

FURTHER REFERENCES TO THE VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA
IN THE PĀTAÑJALAYOGASĀSTRIVIVARAṆA
(Studies in the Pātañjalayogasāstravivarāṇa III)*

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1. Elsewhere¹ attention was drawn to a quotation from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (= VS) found in the Pātañjalayogasāstravivarāṇa (= PYŚV), which was not recognized as such by the editors of the latter text : while examining this quotation, it was also shown that the author of the PYŚV – whose identity has to be regarded as not yet established² – was acquainted not only with the VS itself, but evidently also with an old commentary on it which seems not to be extant any longer, but is echoed, as it were, in Candrānanda's Vṛtti,³ at least to a certain degree.

In what follows, two more instances are presented and discussed where the author of the PYŚV, though not quoting in the strict sense of the word from the VS, nevertheless clearly refers to it ; and these references, too, have apparently not been noticed by the editors of the PYŚV. My present aim is a double one : Firstly and generally I wish to keep alive the discussion about the PYŚV,⁴ as this highly interesting text has not yet found the attention it no doubt deserves by itself, i. e. quite apart from the provocative intricacies of the authorship problem

* As for " Studies in the Pātañjalayogasāstravivarāṇa I ", entitled " Philological Observations on the so-called Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa ", cf. IJ 25 (1983), pp. 17–40 : " Studies. ... II ", entitled " On the Quadruple Division of the Yogasāstra, the Caturvyūhatva of the Cikitsāsāstra and the ' Four Noble Truths ' of the Buddha ", will be published in " Indologica Taurinensia ", most probably in 1984. – The edition referred to is, of course : Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivarāṇa of Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda (MGOS No. 94), Madras 1952.

1. Viṛ. in my article " Remarks on the Definition of ' yoga ' in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra ", published in : Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. DE JONG on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. by L. A. HERCUS et al., Canberra 1982, pp. 643–686.

2. Cf. " Studies in the PYŚV I " as well as the Appendix " Notes on the ' Yoga-sūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa ' " in W. HALBFASS' monograph : Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara, Reinbek 1983.

3. Cf. my article mentioned in fn. 1. – The edition referred to is, of course, Muni Śrī JAMBUVIJAYAJI's Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda (GOS No. 136), Baroda 1961.

4. This was, by the way, also the first aim of W. HALBFASS in adding the Appendix, mentioned above in fn. 2, to his " Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara,

it also poses. In addition what I wish is not merely to supplement the list of quotations from and references to other works found in the PYŚV which was compiled by T. VETTER,⁵ though apparently on the basis of the editors' observations only; for regarding the undisputed, though limited⁶ importance of such a list, provided it is really exhaustive, for tackling the problem of dating this text, in terms of a relative chronology at least, hardly anything is gained by pointing out that a particular work, in the present case the VS, is quoted or referred to more than once. It is rather my intention to throw some light on the attitude shown by the author of the PYŚV towards the VS in particular and the Vaiśeṣika school of thought in general, an attitude which is not, as might have been expected on account of the criticism directed by him against the Vaiśeṣika definition of *yoga*, determined by biased opposition alone. In discussing the manner in which the author of the PYŚV makes use of two more elements of the VS, I also hope to offer a contribution, though a quite modest one, to our knowledge of the reception of the VS and to that of the history of Indian philosophy.

2. Almost right at the outset of the Yogahhāṣya (= YBh) on Yogasūtra (= YS) 1.1 the following statement is met with *yogaḥ samādhiḥ / sa ca sārvaḥaumaś cittasya dharmah / kṣiptam, mūḍham, vikṣiptam, ekāgram, niruddham iti cittabhūmayah* /. As I have dealt with this passage and essential parts of the PYŚV on it already elsewhere,⁷ albeit not yet with the necessary comprehensiveness, I need not go here into the details again nor pursue this topic any further, but can confine myself to a portion of the PYŚV passed over in my earlier article.

2.1. The manner in which the author of the YBh expresses himself poses a problem: On the one hand he (provisionally) defines *yoga* as "the state of being attentively directed" and states this latter to form a property (*dharmā*) of the mind-stuff present in all its different states (*bhūmi*); in enumerating these states thereafter, on the other hand, he uses expressions, viz. *kṣiptam* etc., which cannot but be taken as attributes of the term *cittam* to be supplemented;⁸ that is to say, he does not give the actual names of the five states themselves, but instead those of the mind-stuff in so far as it is in one or the other state.

It speaks clearly for the Vivaranakāra's philological competence, the acuteness of his observation, that he fully recognizes this problem and deals

5. Cf. his book: Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śāṅkaras (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, ed. by G. OBERHAMMER, Vol. VI), Wien 1971, p. 22.

6. This proviso results from general methodological considerations as well as from what W. HALBFASS says in his Appendix (cf. fn. 2) on the authorship problem.

7. Viz. in the "Studies in the PYŚV I" (cf. fn. *).

8. This is made clear by the author of the YBh himself in that he introduces the immediately following sentence by: *tatra vikṣipte cetasi...*

explicitly with it. For, after having explained the attributes *kṣiptam* etc., as regards their grammatical formation (*karmakartari niṣṭhā*!) as well as their meaning, he continues his interpretation by himself raising the objection (p. 5 1. 17): *nanu ca bhūmiṣu dharmeṣu vivakṣiteṣu kimartham kṣiptam ityādinā dharmy ucyate* /. "Since⁹ it is intended to state (i. e. define) the [different] states as properties [of the mind-stuff],¹⁰ to which purpose is the possessor of the property taught [thereafter] by [employing the attributes] *kṣiptam* etc., [and not these properties themselves]?"

Yet, as in other cases, too, when a sentence is introduced by *nanu ca*, used almost stereotypically in the PYŚV,¹¹ the objection raised is not accepted as justified. In the present case it is rejected thus (p. 5 1. 18-20): *naiṣa doṣaḥ, dharmiṇā dharmā evopadiśyate / dharmāṇām dharmivaiśayātvaṭ / yathā gotve kim līṅgam iti / prṣṭe, viśāṇī kakudmān prāntavālādhir iti dharmiṇā dharmā evopadiśyate / tasmāt kṣepādayaś cittasya bhūmayo dharmā ity arthaḥ* //.

"This is not a fault; by what possesses the property (i. e. by the expression denoting the *dharmin*) the property itself (*eva*) is pointed out because of the fact that the sphere of properties is [by necessity] what possesses them / is characterized by them. As e. g., when it is asked, 'What is the characteristic sign as regards the being an animal of the bovine species?', [by giving the answer] '[An animal] characterized by peculiar horns, by a hump and as one having a tail at the [hinder] part [of its body]', it is the property which is pointed out by [the expressions denoting] their possessor. Therefore, what is meant [by the YBh statement under discussion] is that the states of the mind-stuff forming its properties are 'the having thrown itself indeliberately', etc."

2.2. Anybody conversant with the VS will recall here sūtra 2.1.8¹² which runs thus: *viśāṇī kakudmān prāntevālādhīḥ sāsānāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭam*

9. I give throughout my own translation, since the work done by T. LEGGETT (Śāṅkara on the Yoga-sūtra-s [Vol. I: Samādhi]. The Vivaraṇa sub-commentary to Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-sūtra-s of Patañjali: Samādhi-pāda, London 1981) can only be styled a pseudo-translation: I have never come across a comparably careless translation of any Sanskrit text: it abounds in incredible misconstructions of the original to such an extent that those interested in the text itself can only be strongly warned from consulting this would-be-translation, unless they are fond of shaking their heads in utter disbelief.

10. This is true in so far as according to the author of the YBh as well as to the Vivaranakāra *samādhi* is a permanent *dharmā* of the mind-stuff, whereas the different *bhūmis* are temporary properties of it.

11. Cf. "Studies in the PYŚV I", p. 36. - In passing it may be pointed out that *ca* in juxtaposition with *nanu* has only in quite vague a manner its normal conjunctive adversative function so that it seems even advisable to transcribe it as one word: *nanuca*.

12. In numbering sūtras of the VS I follow MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA's edition (cf. fn. 3).

lingam /. Of course, the formulation of the relevant passage in the PYŚV differs to such a degree that it cannot by any means be regarded as a quotation in the strict sense of the word: The attribute *sāsnāvān* is absent, *dr̥ṣṭam*¹³ is likewise left out, etc.; on the other hand, it is, I think, equally patent that what we have to do with is not simply another reading i. e. a variant to VS 2. 1. 8. The manner in which the author of the PYŚV takes recourse to this sūtra has rather to be called a complex mixture of a partial quotation and a reference which at the same time contains elements of an explanation of VS 2. 1. 8, which latter, as it stands, is not easily intelligible; the explanatory aspect is, however, confined to what really matters to the author of the PYŚV in the context of his commentary on the YBh; hence the attribute of the key-word *lingam* in the VS, viz. *dr̥ṣṭam*, which is of particular importance in the context of this *āhnika* of the 2. *adhyāya* of the VS,¹⁴ is simply left out, and the sūtra is reformulated in such a way as to derive two sentences, viz. a question and its answer; and by this a specific peculiarity of the sūtra is brought out into distinct relief, namely, that in it *dharmin*-expressions are used instead of expressions denoting properties (*dharmas*) though this is what one actually expects.

It is noteworthy that Candrānanda on his part likewise does not even look this peculiarity of the wording of VS 2. 1. 8; for he concludes his commentary on it by stating:¹⁵ *viśāṇyādibhiḥ śabdais tadvatpratipāḍakair apy arthavyāpārād dharmā eva vyapadiśyante* /. "What is indicated by the words 'characterized by peculiar horns', etc., are, although [these words literally] convey [the meaning] of 'that which is characterized by it', nothing but the [corresponding] properties, because they are employed [here precisely] for [this] purpose / [to denote this] meaning."

In spite of the fact that Candrānanda's introductory remark *dr̥ṣṭāntārtham sūtram* refers to the contextual importance of VS 2. 1. 8 in so far as it illustrates a basic element of the VS's epistemology, i. e. although he is fully aware that this sūtra was introduced as an example of something quite different, he does not fail to point out also a linguistic peculiarity though this forms but a side-issue for him.

Therefore, one wonders whether what the author of the PYŚV had in mind was this sūtra alone or whether he, in this case too, was acquainted with an older commentary on the VS in which this linguistic peculiarity had already been explained in a similar manner and which was drawn upon by Candrānanda also in

13. On this term cf. my article "A Note on the Concept *adr̥ṣṭa* as used in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra", to be published in the Felicitation Volume for Professor A. N. JANI.

14. Cf. the article mentioned in fn. 13.

15. The quotation is from the edition (cf. fn. 3), p. 12 1. 10-11.

his turn. The similarities between the latter's *Vṛtti* and the passage of the PYŚV, quoted above, are in any case remarkable, and, to be sure, to such an extent that one may even reckon with the possibility that the Vivaraṇakāra knew also, albeit probably from another source, the explanation of the word *gotve* as given by Candrānanda, viz.: '*gotve* ' *iti gotvāvacchinnā vyaktiḥ* /. For in the context of the YBh passage under discussion as well as of the PYŚV on it, it is likewise not a *jāti* that is spoken of, but a *vyakti*, i. e. the mind-stuff as an individual, so that one would in fact expect the question *kim lingam* similarly to refer to an individual of the bovine species, and not to the species itself – if the example adduced by the author of the PYŚV is really intended to fully correspond to the *upameya* / *dārṣṭāntika*.

2.3. At first sight it might seem a deviation when in addition to what has been said in paragraph 2.2 attention is now drawn to another and, to be sure, diverging interpretation of VS 2. 1. 8. However, it will become clear that in view of the close similarity between the interpretation common to both, Candrānanda and the author of the PYŚV, and in view of the above assumption based on this close similarity, it is, no doubt, useful to take into account other interpretations also.

What I mean is that the anonymous author of the Vyākhyā¹⁶ gives a significantly different interpretation of the expressions *viśāṇi* etc., in that he takes them to stand for the corresponding abstract nouns:¹⁷ *sarve caite bhāvapradhānā nirdeśāḥ / tenāyam gaur viśāṇaviśeṣavattvāt kakudmattvād ityādi* //. That is to say, according to him it is not the properties that are intended, but the fact of something being characterized by them. This interpretation was, however, evidently suggested to the author of the Vyākhyā by the epistemological context of VS 2. 1. 8, viz. that of inference, and a particular, more exact manner of formulating an *anumāna*, which had become usual in his times, the standard example of such a *prayoga* being *parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt* (and not any longer: *dhūmāt*). In its substance, his interpretation is hence most probably later than that offered both by Candrānanda and the author of the PYŚV; both these interpretations, though different, have, on the other hand, equally the advantage of grouping rather well in a widely known picture, i. e. that the authors of (certain) Sūtra works and other ancient writers sometimes tend to express themselves in a way which definitely lacks precision.

These shortcomings were evidently not observed for the first time by Western philologists, but already much earlier by Indian 'commentators' who

16. Cf. Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an Anonymous Commentary, ed. by Anantalal THAKUR, Darbhanga 1957.

17. The quotation is from p. 20 1. 9-10.

not only tried their very best to solve individual cases of such inaccuracies, but also seem to have gathered the impression that the Sūtrakāras took quite some liberties in expressing themselves and in ordering their material. At least, one cannot but recall in this connection the dictum of the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti on Pāṇ. 1. 2. 35: *vicitrā hi sūtrasya kṛtiḥ Pāṇineḥ*, or the remark found in the Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā 3:¹⁸ *vicitrāḥ sūtrakārāṇām abhiprāyagatayaḥ*, or similar statements, although they do not exactly refer to this lack of precision.

The modern philologist, on the other hand, will, of course, start with no more than noticing the unevenness of the construction of VS 2.1.8 as it stands formulated, and in terms of its syntactical analysis he will then arrive at the conclusion that it forms an anacoluthon in that an answer – to refer now to the Vivaraṇakāra's rewording for the sake of clarity – is given not to the question 'What are the characteristic properties of an animal of the bovine species?', but as it were to the question, 'What does an animal of the bovine species look like as regards its characteristic properties?'. In addition the modern philologist will most probably recall a relevant passage from the Paspasāhnikā of the Mahābhāṣya, viz. I. 1. 6-7:¹⁹ *atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ/ kiṃ yat tat sāsna-lāṅgulakakudakhuraviṣāṇy artharūpam sa śabdaḥ/ nety āha/ dravyam nāma tat ||*, and contemplate the likelihood that the peculiar construction of VS 2.1.8 is due to the fact that there existed from of old a question and answer pattern, viz. 'What is an animal of the bovine species?', 'It is an animal characterized by a dewlap, etc.'; and that this pattern was more or less stereotypically used whenever the problem of the "characteristic sign(s)" of something was discussed.

Candrānanda and the Vivaraṇakāra, not to mention the author of the Vyākhyā, however, clearly go a step further: Obviously unable or, at least, unwilling to accept the anacoluthon, both of them do away with it by contending that the expressions *viṣāṇi* etc., though literally denoting the *dharmin*, are in the context of VS 2.1.8, nevertheless, used to convey the meaning of the corresponding *dharma*s.

2.4. There cannot, hence, be the least doubt that it is precisely this interpretation which made the Vivaraṇakāra adduce VS 2.1.8 as an example which by its syntactical and semantic parallelism at the same time illustrates and justifies the peculiar construction of the YB observed by him. His motive is, therefore, perfectly clear: Evidently he thought it necessary or, in any case, advisable to safeguard against any criticism with which one might come up against his interpretation of this passage of the YBh by explicitly stating that

this is not by any means a unique case, but that this peculiar manner of expressing oneself is, on the contrary, attested elsewhere also.

Yet, there remains one question still to be answered, viz. why the author of the PYŚV did opt precisely in favour of VS 2.1.8. Were there no parallels to be found in everyday speech? And, if he thought it preferable to adduce an example from a Śāstra, why did he select of all others this sūtra of the basic text of the Vaiśeṣikas? Of course, one might raise the following counter-objection: Since it is evidently not the doctrinary content of VS 2.1.8 which the Vivaraṇakāra is interested in, but only its linguistic form, i.e. since philosophical theoremata of the Vaiśeṣika are of no importance at all to him here, why should he have hesitated to refer his readers to just this parallel? But as there is apparently no circumstantial evidence whatsoever to warrant the assumption that VS 2.1.8 functioned as a well-known *mūrdhābhiṣikṭam udāharaṇam* for *dharmin*-terms being used to denote the corresponding *dharma*s, this objection, if it is justified, would only mean that the problem boils down to asking why it was precisely VS 2.1.8 that came first to the author's mind when about to account for the peculiar mode of expression of the YBh. One possible answer that suggests itself is that he thought first of the VS since he intended to deal shortly afterwards (viz. p. 6 1. 8 ff) with the definition of Yoga as given there. Yet, I think, this solution is not absolutely convincing: it is by far more likely that this sūtra came (first) to his mind simply because he was generally quite familiar with the VS as such and most probably also with a commentary or commentaries thereon; at least, this familiarity is a fact which can be demonstrated also with the help of other passages of the PYŚV, among them the second example referred to at the beginning of the present paper and to be discussed in what now follows.

3. This second instance is from the long *utsūtra* portion of the PYŚV to which as such attention has already been drawn by P. HACKER²⁰ and which, starting from VS 1.25 and the Bhāṣya on it, is wholly devoted to the topic of the *īśvaravāda*, i.e. to adducing an extensive list of proofs for the existence of *īśvara*, to refuting the inferences brought forward by an opponent against this view, and to maintaining the position of theistic Yoga. It is in this latter part that the discussion centres around the (Yoga) concept of *īśvara* being (even) simultaneously *saśarira* and *aśarira*. For the opponent both these ideas seem to imply many and serious difficulties, particularly as regards the central Yoga tenet

18. In the edition by R. C. PANDEY, Delhi 1967, p. 28 1. 15-16.

19. The reference is to F. KIELHORN's edition, Poona 1962³.

20. Cf. his article "Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen" in: Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner. ... Wien 1968 (= WZKSÖ 12-13. 1968-59), p. 124 = Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 218.

of Īśvara's omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) taught in YS 1.25: If Īśvara is *saśarīra*, so he makes the upholder of the Yoga position consider, his cognitive capacity should be limited like that of us and the like of us, and if he is, on the other hand, *aśarīra*, he shouldn't be able to have any cognition at all.

The defendant is convinced that he has proved Īśvara's omniscience even if God is taken to lack a body and organs of sense (... *ity akāyānindriyatva-pakṣe 'piśvarasarvajñatvasiddhiḥ*: p. 69 l. 6); and the counter-argument of the opponent that the capacity of the mind-stuff to perceive anything visible necessarily depends on organs of sense like the eye, etc., is refuted by repeating what had already been stated earlier by the defendant, viz. that Īśvara possesses *aīśvarya* and is free of *dharma* and *adharma*.

3.1. The discussion is continued as follows: *api ca cakṣurgrāhyasyāpi cakṣuṣāgrahaṇam loke drśyate | cakṣurgrāhyam sat santamaḥ²¹ sannimīlita-locanair api svasthāntaḥkaraṇair upalabhyate | tad evāndhatamasam viśphāritanayanair apy anyagatacittair naiva gṛhyate | yathā gṛhyamāṇa evākāśe prakāśaḥ ||*.

"And, besides, it is an empirical fact that [an object which], though it could [by its nature] be perceived by the eye, is [nevertheless] not perceived by the eye; [e.g.] complete darkness which forms [an object] that [by its nature] can be perceived by the eye, is [in fact] perceived [by people] whose internal organs are healthy, even though they have their eyes fully closed; but this same intensive darkness is actually not perceived [by people] whose mind is fixed on something else even though they have their eyes wide open, contrary to the light in sky which is in fact [in any case] apprehended [even if one's mind is fixed on something else]."

athāpi prakāśābhāvamātram eva tamo na vastv iti brūyāt - tac ca na - abhāvasya vastutirodhānasāmarthyābhāvāt ||.

"If [the opponent] would say that darkness is, nevertheless, nothing but the [absence of light [and] not a [really existing] thing, this, too, would not [be acceptable], because the absence [of something, viz. light] could not conceal really existing] things, [whereas darkness is patently able to do so]."

atha grahaṇnimittasya prakāśasyābhāvād eva ghaṭādyagrahaṇam, na vastutirodhāyakaṃ tama iti bruvīta - na - cakṣuṣaḥ prakāśakatvāt prakāśasāhāyakaḥ prakāśanupapattiḥ | asati bhinnajātye vastuni vastūnām tirodhātṛṇi talrayā ca yāvati ca mātṛa prakāśakatvāc cakṣuṣā prakāśyeta | na hi pradīpaḥ pradīpāntaradvaityakāpekṣaḥ prakāśayati ||.

"If [the opponent] would, on the other hand, maintain that [really existing things] like a jar etc. are [sometimes] not perceived simply because of the absence of light, a necessary precondition / cause of perception, and that [it is hence not necessary at all to assume that] darkness conceals [really existing] things, [then this objection] would not be correct; since the eye [itself] illuminates [its object], it is not correct [to assume] that [in order to be able to perceive an object] it depends on an accompanying factor in the form of [another, i.e. extraneous] light assisting it [in its function]. If there were no [other] thing of a different kind to conceal things (i.e. the potential objects of the perception by the eye), the eye because of its being something which [itself] illuminates would [by necessity] throw its light on whatever and how vast soever [object(s)] there are in the particular [place covered by darkness]. For a lamp does not in lighting up [things] depend on a second factor, i.e. another lamp."

kimcānyat - cakṣuṣaḥ prakāśāntarasahāyatvāpekṣatāyām ca niśāyām api tārādhipati²² - prakāśadvitīyena cakṣuṣā divasa iva rūpādigrahaṇaprasaṅgas tirodhānasyāsati nimitte ||.

"And further, [there is] something else [to be pointed out in this connection]: And if the eye would [indeed] depend [for its functioning] on the assistance of another [source of] light, [then] something visible etc. would necessarily be perceived by the eye even at night just as at day-time (i.e. equally clearly and distinctly) as it is [then] seconded by the light of the moon, since there would be no cause for the [partial] concealment [of its object]."

kimcānyat - abhāvaś cet tamaḥ, candrabhāsu niśāyām bhavantiṣu²³ tamaśā mandena na pravartitavyam | sarvātmanaiva hi tena vīṇaśanīyam | bhāśām bhāvāt | bhāśām tu vastutvān mandatvapātāvādiviśeṣo ghaṭate na bhābhāvasya²⁴ nirviśeṣatvāt ||.

"And further [there is still] something else [to be considered here]: If darkness were [nothing but] the absence [of light], [then] darkness could not obtain faintly when the rays of the moon shine at night; for it (i.e. darkness if it were merely absence of light) ought to vanish completely because of the presence of the [moon-] rays. But since the rays [as in fact any light] belongs to the category of [really existing] things, the distinctions between faintness and intensity etc.

22. Note that the Lahore MS. (cf. "Studies... I") reads *tārātārādhipati*²², which might be the original reading.

23. The editors of the PYSV propose the emendation *bhāntiṣu*; but *bhavantiṣu* is attested in all the MSS. consulted by me so far and need not be emended if *bhū* is taken to mean "to arise, to function."

24. Read thus with the Lahore MS,

[of darkness] are possible, not [however] if [darkness] is [nothing but] the absence of light, for [such an absence] does not possess any distinctions."

kimca saḥāyābhāvāc cakṣuṣa upalabdhisāmarthyābhāvād agrahaṇam ity etad api vyabhicarati | yathā saty api vidyullatāprakāśe tivratare vidyullatā-vilāsena cakitatadṛṣṭir²⁵ nopalabhate | na hi vidyutaḥ saḥāyatve²⁶ dṛṣṭa²⁷ cakitatvenāgrahaṇam virodhābhāvād yuktaḥ ||.

"Nor does it correspond [to empirical fact] to contend that the eye [in certain cases] does not perceive [its object] because without assistance it lacks the capacity of apprehension. For instance, [a person] whose vision is frightened (i.e. who is dazzled) by the appearance of a flash of lightning does not perceive [anything at all at that moment] although there is the highly intensive light of the flash of lightning. For, as there is an assisting factor [in this case], viz. the lightning, the non-apprehension cannot [as it should] be correctly accounted for by the fact that the vision is frightened (i.e. the person dazzled), because [the light of the flash of lightning] is not opposed [to the rays of the eye]."

kimca - cikitsāśāstre chāyā madhuraśītalety ucyate | na hy avastuno madhuraśītalatvam | tathā cākṣipathyāpathyatvam²⁸ | nābhāvasya pathyāpathyatvam brūyuh ||.

"And, again, in the science of medicine²⁹ shadow is said to be pleasant and cool. [Yet] it is patent that what is not a [really existing] thing [cannot] be pleasant and cool; and, similarly [the science of medicine speaks] of the fact that [shadow] is [sometimes] healthy for the eye and [sometimes] unhealthy. [The authors] would [of course] not teach [shadow] as being healthy and/or unhealthy, were it [merely] an absence [of light, and not a really existing thing]."

25. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS. and cf. *dṛṣṭacakitatvena* in the immediately following sentence.

26. This is a conjecture; all MSS. read *saḥāyake*.

27. Should one perhaps read instead *dṛṣṭi*?

28. The Trivandrum MS. reads *cākṣipathyāpathyatvam*; my conjecture is strikingly confirmed by *pathyāpathyatvam* in the immediately following sentence.

29. My colleague Prof. Dr. Ronald E. EMMERICK has kindly checked these references and I am most grateful for the information given by him, viz. (as regards the first one) cf. Rājanighaṇṭu, varga 21. 38 (p. 418): *ātapaḥ kaṭuko rūkṣaś ch āyā mādhuraśītalā | tridoṣaśamanī jyotsnā sarvavyūdhikaram tamaḥ* | and Kaiyadevanighaṇṭu, ed. P. V. SHARMA and G. P. SHARMA, Varanasi-Delhi 1979, p. 549: *ātapaḥ pittarakṭiṅguśvedanūrechhātṛṣṇavahaḥ || (418) dāhavaivarnaḥ jananano rūkṣaḥ katurasaś ca saḥ | ātapoktaguṇān hanti ch āyā mādhuraśītalā || (419)*. As for the second reference of the PYŚV, however, a literally identical passage could not be found in any of the medical texts; nevertheless, there is at least the following statement in Bhoja Rāja's Cārucaryā (ed. by B. RAMA RAS, Hyderabad 1974, p. 101): *chatraṇ tu vūtātapa-varṣadāhanivāraṇam netra hitaṇ ca*, which should be noted here.

pradīpāc chāyopalabdheś ca | abhāvaś cet tamaḥ, pradīpuprabhāmaṇḍale pradīpāc chāyā katham bhavet | vastutve 'pi virodhād ayuktam iti cet - na - viśasarpayor iva sambhavāt | yathā prānaviyogakaram api viṣaṇ panna-gapṛānaviyogāya na paryāpnoti tathā pradīpalacchāyayor api ||.

"[Shadow as a particular form of darkness is in fact a really existing thing] also because shadow is perceived due to [the presence of] the light of a lamp: If darkness were [nothing but] absence [of light], how could there be within the circle on which the light of a lamp falls a shadow due to [the presence of] the light of the lamp? If [the objection is raised] that [this fact] cannot be correctly accounted for even if shadow is a [really existing] thing because [shadow] is the opposite [of light and vice versa], [then this] couldn't [be accepted], because [both of them, i.e. the shadow and the light of a lamp] co-occur [in a given space] just as a snake and its poison: As poison, though causing death [of other living beings if bitten by a venomous snake] is not able to kill the snake [itself], so it is the case also with the light of a lamp and its shadow."

tasmād vastu tamaḥ, prakarṣāpakarṣavattvāt prabhāvāt | virodhidravayāpane-yatvāc ca ghaṭavat | upalabdhṛvyavadhānakaratvāc ca bhittivat iti ||

"Therefore, [to sum up], darkness is a [really existing] thing [1] because it is characterized by faintness and intensity like light, [2] because it can be removed by [another] substance which is opposed [to it] (i.e. by light) like a jar, and [3] because it causes a separation of the perceiving subject [from an object] like a wall."

3.2. This rather detailed discussion about the nature of darkness, remarkable in itself and also in the context of the history of Indian philosophy, has been given here in full primarily with the aim of examining the relation in which it stands to the VS.

Now, the relevant sūtra, viz. 5.2.21, poses some text-critical problems. In the Sūtra text as constituted by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI it runs thus:

dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād bhāvābhāvamātram tamaḥ ||

One of the MSS. used by MUNI reads ... *bhāvābhāvas tamaḥ*, as does Siddhasena in his commentary on Tattvārtha-sūtra 5.24³⁰ (only that in the former part of the sūtra he reads *karmāṇispattivaidharmyād*), whereas in the anonymous Vyākhyā the variant *dravyaguṇakarmāṇispattivaidharmyād abhāvas tamaḥ* is attested to, as also in Śāṅkaramisra's Upaskāra. According to the secondary transmission

30. Viz. in Hiralal Rasikdas KAPADIA's edition of the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra with Umāsvāti's auto-commentary and Siddhasena Gaṇi's Tīkā, (Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakodhar Fund Series) Vol. I, Bombay 1926, p. 363,

(listed by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI³¹) as found in the Nyāyakandalī,³² the Kiraṇāvalī,³³ the Nyāyavārttika³⁴ and the Nyāyaratnākara,³⁵ however, the sūtra runs thus: *dravyaguṇakarmaniṣpattivaidharmyād bhābhāvas tamaḥ*.

But it is further to be noted that already MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI states in a footnote³⁶: *atra vṛtṭyanusāreṇa Nyāyakandalīyanusāreṇa Mi. anusāreṇa ca 'bhābhāvas tamaḥ' iti pāṭho 'numato bhāti' ;* and he adds in another footnote³⁷ by way of correcting himself: *pṛ° 43 paṇ° 28 ity atra "vṛtṭyanusāreṇa" ity atah param "bhābhāvamātram tamaḥ iti pāṭho 'numato bhāti'" iti pūraṇīyam*. He is perfectly right in pointing out that both the commentators, Candrānanda as well as the anonymous author of the Vyākhyā, cannot have known any other reading but *bhābhāva*; for, the former concludes his explanation of VS 5.2.21 with the words; *tasmāt prakāśasyābhāvamātram tamaḥ*, while the latter in the body of his (obviously partially corrupt) commentary on this sūtra uses a similar wording, viz. *tasmā [d] bhāsas tejaso 'bhāvas tamaḥ*, and, besides, gives the *pratiñā* of the subsequent inference as *bhābhāvas tamaḥ*. Thus there is, in fact, sufficient evidence to assume that both of them refer to a reading *bhābhāva*. Much less convincing, however, is the MUNI's conclusion that Candrānanda actually read *bhābhāvamā tr am*; for *mātram* is clearly an explicative and has for this very reason in any case to be regarded as secondary when we compare the reading transmitted in the Nyāyakandalī etc. and indirectly attested by the author of the Vyākhyā with that of the MS. O of those used by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI. There is, hence, a much higher degree of probability that *mātram* slipped into the sūtra only out of Candrānanda's paraphrase who added it to *bhābhāva*, for the sake of clarity.

As regards the second half of VS 5.2.21, the choice is, therefore, between three readings only, viz.

- a) *abhāvas tamaḥ*,
- b) *bhāvābhāvas tamaḥ*, and finally
- c) *bhābhāvas tamaḥ*.

31. Cf. his edition of the VS (fn. 3), p. 230.

32. Cf. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* (Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdharaḥṭṭa (Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā, Vol. I), Varanasi 1963, p. 26.

33. Cf. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, ed. by J. S. JETLY (GOS, No. 154), Baroda 1971, p. 13.

34. Viz. on Nyāyasūtra 3. 1. 1.

35. Viz. in Rāmaśāstri TAILANGA's edition of the *Sloka-vārttika* with Pārtha-sārathi Mīśra's Commentary (ChSS 11, 1898-99), p. 740, l. 13.

36. Viz. on p. 43 of his edition.

37. Viz. on p. 230 of his edition.

Of these, variant *a* could mean either "darkness is a non-positive entity", i. e. "is not a positive entity" or else "darkness is (an) absence." As to the first alternative, one cannot but think of Udayana who in his Kiraṇāvalī³⁸ rejects Śrīdhara's view³⁹ according to which darkness is a particular colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*) and is, therefore, a *bhāva*; the reading has, then, to be discarded. The second alternative interpretation is by no means preferable since in its case the entity the absence of which is darkness would not be stated. One might, of course, voice the opinion that there is also no need to state it explicitly; for, what else if not the absence of light could be the definiens in the present case?⁴⁰ Variant *c* would, then, have to be regarded as secondary since it would contain an explicative addition. But in view of the obvious posteriority of the only real testimony for variant *a*, viz. the Upaskāra, and its notorious unreliability, the balance is clearly weighted on the other witnesses' side, i. e. the side of those commentaries and secondary sources who attest variant *c*. And that this is the reading which has also to be accepted as the original one, follows from the fact that variant *b* is most naturally and convincingly explained as due to dittography (just as variant *a* might be simply a kind of haplography).

As for the first half of VS 5.2.21, the situation is different: It is only Candrānanda who testifies to the reading *dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād*, whereas in all the other sources the reading is *'karma niṣpatti: vaidharmyād*. As the expression *niṣpatti* can hardly be used here in a sense different from the one it has in other sūtras (cf. VS 2.2.36; 3.2.15; 8.3 and 4. 10.4), viz. "arising, origin", the latter reading implies a considerable narrowing down of the argument; for, the reason given for the conclusion that darkness is but the absence of light is confined to the difference obtaining in the manner in which *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*, on the one hand, and darkness, on the other, arise. Within the framework of Vaiśeṣika categoriology this argument is not only plausible, but also sufficient to prove what it is adduced for. In terms of logic of proof there is indeed no need to point out other differences also to be observed between darkness and substances, qualities and movements. Yet, in the course of the discussion about the nature of darkness, which was evidently continued by later philosophers, it might have seemed useful, if not even necessary, to at least some of the Vaiśeṣikas to argue out their traditional position with all the elements of *vaidharmya* between the three first *padārthas* and darkness, which latter could but belong to one of these very three categories and not, of course, to any of others. There is,

38. In the edition mentioned in fn. 33, p. 11 ff.

39. Expounded in the edition mentioned in fn. 32 on p. 21 ff.

40. It should, however, be noted that even in the PYSV a wording like *abhāvas (cet) tamaḥ* is used only later, i. e. after it has been stated at the very beginning of the discussion about the nature of darkness that *prakāśasyābhāvamātram eva tamaḥ*.

hence, a greater likelihood that 'niṣpatti' was secondarily eliminated than that it was a later addition.

3.3. Be that as it may, this part of VS 5.2.21 is in any case not referred to in the PYŚV, at least not directly; rather, it is the second part, i.e. the statement of the actual view of the VS as regards the nature of darkness, which the Vivaraṇakāra vigorously attacks. But again he does not really quote this part of VS 5.2.21; instead what he gives is a paraphrase, viz. *prakāśābhāva-mātram eva tamo na vastu* (p. 69 l. 13), thus reformulating, as it were, the relevant Vaiśeṣika tenet more explicitly and indicating at the same time his own view, viz. that darkness is, on the contrary, a really existing thing (*vastu*), obviously regarded by him as a substance. This paraphrase, except for the final *na vastu*, is of particular interest in that it, too, in its turn exhibits a striking similarity with a remark of Candrānanda's, viz. the concluding one on VS 5.2.21, already quoted above, viz. (*tasmāt*) *prakāśasyābhāvamātram tamaḥ*. Therefore, there is hardly room for doubting that the opponent in the passage of the PYŚV under discussion is a Vaiśeṣika, and this is true in spite of the fact that the arguments implied in VS 5.2.21 for the view that darkness is but the absence of light, are not discussed by the Vivaraṇakāra.⁴¹

Apart from the fact that the whole topic, i.e. the nature of darkness, forms in the context of this *utsūtra* section of the PYŚV but a side-issue, although *tamas* as such occupies a central and prominent position in Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics, it is rather difficult to judge to what extent the arguments of the opponent reflect genuine Vaiśeṣika thought. They might well be fictitious in the sense that they were devised by the author of the PYŚV himself, thinking along the lines of the Vaiśeṣika.

As for his own counter-arguments, one cannot but notice that they are by and large substantially different from those which Vaiśeṣika and, to a lesser degree, also Nyāya authors⁴² feel prompted to refute; there is, however, one important exception: The 'shadow argument', though according to E. FRAUWALLNER an ancient one,⁴³ continues to engross the attention of later Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

41. A possible reason being that such a discussion would have necessarily led to a rather long digression, i.e. critical examination and finally, of course, rejection of, at least, the first three categories of Vaiśeṣika.

42. The relevant passages for both of them can be easily and, so I hope, exhaustively, located with the help of the Index in: *Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, ed. by K. H. POTTER, Delhi 1977.

43. Cf. the quotation below.

Space does not permit to elaborate on this point, as this would entail examining the entire history of the discussion about the nature of darkness – and shadow – in Indian philosophy, nor to inspect the defendant's arguments more closely as regards their importance for the Yoga theory of perception. Therefore, I have to confine myself to a few concluding remarks which are in part even of the nature of mere impressions.

3.4. Compared with the first instance (§ 2), the reference to the VS is in the second case, though almost equally unambiguous, of quite a different kind; for, regarding VS 5.2.21 the author of the PYŚV is evidently and exclusively interested in its doctrinary content. It is, therefore, perfectly understandable that his attitude in this case is that of a severe critic, as the positions of the Vaiśeṣika and that of Sāṃkhya-Yoga are in fact mutually incompatible, nay plainly contrary to each other. The Vivaraṇakāra's arguments, though wholly unconvincing to the modern mind, are nevertheless evidence of a remarkable intelligence, if viewed against the background of the (physical) 'Weltbild' of his time (whatever it may be) in general and of Sāṃkhya-Yoga in particular. And when we view them against their proper background, i.e. the old nature-philosophy (as tentatively reconstructed and outlined by FRAUWALLNER⁴⁴) as well as the later development of the discussion about the nature of darkness, we also perceive that the discussion found in the PYŚV forms a most welcome and not unimportant additional piece of information in that it clearly enlarges our knowledge of the history of this discussion; for the Vivaraṇakāra's arguments are different both from those of the old nature-philosophy as well as those refuted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors. While the latter difference suggests the conclusion (which cannot, however, be regarded as absolutely cogent) that the Vivaraṇakāra's arguments are of a marked antiquity or, at least, archaic, the former makes one realize that what we ultimately have to do with is a phenomenon, only too well-known in the history of Indian philosophy, viz. the substantial preservation of a traditional theorem, while introducing a palpable change or, perhaps, a considerable progress as regards the manner in which the traditional view is defended by arguments. This becomes even more clear when we take into account what is said in an anonymous verse quoted by Śrīdhara:⁴⁵

na ca bhāsām abhāvasya tamastvaṃ vṛddhasaṃmatam |
chāyāyāḥ kārṣṇyam ity evaṃ purāṇe bhūguṇaśruteḥ ||
dūrāsannapradeśādi mahadalpacalācalā |
dehānuvartinī chāyā na vastutvād vinā bhavet ||

44. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. II. Bd., Salzburg, p. 15 ff. = *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, tr. by V. M. BEDEKAR, Delhi 1973, p. 3 ff.

45. Cf. the edition mentioned in fn. 32, p. 25.

For, regarding the 'shadow argument' as attested in this verse, one cannot but refer to what FRAUWALLNER has said about the difficulties the old nature-philosophers were faced with,⁴⁶ viz. : "One could not, in a natural manner, explain shadow to be a form of one of the known elements. Such an explanation was also excluded because of the old popular view that shadow is something substantial." Instead of "popular" or, perhaps in addition to it, FRAUWALLNER might have said "magical". In contradistinction to this archaic view, the 'shadow argument' as brought forward in the PYSV gives the impression of being quite rationalistic; and this not so much because in this connection, too, the author refers to empirical facts only, i.e. natural phenomena, known to everybody or at least easily verifiable, but rather because his argument is distinctly different from that adduced in the anonymous verse in that the Vivaranakāra (just as the Jaina Guṇaratna)⁴⁷ does not seem to have thought any longer, at least not primarily, of the shadow of man as forming an essential part of any human being.

46. As BEDEKAR's translation (p. 20) is in this case (too) not faithful to the original (p. 38), I give my own English rendering here.

47. Cf. Tarkarahasyadīpikā on Śaṅkarsaṇasamuccaya, verse 49 (ed. Dr. Mahendra Kumar JAIN [Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jainagranthamālā : Saṅskṛit Grantha No. 36] Benares 1969, p. 267 f.).