6

IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BUDDHIST–JAINA DISPUTE OVER
THE FALLACIOUS EXAMPLE
IN NYĀYA–BINDU AND
NYĀYĀVATĀRĀ–VIVRTI*

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From the times of Aristotle, to whom the idea seemed so obvious and natural that he eventually failed to spare anywhere in his voluminous oeuvre even a single word of explanation on it, and of Alexander, his commentator, who was the first to point out its significance explicitly,¹ the benefits of symbolic expressions in logic,² or formal logic to be more precise, have not been questioned seriously by any sane student ever since. It has been unanimously determined that the predominant idea underlying the usage of symbols in logic lies in the desire, first, to make the student aware, that the validity of the processes of analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols which are employed, but solely upon the laws of their combination,³ and, secondly, to render "every logical proposition, whether categorical or hypothetical, capable of exact and rigorous expression",⁴ not to mention a certain amount of intellectual gratification derived from "the symmetry of their analytical expression, harmony and consistency",⁵ notwithstanding the simple fact that "in the beginning the use of letters is a mystery, which seems to have no purpose except mystification".⁶ The distinct advantage of the first two requirements, that is the recognition of class and general notion as a universal point of reference and univocality in the use of names, that jointly enable us to arrive autonomously at specific universally applicable, contents- and context-independent "elementary laws of thought"⁷ and draw valid conclusions autonomously with reference to the contents of premises, was recognised relatively early by Alexander:

In the discipline [of logic], letters are used in order to make us aware, that conclusion does not depend on contents, but on [syllogistic] figures, on relation of premisses and on [syllogistic] modes, because it is not the
very contents that is important for syllogistic inference, but the arrangement itself. Accordingly, letters are employed to represent general notions and to show, that conclusion will always follow and from any assumption.8

Two additional considerations that are taken for granted and speak in favour of the method resting upon the employment of symbols in formal logic were added in one breath at the moment of formulating the first theory to represent formal logic with the help of symbolic means that remain at the disposal of algebra, the result of which is symbolic logic, or mathematical logic or logistic: the need for a necessary instrument, or methods, or ‘aids’ (or, to intimate the name of the ‘symbolic culprit’ new, to ρρεπενοι) to facilitate the progress of scientific discovery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the demand of the discipline of the intellect.9

Our list of benefits can be further extended with two more features, that is, that of concision and manageability as well as amenability to and capability of expressing abstract concepts absent from natural language.10 Every student of philosophy Sanskrit knows how indefinite or imprecise – and logically unsatisfactory – the conjunctions ca or va (especially in negated sentences) in the natural language can be, how their meaning in certain contexts may overlap and how much intuitive their interpretation sometimes is. Conspicuous examples are furnished, for instance, by the problem of causas-kośa, wherein the first hemistich of one of its formulations na va svaitah prasiddhir na parasparah para-pramāṇair va13 could theoretically be represented in a number of ways (p stands for svaitah prasiddhir, q for parasparah prasiddhir, and r for para-pramāṇair prasiddhir): (1) p∧¬q∨r, (2) p∧q∨¬r, (3) ¬p∧¬q∧r, (4) ¬p∧q∧¬r, (5) p∧(q∨r) or (6) p∨(q∨r) etc., but it is the reader who intentionally interprets it not as an alternative (the usual meaning of va) but as a disjunction (7) p∧q∧¬r. The inadequacy of, say, such ambiguous words as ‘and’ or ‘or’, or its equivalents, to express certain abstract relations, that are not present in the natural language but are easily definable with the help of truth tables (110, 011 and 010) in the two-value logic and can be represented with symbols (pq, pvq, pqr), is well-known.12

Having said that, could such a symbolic and formalised language have any drawback? Apart from the earlier-quoted remark uttered jokingly by Bertrand Russell, two crucial disadvantages can be seen in the way any formalised language, alongside symbols as its corollaries, operates ‘at the expense, where necessary, of brevity and facility of communication’.13

But there is one more to be mentioned, of extralogical consequence and of sociological import. However, before I come to speak of it, let us consider what actually happens when, say, Dharmakīrti avails himself of examples of proof formulas or of the fallacies of proof formula? Notoriously, Indian logicians did not use symbols in the proper sense. In which sense does he then use sentences that stand for proof formulas? While formulating an inference for others, does he refer to a particular situation or does he articulate general rules? The question indeed seems rather trivial. A good example of a reasoning of universal denotation is the one provided by Dharmakīrti: ‘Thus is the formulation of the logical reason based on [essential] identity: whatever is existent, is without exception impermanent, for instance the pot – this is the simple (unqualified) formulation of the logical reason based on [essential] identity;14 with the thesis and the logical reason having most broadly conceivable universal reference: sarvam anityam, satvāt (‘everything is impermanent, because it is existent’).15 But we have countless instances when Dharmakīrti, and Indian logicians in general, draws inference with regard to a very particular situation (‘here, on this particular spot’) following a general rule of invariable concomitance, for example: ‘The formulation of the logical reason based on effect is [as follows]: wherever there is smoke, there is fire, for instance in the kitchen, etc. And there is smoke here, [hence there is fire here],16 where the implied thesis (or conclusion) āsītiḥāvgraḥ (‘there is fire here’) pertains to an individual case.17 But even then, in both earlier cases these formulations instantiate only some ideal patterns, or semi-symbolic formulas, even though no symbolic expressions occur in the formulations. That is clear from Dharmakīrti’s commentary itself, when the general rule is first stated and then instantiated, or applied to a particular case, for example:

If x-s are observed, y – characterised by (i.e. dependent on) these (x-s) [previously] unobserved – is observed, and [y] is not observed, even if one of x-s is absent, [then] y is the effect of x; and [in this case] this [effect] is smoke.18

Clearly, Dharmakīrti – and Indian logicians in general – does not use symbols; however, particular terms such as ghaṭā, akāśa, paramāṇa, śabda, etc., stand for certain classes of objects, for example the class of material perceptible things (mūrtā = práyakṣgāṇa-anupalabdhā), the class of imperceptible things (amūrtā), the class of produced things (kṛtaka), etc. His formulations are ‘replaceable’, namely they stand for general symbols, and the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary; being of exemplary, illustrative character, its meaning is hardly of any relevance. However, their meaning is not entirely irrelevant: such semi-variable, for example ghaṭā, that occur in proof formulas denote a particular class, for example either the class of material perceptible things (mūrtā) or the class of produced things (kṛtaka), and its particular denotation range is determined by the context. Thus, intensional logic possesses some indistinct aspects of extensionality.

A good exemplification of this is furnished by a comparison of two varieties of the fallacious example found in Saṅkarācārya’s Nīyāya-praṇeva (NP) and in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāya-bīdu (NB). The former avails himself of one and the same sentence word for word (nītāḥ śabdo mūrtavāt paramāṇuvat) to exemplify two different kinds of drṣṭāntābhāsa, namely of sūdhana-dharmāśiddha (of the sādharma type) and sūdhāvyuṣṭa (of the vaidharmā type), the only difference being in stating the invariable concomitance (vyāpīt) either in the positive
manner (yad amūrtaṁ tan nisyaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ – 'whatever is imperceptible is experienced to be permanent') or negative manner (yad nisyaṁ tan mūrtaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ – 'whatever is impermanent is experienced to be perceptible'). However, Dharmakīrti, in explicating two divisions of the fallacious example, namely sādhyā-vikala and sādhyāvyātirekin, that correspond to Śaṅkarasvāmin's sādhanā-dharmāsiddha and sādhyāvyātṛta respectively, employs partly the same sentence, but changes the essential element in the reasoning: the statement of the object that serves as an example. The result is that we have two different examples that can be interchanged ([S1] karmavat and [V1] paramādyatvavat).

I have expressed earlier the conviction that the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary instead of saying it is of no relevance, inasmuch as the contents of a proposition is indeed entirely irrelevant structurally to the way a proof formula is formulated (its role is to exemplify certain ontological and logical relations), but, on the other hand, it does play a certain role, since it conveys some ideas, being formulated with verbal means. I agree, all these remarks are perhaps not particularly original and are, at least intuitively, taken for granted by every student of Indian epistemology. Why, then, am I saying all this? To repeat my previous question: is there, thus, any advantage in using no symbols? Apparently there is, though it is not of logical nature, and I shall try to demonstrate this on the following pages.

As it is well-known to the student of Buddhist thought, in the third chapter of Nyāya-bindu we come across Dharmakīrti's exposition of nine fallacies of the example based on similarity (sādharanya-dṛṣṭāntabhaṣa) as well as the complementary ninefold division of the fallacy of the example based on dissimilarity (vaidhārmya-dṛṣṭāntabhaṣa). Further, within both ninefold divisions of fallacious examples we can observe that each of them can be naturally divided into three sub-classes of three structurally similar elements. Accordingly, the complete enumeration runs as follows:

[S] fallacious examples based on similarity (sādharanya-dṛṣṭāntabhaṣa):

[S] fallacious examples based on similarity (sādharanya-dṛṣṭāntabhaṣa):

[S1] the fallacious example lacking the probandum (sādhyā-vikala),
[S2] the fallacious example lacking the probans (sādhanā-vikala),
[S3] the fallacious example lacking both the probandum and the probans (sādhyā-sādhanā-vikala),

[S] fallacious examples based on similarity (sādharanya-dṛṣṭāntabhaṣa):

[S4] in which the property of x is doubtful:
[S4] the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum is doubtful (sandīgha-sādhyā-dharma),
[S5] the fallacious example in which the property of the probans is doubtful (sandīgha-sādhanā-dharma),
[S6] the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful (sandīgha-sādhyā-sādhanā-dharma),

Noteworthy is the fact that Dharmakīrti's typology, along with illustrations for each of the entries, is followed in each and every detail - with a few exceptions - in the classification found in Siddharṣiṇi's Nyāyāvatāra-vyṛti (NAV) - a Ājīvin epistemic treatise, the significance of which exceeds perhaps even the philosophic import of the Nyāyāvatāra aphorisms, despite the subservert function it was predestined to perform, being a commentary thereupon. The juxtaposition presented in the following two tables (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) will clearly show such a dependence. I have single-underlined phrases found in NB that are basically identical with NAV. I have double-underlined the portions that can be either reconstructed on the basis of NB or NB or supplied from corresponding sections of NAV. I use a broken underline to mark synonymous (but not identical) expressions in NB and NAV.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Variety of the fallacious example</th>
<th>Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti</th>
<th>Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (on NA 24) of Siddhārṣigaṇī</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[S1]</td>
<td>stāhya-vikāla lacking the probandum</td>
<td>nityāḥ śabdo 'mārtavāt, karmavat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like action.</td>
<td>bhrāntam anumānaṇī, pramāṇavāt, pratyakṣavat. Inference is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like perception.</td>
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<td>[S2]</td>
<td>stādāna-vikāla lacking the probans</td>
<td>nityāḥ śabdo 'mārtavāt, paramāṇavat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like infinitesimal atom.</td>
<td>jñānta-saṅvedanānaṁ bhrāntam, pramāṇavat, svapna-saṅvedanavat. The sensation of a person in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in dream.</td>
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<td>[S3]</td>
<td>stādāna-stādāna-vikāla lacking both the probandum and the probans</td>
<td>nityāḥ śabdo 'mārtavāt, ghatavat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like pot.</td>
<td>nāsti sarva-jīvaḥ, pratyokṣaḍy-anaṅgamaṅgavat, ghatavat. There is no omniscient person (sc. omniscient person is non-existent), because he is not comprehended through perception, etc., like a pot.</td>
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<td>[S4]</td>
<td>sandigdha-stādāna-dharma in which the property of the probandum is doubtful</td>
<td>rāgādīmānaḥ āyani vasaṁd rathye-purṣavat (NB 3.125). This [particular person] is endowed with passion, because he speaks, like a person in the street.</td>
<td>vīti-rāgō 'yam, maraṇa-dharmatvād, rathye-purṣavat. This [particular person] is dispassionate, because he is mortal, like a person in the street.</td>
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<td>[S5]</td>
<td>sandigdha-stādāna-dharma in which the property of the probans is doubtful</td>
<td>maraṇa-dharmāyaṁ purusā rāgādīmatvād. rathye-purṣavat (NB 3.125). This particular person is mortal, because he is endowed with passion, like a person in the street.</td>
<td>maraṇa-dharmāyaṁ purusā, rāgādīmatvād, rathye-purṣavat. This particular person is mortal, because he is passionate, like a person in the street.</td>
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<td>[S6]</td>
<td>sandigdha-stādāna-stādāna-dharma in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful</td>
<td>asarva-jīva 'yam rāgādīmatvād, rathye-purṣavat (NB 3.125). This [particular person] is not omniscient, because he is endowed with passion, like a person in the street.</td>
<td>asarva-jīva 'yam, rāgādīmatvād, rathye-purṣavat. This [particular person] is not omniscient, because he is passionate, like a person in the street.</td>
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<td>[S7]</td>
<td>anānaya without positive concomitance</td>
<td>[*rāgādīmānaḥ avyāt, vaktraṅguḥ, 2] yathā yo vaktraṅguḥ sa rāgādīmānaḥ, ista-purṣavat (NB 3.126). [This particular person is endowed with passion, because he is a speaker (sc. talks),] for instance whoever is a speaker is endowed with passion, like any selected person.</td>
<td>rāgādīmānaḥ vivakṣitaṁ puruṣo, vaktraṅguḥ, ista-purṣavat. A particular person in question is dispassionate, because he is a speaker (sc. talks), like any selected person.</td>
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<td>[S8]</td>
<td>apruddatiśāna without unindicated positive concomitance</td>
<td>asarva-jīvaḥ sabdhakṛtakaravat ghatavat (NB 3.126). Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like pot.</td>
<td>anityāḥ śabdhak, kṛtakatvād, ghatavat. Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like pot.</td>
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<td>[S9]</td>
<td>viparītānya with inverted positive concomitance</td>
<td>[* Anityāḥ śabdhak, kṛtakatvād,] yad anityāṁ tad kṛtakam [*ghatavat 23] (NB 3.127). [Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced:] whatever is impermanent is produced, like pot.</td>
<td>anityāḥ śabdhak, kṛtakatvād, yat anityaṁ tat kṛtakam ghatavat. [Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced:] whatever is impermanent is produced, like pot.</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Variety</td>
<td>Nyūya-bindu</td>
<td>Nyūyāvadāra-vivrti (on NA 25) of Śādhanārāmati</td>
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<td>[V1]</td>
<td>sādānūyāvaiśrekin lacking negative</td>
<td>(<em>nītyaḥ labdo 'mārtvātāḥ,'</em>)</td>
<td>bhāntam anūmānām, prāṃṣmatvāt: yat punar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>concomitance with the prohbamd</td>
<td>[Speech element is impermanent,</td>
<td>bhrūnnaḥ na bhrūṣṭā iva na tat prāṃṣmatvāḥ,</td>
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<td>because it is imperceptible,</td>
<td>tat yathā svāmapi-jānam</td>
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<td>like infinitesimal atom</td>
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<td>[V2]</td>
<td>sādānūyāvaiśrekin lacking negative</td>
<td>(<em>nītyaḥ labdo 'mārtvātāḥ,'</em>)</td>
<td>inference is erroneous, because it is a</td>
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<td>concomitance with the prohbamd</td>
<td>kārmavat (NB 3.129).</td>
<td>cognitive criterion, whatever is</td>
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<td>Speech element is impermanent,</td>
<td>not erroneous, however, is not a cognitive</td>
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<td>because it is imperceptible,</td>
<td>criterion, like cognition in dream</td>
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<td>like action</td>
<td>nirvikāpakam pratyākṣaḥ, prāṃṣmatvāḥ;</td>
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<td>yat punah savikalpakaḥ na</td>
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<td>tat prāṃṣmatvāḥ, tad yathānunāmānām</td>
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<td>Perception is non-conceptual, because</td>
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<td>it is a cognitive criterion, whatever is</td>
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<td>accompanied by a conceptualisation,</td>
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<td>however, is not a cognitive criterion,</td>
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<td>like inference</td>
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<td>nityānityā labdah, satrīvāḥ; yat punah</td>
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<td>na nityānityā sa na sa, tad</td>
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<td>yathā ghaṭaḥ</td>
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<td>[V3]</td>
<td>sādāya-sādānūyāvaiśrekin lacking negative</td>
<td>(<em>nītyaḥ labdo 'mārtvātāḥ,'</em>)</td>
<td>The speech element is [both] permanent</td>
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<td>concomitance with the prohbamd and the</td>
<td>ākhāvata (NB 3.129).</td>
<td>and impermanent, because it is existent,</td>
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<td>prohbamd</td>
<td>Speech element is permanent,</td>
<td>whatever is not [both] permanent and</td>
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<td>because it is imperceptible,</td>
<td>impermanent, however, is not existent,</td>
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<td>like space</td>
<td>like a pot</td>
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<td>avaro-jīva anāptā vo kapilādāya,</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
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<td>yat punah sāvaro jīva api vo dhyāyā</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatā purāpādākavāḥ;</td>
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<td>[V4]</td>
<td>sanidgīha-sādāya-vaiśreka</td>
<td>avaro-jīva anāptā vo kapilādāya,</td>
<td>tad yathā saudhādānī, Kapila and others are</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
<td>neither omniscient nor authoritative persons,</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
<td>because they do not teach the four noble truths,</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
<td>whoever is an omniscient and authoritative</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
<td>person, however, he teaches the four noble</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
<td>truths, like the Buddha.</td>
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<td>avaro-sayā-ca-tatāśāyatāpurāpādākavāḥ;</td>
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<tr>
<td>[V5]</td>
<td>sanidgīha-sādānūyāvaiśreka in which</td>
<td>(*kācit vīvakāśakpuravo rūgādīmatvāt; yat</td>
<td>anūdāya-vākhyo kācid vīvakāśakpuravo</td>
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<td>negative concomitance with the</td>
<td>punaḥ adāya-vākhyo, na sarīgdūrdvāms, tad</td>
<td>rūgādīmatvāt; yat punaḥ adāya-vākhyo, na</td>
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<td>probandum is doubtful</td>
<td>yathā supraśaḥ</td>
<td>sarīgdūrdvāms, tad yathā supraśaḥ</td>
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<td>A particular person in question is untrustworthy,</td>
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<td>because he is endowed with passion, etc.,</td>
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<td>whoever is trustworthy, however, is not</td>
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<td>endowed with passion, etc., like the Buddha.</td>
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<td>sādānūyāvaiśreka in which negative</td>
<td>yāyogāḥ; yo vītā-rāgā na tvam prīgarahānychāḥ.</td>
<td>apy akunāntaparita-cittādrastā-dattā-niṣkata-</td>
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<td>negative concomitance both with</td>
<td>yathārāgabhedāḥ (NB 3.132).</td>
<td>mānāsa-lokānād; yo punar vītā-rāgāḥ te</td>
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<td>the probandum and with the prohbamd</td>
<td>Kapila and others are not dispasionate,</td>
<td>karudspadeṣeṣya karunā-partā-cittādrastā datta-</td>
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<td>because they are endowed with covetousness</td>
<td>niṣkata-mānāsa-lokāls, tad yathā bodhī-satvāḥ.</td>
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<td>and greed, whoever is dispasionate, he does</td>
<td>Kapila and others are not dispasionate,</td>
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<td>not have covetousness and greed, however, he</td>
<td>because – inasmuch as [their]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>does not have covetousness and greed, like</td>
<td>consciousness is not filled with compassion –</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rṣabhā.</td>
<td>they have not offered any bits of their own</td>
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<td>flesh even to the abode of compassion (i.e.,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to hungry beings who deserved compassion),</td>
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<td>those, however, who are</td>
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<td>dispasionate, inasmuch as their consciousness</td>
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(Continued)
As far similarities in wording in both texts are concerned, the exceptions, that is, passages where Siddharṣigani does not follow in his illustrations those of Dharmakīrti at all, can easily be seen in the tables: [S1] sādhya-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, [S2] sādhana-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, [V1] sādhayāvyatikre- dṛṣṭāntābhāsa and [V2] sādhana-vyatikre- dṛṣṭāntābhāsa.

In some other cases Siddharṣigani's classification follows Dharmakīrti's typology in general, but varies in wording so insignificantly that the differences can be altogether discarded. Thus in [S7] the anamaya type of fallacious example and in Siddharṣigani's expression vivakṣitah puruṣaḥ is tantamount to Dharmakīrti's ayam. That is also the case in [V7] the avyayatika type of fallacious example (ayam = kāścid vivakṣitah puruṣaḥ), whereas the invariable concomitance is expressed in quite a similar way, barring different position of the negative clause (yatāvṛttā-rāgatvaṁ nāsti sa vākta, yaḥ punar vīta-rāgo, na sa vākta). In [V4] sanidgītha-sādhya-vyatikre-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the second predicate anātā vā is interchanged with the subject kapilādayaḥ; the verb forms upaṭītavān (Dharmakīrti) and pratipadat (Siddharṣigani) are identical in meaning, likewise the pronouns sa (Dharmakīrti) and asau (Siddharṣigani); the significant difference being the logical reason, that is the realm of supernatural teaching in the invariable concomitance and the example respectively; avidyāmāna- sarva-jañātātā-tārīkha-pramāṇātīṣya-tāsanatvāt, jyotrīpajñātikam, vardhamānādik (Dharmakīrti) and ārya-saupa-catuṣṭatīdpratipadavakvaṁ, śuddhānovāḥ (Siddharṣigani). In [V5] sanidgītha-sādhana-vyatikre-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the negation in the statement of the thesis is expressed either by the particle na (Dharmakīrti) or by the alpha-privativum a- (Siddharṣigani), while the compounds grāha-vacanavā (Dharmakīrti) and ādaya-vākyavā (Siddharṣigani) are identical in meaning; the only difference in the expression of the invariable concomitance is the number, namely plural ye... te (Dharmakīrti) and singular yah... sa (Siddharṣigani); Siddharṣigani does omit the phrase tṛaya-viśva brāhmaṇena; the only significant difference being the example gautamādayo dharmā-sastraṁ pranetrāvaḥ (Dharmakīrti) and sugāvaḥ (Siddharṣigani). In [V9] the vīparītavatya type the example is indicated either by the suffix -vātr (Dharmakīrti) or by relative indeclinable yathā (Siddharṣigani).

In two instances the similarities in the Dharmakīrti's and Siddharṣigani's formulations are partial, thus in [S3] sādhya-sādhana-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa and in [S4] sanidgītha-sādhya-dharma-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa only the example is identical, namely ghatavaḥ and rāhyā-puruṣava, respectively, and the compound element -rāga- and pronoun ayam in [S4]. In [V3] sādhya-sādhana-vyatikre-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the subject of the thesis faṭahā is the same, whereas the predicate nītva (or niṣva-) partly overlaps. In [V6] sanidgītha-sādhya-sādhanavyatikre-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa only the theses of Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigani are identical, the negations being expressed either by the alpha-privativum a- (Dharmakīrti) or by the particle na (Siddharṣigani).

The large number of similarities or identical formulations alone is so ample that it leaves no doubt as regards the indebtedness of Siddharṣigani to Dharmakīrti in this respect. That is the first point I wished to make: Dharmakīrti's
Typology has been practically accepted by NAV en bloc. A solitary case of parallelism in choosing illustrations of fallacious examples might be claimed to be nothing but coincidental, but the situation when Siddharṣigaṇi’s choice of expressions in most cases coincides with that of Dharmakṛiti and the eighteenfold division of dṛṣṭāntabhāṣa is identical in both cases, it can by no means be a matter of coincidence. Further, my thesis is corroborated additionally by the way Siddharṣigaṇi makes the selection of three proof formulas that are not mentioned by Dharmakṛiti in extenso but in a terse, incomplete form to be supplemented from the context of preceding sūtras, namely [S7], [S9] and [V9]. When we reconstruct the proof formulas to complete formulations (for details see respective notes 22, 23, 27), as intended by Dharmakṛiti — that is, [S7] [rāgadīmān āyam, vakrrtvād], yathā yo vakta sa rāgadīmān, iṣṭa-purusavat, [S9] [anityāḥ sādāḥ, krakatvāt], yad anityam sat krakam [gatavat], [V9] [anityāḥ sādāḥ, krakatvāt], yad akṛtakam tan niyam bhavati, [ākāśavat] — it turns out that they correspond virtually in every detail to the examples given by Siddharṣigaṇi.

There is at least one more reason to believe that Siddharṣigaṇi follows Dharmakṛiti in his typology. Commenting upon [V4] he classifies the sandīḍha-sāḍhya-svātāreka type as reducible, on extra-logic grounds, to be exact, to [V1] the sāḍhya-svātāreka type. The only reason for singling it out as a separate variety is the need to take into consideration the opinion of some people ‘lacking the recognition’ of certain substantial facts, to whom a particular case of a fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum appears to be [the fallacious example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful. As a commentator, he was obviously restrained by the contents of Siddhasena Mahāmati’s Nyāyavatīra. However NA 235 may be similarly taken to enforce the acceptance of the whole [VA] class (namely [V1], [V2], [V3]) as well as only some types of the [VB] class (namely one or more out of [V4], [V5], [V6]), but not necessarily all of them. As the text stands, NA 25 does not urge one to distinguish separately the sandīḍha-sāḍhya-svātāreka type.

Having examined the varieties of fallacious examples as illustrated by Dharmakṛiti and Siddharṣigaṇi, we can easily notice a couple of regularities. What is conspicuous is the almost complete absence of any similarity in the [A] sub-category of [S] and [V], namely in [SA] (i.e. [S1], [S2], [S3]) and in [VA] (i.e. [V1], [V2], [V3]). There is a lot of correspondence in the [B] sub-category — namely [SB] (i.e. [S4], [S5], [S6]) and [VB] (i.e. [V4], [V5], [V6]) — in the exposition of both authors, although the comparison betrays certain differences, whereas the [C] sub-category — namely [SC] (i.e. [S7], [S8], [S9]) and [VC] (i.e. [V7], [V8], [V9]) — is altogether identical in NB and in NAV.

The question what factors could account for this evident incongruity in treating Dharmakṛiti’s sub-categories by Siddharṣigaṇi, if there is any, arises. Why does Siddharṣigaṇi quote certain Dharmakṛiti’s reasonings in extenso, whereas he diverges from the Dharmakṛiti’s formulations in other cases?

Examining the varieties [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8] and [V9], Siddharṣigaṇi enters into a polemical discussion with an opponent, now, he openly disputes the status of a separate fallacious example of the six types, attempting to prove them to be misconceived and faulty solely either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker, but not because of their deficient nature being a separate and independent category of the fallacy of the example. The appropriate sections of NAV are introduced respectively as follows:

And now [a doubt is raised]: “Some [thinkers] have taught an additional triad of fallacies of the example, as well, namely [S7] [the fallacious example] without positive concomitance, [S8] [the fallacious example] with unindicated positive concomitance and [S9] [the fallacious example] with inverted positive concomitance.”

and

Other [thinkers], inasmuch as they are [such kind of people] who speak without deliberation, have demonstrated three additional fallacies of the example, as well, namely: [V7] [the fallacious example] without negative concomitance, [V8] [the fallacious example] with unindicated negative concomitance and [V9] [the fallacious example] with inverted negative concomitance.

In the light of what has been said on the foregoing pages there can be no doubt regarding the identity of the opponent, referred to by Siddharṣigaṇi as ‘others’ (paraih). To dispute the antagonistic standpoint, in this case Dharmakṛiti’s tradition, the easiest way would be simply to cite either the rival thesis and the name of its advocate. General practice of philosophic discourse in India, however, has it that it was enough to hear even the incipit alone to identify Dharmakṛiti as the adversary. On the other hand, to interpolate or alter in any other way the opponent’s statements was not advisable methodologically for a variety of reasons. A modified quotation might no longer be an unambiguous indication of its source and author. Moreover, in case of an interpolated excerpt the opponent could easily ward off possible criticism pointing out that what is actually being refuted is not his own thesis and the criticism is misdirected. These seem to be Siddharṣigaṇi’s motives to leave Dharmakṛiti’s six faulty illustrations ([S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8], [V9]) in an unmodified form.

Having thus pointed out the target of his criticism, this decision did not compel Siddharṣigaṇi to preserve all the remaining original illustrations of Dharmakṛiti intact. Still, he did refrain from introducing any changes to the illustrations taken over from NB in a few other cases, namely in the [B] sub-category of the sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntabhāṣa (i.e. [S4], [S5], [S6]).

These unmodified categories seem to be of considerably less interest for my purposes, whereas most of the remaining cases when Siddharṣigaṇi interpolates or modifies Dharmakṛiti’s illustrations form a kind of a puzzle, bringing up the question what purpose he had in mind while taking liberties with the original instances of fallacious examples formulated by Dharmakṛiti. A closer
and authoritative (‘Ṛṣabhā, Vardhamāna and other [Jinas]’)—is in his opinion fallacious, being doubtful. In this clandestine way Dharmakīrti discredits spiritual and intellectual accomplishments of Jaina Thīrthankaras. In retaliation, Siddhārṣiṇī employs the same procedure and questions the Buddha’s omniscience and authority, explaining that nothing bars the possibility that a charlatan may likewise teach the Four Noble Truths and deliberately deceive people at the same time, without being omniscient or authoritative.33 Siddhārṣiṇī’s formulation of the doubt indicates that the Buddha was indeed neither omniscient nor authoritative.

[S3] sandigdha-sādhyā-vyātireka. Kapila and the Śāṅkya school remain the scapegoat of the thesis also in this variety of the fallacious example both in NB and NAV. As in the preceding case, Dharmakīrti chooses the Jinas as the whipping boy in his example. His unpronounced assumption, at least something which is liable to doubt, is whether the Thīrthankaras are dispassionate and free of covetousness and greed. Since in this proof formula both probandum and probans are doubtful, Thīrthankaras’ moral status is questioned in two ways. Not only their dispassionateness is disputed by the ‘doubtful probandum’ (in the correct vyātireka example this should be vīta-rāgā), but also the logical reason imputes that the Thīrthankaras are ‘endowed with covetousness and greed’ (parigrahāghogyā-yoge). This is particularly offensive to Jinas, or to Digambaras as Dharmottara specifies, who would refrain even from wearing clothes in order to curb all desire for possessions and to manifest total lack of ‘covetousness and greed’. Siddhārṣiṇī is quick to reprimand him for this, and follows Dharmakīrti’s method in every detail. He chooses two doctrinal points regarding Bodhisattvas—a Buddhist parallel of Jaina Thīrthankaras—that are as sensitive to the Buddhists as Thīrthankaras’ dispassionateness and lack of possessions for the Jinas. To discredit the Buddhist ideal, he cites Bodhisattvas’ compassion as an instance of doubtful probans. As if it were not enough, Siddhārṣiṇī adds a second logical reason (benevolence, dāna), which seems doubtful to him: ‘Bodhisattvas have offered bits of their own flesh to hungry people who deserved compassion’.34 Siddhārṣiṇī’s charge is repeated explicitly in the concluding part of his argument, where he expresses his doubt through the doubtful probans (‘[it is not known] whether the [Bodhisattvas] have offered bits of their own flesh to those deserving sympathy or not’), which follows the repetition of the doubtful probandum (‘it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas] are endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate’).

Therefore the two virtues of Bodhisattvas put to doubt are therefore compassion (karuṇā), the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and benevolence or charity (dāna), the first of the Perfections (paramitā). Siddhārṣiṇī is accurate to link karuṇā to dāna,
following Buddhist tradition:

The sons of the Buddha have always renounced even their own life [sacrificing it for [the sake of anyone] who wishes for what is beneficial. And there is no higher disposition than compassion. There is no fruit [more] welcome [than the one] desired. And precisely thanks to this benevolence [they] have elevated the whole humankind to the triple understanding, and furthermore, by acquiring knowledge, [they] established benevolence in the world, which has not known [it previously].\(^{37}\)

Clearly, not only is compassion (karuna) the prime motive for benevolence (dana), but also the proper practice of benevolence connotes absolute lack of passion or attachment (raga): "That because of which [something] is given [is] benevolence." Verily [that] is [benevolence]. [However, something] can also be given with passion etc., but this is not meant here.\(^{38}\)

A noble person, who is dispassionate, as well as an ordinary man, who is passionate, can give offering in the temple. If a noble person, who is dispassionate, gives offering to other beings – with the exception of [the case when its results are] to be experienced in the present life – in that case the gift is for the sake of others, because this [offering brings] them benefit.\(^{39}\)

The three virtues – dispassionateness (vita-raga) as the probandum (sadhya), as well as compassion (karuna) and benevolence (dana), the offering of bits of one's own flesh being the proof of, and motivated by, one's compassion as the probans (sadhana) – are therefore related doctrinally and ethically. However, there is nothing that would compel one to enlist all of them together in an instance of a faulty reasoning. The use of double logical reason (karuna and dana) is not enforced by the logical structure of the argument itself. On the contrary, it is rather surprising to find such an elaborate, compounded logical reason in the exposition of the fallacies of the example. Why did then Siddhārṣigaṇi avail himself of two logical reasons, both of which express doubts about two virtues of Bodhisattvas?

A possible answer would be to match the double logical reason (sadhana) employed by Dharmakīrti (parigraha and dūgra). Astounding as it may be, the fallacious example of the sandigīha-sadhya-sadhana-vyatireka type is the only case when Dharmakīrti avails himself of a double logical reason, without any structural or logical need, and similarly the only case when Siddhārṣigaṇi’s classification has a double logical reason!

2 Anti-Buddhist illustrations not provoked by Dharmakīrti. In this category of sectarian-biased and doctrinally-bound illustrations, Siddhārṣigaṇi attempts to indirectly refute a particular Buddhist thesis.

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[51] sādhyā-vikalpa. In view of Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda), sound could be said to be both permanent and impermanent, depending on the specific point of reference. However, from this perspective practically every assertoric statement could be problematic for the Jaines, therefore it would be difficult to take Dharmakīrti’s instance of the faulty proof formula as something provocative. Nevertheless, in his own illustration of the faulty example, Siddhārṣigaṇi indirectly disavows the Buddhist well-known doctrine of erroneousness of inference.\(^{40}\) It is the thesis (bhṛntam anumānān) which conveys the criticism, whereas the example (perception as erroneous knowledge) was as unacceptable to the Buddhist as it was to the Jaines. The background for this faulty proof formula is apparently the discussion (NAV 5) of the idea of cognitive validity (prāmāṇya), which by definition entails non-erroneousness of our cognition; hence perception and inference have to be non-erroneous, if they are both cognitive criteria. In fact, the thesis of the defective proof formula in question (NAV 24.2 (p. 409): bhṛntam anumānān, pramāṇavat, pratyakṣavat), is antithetical to NA 5cd: ‘This [inference] is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception’ (tad abhṛntam pramāṇavat samākṣavat).

[52] sādhnā-vikalpa. Dharmakīrti’s reasoning is almost identical to [51], with the only exception of the ‘infinitesimal atom’ (paramāṇa) that replaces ‘action’ (karman) in [51]. Similarly, there is nothing explicitly anti-finistic in Dharmakīrti’s proof formula. Nevertheless, Siddhārṣigaṇi takes this opportunity to criticise another Buddhist theory: the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance as the contents of consciousness (vijñāna-vāda). What we have here – except for the use of pramāṇa in the guise of the usual pratyaya – is one of many formulations of the so-called Dreaming Argument: ‘The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in a dream’ (jāgatisamvedanaṁ bhrāntam, pramāṇavat, svapna-samvedanaṁ). This argument is commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and we find references to it also in a number of non-finistic sources. In its typical formulation (with ‘pratyaya’ or ‘khyāti’ as the logical reason), the Dreaming Argument is refuted, for instance, by Kumāra,\(^{41}\) Uddiyotakara,\(^{42}\) Śāktara\(^{43}\) and by Siddhārṣigaṇi himself later on.\(^{44}\) It is important to note that, as it has been shown by Taber (1994: esp. 28–31), the so-called Dreaming Argument has never been expressed by the Buddhist thinkers in the form as it appears in anti-Buddhist works. In subsequent lines Siddhārṣigaṇi employs a series of expressions that describe cognitive states (namely samvedana, pramāṇa, pratyaya) in the context of Dreaming Argument. It is an open question whether one may be justified to conclude that he saw no qualitative difference between these three expressions in this particular
to passions. The proof formula has the following structure:

1. \( rågådīmån (H) \) kaścit vivaśṭiḥ puruṣaḥ (P): \( P \subseteq H \).
2. na trayvīdå brāhmaṇaṇa gråhya-vacanaḥ (S) rågådīmån (H): \( H \subseteq S \).

\[ \text{ergo: na trayvīdå bråhmaṇaṇa gråhya-vacanaḥ (S) kaścit vivaśṭiḥ puruṣaḥ (P): } P \subseteq S. \]

The correct negative example (D) should be excluded from the probans/logical reason (sådhana-vyatike: \( D \subseteq H' \)) as well as excluded from the probandum/the property to be proved (sådhya-vyatike: \( D \subseteq S' \)), namely \( (D \subseteq H') \cap (D \subseteq S') \). One more condition is that in the negative formulation of the example (D exemplifying P) occurs the contraposition of \( P' \subseteq H \subseteq S, \text{viz. } S' \subseteq H' \subseteq P' \). Thus, \( D \subseteq S' \) would be the condition for \( D \subseteq H' \): ‘if a particular person d of the D-range (\( d \in D \)) is trustworthy (\( S' \)), then this person is dispassionate (\( H' \)).’ In other words, to distrust the dispassionateness of Gautama, Manu and other Brahmanic law-givers undermines one’s trust in their trustworthiness, and ipso facto the veracity and authority of the Brahmanic lore is undermined. This unauspicious conclusion is openly expressed by Dharmottara in his commentary;\(^ {51} \) it is unreasonable to rely on words of teachers of Brahmanical tradition, like Gautama, Manu, etc. At the same time, Dharmakirti is claimed by Dharmottara\(^ {52} \) to question the veracity of statements of other Brahmanical philosophers like Kapila, etc. This criticism has also its social dimension: such is the behaviour of most people who rely on the teaching contained in the works on dharma by Gautama, Manu, etc.

Dharmakirti’s thesis refers to ‘a Brahmin learned in the three Vedas’ (trayvīdå bråhmaṇaṇa), who is a follower and/or promulgator of the Brahmanical philosophical and religious tradition in everyday life and a local authority. The Brahmin’s scepticism regarding his own Brahmanical tradition, as expressed in Gautama-dharma-sūtra, Manu-smṛti etc., could undermine the tradition itself. The overall picture of the Brahmanical society relying on tradition would be, therefore, that neither proponents of the social-religious tradition (Gautama, Manu, etc.) nor preceptors of philosophical schools (e.g. Kapila) are a suitable source of reliable teaching for a true Brahmin. Dharmakirti’s approach in the argument is therefore clearly anti-Brahmanical and could be a reflection of Buddhist-Brahmanic strife.

Last but not the least, that the opponents’ tradition, which one criticises, was at some point not too well-known is attested by Durveka Miśra, who erroneously identifies the Gautama in Dharmakirti’s example with Gautama Akṣapāda: ‘Gautama’s other name is Akṣapāda, and he is the thinker who is the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.’\(^ {153} \) Dharmakirti himself was clear enough when he mentioned that Gautama is one of promulgators/authors of Law textbooks (gautamādāya dharma-sāstraḥ nāṁ pranetraḥ), and this could by no means be Akṣapāda!

On his part, Siddhaṛṣigaṇi leaves the basic structure of Dharmakirti’s argument intact and replaces Dharmakirti’s original example gautamādāya dharma-sāstraḥ nāṁ pranetraḥ with sugataḥ, the Buddha. Mutatis mutandis the Buddha’s dispassionateness becomes subject to doubt, and subsequently the whole Buddhist
teaching. What is missing from Siddharṣigaṇi’s formulation is ‘the Brahmin learned in the three Vedas’ (trayātīdā brāhmaṇaṇa). This could have been a conscious decision to leave this phrase out: the implication would be that any teacher who is not dispassionate should not be trusted, be he a Hindu or Buddhist; and the truly dispassionate are the Jinas. Moreover, the main opponent for the Buddhist was Brahmanic tradition whereas the Jinas had to protect their identity and distinction not only against Brahmanic conversions but also against Buddhist influence. To confront this wider picture of the society from Jaina perspective, Siddharṣigaṇi apparently extended it by embracing the proponents of Buddhism and including them into the comprehensive framework of unreliable teachers whose dispassionateness was doubtful.

3 Theses prompted by certain other doctrines that stand in opposition to Jaina tenet.

[S3] sādhyā-sādhanā-vikāla. In case of Dharmakīrti, the reasoning is a mere repetition of [S1] and [S2], with a new example (‘pot’ excluded from both the probans ‘imperceptible’ and the probandum ‘impermanent’). Unlike Dharmakīrti, Siddharṣigaṇi takes this opportunity to corroborate indirectly a crucial dogma of the Jinas, namely the omniscience of the Jinas and the Arhats. From Siddharṣigaṇi’s contention that ‘this example is fallacious because, firstly, a pot is existent and, secondly, it is comprehended through perception, etc.’ one could even venture to infer its antithesis, namely anti sarva-sākh. An elaborate discussion of all implications of this reasoning, however, would not be relevant to the subject of the present chapter and would exceed its limits.

As it has been pointed out earlier, Siddharṣigaṇi rejects Dharmakīrti’s six sub-varieties of the fallacious examples (namely [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8] and [V9]) as irrelevant and wrongly classified due to two reasons: they are either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker. Dharmottara, whose influence on Siddharṣigaṇi is clear, was well aware that some fallacies of the example are in fact due to the ineptness of the speaker to communicate his thoughts properly. Commenting on the [S8] apradārśitānāvaya category, in which positive concomitance is unindicated, he says:

Hence, the example has as its objective [the demonstration of] the positive concomitance; its object is not explicated by this [example]. And [the example] that is explicated [here as having as] its objective [the demonstration of] similarity [alone] is of no use, therefore this [alleged example] is—inasmuch as [it is] due to the defect of the speaker— the defect of the example, for the speaker has to demonstrate [his thesis] to the opponent in this [example]. Therefore, even though the circumstances are not defective, nevertheless, they are shown in a defective manner. Hence, [this example] in nothing but defective (sc. fallacious).  

Similarly on [S9]:

Therefore also [S9] [the category] with inverted positive concomitance is defective because of the speaker’s mistake, not because of circumstances. And in [case of] inference for others one has to consider also the defect of the speaker,

on [V8]:

In this case [of] inference for others the meaning should be understood [directly] from the opponent’s [words]. Even if the [argument] is correct in itself, but is formulated incorrectly by the opponent, it [becomes] such (sc. defective): as far as it is expressed, it is not correct, [and] as far as it is correct, it is not expressed. And [what is] expressed is the logical reason. Hence either the logical reason or the example [can be] defective because of the speaker’s mistake,

and on [V9]:

And accordingly, also [the category] with inverted negative concomitance is defective because of the speaker’s mistake.

His proof that such varieties as [S8], [S9], [V8] and [V9] are varieties of the fallacious example was rather conversational: although there is a deficiency solely on the part of the speaker, nevertheless, they become fallacies of the example in case of inference for others (parārdhānāmāna). As an ardent commentator, however, Dharmottara accepted Dharmakīrti’s typology en bloc. Perhaps, it was his candid assertion that all these sub-types are due to various defects of the speaker that inspired Siddharṣigaṇi. A separate question is whether Dharmakīrti himself was aware of the fact that some of his fallacious examples could rather be cases of the speaker’s incompetence alone?

What role was actually assigned to the example in the proof formula by both parties? Dharmakīrti admits that drṣṭānta is not an independent member of the proof formula:

The triple-formed logical reason has been discussed. This alone [can produce] the cognition of an object. Hence there is no separate member of the proof formula called example. That is why no separate definition of this [example] is given, because its meaning is implied by definition of the logical reason.

Accordingly, the role of drṣṭānta is to additionally corroborate what the logical reason expresses. Fallacious examples ‘fail to demonstrate with certainty the general characteristic of the logical reason, viz. its presence in the homologue only, and [its] complete absence in the heterologue, and its individual characteristic’.  

136

137
or

\( (2') \) 'wherever if there were no fire, there would be no smoke': \( \forall x \neg S(x) \Rightarrow \neg H(x) \).

This decrease of necessary members of the proof formula was in fact possible, thanks to the new way of defining the characteristic of the logical reason, namely 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathānapapatkana, anyathānapaptani), which can be either formulated in the positive way (tathāpapti) or (anyathānapapti).75

To recapitulate, there can be hardly any doubt that Dharmakīrti immensely contributed to Jaina typology of fallacies of the example (deṣṭānābhaṣa), at least in case of Siddhasena Mahāmatī and his commentator, Siddharṣigāni. A closer look at the instances of fallacious examples offered by Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigāni reveals that Dharmakīrti inspired his rivals not only in the realm of strictly logical analysis (in our case: classification of fallacies), but also methodologically: how to attack one's own opponents with arguments clad in harmless illustrations of faulty proof formulas, and to express doubts with regard to fundamental doctrines upheld by rival schools. Neither Dharmakīrti nor Siddharṣigāni were negligent when it came to the selection of exemplifications of the fallacious example. On the contrary, their most careful choice reveals considerable amount of prejudice against their rivals. In case of Siddharṣigāni, his biased position was provoked to some degree by Dharmakīrti, whose method was discrediting the antagonist he conscientiously follows.

Furthermore, minor differences in Buddhist and Jaina classification of deṣṭānābhaṣa, especially [57], [58], [59], [V7], [V8] and [V9], testifies to a different role assigned to the example and the invariable concomitance in the proof formula. This uncovers also an important tendency among Jaina logicians to simplify the structure of the proof formula and to free it from the need of empirical exemplification.

What is also important, the discussion shows that even such eminent thinkers as Dharmakīrti or Siddharṣigāni were not above sectarian prejudice and provocation. Being Human, they did not abstain from expressing such not entirely elevated emotions in a concealed way at every available opportunity.

Having said all this, let me come to my initial question: is there any other disadvantage, apart from occasional 'expense of brevity and facility of communication' mentioned already (p. 118), in having a symbolic and formalised language to describe the way we reason and draw inferences? Obviously, had Indian logicians used symbols and a applied formalised language of logic, decidedly less sources would have been left at our disposal to follow the development of certain ideas or to track down historical dependencies and intellectual influences among philosophers. And Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigāni would not have had an additional tool, of extralogical nature, to censure their opponents.

11 Vīyā 51: 'The establishing [of a particular cognitive criterion can] by so means [be accomplished] by [the cognitive criterion] itself or by [cognitive criteria] mutually or by other [cognitive criteria].'

12 Bochenski (1980: § 3 (1)).

13 Church (1956: 2–3).

14 NB 3.9; tathā svabhāva-hetu pratyayogah—yat sat tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaḍā hi tī buddhaśya svabhāva-hetu pratyayogah.

15 Cf. NBT ad hoc: yatu sat uci sarvam anityam iti anityavān vidiḥya: sarvam-grahaṇam ca niyāmāritam. sarvam anityam. na hi ceto nādiyam.

After existence has been called to mind [as something well known] by [words] 'whatever is existent', impemaenece of [something] is taught as something yet unknown (ex: to be proved) with [words] 'that every thing is
The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (anitya sabda, kratavan...) alongside with the example (...gatha...), are, obviously, to be supplied from the preceding aphorism NB 3.126. The statement vad anitya tat kratavam is the formulation of the invariable concomitance (ananya) referring to the proof formula in NB 3.126, which is incomplete; inasmuch as it lacks its explicit statement, being the fallacy of anavaya type. Cf. also NB 3.126 ad loc: ya nidhata iti anitavan antaya ut kratavan iti kratavan vikharan. This proof formula bears resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the thesis of sthada-dharmasiddha type of fallacious example, which is to be supplied further on in the vipartanavya type) to the one found in NB 3.311 (=NP 1) 5.19-6.14: tatra sthada-rmnasa tavad dhrtatbhsaha paicca-prakrutah, tad yathat...[1] sthada-dharmasiddha yathat: nitya sabdo murtavid paramdnavat, tad anityam tan nityam dhrtam yathat paramdnavat, paramdnavi sthadyam nityavam asi sthada-dharmo murtivid na murtavid paramdnavitam iti...[2] NP 3.322: vaidharya-anacias dhrtatbhsaha paicca-prakrutah, tad yathat: [1] sthada-yavirvrtah, [2] sthada-dharmasiddhah, [3] ubhaya-dharmasiddhah, [4] anavayavah, [5] vipartanavya ceti iti tatra [1] sthada-dharmasiddho yathat: nitya sabdo murtavid paramdnavat, tad anityam tan nityam dhrtam yathat paramdnavat, paramdnavi sthadyam nityavam asi sthada-dharmo murtivid na murtavid paramdnavitam iti, sthada-dharmo murtavid yavirvrtam murtavid paramdnavitam iti sthada-dharmo murtavid na yavirvrtam nityavat paramdnavitam iti.

NB 3.126 [S1] sathyavikala - nitya sabdo murtavid, karmavat, and NB 3.129 [V1] sthada-dharmasiddha... nitya sabdo murtavid, paramdnavat. For details see the tables below and the respective note 24.

Another way of looking at the typology of fallacious example could be the following table, where A is a variable (sthada, sthada, and the relation between them both, that is, ananya and vyatireka) and $\eta$ is a function of $x$:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$x$-vikal</th>
<th>$x$-vyatireka</th>
<th>sandhigdo-svarma</th>
<th>sandhigdo-svarma</th>
<th>a-x</th>
<th>aparadarhita</th>
<th>vipurva-x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[S1]</td>
<td>[S2]</td>
<td>[S3]</td>
<td>[S4]</td>
<td>[S7]</td>
<td>[S8]</td>
<td>[S9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[V1]</td>
<td>[V2]</td>
<td>[V3]</td>
<td>[V4]</td>
<td>[V5]</td>
<td>[V6]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This (rghdmam sama vakrtvah) is how the thesis and the logical reason should be reconstructed, first, in view of the exposition of the positive concomitance in NB 3.126 itself (yathat yo vakrttvam tad etayam sa rghdmam iti rghdmavatam vikharan, wherein the gerund anavaya of anuvad is used in its conventional meaning of 'having called something to mind [as well known]' and the past passive participle vikhar, a derivative of the verb vikara, occurs in its well attested meaning 'introduced as something new; taught as something yet unknown (ac. to be proved).'. Also DhPr: vikrttvam heio rghdmavatm sthada pratinivam pratinivamam uktan iti escapades plainly the logical reason (hetu: vakrtvah) and the probandum (sthada: rghdmavatma). The significance of the corresponding section of NAV that offers the formulation of the proof formula in extenso and tallies with our reconstructed version, should not be underestimated.

29 On the authorship of NA see Balcerowicz (2001).
30 NA 25:

vaidharya-vikramo drshtan-dha na vyav-siddhi//
sthada-sthada-yogam i. anivrti ca santakat //

Defects of the example, here based on dissimilarity, have been proclaimed by the experts in logic [to arise] from non-exclusion of the probandum, of the probans and of their combination and from the [liability to] suspicion [regarding their presence].

31 One would naturally read anivrti and santakat as dependent on the compound sthada-sthada-yogam. Then, in speaking, however, the latter could be taken separately. NA 25 is not the only aphorism that is not conclusive. For instance NA 8:
drsgtyavathit dhyavat pramrtadhikhyah //
tairva-dhyayapannam maha bbdh prakritaam //

The cognitive criterion - arises as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as what is experienced, and which is not
is differently construed by the commentators, for example, (1) NAV 8.1 (p. 380); dṛṣṭena pumāsūkṣavakṣātenāḥ pratipaddatam evaḥ ca nīkāyati sātmāvyāhāḥ artho yatrāṁ vyāh₂t-aṭṭh₂kā (in which [momentous] sentence the meaning is due to its efficacy - is “accepted,” [i.e.,] desired to be demonstrated, as “what is experienced” [i.e.,] as what is seen by [means of] a cognitive criterion, [and which is] “not contradicted,” [i.e.,] which is not revoked, that [momentous sentence] is such), and (2) NĀJ ad loc. (n. 340, p. 222); dṛṣṭenaṇvītīt. ayam bhinnādikaraṇas trīpade yevaḥ-vṛttih yadi vēgō vyāh₂t-ṛhō yatra tad ēśāyāhāram vēkyaṁ, tadana dṛṣṭena pumāsa-nīkāyati-sātmāvyāhāram iti tat-purūṣaḥ ("This is either a bahu-vrīhot compound consisting of three words, which has a substance different [from its constituent elements]: “such a statement in which the meaning is accepted [and] not contradicted”; or it [may be understood as] a rat-purūṣa compound: “what is accepted [and] not contradicted by what is experienced [viz.,] by what is determined through a cognitive criterion.").

32 NAV 24.3 (p. 411); na na ca parair anyay apī dṛṣṭenaṇvītītāhāram uktam, tad yathā-nāmnaya pradāśītāvay prāśītāvay ca cēti.

33 NAV 25.3 (pp. 415-416); parair apare ‘pi dhīnāśāhāram trayaḥ vīnīyā-bhāṣāyāva dārśānāḥ, tad yathā-ayatarekro, prāśītāvay prāśītāvay cēti, te śāmśābhīvātān na dāśāyāvāyāḥ.


Here the example based on dissimilarity [can be formulated in the following manner]: "Whoever were either an omniscient or an authoritative person, however, he would teach the four noble truths, for instance: Siddhartha’s son (sc. the Buddha). Or else, [one could say as well that] this is [the first variety of fallacious example] lacking negative concomitance with the probandum, because - inasmuch as the four noble truths characterized by the suffering, [its] origin, the path [leading to its cessation and its] cessation are subverted by cognitive criteria - an advocate of these [four noble truths] is explicable [only] as a non-omniscient and a non-authoritative person. Simply, [the above mentioned example] has been specified as such as [an example in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful] because to [people] lacking the recognition of the efficacy of cognitive criteria that revolve these [four noble truths], it appears as [the fallacious example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful. For it is as follows: even though Siddhodana’s son (the Buddha) taught the four noble truths, nevertheless his omniscience and his authority are not proved, because there is no proof that teaching the four noble truths is otherwise inexplicable except together with these two, [i.e., omniscience and authority], inasmuch as it [is equally] possible that a cunning person of an adroit mind, who acts with an intention of cheating others, although he is neither omniscient nor authoritative, can impart teaching of that kind. Therefore, non-occurrence of the probandum characterised by non-omniscience and by lack of authority is doubtful in [the case of] Siddhodana’s son (the Buddha); hence [this instance is called an example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful."

It is worth mentioning that, strangely enough, the typical sequence of the four noble truths is here disturbed: Šuddhārājgaḷi interchanges the third and fourth noble truths.

36 NAV 25.2 (p. 415):

na vēta-rāgāḥ kapālayaḥ, karuṇāpadesu apy ākhaṇapadota-cittātyāyā datta-niṣka-māṣṭika-sākṣāti vētāḥ. ātma vaidharmsyā-ṛṣṭānāḥ: ye punaḥ vītāḥ rāgāḥ te karuṇāpadesu karuṇā-pārtha-cittātyāyā datta-niṣka-māṣṭika-sākṣāti, tad yathā-bodhi-saṅvā (ti) a bhāyā-sādhanā-dharma-yād bodhi-sanvekho vyāśāyāhāram, śāṭhatrīpāda-pramāṇa-vaikālyanāṁ na jñāyate kim te rāgādhamana uta vēta-rāgāḥ; tāhānukāpyeyiḥ kuṇa sv-piṣṭa-hā⟩[dī]| datavāno nētī vā, asubhā-sādhanā-sādhanā-yāvāt kṛṣṇāram śāṭhayāvām āt karvaka bhāṣaḥ, karmanahaṃ ayāyam yāvāt. "Karṇa and other [thinkers of his kind] are not dispassionate, because - inasmuch as their consciousness is not filled with compassion - they have not offered any bits of their own flesh even to the abodes of compassion (sc. to hungry beings who deserved compassion)." Here the example based on dissimilarity [can be formulated in the following manner]: "Those, however, who are dispassionate, inasmuch as their consciousness is filled with compassion, offered bits of their own flesh to the abodes of compassion (sc. to hungry beings who deserved compassion), for instance: Bodhisattava. Here the non-occurrence of the properties of both the probandum and the probans in the case of Bodhisattva is doubtful. Because of lack of any cognitive criteria that [could] demonstrate that (sc. that passions, etc., are excluded in the case of Bodhisattvas), it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas are] endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate; similarly, [it is not known] whether they have offered any bits of their own flesh to those worthy of sympathy, or not. Hence, [this is the fallacious example] in which negative concomitance with [both] the probandum and the probans is doubtful.

37 MSA 16.36 (p. 105.24-27):

vatān bhuddha-saṅghā svājīvata apj-prāypārinām saravātsa/kāruṇā paramo na ca prakṛtir neṣṭām phalaṃ prakṛtihītan/ dānena ca tāna sarva-jānātā bodhi-trāye rupāt/ ājñāna jñāna-parigrahaṇa ca punar loke jñāyam śāktipatam/
cognition of a person in the waking state, which is opposite to this [sensation in dream]."

46 Cf. for example NAV 29.1 (p. 425): "Iha yad yatra pratibhāt, tād eva tad-goccamayyāpāt
prapanna-vāsāt.

47 As far as certain structural nuances are concerned, worth pointing out is the fact that Dharmakīrti employs not more than two different instances of reasoning to represent altogether four types of fallacious reasoning, namely he interchanges them as follows: [S1] = [V2] and [S2] = [V1]. Siddhārṣigāni uses various intermingled illustrations, in which certain ‘semi-variables’ overlap as follows: the prakāsas is — with one exception — the same (i.e. sādhyā of [S1] = sādhyā of [S2] = sādhyā of [V1] = "bhrāntam"), the logical reason remains unchanged (i.e. hetu of [S1] = hetu of [V1] = hetu of [V2] = "pramāṇavāt""); prakāsa of [S1] = prakāsa of [V1] = drṣṭānta of [V2] (anumānam); prakāsa of [V2] = drṣṭānta of [S1] (pratyayam); drṣṭānta of [S2] = drṣṭānta of [V1] (svapna-samvedanam); sādhyā of [V2] (v. nirvākṣa) has no match.

48 See for example PSV 1.3.3d: "pratyayam kalpanāpāṭhaṇā nama-jātī-bāy-ānunātām, and NB 4: tatra pratyayam kalpanāpāṭhaṇā bhrāntam. Comp. also the definition found in NP 4.1. (NP 1.7.12.3), bearing striking similarity to the one of Dīnaka, which fact was initially one of the reasons responsible for the wrong attribution of Śūkramānī’s manual to Dīnaka: tatra pratyayam kalpanāpāṭhaṇ, yaj jñānam arthe rūpāda nama-jātī-bāy-kalpanā-rūpaṇaṃ tadb. See also NB 1.4 (p. 471): bhrāntam hi anumānam svapna pratibhāte "narte rūdhyavyavasthaya praṇayavatvāt;" bhrāntam hi anumānam svapna pratibhāte "narte rūdhyavyavasthaya praṇayavatvāt;"

49 This is an addition to Dīnakkottāra, cf. NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

50 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudrayāḥ vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

51 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

52 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

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54 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

55 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

56 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

57 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

58 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

59 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

60 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

61 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.

62 NB 2.1.3.1: gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. ye gṛhītā-vacanā na te rāgaśīnāt, tathā yathā gautamādhyo dhyāna-pāṭhaṇāy. prayeṣātātātāt gautamādhyo rāgaśīnātva sādhanā-samudraya vyāvṛtiḥ sandhyāṅaḥ.
67 NAV 20.1 (p. 401):


Experts in logic, [i.e.,] specialists in logic, 'have recognised' [i.e.,] they know, that when this [invariable connection] has been proved, an exemplification by [adding] an example is ineffective, inasmuch as the probandum is [already] proved by this [invariable connection]. And even though the definition of the remaining members [of a proof formula] characterised by application, conclusion and the five clearances have not been taught directly here in this treatise, inasmuch as this [treatise] aims at the advantage of [human] beings who delight in concise [form], nevertheless [respect marking] can be deduced by the learned from this very triad of the members of the proof formula demonstrated [above], because there are [eventually] three kinds of discourse as regards the [number of] members of the proof formula, viz. lower, intermediate and superior. Out of them, the lower one is a mere demonstration of the logical relation; the intermediate one is a proclamation of two or more [but not all] members of the proof formula; the superior [discourse] is the mention of complete ten members of the proof formula. Regarding these [varieties of the discourse], by the direct mention of the intermediate [discourse] here in this treatise the author indicates both the lower and the superior [varieties of the discourse] by implication, because their presence can be proved by cognitive criterion.

68 NAV 24.4 (p. 412):

yātī hi drṣṭānta-balena vypīṭhā stādiya-sādhānayoḥ pratipādyeta, tataḥ svad avayavo drṣṭāntābhasa, sva-bhāvyakaranād, yātā tu pārvat-praṇava dispūtā-sātvadnu-grāhi pramāṇa-gocara-samarānām-sampūnānānām drṣṭāntādibhīr hi svadūn, sādānaya-vatvō laṅko na drṣṭānāsāya doṣa, kēn tarhī hetu eva, pratipādāvādyavō pramāṇāṇādibhītāva, pratipādāvādyavō pramāṇāṇādibhītāva, pratipādāvādyavō pramāṇāṇādibhītāva, na ca hetu-dosā ‘pi drṣṭānta vacya, vprayasārthād iti.

For if the invariable connection between the probandum and the probans could be demonstrated by the force of an example, then [the example] without positive connection would be [indeed] a fallacy of the example, because it would not demonstrate the invariable connection between the probandum and the probans. But when it is established that an exemplification by [adding] an example serves the purpose of producing a recollection, whose domain is a cognitive criterion grasping the relation that has occurred before, then the characteristic of being without positive connection is not the defect of an example, but of the logical reason itself, because the invariable connection has not been determined by cognitive criterion until now; and if there is no invariable connection, then positive connection is not proved [either]. And the defect of the logical reason should not be taught in [the case of] (sc. should not be blamed on) the example, because that would have too far-reaching consequences.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE

Furthermore, yours is that view – namely: inasmuch as, in the time of the inference for oneself, one knows the probandum himself merely by seeing the logical reason, also at the point of the inference for others, only the demonstration of the logical reason should be carried out – on account of the following utterance: [ ] since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated [pronounced by you] whose description of all fallacies of the example, as well – inasmuch as the probandum intended to be proved can be proved by specifying the logical reason alone [in the form of] nothing more than: ‘because it is produced’ – demonstrates [your] aptitude for formulations in which antecedent and subsequent statements are contradicted [by each other]. Let us leave therefore these two [fallacious examples [V8] and [V9]] alone, because the example is not accepted as a part of the probans.

73 See Balcerowicz (2001a: xx-xxi).
74 NAV 11.1: [śākhyāmyena:] agnir atra dhīmōpopate; vaisākhīmyena: agnir atra, anyathā dhīmānupapateh.
75 I discuss it at length in Balcerowicz (2003).
76 In Balcerowicz (2001a: esp. xii-xx), I discuss Dharmakīrti’s influence on the NA at length.

Bibliography


AKBh = Vasubandhu: Abhidharma-kośa-bhāya. See: AK.


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NBh = Viśṣṭayāna: Nāyāya-bhāṣya. See: NV.
NBī = Dharmatkṛti: Nāyāya-bindu-bhāṣya. See: DhPr.

PVS = Dharmatkṛti: Pramāṇa-vārttika-svāpṇa-vṛtti. See: PV (1).