until the moment of transition to the extremely brief fourteenth stage, the kevalin is still susceptible to many of the same kind of experiences, such as hunger, cold and heat, as the chadmasṭha, experiences which are not inflicted by any outside agency which would imply imperfection in the kevalin but are, rather, inevitable, given the way the human body works. The Digambaras make great play with the fact that the attainment of kevala knowledge gives rise to the full development of the soul's original, pre-karmic qualities namely bliss, energy, insight and knowledge, and so a personage possessing these qualities would have no need to eat. This is not a valid point, however, for taking food has the same status as other normal human activities such as resting (the kevalin has had a magically constructed pavilion built where he can do this), moving about or sitting down. Furthermore, it cannot be said that an individual's energy would increase as his hunger decreased, for that is contrary to experience.

For the Śvetāmbaras, then, the chadmasṭha and the kevalin are linked by the possession of audārika bodies and feeling-producing karma, the latter of which has not become, in Digambara parlance, 'like a burnt rope', without any efficacy. The fact that the kevalin has extirpated the harming karmas does not mean that he is not still subject to some sort of karmic activity; it is only the siddha, the liberated soul living in a state of disembodied bliss in the roof of the universe, who is completely free from worldly feeling and karma. Certainly the kevalin has had some of his miraculous attainments (atiśaya) from his very birth right through the chadmasṭha state but it could not possibly be argued on that basis that he did not eat while a chadmasṭha. The same audārika body which was nourished with food then must be supported in identical fashion in the kevalin state and since it has been established that there are perfectly legitimate reasons why the kevalin should eat, denial of this could only mean that a cause could not have its proper effect, a nonsensical conclusion.
It is no argument to say that his omniscience removes the kevalin from the necessity of eating, because it is perfectly clear from experience that omniscience can have nothing to do with ordinary bodily activity. If it were the case that hunger increases in direct proportion to decrease in knowledge, then a child (bāla) would be likely to be very hungry. The omniscience which the kevalin possesses is ultimately beyond the senses and cannot be regarded in the same light as hunger; it comes about through the destruction of the harming karmas and is of no consequence for the operation of the flesh and blood audārika body. Just as a lamp needs oil or a stream needs water, so the human body needs food.

As a consequence of this insistence on the fundamental identity of the physical structure of the chadmāṣṭha and the kevalin, the Śvetāmbaras are able to reject the possibility of the indefinite existence of the kevalin without food, which is the necessary implication of the Digambara standpoint. Jain tradition held that some kevalins had been able to live for long periods of time, from six months to a year, without food, but it is an entirely different matter to say that the kevalin could, because of his exalted status, exist without food for as long as he wished. The theoretical maximum period for the duration of the kevalin state is conventionally described as being 'ten million pūrva. years less a fraction' (desonāpūravoṣṭi), an almost unimaginable length of time, and if there were to be just one instance of the possessor of an audārika body existing for such a long period without food, then the whole edifice of causality would collapse, since it is an obvious fact that food causes the continued existence of the body. Moreover, if physical existence without food, which effectively amounts to non-death, was to be accepted as the equivalent of the kevalin's other miraculous attainments, such as his purity of body, then there would be very little point in the notion of final release since he could go on in virtual perpetuity. Scriptural references to Rṣabha, the first tīrthankara, existing for a year without food, in fact refer to his period as a chadmāṣṭha and accounts of his fasting during the kevalin stage obviously imply that he ate at other times. The general enjoinder on the Jaina monk to fast on certain occasions does not mean that eating is a fault (doṣa), for it could equally be argued that activities such as sitting and speaking are in their turn faults because there exist particular ascetic vows which entail their temporary abandonment. Nor need eating imply excessive contact with the objects of the senses, which is the function of matijñāna, an inferior kind of cognition which the kevalin should have transcended, for, if the kevalin is completely unaffected by the wonderful sights, sounds and smells which, tradition is unanimous, continually surround him, then it would be ludicrous to suppose that he could be seduced by a mere taste on the tongue. Even in the very act of eating his omniscience is still not prejudiced, for if a chadmāṣṭha who has mastered clairvoyance (avādhi) does not suffer any impairment of his powers while taking a meal, then how could a kevalin?
There are two basic factors which ensure that the **kevalin** can exist for a considerable period of time: life karma which determines the length of his life, and the intake of food; his energy, state of bliss etc. are irrelevant. What, then, is the nature of the food that the **kevalin** takes? The Śvetāmbara polemicists give this some consideration since there is a possible ambiguity involved, the term at issue being **āhāra**, literally ‘taking to (oneself)’ which can most appropriately be considered as ‘nourishment’. The canon tells us that all soul ‘take nourishment’ (**āhāriṇah**) for they are all subject to a particular law of nature whereby material particles are attracted to the soul and transformed into nourishment in order to build up a physical body. The Śvetāmbaras divide this matter into three types: **ojas**, the prebirth nourishment taken in the womb which moulds the **audārika** body; **loman**, matter which is taken in through the pores of the skin after the formation of the **audārika** body, and **prakṣepa**, solid food, so called because it is ‘deposited’ (**pra-ksip**) in the mouth and which is the only one of the three which is visible to the ordinary human eye. Now there are traditional statements which say that all creatures, from one-sensed up to the **kevalin**, are continually taking nourishment; that does not mean, however, that the **kevalin** is therefore literally the same as one-sensed creatures or, alternatively, that he is continually eating, but rather that there are two processes at work, the continual influx of matter through the pores and also the intermittent taking of solid food. The Śvetāmbaras insist that a knowledge of the conventional meaning of words must make it clear that when the term **āhāra** is used in the context of the debate about the **kevalin** eating, it must refer to **prakṣepa** nourishment and not to the matter which is attracted to the body.

If it be accepted that it is necessary for the **kevalin** to take food, then the status of hunger (**kṣudh, bubhukṣā**) by which the body signals its need to eat must be assessed. The obvious point the Śvetāmbaras can make is the presence of hunger in the traditional list of afflictions to which the traditional **kevalin** is still subject. As we have seen, these are experienced for various reasons, some occurring prior to the attainment of omniscience and disappearing when the harming karmas are destroyed, others, such as hunger, continuing during the **kevalin** state as a consequence of feeling-producing karma. But, since the Digambaras reject the Śvetāmbara canon and manipulate the sense of TS 9.11, this cannot be a compelling argument in the debate. Nonetheless, the Śvetāmbaras feel perfectly capable of demonstrating by other means that hunger is not something which militates against the **kevalin**’s state of omniscience and, in particular, that it does not disturb his bliss (**sukha**). The feeling-producing karma to which the **kevalin** is still subject gives rise to a variety of sensations, both pleasant and unpleasant, such as hunger, but the experience of unpleasant feelings which continues to the end of the thirteenth stage does not mean that the **kevalin** is in a state of imperfection or unhappiness (**duhkha**),
for the experience of pleasant feelings of necessity involves the experience of their opposite; the terms serve to define each other.\textsuperscript{119} As long as the \textit{kevalin} has feeling-producing karma, he has no control over the working of his body; but whatever he experiences has no bearing on the status of his knowledge which is beyond the categories of bodily pleasure or pain.\textsuperscript{120} Nor can hunger be regarded as impossible in the \textit{kevalin} on the grounds that it is prompted by desire which is in turn a result of delusion (\textit{moha})\textsuperscript{121} for delusion can be dispelled by a particular sort of meditation (\textit{bhāvanā}).\textsuperscript{122} In this context the Śvetāmbaras regard meditation as the contemplation of the positive feeling which is the opposite of the negative feeling which one wishes to suppress: if one wishes to quell anger, gentleness should be contemplated.\textsuperscript{123} But it is obvious that hunger cannot be suppressed in this fashion, for, while craving for food can doubtless be ended temporarily by the contemplation of fasting, hunger will return as soon as the meditation ceases.\textsuperscript{124} Also, if meditation could really put an end to hunger, then the canon would not talk so much about begging for alms which takes up time which could be better spent in meditation and study.\textsuperscript{125} In reality, the onset of hunger is like the onset of heat and cold, a natural event over which the \textit{kevalin} has no influence.\textsuperscript{126} It is only \textit{desire} for the food which conquers hunger which can be regarded as delusion, but as the \textit{kevalin} has got rid of deluding karma, he no longer experiences desire.\textsuperscript{127}

The Śvetāmbara position, therefore, is that there is nothing about eating and hunger which is fundamentally at variance with the attainment of omniscience. The grounds for this are essentially two-fold.\textsuperscript{128} First there are the results of direct sensory perception which tell us that all creatures with physical bodies need food to survive, there being no example of a creature in this world existing without food.\textsuperscript{129} Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is the testimony of scriptural tradition. It is the canon which tells about karma, about the various sorts of bodies and about nourishment; there are specific references within the canon to figures like Mahāvīra eating and, significantly, there is no passage ruling out the taking of food by the \textit{kevalin}.\textsuperscript{130} This is unimpeachable evidence, for scripture has been promulgated by the omniscient ones themselves; it deals with matters ultimately beyond the senses\textsuperscript{131} and any statement or description contained within it is in accordance with reality.\textsuperscript{132}

Finally, it must be emphasised that the \textit{kevalin}'s taking of food is not solely to support his body, for there is a specifically soteriological reason, the \textit{kevalin}'s continued existence serving to bring about not only his own salvation but also that of other beings in the world. \textit{Siddhi} comes only at the last moment of the fourteenth stage of the path; by eating and thus prolonging his life, the \textit{kevalin} can, through preaching and example, point the way to others.\textsuperscript{133}

Although he was not the only Digambara to discuss the nature of the
kevalin, it is clear that Prabhācandra (11th century) can be regarded as the main respondent to Abhayadeva, Śākaṭyana and Śilārika both because of his chronological posteriority to these writers and because, in the seventeenth century, the great Śvetāmbara, Yaśovijaya, specifically identifies Prabhācandra and his Nyāyakumudacandra (‘The Lotus-moon of Logic’; = NKC) with the general Digambara position. The NKC is a lengthy commentary on Akalanika’s Laghīyavastraya and effectively summarises the Digambara attitude to key ontological issues. Before giving an account of Prabhācandra’s response, it is interesting to consider two possible objections to the Śvetāmbaras made by other Digambaras but not utilised by Prabhācandra. The first objection is specifically Digambara since it derives from the writings of Kundakunda and, in particular, his Samayasāra. Kundakunda is noteworthy for having evolved an approach to the description of reality very close to the notion of two levels of truth which is much better known in the context of Mādhyaṃika Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. According to Kundakunda, there are two possible standpoints (naya) from which judgements can be made about the soul: the standpoint of determination (niścaya) and the standpoint of everyday reality (vyavahāra). The former is concerned with the soul as ultimate reality whereas the latter is concerned with the soul’s ostensible contact with that which, in reality, does not pertain to it. So Devasena (tenth century) in his Bhāvasamgraha (verse 113) says that, while the kevalin metaphorically (uvaśāṇa, i.e. on the level of vyavahāra, ordinary reality) might be said to be subject to the process of āhāra whereby karmic or non-karmic matter (including food) is taken into the body, on the level of true reality (niṣaṇṇa), he is not subject to it because he is free from passion and wholly ‘other’.

The second possible objection to the Śvetāmbaras is more obvious given Jainism’s strongly sympathetic attitude towards all forms of life in the world. Since even plants have souls and are composed of conglomerations of life forms (nigoda), Vāmadeva (fourteenth century) points out that for the kevalin to take alms, even in vegetarian form, must involve ‘intention to harm’ (himsā) for somebody. Even though monastic law, which deals with giving and receiving alms, makes clear that the monk’s attitude to the preparation of food is neutral, it might still seem highly improbable that the kevalin should be implicated in any way in the destruction of life. That Prabhācandra uses neither of these arguments of Devasena and Vāmadeva presumably suggests that he felt able to confute the Śvetāmbaras by showing the obvious inconsistencies of the points they themselves made.

Prabhācandra starts by trying to establish exactly what is meant by the term ‘nourishment’ (āhāra). The traditional Digambara analysis of this is both more elaborate than the Śvetāmbara version and also has different nomenclature: the solid food which the Śvetāmbara call ‘deposit nourishment’
(prakṣepāhāra) is termed by the Digambaras ‘morsel, mouthful nourishment’
(kavalāhāra), perhaps reflecting the more austere form of eating of the
Digambara ascetic. Prabhācandra affirms the point made by the
Śvetāmbaras that āhāra means the matter which the laws of nature dictate is
attracted to the body. However, this cannot mean that the kevalin specifically
takes morsel nourishment when he is described as ‘taking nourishment’, for
this would mean designating as not ‘taking nourishment’ one-sensed creatures
(that is, plants), egg-born creatures (that is, when actually in the egg) and the
gods, none of whom, according to Digambara analysis, take morsel nourish-
ment, as well as those animals and men who do not happen to be eating at a
particular time. Particularly significant is the example of the gods, for,
although they are subject to feeling-producing karma and thus might be
expected, in Śvetāmbara terms, to experience hunger, they do not take solid,
morsel food. This is high praise indeed of the kevalin, says Prabhācandra
mockingly, when feeling-producing karma does not cause the gods to eat
whereas it does for the kevalin who is far superior to the gods. This is a rather
inauspicious start to Prabhācandra’s argument since he has not in any way
refuted the Śvetāmbara point that the meaning of āhāra is perfectly clear from
the context in which it is used.

Prabhācandra then goes on to ask what could be the factors which deter-
mine that the kevalin does eat. Since the Śvetāmbaras place great weight upon
the authoritative means of knowledge by which they reach their conclusions,
the Digambara, by adducing the Śvetāmbara belief that the kevalin’s eating
and evacuation of food are invisible, is able to turn the tables on his opponents’
view that direct perception and the Śvetāmbara canon enable us to make a
correct judgement in this matter, for if we understand directly through our
senses that the kevalin eats, then that contradicts the canonical position that he
has transcended the senses; alternatively, if it were said that our under-
standing comes through extrasensory means, then the holder of such a stupid
view would have to be subjected to trial by ordeal. If, however, we infer that
the kevalin eats, then what is the premise (linga) on which such an inference is
based? It cannot be feeling-producing karma because this has already been
ruled out by reference to the gods, nor can it be mortality because the kevalin
has transcended this state, a judgement which is very revealing of the
Digambara position. This last point is reinforced by the fact that the kevalin
does not possess a ‘normal audārika body of flesh and blood, as the
Śvetāmbaras argue, but a ‘supreme’ (parama) audārika body ‘which is like
pure crystal, the embodiment of lustre and without the seven constituents of
the human body’. Such a body, completely different from the bodies of normal
creatures, cannot be said to require food for its support, when inferior beings
like the gods can survive without eating. In the kevalin state, absence of
eating is no more noteworthy than absence of growth of hair.
Since the kevalin has great ascetic power, there is no contradiction in his existing without eating, just as there is no contradiction in him facing in all geographical directions simultaneously (caturāsya) and other such miraculous attainments. Evidence for this can be found both in ordinary life where it is obvious that there is no difference in bodily condition between someone who eats on five occasions and someone engaged in meditation who eats a lesser number of times, or between someone who eats every day and somebody who omits to eat for several days, and also in traditional lore which asserts that the kevalin Bāhubali maintained excellent physical condition without eating for a year. In fact, the main determining factor for the existence of the body is life-karma and life-karma alone; food, if taken, is merely a subsidiary factor even during the chadmāsthā period. As Akalanka had already pointed out, matter perpetually flows into the kevalin’s body to ensure that it does not diminish in size and therefore there is no way of proving that the kevalin cannot exist for vast periods of time without eating.\textsuperscript{143}

Prabhācandra then returns to feeling-producing karma and reiterates the early Digambara assertion that it would be incapable of independently giving rise to any unpleasant experience such as hunger unless it were accompanied by deluding karma. He gives two similes to illustrate this. Just as when the general of an army falls in battle and his army as a consequence has no power, so in the same way, when the deluding karma is destroyed, the non-harming karmas, such as feeling-producing, lose their efficacy. Again, here echoing Akalanka’s simile in his commentary on TS 9.11, just as when poison is rendered harmless by a doctor and has no effect, so feeling-producing karma cannot bring about an effect when deluding karma has been destroyed by the fire of intense meditation (śuklādhyāna). The kevalin cannot experience hunger because there is no delusion (moha) in him which might serve as its cause, and without a cause there can be no effect.\textsuperscript{144} If the karma were to bring about an effect irrespective of the spiritual status of the person being affected, then all sorts of disagreeable things, sexual temptation and so on, would come about for the person on the religious path; as the mind would be disturbed, meditation could not be performed and so the important transition through the eighth, ninth and tenth stages (kṣapakāśrenī) could not be made in order to bring about the destruction of delusion. But, in reality things of an impure nature do not afflict the kevalin who is subject only to the pure. The kevalin is like a powerful king who has just captured a neighbouring country: the wicked inhabitants who still survive cannot go on performing wicked actions while the good inhabitants continue to perform their activities without hindrance. The kevalin destroys impure things and preserves pure things, as the king punishes the guilty but not the innocent.\textsuperscript{145}

Hunger, as its name suggests, involves desire (Prabhācandra uses the desiderative noun from bhuj, bubhukṣā) and as such is no different from the
desire for sexual relations. Contrary to the Śvetāmbara viewpoint, it must disappear when its opposite is meditated upon; just as lust for women disappears when one emerges from meditation, so does hunger. Once again, lack of delusion can be seen as the crucial factor: hunger and lack of delusion in the same person are as impossible as heat and cold together. Even if it be allowed that hunger does not involve desire, it still involves unhappiness or discomfort (duḥkha) which is impossible in the kevalin who is characterised by infinite bliss (anantasukha); bliss and unhappiness cannot co-exist, for the former dispels the latter as fire does cold. Śākaṭāyana’s assertion that the Digambara position entails a situation wherein a person of little knowledge such as a child would be very hungry and vice versa is futile because knowledge characterised by bliss is something only the kevalin can have. There is no point in the Śvetāmbaras maintaining that omniscience is not at variance with hunger because it is ultimately beyond the senses, since it would therefore be impossible to say anything sensible about it or understand how it is capable of witnessing anything. The kevalin does not experience hunger precisely because he is omniscient; his powers would lose their efficacy were he to need food, just as ordinary people experience a diminution of their physical powers when affected by hunger.

Prabhācandra then attempts to refute other Śvetāmbara contentions. The eleven parīṣahas which the Śvetāmbaras claim afflict the kevalin because of his feeling-producing karma can be rejected on etymological grounds, and also because the kevalin would have to fall prey to illness; but gods have feeling-producing karma and do not fall ill. The Śvetāmbara assertion that, if eating were to be regarded as a fault (doṣa), then so should activities like speaking is incorrect for two reasons: the kevalin’s obligation to speak is a result of nāme-karma, and speech, unlike hunger, is not found in the traditional list of eighteen faults. It is wrong to compare the operation of clairvoyance (avādhi) with omniscience, for while clairvoyance may function perfectly well when applied to external objects which are its proper sphere, there arises interference when it is applied at the same time as eating; this is completely different from kevala knowledge which functions without any interruption. Finally, the Śvetāmbara assertion that matijñāna, the inferior kind of knowledge, would not arise in the kevalin even though he were to have contact with the objects of the senses is inappropriate, for if the relationship between object and perceiver does not give rise to matijñāna, then the sphere of operation of that form of knowledge is completely removed.

According to the Digambara, then, there is no reason why the kevalin should eat. He does not need to increase his size because this occurs through the continual influx of matter. He certainly does not eat to maintain his knowledge because he has destroyed the harming karma which veils knowledge (jñānāvaraṇīya). He does not need to put an end to the pangs of hunger because a
being of infinite bliss and energy does not experience such discomfort, nor is he attempting to avoid accidental or premature death (apavartana), for a being in his last existence cannot fall victim to that. The excuse that eating enables the kevalin to point out the way to liberation to others is totally improbable because the kevalin with his infinite energy is quite capable of doing this without eating.\textsuperscript{154}

It is in the last portion of his account that Prabhācandra makes his most telling points. As we have already seen, the traditional Śvetāmbara list of the miraculous attainments of the kevalin includes the fact that he eats and excretes food unseen by human eye. That none of the Śvetāmbara polemicists mention this suggests that it may have been a cause of some difficulty to them in the debate and certainly Prabhācandra is well able to demonstrate the ludicrous inconsistency of this situation. The conventionalised surroundings in which the tīrthaṅkara (and it is this figure and not the ordinary kevalin, that Prabhācandra would appear to be now talking about) promulgates the law is called the samavasarana, an assembly of divine beings, humans and animals who have come together to hear the tīrthaṅkara preach and where a temple (devacchandaka) has been magically created to which, according to the Svetāmbaras, the tīrthaṅkara can withdraw and stay at his leisure (yathāsukham āste). But what possible reason, asks Prabhācandra, does he have for retiring there? He does not need peace and quiet to facilitate meditation because he does not have normal mental faculties which could be disturbed; besides, a tīrthaṅkara can only metaphorically be said to meditate. It simply makes no sense to describe a being of infinite bliss and energy taking his ease.\textsuperscript{155}

The supposition must therefore be that the tīrthaṅkara withdraws for some secret purpose. Assuming for the sake of argument that he might be going off to a solitary place to consume food outwith the sight of human eye, Prabhācandra mockingly asks whether he is afraid of being seen or whether he is leaving behind his hungry pupils and, despite his great compassion, slinking off to eat on his own. It might as well be maintained that he consorts with women as to suggest that he behaves in this way.\textsuperscript{156}

An alternative hypothesis might be that his solitary sojourn in the temple is for the purpose of destroying karma. However, the tīrthaṅkara has already destroyed the harming karmas and will easily put an end to the non-harming karmas at the appropriate moment through the fire of ‘pure meditation’ (śukladhyāna) which characterises kevalins. If this were not so, then it would mean that the continuing process of the cultivation of pure meditation would manifest itself in one form in private in the temple and in another form openly in the assembly. Prabhācandra then combines these two unlikely possibilities and asks how the tīrthaṅkara could destroy the karma which of necessity would accrue at the time of eating. Confession (pratikramaṇa) is the normal way of
doing this, yet confession is for those who have committed faults, a category in which the tirthaṅkara cannot be included.  

In a final burst of sarcasm, Prabhācandra asks how the tirthaṅkara could become invisible to even his closest disciples at the time of eating since his body continually blazes forth with light. If he is concealed by some kind of screen then it would be difficult to give alms to him at all, and if his invisibility comes about through some kind of magic spell, then he is a wizard (vidyādhara) and not an ascetic. The Digambara position, in short, is that the kevalin’s position is one of infinite bliss, and hunger is at odds with this.

Although other Jaina writers engaged in debate about the kevalin, it was Abhayadeva, Śakaṭāyana, Śilāṅka and Prabhācandra who established the main terms of reference of the controversy. We have already seen that Vādidevasuṇi employed traditional Śvetāmbara arguments in his disputation with the Digambara Kumudacandra and an examination of his Śyādvādaratnākara highlights this, for in this work which is, somewhat ironically, indebted to Prabhācandra, he merely reiterates the points made by his distinguished predecessors, often scarcely deviating from their actual language, and adds nothing new to the Śvetāmbara approach to the kevalin. Digambara writers such as Jayasena (12th century), the commentator on Kundakunda’s Prawacanasāra, and Vāmadeva (14th century) echo the arguments and spirit of Akalanika and Prabhācandra.

The last noteworthy writer to participate in the debate was the Śvetāmbara, Yaśovijaya, one of the most illustrious members of the Tapā Gaccha. Although he is usually depicted as a reformer and standardiser of Jaina practice, his Ādhyaṭmikamatakhaṇḍana (‘The Destruction of Digambara Doctrine’) is, as its title suggests, neither sirenic nor conciliatory towards his opponents. In this often fiercely polemical work, in which Prabhācandra is singled out for specific abuse, Yaśovijaya deploys a broad range of reference to Jaina literature and also utilises a highly sophisticated logical technique to reinforce the standard Śvetāmbara position and to attack some aspects of the Digambara argument not dealt with by the earlier writers. He is particularly scathing towards the idea that the kevalin might possess a special kind of body, a paramaudārika body, which lacks the fundamental physical constituents (dhātu). It is nonsensical, Yaśovijaya asserts, to maintain that a body with such a tough physical structure as the kevalin’s should not have the fundamental constituents, for the very idea of an audārika body of any sort would be undermined if it did not have bones, sinews and so on. If it were to be denied that the kevalin has blood, then belief in his miraculous attributes (atiṣaya), valid by and large for both sects, would have to be abandoned, for it is supposedly one of the main characteristics of the kevalin that his blood is as white as milk. Alternatively, if the Digambaras were to argue that the fundamental constituents gradually disappear as the individual progresses
through the stages of spiritual development, then this would entail
the impossible situation of the body altering its basic structure as each new stage is
reached.\textsuperscript{163}

For Yaśovijaya, Śivabhūti, the putative founder of the Digambara sect, can
hardly be considered a Jaina at all. The aim of the Digamberas in saying that the kevalin doesn’t eat is to mislead the world and, as they are in the grip of
‘deluding karma which arises from false doctrine’ (mithyātvamohaniya), they
are to be avoided at all costs.\textsuperscript{164}

It is somewhat startling to read such virulent denunciation of one Jaina sect
by a member of another, even if it be partly rhetorical, and one must conclude
that the embattled situation in which Jainism no doubt found itself in the
seventeenth century, with numbers shrinking under Hindu and Moslem
pressure, must have induced Yaśovijaya to resort to harsh language in an
attempt to impose doctrinal unity. Unfortunately for him, this was hardly a
debate which could be ‘won’ by either side, Vādidevasūri’s victory over
Kumudacandra in 1125 AD probably representing not so much the triumph of
one set of doctrinal beliefs over another but more likely the confirmation of the
geographical boundaries of sectarian spheres of influence, Śvetāmbara in
Gujarat and Digambara in the south. A comment by the twelfth century
Digambara, Jayasena, is particularly revealing in this aspect. There is, he
says, no point in asserting that the kevalin eats food on the basis of observation of
the behaviour of ordinary people in the world today, since there have been
no kevalins since Jambū whose behaviour we could observe. We would be
forced to deny the omniscience of the kevalin because we do not currently find
anybody with comparable attainments and the prowess of the legendary
heroes, Rāma and Rāvana, would also have to be rejected because we do not see
their like today.\textsuperscript{165} In fact, a consideration of our polemicists’ statements
suggests that neither of the competing viewpoints was really susceptible to
disproval by logical means and that the weight of the respective traditions
built up over the centuries, with their differing emphases and interpretations
of aspects of the common Jaina tradition, produced two different and
incontrovertible pictures of the kevalin.

As far as the debate is concerned, the Śvetāmbaras seem to view the kevalin
as essentially human, but a human of a highly developed type who is at the
same time still subject to mortal frailties: in the words of Abhayadeva, ‘There
is no time until his final release when he does not have vexations (kleśa)’.\textsuperscript{166}

For the Digambaras, on the other hand, he is much more than human and to
all intents and purposes approaches divinity, a view expressed in
Samantabhadra’s Bhātsvayambhūstotra which Prabhācandra quotes with
approval: ‘He (i.e. the kevalin qua śūraṅkara) has gone beyond mortal nature
and is a divinity among divinities.’\textsuperscript{167}

As my purpose in this paper has been the delineation of the terms of
reference of this old debate, my concluding remarks will be general and
tentative. If we can assume, as I have already suggested, that the sectarian
polemicists, in discussing the kevalin, are effectively referring to the
tīrthaṅkara, then it must necessarily be asked whether the differing judgements
about his need to eat have any implications for the attitudes of contemporary
Jaina devotees (for it is the tīrthaṅkaras who are the objects of worship and not
the siddhas, the liberated souls who are the members of a much larger
category). The most tangible manifestation of these differing conceptions is
the offerings placed in front of images of the tīrthaṅkaras: edible things such as
fruit and nuts by the Śvetāmbaras and inedible things such as flowers by the
Digambaras, although they do not seem totally consistent in this.\textsuperscript{168}
Śvetāmbara ritual thus confirms Abhayadeva, Śilāṅka and the rest. But how
‘human’ does this make the Śvetāmbara tīrthaṅkara, for if he eats, which is a
basic human function, he does not sleep, another equally basic human
function, as the Bhagavaśutta makes clear.\textsuperscript{169}
In fact, it is not only the Digambaras who describe the tīrthaṅkara as a god
but also the Śvetāmbaras. The description ‘god’ (deva) is analysed in the
Bhagavaśutta 12.9\textsuperscript{170} where it is stated that it can be used not only of those
beings who live in heaven while still being subject to the process of rebirth but
also of kevalins and even ordinary monks; divinity in these terms signifies
status alone and does not entail any ability or desire to influence human events
and destinies. The distinguished Digambara layman and scholar, A.N.
Upadhye, used the expression ‘divinity’ in the title of a short essay about the
tīrthaṅkara which could scarcely be bettered as a general statement about
Jaina worship and belief.\textsuperscript{171} Upadhye asserts confidently that no Jaina
believes that one worships a tīrthaṅkara in order to ensure some reward or
blessing; participation in ritual serves merely to concentrate the mind, the
objects of devotion being examples to be emulated by the worshipper.
Upadhye gives the standard intellectual account of the religion: as such it is
worthy of respect and would no doubt be echoed by many members of the
community, irrespective of sect. Yet it has not passed unnoticed that many
Jainās do in fact act towards the tīrthaṅkara in a manner which suggests that
they expect some form of reward for their worship, if only in the form of
grace,\textsuperscript{172} and the non-Jaina is entitled to wonder whether Upadhye’s all-
embracing statement about the nature of Jaina belief is valid for all
members of all sects on every occasion. Unfortunately, it is here that the lack of
competent field-studies is most to be regretted and we must be highly cautious
about any judgements we make. It is, however, tempting to seek a possible
analogy with Sinhalese Buddhism, an area in which field-studies abound and
which, from the point of view of the situation just described, has many
similarities with Jainism. Like Mahāvīra and the other tīrthaṅkaras, the
Buddha is essentially a dead renouncer who has achieved nirvāṇa and is
therefore outwith \textit{samsāric} affairs. Despite this, many Buddhists perform rituals which seem to suggest that he is more than this. In Gombrich's opinion, there are two levels of belief at work here. For the villagers whom he studied, the Buddha was 'cognitively' dead and unable to exert influence, in other words, this is what the villagers firmly stated to be the case. On the 'affective' level, however, the Buddha is alive and capable of granting boons; the villagers manifested this attitude by their behaviour in worship.\textsuperscript{173} This analysis has been criticised by Southwold on the grounds that behaviour is never a sufficient basis for deducing belief.\textsuperscript{174} His fieldwork shows that Sinhalese Buddhists consistently hold that the Buddha is defunct and as a consequence, totally unable to influence human affairs. When some wordly favour is required, then worship is directed towards the intermediate figures of the Sinhalese pantheon (similar deities exist in Jainism);\textsuperscript{175} true religion, which has more serious goals, is in the mind.

The whole notion of belief is, of course, notoriously difficult. If we do not take seriously what an informant specifically tells us to be the case, then our ability to make valid statements about anything is likely to be seriously hindered, but, at the same time, we should beware of overemphasising the validity of statements such as Upadhye's and giving total credence to them, for all utterances about belief function in a wider network of other unexpressed utterances and beliefs.\textsuperscript{176} Upadhye's statement about Jaina belief is in these terms not worthless but must inevitably be subject to qualification: the context in which statements about worship are uttered is not the same context in which worship is performed.

In a recent book\textsuperscript{177} Southwold has subjected the idea that belief has primacy in religion to a rigorous critique and demonstrates that it is a legacy of the Christian world-view (perhaps ultimately going back to the Greeks) to maintain that matters of religious truth can only be expressed in belief-avowals.\textsuperscript{178} Similarly, it is a legacy of the fact that westerners have been reared and conditioned in a theistic culture (or at least one which generally speaks about religion in theistic terms) which leads them to judge the Buddha and, by extension, the Jaina \textit{tīrthāṅkara}, in theistic terms.\textsuperscript{179} I do not wish to take issue with Southwold's subtle and, above all, humane study which provides a highly attractive model for the study of religions, but it is not mere theistic bias which finally leads me to question Jainism's credentials as a totally atheistic religion. The early texts may indeed advise the Jaina that there is no being worthy of worship, but it does seem highly likely that the centuries of influence which an increasingly predominant Hinduism exerted upon Jainism reshaped many of the characteristics of Jaina religious behaviour. In the words of P.S. Jaini, 'The wave of the \textit{bhakti} movement that had swept over the whole range of Indian life finally overtook the atheist Jainas and forced them to deify, as it were, their human \textit{tīrthāṅkaras} or face the peril of extinction. Probably this move brought
to the surface the emotional hunger of the Jaina laity for an object of worship more gracious or glamorous than merely the austere figure of an exalted human teacher. The Digambara Jinasena’s Ādiṣṭḥā (9th century) shows a clear desire to assimilate the tīrtheśvara (in this case Rṣabha) and the Hindu gods and leaves no room for doubt that devotion directed towards him will bring about the desired rewards. Although these rewards arguably involve the internal, spiritual transformation of the devotee, Jinasena unmistakably conveys that the tīrtheśvara is capable of bestowing grace.

The time is surely ripe to consider some vital questions about the Jaina religion: contemporary sectarian attitudes towards the tīrtheśvara, the role of the deities of the Jaina pantheon in worship, the possibility of regional as well as sectarian variations in ritual and so on. Jinasena jeered that anybody who tried to demonstrate that the kevalin takes food was suffering from a disease brought about by delusion and would need a strong dose of ancient ghee to remedy it. It is to be hoped that Western students of South Asian religion can find a more palatable means of dispelling the deluding karma which has prevented them from giving Jainism the attention it deserves.

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NOTES

1 R. Williams, Jaina Yoga: a survey of the medieval śrāvakācāras, London 1963. The University of California’s publication in 1979 of P. S. Jaini’s The Jaina Path of Purification is greatly to be welcomed.
2 See, for example, A. L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, London 1971, p. 295.
3 Published by the Oxford University Press 1915; reprinted in Delhi 1970.
4 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, London 1973, p. 398. Happily, the situation seems to be changing. Caroline Humphrey of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, UK, is studying image installation in Jaina temples; two postgraduate students working under Dr Humphrey’s direction, Josephine Reynell and Marcus Banks, are studying respectively Jaina women in Jaipur and the Jaina communities in Jamnagar and Leicester; Michael Carrithers, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Durham, UK, is studying the Jaina community in Kolhapur and Thomas McCormick, Department of History, University of Michigan, USA is completing a doctoral dissertation on lay-monastic relations in Gujarat.
5 See Burton Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India, Delhi, 1980, pp. 79–80.
6 For this characterisation of southern religion see Friedhelm Hardy, Virahabhakti: The Early History of Kṛṣṇa Devotion in South India, Oxford 1982, p. 169.
7 Stein op. cit. See also Burton Stein, All the King’s Mana: Perspectives on Kingship in Medieval South India, in J. F. Richards (ed.) Kingship and Authority in South Asia, Madison 1981 (second edition), pp. 115–67, which is fundamental for assessing the ideological role of Jainism in South India.

8 See Kṣamāśramaṇa Jñabhadra Gaṇin’s Nihnavaśīda with Hemacandra Maladhārīn’s commentary, ed. Muni Rātnaprabhavijaya, Ahmedabad 1947. Some versions know of seven schisms only and it is conceivable that the account of the eighth is an interpolation. See Suzuko Ohira, A Study of Tattvārthasūtra with Bhāṣya with special reference to authorship and date, I. D. Series 86, Ahmedabad 1982, p. 129. Still basic for the schisms remains Ernst Leumann, Die alten Berichte von dem Schisma der Jainen, Indische Studien, 17, 1885, pp. 91–135.

9 The importance of this tenet can be judged from its occurrence at the beginning of the vast fifth aṅga of the canon, the Bhagavaisutta. (For convenience I will quote from the Sthānakhāsi edition of the canon, Suttāgame (SĀ), in two volumes by Pupphabhikkhū, Gurgaon 1953, 1954.) Bhagavaisutta 1.1 = SĀ I p. 384 line 23 – p. 385 line 8. See also Jozef Deleu, Viyāhapannatti (Bhagavāi): The Fifth Aṅga of the Jaina Canon: Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary and Notes, Brugge 1970, p. 73.

10 Yogāśītra 2.3.3 prathamo vibhāgah, ed. Muni Jambūvijaya, Bombay 1977, p. 165.

11 The other category is the sthāvirakalpa according to which the monk wears a robe and lives in a monastic community.


13 Jaina, Path, p. 51.

14 For observations on the sense of the term ‘canon’ see Klaus Bruhn, Āvaśyaka Studies I, in Klaus Bruhn and Albrecht Wezler (eds). Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus: Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 12 (pp. 11–49).


16 The assumption must be that by this time the white robed monks were in a numerical ascendancy in the west. See Ohira op. cit., pp. 126–34. It is clear from the metrical and linguistic evidence that the canon underwent a long period of evolution. For an example justifying Digambara suspicions about Śvetāmbara texts, see Ludwig Alsdorf, Further Contributions to the History of Jaina Cosmography, New Indian Antiquary, 9, 1947, pp. 112–113 (pp. 105–128) = Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1974, pp. 143–144 (pp. 136–159) and for the editorial processes at work in one text, see Colette Caillat, Notes sur les variantes dans la tradition du Dasaveyāliya-sutta, Indologica Taurinensia, 89, 1981–2, pp. 71–83.


19 The type of whisk carried by a Digambara monk was as important an element of orthopraxy as nakedness. Kumārasena, the founder of the Kāśhā Saṅgha, was expelled from the Mūla Saṅgha for attempting to change the peacock-feather whisk to one made out of cow’s tail. See Ram Bhushan Prasad Singh, Jainism in Early Medieval Karnataka, Delhi 1975, p. 127.

23 Tawney, p. 98.
24 Ibid. p. 104.
25 Verses 218–227. The question of women’s ability to reach nirvāṇa is essentially a by-product of the sectarian attitude to the wearing of clothes by renouncers.
26 For the various unpleasant experiences which the Buddha underwent, see Étienne Lamotte, L’Enseignement de Vimalakirti, Louvain, 1962, pp. 416–420.
27 For a representative cross-section, see Jinendra Varṇi, Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa (= JSK) four volumes, Delhi 1970–73, volume two, pp. 155–169; and Balchandra Siddhāntashāstrī, Jainalakṣaṇāvalī, volume two, Delhi 1973, p. 373.
30 Ibid., p. 51 and Jaini, Path, p. 33.
31 Bhagavaśutta 20.8 (SĀ I, p. 805 lines 6–7); Deleu, Vīyāhapannatti, p. 257.
35 However Śakaṭāyana, Kevalibhukti-prakaraṇa (see footnote 72) kārikā 28, commentary, makes a distinction between tirthaṅkaras and other kevalins. Prabhācandra (footnote 133) mentions Bāhubali.
37 SĀ I, pp. 118 lines 13 to 14.
38 Ibid., lines 15 to 17.
39 Ibid., lines 19 to 21.
40 SĀ I, p. 118 line 22 to p. 119 line 2.
41 SĀ I p. 119 lines 7 to 8.
42 Ibid., lines 21 to 22.
43 Ibid., lines 24 to 25.
44 Ibid., lines 26 to 27. (Eating at night involves the possible unwitting destruction of lifeforms.)
SĀ I, pp. 708–739; Deleu, Vīyāhāpannatti, pp. 214–220.

Ibid., p. 730 line 18 to p. 732 bottom.


Kundakunda, Pravacanasāra, ed. A. N. Upadhye, Bombay 1935, p. 27.

Quoted by JSK, volume 2, p. 159.

See Ohira op. cit.

SĀ I, pp. 29–32; Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras, Part One, pp. 79–87.

Bhagavāsutta 8.8 (SĀ I, p. 558 lines 23 – p. 559 line 24); Deleu, Vīyāhāpannatti, pp. 152–3. See also Uttarajjhayanasutta Chapter two (SĀ II, pp. 979–981); Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras, part two, pp. 8–15.

See Sukhlalji op. cit., p. 333.

See TS 8.5–14. See also the descriptions of Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi 1951, pp. 232–233 and Jaini, Path, pp. 131–133. The form (a)ghātiyā is semi-Prakritised based on ghātikā. Also used is (a)ghātin.

For the difference between jāna and darṣana, see Ramjee Singh op. cit., pp. 61–67.

According to TS 10.5 it is only final release which involves destruction of all karma.


For the four infinite qualities of the kevalin viz. insight, knowledge, bliss and energy, see JSK, volume 1, p. 141.

For auspicious (sūbha) karma, see TS 8.26.

One of the oldest Digambara texts, Vaṭṭakeras’ Mulācāra, states (5.58) that there are two types of aversion (vidiginchā): one is directed towards material (dawva) things such as excrement while the other is directed towards spiritual or psychological (bhāva) things such as the afflictions. The Digambaras add two more parīṣahas to the Svetāmbara list: disaffection with monastic life (aradi) and liking for worldly life (radi). See Kiyoaki Okuda, Eine Digambara-Dogmatik: das fünfte Kapitel von Vaṭṭakera’s Mūlācāra, Wiesbaden 1975, pp. 49–50 and pp. 108–109. It is the Digambara contention that it is only the ordinary monk who is afflicted by the parīṣahas. For dawya and bhāva see Ludwig Alsdorf, Nikṣepa – a Jaina Contribution to Scholastic Methodology, Journal of the Oriental Institute Baroda 22, 1973, p. 456 (pp. 455–463) = Kleine Schriften, p. 258 (pp. 257–265).

Tattvārthavārttikā. Volume one, p. 105 lines 30 to 33.

See Sukhlalji op. cit., p. 312.

The influential Digambara work, the Dhavalā, (quoted by JSK volume two, p. 158) states that feeling-producing karma is without power over the kevalin, while the Gommaṭasāra: Karmakāṇḍa, ed. Rai Bahadur J. L. Jaini, Sacred Books
of the Jainas, volume 6, Lahore 1927, p. 12, states that feeling-producing karma does not operate without deluding karma. Bhagavaisutta 8.10 (SĀ I, p. 573 line 3 – p. 574 line 6; Deleu, Viyāhapanatti, p. 158) discusses the various combinations of types of karma and states that deluding karma may or may not occur in conjunction with feeling-producing karma but says nothing of any possible lack of efficacy of the latter.

Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmatitarkapracaranā with the commentary of Abhayadevasūri, part four, ed. Sukhlāl Sanghāvi and Becardās Dosi, Ahmedabad, Samvat 1985, pp. 610–615. For Abhayadeva’s date see Jaini, Path, p. 85.

68 There was general agreement amongst Jainas that consciousness was composed of knowledge (jñāna) and insight (darśana). However, it was not clear how these operated in the context of kevala knowledge i.e. do they occur in sequence or in tandem or is there no difference between them at all inasmuch as they occur simultaneously? Siddhasena Divākara argues for the last view and it is while discussing the possible validity of sequential consciousness that Abhayadeva deals with the nature of the kevalin. See Ramjee Singh op. cit., pp. 61–67.

69 For SNT I have used the reprint of the Āgama dayasamiti edition Acārāṅgsūtram and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram with the Niruykti of Acārya Bhadrabrāhu Svāmī and with the commentary of Śīlāṅkācārya, originally edited by Sāgarānanda Sūri and re-edited by Muni Jambuṣvijaya, Lālā Sundarlāl Jaina Āgamagranthamālā, volume one, Delhi 1978, pp. 228–231. For Śīlāṅka’s date see W. B. Bollée, Studien zum Siyagada, Heidelberg 1977, p. 3.

70 Śākaṭāyana is quoted by Śīlāṅka and must therefore be before him. For a discussion of Śākaṭāyana’s dating see Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature in Jan Gonda (ed.), History of Indian Literature, volume 5, fascicule two, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 169.


72 Śākaṭāyana, Strinivānakevalibhuktiṣprakaraṇe, ed. Muni Jambuṣvijaya, Bhavnagar 1974; KBHP = pp. 39–52. This edition contains reprints of the relevant portions of SMTV and SNT.

73 For the fourteen gunasthānas see Jaini, Path, pp. 272–273.

74 TS 6.1 defines yoga as activity of body, speech and mind. It is one of the five causes of karmic bondage, defined at TS 8.1 as false doctrine, absence of discipline (avirati), spiritual negligence (pramāda) passion (kasāya) and yoga.

75 TS 10.5–6.

76 Bhagavaisutta 1.4 (SĀ I, p. 397 line 13 to bottom of page); Deleu, Viyāhapanatti, p. 79. Higher forms of knowledge such as avadhi disappeared with Jambū. See Jinabhādra, Nihnavavāda, p. 314.

77 Bhagavaisutta 5.4 (SĀ I, p. 478 lines 27 to lines 30); Deleu, p. 109. See also Deleu p. 167 where the kevalin are said to have no senses.

78 Bhagavaisutta 8.2 (SĀ I, p. 540 line 8 to line 14); Deleu, p. 146.

79 The canonical list of the Samavāyamgasutta (SĀ I, p. 345 line 24 – p. 346 line 17) calls them aisesa. See also Krause, Ancient Jaina Hymns, pp. 20–22. For the Digambara list see JSK I, p. 141. There are also five auspicious events (kalyāna) which occur during the tīrthāṅkara’s life.

80 Among the various types of name-karma enumerated at TS 8.12 is that which
brings about the tīrthaṅkara state. The various religiously auspicious acts done in the previous life which serve to form it are listed at TS 6.23. See also Jaini, *Path*, p. 260 and p. 266.

81 *Bhaṭagavāsutta* (5.4) (SĀ I, p. 474 line 11 to line 27 and p. 477 line 22 to 29); Deleu, *Viyaḥapannatti*, p. 107 and p. 108.

82 *Pannavaṇaṇasutta* = SĀ II, pp. 265–533; see also the edition of Muni Puṇyavijaya, Dalsukh Mālvanī and Amritāl Mohanlāl Bhojak, *JainaĀgama Series*, number nine, parts one and two, Bombay 1971. For the incorporation of the *Pannavaṇaṇasutta* into the *Bhaṭagavāsutta* see Deleu, pp. 26–28.


84 See TS 2.46 and *Pannavaṇaṇasutta*, *Jaina Āgama Series* edition, part two, p. 329.


86 KBHP kārikās 27–28 points out that, while the kevalin does have many miraculous attributes (*atiṣaya*), some of these existed from his birth and it cannot be established that he did not eat during this period. Essentially, the *atiṣayas* have nothing to do with eating. Compare SNT p. 231 lines 21 to 22: absence of sweat (one of the *atiṣayas*) does not mean absence of consumption of solid food (*prakṣepāhāra*). Also SNT, p. 231 lines 22 to 24: no change takes place in the *audārika* body on the transition from the *chadmaṣṭha* state to the kevalin state.

87 SMTV, p. 612 lines 26 to 29. I take *sakti* here to mean the ability of the body to perform its function as an *audārika* body; the Śvetāmbara seem to accept that the kevalin’s body can lose strength (*bala*) even though he possesses infinite bliss. See SNT, p. 230 line 33.

88 SMTV, p. 612 lines 29 to 31.

89 KBHP kārikā 1 and commentary; SNT, p. 230 lines 28 to 29.

90 For the *taijasa* body see KBHP kārikā 1 and commentary; see also *Pannavaṇaṇasutta*, chapter twenty-one.

91 KBHP kārikā 1 and commentary: SMTV, p. 613 lines 13 to 16.

92 KBHP kārikā and commentary and SMTV, p. 612 lines 12 to 19. For the sense of sātā and asātā, I quote the editors of the Jaina Āgama Series edition of *Pannavaṇaṇasutta*, part two, p. 418: "The feeling of pleasure and pain that we experience on account of the due rise of vedaniyakarma is called sātā-asātā type of vedanā whereas the feeling of pleasure and pain that we experience on account of the instigation (*udīrana*) by other person is called sukha-duḥkha type of vedanā." There is canonical evidence for the kevalin experiencing sātā, according to SNT, p. 230 line 30.

93 For hunger not prejudicing bliss see KBHP kārikās 4–5 and commentary; also SNT, p. 231 lines 10 to 12.

94 SNT, p. 231 line 12.

95 SNT, p. 230 line 29; for life karma not being like a burnt rope, see SMTV, p. 615 lines 5 to 8. For a Digambara example of the expression, see Vāmadeva, *Bhāvasamgraha* verse 215 in *Bhāvasamgrahādīh*, ed. Pannālāl Sonī (Māṇikcand Digambara Jaina Granthamālā 20), Bombay 1922.

96 For the difference between the kevalin and the siddha see *Bhaṭagavāsutta* 14.10 (SĀ I, p. 707 line 26 – p. 708 line 19); Deleu, *Viyaḥapannatti*, p. 213. For the state of complete freedom from karma, *Bhaṭagavāsutta* 7.1 (SĀ I, p. 509 line 20 – p. 510 line 9); Deleu, p. 131. For the continued existence of non-harming karmas in the kevalin see Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 279.
97 See footnote 86.
98 SMTV, p. 613 lines 9 to 26.
99 KBHP kārikā 3 commentary.
100 Ibid. rejecting the point that the kevalin possesses knowledge of a particularly intense kind which can have nothing to do with hunger.
101 SMTV, p. 613 lines 26 to 29.
102 KBHP kārikā 26.
103 See, for example, Akalaṅka, Tattvārthavārttika, volume one, p. 106 lines 1 to 2.
104 KBHP kārikā 25.
105 KBHP kārikā 21 and SNT, p. 231. For pūrva see JSK volume 2, p. 216. The expression désonapūrvakoṭi is canonical. See Bhagavaisutta 12.10 (SA I, p. 670 line 16): desinā puvaṇakotī. The expression is defined more fully at Bhagavaisutta 9.31 (SA I, p. 579 line 6): jahannenaṁ sāregatthavāsāye ukkosenam puvaṇakodiāya. See also Hemacandra, Yogaśāstra dvitiyo bhāgaḥ, ed. Muni Jambuviṣaya, Bombay 1981, 4.10.1, p. 788: ‘The fire of anger burns away (the fruit of) that austerity which has been gained for ten million pūrvas less eight years’ and Yaśovijaya, Ādhyātmikamatakhaṇḍana (see footnote 162), p. 61a lines 3 to 4: ‘If the kevalins’ bodies were not to grow from their ninth year for a period of ten million pūrvas then they would be perpetually in childhood’. See also KBHP 21 commentary. I assume that nine years here represent the minimum age for monastic ordination. Nathmal Tatia and Mahendra Kumar, Studies in Jaina Monachism, p. 69, without quoting the original expression, say that ‘the maximum duration of the (kevalin)’s course is one pūrvakoṭi less twenty-nine years.’ Does this refer to the fact that Mahāvīra renounced at the age of thirty years?
106 SMTV, p. 614 lines 6 to 8.
107 SMTV, p. 614 lines 2 to 6; KBHP kārikā 21. KBHP 22 rejects the possibility of untimely death (apavartaṇā) for the kevalin. For this, see Sukhalal’s Commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra, p. 126.
108 SMTV, p. 614 lines 13 to 15. The period in which the first tīrthaṅkara lived was presumably more suitable for spiritual cultivation than later, more corrupt times.
109 KBHP 29 and commentary. For the eighteen faults, see Helen Johnson, The Deeds of the Sixty-four Illustrious Men, Volume 6, p. 293. For the Digambara list which includes hunger see JSK, Volume 1, p. 141.
110 KBHP kārikā 33 with commentary.
111 KBHP kārikā 32 with commentary.
112 KBHP kārikā 23 with commentary: food is like life-karma. Also SNT, p. 231 lines 8 to 10 and line 24.
114 See Sūyagadāmganiyuttī verse 171–173. Souls which attract ojāhāra are undeveloped (i.e. still in the womb) while those that attract the other two are developed. One-sensed creatures, gods and hell-beings do not take prakṣepa food; all other souls in saṃsāra do. According to an alternative explanation given by SNT, p. 229 lines 36 to 39, prakṣepa is that which is deposited in the body.
115 Quoted by KBHP kārikā 35 commentary, SNT, p. 230 lines 1 to 2 and referred to as authoritative by SMTV, p. 612 line 31 – p. 613 line 3. According to this
verse, the exceptions to the rule about the intake of matter are souls in the process of transmigration (vīghaṇagai), kevalins who are bringing excessive karma to fruition by the process shown as samudghāta (samuhayā), kevalins without activity (ajogi) and siddhas who have attained liberation. Muni Jambūvijaya, KBHP, p. 52, quotes the Digambara version in the Pañcasāṃgraha.

116 SMTV, p. 613 lines 4 to 9; lomāhāra occurs all the time.
117 KBHP kārikā 36.
118 KBHP kārikās 30–31. SMTV, p. 615 lines 8–10 and SNT, p. 231 lines 12 to 20. Śāktaśayas refers to the pariṣaha of illness (roga) and says that gods and tīrthāṅkaras, as distinguished from ordinary kevalins, are traditionally regarded as not experiencing illness (rogaḥbhāvah śrīyate) from their birth but there has never been an example of a mortal in sāmsāra (such as a kevalin) not experiencing hunger. It should incidentally be remembered that, according to the canon, Mahāvīra succumbed to fever after his duel with Makkhali Gosāla.

119 SMTV, p. 615 lines 2 to 7: asātā continues until the fourteenth gunasthāna is entered; if sātā didn’t exist, then how could the kevalin experience bliss (sukha)?

120 KBHP kārikā 5 with commentary.
121 KBHP kārikā 6 with commentary.
123 SNT p. 23 line 29 – p. 231 line 6. The passions (kaśāya) are strong attachment (īrga) and hatred (dveṣa). For the nine nokaśāyas, the subsidiary passions, which are caused by deluding karma viz laughter, like, dislike, fear, grief, disgust and three types of sexual disturbance, see Sukhlalji’s Commentary on the Tattvārthāsastra, p. 308. Compare also Hemacandra, Yogaśāstra 2.4, p. 167 line 6: ‘the tīrthāṅkara has conquered faults like strong attachment and hatred by cultivating their opposites (pratipakṣaṣeṣa) and so on.’

125 KBHP kārikā 7 with commentary.
126 KBHP kārikā 8, p. 43 lines 21 to 25.
127 KBHP kārikā 8, p. 44 lines 1 to 6.
128 SMTV, p. 614 lines 6 to 8.
129 SMTV, p. 613 lines 32 to 33.
130 SMTV, p. 614 lines 11 to 16.
132 SMTV, p. 613 lines 2–3.
133 KBHP 17–18 with commentary. Hemacandra, Yogaśāstra 4.120, p. 952 forcibly rejects the idea that the kevalin by this act of altruism is similar to the Mahāyāna Buddhist bodhisattva: ‘the Buddhist compassion, because of which the bodhisattva says that he will achieve nirvāṇa only after all other creatures have achieved liberation, is not in fact compassion, for if all creatures could be saved, there would be no such thing as samsāra. Buddhist compassion here is just to deceive fools’. It should be remembered that Jainism holds that there is a category of souls called abhaya who will never achieve liberation. Siddhis can be valid only if there is still samsāra.

TS 7.6 advises the cultivation of goodwill (maitrī), joy (pramoda), compassion
(kārṇya) and neutrality (mādhyaṣṭhya) to all beings. These are very similar to the Buddhist brahmavihāras.

134 Prabhācandra, Nyāyakumudacandra, Mānik Candra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, volumes 38 and 39, ed. Mahendra Kumar, Bombay 1938 and 1941; Kevalikavalāhāravīcāra, pp. 851–865. For the dating see the introduction to volume two. Prabhācandra’s other important work, the Prameyakalamārtanḍa also deals with kevalibhukti but does not differ substantially from NKC. For Yaśovijaya’s references to Prabhācandra see Ādhāyātmikamatakhaṅḍaṇa (footnote 162) p. 62b line 10, p. 65b verse 15, p. 67a line 14 and p. 67b line 10. Yaśovijaya regards the author of NKC and the Prameyakalamārtanḍa and the Prabhācandra who commented on Samantabhadra’s Upāsakādhyayana as identical. Compare Chandrabhāl Tripaṭhi, Catalogue of the Jaina Manuscripts at Strasbourg, Leiden 1975, p. 410, who regards the two as different.


136 Verse 113. For the edition see footnote 95. For Devasena’s date see Williams, Jaina Yoga, p. 21.

137 Bhāvasamgraha verse 235. For its date, see Williams, p. 29.

138 NKC, p. 856, lines 1 to 5. The Digambaras regard āhāra as six-fold: nokaṃra and karma are taken by hell-beings, animals, men and gods; kaivala is taken by men and animals, lepya by trees, ojaś by egg-born creatures and manaḥ by gods. Only metaphorically does scriptural tradition describe the kevalin as taking the first two; in reality he is free from passions. See Samayasāra, Sacred Book of the Jainas, pp. 209–210.

139 NKC, p. 856 line 5 – p. 857 line 1.

140 NKC, p. 857 lines 2–3. For the religious ordeal called Kośāpāṇa, see Yājnavalkyasūtila 2, 112–113.

141 NKC, p. 857 lines 8 to 19. The definition of the paramaudārika body is that of Jayasena, the twelfth century commentator on Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra (ed. A. N. Upadhye, Bombay 1935, p. 28). It is unclear to me precisely what is meant by the body lacking the basic constituents. Compare Amṛtacandrasūri, Laghutattvavāpaṭa, ed. P. S. Jaini, L. D. Series, Vol. 62, Ahmedabad 1978, p. 60 verse 13: ‘Free from anxiety you always merely observe this body of yours which is sustained by nourishment derived from its own elements (svadhātposopacitam).’

142 NKC, p. 857 lines 19 to 20. Prabhācandra goes on to point out that the atiṣaya, absence of growth of hair, stems from the destruction of the harming karmas and has nothing to do with Indra’s consecration of the tīrthaṅkaras at their birth by passing his sign of office (vajra) over their hair and nails. That would mean that their hair did not grow up from the roots at all or that all the tīrthaṅkaras had the same type of hair. But Rṣabha’s hair, for example, was different because it was not characterised by the quality of agurulaghu (for which see Sukhaljī’s Commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra, p. 311). In fact their hair and nails cease to grow on the destruction of the harming karmas. If it be accepted that they eat, then it must also be accepted that their nails and hair grow and that they blink, as in the chadmaṭhā stage. See NKC, p. 857 line 21 – p. 858 line 6.

143 NKC, p. 858 line 6 – p. 859 line 2.

144 NKC, p. 859 lines 3 to 8. For śukladhyāna see Jaini, Path, pp. 257–258.

145 NKC, p. 859 lines 9 to 17. According to Prabhācandra (NKC, p. 859 line 18 –
p. 860 line 5) the process of samudghāta by which the soul expands outside the confines of its body and assumes various shapes (daṇḍakapāṭādiviḍhānam) in order to reduce excess feeling-producing karma would be pointless if that karma was still to produce some kind of negative effect afterwards so that liberation could not be achieved. In reality, feeling-producing karma can have no effect upon the kevalin, just as he cannot be subject to passions arising through contact with the objects of the senses. It is only deluding karma which can bring these things about. For kevalisamudghāta see Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 280 and Jaini, Path, pp. 268–269.

146 NKC, p. 860 lines 6 to 17. Prabhācandra suggests (NKC, p. 860 lines 18 to 21) that scriptural references to meditation as a way of completely stopping hunger take precedence over references to alms-begging which is merely temporary.

147 NKC, p. 860 line 23 – p. 861 line 8.

148 NKC, p. 861 lines 8 to 15.

149 NKC, p. 861 lines 16 to 24.

150 NKC, p. 862 lines 3 to 9. Prabhācandra interprets TS 9.11 ‘there are eleven (ekādaśa) endurances in the kevalin’ as a prohibition by the dubious means of breaking up ekādaśa as if it contained the negative prefix a- so that the word is taken to mean ‘not ten when exceeded by one’ (ekena adhikā na daśa ekādaśa).

151 NKC, p. 862 lines 13 to 15. Here Prabhācandra is specifically referring to the tīrthaṅkara.


153 NKV, p. 863, lines 5 to 9.

154 NKC, p. 863, lines 10 to 21.

155 NKC, p. 863 line 22 – page 864 line 5.

156 NKC, p. 864 lines 6 to 13.

157 NKC, p. 864 lines 14 to 24.

158 NKC, p. 865 lines 1 to 10.

159 The bulk of his treatment of kevalabhūkti is reprinted in Muni Jambūvijaya’s edition of Strinirvāṇakevalabhūktiprakarane; see footnote 73.

160 K. K. Dixit, Jaina Ontology, p. 155

161 For Yasovijaya see Schubring, Lehre der Jainas, p. 52 and Williams, Jaina Yoga, p. 16 and p. 27.

162 Bhāvnagar, sāṃvat 1965.

163 Ādhyātmikamatakhaṇḍa verse 10 and commentary, pp. 61a–62b. Yasovijaya also attempts to refute the Digambara view that a person on the religious path does not need an alms-bowl and need only use his hands as a receptacle for food. Using an alms-bowl, he claims, does not imply any sort of worldly possession for, by the same token, the human body would also be a possession. Any possible delusion which might arise from using such a bowl would have to be extended to basic human activities like sitting and walking; in reality nothing in the world is a bond or a non-bond, it is only infatuation (mūrchā) which makes it seem so. Indeed, not using an alms bowl leads to the worst of sins, destruction of life-forms, for, if the monk were to eat with his hands, liquid would drip down through the gaps in his fingers to which insects would be attracted and then trodden upon. To place such importance upon lack of an alms-bowl is, claims Yasovijaya, as foolish as thinking that nakedness is connected with omniscience, for, if that were so, as soon as the kevalin put on clothes or took up an alms-bowl, his omniscience would disappear. In reality, the kevalin has conquered the afflictions and eating in fact means taking what is suitable and avoiding what is unsuitable. See Ādhyātmikamatakhaṇḍa, pp. 57b–59b.
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164 Ādhyātmikamatakhaṇḍana, p. 67b–p. 69b.
165 ed. A. N. Upadhye, Bombay 1935, p. 29 lines 12 to 14.
166 SMTV, p. 619 lines 17 to 19 (... kleśasya bhagavaty adyāpy ā muktigamanāt sarvathā anivṛtteh). For kleśa in Buddhism, see Étienne Lamotte, Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism, in L. Cousins et al. (eds), Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner, pp. 91–104 where kleśa is translated by ‘passion’.
167 NKC, p. 857 line 12 (mānuṣīṁ prakṛtim abhyatātavān devatāsv api ca devatā yatāḥ). Note that Prabhācandra comes very close (NKC, p. 861 line 1) to identifying the kevalin with the siddha.

169 Bhagavāisutta 5.4 (SA I, p. 475 lines 11 to 15); Deleu, Viyāhapannatti, p. 107.
170 Bhagavāisutta 12.9 (SA I, p. 669 lines 9 to 22); Deleu, p. 190. The arhats are described as devaḥidevā. For Digambara definitions of deva see JSK, volume 2, pp. 442–448.
172 See Sangave op. cit., p. 228. Sangave regards such worship as against the ‘real spirit’ of Jainism. There are Jaina sects, such as the Sthānakāvāsīs, which reject image-worship.
177 Martin Southwold, Buddhism in Life: the anthropological study of religion and the Sinhalese practice of Buddhism, Manchester 1983.
179 Ibid., p. 168. On p. 197 Southwold clearly views Jainism as a religion of the same kind as Theravāda Buddhism.
180 P. S. Jaini, Jina Rśabha as an avatar of Viṣṇu, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 40, 1977, p. 335 (pp. 321–337). In future studies of Jainism it would be wise to avoid assigning priority to monastic, intellectual or textual views of the religion over “popular” or lay views; both are two sides of the same religious coin.
181 E.g. Ādipurāṇa 7.286, 25.10 and 25.14. Note that it is a fundamental tenet of Jainism that the soul is eternal so that, while the tīrthaṅkara may be said to be outwith samsāra, he cannot be said to be defunct in the same way as the Buddha.
182 Ādipurāṇa 25.40.

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