

Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion

[c. 3rd-10th A. D.]

The Western scholars often remark that the Indian philosophies and religions are not dynamic but static. But this remark is not tenable when we study any Indian Philosophy or religious tradition from historical point of view. We notice a sequence of changes and developments in their thoughts and practices. This is true with regard to Jainism as well as other schools of Indian philosophy.

Though the basic tenets such as non-violence, self-control etc. of Jainism, in thought and practice, remained the same throughout the ages yet their explanations and their applications were modified in conformity with time and circumstances by Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* and *Ācāryas*. Even in the earlier times, every successive *Tīrthaṅkara* made reforms and changes in the religious practices and ethical code of conduct as per the need of his age. As regards the code of conduct of monks and nuns, 23rd chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (verses 1258-1262) and some other commentaries on Jaina canons clearly maintain that the religious code of Mahāvīra and his predecessor Lord Pārśva and other *Tīrthaṅkaras* were different. It was found that whereas Lord Ariṣṭanemi laid more stress to avoid the violence and cruelty towards animal kingdom in social rituals such as marriage ceremonies etc. Lord Pārśva opposed the violence in the name of religious austerities (practices). Lord Mahāvīra discovered the root cause of violence in the will for the accumulation of wealth and lust for worldly enjoyment hence laid much stress on celibacy and non-possession and prescribed a new religious code of conduct. Not only in the earlier period but in the above said period, i. e., corresponding c. 3rd-10th A.D. also, several revolu-

tions, changes and developments took place in Jaina thoughts and practices. Jains were proud of the rigorous and austere life-styles of their monks. But in the post *Nirvāṇa* era of Mahāvīra some relaxations and exception crept into the code of conduct of Jaina monks. Not only the junior monks, i. e., *Kṣullakas*, keeping three, two or one cloth alongwith a bowl but the senior monks, having accepted nudity also started keeping one woolen blanket to save themselves from the extreme cold of northern region and also a bowl for accepting the alms, particularly some liquids, necessary in the old age. Thus, the code of *Jinakalpa* and *Sthavirakalpa* along with *sāmāyik-cāritra* (junior monk-hood) and *Chedopasthāpanīyacāritra* (senior monk-hood) came into existence, which, later on, after c. 2nd A. D. divided Jainism into Schism such as *Digambara*, *Śvetāmbara* and *Yāpanīya*, with their own Codes of Conduct.

It was the first phase of major changes in the Jaina code of conduct, particularly the one for Jaina monks and nuns. The second phase is known as *Caityavāsa*, i. e., the temple based living of monks. With the advent of idol worship and the acquisition of great wealth in the name of these temples and deities by the community, the ceremonial-ritualistic aspect of religion became dominating and the monks started taking interest in external and pompous modes of religious practices. There also developed a special group of administrator clergies. Thus, the *Bhaṭṭārakas* in the Digambara sect and the *Yatis* in Śvetāmbara sect, started living under luxurious conditions, became managers of the temples and temple associated properties and assumed control over the temple-rituals as well as over certain part of community

living in a certain province. In their time, the code of conduct of monks and nuns remained confined into the books only and did not appear in the practical life.

Against this situation a revolution was worked out, in Digambara tradition by Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) and in Śvetāmbara tradition by Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.). But this revolution failed to reap any fruit and remained ineffective and the institution of *Bhaṭṭārakas* and *Yatīs* thrived in the later centuries also. Its only credit was that the tradition of the real ascetics, following the rigorous path of Mahāvīra, could be saved for some centuries. Again in Śvetāmbara tradition, a great revolution took place in the c. 10th A. D. under the leadership of Jineśvara-sūri against the temple based living of the monks, i.e., *Caityavāsa* and administrator clergies. Due to this revolution *Kharataragaccha* came into existence in the c. 10-11th A. D. This revolutionary and reformative spirit continued in Jaina community in the later centuries also and owing to that sub-sects *Tapāgaccha* (c. 12th A. D.), *Loṅkāgaccha* (c. 15th A. D.), *Sthānakavāsī* (c. 16th A. D.) and *Terāpanthī* (c. 18th A. D.) came into existence in Śvetāmbara tradition. Similarly, in Digambara tradition also *Banārasīmata* Digambara *Terāpantha* (c. 16th A. D.) and *Tāraṇapantha* a non-idol worshipper sect, came forward with their reformative outlook. In fact, it is due to the impact of Hindū devotionism and Tāntrism that the ritualistic idol-worship started in Jainism and it is that due to the Muslim impact non-idol worship sects such as *Loṅkāgaccha*, *Sthānakavāsī*, *Terāpantha* and *Tāraṇapantha* took birth in Jainism. This shows that in practice Jainism is not a static but a dynamic religion.

So far as the changes in the Jaina thought are concerned, Jaina scholars divided their history of philosophical development in three ages which are as under :

- (i) The *Āgama* Age (c. 5th B. C.-3rd A. D.).
- (ii) The age of critical presentation of

Anekāntavāda (c. 4th-6th A. D.).

- (iii) The age of systematization of Jaina philosophy (c. 7th-10th A. D.).

This nomenclature underlies the tendencies, dominating the particular era. However, this division is only a tentative one. No water tight compartment in the division of ages is possible. The tendencies of one age can be traced in other ages also. For example, *Āgamic* age terminates with c. 3rd A. D. but the final editing as well as the composition of some *Āgamic* texts continued up to the c. 5th A. D. Not only this but the date of composition of commentaries on *Āgamas* extends up to the c. 11th A. D. Similar is the case with the age of critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda*; as seeds of *Anekānta* can be traced in *Āgamas* such as *Bhagavatisūtra* etc. but its critical presentation continued not only upto Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.) but upto Yaśovijaya and Vimaldas (c. 17th A. D.). Similarly the age of philosophical systematization commences from c. 7th A. D. but the actual effort in this direction starts from the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary by Umāsvāti long before during the c. 3rd A. D. and continued upto the period of Yaśovijaya, i. e., the c. 17th A. D. Thus, it is very difficult to divide these ages strictly into a particular framework of time.

The Age of *Āgamas*

Most of the *Āgamic* literature was composed during c. 5th B. C.-3rd A. D. but some of *Āgamic* texts like *Nandīsūtra* and the present edition of *Praśnavyākaraṇa* were composed in c. 5th-6th A. D. In the most important councils (*Vācanās*), which were held at Mathurā and Valabhī in c. 4th-5th A. D. respectively, for editing and rewriting of these *Āgamas*, some new additions and alterations were also made and that is why some of the *Āgamas* contain some informations and conceptions, developed later in c. 4th-5th, in Jaina philosophy.

The *Āgamas* are mainly concerned with the

religious code of conduct and moral preaching. Pt. Dalasukha Malvania rightly observes that *Anga Āgama* deals with moral code of conduct (*Caritānuyoga*) rather than metaphysics (*Dravyānuyoga*). So far as the subject-matter of *Āgamas* is concerned this position remains the same upto the period of *Niryuktis* (c. 3rd-5th A. D.), *Bhāṣyas* (c. 6th A. D.) and even *Cūrṇis* (c. 7th A. D.). Some scattered seeds of philosophical discussions may no doubt be seen in some of the *Āgamas* and their commentaries; but *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, mainly a work full of philosophical discussions, is an exception.

Age of Critical Presentation of Anekāntavāda

Similar is the case with the second era, i. e., the age of critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda*. So far as *Anekāntavāda* is concerned, it can be traced in *Āgamas* as a mere conception. Its critical presentation as a Jaina doctrine was introduced with the works of Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra in c. 4th-5th, respectively. The treatises, composed by them, mainly for critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda* also worked as a base for the age of philosophical systematization.

Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka* and *Dvātrimśikas* is regarded as the first book of critical philosophy. The concept of *Pañcājñāna* (Five-fold knowledge) is, for the first time, critically analysed in its subtle form in the said composition. It embraces other different contemporary views prevalent in Jaina tradition. The author dives deep in evaluating the established concepts in Jainism rather than peeping outside in different systems.

In the works attributed to this age, particularly in commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra*, the first extant commentary, after the auto-commentary of Umāsvāti, is *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda (first half of the c. 6th A. D.). It not only depicts the concept of *Guṇasthāna* but rather describes it with more details.

Akalaṅka's *Rājavārttika* and Vidyānandi's *Śloka-vārttika* are the two works, regarded as main contributions in Digambara tradition. Both these works critically elaborate the contents of *Tattvārtha*. Through, these works we can assume that, the differences between Digambara and Śvetāmbara became more prominent in this era and the disputes on the problems of '*Strī-mukti*', '*Kevalī-bhukti*' and simultaneousness and succesiveness of *Jñānopayoga* and *Darśanopayoga* of *Kevalī* came into prominence. Along with these internal disputes of Jaina sects, logical refutation of other schools of thought, is also the main characteristic of this age. All the important philosophical works, composed in this particular era, critically evaluate the views of other schools of thoughts and try to establish Jaina view of non-absolutism, based on their theory of *Anekāntavāda*, as most logical and true.

The Main Objective of Early Jainism

Before discussing the early metaphysics and epistemology of Jainas it would be proper to discuss the main objective of early Jainism and its attitude towards life, which is to get rid of the cycle of birth and death and thus, to emancipate man from sufferings. It tries to track down sufferings to their very root. The famous Jaina text of an early period *Uttarādhyanasūtra* says :

*kāmāṇugiddhippabhavaṃ khu dukkhaṃ
savvassa logassa sadevagassa.*

jaṃ kāiyaṃ mānasiyaṃ ca kiñci

tassa antagam gacchai vīyarāgo. (32.19)

That is the root of all physical as well as mental sufferings of everybody, including the gods, is the desire for enjoyment. Only a dispassionate attitude can put an end to them. It is true that materialism seeks to eliminate sufferings, through the fulfilment of human desires, but it cannot eradicate the prime cause from which the stream of suffering wells up. Materialism does not have at its disposal an effective

means for quenching the thirst of a man permanently. Not only this, its attempts at the temporary appeasement of a yearning, have the opposite effect of flaring it up like the fire fed by an oblation of butter. It is clearly noted in the *Uttarādhyayana* :

*suvanṇa-rūpassa u pavvayābhavē
siyā hu kelāsasama asamkṣayā.
narassa luddhassa na tehiṃ kiñci
iccha u āgāsasamā aṇantiyā. (9.48)*

That is even if an infinite number of gold and silver mountains, each as large as the *Kailāsa*, are conjured up, they would not lead to the final extinction of human desires, because desires are infinite like space. Not only Jainism but all spiritual traditions unanimously hold that the root cause of sorrow is attachment, lust or a sense of mineness. The fulfilment of desires is not the means of ending them. Though a materialistic perspective can bring material prosperity, it cannot make us free from attachments and yearnings. Our materialistic outlook can be compared to our attempt of chopping the branches off while watering the roots of a tree. In the above mentioned *gāthā*, it is clearly pointed out that desires are endless just as space (*Ākāśa*) and it is very difficult to fulfil all of them. If mankind is to be freed from selfishness, violence, exploitation, corruption and affliction stemming from them, it is necessary to outgrow materialistic outlook and to develop an attitude, which may be described as spiritual.

The word *Adhyātma*, the Samskr̥ta equivalent of spirituality derived from *adhi + ātmā*, implies the superiority and sublimity of *Ātman*, the soul force. In the oldest Jaina text *Ācārāṅga*, the word *ajjhatthavisohī*, connotes, inner purity of the self, which is the ultimate goal of *Jaina-Sādhana*. According to Jainism, the realisation of physical amenities or creature comforts is not the ultimate aim of life. There are some higher ideals of life which are over and above the mere biological and economic needs of

life. Spirituality consists in realising these higher values of life.

Jaina spirituality teaches us that happiness or unhappiness is centred in the soul and not in worldly objects. Pleasure and pain are self-created. They are subjective in nature also. They do not depend totally on the objects, but depend also on the attitude of a person towards them. The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* (20.37) mentions :

*appā kattā vikattā ya, duhāṇa ya suhāṇa ya
appā mittamamittam ca, duppaṭṭhiyasupaṭṭhio.*

That the self (*ātmā*) is both the doer and the enjoyer of happiness and misery. It is its own friend when it acts righteously and foe when it acts unrighteously. An unconquered self is its own enemy, unconquered passions and sense organs of the self are its own enemy. Oh monk ! having conquered them, I move righteously.

In another Jaina text of the early period *Āura-paccākkhāṇam* (c. 3rd A. D.) it is mentioned :

*ego me sāsado appā, nāṇadamisaṇasamjuo
sesā me bahirā bhāvā, savve samjogalakṣhāṇā.
samjogamūlā jīveṇam, pattā dukkhaparamparā
tamhā samjogasambandham, savvabhāveṇa vosire.
(26. 27)*

The soul endowed with knowledge and perception alone is permanent, all other objects are alien to self. All the serious miseries, suffered by self, are the result of individual's sense of 'mine' or attachment towards the alien objects and so it is imperative to abandon completely the sense of 'mine' with regard to the external objects. In short, according to Jainism not identifying oneself with the objects not belonging to the soul, is the starting point of spiritual practice (*sādhana*). Non-alignment with material object is the pre-requisite for self-realisation, the main objective of early Jainism. According to it, renouncement of attachment is the same as the emergence of a balanced view of even-sightedness (*samadṛṣṭitā*).

The reason, as to why Jainism regards abandonment of 'sense of mine' or of attachment as the only means for self-realisation, is that so long as there is attachment in a man, his attention is fixed not on self or soul, but on not-self, *i.e.*, material objects. Materialism thrives on this object-oriented attitude or indulgence in the not-self. According to the Jaina philosophers, the identification with the not-self and regarding worldly object as a source of happiness or unhappiness, are the hallmarks of materialism. This is considered as a wrong view-point. The right view-point regards the self as of supreme value and aims at the realisation of its quiddity or its ideal unconditioned state of pure knower, which is free from attachment and passions. It is mentioned in *Samayasāra* (209) :

evam sammāñi appānam muṇadi jaṇagasahāvañi.

that the self, possessed of a right view-point, realises the pure soul as knowledge. Thus according to Jainism the right view-point regards self as pure knower (*śuddha draṣṭā*) and distinct from not-self. This detached attitude only can free one from one's mental as well as physical sufferings.

Cause of Bondage and Suffering of the Self

Jainism maintains that the attachment (*Rāga*) and delusion (*Moha*) obscure our spiritual nature and are responsible for our worldly existence and suffering. The most intense *vāsanā* is *hrdaya-granthi*, which is a deep attachment towards sense-objects and worldly desires. The oldest nomenclature of Jaina sect is *Niggantha-dhamma*. The word *Niggantha* means the one who has unknotted his *hrdaya-granthi*, *i.e.*, the 'mine'-complex. It means, in other words, one who has eradicated ones attachments and passions. The word, 'Jaina', also conveys the same meaning; a true Jaina is one who has conquered one's passions. According to Lord Mahāvīra, "to remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl" (*Ācārāṅga*, 1.1.5). The attachment towards sensuous

objects is the root of our worldly existence (*Ācārāṅga*, 1.2.1). Further, it is also mentioned in the *Ācārāṅga*, 1.3.1, "only he who knows the nature of the sensuous objects is possessed of self, knowledge, scripture, Law (*dhamma*) and Truth (*bambha*)." The five senses together with anger, pride, delusion and desire are difficult to be conquered, but when the self is conquered, all these are completely conquered (*Uttarādhyayana*, 9.36). Just as the female crane is produced from the egg and the egg from the crane, in the same way desire is produced by delusion and delusion by desire (*Uttarādhyayana*, 32.6). Attachment and hatred are the seeds of *karma* and delusion is the source of attachment and hatred. *Karma* is the root of birth and death. This cycle of birth and death is the sole cause of misery. Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no greed, while greed is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment" (*Uttarādhyayana*, 32.8). According to the *Tattvārthasūtra* 8.1, a famous Jaina text, perverse attitude (*mithyā-darśana*), non-abstinence (*avirati*), spiritual inertia (*pramāda*), passions (*kaṣāya*) and activity (*Yoga*) — these five are the conditions of bondage. We can say that *mithyā-darśana* (perverse attitude), *mithyā-jñāna* (perverse knowledge) and *mithyā-cāritra* (immoral conduct) are also responsible for our worldly existence or bondage. But perversity of knowledge and conduct depends upon the perversity of attitude. Thus, the perversity of attitude, which is due to *darśana-moha* is one of the important factors of bondage. Non-abstinence, spiritual inertia and passions are due to the presence of perverse attitude. Though activities of mind, body and speech known as *Yoga* are considered the cause of bondage yet these, in themselves are incapable of bondage unless by perverse attitude and passions. They are only the cause of *Āsrava* (in-

flux of *kārmic* matter), not the cause of bondage. Bondage is possible only through the *Yoga* in association with perverse attitude and passions. The perverse attitude (*mithyā-darśana*) and the passions (*Kaṣāyas*) are mutually cause and effect of each other just as the egg and the hen or the seed and the tree. We can not fix the priority of one over the other, passions are due to the perverse attitude and perverse attitude is due to the passions.

Early Jaina Doctrine of Karma/Bondage

According to Jaina philosophy every activity of mind, speech and body is followed by the influx of a finer type of atoms, which are technically known as *karma-vargaṇā-pudgala*. In the presence of passions, this influx (*āsrava*) of *kārmic* matter cause bondage, which is of four types — 1. Kind (*prakṛti*), 2. quantity (*pradeśa*), 3. duration (*sthiti*) and 4. intensity (*anubhāga*) (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.4). The activities of mind, body and speech, technically known as *yogas*, determine the *prakṛti* and the *pradeśa* of *kārmic*-matter while the passions determine the duration (*sthiti*) and the intensity (*anubhāga*-mild or intense power of fruition) of the *Karma*. *Karma*, in Jainism is the binding principle. It binds the soul with the body hence responsible for our worldly existence. *Karma* has the same place in Jainism, as unseen potency (*adrṣṭa*) in Nyāya, *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya, *Māyā* in Vedānta, *Vāsanā* in Buddhism, *Śakti* in Śaivism and *Pāśa* (trap) in Śākta school. *Karma* is something foreign which veils the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. It is also responsible for our pleasant and unpleasant experiences and worldly existence. According to Vidyānandī, two functions of the *Karma* are to obscure the natural faculties of soul and to defile the soul. Jainism also believes in the same *modus operandi* of *karma*. According to it *karma* itself is competent to produce its fruit in due course of time and there is no need of God or other external

power for its fruition.

The *Karmas* are of eight types — (i) *jñānāvaraṇa* : knowledge obscuring, (ii) *Darśanāvaraṇa* : perception obscuring, (iii) *Vedanīya* : feeling producing, (iv) *Mohaniya* : deluding, (v) *Āyu* : age determining, (vi) *Nāma* : body or personality determining, (vii) *Gotra* : status determining and (viii) *Antarāya* : obstructive (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.5).

Among these eight types of *karma*, *Jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *mohaniya* and *antarāya* — these four are considered as destructive *karma* or *ghātī karma*, because they obscure the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power, respectively. The other four — *vedanīya*, *āyu*, *nāma* and *gotra* are called *aghātī* or non-destructive *karma*. They are only responsible for bodily existence of present life and incapable of continuing the cycle of birth and death. It is only due to the deluding *karma* (*mohaniya karma*) that the cycle of birth and death continues. This deluding *karma* is responsible for perversity of attitude and the passions. The emancipation of soul is only possible when the perversity of attitude is destroyed and passions are overcome.

The *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra* says that just as a tree with its root dried up, does not grow even though it is watered, similarly actions (*Karma*) do not grow up when delusion (*moha* or *avidyā*) is destroyed (28. 30). One devoid of a right attitude (*darśana*) cannot have right knowledge (*jñāna*) and there can not be rectitude of will (*caraṇa-guṇa*) without right knowledge (*jñāna*). One devoid of the rectitude of will cannot have emancipation from evil will and one devoid of emancipation from evil will (induced by *karma*) cannot attain final emancipation (32.9).

The Ultimate End : Mokṣa

The attainment of emancipation or *mukṭi* is the pivot on which all the ethico-religious philoso-

phies of India revolve. Jainism maintains that the liberation — the perfect and purified state of the soul, is the only and ultimate goal of every individual. *Mukti* does not mean in Jainism, the losing of one's own identity. The self retains its identity even in the state of liberation.

In *Ācārāṅga*, the nature of *Paramātmā* (the immaculate soul) is described as that which is beyond the grasp of logic and intellect. He is one and alone. He is harmless. He is neither long nor short, nor a circle nor a triangle, nor a quadrilateral nor a sphere. He is neither black nor blue, nor red, nor yellow, nor white. He is neither pungent nor bitter, nor astringent, nor sour, nor sweet. He is neither hard nor soft, neither heavy nor light, neither cold nor hot, neither greasy nor dry. He is not subject to birth and decay. He is free from attachment. He is simileless. He baffles all terminology. There is no word to describe. He is neither sound nor form, nor odour, nor taste, nor touch. (*Āyāro* — Ed. Yuvācārya Mahāprajña, J. V. B., Ladnun, 1981, pp. 262-266.)

In the *Niyamasāra* (181), 'Being' (*astitva*), the pure existence is considered to be one of the qualities of a liberated soul. *Mokṣa*, according to Jainism, means a complete perfection and purification of soul. In the state of liberation there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor any obstruction, nor any annoyance, nor delusion, nor any anxiety. A liberated soul is really free from all sorts of impurities and from the cycle of birth and death (*Niyamasāra*, 178-180). In liberation the soul realises the *ananta-catuṣṭaya*, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. This *ananta-catuṣṭaya* is the inherent nature of the soul. Jainism believes that every individual soul has the potentialities of Godhood and the soul can attain to it. By shedding away all the *kārmic* particles of four destructive *karmas* (*ghātī-karma*), the soul attains *Arhathood*, which is the state of *vītarāga-daśā* or *jīvana-mukti*. So long as the

four non-destructive *karmas*, i.e., *Nāma*, *Gotra*, *Āyuṣya* and *Vedaniya*, are not exhausted the soul of *Arhat* remains in a highly refined physical body and preaches truth to the world. Shedding physical and *kārmic* body, when these four non-destructive *karmas* are exhausted the soul of *Arhat* goes upto the top-most of the universe — abode of liberated soul known as *siddhaśīlā*, remains there eternally and enjoys perfect knowledge, perfect power, perfect perception and perfect bliss (*Niyamasāra*, 181-182). Thus, emancipation, according to Jainism, is nothing but realisation of one's own real nature.

Jaina Sādhana in Early Period

In the earliest Jaina āgamas, particularly in *Ācārāṅga* and *Uttarādhyayana*, we have a mention of *Triyāma*, *Cāturyāma* and *Pañcayāma*. Though *Ācārāṅga* mentions *Triyāma*, it does not give any detail about it. Its commentator Śīlāṅka had derived the meaning of three-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. But in my opinion this derivation of Śīlāṅka is hardly in accordance with its real meaning. *Triyāma* refers to the three vows — Non-violence, Truth and Non-possession. Jaina tradition is very firm in maintaining that Lord Pārśva, the twenty-third *Tīrthaṅkara* had preached *Cāturyāma* — Non-violence, Truthfulness, Non-stealing and Non-possesiveness. Mahāvīra added one more *yāma* celibacy as an independent vow in the *Cāturyāma* of Pārśva and thus, introduced *Pañcayāma*. Formerly, it was taken for granted that woman is also a possession and no one can enjoy her without having her in his own possession. But Mahāvīra took it as an independent vow. In some of the canonical works we also have a five-fold path of liberation but in a different way as Right faith, Right knowledge, Right conduct, Right penance and Right efforts. In *Uttarādhyayana* as well as in the works of Kundakunda the four-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right faith, Right knowledge, Right conduct and Right pen-

ance are mentioned. Here Right effort has been merged into Right penance. Similarly, later on merging the Right penance into Right conduct, Umāsvāti prescribed the three-fold path of liberation in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 3rd A. D.). *Ācārāṅga* has also mentioned the three-fold path in a different form, namely — non-violence (*nikṣiptadaṇḍa*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and ecstasy (*samādhi*) which is more like the three-fold path of *prajñā, śīla* (supplementary vow) and *samādhi* of Buddhism. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and some other canonical works also mention two-fold path of liberation, i.e., *vidyā* (wisdom) and *caraṇa* (conduct) (*Vijjācaraṇa pamokkha*). We see that there are different views about the path of liberation but Jainas never accepted single path either of knowledge or devotion or action. They believe that neither knowledge, nor faith nor conduct alone can be regarded as a means of salvation. But all the three combined together make an integrated path of liberation which is a peculiarity of Jainism. In this integration we have a reflection of its non-absolutistic approach *Anekāntavāda*, the central doctrine of Jainism.

Now, if we take each constituent of the three-fold path, separately, Right faith (*Samyak Darśana*) comes first. In earliest canonical works such as *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the term *Darśana* is used either in the sense of self-realisation or right vision (right attitude). As 'faith' it is used for the first time in *Uttarādhyayana*, and there it means nine categories (*Tattvas*). The same meaning is retained in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* while defining *Samyak-Darśana*. But after c. 3rd-4th the meaning is also changed and *Samyak-Darśana* is defined as faith, 'Jina' as a Deva (Ideal), Nirgrantha as a Guru (Teacher) and non-violence as a *Dharma*.

Similarly, the term *Samyak-Jñāna* (Right knowledge) is used in the sense of discriminative knowledge of self and not-self in the earlier canons. But later on the term is used as the knowledge of

Jaina scripture.

So far as *Samyak-Cāritra* (Right conduct) is concerned, the meaning of the term remains the same throughout the ages. It encompasses the observance of five great vows (*mahāvratas*), five vigilances (*samitis*), three controls (*guptis*) and ten *dharma*s. This right conduct is exclusively prescribed for the monks and nuns. Similarly, five minor vows (*aṇuvratas*), three *guṇa-vratas* and four *śikṣāvratas* as well as eleven *Pratimās* are prescribed as a right-conduct for the house-holders (*Śrāvakas*). According to both the sects — Śvetāmbara and Digambara, the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns was very rigorous at the time of Mahāvira (c. 6th B. C.) but with the passage of time, coming to the period of Bhadrabāhu-I, (c. 3rd B.C.) it became lenient. By this period various exceptions in the five great vows as well as in other rules and regulations of Jaina monks and nuns has been accepted. This lenient tendency is clearly visible in the *Chedasūtras* of Bhadrabāhu-I in the form of atonements of the various exceptions and transgressions in the code of conduct. This liberalism in the code of conduct culminates in c. 6th-7th. In *Bhāṣyas* and *Cūrṇis* of *Chedasūtras*, one can find ample examples of this liberalism. It is quite difficult to mention all those changes which took place in the Jaina code of conduct during the period of c. 3rd B.C.-3rd A. D., because of two reasons — firstly, some of the exceptions mentioned in *Bhāṣyas* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Cūrṇis* (c. 7th A. D.) might have come in practice after c. 3rd A. D. A period which is beyond the purview of this article and secondly, it is impossible to include, all the changes that occurred, in the frame of this brief article. Here we can only refer the scholars to see these *Chedasūtras* and their commentaries.

The major changes which took place during above period are regarding the use of clothes and begging bowls by Jaina monks. On the basis of the fig-

ures of Jaina monks and nuns inscribed on the pedestals of Jina-images of Mathura (c. 1st B. C.-2nd A. D.) it can be easily inferred that by that time the use of clothes and begging bowls was in vogue, though the ideal state of nudity was intact. The figures of monks found at Mathura are almost nude but are depicted having a folded large piece of cloth, on their left arm, may be a woolen blanket, and which seems to be instrumental in hiding their nudity. Similarly, there are certain figures of Jaina monks, having begging bowls in their hands. These figures clearly show that in these centuries, i. e., c. 2nd B. C.-3rd A. D., the use of woolen blanket and begging bowls was common atleast among the Jaina monks and nuns of North India. But in South India, practice of nudity remained intact in that period.

The Cause of Schism and Caityavāsa

Remarkably, it was this use of blanket and begging bowls, along with certain other exceptions in the code of conduct which led to the schism in Jainas into Śvetāmbara, Digambara and Yāpanīya. According to *Āvaśyakamūla-bhāṣya*, the controversy regarding the use of clothes and begging bowl was raised first time after 606 years of the Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvīra, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D.

However, on the basis of facts, narrated above, it can be concluded that liberalism in the rigorous code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns caused the schism into Śvetāmbara, Digambara and *Caityavāsa*, i. e., living in temples or *Maṭhas* in Jaina order. This tendency of living in the temples of Jaina monks and nuns further caused the deterioration in their strict code of conduct and various exceptions were accepted into general rules. This liberalism, later on, also gave birth to the various *Tāntrika Sādhanās* in Jainism.

Though on the basis of the code of conduct, particularly the use of clothes and bowls, the first sectarian division took place inc. 1st-2nd A. D. But prior to that, we have also trace of another type of differences in Jaina order particularly pertaining to doctrines, started in the life-time of Lord Mahāvīra itself.

In Jaina tradition, the persons, having doctrinal differences with the tradition of Mahāvīra, are called as *Nihnavas*. These *Nihnavas* were seven in number. *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (Verse 778-783) and *Uttarādhyayananyukti* (Verse 165-178) mention the following *Nihnavas* and their basic differences from the traditional Jainism along with time and place of their origin. The names of *Nihnavas* and their details are as under :

No.	Name of <i>Nihnavas</i>	Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahāvīra's tradition	Time of Origination	Place of Origination
1.	Jāmāli	<i>Bahuratavāda</i> (An action, in the process of completion, can't be called completed, it is uncompleted.)	14 years after Mahāvīra's enlightenment.	Śrāvastī
2.	Tiṣyagupta	<i>Jīva-pradeśavāda</i> (Any one pradeśa of the soul can be called as <i>Jīva</i> .)	16 years after Mahāvīra's enlightenment.	Rṣabhapur
3.	Āśāḍha-bhūti	<i>Avyaktavāda</i> (difficult to say who is who).	214 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Śvetāmbikā
4.	Aśvamitra	<i>Samucchinnavāda</i> (All the objects are transient and get destroyed just after their origination.)	220 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Mithilā
5.	Dhanagupta	<i>Dvikriyāvada</i> (possibility of having two experiences simultaneously.)	228 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Ulūkātīra

No.	Name of <i>Nihnavas</i>	Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahāvīra's tradition	Time of Origination	Place of Origination
6.	Rohagupta	<i>Trairāśikavāda</i> or <i>no-Jīvavāda</i> (three categories in world — living beings, non-living beings, neither living nor non-non-living beings.	544 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Antaranjīā
7.	Goṣṭhā-māhila	<i>Abāddhikavāda</i> (Karma-particles only touch the soul — pradeśas.	544 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Daśapur

Apart from these, some divisions took place in the Jaina order only due to administrative needs. In *Kalpasūtrasthavirāvalī*, the Jaina order is said to be divided in various *Gaṇas*, *Kulas* and *Śākhās*. This type of division was based neither on any theoretical differences nor on the Code of Conduct. This division of *Gaṇa*, *Kula* and *Śākhā* was based on the hierarchy of the spiritual teachers or on the basis of the group of the monks belonging to a particular region. The final division of the Jaina church such as Śvetāmbara, Digambara and Yāpanīya came into existence in the c. 4th-5th A. D. as we do not find any literary or epigraphic evidence for these sectarian divisions dated pre-c. 4th-5th A. D.

Development of Jaina Theory of Knowledge

The development of Jaina theory of five-fold knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The tradition of Mahāvīra's predecessor Pārśvanātha (c. 800 B. C.) bears clear marks of *Pañcājñānavāda* or five-fold knowledge, a preliminary conception of Jaina epistemology. In *Rājaprasānīyasūtra* (165) Ārya Keṣī, a follower of Pārśva tradition, called himself believer of the theory of five-fold knowledge and explained the same to King Paesī. *Uttarādhyayana* also the same refers. It is remarkable that there is not much difference between Pārśva and Mahāvīra, so far as their Metaphysics and Epistemology are concerned. Had there been any difference on these issues, it would have been definitely mentioned in *Bhagavati* and *Uttarādhyayana*, both pointing out the differences regarding ethical code of conduct the traditions of

both. Except some issues on the ethical code of conduct in which he makes some additions later on, Mahāvīra accepts the metaphysics and epistemology of Pārśva as it is. The reference of *Jñānapravāda*, the fifth one of fourteen *Pūrvas* (the literature belonging to the tradition of Mahāvīra's predecessor Lord Pārśva) also proves that before Mahāvīra there was a concept of *Pañcājñānavāda* assigned to *Nirgrantha* tradition of Pārśva and was later developed in Mahāvīra's tradition. *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the oldest extant Jaina literature, do not bear any mark of the discussion over the theory of knowledge, whereas *Uttarādhyayana*, *Sthānāṅga*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Bhagavati*, *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandīsūtra*, elaborately discuss the gradual development of the conception of *Pañcājñānavāda*. It suggests that although the theory of five-fold knowledge (*Pañcājñānavāda*) was derived from Pārśva's tradition, it was later on developed by Mahāvīra.

Pt. Dalasukha Malvania, in his well-known book '*Āgama Yuga kā Jaina Darśana*' has mentioned three stages of the development of *Pañcājñānavāda* based on the chronology of Jaina *Āgamas*. At the first stage knowledge was divided into five types — *Matī* (the knowledge obtained through the sense-organs (*indriya*), quasi-sense-organs (*anindriya*), and mind (*mana*), *Śruta* (scriptural knowledge); *Avadhi* (clairvoyance); *Manah-paryaya* (telepathy or knowledge of others' mind) and *Kevala* (perfect knowledge comprehending all substances and their modifications or omniscience). The description of

five-fold knowledge, found in *Bhagavatisūtra*, is in accordance with this first stage. The *Sthānāṅga* and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 3rd A.D.) refer the second stage where the knowledge is divided into two main heads — (i) *Pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge incorporating sensory and scriptural knowledge) and (ii) *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge which incorporates the three extra-sensory knowledge). Umāsvāti also supports this two-fold division. At this stage, it was supposed that apart from the cognition depending on the soul alone (*Ātmasāpekṣa Jñāna*), the cognition depending on sense-organs and quasi-sense-organs (*indriya-anindriya sāpekṣa*), depending on the intellect (*buddhi sāpekṣa*) and the cognition depending on the *Āgamas*, should be considered as Indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa Jñāna*). It became a special feature of Jaina Epistemology because others were considering it as a direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). The development of this second stage was very essential as it was to pave the way of synthesis between the theory of knowledge (*Jñāna-vāda*) and validity of knowledge. At this stage, the knowledge (*Jñāna*) itself was considered as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and was divided into Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).

The third stage of the development is represented by *Nandīsūtra* (c. 5th A. D.). In the whole of the *Āgamas*, *Nandīsūtra* is the only composition which thoroughly deals with the theory of five-fold knowledge. In *Nandīsūtra* another development is also visible where the sense-cognition is included in *pratyakṣa*, following the common tradition. The second work, dealing with the conception of five-fold knowledge is *Anuyogadvārasūtra* (c. 2nd). *Anuyogadvāra* is earlier than *Nandīsūtra* because former does not include sense cognition in Direct knowledge as the latter does. It is believed that *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandīsūtra* are compiled by Āryarakṣita and Deva-

vācaka, respectively. Regarding the authorship of *Anuyogadvārasūtra* scholars have different opinions as to whether Āryarakṣita himself is the author or some one else. So far as the question of Āryarakṣita is concerned it is a fact that he for the first time translated the Jaina technical terms by *Anuyoga-vidhi*. It is the text of philosophical method. In the beginning, *Anuyogadvārasūtra* mentions that *mati*, *avadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kevala* — these four types of knowledge depend on experience only. They can not be preached where as *śrutajñāna* can be studied and preached. At this third stage of development *Anuyogadvāra* gives importance to the four-fold division. In this third stage of development particularly based on *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, the cognition depending on sense-organs, even being considered transcendently as indirect (*parokṣa*), was also included in direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) following the concept of other traditions and it was designated as *saṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to the common usage or ordinary perception).

In my opinion, primarily empirical sensual cognition was included in *darśana* and contemplative *matijñāna* was confined only to the deliberative intellectual knowledge (*vimarśātmaka jñāna*). This distinction was also recommended in later period. Four early classifications of *matijñāna*, i.e., *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* are also considered as deliberative knowledge but when sensory cognition was included in *matijñāna*, the question arose as to how the knowledge, originated from sense-organs, would be regarded as indirect knowledge. Consequently, it was accepted as *saṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage) following the other philosophical traditions.

To synthesize the first stage of five-fold knowledge with two-fold classification of *pramāṇa* — *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* of second stage, a third stage was introduced. An attempt was also made to

correlate the Jaina concept of *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) with the concept of perception (*pratyakṣa*) of other philosophical traditions.

Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) who contributed a parallel system of Jaina logic based on the *Āgamic* conception and some later Ācāryas classified the *pratyakṣa* into two parts, i.e., *saṁvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage) and *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception). Its brief reference can be traced in *Nandīśūtra* and a detailed one in Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* (c. 700 A. D.). Akalaṅka etc. have followed the same two-fold concept of *pratyakṣa*.

So it is clear that the conception of five-fold knowledge is quite old but its gradual development took place only during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. Because *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, both do not refer these two types of *pratyakṣa* — *saṁvyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*. By that period *mati-jñāna* was considered as *parokṣa*. The hypothesis of these two types of *pratyakṣa* — *saṁvyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* came into existence after c. 3rd-4th A. D. in the period of *Nandīśūtra* (c. 5th A. D.) as the above division was clearly mentioned in this text.

Bhagavatisūtra refers to *Nandīśūtra* and *Anuyogadvāra* for the details about the Jaina theory of knowledge. It concludes that this portion was incorporated in *Bhagavati* at the time of *Valabhī Vācanā* (c. 5th A. D.). *Sthānāṅga*'s classification of knowledge as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, also is contemporary to *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 4th A. D.). In the above mentioned scriptures *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance), *manah-paryaya-jñāna* (telepathy or knowledge of others' mind) and *kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge comprehending all the substance and their modes, i.e., Omniscience), all being beyond the range of our senses are considered as transcendental perception or self perception. This conception did not undergo any

change in later periods also. Similarly the scriptural knowledge also continued to be considered as indirect (*parokṣa*). But among the two classes of *matijñāna* — *indriyajanya matijñāna* (originated from senses) and *manojanya mati-jñāna* (originated from mind), the sense originated *matijñāna* was considered as *parokṣa* from the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) point of view and *pratyakṣa* from the point of view of common usage (*saṁvyāvahārika*). The other traditions were considering sense originated *matijñāna* as *pratyakṣa*. When discussions over *Pramāṇasāstra* (science of valid cognition) started, the *matijñāna*, originated from mind, was further divided in different classes and got assimilated with different *Pramāṇas*. After *Nandīśūtra* the development of this conception of the five-fold knowledge is found in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* where not only its different classifications are mentioned but the doubts regarding the very concept and the solutions are also discussed. This era witnessed intensive discussions over the relationship of *darśana* and *jñāna* as well as *śrutajñāna* and *mati-jñāna*.

The development of the conception of five-fold knowledge continued during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. but it got interrupted after the c. 7th A. D. and discussions over *Pramāṇavāda* (science of valid cognition) started. This is noteworthy that *Pramāṇavāda* in Jainism was the result of the impact of other philosophical traditions.

Jaina Concept of Pramāṇa

The theory of five-fold knowledge, originally belonged to Jainas but the case is different with the theory of *Pramāṇa*. This latter conception is borrowed by Jainas from other philosophical traditions. The concept of *Pramāṇa* in Jaina philosophy came into existence in c. 3rd-4th A. D. and continued to develop upto the c. 13th A. D.

Jaina Ācāryas, first of all accepted the concept of *Pramāṇa* as it was prevalent in other philoso-

phical traditions, particularly in Nyāya and Sāṅkhya school, but in due course of time they got it associated with their concept of five-fold knowledge. Thus, whatever development of Jaina theory of *Pramāṇa* is seen in Jainism, is the result of its synthesis with *Pañcā-jñānavāda*. While classifying the *Pramāṇa* some new concepts came into existence. They are undoubtedly unique contributions of Jaina philosophy. For instance, *Smṛti* (memory), *Pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *Tarka* (Induction) were for the first time considered as *Pramāṇa*.

We shall now see as to how the development of *Pramāṇavāda* took place in Jaina *āgamas*. Jaina *āgamas* refer three and four types of *Pramāṇa* accepted by Sāṅkhya and Naiyāyikas, respectively. *Sthānāṅga* clearly mentions three types of *Vyavasāya* (determinate cognition), i.e., *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Prātyika* and *Ānugāmika* (inference) whereas *Bhagavati* mentions four types of *Vyavasāya*, i.e., *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna* (comparison) and *Āgama* (verbal testimony). Similarly, in *Sthānāṅga* four types of *pramāṇas* called *Hetu* are mentioned.

In this way *Sthānāṅga* mentions both, three-fold and four-fold classification of *Pramāṇa* in the form of *Vyavasāya* and *Hetu*, respectively. *Anuyogadvārasūtra* not only clearly mentions four types of *Pramāṇa* but also elaborately discusses each of them. The details about the four *Pramāṇas* given by *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is very much similar to that of Nyāya school. As I have stated earlier, *Bhagavati* refers to the *Anuyogadvāra* for more details about the *Pramāṇas*. It indicates that at the time of Valabhī council (c. 5th A. D.) the concept of four types of *Pramāṇa* had already been accepted by Jaina philosophers but when *Pramāṇavāda* got synthesized with the conception of five-fold knowledge, the *Upamāna* (comparison) had no place in it.

Later, Siddhasena Divākara in his *Nyāyāvātāra* and Haribhadrāsūri in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*

mentioned only three types of *Pramāṇas*. Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) for the first time declared five-fold knowledge as *Pramāṇa* and divided it into two classes *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa*. Later on, *Nandīsūtra* divided *Pratyakṣa* in two sub-classes *Sāmvyaṭvāhārika* and *Pāramārthika*, including sensory perception into the first one and *Avadhi*, *Manah-paryaya* and *Kevala* into the second, respectively. The four *Āgamic* divisions of *Matijñāna* — *Avagraha* (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc.); *Īhā* (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by *avagraha*); *Avāya* (when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of *Īhā*) and *Dhāraṇā* (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of *matijñāna* are called *dhāraṇā*) were accepted as the two classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa-jñāna*) enumerated the cognition originated from mind (*manasajanya jñāna*) and Verbal testimony (*Śrutajñāna*) with a view that Inference (*Anumāna*) etc. are the forms of *Manasajanya-jñāna*.

Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of *Pramāṇa* with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umāsvāti. Ācārya Umāsvāti maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five *pramāṇas* and divides these five cognition into two *Pramāṇas* — direct and indirect. Pt. Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, the only text accommodating Naiyāyika's four-fold division of *Pramāṇa* into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with the Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so. They discussed the

concept of *Pramāṇas* on the base of five-fold knowledge of Jaina Āgamas. According to *Nyāya-śāstra*, the cognition originated from Mind (*mānasa-janya jñāna*) is of two types — *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa*. The knowledge originated from mind which experiences pleasure and pain, is Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) whereas the inference (*anumāna*) and comparison (*upamāna*) are Indirect forms of knowledge (*parokṣa*). So having considered sensory-perception of *Matijñāna* as *Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage), cognition based on intellect (*Bauddhika Jñāna*) as inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*Śrutajñāna*) as *Āgama pramāṇa*. Jainas synthesized the conception of five-fold knowledge with the *Pramāṇaśāstra* of the other schools of Indian philosophy. In *Anuyoga-dvārasutra*, *Pratyakṣa* is divided in two heads, i. e., (1) perception originated from sense-organs (*indriya-janya*) and (2) perception originated from quasi-sense-organs (*no-indriya*). Quasi-sense originated perception included *avadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kevalajñāna*. This concept of knowledge carries the same meaning as the one, conveyed by the transcendental knowledge in other philosophical traditions. The distinction between ordinary perception (*Laukika Pratyakṣa*) and Transcendental perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*) of Vaiśeṣikas is accepted by the Jainas under the name of *Sāmvyāvahārika* and *Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa* and was synthesized later on with their conception of five-fold knowledge (*pañcājñānavāda*).

According to Pt. Dalasukha Malvania the *Āgamic* period (c. 5th A. D.) has no trace of any independent discussion over *Pramāṇa*. Till that period Jainācāryas have collected the opinions of other philosophical schools in their treatises. In the corresponding period a number of traditions on the types of *Pramāṇa* were prevalent. Jaina Āgamas refer traditions of three and four types of *Pramāṇas*. The mention of three types of *Pramāṇas* — *Pratyakṣa*

(perception), *Anumāna* (inference) and *Āgama* (verbal testimony), refers to the old Sāṅkhya System. While mention of four *pramāṇas* including *Upamāna* (comparison) belongs to Naiyāyikas. It clearly shows that by the end of c. 5th A. D. the concept of *Pramāṇa* as an independent concept was not developed in Jainism. The first work which elaborately deals with the *Pramāṇaśāstra* is Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra*. The period of Siddhasena Divākara is fixed as c. 4th-5th A. D. *Nyāyāvatāra* mentions three *Āgamic* divisions of *Pramāṇa*, i.e., perception, inference and verbal testimony (*Āgama*). Though Siddhasena has expressed briefly the Jaina opinion on the *Nyāya-śāstra* of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya but he has followed mostly the old tradition, accepted by Jaina Āgamas. At some places he has only revised the definitions of *Pramāṇa* of other schools on the basis of Jaina theory of Non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*).

Nyāyāvatāra clearly follows the *Āgamic* tradition, as far as the description of *Pramāṇa* is concerned. It, no where, mentions the later developed concept of *Smṛti* (memory), *Pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *Tarka* (indirect proof : *tarka* is not by itself, a source of valid knowledge, though it is valuable in suggesting hypothesis which leads indirectly to right knowledge) as *Pramāṇa*. This proves that *Nyāyāvatāra* is undoubtedly an ancient text compiled by Siddhasena Divākara. After *Nyāyāvatāra*, the literary works which discuss the concept of *Pramāṇa* are Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 6th A. D.) of Digambara tradition, Siddhasenagaṇi's commentary on *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* (c. 8th A. D.) of Śvetāmbara tradition. In these works there is no trace of *Pramāṇa* like *Smṛti* etc. This concept is discussed for the first time in the works of Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) and Siddharṣi's commentary on *Nyāyāvatāra* (c. 9th A. D.) of Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions, respectively. The independent development of Jaina Nyāya

commences from the period of Akalaṅka, who for the first time expounded *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇas*. The Jaina theory of Nyāya was given a new direction in the c. 8th A. D. Akalaṅka not only established *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇa* but also revised the definitions or meanings of Perception, Inference and Āgama, given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. In his definition of *Pramāṇa*, he introduced a new term *avisamvādi* in place of *svapara-avabhāṣaka*. Most probably, this characteristic of changing definitions was borrowed from the Buddhist tradition. It was an especiality of Akalaṅka that he logically evaluated even the pre-established conceptions, hence rightly called the father of Jaina Nyāya. His works *Laghiyastraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Siddhiviniścaya* and *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* are related to the Jaina Nyāya. *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* is the Akalaṅka's last work in which matured Jaina Nyāya, especially *Pramāṇa-śāstra*, is elaborately discussed. Though in his earlier works he mentioned *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as *Pramāṇa* yet as independent *Pramāṇas*, these are established only in this work. As such from the point of view of the history of Jaina *Pramāṇa-śāstra* this is a valuable work giving new dimension to the concept of *pramāṇa*.

In the history of Indian logic the Jaina logicians, in the c. 8th A. D., for the first time accepted memory (*Smṛti*), recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) and induction (*Tarka*) as a *Pramāṇa*. This is Jaina's special contribution to the field of Indian *Pramāṇa-śāstra*. Not even a single tradition of Indian logic accepts memory (*smṛti*) as an independent *Pramāṇa*. Only *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, a work of c. 16th A. D., mentions *Smṛti* as *Pramāṇa*. Though Naiyāyikas had accepted recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as a kind of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) yet neither they regarded it as an independent *Pramāṇa* nor accepted *Smṛti* as its cause (*hetu*). Jainas maintained, in case

Smṛti is not *Pramāṇa*, how recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) can be accepted as *Pramāṇa* because in absence of memory (*Smṛti*), *Pratyabhijñā* is not possible. If memory (*Smṛti*) is not *Pramāṇa*, *Pratyabhijñā* also a combination of past memory and present perception can not be considered as *Pramāṇa*, because *Pratyabhijñā* is based on *Smṛti*. Similarly, Jainas established *Tarka* as independent *pramāṇa* because in the absence of *Tarka* *Pramāṇa*, *Vyāpti* (universal relation) is not possible and without *Vyāpti*, inference (*Anumāna*) is quite impossible. To solve this problem Naiyāyikas accepted *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* (generic nature of individuals). Jainas accepted *Tarka* *Pramāṇa* at the place of Naiyāyika's *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* which is more extensive than that and may be called Inductive leap (*āgamana*). Jainas maintained induction (*āgamana*) and deduction (*nigamana*) of Western Logic and introduced them in the name of *Tarka* and *Anumāna* as an independent *Pramāṇa*, respectively. An independent *Tarka* *Pramāṇa* was needed because acquisition of *Sāmānya* (generality) through perception is not possible and without *Sāmānya*, *Vyāpti* is not possible. Similarly in absence of *Vyāpti*, Inference (*anumāna*) is impossible. Since in Jainism, *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* is nowhere mentioned as a kind of perception, Jainas established *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇa* to solve the problem of *Vyāpti*. As *Pratyabhijñā* was needed for *Tarka* and *Smṛti* for *Pratyabhijñā*, Jainas accepted all these three as independent *Pramāṇa*.

It was Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) who for the first time referred these three types of independent *Pramāṇa* in Digambara tradition. Before Akalaṅka, his predecessors Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D.) and Pūjyapāda (c. 6th A. D.) do not make any mention of it. In Śvetāmbara tradition, Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D.), Jinabhadra (c. 6th A. D.), Siddhasena Gaṇi (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.)

mention nothing about these three independent *Pramāṇas*. In Śvetāmbara tradition, as per my knowledge, only Siddharṣi (c. 9th A. D.), in his commentary of *Nyāyāvatāra* has mentioned the validity of these three independent *Pramāṇas*.

Thus, in Digambara tradition from c. 8th A.D. and in Śvetāmbara tradition by the end of c. 9th A.D. memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) and induction (*tarka*) were established as independent *Pramāṇa*. Earliest works on Jaina logic were in brief and mainly concerned with the Jaina concept of *Pramāṇa*. Works on Jaina logic, composed later on were a healthy review of the conceptions of *Pramāṇa* prevalent in other philosophical traditions. Pātraśvāmi's *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* was the first one to refute the *Hetulakṣaṇa* of Dinnāga. Vidyānandi (c. 9th A. D.) wrote *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* to evaluate the characteristics of *Pramāṇa*, their divisions and subdivisions, prevalent in other philosophical traditions. In this period some more works pertaining to Jaina logic (*Pramāṇaśāstra*) had been composed but seem to be destroyed. In Digambara tradition, Prabhācandra's *Nyāyakumudacandra* and *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* are two of some prominent works composed in c. 10th-11th A. D. Both of the works are the commentaries on Akalaṅka's *Laghiyastrayī* and in Śvetāmbara tradition, Vādidevasūri's *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara* (c. 11th A. D.) are well known works on Jaina logic. After that Hemcandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* (c. 12th A. D.) is an important work which mainly deals with the concept of *pramāṇa* though it is incomplete. The development of *Navya-nyāya* (Neo-logistic system) begins with the entry of Gaṅgesh Upādhyāya in the field of Indian *Nyāya* in c. 13th A. D. But for four centuries the Jaina logicians were unacquainted with this new literary genre and continued to follow the style of Vādidevasūri. Thus, the development of Jaina Logic (*Nyāyaśāstra*) remained interrupted after

c. 12th A.D. It was Yaśovijaya who followed the style of *Navyanyāya* and for the first time composed *Tarkabhāṣā* and *Nyāyabindu* in *Navyanyāya* style, in the latter part of c. 17th A.D. In Digambara tradition, *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgaṇī* was written by Vimaladas following the same style.

Thus, we can conclude that it is only from c. 3rd A. D.-12th A. D. when Jaina logic made its progress and opened a new vistas for its further development.

Development of the Theory of Non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) and *Syādvāda*

Non-violence in practice, non-absolutistic approach in thought and conditional predication or qualified assertion (*Syādvāda*) in speech are the pillars upon which the splendid palace of Jainism is erected. Theory of non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) is the central philosophy of Jainism. So far as the historical development of this theory of *Anekāntavāda* is concerned, its historical development can be divided into three phases. Its first phase begins with the preachings of Mahāvīra, i. e., c. 6th B. C. and is extended upto the composition of Umāśvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (first half of the c. 4th A. D.). It was the period of origination of *Anekāntavāda*. Basically, the non-violent and tolerant attitude of Mahāvīra helped much in the development of the non-absolutistic principle of *Anekāntavāda*. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, he clearly opines, "one who praises one's own view-point and discards other's view as a false-one and thus, distorts the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death."

It follows that Mahāvīra preached the uttermost carefulness regarding one's speech. In his opinion speech should be unassaulting as well as true. He warned his disciple monks against making unwarranted categorical assertions or negations. He instructed them to make only a conditional statement (*Vibhajjavāya Vāgarejja*). It is the *Vibhajjavāda*

from which the theory of non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) emerged. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, in its first chapter records various contemporary one-sided doctrines regarding the nature of soul and creation of the universe. Mahāvīra's approach to all these doctrines is non-absolutistic or relative. In every case, whether it was the problem of eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*) and nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*) about the soul or that of finiteness and infiniteness of the world or that identity and difference of body and soul or also that of monism and pluralism, Mahāvīra's approach was never absolutistic but relativistic. It was firmly maintained in Jaina canons that the nature of reality is complex and multi-dimensional as well as confluence of many self-contradictory attributes, so it can be approached and explained from various angles or view-points. It is believed that *Tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra while explaining the reality uttered first sentence as *tripod (tripadī)*, i.e., *Uppannei, Vigamei, Dhuvei Vā*. Accordingly in Jainism Reality / 'Sat' is defined as possessing origination, decay and permanence (*Utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat : Tattvārtha*, 5.29). This three-fold nature of Reality is the base of the Jaina theory of Non-absolutism. On the one hand, the nature of Reality is complex, i. e., a synthesis of opposites : identity and difference, permanence and change, oneness and manyness and so on, and on the other hand scope of our experience, knowledge and even expression is limited and relative, so we can not know the Reality as a whole from any particular angle. Our every knowledge about the Reality will always be partial and relative only and in that position our expression or statement about the Reality will be always relative and not categorical (*ārpitā nārpite siddhe : Tattvārtha*, 5). In canonical age we have an account of only this much discussion about *Anekāntavāda*.

Thus, in the first phase of its development, this theory was evolved from the theory of *Vibhajja-*

vāda. Though the theory of *Vibhajjavāda* was common to both — Jainism and Buddhism but so far as Buddhist approach to the metaphysical doctrine is concerned, it was a negative one, while Mahāvīra's was a positive one. Lord Buddha maintained that whether it is eternalism or nihilism, none of these can be regarded as true because any one-sided approach neither represents a right vision regarding Reality nor it explains our practical problems of sorrow and sufferings. That is why he kept mum while answering the questions related to the metaphysics. It is due to this negative approach that Buddha's theory of Nihilism came into existence later on in Buddhism. On the other hand, Mahāvīra's approach towards these one-sided views was positive. He tried to synthesize these different views on the basis of his theory of *Anekāntavāda*.

The synthesis is found for the first time in *Bhagavatisūtra*, wherein, on the basis of two main divisions of *Nayas* — substantial standpoint (*Dravyārthika Naya*) and modal standpoint (*Paryāyārthika Naya*) as well as *Niścaya Naya*, *Vyavahāra Naya* and different *Nikṣepas* (Positing) and Gateways of investigations (*Anuyogadvāras*) such as — Substance (*dravya*), space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), mode (*bhāva*), name (*nāma*), symbol (*sthāpanā*), potentiality (*dravya*), actuality (*bhāva*) etc. He has synthesised the various opposite view-points. So it is clear that in the first phase, i. e., before c. 3rd A. D. *Vibhajjavāda* of Lord Mahāvīra was fully developed in the positive and synthesising theory of *Anekāntavāda* along with its subsidiary doctrines such as the doctrine of standpoint (*Nayavāda*) etc. Thus, along with the origination of *Anekāntavāda*, the doctrines of *Naya*, *Nikṣepa* and *Anuyogadvāra* came into existence.

The second phase of the development of Non-absolutism / *Anekāntavāda* began with Siddhasena Divakara's *Sanmatitarka* (c. 4th A. D.), continue till the Haribhadra's works such as *Śaddarśana-*

samuccaya, *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* (c. 8th A. D.) etc. This second phase has three main characteristics — firstly, apart from the *Āgamic Nayas*, i. e., *Dravyārthika* (Substantial) and *Paryāyārthika* (modal) or *Niścaya* (Ideal) and *Vyavahāra* (practical view-point), the doctrine of Seven-fold *Nayas*, i.e., *Naigama* (considering both the general and particular properties of the thing), *Sangraha* (considering general properties of an object), *Vyavahāra* (considering specific properties of an object), *Rjusūtra* (confined only to the present mode of an object), *Śabda* (treating with synonyms), *Samabhirūḍha* (taking into consideration only etymological meaning of word. According to this *Naya*, even word has a different meaning) and *Evambhūta Naya* (denoting object in its actual state of performing its natural function) was developed. Though the *Āgamic Nayas* remained in vogue till the Kundakunda's period (c. 6th A. D.).

It is to be noted that in earlier *Āgamas* such as *Ācarāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Uttarādhyayana* etc., this concept of seven-fold view-point (*Nayas*) is absent. Only in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Nandīsūtra* this concept of seven-fold view-point is found but these are the works of the c. 2nd-4th A.D. In *Samavāyāṅga*, it is an interpolation. Secondly, in *Tattvārthasūtra* (first half of c. 4th A. D.) the number of basic view-points are five. The *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta* are accepted as sub-types of *Śabdanaya*. Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D.) in his *Sanmatitarka* has accepted six *Nayas*, he does not mention *Naigama Naya*. Thus, we may conclude that the number of *Nayas*, as seven, was finalised later on but prior to the end of c. 5th A. D. Only with one exception of Mallavādī (c. 5th), who mentions twelve *Nayas* in his work '*Dvāśāranayacakra*', development in the number of *Nayas* became stagnant because of the development of the doctrine of *Anuyogadvāras*, i. e., the gateways of investigation. These twelve *Nayas* of

Mallavādī are some what different in their names and presentation. Though the author showed the relationship between the traditional seven *Nayas* and his twelve *Nayas* [See : Malvania D., *Āgama Yuga kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 312.] though doctrine of *Anuyogadvāras* (gateways of the investigation) can be traced in some of the *Āgamas* of later period as *Bhagavatī*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Prajñāpanā* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* yet the number of these gateways of investigation never remained constant. In *Tattvārthasūtra*, it was only eight while in *Dhavalā tīkā* of *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* its numbers were increased upto eighty. This doctrine of gateways of investigation is nothing but viewing, understanding and explaining the nature of the things with their multiple facets or aspects and thus it can also be considered as a development of *Vibhajyavāda* and *Anekāntavāda*. Here, it is noteworthy that this increase in the number of the *Nayas* (view-points) or the *Anuyogadvāras* was well received by later Jaina thinkers because the earlier *Ācāryas* kept the door open in this regard. Siddhasena Divākara clearly mentions in his work *Sanmatitarka* (second half of the c. 4th A. D.) that number of view-points can be as much as the way of linguistic expressions. (*Sanmatitarka*, 3/47)

Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication (Saptabhaṅgī)

The second main characteristic of this second phase of the development of *Anekāntavāda*, is the doctrine of seven-fold predications or the seven ways of expressions (*Saptabhaṅgī*). The concept, regarding the ways of expressions, dates back to the Vedic period. The two forms of expressions / predications — affirmation and negation, are accepted by all. These two depend on existence or non-existence. By negating both the existence and non-existence, we have a third way of expression *Avyaktavyatā*, i.e., inexpressibility. By accepting the both a fourth way of expression was emerged, comprising both affirmation and negation. These four ways of expression are well

accepted in *Upaniṣadas* and Buddhism. So far as Jainism is concerned it is in the *Bhagavatisūtra* where for the first time these different ways of expressions (*Bhaṅgas*) are found. In *Bhagavatisūtra* (9/5) while dealing with the concept of Hell, Heaven and abode of *Siddhas*, Lord Mahāvīra mentioned only three ways of expression, i. e., affirmation, negation and in-expressibility but while dealing with the aggregates of the different numbers of atom, he mentioned more than twenty-three ways of expressions. Pt. Dalsukha Malvania is right when he says that of course we have seven predications or *Saptabhaṅgī* in *Bhagavatisūtra*, but in my humble opinion these different ways of expressions (*Bhaṅgas*) do not represent the doctrine of seven-fold predications rather it is only a prior state. Here, these ways of expressions are framed on the number of atoms in aggregates. Secondly, this discussion may be a later interpolation because in *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, this concept of seven-fold predication is absent. Thirdly, it is also clear that neither in *Bhagavatisūtra* nor in the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, the theory of seven-fold predication is systematically presented in its logical form, with number of predications as seven and only seven. For the first time in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka*, this theory of seven-fold predication is logically presented. After that in *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra (c. 5th), *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda (c. 6th), *Pañcāstikāya* (14) and *Pravacanasāra* (2/23) of Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) and some other later works of this period this doctrine of seven-fold conditional predication has been discussed in detail. In general, there are only three types of our linguistic expression — affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. On the basis of these three fundamental ways of linguistic expressions and their combinations mathematically only seven predications are possible neither more nor less. In order to show the conditionality or relativity of these seven-fold predi-

cations Jaina ācāryas put a qualifying mark before each of the predication / statement, so that the affirmation or negation or even in-expressibility of predication may not be taken as absolute. This qualifying mark is the word 'Syāt' (स्यात्), which being put before every predication, removes the every possibility of uncertainty and indefiniteness of the predication and make the predication conditional as well as relative. The seven-fold conditional predications are as follows :

1. Conditional affirmation (स्यात् अस्ति)
2. Conditional negation (स्यात् नास्ति)
3. Conditional inexpressibility (स्यात् अवक्तव्यं)
4. Conditional affirmation and negation respectively (स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च)
5. Conditional affirmation and inexpressibility (स्यात् अस्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)
6. Conditional negation and inexpressibility (स्यात् नास्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)
7. Conditional affirmation, negation and inexpressibility (स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)

It is noteworthy that for Jainas inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatā* or *avyaktavyatā*) does not denote absolute inexpressibility as Vedānta means. It is only conditional inexpressibility because simultaneous affirmation and negation are not possible in our linguistic expressions.

The Jaina doctrines of non-absolutism, conditional predication and view-points yielded good results particularly in that age of philosophical disputation as well as religious and social conflicts. Though the Jaina thinkers made optical estimation of the philosophical assumptions of other schools of thought yet they paid proper respect to them and accepted their Truth value on the basis of different *Nayas*. In this regard the views of Siddhasena Divākara and Haribhadra are commendable. Siddhasena tried to establish the truth value of other schools of thought on different view-points. He said Sāṅkhya school is

true from substantial view-point, while Buddhist view is true from the view-point which is confined to only present mode of an object (*Rjusūtra Naya*).

He further remarks that all schools of thought are true when they are understood from their own standpoint and so far as they do not reject the truth-value of others. A non-absolutist does not divide them into the category of true and false. The same spirit is also followed by Haribhadra in his works such as *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* and *Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya*. It is only Haribhadra, who in his *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, presented all the six schools of thought in their true spirit and without condemning them. No other work in the history of Indian philosophy has been written till date in such a noble spirit. In this period, Jaina ācāryas tried to synthesize the different conflicting views and thus tried to establish harmony and peace in the society.

Historical Development of Jaina Metaphysics Astikāya

The doctrine of *pañcāstikāya* which refers to the five constituents of the universe is regarded as the most original theory of Jainism. There is, of course, no mention of *pañcāstikāya* in *Ācārāṅga*, but it is found in the Pārśva chapter of *Rṣibhāṣita* (c. 4th B. C.). This shows that this concept belongs to the tradition of Pārśva (c. 8th B. C.). In the tradition of Mahāvīra, however, we find its first reference in *Bhagavatīsūtra* (about c. 1st B. C.).

In Jaina philosophy the word *astikāya* means the substance which exists (*asti*) with an extension in the space, i.e., constituent component (*kāya*). In Jaina philosophy *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *pudgala* — these five are regarded as *astikāyas* from the very ancient times, and there is no change in this concept, even today. They can be translated as the living beings (*jīva*), Space (*ākāśa*), Medium of motion and rest (*dharma-adharma* taken together) and Matter (*pudgala*).

Among these five *astikāyas*, three of them — *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* are thought of as unitary and remaining two — *jīva* and *pudgala* as infinite in number. From the c. 3rd-10th A. D. there is no major change in the concept except that, with the development of the concept of *śaḍdravya* (the six-fold theory of substance), time (*kāla*) was also accepted as an unextended substance (*anastikāya*). The debate whether time can be regarded as an independent substance or not begins with the c. 3rd-4th A. D. or even before the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra*; and the difference of opinion in this regard continues upto the time of *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (c. 7th A. D.). Some of the Jaina philosophers regarded time as an independent substance while the others did not. But subsequently Digambara and Śvetāmbara both the traditions synthesized the concept of *astikāya* and *dravya* and both of them agreed to accept time as *anastikāya*, i.e., an independent unextended substance.

The idea of *Pañcāstikāya* is, distinctly, an original concept of the Jainas. We do not find it in any other ancient philosophical system, except that in the ancient times *astikāya* has a broad and general meaning, denoting anything that exists (*asti*); but in due course of time there developed a distinction between *astikāya* and *anastikāya* and the former was taken to be an extended substance in space. Technically speaking *astikāya* is a multi-spatial substance (*bahu-pradeśī-dravya*), i.e., a substance which is extended in space.

Pañcāstikāya

The Jaina concept of *śaḍdravya* (theory of six substances) has developed from this very idea of *pañcāstikāya* by adding time as an independent substance in the earlier concept of *pañcāstikāya*. The concept of *śaḍdravya* came into existence during the c. 1st-2nd A. D. Thus the concept of *pañcāstikāya* is definitely a very old concept because we find its reference in the Pārśva chapter of *Isibhāṣiyāim*, one

of the oldest scriptures. Till the period of *Ācārāṅga* and the first *Śrutaskandha* of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* we donot find any reference to this concept so far as the Mahāvīra's tradition is concerned. Thus, we can say that the concept basically belongs to Pārśva tradition. When the followers of Pārśva were included in the Mahāvīra's order, their concept of *pañcāstikāya*, along with some other concepts, was also accepted in the Mahāvīra's tradition. *Bhagavatisūtra* for the first time mentions that the world is made of *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *jīva* and *pudgala*. *Isibhāsiyāim* only refers to the five *astikāyas* but has not mentioned their names. Even, if the names were decided, we find no description as to their exact nature and function. Further, the meaning that we understand of the *pañcāstikāya*, today, is gradually ascribed to them in due course of time. We find atleast two references in the *Bhagavatisūtra* which clarify that the *dharma-astikāya* and the *adharma-astikāya* at that time did not mean media of motion and rest, respectively. In the 20th *śataka* of *Bhagavatisūtra*, it is mentioned that abstinence from the eighteen places of sin and observance of the five vigilances (*samitis*) alongwith three controls (*guptis*) is *dharmāstikāya*, while indulging in the eighteen places of sin and not following the five vigilances (*samitis*) and the three controls (*guptis*) is, called *adharmāstikāya*. In the 16th *śataka* of *Bhagavatisūtra*, the question is raised whether a deity (*deva*) standing at the end of the universe (unoccupied space) can move his hands outside the universe (*aloka*)? The answer given to this question is not only negative but is also explanatory. It says that as the movement of *Jīva* and *Ajīva* is possible only through matter (*pudgala*) and as there is complete absence of *jīvas* and the *pudgalas* in the *aloka*, the movement of the hands of the diety is impossible there. If *dharma-dravya* was considered as a medium of motion, at that time the answer would have been in different way, i.e., due to the absence of *dharma-dravya* he can not

move his hands. Thus, the concept of *dharma* and *adharma* as the respective medium of motion and rest, seems to be a later concept. This idea has arrived by the time of the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* (i.e. in the second half of the c. 3rd or first half of the c. fourth). The allusions made in *Bhagavati* and other scriptures clearly show that the meanings of *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* in those days were identical to the meaning of the terms *dharma* and *adharma* as pious and sinful respectively. Thus, the concept of *dharma* and *adharma* as the medium of motion and rest, respectively, seems to be a latter concept, but this idea has arrived by the time of the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* (i.e., c. 3rd A.D.). In *Uttarādhyayana*, chapter 28th also *dharma* and *adharma* are mentioned as the medium of motion and rest respectively, but according to scholars this chapter is a later addition of the c. 1st or 2nd A. D.

Seven Categories

In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (2 / 5-765-782) we find two categories of being (*asti*) and not-being (*nāsti*). The elements which are classified under being category are — *loka* (universe), *aloka* (space beyond universe), *jīva* (the living-being), *dharma*, *adharma*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṃvara*, *vedanā*, *nirjarā*, *kriyā*, *akriyā*, *krodha*, *māna*, *lobha*, *prema*, *dveṣa*, *caturanta*, *samsāra*, *deva*, *devī*, *siddhi*, *asiddhi*, *siddhanijasthāna*, *aādhu*, *asādhu* and *kalyāṇa*.

This detailed list is abridged in the second part (*śrutaskandha*) of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. Here we find the mention of *jīva-ajīva*, *puṇya-pāpa*, *āsrava-saṃvara*, *vedanā-nirjarā*, *kriyā-adhikaraṇa*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*. It is an earlier stage, as Pt. Dalsukha Malvania observes, the concept of nine-fold elements is developed from this very list after deleting *vedanā*, *kriyā* and *adhikaraṇa* from it. This is alluded, in *Samavāyāṅga* and *Uttarādhyayana*, approximately c. 2nd or 3rd A. D. Out of these nine-fold elements

Umāsvāti presents, the concept of seven elements (*tattvas*) including *punya* and *pāpa* under *āsrava*, in the c. 3rd-4th. We find discussions of the seven-fold or nine-fold categories (*tattva*) in the later composed scriptures of both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara traditions. This shows that the concept of seven categories (*tattva*) has also its origin in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and has taken final shape in due course of time and got finalised in c. 3rd or 4th A. D. During the c. 7th-10th A.D. these ideas had properly conceptualised as it is described in details with their various classes and sub-classes.

We find that at the root of the formulation of the concepts of seven or nine-fold categories, six-fold substances and the six-fold *jīvanikāya*, is the basic idea of *Pañcāstikāya*. The Jaina thinkers, of course, have developed the concept of six substances by synthesizing their conception of *Pañcāstikāya* and the idea of substance as it is found in the other philosophical systems. In the following pages we will try to see as to how it has worked out.

Substance

What is known as substance is the fundamental constituent of the universe. The *sat*, of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions, has taken the form of *dravya* (substance) later on. As a matter of fact, the philosophical traditions which regard the ultimate reality as one and unchangeable have adopted the world 'Sat' and those which consider the reality as many and changeable have used the word substance (*dravya*), instead of 'sat'. In the systems of Indian thought like *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* etc. the use of the word substance (*dravya*) or *padārtha* remains in vogue. So far as the Jaina philosophy is concerned though we find the term *dravya* in *Ācārāṅga* yet the word is not used in any technical sense.

In *Uttarādhyayana*, the word '*dravya*' is mentioned for the first time. That particular chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, where in *dravya* is discussed, is reg-

arded as relatively later, of c. 2nd or 3rd A. D., by the scholars. There we find that not only the word *dravya* (substance) is used, but the mutual relation among the substance, attributes and modes are also discussed. Substance is defined as substratum of attributes (*guṇāṇām āsavo davvo*). In my opinion, this definition of substance, given in *Uttarādhyayana*, seems to be influenced by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. Pūjyapāda Devanandī defined substance as an aggregate of attributes in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*, known as *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 5th or 6th A. D.). This definition seems to be influenced by the Buddhist *Skandhavāda*. In favour of this view Pūjyapāda has quoted '*guṇāṇām samuo davvo*' from the scriptures. This shows that this concept should have been prior to the c. 6th. Both the definition of substance as 'substratum of attributes' and 'aggregate of attributes' should have been in my opinion, prevalent before the c. 3rd. By synthesizing these two views through Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism) the substance is defined for the first time, as that which possesses attributes and modes in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*.

Six-substances (Ṣaḍdravya)

We have already stated that the concept of *ṣaḍdravya* (six substances) has been developed from the idea of *pañcāstikāya*. By adding 'time' as an independent substance in *pañcāstikāya*, the concept of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) is formulated. Though from c. 2nd-7th A. D., 'Time' was always a matter of discussion whether it is an independent substance or not (as it is indicated in several works from *Tattvārthasūtra* to *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*), yet finally it was accepted as an independent substance. It was c. 7th A. D. when both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions agreed to accept the idea of *ṣaḍdravya* and no change occurred in the theory afterwards. The six substances are now classified into the following three main divisions — *astikāya-anastikāya*, *jīva* (living),

ajīva (non-living) and *mūrta-amūrta*. In the first classification — *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *jīva* and *pudgala* — these five are regarded as *astikāya* and 'Time' as *anastikāya* (unextended substance). In the second classification *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *pudgala* and *kāla* are regarded as *Ajīva* (Non-living beings) and the *Jīva* is considered as living being. In the last classification *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* are regarded as *amūrta* (abstract) and *pudgala* (matter) as *mūrta* (concrete). We have already stated that the development of the concept of substance in the Jaina philosophy is almost influenced by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. *Jainācāryas* have synthesised the *Vaiśeṣika* idea of substance with their own concept of *pañcāstikāya*. As such while in *Vaiśeṣika* there are nine substances, the Jainas, by adding time to *pañcāstikāya* have made them six in all. *Jīva*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* remained common in both. *Prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *marut* — the four, out of the five *mahābhūtas* which are regarded as substances in the *Vaiśeṣika* are not recognised by the Jainas as independent substances. They are only considered as varieties of *jīva-dravya*. The Jainas have also not accepted 'dik' and 'mana' as independent substances, instead they have included three others — *dharma*, *adharma* and *pudgala* in their scheme of substances. It may also be noted that while the other traditions have treated *prthvī*, *ap*, *vāyu* and *agni* as *jaḍa* (non-living), the Jainas regard them as living. Thus, the Jaina concept of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) seems to be quite original. We can only find its partial similarity with other traditions. The main reason behind this is that the Jainas have developed their idea of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) on the line of their own theory of *pañcāstikāya*.

Ṣaḍjīvanikāya

Along with *pañcāstikāya*, we also find the concept of *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* (six-fold living beings) in Jaina canons. This concept has developed from

jīvāstikāya, one of the *kāyas* in *pañcāstikāya*. The six kinds of *jīvāstikāya* are — earth (*prthvīkāya*), water (*apkāya*), air (*vāyukāya*), fire (*tejas-kāya*), vegetation (*vanaspatikāya*) and mobile beings (*trasakāya*). The use of the word *kāya* (body) for earth etc. is found since remote past. In *Pālitripitaka* Ajitakeśa-kambali, calls *prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *vāyu* — the four *bhūtas* as *kāya* but *Pakudhakaccāyana* adds three more to the list, i.e., happiness (*sukha*), sufferings (*duḥkha*) and the living being (*jīva*) and make them seven in number. The Jainas position is a little different. First they regard the five — *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *pudgala* as *kāya* (*astikāya*) and then include *prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *vanaspati* and *trasa*, six in all, under *jīvanikāya*. Thus, there are two concepts — *pañcāstikāya* and *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* and both of them have been prevalent in Jainism in the c. 4th-3rd B. C. in their crude form, but were developed and systematised in c. 3rd-5th A. D.

Distinct references of *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* are available in the first chapter of *Ācārāṅga* and in *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga* also. It is accepted by all the scholars that all these scriptures are of the c. 4th B. C. and are contemporary to the older part of Pāli *Tripitaka* and earlier *Upaniṣadas*. It is likely that these concepts might have belonged to Mahāvīra.

The concept of *pañcāstikāya* basically belongs to the Pārśva tradition. It is recognised in the tradition of the Mahāvīra also while interpreting the world. There is a reference in the *Bhagavatisūtra* to the effect that Mahāvīra has accepted the Pārśva ideas that the universe is made of *Pañcāstikāya*.

I do not agree with Pt. Malvania's opinion that the concept of *pañcāstikāya* is a later developed concept. It is true, of course, that in the earlier works of Mahāvīra's tradition there is mention of only *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* and not of *pañcāstikāya*. But when the Pārśva tradition merged with that of the Mahāvīra,

the philosophical ideas of the former also got their way in the latter. As such, the idea of *pañcāstikāya* was basically of Pārśva tradition, so it could find its place in *Bhagavatisūtra* after its merging in Māhāvīra's tradition.

The Jains regard, not only vegetation and other living beings but even earth, water, fire and air too, as living beings. This is a very typical Jaina concept. In the other systems, such as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* etc. these four elements are considered as *mahābhūtas* and as such *jaḍa* (unconscious, inanimate). Among the *mahābhūtas*, *ākāśa* (space) is the only element, regarded as non-living (*ajīva*) in both the traditions (Jainism as well as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*). That is why *ākāśa* is included in *pañcāstikāya* but has no place in *śaḍjīvanikāya* in which only the other four, viz., earth, water, fire and air are included. The Jaina thinkers accept not only the life as dependent on earth, water and the like but also as living too. That is why the abstinence from violence towards earth, water, air, fire and vegetation is so prominently prescribed in the Jaina *Sādhana*, particularly for the *Muni*'s. The subtleness and the extreme that we find in the observance of non-violence (*Ahimsā*) in the Jainism have their roots in the idea of *śaḍjīvanikāya*. If we regard earth etc. under the category of the living beings, it is but natural to abstain from their violence.

The conception of *śaḍjīvanikāya* in Jainism is the oldest one. It is accepted as such from its origin to date. It is difficult to say that it has undergone any fundamental change between c. 3rd-10th except that some important issues regarding their classification have been raised and some detailed informations about their body, their way of taking food, their language, their classes, sub-classes etc. are depicted in *Prajñāpanā* and *Jīvājīvaḥigama*. According to Pt. Malvania there is a description in the second chapter of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, known as *Āhāraparijñā*, regarding the *yonis* in which *jīvas* take the birth and the way in

which they transmigrate from one *Yoni* to another and the manner in which they take their food etc. A type of *jīvas* are called *anasyūta* there. From this, we can conclude that the idea of *anantakāya* (infinite *jīva* in one body) and *pratyekakāya* (One *jīva* in one body) came into existence in c. 3rd-4th. The decision as to which of the creatures (*jīvas*) are to be included in the two, three or the four sensed *jīva*, respectively is also finalised afterwards. In *Bhagavati*, it takes the form of *jīva-ajīva* division, however, the concept has fully developed by the time of *Prajñāpanā* because there we have detailed discussions on *indriya*, *āhāra*, *paryāpti* etc.

After the c. 3rd an important change occurred in the classification of mobile and immobile being (*trasa* and *sthāvara*). Right from *Ācārāṅga* to *Tattvārthasūtra*, earth, water and vegetation are regarded as immobile (*sthāvara*) and fire, air and the two, three, four and five-sensed living creatures as mobile (*trasa*). The last chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra* and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* confirm it. Afterwards not only earth, water and vegetation but all the one-sensed beings are regarded as immobile. However, due to the movement seen in fire and air it becomes difficult to regard them as immobile. The root cause of the problem was that in those days the two or more sensed beings were called *trasa*, hence it was thought that other than two or more sensed beings all the one sensed beings are considered as *sthāvara* (immobile). This shows the change which had taken place in the c. 5th-6th in the *trasa-sthāvara* classification, approximately. After that in both the *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* sects, the concept of *pañcāsthāvara* has found firm footings. It is noteworthy here that when air and fire are regarded as *trasa*, there is the use of the term *udara* (urala) for *trasa*. In the beginning the criterion of classification of *trasa-sthāvara* is made from the point of view of moveability of things, and as air and fire are

moveable in nature they are thought of as *trasa*. The moveable nature of *vāyu* is so apparent that it is called *trasa*, first of all out of five one sensed beings. By minute observations, it is seen that fire too has a tendency of gradual expansion through fuel so it is also included into *trasa* (mobile). But the movement of water is regarded as possible only due to the low level of the earth so movement is not its own nature. Therefore, water, like the vegetation is also taken as *sthāvara* (immobile). As the movement in air and fire is inherent so these two are considered as *trasa* and other as *sthāvaras*. Further when the two or more sensed *jīvas* are recognised as immobile (*sthāvara*) the problem of reconciling this view with *āgamic* statements arose. In the *Śvetāmbara* schools this reconciliation is marked as the basis of the distinction of *labdhi* and *gati*. From the standpoint of the *labdhi*, air and fire are viewed as immobile (*sthāvara*) but viewed from the angle of movement (*gati*) they remain mobile (*trasa*). In the *Dhavalā* commentary of Digambara tradition (c. 10th) the problem is solved differently. It is said that the basis of calling air and fire as *sthāvara*, is not their movement but their *Nāma-karma* origin. *Jayasenācārya*, the commentator of *pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda, solves the problem by making a distinction between *nīścayanaya* and *vyavahāra-naya*. According to him, the earth, water and vegetation are included into *pañca sthāvara* because of their *Nāma-karma* origin, but air and fire classification under *pañcasthāvars* are only from the practical point of view (*vyavahāra*). From *nīścayanaya* they are *trasa* as they actually appear to be mobile. All these excercises really are worthwhile attempts to reconcile the differences, cropped of during respective contentions of the ancient and the later scriptures.

So far as the question of different classifications of *jīvas* are concerned they are crystalised during the c. 3rd-10th. In that period the concepts of

Jīvasthāna, *Mārgaṇāsthāna*, *Guṇasthāna* have also developed. Wherever these topics have been discussed in the *Aṅga-Āgamas* such as *Bhagavati* etc. the reference has been made to *Aṅga-bāhya Āgamas* (External authorities) such as *Prajñāpanā* etc. It confirms that these theories are developed after the c. 2nd. First they are discussed in the *Aṅga-bāhya Āgamas* and afterwards at the time of *Valabhī-vācanā* they are included in *Aṅga-āgamas* with the note that for detailed discussions relevant *Aṅga-bāhya* scriptures are to be seen.

Jaina Theory of Guṇasthāna and its Development

The doctrine of fourteen stages of spiritual development (*Guṇasthāna*) is one of the most popular theories of Jainism. Except *Samavāyāṅga*, none of the canonical work refers to this theory. Scholars are of the strong opinion that the reference relating to *Guṇasthāna* found in *Samavāyāṅga* is an interpolation incorporated at the time of second Valabhī Council (c. 5th A. D.). The *Niryuktis* are also silent about this theory, except the present edition of *Āvaśakaniryukti* wherein, two *gāthās* mention the names of these fourteen *Guṇasthānas*. This is remarkable that till the time of Haribhadra's commentary on *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, these two *gāthās* were not accepted as *Niryuktī gāthās* as in his commentary, he has clearly mentioned that these *gāthās* has been quoted by him from the *Saṅgrahaṇī-sūtra*.

It seems that till the c. 4th A. D. the concept of these fourteen stages of spiritual development has not come into existence. Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* throwing light on almost every aspect of Jaina philosophy and religion including various stages of spiritual development does not mention the fourteen *Guṇasthānas* as such. The same is the case with its auto-commentary. Though in the ninth chapter of the *Tattvārthasutra* the author has mentioned four, seven and ten stages of spiritual development, yet he does not make any mention of these fourteen stages in it.

Thus, we may conclude that the theory of the fourteen stages of spiritual development was not prevalent at the time of compilation of *Tattvārthasūtra*, otherwise, Umāsvāti would have mentioned it.

These evidences show that the theory of fourteen *Guṇasthānas* came into existence after *Tattvārthasūtra*, i.e., c. 4th A. D. For the first time, this theory was introduced along with all its details, in Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali's *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* (c. 5th A. D.). After that it is discussed in Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Tattvārthabhāṣya-tīka* of Siddhsenagaṇi (c. 7th-8th) in detail, however, its pre-concept in the form of ten stages was already present in *Ācārāṅganiryukti* (22-23) and *Tattvārthasūtra* (9/47). From these ten stages of spiritual development the theory of fourteen *Guṇasthāna* was conceptualised in c. 5th A. D.

These fourteen stages are as follows :

1. The first stage is called *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., perversity of attitude. It is the lowest stage from where the spiritual journey of soul starts. It is considered as a stage of spiritual development only because in this very state the efforts for the attainment of the right vision are made. The process of *granthi-bheda* occurs at the end of this stage. At this stage the soul, is in the grip of extreme passions (*anantā-nubhandhī kaṣāya*).

2. The second stage is known as *sāsvādana-samyagdr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., to have a momentary taste of the right vision. This is an intermediate stage and it occurs when soul falls from the right attitude towards the false attitude. This stage is called *sāsvādana-samyagdr̥ṣṭi* because in this stage soul has a taste of right attitude or right version just as a person after eating delicious dishes vomits and has a taste of those dishes in that state of vomiting.

3. The third stage is technically known as *samyag-mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. It is mixed stage of the right and

false attitudes like the taste of curd mixed with sugar, which is neither sweet nor sour. This is the stage of doubt. In this stage soul accepts neither the perverse attitude nor the right one. It remains in dilemma.

4. The fourth stage is *aviratasamyagdr̥ṣṭi*, a stage of right attitude without right conduct. Though in this scheme of *Guṇasthāna* it is considered to be the fourth stage, but in reality it is the first stage in the upward journey of the soul towards its spiritual heights. It is the stage in which the soul gets the glimpse of truth for the first time. At this stage the self knows right as a right and wrong as a wrong but due to the lack of spiritual strength, inspite of the knowledge and the will, he cannot abstain himself from the wrong path of immorality.

5. The fifth stage is known as *deśavirata-samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. This is the stage of right attitude with partial observance and partial non-observance of moral code. A house-holder, who possesses right vision and observes five *anuvratas*, three *guṇavratas* and four *śikṣāvratas*, comes in this category. In this stage one knows what is right and also tries to practise it, but one cannot have full control over one's passions. At this stage there is only partial expression of the energy of self-control. After attaining the fourth stage, if one develops spiritual strength and has control over the second set of four passions, i.e. *apratyākhyāni-kaṣāya-catuṣka*, one is able to attain this stage.

6. In spiritual journey of the soul, the sixth stage is called *pramatta-samyata-guṇasthāna*. It is the stage in which the self observes right conduct fully. He observes five *mahāvratas* and other rules of moral conduct of a monk, yet he has an attachment towards his body and due to this attachment the spiritual inertia is still there. This is the stage of self-control with spiritual inertia. At the end of this stage the aspirant tries to subside or annihilate the third set

of four passions and spiritual inertia and climbs the seventh ladder.

7. The seventh stage is the stage of self-control and self awareness alongwith freedom from spiritual inertia, which is technically known as *apramatta-samyata-guṇasthāna*. At this stage the self has full control over his passions and observes the moral code without any negligence. This stage can be attained by overcoming the nine types of *pramādas* or unawareness and the three sets of four types of passions. From this stage there are two ways open for the upward spiritual journey of the soul. They are technically known as *upaśama-śreṇī* and *kṣapaka-śreṇī*. *Upaśama-śreṇī* is the path of suppression or subsidence while the *Kaṣapaka-śreṇī* is the path of annihilation. The person, who climbs the ladder of spiritual progress by suppressing his passions, is bound to fall from spiritual heights but the person who climbs up the ladder of spiritual heights through the annihilation of his passions ultimately attains *nirvāṇa* or emancipation.

8. The eighth stage of spiritual development is called *apūrvakaraṇa*. In this stage self attains a special purification and spiritual strength, and thus becomes capable of reducing the duration and the intensity of the previously bonded *karmas*. At this stage soul performs the four processes of the *karma* — *sthitighāta* (destruction of the duration of *karmas*), *rasaghāta* (destruction of the intensity of *karmas*), *guṇa-saṅkramaṇa* (transformation of the quality of *karmic* matter) and *apūrva-sthitibandha* (bondage of an unprecedented kind of duration). This total process is technically known as *apūrva-karaṇa*. In this stage the soul for the first time experiences the spiritual bliss and tranquility and emotional disturbances do not effect it much. At this stage the three sets of four passions alongwith anger and pride of the fourth set disappear, only subtle deceit and greed alongwith nine sub-passions (instincts) remain.

9. The ninth stage is named as *anivṛttikaraṇa*, because the process of *anivṛttikaraṇa* operates in this stage. It is also known as *bādara-samparāya guṇasthāna*, because in this stage there is occasional possibility of the soul being effected by gross passions (*bādara-samparāya*), although it has a power of control over them. At this stage, out of nine sub-passions, three types of sexual instinct subside and only six instincts and subtle greed remain, but due to the presence of sub-passions and subtle greed, a fear of attack by gross passions remain. At the end of this stage struggle for spiritual progress comes to an end and the soul climbs the tenth ladder.

10. This stage is named as *sūkṣmasamparāya-guṇasthāna*, because at this stage only the subtle form of greed remains. This greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment of the soul with the body. When this subtle attachment alongwith remaining sub-passions is subsided or annihilated, the soul ascends to the next stage. The soul, who has made his spiritual progress through the ladder of subsidence (*upaśama-śreṇī*) ascends to the eleventh *guṇasthāna* and the soul, which take up the ladder of annihilation (*kṣapaka-śreṇī*), climbs directly to the twelfth stage.

11. This stage is known as *upaśāntamohaniya-guṇasthāna*; because in this stage deluding *karma* remains in the subsided form. It is the highest stage for those who ascend through the ladder of subsidence or suppression. But ultimately the suppressed passions arise and disturb the tranquility of mind. The soul invariably descends from this stage either to the sixth, fifth or fourth or even first stage. This is noteworthy that Jainism does not advocate the process of suppression of the passions for the spiritual progress. This view of Jainism is further supported by the modern psychologists such as Freud etc.

12. The twelfth stage in the spiritual development of the soul is called *kṣīṇamoha-guṇasthāna*. In this stage deluding karma, which is the main obstruc-

tion in the spiritual progress, is completely destroyed. At the end of this stage the rest three *ghāti-karma*, *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa* and *antarāya* are also destroyed and the soul ascends to the thirteenth stage.

13. This stage is known as *sayogī-kevalī-guṇasthāna*. In this stage soul attains the four infinities, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, infinite power and thus becomes omniscient. It is the highest stage of spiritual development. It is the stage of *jīvana-mukti* of other systems of Indian philosophy. Only due to the existence of four non-destructive *karmas*, i.e., *āyu* (age), *nāma*, *gotra* and *vedanīya*, soul remains in the body till the span of age determining *karma* is not exhausted.

14. This stage is named as *ayogīkevalī-guṇasthāna*, because in this stage the omniscient soul controls its activities of mind, body and speech and thus prepares itself for the final emancipation. In this stage the remaining four non-destructive *karmas* are destroyed and the soul, after leaving the body, proceeds for its heavenly abode at the top of the universe and lives there for time-infinite.

Three Stages of Spiritual Quest

There are two classifications of spiritual quest in Jainism — Theory of fourteen *guṇasthānas* already discussed and the theory of three stages of spiritual developments. This second classification is based on *Upaniṣadic* classification of the soul. The *Upaniṣadas* have two, three and four-fold classification of the soul. In two-fold classification, the soul is of two kinds — *antaḥprajñāna* and *bahīḥprajñāna* (*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 7) and in four-fold classification, four stages of the soul, are : (i) sleeping state, (ii) dreaming state, (iii) awakened state and (iv) transcendental state (*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2/12). Similarly, in Jainism spiritual quest has been summarised in three stages — (i) the extrovert self (*bahirātmā*), (ii) the introvert self (*antarātmā*) and

(iii) transcendental self (*paramātmā*). It is clear that in Jainism these three stages of spiritual quest are a later developed concept, because neither the canonical works nor the earlier works of Jaina philosophy of Umasvāti, Siddhasena Divākara etc. refer it. In Digambara tradition, for the first time we have a mention of these classification in Ācārya Kunda-kunda's *Mokṣaprābhṛta* (4) then in the Pūjyapāda's *Samādhitantra* (4), Svāmikumāra's *Kārtikeyānu-prekṣā* (192) and Yogindu's *Paramātmaprakāśa* (13). In Svetāmbara tradition, Haribhadra has mentioned these three states of spiritual quest in his work :

These three stages are as under :

1. The extrovert self (*bahirātmā*) : Possesses perverse attitude hence consequently does not discriminates soul from body, regards the external thing as mine and takes keen interest in the worldly enjoyment.

2. The introvert self (*antarātmā*) : The self, which possesses the right attitude and therefore, clearly distinguishes the soul from the body and the other external belongings is called an introvert self. It does not take interest in the worldly enjoyments, but meditates on one's own real nature and regards external belongings as alien to it. This has been further subdivided into three states — (i) lower, (ii) middle and (iii) higher. The soul belonging to fourth stage of *guṇasthāna* is called lower introvert self. The soul belonging to the fifth or the sixth stage of *guṇasthāna* is called middle introvert self and the soul belonging to the seventh to twelfth *guṇasthāna* is called higher introvert self.

3. The transcendental self (*paramātmā*) : The self, completely free from all sorts of impurities and passions such as aversion, attachment, pride, anger, deceit, greed, sexual desire and other sub-passions. According to Jaina tradition this type of self possesses four infinities, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. There are

two categories of transcendental Self — (i) *Arhatas* and (ii) *Siddhas*.

Three-fold Path of Liberation

The Jaina theory of bondage and liberation of the soul is unique in Indian philosophy. Jainism holds that *jīva* is bound by its own *karmas*. With every activity mental or physical and, however, subtle that may be, the *karma* particles veils the soul and this is the bondage of the *jīva*. Thus, the cause of the bondage of the *jīva* is its own passionate activity of mind, body and speech. As the cause of the bondage is the union of *karma*-matter with the soul, the liberation means the separation or complete annihilation of these *karma*-particles, Jainism prescribes three-fold path for attainment of liberation. This three-fold concept witnessed gradual changes in it between c. 3rd-10th A. D. *Ācārāṅga* for the first time in its 6th chapter, mentions *triyaṃ*, but as this term is used there vaguely, it is quite difficult to derive any definite meaning from it. That is why the commentators explained it in different ways. Some explained it as three *yamas*, i.e., non-violence, truth and non-possession, while some took it as Right knowledge, Right faith and Right conduct. In my opinion, this term connotes the meaning of non-violence (*nikhitta-daṇḍa*), reasonableness (*prajñā*) and composure or equanimity of mind. Apart from this three-fold concept we find mention of four-fold path of liberation in *Uttarādhyaṇa* and Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya*. This four-fold path includes — Right attitude, Right knowledge, Right conduct and Right penance. In *Samavāyaṅga* and *Sthānāṅga*, we find different outlook as the both of the works mention two-fold, three-fold, four-fold and five-fold path of liberation. Thus, till the canonical age the number of constituents of the path of liberation was not fixed. For the first time in the Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* it was fixed as three — right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*), right faith (*samyak-darśana*) and right conduct (*samyak-*

cāritra), (three jewels of Jainism) which are equally recognised and well received in both of the sects of Jainism — Śvetāmbara and Digambara alongwith their sub-sects.

In c. 4th-5th the meaning of the constituents of this three-fold path was reinterpreted. For example the term *darśana* used in *Ācārāṅga*, connoting the meaning as 'to see' or 'to observe' got its new interpretation in *Uttarādhyaṇa* as 'to believe' or 'to have faith' in categories (*tattvas*), *Tattvārthasūtra* also supports this meaning. Later on, this meaning of *samyak-darśana* was replaced by the meaning as to have faith in *Arhanta* as a 'Deva', i.e., the object of worship, *Nirgrantha* as a teacher (guru) and religion as non-violence or being benevolent to others. This meaning is still in vogue.

Similarly, the meaning of *samyak-jñāna* or right knowledge also got some new interpretation. In the earlier times Jaina thinkers held that the right knowledge consists in knowing the things in its real nature alongwith its infinite facets. This right knowledge is classified into five types in earlier *Āgamas* as — (i) *Matijñāna* — the knowledge obtained through five senses and the mind. It includes both sense perception as well as rational and inferential knowledge, (ii) *Śrutajñāna* — the knowledge acquired through language or through symbols and expressions or scriptural knowledge, (iii) *Avadhijñāna* — extra-sensory perception akin to clairvoyance, (iv) *Manahparyaya-jñāna* — reading the thought-waves of others mind and (v) *Kevalajñāna* — perfect knowledge. The detailed description about the development of these types of knowledge has already been discussed in the present article under the heading of 'Jaina Theory of Knowledge'.

Later on, Right knowledge was considered as the knowledge of the seven categories (*tattvas*), i.e., *jīva* (living substance), *ajīva* (non-living substance), *āsrava* (influx of karmic matter), *saṃvara* (stoppage

of the influx of the karmic matter), *nirjarā* (stoppage of the accumulated karmic matter) and *Mokṣa* (complete annihilation of the *karma* and to remain in one's pure nature). But after the c. 3rd A. D. the meaning of right knowledge changed and it was held that right knowledge consisted in the discrimination between the self and not-self. The right knowledge is the knowledge of the pure self but the pure self can be known only through the reference to not-self. Thus, knowing the nature of the not-self and differentiating it from the self is called the science of discrimination (*bheda-vijñāna*) and this science of discrimination constitutes the real meaning of right knowledge. Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) has made an exhaustive study of the science of discrimination in *Samayasāra* (207-210). He says anger, deceit etc. are due to the power of fruition of the karmic matter, hence not the real nature of the self. The self is the pure knower. In *Iṣtopadeśa* (33) of Pūjyapāda Devanandī (c. 6th A. D.) it is mentioned that right knowledge is that in which a clear distinction between the self and not-self is made. Amṛtacandra also followed the same meaning of right knowledge in his works. He says 'he who is liberated (*siddha*) has become so, through discrimination of self from not-self and who is in bondage, is so due to its absence (*Samayasāra*kalaśa, 132). Thus, in Jainism during c. 6th-10th A. D., the right knowledge is equated with this science of discrimination of self and not-self which as a right knowledge was well accepted in Jainism as well as in Gītā, Sāṅkhyā-Yoga system and Śāṅkara-Vedānta also.

In Jainism right conduct has been described from two points of view — real and practical. In the earlier *āgamas* from real point of view right conduct is considered in which the soul is completely free from passions and perversities. It is the state of equanimity of mind. In Jainism, it is maintained that conduct is *dharma*, *dharma* is equanimity and equanimity means the state of self which is free from the

vectors of attachment and aversion. From practical point of view right conduct means the adoption of such rules of disciplines as prescribed by the Jinas.

Later on, right conduct is considered by Jaina thinkers on the basis of its two aspects — external and internal. These two aspects are technically called *dravya* and *bhāva* respectively. In Jainism external rightness of an action is to be decided in relation with other living beings. In other words, external rightness of an action depends upon its outer social results. If an action results in the well being of others or cultivates social good from the practical or extrinsic viewpoint, it is called good or right. But the intrinsic purity or righteousness of an action depends on the intention or motive of the doer. It is purity of intention or motive and not the external result, that makes an action intrinsically good or bad. In earlier times extrinsic aspect was more important for Jainas. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the Buddhist view is criticised on the basis that they neglect the external aspect of an action. Later on, stress was given on intrinsic aspect by Jaina themselves. It is considered that an action is wrong if it is actuated by a bad intention, may it lead to the happiness of others. But we must be aware of the fact that Jainism being an integral philosophy does not hold any one-sided view, it gives due importance to the intention as well as the consequences of an action. It adds due importance to the social aspects of morality. Jainas do not believe in the dualism of thought and action. For them a right action is the proof of mental purity and the mental purity is the basis for the righteousness of an action. This outlook about the righteousness of the conduct remained unchanged in the later times also. One should be aware of the fact that the general code of conduct for an house-holder as well as for monks and nuns remained the same from the earliest time to the c. 10th but with the passage of time some changes occurred in the interpretation of such rules.

In fact, the canonical works have mere skeleton of rules and regulations of conduct, it is only in the *Bhāṣya* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Cūmīs* (c. 7th A. D.). Jaina thinkers tried to robe this skeleton. They gave not only the various interpretations to the rules and regulations for the monks and nuns as well as for the lay followers, according to their time and circumstances, but discussed in detail their exceptions and atonements also. In the earlier times, it was maintained that instead of breaking the rules prescribed for self-control, it is better to accept the *Samādhimarāṇa*, but in those centuries it was maintained that one should protect one's self by all means. A monk or a nun who protected his life by accepting or resorting to the exception was not considered the guilty of breaking the rules if his mind was pure. In *Oghaniryukti* (47-48), it is said that for the proper following of the path of liberation, protection of body is essential. Thus, in these centuries accepting the exceptions was favoured.

So far as the developments or the changes in the ethical code of conduct of monks and nuns are concerned, the period from c. 3rd-10th A. D. must be considered of much importance on the two grounds. Firstly, in the c. 4th-5th A. D. a major diversion took place in the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns. Before this said period Jaina *sādhana* meant self-purification, hence exclusively individualistic, but by these centuries, instead of self-purification, stress was laid on the propagation as well as survival of Jainism in the society. As a result, instead of individual, Jaina order (*saṅgha*) became more important. It was maintained that at any cost, the image of Jaina order (Jaina society as a whole) should not be damaged and for this purpose external behaviour was considered of much importance than that of internal purification. A slogan had been given that an action though pure, if against the general will, should not be followed. Not only this, but to maintain the dignity of Jaina *saṅgha* and propagation of Jaina religion various exceptions

were accepted in earlier code of conduct. Secondly, this period is considered very important as most of the Jaina sects emerged in this period during c. 4th-5th A. D. This period is known as the period of Schism in Jaina history. Three important Jaina-Sects – Digambara, Śvetāmbara and Yāpaniya have their origin in this period. This is also to be noted that before c. 2nd-3rd A. D., the code of conduct of Jaina ascetics was very rigorous but from the c. 3rd-4th many exceptions-relaxations were accepted in their earlier code of conduct.

The distinguished feature of this age was that by this period Jaina ascetics started living in the temples and *maṭhas* instead of living in outskirts of the cities and secluded places. Not only this but instead of following the vow of non-possession, in its true spirit, Jaina monks became the owner of these temples, *maṭhas* and the properties donated to the temples. It was only this period when tradition of *Caityavāsa*, i.e., living in the Jaina temples or *maṭhas* started. Due to the tendency of *Caityavāsa* Jaina monks became liberal to some extent in their code of conduct. They started leading luxurious life instead of rigorous one. In spite of these drawbacks of this period one thing is very remarkable that most of the important Jaina literature was composed as well as written in this period. It is noteworthy that in this period (c. 4th-5th A. D.) writing of the Jaina canons as well as other works on palm-leaves was started. The Bhaṭṭārakas and Yatis made better efforts to preserve the treasure trove of Jaina literature. They offered the medical services not only to Jaina society but to the other people also. Thus, in spite of, some weakness in following the religious code of conduct of Jaina monks, they got favour of Jaina society at large due to their benevolent services to the society.

Development of the Concept of Tīrthaṅkara and Bhakti Movement in Jainism

The concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* is the pivot,

around which the whole Jaina religion revolves. In Jainism, *Tīrthaṅkara* is regarded as the founder of religion as well as the object of worship. Generally, the Jaina concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* resembles that of incarnation (*avatāravāda*) of Hinduism. Both carry the same object as they are propounders of religion but there is a fundamental difference in both of the concepts. According to *Gītā*, the purpose behind the incarnation of God is to propound religion and to destroy the wicked while in Jainism *Tīrthaṅkara* is only regarded as propounder of religion, not the destroyer of wickeds. Not only this, the second fundamental difference between *avatāra* and *Tīrthaṅkara* is that, in former the supreme power or God descends on earth to reincarnate himself in different forms in different ages and in this way, He is the one and only person who reincarnates himself from time to time, on the contrary, in Jainism every *Tīrthaṅkara* is a different person (Soul) and on account of his special personal efforts (*sādhanā*) made in previous births, attains the supreme position. Though, it is very difficult to say that in this entire hypothesis of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* and twenty-four *Avatāras*, who has taken to what extent from whom but it is fact that in the process of development of their concepts both have influenced each other.

The word *Tīrthaṅkara* is being used from time immemorial. It mainly connotes the meaning as one who establishes four-fold order (*caturvidha saṅgha*). According to the old Buddhist literature, such as, *Dīghanikāya* and *Suttanipāṭa* (at the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra) there were flourished several persons who declared themselves as *Tīrthaṅkaras*. *Dīghanikāya* mentions the Jñātaputra Mahāvīra as one of the six Buddha's contemporaneous *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Though, it seems quite amazing because the first *Śrutaskandha* of *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, elaborately describing the life of Mahāvīra, do not call him as *Tīrthaṅkara*. It shows that these *āgamic* texts are

more older than that of *Dīghanikāya*. In the whole Jaina *āgamic* literature, the word '*Tīrthaṅkara*' is used for the first time in *Uttarādhyayana* and in second part of *Ācārāṅga*. Words like *Arhat*, *Jina*, *Buddha* are frequently used in excessive form in the old *Āgamas*, the synonyms of *Tīrthaṅkara*. Presently, the word *Tīrthaṅkara* has become a specific term of Jaina tradition.

Chronologically, the concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* came into existence between c. 3rd-1st B. C. So far as the fully developed concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* is concerned, the first complete list of *Tīrthaṅkaras* is found in the appendix of the *Samavāyāṅga* which was incorporated at the time of Valabhī council, i.e., c. 5th A.D. Among Jaina *āgamas* the first part of *Ācārāṅga*, considered as the oldest extant Jaina text (c. 5th B. C.), mentions the ascetic life of Mahāvīra only. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* which describes some special features of Mahāvīra's life only hints about *Pārśva's* tradition. *Ṛṣibhāṣita* mentions *Pārśva* and Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) as *Arhat* Ṛṣi. The second part of *Ācārāṅga*, for the first time describes Mahāvīra as *Tīrthaṅkara* alongwith some details of his parents, mentioning them as *Pārśvāpatya*. *Uttarādhyayana* clearly mentions some of the life-incidents of *Tīrthaṅkara's* like Ariṣṭanemi, *Pārśva* and Mahāvīra, whereas it indicates only the name of *Ṛṣabha*, *Śānti*, *Kunthu* and *Ara*. Similarly, the *Namipavajjā*, the 9th chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, elaborately describes the facts about Nami but it does not mention Nami as *Tīrthaṅkara*. Even in *Kalpasūtra*, there are some details about the life of Mahāvīra, *Pārśva*, Ariṣṭanemi and *Ṛṣabha* out of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Remaining names of second to twenty first *Tīrthaṅkaras*, seem to be incorporated in the list of *Tīrthaṅkaras*, later on in c. 4th-5th A. D. In Digambara tradition earliest description about 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* is found for the first time in *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, which is supposed to be composed after c. 5th A. D. So far as iconographical

evidences are concerned only images of the four *Tīrthaṅkaras* — Mahāvīra, Pārśva, Ariṣṭanemi and Rṣabha — are found during c. 3rd B. C.-1st A. D. The images of other *Tīrthaṅkaras* are of later period, i.e., after c. 2nd-3rd A. D. This suggests that the concept of 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* came into existence only after c. 3rd. With the development of the concept of *Tīrthaṅkaras* the system of their worship (*Pūjā-paddhati*) also came into prominence.

Jainism emerged as an ascetic religion. Initially, it laid more stress on austerity and meditation. In the beginning all sorts of ceremonial or sacrificial performances (*karmakāṇḍa*) were totally absent in it. It was only a religion of self-purification. In *Āgamas* there are no traces of ceremonial performances or any system of idol worship or religious adoration, asking for the grace of God. In Jaina tradition, for the first time the six essential duties (*ṣaḍāvaśyakas*), i.e., practice for equanimity (*Sāmāyika*), praising twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* (*Caturvīṃśati stavana*), paying respect to *ācāryas* (*vandanā*), atonement of blemished activities (*pratikramaṇa*), mortification (*kāyotsarga*) and taking some vow (*pratyākhyāna*) were introduced.

Most probably, in c. 2nd-3rd B. C., these six essentials (*ṣaḍāvaśyakas*) got ordained and established. Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition, making of the Jaina images was started in c. 3rd-4th B. C., but no evidence found about the modes of worshipping these idols, particularly in ancient *Āgamas*. For the first time, *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* mentions the rituals of worshipping of Jina-image. A comparative study proves that it was only an adoption of Hindu method of worshipping their deities. Though, some of the portions of *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* are undoubtedly old, but the portion which deals with the art of temple building and rituals relating to the worship is still older and belongs to the c. 3rd-4th A. D. To me, it appears that

the development of devotionism and ceremonial performances in Jainism, started from c. 3rd-4th A. D. In this period, the Hindu system of ceremonial performance and worship was adopted in Jainism with minor changes. Starting from the period of Lord Pārśva and Mahāvīra upto the c. 2nd A. D., the Śramanic tradition in general and Jainism in particular joined hands in the development of new spiritualistic Hinduism, through condemning all sorts of ceremonial as well as sacrificial performances alongwith Vedic sacerdotalism, but Jainism itself started imitating blindly the Hindu rituals in c. 3rd-4th, and thus a variety of ceremonial offerings came into existence in the Jaina religious practices. This blind adoption of Hindu practices occurred not only in Śvetāmbara and Yāpanīya tradition of Northern India but in the Digambara sect of South India also. As a result, not only the *Vaiṣṇava* system of worship and ceremonies started in the Jaina temples but sacrificial offerings and ladles became prevalent. Due to these influences of Hindu caste system and untouchability also paved their way in Jainism. Jaina lay-devotees started wearing brahmanical sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*) and performing sacrifices and sacrificial ladles. Ācārya Jinasena (c. 8th A. D.) had adopted all the Hindu sanctifying rites (*samskāras*), with some modifications in his work *Ādipurāṇa*.

Following blindly, the Hindu *mantras* of worshipping, Jaina lay devotees started invoking and departing the *Tīrthaṅkaras* in their *Pūjā* ceremonies, while according to the Jaina philosophy the *Tīrthaṅkaras* neither come nor depart after final emancipation, as well as they may not be adored as the object of worship for the worldly attainment, as they are free from all types of attachment and aversion (*vītarāga*). But a lay-devotee always remains in search of such a deity who can save him from worldly calamities and help him in worldly attainments. For this purpose

Jaina ācāryas accepted several Hindu goddesses like *Kālī*, *Mahākālī*, *Padmāvatī*, *Ambikā*, *Siddhāyikā*, etc. as demi-goddesses (*Yakṣis*). They accepted various rituals and incantations for worshipping these goddesses. Thus, in between c. 5th-8th A. D. several Hindu gods and goddesses became part and parcel of Jaina deities. The special feature of this age was that performing arts like Dance, Music etc., which were strongly opposed in earlier āgamas, such as *Uttarā-dhyayana* strongly expounds all sorts of dances as vexation and songs as lamentation, are cropped in Jaina system of worship, gradually. This description of fine arts in *Rāyapaseṇīya*, as a part of Jaina way of worship was incorporated in about the c. 5th A. D. at the time of *Valabhī-vācanā*. This depicts a complete picture of gradual development of fine arts like Sculpture, Dance, Music, Drama etc. in Jaina tradition. When the *Tāntrism* and *Vāmamārga* came in-vogue in c. 5th-6th A. D., Jainism could not save itself from the impact of these traditions. Being an ascetic and spiritual religion, Jainism was not much affected with *Vāmamārga* but *Tāntrism* and ceremonial performances of Hinduism definitely left their impact on it.

Development of Various Arts & Architecture in Jainism in Early Period

Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition the making of Jaina images started in c. 4th-3rd B. C. Though, on the basis of Harappan Teracotas and seals some Jaina scholars opine that tradition of making Jaina images is as old as the Harappan culture, yet it is very difficult to prove these teracotas and seals as of Jaina origin. Later, in the Khārvela epigraphs (c. 2nd B. C.) it is clearly mentioned that Nandas (c. 4th B. C.) had taken away the Jaina images from Orissa to Patna which is enough to prove that the making of Jaina

images was prevalent in c. 4th B. C. The earliest Jaina image, found from Lohānipur, Patna, belongs to Mauryan period (c. 3rd B. C.). Several Jaina images alongwith epigraphs have been found from Mathurā and remains of Jaina temples from Kaṅkālīṭīlā. Among those, the earliest images date from c. 2nd B. C.-2nd A. D. Many of these images are found with dated epigraphs of Kuṣāṇa period, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D. So far as the literary evidences are concerned, we for the first time, find in *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta*, the details of temple architecture and the rituals related to idol-worship. The *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* is undoubtedly an early work, and its portion dealing with temple architecture and various performing arts, by no means, can be of later period than c. 3rd A. D., because its various incarnations (*avatāras*) tally with the archaeological remains of c. 1st-2nd of Kaṅkālīṭīlā, Mathurā.

Though the development of various secular arts and sciences was a movement, independent of any religious tradition, yet it may be noted that religious traditions not only contributed in their development, but also decided the direction of development. Jainas believe that various arts and sciences were developed by Lord Rṣabha, the first *Tīrthanikara*. In Jaina canonical literature 64 arts of women and 72 arts of men are mentioned. We have a general reference to these arts / sciences in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Jñātādharmakathā*, *Antakṛddasā*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā*, *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta*, *Jambūdvīpaprajñapti*, etc. Though in these canonical works we do not find any details about these yet on the basis of these works and their commentaries Dr. N. L. Jain, in his book (*Scientific Contents in Prākṛta Canons*, P. V., Varanasi, 1996) has presented the following list of various arts and sciences prevalent in c. 2nd-3rd A. D.

Different Types of Learning Arts and Sciences in Various Canons

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	SK	RP	AKT	GDK	ANU	JDP
Number of Learnings	64	72	72	72	72	72
1. Terrestriology (Storms)	✓	—	—	—	—	—
2. Meterology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
3. Dreamology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
4. Astrology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
5. Science of Limbal Movement	✓	—	—	—	—	—
6. Science of notes (birds)	✓	—	—	—	—	—
7. Palmistry	✓	—	—	—	—	—
8. Science of Distinctive marks in body	✓	—	—	—	—	—
9. Science of Women Studies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10. Science of Men Studies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
11. Science of Horses (Training & Management)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12. Science of Elephants (Training & Management)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13. Science of Cows and Oxen	✓	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
14. Science of Sheep	✓	—	—	—	—	—
15. Science of Poultry	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
16. Science of Portridge	✓	—	—	—	—	—
17. Science of Quails	✓	—	—	—	—	—
18. Science of Young Quails	✓	—	—	—	—	—
19. Science of Royal Wheels	✓	✓	—	—	—	—
20. Science of Royal Umbrella	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21. Science of Royal Sceptre	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
22. Science of Swords	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
23. Gemology (Precious Stones)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
24. Science of Coinage, Cowries or Special Gems	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
25. Science of Shieldings	✓	—	—	—	—	—
26. Science of Prosperity	✓	—	—	—	—	—
27. Science of Fiascos	✓	—	—	—	—	—
28. Science of Natural or Acquired Conception	✓	—	—	—	—	—
29. Science of Stimulation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
30. Atharva-vedic Incantation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
31. Science of Jugglery/Magic	✓	—	—	—	—	—
32. Science of Oblation with Fire	✓	—	—	—	—	—
33. Archery	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
34. Science of Moon	✓	—	—	—	—	—

	1	2	3	4	5	6
35. Science of Sun	✓	—	—	—	—	—
36. Science of Venus	✓	—	—	—	—	—
37. Science of Jupiter	✓	—	—	—	—	—
38. Meteorology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
39. Science of Glow of Horizon	✓	—	—	—	—	—
40. Science of Notes of Animals	✓	—	—	—	—	—
41. Science of Notes of Special Birds	✓	—	—	—	—	—
42. Prognostics of Dust-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
43. Prognostics of Hair-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
44. Prognostics of Meat-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
45. Prognostics of Blood-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
46. Science of Goblins	✓	—	—	—	—	—
47. Science of Semi-goblins	✓	—	—	—	—	—
48. Science of Sleeping	✓	✓	—	—	—	—
49. Science of Unlocking	✓	—	—	—	—	—
50. Cāṇḍālic Learning/Psychotherapy	✓	—	—	—	—	—
51. Shabari (Kiratana) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
52. Dravida (Tamila) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
53. Kalingi (Oriya) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
54. Gauri (A specific cardiolic) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
55. Gandhari Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
56. Science of Descending	✓	—	—	—	—	—
57. Science of Ascending	✓	—	—	—	—	—
58. Science of Yawning	✓	—	—	—	—	—
59. Science of Sustainance	✓	—	—	—	—	—
60. Science of Embracing/Clinging	✓	—	—	—	—	—
61. Science of Dispeptisation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
62. Science of Surgery and Medicine	✓	—	—	—	—	—
63. Demonology/De-demonology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
64. Science of Invisibility/Disappearance	✓	—	—	—	—	—
65. Art of Writing	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
66. Mathematics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
67. Dramatics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
68. Vocal Music	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
69. Instrumental Music	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
70. Science of Musical Notes, Phonetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
71. Science of Percussion Instruments	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
72. Science of Orchestra	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	1	2	3	4	5	6
73. Art of Gambling	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
74. Special type of Gambling/Art of Speech	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
75. Art of Playing by Dice	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
76. Art of Playing by Special Dice	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
77. Art of Quick Poetics/Guarding City	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
78. Water Purification/Ceramics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
79. Food Science/Agriculture	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
80. Art of Soft/Medicated Drinks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
81. Textiles and Fabrication	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
82. Cosmetics and Perfumery	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
83. Science of Bed-dressing	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
84. Art of Composing Ārya-metrics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
85. Art of Riddlerly Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
86. Magadhan Language Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
87. Art of Comp. Non-samskr̥ta 32 Letter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
88. Art of Comp. <i>Ġitika</i> -meter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
89. Art of Comp. <i>Anuṣṭup</i> -meter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
90. Chemistry of Silver	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
91. Chemistry of Gold	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
92. Art of Goldsmithy	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
93. Women Cosmetisation	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
94. Building/Architectural Engineering	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
95. Town Planning	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
96. Construction of Army Barracks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
97. Science of Measures	—	✓	—	—	—	—
98. Astrology/Medicine/Military Science : Counter movement of Army Art	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
99. Military Science : Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
100. Cyclic Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
101. Garudic Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
102. Wedge Arraying	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
103. General Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
104. Wrestling	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
105. Intense Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
106. Sight Fighting/Stick Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
107. Fist Fighting/Boxing/Pugilistic Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
108. Hand-to-Hand Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
109. Creeperlike Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	1	2	3	4	5	6
110. Art of Divine Arrows/Transformation	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
111. Art of Swordsmanship	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
112. Silver Digest (Pak)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
113. Gold Digest (Pak)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
114. Metal Digest	—	✓	—	—	—	—
115. Jewel-Gem Digest	—	✓	—	—	—	—
116. Rope Tricks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
117. Circular Play-tricks/Playing with Fabrics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
118. Special Type of Gambling (Nalika-khela)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
119. Art of Piercing Leaves	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
120. Art of Drilling Hard Earth	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
121. Art of Animation/Inanimation	—	✓	—	—	—	—
122. Science of Omens/Omenology	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
123. Sc. of Dramatic Dressing/Painting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
124. Science of Planet Rahu	—	—	—	—	—	—
125. Planetology	—	—	—	—	—	—
126. Town Planning	—	—	—	—	—	—
127. Army Barracking	—	—	—	—	—	—
128. Horses Training	—	—	—	—	—	—
129. Elephant Training	—	—	—	—	—	—
130. Knowledge of Special Learning	—	—	—	—	—	—
131. Science of Incarnation	—	—	—	—	—	—
132. Science of Knowing Secrets	—	—	—	—	—	—
133. Science of Direct Knowing About Objects	—	—	—	—	—	—
134. Planetary Motion/Science of Military Movements	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
135. Chemistry of Perfumes	—	—	—	—	—	—
136. Art of Flowering/Tasting of Foods/ Art of Wax-technique	—	—	—	—	—	—
137. Counter Arraying of Army	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
138. Art of Home Construction	—	—	—	—	—	—
139. Powder Technology	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
140. Art of Inanimation	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
141. Agriculture	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
142. Science of Architecture	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	64	72	72	72	72	72

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to mention here some of the specialities of early Jainism. Though early Jainism was much rigorous in its code of conduct yet on the other hand it was very liberal in its approach. The earliest Jaina canonical works, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Rṣibhāṣita* not only incorporate the preachings of the various sages of Upaniṣadic, Buddhists and some other Śramaṇic traditions, but call them *Arhat*, *Rṣis*, as acceptable to their own tradition. Furthermore, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, propounding this liberalism, says "One who praises one's own views as true and condemns others view as false distorts the truth and remains confined to the cycle of birth and death." It was the non-violent, liberal and assimilating approach of early Jaina thinkers which gave birth to the non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*), the fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy. On the basis of this principle early Jaina thinkers built their philosophical structure and developed their metaphysical and epistemological theories in which they tried to reconcile beautifully the rival views of Indian philosophy. Whether it was the question of metaphysical theories or the epistemological problems of Philosophy, they always tried for the reconciliation of the opposite conflicting views.

Though, some of the basic concepts of Jaina Philosophy such as *Pañcāstikāyavāda*, eight types of *karmagranthi* and five-fold knowledge were prevalent even before the times of Lord Mahāvīra or of Lord Pārśva, but the concepts such as three-fold nature of reality, six substances, two-fold and seven-fold division of *Nayas*, four-fold *Nikṣepas*, different *Anuyoga-*

dvāras and doctrine of *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgī* have developed gradually in due course of time. Barring the concept of *Saptabhaṅgī*, fourteen *Guṇasthānas* and six types of *Pramāṇas*, all other concepts of Jaina metaphysics and epistemology took their shape before c. 2nd-3rd A. D. It is the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti and its auto-commentary (c. 3rd A.D.) in which Jaina philosophy for the first time, was presented in a systematic form. But it was not the last stage of the development of the Jaina philosophy, since various new definitions and details about these concepts were formulated even after this period which I would like to discuss in the second volume of this project. In developing their own philosophical system, Jaina thinkers while on the one hand, have accommodated various philosophical concepts of other contemporary Indian schools, on the other hand they synthesised the various contradictory theories of Indian schools of thought in such a way that the contradictions are completely dissolved in the non-absolutistic broader perspective. It is the most important contribution of early Jaina thinkers to the Indian philosophy.

But in the process of adopting the thoughts and practices of other Indian systems, particularly Hinduism, caste-system, untouchability, wearing of sacred thread and various other rituals also crept their way in Jainism. As a result spiritualistic Jainism became ritualistic. Though it was a later development (c. 6th-7th A. D.) yet, it no doubt had given some scratches to the ideal spiritualistic image of Jainism. It was necessary, perhaps, for the survival of Jainism in the middle centuries of Indian history.

