

# Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya

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1. VA, p. 338, 17: *indriyārthôdbhave nāsti vyapadeśyādi-sambhavaḥ*. PS, I, k. 19 (3 a, 2, 97 b, 8): dbaṅ po las byuṅ don blo las (=la) // tha sñad la sogs srid ma yin /

(The cognition) caused by the contact of sense-organ with object is incapable of 'being expressible' etc. Dignāga's criticism of Nyāya theory of perception starts with this verse. NS, I, i, 4 states: — Perception is that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate. According to Dignāga, the expressible is cognized by means of inference only, and perception can never be expressible. Hence, the term 'inexpressible' in the definition of perception is superfluous.

2. VA, p. 338, 14–15: *nanv artham antareṇendriya-mātrād yad utpad-yate tasyāpi vyabhicāritā tat kiṃ “mano bhrānti-viśayatvad” iti vacanaṃ*. cf. VA, p. 338, 10: *katham tarhi tad uktaṃ “sa no (=mano) bhrānti-viśaya-tvad vyabhicāriṇaḥ”*. PSV, I (98 a.): yid kyi yul ni ḥkhrul paḥi yul yin paḥi phyir ro /

After removing the term 'inexpressible' in the Nyāya definition of perception (see above Frag. 1), Dignāga further says that the qualification 'non-erroneous' is also of no use. The sense-perception is free from being erroneous, because the error is to be attributed to mind (*manas*), which is not sense-organ. The Naiyāyikas hold that mind, though being not comprised in the enumeration of sense-organs at NS, I, i, 12, is also to be regarded as a sense-organ in accordance with the commonly accepted theory (cf. NBh, ad. I, i, 4). This view is refuted by Dignāga (Randle, Frag. B=PS, I, k. 21), according to whose theory, mind functions as an apperception synthesizing present perception and past experiences. The object grasped

by mind, therefore, is mere conceptual and has no reality: "mind takes erroneous thing as its object". Dignāga's theory is again criticised by opponents on the ground that some kinds of erroneous cognition are caused by the defect of sense-organ. It is with this criticism in view that Dhārmakīrti includes *indriyagata-vibhrama* in his enumeration of erroneous perception (NB, NBT, I, 6).

3. *Svavṛtti*, p. 165, 1: yad āha "adṛṣṭārthe hy artha-vikalpa-mātram" iti. PSV, II (111 a, 2-3): ma mthoñ bañi don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi..... /

In the portion where this passage is found, Dignāga discusses that the particular is never admitted as the object to be cognized by means of inference. Some hold that inference is the same as the cognition relying upon authoritative words, by which the particular as well as the universal are cognized. Opposing to this view, Dignāga says: — Object to be cognized by the knowledge derived from words is twofold, visible and invisible. Regarding visible objects, words are the cause of apprehending their names, and "with regard to invisible objects, such as *svarga* etc., the apprehension is actually a mere imagination of object." In both cases, what is apprehended is not the particular but the universal.

4. VA, p. 580, 14: "dharma-viśiṣṭo dharmy anumeya" iti vacanāt. PSV, II (111 a, 6): rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / cf. Vasudhararakṣita: rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyis khyad par du byas pañi chos can no /

The object to be inferred is S qualified by P. On this point the detailed discussion is made in PS, II, kk. 8-11 (cf. HIL, p. 281). Kanakavarman wrongly rendered *anumeya* into *rjes su dpag pa*. See below Frag. 7.

5. VA, p. 468, 1: tatañ "tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam" iti Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛttir virudhyate. PSV, III (124 b, 3-4): tshul gsum rtags brjod pa ni gñan gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste /

'Inference for others' consists in expressing in words the three aspects of the logical mark. In the first verse of PS, III (cf. HIL, p. 288, Randle, Frag. I), Dignāga says: — 'Inference for others' is to make explicit (for

others) what has been apprehended by oneself. The above cited passage is found in his commentary on this verse, and is adopted by Dharmakīrti as the definition of 'inference for others' at NB, III, 1. Dharmottara distinctly states at NBT ad. II, 1 that the essence of 'inference for others' is words, i. e., propositions (śabdātmaka), while that of 'inference for oneself' is cognition (jñānātmaka).

6. VA, p. 580, 1: *pakṣa-dharmo yato hetus tad-ābhāsāś ca bhūyasā, tasmāt tad vistaraḥ pūrvam hetv-ādy-arthāt pradarśyate*. PS, III, k. 7 (6 b, 8-7 a, 1, 127 b, 1-2): gañ phyir gtan tshigs bsgrub byaḥi chos // phal cher der snañ ba yin te // de phyir de rgyas pa ni snar // brtag bya rtag (=rtags) sogs ūgs kyis so /

NM, lb, 4-5 is almost identical with this verse, though it is written in prose. The first half is quoted in NVT, as indicated by Tucci (NMD, p. 11, cf. his transl.).

7. VA, p. 580, 16, 29: *samudāyārtha-sādhyatvād dharma-mātre'tha dharmīṇi, amukhe'py eka-deśatvāt sādhyatvam upacaryate*. PS, III, k. 9 (7a, 2, 127 b, 4): bsdus paḥi don ni bsgrub byaḥi phyir // chos sam yañ na chos can la / /gtso bo min yañ phyogs gcig phyir // bsgrub bya ñid du btags pa yin /

The object to be inferred being the thing (S) combined (with P), mere P or S is not (to be regarded as) the essece (of it). However, both P and S are metaphorically called the object to be inferred because of their being a part of it. That the object to be inferred is S qualified by P is established in PS, II (see above, Frag. 4), where both views that S is inferred from M and that the connection (sambandha) between P and S is inferred from M are rejected. In the preceding verse to the above (Randle, Frag. J, 1-2= PS, II, k. 8), the middle term is expressed by the term 'pakṣadharmā', i. e., the attribute of S; thus what is meant there by the term 'pakṣa' = 'sādhyā' (the object to be inferred) is mere S and is not S combined with P. The above verse is meant for explaining a reason for this different usage of the same term. (cf. NM, 1 b, 8-10)

8. VA, p. 647, 9: *dvayoḥ siddhena dharmena vyavahārād viparyāye, dvayor ekasya cāsiddhau dhrmy-asiddhau ca nēsyate*. PS, III, k. 10 (7 a, 3, 127 b, 7):

gñi ga la grub chos kyis ni // tha sñad bya phyir gñi ga dañ // gcig la ldog  
dañ the tshom dañ // gñi ma grub la mi ḥdod do /

(The valid reason is to be) expressed by the medium of an attribute (M) which is equally recognized (as residing in S) by both (the disputant and the opponent). When (a) both or (b) either of them oppose to or (c) are dubious of the residence of M in S, or (d) when (the existence of) S is not proved, (the reason) cannot be accepted as valid. Four varieties of *asiddha* are enumerated here, namely, (a) *ubhayāsiddha*, (b) *anyatarāsiddha*, (c) *saṁdigdhāsiddha* and (d) *āśrayāsiddha*. (cf. NM, 1 b, 17–23) In stanza c, *cāsiddhau* may be incorrect because both Tibetan translators render it to *the tshom* (saṁdeha, saṁdigdha). Vasudhararakṣita perhaps erroneously renders *dharmyasiddha* to *chos grub*.

9. *Svavṛtti*, p. 350, 1: yathāha “*pramāṇa-viśayājñānād*” iti. cf. Karnakagomin: yathāhēty ācārya-Dignāgaḥ. asti pradhānam ity anena pradhāna-svalakṣaṇam eva sādhyata iti yat Sāṁkhyenōktaṁ tat *pramāṇasyānumānasya viśayājñānāt* sāmānya-viśayaṁ hy anumānam svalakṣaṇa-viśayaṁ (=aviśayaṁ?). PSV, III (141 b, 4–5): [de la re ṣig gtso bo ni yod pa yin te / .....ḥdi gal te gtso bo yod pa ṇid bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te /] tshad maḥi yul ni mi ṣes phyir / [spyiḥi mtshan ṇid kyi yul can ma yin paḥi rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no ṣes bstan zin to /]

The Sāṁkhyas maintain that the primordial matter does exist, thereby giving five kinds of reason. If, however, the primordial matter, which is *sādhyā* of their inference, is the particular, then there is no possibility of their inference being valid, because “the particular can never be cognized as the object of inference”. According to Dignāga, perception apprehends the particular only, inference apprehends the universal exclusively (PSV, ad. I, k. 1), and besides these two there is no other source of knowledge which may apprehend both the particular and the universal.

10. VA, p. 487, 33: *sva-niścaya-vad anyeṣāṁ niścayōtpādanēccayaḥ, pakṣa-dharmatva-sambandha-sādhyōkter anya-varjanam*. PS, IV, k. 6 (9 a, 2–3, 150 b, 7): rañ la ṇes bñin gñan dag la // ṇes pa bskyed par ḥdod pa yis // phyogs chos ṇid dañ ḥbrel ba dañ / bsgrub bya brjod bya gñan dag spañ /

In order to produce in the mind of others the ascertainment in the same way as it is produced in one's own mind, one should state (a) that M is resident in S (*hetu*), (b) the connection between M and P (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) and (c) the proposition to be proved (*pratijñā*). Other (members of syllogism, i. e., *uṇanaya* and *nigamana*) are to be excluded (because they are no other than the repetition of *hetu* and *pratijñā*). This verse exactly coincides, as indicated by Miyasaka (*Journal of Ind. & Bud. Studies*, VI, 1, p. 31), with NM, 3 a, 7-8, and Tucci seems to have misread it (NMD, p. 44, XIII). The latter half of the verse is cited in NV (cf. Frauwallner, WZKM, 40 Bd., p. 304).

11. TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 13-15: yat tūktam *anyāpohena bhāṣata* iti tatra bhāṣaṇam dyotanaṁ jñāpanam iti yāvat. tathā cāśya vivaraṇam “*tat kṛtakatvādi-vad arthāntara-sambandhena vyavacchedena dyotayati*” iti. PSV, V, ad. k. 1 (156 a, 5-6): de byas pa ñid la sogs pa bñin du don gñan rnam par bcad pas gsal bar byed pa [dehi phyir rjes su dpag pa las tha dad pa ma yin no /]

It (=knowledge derived from words) indicates (its own object) through a contact with or by excluding other things, as for instance the words ‘being a product’ (designate their own meaning by excluding other things which are not product or are eternal. Therefore, this means of knowledge does not differ from inference). ‘*Anyāpohena bhāṣate*’ is the stanza d of PS, V, k. 1, which is wholly quoted in TSP (cf. Ihara, *Annals of Phil. Studies, Kyūsha Univ.*, XIV, p. 114).

12. PKM, p. 436, 15-16: Dignāgena viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-samarthanārtham “*nilotpalādi-śabda arthāntara-nivṛtti-viśiṣṭān arthān ahuḥ*” ity uktam. cf. Karnakagomin ad. *Svavṛtti*, p. 248, 26-27: katham tarhy ācārya-Dignāgena “*śabdo 'rthāntara-vyāvṛtti-viśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*” ity ādy uktam. PSV, V (159 a, 6-7): u tpa la sñon po šes bya ba la sogs pañi sgra ni gñan sel bañi tha dad pa yod kyañ ḥgreñ ba dañ..... /

Words, e. g., ‘blue lotus’ etc., (cannot express the object itself directly, but they) designate the object (indirectly) as qualified by the exclusion of other things, (e. g., white lotus, a blue piece of cloth etc.)

13. VA, p. 44, 29-30: *kāryatvānyatva-leśena yat sādhyāsiddhi-darśanam, tat*

*kāryasamam etat tu tridhā vaktṛ-abhisandhitāḥ. PS, VI, k. 7 (12 a, 4, 171 b, 1):*  
 ḥbras ṇid gṣan gyi cha yis ni // bsgrub bya ma grub par mthoñ gañ // de  
 ni ḥbras mtshuñs ḥdi yañ na // smra poḥi bsam pas rnam gsum mo /

This verse gives the definition of *kāryasama* and further states that it is classified into three in accordance with the intention of the disputant. The part of definition (stanzas a-c) is identical with *NM*, 5 b, 1-2 and is cited in *NVT* and *TSP* (cf. *NMD*, p. 66) and also at *PKM*, p. 275, 6-7. Three kinds of *kāryasama*, i. e., *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika* or *drṣṭāntābhāsa* are referred to at *NM*, 5 b, 27-5 c, 1.

Prajñākaragupta quotes the first verse of *Ālambanaparīkṣā* at *VA*, p. 336, 5. The verse cited by Kamalaśīla at *TSP*, p. 582 (cf. Poussin, *JA*, 1930), slightly differs from the Tibetan version, with which the following quoted in *VA* is exactly coincident.

*yady apīndriya-vijñaptēḥ kāraṇaṁ paramāṇavaḥ,*  
*atad-abhātayā nāsyā akṣa-vad viṣayo'ṇavaḥ*  
 / dbaṁ poḥi rnam par rig paḥi rgyu // phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi /  
 / der mi snañ phyir deḥi yul ni // rdul phran ma yin dbaṁ po ḥṣin /

Note: (Abbrev.) *NM*, Nyāyamukha (Chin.), Taisho, XXXII; *PKM*, Pra-meyākamalamārtanḍa, Bombay, 1941; *Svavṛtti*, Acārya-Dharmakīrtiḥ Pra-māṇavārttikam, Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ, Allahabad, 1943; *VA*, Pramā-ṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṁkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, Patna, 1953; others are as commonly used. Folio number of *PS* (V) shows that of Pek. Ed. No. 97 (Ce). Kanakavarman's transl. is referred to in principle, while Vasudhararakṣita's transl. is touched upon only in case of necessity. Besides the concerned studies so far published both in Japanese and in foreign languages, I, thanks to the kindness of Jain Muni Jambuvijaya, could refer to the proof of his *PS* (V), *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, Appendix to *Nayacakravṛtti*, which will soon be published. *PS* (V), I, kk, 1-13 is almost perfectly reconstructed by him, who extensively refers to sources in which passages of *PS* (V) are quoted.