Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya

Masaaki Hattori

1. VA, p. 338, 17: indriyārthōdbhave nāsti vyapadeśyādi-sambhavaḥ. PS, I, k. 19 (3 a, 2, 97 b, 8): dба́n po las byuṅ don blo las (=la) // tha sṅad la sogs srid ma yin /

(The cognition) caused by the contact of sense-organ with object is incapable of 'being expressible' etc. Dignāga’s criticism of Nyāya theory of perception starts with this verse. NS, I, i, 4 states: — Perception is that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate. According to Dignāga, the expressible is cognized by means of inference only, and perception can never be expressible. Hence, the term 'inexpressible' in the definition of perception is superfluous.


After removing the term ‘inexpressible’ in the Nyāya definition of perception (see above Frag. 1), Dignāga further says that the qualification ‘non-erroneous’ is also of no use. The sense-perception is free from being erroneous, because the error is to be attributed to mind (manas), which is not sense-organ. The Naivyikas hold that mind, though being not comprised in the enumeration of sense-organs at NS, I, i, 12, is also to be regarded as a sense-organ in accordance with the commonly accepted theory (cf. NBh, ad. I, i, 4). This view is refuted by Dignāga (Randle, Frag. B=PS, I, k. 21), according to whose theory, mind functions as an apperception synthesizing present perception and past experiences. The object grasped
by mind, therefore, is mere conceptual and has no reality: "mind takes erroneous thing as its object". Dignāga’s theory is again criticised by opponents on the ground that some kinds of erroneous cognition are caused by the defect of sense-organ. It is with this criticism in view that Dhārmakīrti includes indriyagata-vibhrama in his enumeration of erroneous perception (NB, NBT, I, 6).


In the portion where this passage is found, Dignāga discusses that the particular is never admitted as the object to be cognized by means of inference. Some hold that inference is the same as the cognition relying upon authoritative words, by which the particular as well as the universal are cognized. Opposing to this view, Dignāga says: — Object to be cognized by the knowledge derived from words is twofold, visible and invisible. Regarding visible objects, words are the cause of apprehending their names, and “with regard to invisible objects, such as svarga etc., the apprehension is actually a mere imagination of object.” In both cases, what is apprehended is not the particular but the universal.

4. VA, p. 580, 14: "dharma-viśiṣṭo dharmy anumeya" iti vacanāt. PSV, II (111 a, 9): rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / cf. Vasudhararakṣita: rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyis khyad par du byas paḥi chos can no /

The object to be inferred is S qualified by P. On this point the detailed discussion is made in PS, II, kk. 8–11 (cf. HIL, p. 281). Kanakavarman wrongly rendered anumeya into rjes su dpag pa. See below Frag. 7.

5. VA, p. 468, 1: tataḥ "tri-rūpa-lingākhyānam parārthānumānam" iti Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛttir virudhyate. PSV, III (124 b, 3–4): tshul gsum rtags brjod pa ni gṣan gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste /

‘Inference for others’ consists in expressing in words the three aspects of the logical mark. In the first verse of PS, III (cf. HIL, p. 288, Randle, Frag. I), Dignāga says: — ‘Inference for others’ is to make explicit (for
others) what has been apprehended by oneself. The above cited passage is found in his commentary on this verse, and is adopted by Dharmakīrti as the definition of ‘inference for others’ at NB, III, 1. Dharmottara distinctly states at NBT ad. II, 1 that the essence of ‘inference for others’ is words, i. e., propositions (śabdātmaka), while that of ‘inference for oneself’ is cognition (jñānātmaka).

6. VA, p. 580, 1: *pakra-dharma yato hetus tad-abhāsāś ca bhūyasā, tasmat tad vistarāḥ pārvam hetu-ādy-arthāt pradarśyate.* PS, III, k. 7 (6 b, 8-7 a, 1, 127 b, 1-2): gaṅ phyir gtan tshigs bsgrub byaḥi chos // phal cher der snaṅ ba yin te // de phyir de rgyas pa ni snar // brtag bya rtag (=rtags) sogs śugs kyis so /

NM, lb, 4-5 is almost identical with this verse, though it is written in prose. The first half is quoted in NVT, as indicated by Tucci (NMD, p. 11, cf. his transl.).

7. VA, p. 580, 1b, 29: *samudāyārtha-sādhyatvād dharma-mātre'ha dharminī, amukṣe'py eka-deśatvat sādhyatvam upacaryate.* PS, III, k. 9 (7a, 2, 127 b, 4): bsdus paḥi don ni bsgrub byaḥi phyir // chos sam yaṅ na chos can la / / gtso bo min yaṅ phyogs gcig phyir // bsgrub bya ndi du btags pa yin /

The object to be inferred being the thing (S) combined (with P), mere P or S is not (to be regarded as) the essece (of it). However, both P and S are metaphorically called the object to be inferred because of their being a part of it. That the object to be inferred is S qualified by P is established in PS, II (see above, Frag. 4), where both views that S is inferred from M and that the connection (sambandha) between P and S is inferred from M are rejected. In the preceding verse to the above (Randle, Frag. J, 1-2= PS, II, k. 8), the middle term is expressed by the term ‘pakra-dharma’, i. e., the attribute of S; thus what is meant there by the term ‘pakra’ = ‘sādhyā’ (the object to be inferred) is mere S and is not S combined with P. The above verse is meant for explaining a reason for this different usage of the same term. (cf. NM, 1 b, 8-10)

8. VA, p. 647, 9: *dvayōḥ siddhena dharmena vyavahārād viparyaye, dvayor ekasya cāsiddhau dhrmy-asiddhau ca nēṣyate.* PS, III, k. 10 (7 a, 3, 127 b, 7):
Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya (M. Hattori)

gños ga la grub chos kyi snad bya phyir gños ga dán // gcig la ldog
dán the tshom dán // gši ma grub la mi ḥdod do /

(The valid reason is to be) expressed by the medium of an attribute
(M) which is equally recognized (as residing in S) by both (the disputant
and the opponent). When (a) both or (b) either of them oppose to or (c)
are dubious of the residence of M in S, or (d) when (the existence of) S
is not proved, (the reason) cannot be accepted as valid. Four varieties of
asiddha are enumerated here, namely, (a) ubhayāsiddha, (b) anyatarāsiddha,
(c) saṃdīgḍhāsiddha and (d) aśrayāsiddha. (cf. NM, 1 b, 17–23) In stanza c,
cāsiddhau may be incorrect because both Tibetan translators render it to
the tshom (saṃdeha, saṃdīgḍha). Vasudhararakṣita perhaps erroneously
renders dharmyasiddha to chos grub.

9. Svavṛtī, p. 350, 1: yathāha “pramāṇa-viśayājnānād” iti. cf. Karna-
kagomin: yathāhṛtya ṣācarya-Dignāgaḥ. asti pradhānam ity anena pradhāna-
svalakṣaṇam eva śādhyata iti yat Sāmkhyenōktām tat pramāṇasyānumā-
nasya viśayājnānāt sāmāṇya-viśayaṁ hy anumāṇam svalakṣaṇa-viśayaṁ
(=aviṣayaṁ ?). PSV, III (141 b, 4–5): [de la re šig gtso bo ni yod pa yin te /
......ḥdi gal te gtso bo yod pa ŋid bsgrub bya yin na de ni,mi bden te/] tshad maḥi yul ni mi ḥes phyir / [spyiḥi mtshan ŋid kyi yul can ma yin
paḥi rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no ḥes bstan zin to/]

The Sāmkhyas maintain that the pramodial matter does exist, thereby
giving five kinds of reason. If, however, the pramodial matter, which is
śādhyā of their inference, is the particular, then there is no possibility of
their inference being valid, because “the particular can never be cognized
as the object of inference”. According to Dignāga, perception apprehends
the particular only, inference apprehends the universal exclusively (PSV,
ad. I, k. 1), and besides these two there is no other source of knowledge
which may apprehend both the particular and the universal.

10. VA, p. 487, 33: sva-nīscaya-vad anyesāṁ nīscayōtpādanēcchāya, pakṣa-
dharmatva-sambandha-sādhyōkter anya-varjanam. PS, IV, k. 6 (9 a, 2–3, 150 b,
7): raṅ la ņes bṣin gšan dag la // ņes pa bskeyed par ḥdod pa yis // phyogs
chos ņid dān ḥbrel ba dān / bsgrub bya brjod bya gšan dag spaṅ /

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In order to produce in the mind of others the ascertainment in the same way as it is produced in one's own mind, one should state (a) that M is resident in S (hetu), (b) the connection between M and P (drṣṭānta) and (c) the proposition to be proved (pratijña). Other (members of syllogism, i.e., upanaya and nigamana) are to be excluded (because they are no other than the repetition of hetu and pratijña). This verse exactly coincides, as indicated by Miyasaka (Journal of Ind. & Bud. Studies, VI, 1, p. 31), with NM, 3 a, 7–8, and Tucci seems to have misread it (NMD, p. 44, XIII). The latter half of the verse is cited in NV (cf. Frauwallner, WZKM, 40 Bd., p. 304).

11. TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 13–15: yat tūktam ‘anyāpohena bhāṣata’ iti tatra bhāṣanāṁ dyotanaṁ jñāpanam iti yāvat. tathā cāṣya vivaranām “tat kṛtakatvādī-vaḍ arthāntara-sambandhena vyavacchēdēna dyotayati” iti. PSV, V, ad. k. 1 (156 a, 5–8): de byas pa ŋid la sogs pa bṣin du don gṣan rnam par bcad pas gsal bar byed pa [dehi phyir rjes su dpag pa las tha dad pa ma yin no /]

It (knowledge derived from words) indicates (its own object) through a contact with or by excluding other things, as for instance the words ‘being a product’ (desinate their own meaning by excluding other things which are not product or are eternal). Therefore, this means of knowledge does not differ from inference). ‘Anyāpohena bhāṣate’ is the stanza d of PS, V, k. 1, which is wholly quoted in TSP (cf. Ihara, Annals of Phil. Studies, Kyōshū Univ., XIV, p. 114).


Words, e.g., ‘blue lotus’ etc., (cannot express the object itself directly, but they) designate the object (indirectly) as qualified by the exclusion of other things, (e.g., white lotus, a blue piece of cloth etc.)

kāryasamam etat tu tridhā vaktr-abhisandhitah. PS, VI, k. 7 (12 a, 4, 171 b, 1):
ḥbras ṅid gṣan gyi cha yis ni // bsgrub bya ma grub par mthoṅ gaṅ // de ni ḥbras mtshuṅs ḥdi yaṅ na // smra poṅi bsam pas rnam gsum mo/

This verse gives the definition of kāryasama and further states that it is classified into three in accordance with the intention of the disputant. The part of definition (stanzas a–c) is identical with NM, 5 b, 1–2 and is cited in NVT and TSP (cf. NMD, p. 66) and also at PKM, p. 275, 6–7. Three kinds of kāryasama, i.e., asiddha, viruddha and anaikāntika or dṛṣṭāntabhāsa are referred to at NM, 5 b, 27–5 c, 1.

Prajñākaragupta quotes the first verse of Ālambana-parīkṣā at VA, p. 336, 5. The verse cited by Kamalaśīla at TSP, p. 582 (cf. Poussin, JA, 1930), slightly differs from the Tibetan version, with which the following quoted in VA is exactly coincident.

yady apridriya-vijnaptah karaṇān paramāṇavaḥ,
ata-abhātaya nasya akṣa-vad viṣayo'naḥ
/ dбаṅ poṅi rnam par rig paṅi rgyu // phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi /
/ der mi snaṅ phyir deṅi yul ni // rdul phran ma yin dбаṅ po bšin /

Note: (Abbrev.) NM, Nyāyamukha (Chin.), Taisho, XXXII; PKM, Pra-
meyākalamārtanda, Bombay, 1941; Saurvitti, Acārya-Dharmakīrtiḥ Pra-
māṇavārttikam, Svārthānumanaparicchedaḥ, Allahabad, 1943; VA, Prajñā-
avārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṁkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, Patna, 1953;
others are as commonly used. Folio number of PS (V) shows that of Pek.
Ed. No. 97 (Ce). Kanakavarman’s transl. is referred to in principle, while
Vasudhararakṣita’s transl. is touched upon only in case of necessity.
Besides the concerned studies so far published both in Japanese and in
foreign languages, I, thanks to the kindness of Jain Muni Jambuvijaya,
could refer to the proof of his PS (V), Pratyakṣapariccheda, Appendix to
Nayacakravṛtti, which will soon be published. PS (V), I, kk, 1–13 is almost
perfectly reconstructed by him, who extensively refers to sources in
which passages of PS (V) are quoted.

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