FURTHER REFERENCES TO THE VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA
IN THE PĀTAŅJALAYOGAŚĀSTRAVIVARANA
(Studies in the Pātañjalyogaśāstravivaranā III)*

By

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1. Elsewhere¹ attention was drawn to a quotation from the Vaiśešikasūtra (＝VS) found in the Pātañjalyogaśāstravivaranā (＝PYŚV), which was not recognized as such by the editors of the latter text: while examining this quotation, it was also shown that the author of the PYŚV—which identity has to be regarded as not yet established¹—is acquainted not only with the VS itself, but evidently also with an old commentary on it which seems not to be extant any longer, but is echoed, as it were, in Candrānanda's Vṛtти,⁸ at least to a certain degree.

In what follows, two more instances are presented and discussed where the author of the PYŚV, though not quoting in the strict sense of the word from the VS, nevertheless clearly refers to it; and these references, too, have apparently not been noticed by the editors of the PYŚV. My present aim is a double one: Firstly and generally I wish to keep alive the discussion about the PYŚV,⁴ as this highly interesting text has not yet found the attention it no doubt deserves by itself, i.e. quite apart from the provocative intricacies of the authorship problem.

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3. Cf. my article mentioned in fn. 1. — The edition referred to is, of course, Muni Śrī JAMBUVIJAYAṆ's Vaiśešikasūtra of Kaṇḍāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda (GOS No. 136), Baroda 1961.

4. This was, by the way, also the first aim of W. HALBWASS in adding the Appendix, mentioned above in fn. 2, to his "Studies in Kumārila and Śākara.

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it also poses. In addition what I wish is not merely to supplement the list of quotations from and references to other works found in the PYSV which was compiled by T. Vetter, though apparently on the basis of the editors' observations only; for regarding the disputed, though limited importance of such a list, provided it is really exhaustive, for tackling the problem of dating this text in terms of relative chronology at least, hardly anything is gained by pointing out that a particular work, in the present case the VS, is quoted or referred to more than once. It is rather my intention to throw some light on the attitude shown by the author of the PYSV towards the VS in particular and the Vaiśeṣika school of thought in general, an attitude which is not, as might have been expected on account of the criticism directed by him against the Vaiśeṣika definition of yoga, determined by biased opposition alone. In discussing the manner in which the author of the PYSV makes use of two more elements of the VS, I also hope to offer a contribution, though a quite modest one, to our knowledge of the reception of the VS and to that of the history of Indian philosophy.

2. Almost right at the outset of the Yogahhāṣya (= YBh) on Yogasūtra (=YS) 1.1 the following statement is met with yogah samādhiḥ; sa ca sarvabhaumās cītatsya dharmam/ kṣiptam, mūḍham, vikṣiptam, ekāgram, nirudham iti cītavibhūmayah. As I have dealt with this passage and essential parts of the PYSV on it already elsewhere, albeit not yet with the necessary comprehensiveness, I need not go here into the details again nor pursue this topic any further, but can confine myself to a portion of the PYSV passed over in my earlier article.

2.1. The manner in which the author of the YBh expresses himself poses a problem: On the one hand he ( provisionally) defines yoga as "the state of being attentively directed" and states this latter to form a property (dharma) of the mind-stuff present in all its different states (bhūmi); in enumerating these states thereafter, on the other hand, he uses expressions, viz. kṣiptam etc., which cannot but be taken as attributes of the term cītām to be supplemented; that is to say, he does not give the actual names of the five states themselves, but instead those of the mind-stuff in so far as it is in one or the other state.

It speaks clearly for the Vivaraṇaśāstra's philological competence, the acuteness of his observation, that he fully recognizes this problem and deals explicitly with it. For after having explained the attributes kṣiptam etc., as regards their grammatical formation (karmakartāri niśthāḥ) as well as their meaning, he continues his interpretation by himself raising the objection (p. 5 1.17): namu ca bhūmiṣu dharmaṃ eva kāyāty uttaraṃ kṣiptam ityāc ch et dharmy uhyyate. "Since it is intended to state (i.e. define) the different states as properties of the mind-stuff," to which purpose is the possessor of the property taught [thereafter] by [employing the attributes] kṣiptam etc., [and not these properties themselves]?

Yet, as in other cases, too, when a sentence is introduced by namu ca, used almost stereotypically in the PYSV, the objection raised is not accepted as justified. In the present case it is rejected thus (p. 5 1.18-20): nāṣa doṣaḥ, dharminā dharmam evopādyāyate / dharmam anāvavāyagataḥ / yathā gotre kinn lañgam iti / prāṣe, viśāk kākudāṃ prātavālādhir iti dharminā dharmam evopādyāyate / tasmāt kṣepdayaḥ cītasya bhūmayo dharmā ity arthah.

This is not a fault; by what possesses the property (i.e. by the expression denoting the dharmin) the property itself (eva) is pointed out because of the fact that the sphere of properties is [by necessity] what possesses them is characterized by them. As e.g., when it is asked, "What is the characteristic sign as regards the being an animal of the bovine species?", [by giving the answer] "[An animal] characterized by peculiar horns, by a hump and as one having a tail at the [hinder] part [of its body]", it is the property which is pointed out by [the expressions denoting] their possessor. Therefore, what is meant [by the YBh statement under discussion] is that the states of the mind-stuff forming its properties are 'the having thrown itself indeliberately', etc.

2.2. Anybody conversant with the VS will recall here sūtra 2.1.8, which runs thus: viśāk kākudāṃ prātavālādhir sāmāvān iti gotre dṛṣṭam

9. I give throughout my own translation, since the work done by T. Leggett (Saṅkarā on the Yoga-sūtra-s [Vol. I: Saṁādi]) The Vivaraṇa sub-commentary to Saṅkara on the Yoga-sūtra-s of Patañjali: Saṁādhī-pāda, London 1981) can only be styled a pseudo-translation: I have never come across a comparably careless translation of any Sanskrit text: it abounds in incredible misconstructions of the original to such an extent that those interested in the text itself can only be strongly warned from consulting this would-be-translation, unless they are fond of shaking their heads in utter disbelief.

10. This is true in so far as according to the author of the YBh as well as to the Vivaraṇaśāstra samādhi is a permanent dharma of the mind-stuff, whereas the different bhūmis are temporary properties of it.

11. Cf. "Studies in the PYSV I", p. 36. - In passing it may be pointed out that ca in juxtaposition with namu has only in quite vague a manner its normal conjunctive adversative function so that it seems even advisable to transcribe it as one word: namucā.

12. In numbering sūtras of the VS I follow Muni Jambeviśa'y's edition (cf. fn. 3).
lingam /. Of course, the formulation of the relevant passage in the PYSV differs to such a degree that it cannot by any means be regarded as a quotation in the strict sense of the word: The attribute sāṃnām is absent, drṣṭam\[13\] is likewise left out, etc.; on the other hand, it is, I think, equally patent that what we have to do with is not simply another reading i.e. a variant to VS 2.1.8. The manner in which the author of the PYSV takes recourse to this sutra has rather to be called a complex mixture of a partial quotation and a reference which at the same time contains elements of an explanation of VS 2.1.8, which latter, as it stands, is not easily intelligible; the explanatory aspect is, however, confined to what really matters to the author of the PYSV in the context of his commentary on the YBh; hence the attribute of the key-word lingam in the VS, viz. drṣṭam, which is of particular importance in the context of this āhnikā of the 2. adhyāya of the VS,\[14\] is simply left out, and the sutra is reformulated in such a way as to derive two sentences, viz. a question and its answer; and by this a specific peculiarity of the sutra is brought out into distinct relief, namely, that in it dharmin-expressions are used instead of expressions denoting properties (dharmas) though this is what one actually expects.

It is noteworthy that Candrananda on his part likewise does not even look this peculiarity of the wording of VS 2.1.8; for he concludes his commentary on it by stating: \[15\] visāṇyādhīh sābdais tadvatpratidhāh apy arthādharinā dhamma eva vīpayatiyan. "What is indicated by the words 'characterized by peculiar horns', etc., are, although [these words literally] convey [the meaning] of 'that which is characterized by it', nothing but the [corresponding] properties, because they are employed [here precisely] for [this] purpose [to denote this] meaning."

Inspite of the fact that Candrananda's introductory remark drṣṭimalāhān sūtram refers to the contextual importance of VS 2.1.8 in so far as it illustrates a basic element of the VS's epistemology, i.e. although he is fully aware that this sutra was introduced as an example of something quite different, he does not fail to point out also a linguistic peculiarity though this forms but a side-issue for him.

Therefore, one wonders whether what the author of the PYSV had in mind was this sutra alone or whether he, in this case too, was acquainted with an older commentary on the VS in which this linguistic peculiarity had already been explained in a similar manner and which was drawn upon by Candrananda also in

\[13\] On this term cf. my article "A Note on the Concept adṛṣtah as used in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra", to be published in the Felicitation Volume for Professor A. N. JAIN.
\[14\] Cf. the article mentioned in fn. 13.
\[15\] The quotation is from the edition (cf. fn. 3), p. 12 1. 10–11.

his turn. The similarities between the latter's Vṛtti and the passage of the PYSV, quoted above, are in any case remarkable, and, to be sure, to such an extent that one may even reckon with the possibility that the Vivaranakāra knew also, albeit probably from another source, the explanation of the word gotvā as given by Candrananda, viz.: 'gotvā 'iti gotvācāchārya vyaktāh /. For in the context of the YBh passage under discussion as well as of the PYSV on it, it is likewise not a jāti that is spoken of, but a vyakti, i.e. the mind-stuff as an individual, so that one would in fact expect the question kīm lingam similarly to refer to an individual of the bovine species, and not to the species itself — if the example adduced by the author of the PYSV is really intended to fully correspond to the upameya dārśāntikā.

2.3. At first sight it might seem a deviation when in addition to what has been said in paragraph 2.2 attention is now drawn to another and, to be sure, diverging interpretation of VS 2.1.8. However, it will become clear that in view of the close similarity between the interpretation common to both, Candrananda and the author of the PYSV, and in view of the above assumption based on close similarity, in any case, there is no doubt, useful to take into account other interpretations also.

What I mean is that the anonymous author of the Vyākhyā\[16\] gives a significantly different interpretation of the expressions viśāpī etc., in that he takes them to stand for the corresponding abstract nouns: sāve cahe bhācapratihānā nirdeśāh / tāntayam gaur viśānaśeṣauvatvāt kākudmattād ityāci /. That is to say, according to him it is not the properties that are intended, but the fact of something being characterized by them. This interpretation was, however, evidently suggested to the author of the Vyākhyā by the epistemological context of VS 2.1.8, viz. that of inference, and a particular, more exact manner of formulating an anumāna, which had become usual in his times, the standard example of such a prayoga being parvato vahinmān dhīmaṇadvēt (and not any longer: dhīmāt). In its substance, its interpretation is hence most probably later than that offered both by Candrananda and the author of the PYSV; both these interpretations, though different, have, on the other hand, equally the advantage of grouping rather well in a widely known picture, i.e. that the authors of (certain) Sūtra works and other ancient writers sometimes tend to express themselves in a way which definitely lacks precision.

These shortcomings were evidently not observed for the first time by Western philologists, but already much earlier by Indian 'commentators', who

\[16\] Cf. Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kanāda with an Anonymous Commentary, ed. by Anantadā Thakur, Darbhanga 1957.
\[17\] The quotation is from p. 201. 9–10,
not only tried their very best to solve individual cases of such inaccuracies, but also seem to have gathered the impression that the Śūtrākārās took quite some liberties in expressing themselves and in ordering their material. At least, one cannot but recall in this connection the dictum of the author of the Kālakāvyātī on Pāñ. 1. 2. 35: \textit{vicīṭraḥ hi śūtrasya kṛtah Pāpineh}, or the remark found in the Yuktidipikā on Sāṅkhya-kārikā 3: \textit{vicīṭrāḥ śūtrākārāṇām abhiprāgatah,} or similar statements, although they do not exactly refer to this lack of precision.

The modern philologist, on the other hand, will, of course, start with no more than noticing the unevenness of the construction of VS 2.1.8 as it stands formulated, and in terms of its syntactical analysis he will then arrive at the conclusion that it forms an anacoluthon in that an answer—to refer now to the Vivaraṇākāra’s rewording for the sake of clarity—is given not to the question ‘What are the characteristic properties of an animal of the bovine species?’, but as it were to the question, ‘What does an animal of the bovine species look like as regards its characteristic properties?’ In addition the modern philologist will most probably recall a relevant passage from the Paśupātīkāna of the Mahābhāṣya, viz. 1.1.6-7: \textit{aśra gaur ity atra sah sabdah/ kīṃ yat tat śāmālaśūrākakudakuravāṇy artharāpaṃ sa sabdah neta āha dravyam nāma tat āha,} and contemplate the likelihood that the peculiar construction of VS 2.1.8 is due to the fact that there existed of old a question and answer pattern, viz. ‘What is an animal of the bovine species?’, ‘It is an animal characterized by a deewap, etc.’; and that this pattern was more or less stereotypically used whenever the problem of the ‘characteristic sign(s)’ of something was discussed.

Candrānanda and the Vivaraṇākāra, not to mention the author of the Vyaṅghya, however, clearly go a step further: Obviously unable or, at least, unwilling to accept the anacoluthon, both of them do away with it by contending that the expressions \textit{viṣṇu et al.}, though literally denoting the \textit{dharmin}, are in the context of VS 2.1.8, nevertheless, used to convey the meaning of the corresponding \textit{dharmas}.

2.4. There cannot, hence, be the least doubt that it is precisely this interpretation which made the Vivaraṇākāra adduce VS 2.1.8 as an example which by its syntactical and semantic parallelism at the same time illustrates and justifies the peculiar construction of the YBh observed by him. His motive is, therefore, perfectly clear: Evidently he thought it necessary or, in any case, advisable to safeguard against any criticism with which one might come up against his interpretation of this passage of the YBh by explicitly stating that

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of Īvara's omniscience (sārvaJJñātva) taught in YS 1.25: If Īvara is saJñārīra, so he makes the upholder of the Yoga position consider, his cognitive capacity should be limited like that of us and the like of us, and if he is, on the other hand, aśīrīra, he shouldn't be able to have any cognition at all.

The defendant is convinced that he has proved Īvara's omniscience even if God is taken to lack a body and organs of sense (... ity akāyānindriyāvatapakṣe 'piśvarasārvaJJñātvasiddhiḥ: p. 69 1.6); and the counter-argument of the opponent that the capacity of the mind-stuff to perceive anything visible necessarily depends on organs of sense like the eye, etc., is refuted by repeating what had already been stated earlier by the defendant, viz. that Īvara possesses aśīrīya and is free of dharma and adharma.

3.1. The discussion is continued as follows: api ca caksuJJgrāhyāpyāpi caksuJJgrāhyam loke dhīyate / caksuJJgrāhyam sat santamaḥ śaṃsmittalocanaṁ api svasthāntakaraṇaṁ upalabhyyate / tad evvadhatamasāṃ visphāriyanavair api anyagatoctair nāva grīhyate / yathā grīhyamāṇa evaJkāle prakāṣāḥ]]

"And, besides, it is an empirical fact that [an object which], though it could [by its nature] be perceived by the eye, is [nevertheless] not perceived by the eye; [e.g.] complete darkness which forms [an object] that [by its nature] can be perceived by the eye, is [in fact] perceived [by people] whose internal organs are healthy, even though they have their eyes fully closed; but this same intensive darkness is actually not perceived [by people] whose mind is fixed on something else even though they have their eyes wide open, contrary to the light in sky which is in fact [in any case] apprehended [even if one's mind is fixed on something else]."

athā prakāJJśabhāvamātram eva tamo na vausti itī bruJyāt - tac ca na-abhaJJasya vastuJJtirodhānasamarthyyabhāvāt]].

"If [the opponent] would say that darkness is, nevertheless, nothing but the absence of light [and] not a [really existing] thing, this, too, would not [be acceptable], because the absence [of something, viz. light] could not conceal really existing things, [whereas darkness is patently able to do so]."

atha prakṛṣṭaJJmātāja prakāJJśayābhāvād eva ghatāJJdyagrahāpaṇam, na vastuJJtirodhāyaJJkām tama iti bruJyāt - na - caksuJJṣa prakāJJśakatvo prakāJJśaJJñaYākāpekJnāṇaparaJJtah/ asati bhinnajitaye vastuni vastuJJnām tirodhālaJJci tatra yā ca yāvai ca mātra prakāJJśatvo caksuJJṣa prakāJJśyeta / na hi praddiJJptā praddipantaruhāvāyākāpekJkā prakāJJśayati]].

"And further [there is still] something else [to be considered here]: If darkness were [nothing but] the absence [of light], [then] darkness could not obtain faintly when the rays of the moon shine at night; for it [i.e. darkness if it were merely absence of light] ought to vanish completely because of the presence of the moon-rays. But since the rays [as in fact any light] belongs to the category of [really existing] things, the distinctions between faintness and intensity etc.

22. Note that the Lahore MS. (cf. "Studies... I") reads tataJñāṇadhiJJtaṁ, which might be the original reading.

23. The editors of the FYSV propose the emendation bhāṇīṣu; but bhāṇīṣu is attested in all the MSS. consulted by me so far and need not be emended if bhā is taken to mean "to arise, to function."

24. Read thus with the Lahore MS.,...59
pradīpāc chāyopaladbhē ca ahānāv cet tamaḥ, pradīpāprabhāmānyadā pradīpāc chāyā kathāṃ bhavet / vastu tva virodhād auyakten ut cet-na-viśaarparāy tva samabhavāt / yathā prāyaṃvijāglakar api viśam panna-gaṇaprayātīgotaṇa nyāyam prāyam pradīpa chauchāyē api //

"[Shadow as a particular form of darkness is in fact a really existing thing] also because shadow is perceived due to [the presence of] the light of a lamp: If darkness were [nothing but] absence [of light], how could there be within the circle on which the light of a lamp falls a shadow due to [the presence of] the light of the lamp? If [the object is raised] that [this fact] cannot be correctly accounted for even if shadow is a [really existing] thing because [shadow] is the opposite [of light and vice versa], [then this] couldn't [be accepted], because [both of them, i.e. the shadow and the light of a lamp] co-occur [in a given space] just as a snake and its poison: As poison, though causing death [of other living beings if bitten by a venomous snake] is not able to kill the snake [itself], so it is the case also with the light of a lamp and its shadow."

tasmāt vastu tamaḥ, prakārpaḥkāravarataḥ prabhāsaḥ / virodhādvīgāpataḥ ca ghaṭavaḥ / upalabhīrvarādhanarataḥ ca bhītvat iti //

"Therefore, [to sum up], darkness is a [really existing] thing [1] because it is characterized by faintness and intensity like light, [2] because it can be removed by [another] substance which is opposed [to it] (i.e. by light) like a jar, and [3] because it causes a separation of the perceiving subject [from an object] like a wall."

3.2. This rather detailed discussion about the nature of darkness, remarkable in itself and also in the context of the history of Indian philosophy, has been given here in full primarily with the aim of examining the relation in which it stands to the VS.

Now, the relevant sūtra, viz. 5.2.21, poses some text-critical problems. In the Sūtra text as constituted by Muni Jambuviṣayaji it runs thus:

dravyagunakarmāvidhāmyadhāvābhāvāmātram tamaḥ //

One of the MSS. used by Muni reads ... bhāvābhāvant tamaḥ, as does Siddhasena in his commentary on Tattvārtha-sūtra 5.2.40 (only that in the former part of the sūtra he reads karmaṇapattiyādāmyadhā, whereas in the anonymous Vyākhyā the variant dravyagunakarmanapattiyādāmyadhābhāvant tamaḥ is attested to, as also in Śāṅkaraṁśa's Upākāra. According to the secondary transmission

25. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS. and cf. drṣṭācāśīlātātena in the immediately following sentence.
26. This is a conjecture; all MSS. read sahītāya.
27. Should one perhaps read instead drṣṭā?
28. The Trivandrum MS. reads cākṣapāthāpāthayātvaṃ; my conjecture is strikingly confirmed by pāthāiapāthayātvaṃ in the immediately following sentence.
29. My colleague Prof. Dr. Ronald E. EMERICK has kindly checked these references and I am most grateful for the information given by him, viz. (as regards the first one) cf. Rājaṁghanta, varga 21, 38 (p. 418): ṛtaḥah kātakaḥ rākṣā c hāyā mādhuṣṭātātāḥ triyogāyamānuṣī jyotānti sarvāyogāyaḥ dharam tamaḥ [and Kālayavani-ghanta, ed. P. V. SHARMA and G. P. SHARMA, Varaṇaasi-Calcutta 1938, p. 549: ṛtaḥah pātārātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātाः हैत्तित्ति cātaḥ, which should be noted here.
(listed by Muni Jambuviyajja\textsuperscript{31}) as found in the Nyāyakāndali,\textsuperscript{32} the Kīraṇāvali,\textsuperscript{33} the Nyāyavārttika\textsuperscript{34} and the Nyāyaratnakara,\textsuperscript{35} however, the sutra runs thus: \textit{dvaya}gva\textit{karma}niśpattivaidharmyāyābhāvās \textit{tamaḥ}.

But it is further to be noted that already Muni Jambuviyajja states in a footnote:\textsuperscript{36} \textit{atra} \textit{vythina}ṣāraṇa \textit{Nyāyakāndali}\textit{ya}nsāraṇa \textit{Mi} anusāraṇa ca \textit{bhāvās} \textit{tamaḥ} iti \textit{pāṭho} \textit{numato bhāt} /; and he adds in another footnote\textsuperscript{37} by way of correcting himself: \textit{pr} 43 \textit{pāṇi} 28 \textit{iti} \textit{atra} \textit{vythina}ṣāraṇa \textit{iti} \textit{atāh} \textit{pāram} \textit{bhāvāvamātraṇa} \textit{tamaḥ} iti \textit{pāṭho} \textit{numato bhāt} \textit{iti} \textit{pāṇi}\textit{yam}. He is perfectly right in pointing out that both the commentators, Candrānanda as well as the anonymous author of the Vyākhya, cannot have known any other reading but \textit{bhāvāvā}. for, the former concludes his explanation of VS 5.2.21 with the words; \textit{tasma}ṭ prakāśasyābhāvāvamātraṇa \textit{tamaḥ}, while the latter in the body of his (obviously partially corrupt) commentary on this sutra uses a similar wording, viz. \textit{tasma}d\textit{d} \textit{bhāsas} \textit{tejaso} \textit{bhāvās} \textit{tamaḥ}. and, besides, gives the pratiṣñā of the subsequent inference as \textit{bhāvāvās} \textit{tamaḥ}. Thus there is, in fact, sufficient evidence to assume that both of them refer to a reading \textit{bhāvāvā}. Much less convincing, however, is the Muni's conclusion that Candrānanda actually read \textit{bhāvāvamātraṇa} \textit{tamaḥ}; for \textit{mātraṇa} is clearly an explicative and has for this very reason in any case to be regarded as secondary when we compare the reading transmitted in the Nyāyakāndali etc. and indirectly attested by the author of the Vyākhya with that of the MS. O of those used by Muni Jambuviyajja. There is, hence, a much higher degree of probability that \textit{mātraṇa} slipped into the sutra only out of Candrānanda's paraphrase which added it to \textit{bhāvāvā}, for the sake of clarity.

As regards the second half of VS 5.2.21, the choice is, therefore, between three readings only, viz.

a) \textit{abhāvās} \textit{tamaḥ},

b) \textit{bhāvābhāvās} \textit{tamaḥ}, and finally

c) \textit{bhāvāvās} \textit{tamaḥ}.

Of these, variant \textit{a} could mean either "darkness is a non-positive entity", i.e. "is not a positive entity" or else "darkness is (an) absence." As to the first alternative, one cannot but think of Udayana who in his Kīraṇāvali\textsuperscript{38} rejects Śrīdhara's view\textsuperscript{39} according to which darkness is a particular colour (\textit{rūpa}ṣēga) and is, therefore, a \textit{bhāva}; the reading has, then, to be discarded. The second alternative interpretation is by no means preferable since in its case the entity the absence of which is darkness would not be stated. One might, of course, voice the opinion that there is also no need to state it explicitly; for, what else if not the absence of light could be the definition in the present case?\textsuperscript{40} Variant \textit{c} would, then, have to be regarded as secondary since it would contain an explicative addition. But in view of the obvious posteriority of the only real testimony for variant \textit{a}, viz. the Upaskāra, and its notorious unreliability, the balance is clearly weighted on the other witnesses' side, i.e. the side of those commentaries and secondary sources who attest variant \textit{c}. And that this is the reading which has also to be accepted as the original one, follows from the fact that variant \textit{b} is most naturally and convincingly explained as due to dittography (just as variant \textit{a} might be simply a kind of haplography).

As for the first half of VS 5.2.21, the situation is different: It is only Candrānanda who testifies to the reading \textit{dvaya}gva\textit{karma}niśpattivaidharmyāyā; whereas in all the other sources the reading is \textit{karma}niśpattivaidharmyāyā. As the expression \textit{niśpatti} can hardly be used here in a sense different from the one it has in other sūtras (cf. VS 2.2.36; 3.2.15; 8.3 and 4. 10+), viz. "arising, origin", the latter reading implies a considerable narrowing down of the argument; for, the reason given for the conclusion that darkness is but the absence of light is confined to the difference obtaining in the manner in which \textit{dravyas}, \textit{guna}s and \textit{karman}s, on the one hand, darkness, and on the other, arise. Within the framework of Vaiśeṣika categoriology this argument is not only plausible, but also sufficient to prove what it is added for. In terms of logic of proof there is indeed no need to point out other differences also to be observed between darkness and substances, qualities and movements. Yet, in the course of the discussion about the nature of darkness, which was evidently continued by later philosophers, it might have seemed useful, if not even necessary, to at least some of the Vaiśeṣikas to argue out their traditional position with a I I the elements of \textit{vaidharmyā} between the three first \textit{padārthas} and darkness, which latter could but belong to one of these very three categories and not, of course, to any of others. There is,

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. his edition of the VS (fn. 3), p. 230.
\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Āraṇāṭpaḍabhāṣya with the Commentary Kīraṇāvali of Udayanācārya, ed. by J. S. Jetly (GOS, No. 154), Baroda 1971, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{34} Viz. on Nyāyasastra 3. 1. 1.
\textsuperscript{35} Viz. in Rāmaśastri Tailanga's edition of the Slokavārttika with Pārthaśārathi Miśra's Commentary (ChSS 11, 1898-99), p. 740, l. 13.
\textsuperscript{36} Viz. on p. 43 of his edition.
\textsuperscript{37} Viz. on p. 230 of his edition.
\textsuperscript{38} In the edition mentioned in fn. 33, p. 11 ff.
\textsuperscript{39} Expounded in the edition mentioned in fn. 32 on p. 21 ff.
\textsuperscript{40} It should, however, be noted that even in the PYSV a wording like \textit{abhāva} (set) \textit{tamaḥ} is used only later, i.e. after it has been stated at the very beginning of the discussion about the nature of darkness that \textit{prakāśabhāvamātraṇa eva tamaḥ}.\textsuperscript{38}
3.3. Be that as it may, this part of VS 5.2.21 is in any case not referred to in the PYŚV, at least not directly; rather, it is the second part, i.e. the statement of the actual view of the VS as regards the nature of darkness, which the Vivaranakāra vigorously attacks. But again he does not really quote this part of VS 5.2.21; instead what he gives is a paraphrase, viz. prakāśābhāvamātram eva tamo na vastu (p. 69 I.13), thus reformulating, as it were, the relevant Vaiśeṣika tenet more explicitly and indicating at the same time his own view, viz. that darkness is, on the contrary, a really existing thing (vastu), obviously regarded by him as a substance. This paraphrase, except for the final na vastu, is of particular interest in that it, too, in its turn exhibits a striking similarity with a remark of Candrānanda’s, viz. the concluding one on VS 5.2.21, already quoted above, viz. (tasmā) prakāśasābhāvamātram tamaḥ. Therefore, there is hardly room for doubting that the opponent in the passage of the PYŚV under discussion is a Vaiśeṣika, and this is true inspite of the fact that the arguments implied in VS 5.2.21 for the view that darkness is but the absence of light, are not discussed by the Vivaranakāra.41

Apart from the fact that the whole topic, i.e. the nature of darkness, forms in the context of this utsātra section of the PYŚV but a side-issue, although tamaḥ as such occupies a central and prominent position in Śāṁkhyā-Yoga metaphysics, it is rather difficult to judge to what extent the arguments of the opponent reflect genuine Vaiśeṣika thought. They might well be fictitious in the sense that they were devised by the author of the PYŚV himself, thinking along the lines of the Vaiśeṣika.

As for his own counter-arguments, one cannot but notice that they are by and large substantially different from those which Vaiśeṣika and, to a lesser degree, also Nyāya authors42 feel prompted to refute; there is, however, one important exception: The ‘shadow argument’, though according to E. FRAUWALLNER an ancient one,43 continues to engross the attention of later Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

3.4. Compared with the first instance (§ 2), the reference to the VS is in the second case, though almost equally unambiguous, of quite a different kind; for, regarding VS 5.2.21 the author of the PYŚV is evidently and exclusively interested in its doctrinal content. It is, therefore, perfectly understandable that his attitude in this case is that of a severe critic, as the positions of the Vaiśeṣika and that of Śāṁkhyā-Yoga are in fact mutually incompatible, nay plainly contrary to each other. The Vivaranakāra’s arguments, though wholly unconvincing to the modern mind, are nevertheless evidence of a remarkable intelligence, if viewed against the background of the (physical) ‘Weltbild’ of his time (whatever it may be) in general and of Śāṁkhyā-Yoga in particular. And when we view them against their proper background, i.e. the old nature-philosophy (as tentatively reconstructed and outlined by FRAUWALLNER44) as well as the later development of the discussion about the nature of darkness, we also perceive that the discussion found in the PYŚV forms a most welcome and not unimportant additional piece of information in that it clearly enlarges our knowledge of the history of this discussion; for the Vivaranakāra’s arguments are different both from those of the old nature-philosophy as well as those refuted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors. While the latter difference suggests the conclusion (which cannot, however, be regarded as absolutely cogent) that the Vivaranakāra’s arguments are of a marked antiquity or, at least, archaic, the former makes one realize that what we ultimately have to do with is a phenomenon, only too well-known in the history of Indian philosophy, viz. the substantial preservation of a traditional theorem, while introducing a palpable change or, perhaps, a considerable progress as regards the manner in which the traditional view is defended by arguments. This becomes even more clear when we take into account what is said in an anonymous verse quoted by Śrīdhara: 45

na ca bhāsāṁ abhāvasya tamaṁ va ṛddhasaṁmatam /
chāyāh kāryam iti evam purāne bhāgvaṁ śrutam ||
darāsamapraśeśāḥ mahadālapalācaūlā /
dehānuvarṇīnī chāyā na vastuvād vinaṁ bhavet ||

41. A possible reason being that such a discussion would have necessarily led to a rather long digression, i.e. critical examination and finally, of course, rejection of, at least, the first three categories of Vaiśeṣika.
42. The relevant passages for both of them can be easily and, so I hope, exhaustively, located with the help of the Index in: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Indian Metaphysics and Epistémology: The tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgāśa, ed. by K. H. POTTER, Delhi 1977.
43. Cf. the quotation below.
45. Cf. the edition mentioned in fn. 32, p. 25.
For, regarding the 'shadow argument' as attested in this verse, one cannot but refer to what Frauwaller has said about the difficulties the old nature-philosophers were faced with, viz.: "One could not, in a natural manner, explain shadow to be a form of one of the known elements. Such an explanation was also excluded because of the old popular view that shadow is something substantial." Instead of "popular" or, perhaps in addition to it, Frauwaller might have said "magical". In contradistinction to this archaic view, the 'shadow argument' as brought forward in the PYSV gives the impression of being quite rationalistic; and this not so much because in this connection, too, the author refers to empirical facts only, i.e. natural phenomena, known to everybody or at least easily verifiable, but rather because his argument is distinctly different from that adduced in the anonymous verse in that the Vivaranyakara (just as the Jaina Guparatna) does not seem to have thought any longer, at least not primarily, of the shadow of man as forming an essential part of any human being.

46. As Bedekear's translation (p. 20) is in this case (too) not faithful to the original (p. 38). I give my own English rendering here.