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ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NYĀYĀVATĀRA
AND THE SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARĀṆA*

1. For last few centuries the Jaina tradition came to uncritically attribute such works as the Sanmati-tarka-prakaranā (STP), the Nyāyāvatāra (NA) and a number of Dvātrimśikās to one and the same author, namely to Siddhasena Divākara. A number of scholars raised doubts as to the authenticity of such attribution and, at least as far as the number of Dvātrimśikās is concerned, there is no doubt that some of them could not possibly have been composed by one and the same person, and certainly not by the author of STP. Despite the necessity to update it¹, a valuable resume of research heretofore done on Siddhasena Divākara is offered by Upadhye (1971), who writes: ‘Its (= Nyāyāvatāra’s - P.B.) constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the Sanmati) and consequently its date have to remain open questions for a number of

* The present contribution is a slightly modified version of my paper that was presented at the XI World Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3rd-8th, 2000 and referred to in Balcerowicz (2001b: 377) as ‘forthcoming’. The major changes are incorporated in the latter part, §§ 6 ff., which contains my analysis of some arguments brought forward by Bansidhar Bhatt (2000). The present contribution is a part of my research subsidised by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.

reasons. Perhaps we will never know the true name(s) of the author(s) of STP and NA, but the question of the original number of verses of NA – viz. thirty-two, precisely as the text was rendered to us – seems to have been positively answered recently. In the present paper I intend to add some more arguments in favour of my thesis that STP and NA are works of two different Siddhasenas, and their composition is separated by at least 150 years. Following my earlier suggestions that there is no substantial reason why to maintain the identity of the authors of STP and NA, I shall keep the name of Siddhasena Divākara for the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa. As a matter of fact, we can not even be sure that the Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa was written by a Siddhasena and we might only rely on such a late statement as that of Abhayadeva-sūri, the commentator on STP, who – in the introductory part of Tattva-bodha-vidhāyini (TBV) – explicitly mentions the title of the work (‘A Prabandha called Saṁmati’) and the name of its author: Siddhasena Divākara. In order to distinguish this Siddhasena from the author of the Nyāyāvatāra, I will use the name of Siddhasena Mahāmati for the author of the Nyāyāvatāra, following Haribhadra-sūri in this regard.

1.1. Here, I would like to draw attention to certain discrepancies in the text of STP and NA that prove, in my opinion, that these two works were written by two different people and at different times. Both the genuine title of STP (whether Sammati, Saṁmati-tarka or Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa) and the name of its author are of secondary importance.

4. See Balcerowicz (2001b).
5. TBV.1.1 (introductory part), p. 1.17-18: ...Siddhasena-Divākara ... tad-upāya-bhūta-Saṁmati-ākhyā-prakaraṇa-karane ...
Most conspicuous differences, viz. Sanskrit of NA and Prakrit of STP as well as an overall stylistic dissimilarity, would certainly be a highly unconvincing argument against joint authorship of both works. Much less so is, however, the general outline and matters discussed in both works: apparently the single feature these two works share is their epistemological concern. With the exception of two verses (NA 29-30), NA discusses the question of epistemic validity (prāmāṇya) and the definition of pramāṇa as well as its divisions and their definitions, there being no single reference to the method of the seven-fold predication (saptā-bhaṅgi), an important issue in STP. The text of NA – both in its rigid outline and vocabulary – clearly follows the epistemological tradition of Diṇḍāgā-Dharmakirti school, especially the Nyāya-bindu and the Nyāya-praveśa of Saṅkarasvāmin. In its consistent structure, a definition is followed by its explanation and further exemplification; each thesis derives from the preceding. It is hard to find in NA typically Jaina technical terms, in the sense that one does not have to be acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and creed in order to understand the contents of NA in its entirety. The contents of STP is, in its turn, derives entirely from the Jaina tradition, with a detailed exposition of the theory of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) – that includes nayas (dravyāstika and parayāstika, as well as the set of seven viewpoints: rju-sūtra, etc., especially STP 1.3-5, 7-18, 23, 31), nikṣepas (STP 1.6, 40 ff.), saptā-bhaṅgi (STP 1.36-40) – and with a discussion of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) in Chapter 2, as well as ontological and ethical and soteriological questions of predominantly Jaina relevance. None of these topics is present in NA. Its outline seems to be entirely different from NA, much less rigid and consistent, almost chaotic, the same issue being discussed on several occasions. STP seems to be rather a plain exposition of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine, and a refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. STP constantly uses locutions and terminology that had been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and takes it for granted that the hearer / reader is well acquainted with Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression: certainly a non-Jaina would find it

7. See Balcerowicz (2001a: viii-xxix). Also Bhatt (2002: 79-81) provides a useful list of structural and terminological similarities between NA and NB / NBṬ.
rather difficult to follow the contents of STP without any prior knowledge of Jainism. Thus, one may have an impression that NA and STP derive from altogether different intellectual backgrounds.

1.2. Any direct comparison of NA and STP is indeed an unfeasible task in view of the fact that neither the contents nor the vocabulary of NA and STP overlap. Accordingly, we cannot pinpoint a single concept of expression in order to be able to see whether it is treated in the same manner in both texts.

Even a positive answer to the question (viz. the confirmation that a given term or concept is given precisely the same meaning both in STP and NA) would neither prove the same authorship for both works nor disprove the thesis that NA and STP were written by two different authors. Such overlapping could only have a supportive-corroborative strength, but would in no way be decisive; but its corroborative strength would be directly proportional to the uniqueness and singularity of the identical treatment of a given term / concept in both works and their divergence from the whole Jain tradition in the case of the given term / concept.

To find a concept, however, that is explicated entirely differently in both works or that rests on completely different presuppositions would, on the other hand, prove that NA and STP could not have been written by one and the same person. Indeed, there seem to be indeed some points that presuppose an entirely different conceptual framework in NA and STP.

2. One of them is the question of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) of the living element (jīva). It is problematic what exactly the relation between the two cognitive faculties (upayoga), i.e. jñāna (cognition) and darśana (insight / conation), on the one hand, and pramāṇa (cognitive criterion), on the other, was for Siddhasena Divākara in STP. Commenting on STP, Abhayadeva-sūri – against the general Jain tradition – apparently takes upayoga to bifurcate into

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8. The above issues are discussed in more detail in BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 353-354).
pratyakṣa and parokṣa, and the five subvarieties (avādhi, maṇaḥ-
paryāya, kevala and maṭi, śruta, respectively) to overlap with the Āgamic varieties of pramāṇa.9

Traditionally, pramāṇa related only to the question of the validity of cognition (jñāna), viz. to one aspect of the cognitive faculties (upayoga). Thus, Tattvārtha-sūtra in one chapter discusses five varieties of cognition, and only then adds that these are divided into two pramāṇas.10 This opinion is further supported by Tattvārthādhiḥgama-

bhāṣya. The question of the cognitive faculties is discussed separately in the next chapter of TS; the upayogas comprise all possible cognitive faculties irrespective of their validity. For instance, four varieties of erroneous cognition (ajñāna) as well as three varieties of erroneous conation / fallacious insight (adarsana) are still cases of upayoga. This is precisely the approach that overlaps with such Canonical works as the Paññavaṇṇa-suttaṁ, where the question of pramāṇa is discussed separately.

There seems to be no indication, in my opinion, as regards the exact relation of the upayogas and the pramāṇas in STP, and we must leave the question open.

9. See, e.g., TBV ad 2.1 (p. 457.6-7): ... upayogo 'pi paraspara-vyapekṣa-
sāmāṇya-vaiveśa-grahaṇa-pravṛti-darśana-jñāna-svarūpa-dvayātmaka- pramāṇam 
darśana-jñānākāṅkā-rūpas tv apramāṇam ...; TBV ad 2.1 (p. 458.4-5): nirākāra-
sākārōpyogau tāpasarojani-kṛta-tad-itārākārau sva-viśayāvabhāsaaktivena pravarta-

māṇau pramāṇam na tu niraśītārākārau; and TBV ad 42 (p. 650.23-25): athavā pratyakṣa-parokṣa-rūpaṁ sāṅkeṣapato dviśvidha upayoga ātmanāh. tatra pratyaksāpyogas trividhāḥ avadhī-manah-paryāya-kevala-bhedena. ... parokṣāpyogas tu maṭi-śruta-
rūpa dviśvidhā.

ādy e parokṣam, pratyakṣam anyat.
11. See, e.g., TBh 1.12: maṭi-śrutābhyaṁ yad anyat trividhāṁ jñānam tat-
pratyakṣam pramāṇāṁ bhavati.
12. TS 2.8: upayogo laksanāṁ, TBh 2.8: upayogo laksanam jīvasya bhavati. 
TBh 2.9: sa upayogo dviśvidhāṁ sākāro anākāra ca jñānāpyogasya darśanāpyogasyā 
cēty arthāḥ. TBh 1.3: jñāna-darśana-upayoga-laksanō jīva iti vāksyate.
13. See TBh 2.9.
14. Paññ. 9.1912-1914: ... dvuihe uvaoge paṇnate. taṁ jaḥa – sāgarāvage ya 
anāgarāvage ya. ... taṁ jahāmati-ṇaṇa-sāgarāvage ya. suva-ṇaṇa-sāgarāvage, ohi-
naṇa-sāgarāvage, maṭi-anaṇa-sāgarāvage, suva-anaṇa-sāgarāvage, vibhaṅg-
aṇa-sāgarāvage. ... taṁ jaḥa – cakkhu-dānisāna-anāgarāvage, acakku-
dānisāna-anāgarāvage ya.
2.1. However, the second chapter of STP opens with the verse that distinguishes two kinds of the soul’s cognitive faculties (upayoga), cognition (jñāna) and conation, or insight (darśana)\(^\text{15}\):

\[\text{STP 2.1: } \text{jaṁ sāmāṇṇa-ggaṇaṇāṁ daṁsaṇāṁ eyaṁ visesiyaṁ nāṇam /} \\
\text{donoḥ vi ṇayāṇa eso paḍekkaṁ attha-pajjā //} \\
\text{– ‘Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object [viz. its general and particular aspect] is individually [the contents] for both viewpoints, [i.e. substance-expressive (dravyārthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive (paryāyārthika).’} \]

What the first hemistich of the verse states is that insight / conation (darśana) grasps the general (sāmānyya), whereas the cognition (jñāna) grasps the particular (viśeṣa). Here the discrimination between the sāmānyya and the viśeṣa apparently does not pertain to the usual distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, jāti, language and concepts, kalpanā) and the individual (vyakti, bheda). The dividing line is clearly the opposition between ‘general, indistinct, unclear’ (for sāmānyya) and ‘particular, distinct, specific’ (for viśeṣa). Such a position was definitely liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side, in as much as it could easily be interpreted in opposition to perception (pratyakṣa; called darśana), grasping the viśeṣa, and inference (anumāṇa), etc., grasping the sāmānyya.

Besides, certain inverted, as it were, parallelism of formulations (sāmānyya – darśana and viśeṣa – jñāna) as compared with Dharmakīrti’s distinction of sva-lakṣaṇa as a respective province (viṣaya) for perception (pratyakṣa) and sāmānyya-lakṣaṇa as a respective province (viṣaya) for inference (anumāṇa) is likewise conspicuous. If the author of STP had been acquainted with Dharmakīrti’s ideas, he would not have failed, I expect, to enter into a polemics or elaborate on the issue, just the way Siddhasena Divākara defends his position as regards the distinction of darśana and avagraha (see § 4.2) against

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15. I deliberately do not employ the term ‘perception’ (reserved for pratyakṣa) to render ‘darśana’, in order to preserve the distinct character of the two terms and to avoid hasty identification of pratyakṣa and darśana, that in general epistemological discourse are often equated, but are often kept distinct in case of the Jaina theory of upayoga.
possible misunderstanding (non-Jainas could have easily taken his darśana to be pratyaṇkaṇa, or avagraha); by the same token one would expect him to have done the same in the case of the categorisation of the sāmāṇya related to darśana and the viṣeṣa related to jñāna. And precisely in the same way as the author of NA anticipated a possible criticism from the side of his opponents (the school of Dharmakīrti in the first place) in the case of svārtha and parārtha, while extending the distinction to both pratyaṇkaṇa and anumāṇa, as well as in the case of non-errorousness (abhrāntatva) of both pratyaṇkaṇa and anumāṇa.

I believe the author of STP did not merely ignore any possible criticism, for instance, from the Buddhist side, but he was not even aware that his statement could trigger such a criticism at all. This seems to be a serious indication that he flourished before Diānāga and Dharmakīrti.

2.2. On the other hand, in the text of NA we frequently find – as I have just mentioned – more or less concealed polemics directed against Diānāga and Dharmakīrti, e.g.: (1) in NA 5, the phrase stating that inference (anumāṇa) ‘is non-errorous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception’, is a refutation of Dharmakīrti’s thesis that inference, even though being a cognitive criterion, is erroneous. (2) NA 13 is reminiscent of the trairūpya doctrine and NB 3.1 in the sense that it states new and better condi-

18. NA 5: sādhyāvinā-bhunō liṅgāti sādhyā-niścāyakāṁ smṛtam / anumāṇam, tad abhrāntam pramāṇatvāt samaksavat //–
   ‘Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the inferable property on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the inferable property. It is non-errorous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.’
20. NA 13: sādhyāvinā-bhuvō hetor vaco yat pratipādadakam / parārtham anumāṇam tat paksādī-vacanātmakam //–
   ‘Such an utterance that demonstrates the logical reason as inseparably connected with the inferable property is the inference for others, whose essence are propositions, like the thesis, etc.’
tions of validity. All these and similar passages prove that there can be no doubt that NA was written after Dharmakīrti. Furthermore, NA reveals its author’s general anticipation of possible criticism, e.g. verses NA 2-3 are meant to combat possible censure that the definition of cognitive criterion (stated in NA 1) is unnecessary. It is rather doubtful that the author of NA, so sensitive as regards possible criticism, might at the same time be the author of STP, so much oblivious of how controversial the verse of STP 2.1 could appear.

3. Leaving aside a possible relationship between pramāṇa and upayoga in both works, let us take a look at the paradigms of valid types of cognition and their division into kinds of cognitive criterion (pramāṇa).

3.1. Let us begin with NA. We do not find any mention of cognitive faculties (upayoga) or insight / conation (darśana) there in the first place. After formulating the definition of pramāṇa in the first hemistich, NA 1cd states that there are only two pramāṇas: ‘[Cognitive criterion is] two-fold: perception as well as indirect cogni-

23. NA 2-3: prasiddhāni pramānāni vyavahāraś ca tat-krtaḥ / pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyoīktau jñāya te prayojānam //
prasiddhānāṁ pramāṇānāṁ lakṣaṇoīktau prayojānam /
tad-vyāmohā-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmudha-manasāṁ iha // –
[Rejoinder:] “Cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them; therefore no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion”. [Reply:] The purpose for stating the definition of cognitive criteria, [although they are] well-known, should be the eradication of disorientation concerning that [definition of cognitive criterion] in the case of the disoriented-minded here.’

On this see BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xv-xvi: § 4).
24. Another point of divergence is the way STP and NA approach logical issues and their different attitudes towards the question of reasoning and the proof formula (sādhanā, pāñcāvaya-vākya). These issues are discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 360-362).
25. NA 1ab: pramāṇam sva-parābhāsi jñānām, bādhya-vivarjitam / – ‘The cognitive criterion is cognition revealing itself and something else [different from it and it is] free from subversion.’
tion, corresponding to [the way of] determination of the cognoscible. Subsequent verses provide more information as to the character of the two pramāṇas. The understanding of the nature of the direct cognition, or perception (pratyakṣa), radically diverts from the traditional strand in the Jaina tradition which regarded it to be supra-sensory, and coincides with the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs.

Such an interpretation is not only confirmed by Siddhārṣi-gaṇin in his commentary as well as by the whole subsequent tradition that followed NA, but also by the internal evidence. Indeed, the definition of pratyakṣa and parokṣa formulated in NA 4 is basically tautological in the logical sense, and henceforth brings no information. In other words, the two definitions allow for all possible interpretations!

Fortunately, several other passages give us a clear idea that the main division of the pramāṇas is along the lines of general Indian epistemological tradition, viz. the touchstone for directness of cognition (pratyakṣa) are sense organs, whereas the indirect cognition (parokṣa) comprises inference, verbal testimony, analogy, etc.

26. NA 1cd: pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣaṁ ca dvidhā, meya-viniścayāt //

27. NAV 1: pratyakṣaṁ cēty-ādi; tatra siddhānta-prasiddha-pāramārthika-pratyakṣāpekṣayaśa-sābdo jīva-paryāyataya prasidddhah. ita tu vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa-prastāvād aksa-dhvanir indriya-vacano ghryate. tataś cākṣaṁ pratigataṁ pratyakṣaṁ. yad indriyaṁ āśrityōjihihe 'rīha-sākṣa-kiṁ jñānam tat pratyakṣaṁ ity arthah. – ‘...Perception, etc. Concerning that [issue], the linguistic unit “perceiving organ” – with regard to ultimately real perception well-known from the Canon – is well-known as a synonym of the living element. Here [in this verse], however, the linguistic unit “perceiving organ” is used – since [we] are dealing [here] with the conventional perception – as an utterance [denoting] the senses. And, therefore, that which has gone towards “the perceiving organ” is perception. The meaning is as follows: such a cognition perceiving directly an object which commences resorting to the senses is perception’.

28. NA 4: aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṁ jñānam idṛśam / pratyakṣaṁ, itaraj āṇeyam parokṣaṁ grahamēkṣaya// –

– ‘Such a cognition that grasps an object not-indirectly is perception; the other one should be known as the indirect cognition, as far as [the manner of] grasping [an object] is considered’.

29. To put it plainly, ‘direct is not non-direct’ for pratyakṣa and ‘what is not direct is non-direct’ for parokṣa, or ‘a = ¬¬a’ and ‘¬¬a = a’, respectively. If we want to keep the sentential negation (¬) distinct for the predicative negation (¬), we can symbolise the two sentences respectively as: ‘α = ¬¬(¬α)’ and ‘¬¬α = ¬α’.
In the first place, subsequent verses illustrate two main divisions of the indirect cognition, viz. inference (anumāṇa) and the verbal knowledge (sābda)\(^{30}\). They are indirect because inference is based on the inferential sign (liṅga), or the logical reason (hetu), and because the verbal knowledge is derived from a sentence (vākya). Besides, NA 5 and NA 6, while discussing the issue of validity-and erroneousness, contrast perception (pratyakṣa) with inference (anumāṇa)\(^{31}\). They are also contrasted in a few other passages\(^{32}\). While providing a definition of the thesis in NA 14 33, we find the statement that ‘the thesis is not revoked by perception etc.’ (pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādy-anirākṛtaḥ), viz. the soundness of the thesis is generally verifiable with ordinary means and common cognitive apparatus: by implication ‘perception’ has to mean here ordinary, or sensory perception, employed by everyone, and not extra-sensory perception — viz. either clairvoyance (avādhi-jñāna), mind-reading (manāḥ-paryāya-jñāna) or absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) — not accessible to common people. The phrasing emulates formulations of a validity condition well-known form several other works, just to mention a few, NP\(^{34}\), NM\(^{35}\) and PBh\(^{36}\). Similarly, the

\(^{30}\) NA 8: 

\[ 
\text{dṛṣṭेश्वायताद vākyāt paramarthaḥbhidhāyinaḥ /} \\
\text{tattva-grāhītayōtpannaḥ mānaṁ sābdaṁ prakāritam} /–
\]

‘The cognitive criterion — arisen as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as that what is experienced and which is not contradicted [and] which communicates the ultimate truth — is declared [to be] the verbal knowledge.’

\(^{31}\) NA 5:

\[ 
\text{sādhyāvacnām-bhuno liṅgāt sādhyā-niścāyakam smṛtam /} \\
\text{anumāṇam, tad abhrāntaṁ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat} //
\]

NA 6:

\[ 
\text{na pratyakṣam api bhrāntaṁ pramāṇatvā-vaṇiścavāt /} \\
\text{bhrāntaṁ pramāṇam ity etad viruddhaṁ vacanaṁ yataḥ} //–
\]

‘Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the inferable property on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the inferable property. It is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception. Neither is perception erroneous, because it is determined to be a cognitive criterion, since [to say:] a cognitive criterion is erroneous is a contradictory utterance.’

\(^{32}\) E.g., NA 11ab pratyakṣanānumāṇena prasiddhārthya-prakāśanāt /

\(^{33}\) NA 14:

\[ 
\text{sādhyābhupagamah pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādy-anirākṛtaḥ /} \\
\text{tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dipaka} //–
\]

‘The thesis is the acceptance of the inferable property; [it] is not revoked by perception, etc.; the pronouncement of it has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason.’

\(^{34}\) NP(1) p. 1.5-7 (= NP(2) 2.1, p. 72): tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmā prasiddha-

\(^{35}\) viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatāyā svayaṁ sādhyatvenēpstiḥ. pratyakṣādy-aviruddha iti vākya-śeṣaḥ.
cases which invalidate a thesis and turn it into a fallacious thesis (paksābhāsa) 37, enumerated in NA 21 38, overlap with formulations found both in Jaina texts posterior to NA 39 and in other epistemological-logical traditions in India 40. In other words, the meaning and implications of the term pratyaṅka are so deeply interwoven in the epistemic system of NA in the very same manner as the term was

35. NM 1 (as restored by G. Tucci):

\[
paksādi-vacanānīti sādhanaṃ; tatra hi svayam / \\
\text{sādhyatvānevāpi – paksō viruddhārthānirārākṣa} // – \]

‘Proof [consists in] utterances [expressing] the locus, etc. Among these very [utterances], locus is what is intended by [the propounder] himself as the inferable property [and] which is not revoked by objects [that are] contrary [to it].’

36. PBh [260], p.49-50: avirdhi-grahaṅī pratyakṣānunāmābhuyapagata-svā-
śāstra-sva-vacana-virodhino nirastā bhavanti.

37. The sequence of NA 12 (on vacas / vākyas and pratyaṅka), NA 14 (pratyakṣaṅdy-anirākṛta) and NA 21 (pratipāḍyasya yaḥ siddhah paksābhāso ’kṣa-
lingataḥ – it is the standard division of paksābhāsa) may prove that perception is sen-
sory, hence shows that pratyaṅka here is also āndriya-pratyaṅka (not only anindriya-
pratyaṅka).

38. NA 21:

\[
\text{pratipāḍyasya yaḥ siddhah paksābhāso ’kṣa-} \\
\text{lingataḥ /} \\
\text{loka-sva-vacanābhyaṃ ca bādhiho ‘nekadhā mātah} // – \]

‘The fallacy of the thesis is what is [already] proved for a [person] to be
taught, [what] is subverted by the perceiving organ and by the inferential sign as well
as by the opinion prevalent among people and by one’s own utterances; it is known
[to be] manifor.’

39. See, e.g., PALV. 6.15,16: /15/ [paksābhāsaḥ] bāḍhitaḥ pratijñānu-
māṅgama-lōka-sva-vacanaiḥ. /16/ tatra pratyaṅka-bāḍhitaḥ yathāṣno’ gnir āravya-
tvāj jalavat. Cf. NAV ad loc.: tathākṣa-liṅgato ’dhyaṅka-hetubhyām lōka-sva-
vacanābhyaṃ ca bāḍhitas tīras-ṛtaḥ yaḥ sa paksābhāsaḥ. ... pratyaṅka-bāḍhita
yathā: niramāṇi svalakṣanāṇi, parasmā-para-vivktau vā sāmānā-viśeṣāv iti. anumā
bāḍhitaḥ yathā: nāstī sarva-jña iti. loka-bāḍhita yathā: gamyā mātā iti. svā-vacana-
bāḍhito yathā: na sanīl sarve bhāvā iti.

40. See, e.g., NB.(2).3.49-53: /49/ (2) tatra pratyaṅka-nirākṛto yathā: aśrāvanah
śabda iti. /50/ (3) anumāṇa-nirākṛto yathā: nityaḥ śabda iti. /51/ prati-nirākṛto
/53/ iti catvāraḥ paksābhāsā nirākṛtā bhavanti; also to NP.(2).3.1: sādhaityum iṣṭo ’pi
pratyakṣādi-viruddhāḥ paksābhāsah, tad yathā: (1) pratyaṅka-viruddhaḥ, (2)
anumāṇa-viruddhaḥ, (3) āgama-viruddhaḥ, (4) loka-viruddhaḥ, (5) svā-vacana-viru-
dhaḥ, (6) aprasiddha-viśeṣānām, (7) aprasiddha-viśeṣyāḥ, (8) aprasiddhō-bhayān, (9)
prasiddha-sambandhaḥ cēti // tatra...
understood in such systems as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or in Buddhist tradition, that it is thoroughly unfeasible to interpret it differently, in agreement with the Jaina Agamic tradition. The only exception to the sensory interpretation of pratyakṣa is provided in NA 27.\textsuperscript{41}

The exceptional case of perception is thus the absolute cognition (kevala). But such a standpoint does not contradict the thesis of the general Indian epistemological-logical tradition as the background for NA; in fact, it corresponds to the idea of mystic insight (yogiprathyakṣa) as an additional, supra-sensory kind of perception, well-known not only from the Buddhist tradition.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, in NA we find two subdivisions of pramāṇa: (1) perception (pratyakṣa), divided into sensory an supra-sensory (kevala), and (2) indirect cognition (parokṣa) that comprises inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (śābda).

3.2. We find an entirely different world of epistemic ideas and notions in STP. In the first place, not only are the terms pramāṇa, pramiti, māṇa, pramā, or any equivalent, entirely absent from STP, but even the idea of cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) and the concept of validity (prāmānya) nowhere occur in STP. It is even more surprising in view of the fact that not only these questions are crucial in NA, but

\textsuperscript{41} NA 27: sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma kevalaṁ yat prakāśate / pratyakṣaṁ sakalārthātma-satata-pratibhāsanam // – ‘That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.’

\textsuperscript{42} See, e.g., NB.1.11: bhūtārthabhāvanā-prakārasya-paryanta-jam yogi-jñānam cēti; or VS.9.13: ātmany ātma-manaso – saṅyoga-viśesād ātma-pratyakṣam.

\textsuperscript{43} Siddharṣi-gaṇin confirms this in NAV 1: tataḥ ca sarva-jñānamāḥ yat svarūpa-samvedanam tad api pratyakṣam ity uktam bhavati, tatrāpi svarūpasya grāhyasya sākṣat-karana-sadbhāvād iti. akṣebhyah parato varata iti parokṣam. aksa-vyāpāra-nirapekṣaṁ mano-vyāpāreṇāsāksād-artha-paricchedakaṁ yaj jñānam āt pariśrōtam iti bhāvah. – ‘And, therefore, what it amounts to is the following: that which is a sensation of the intrinsic nature [of an object in case] of acts of omniscience is perception, as well, because direct perception of the intrinsic nature [of an object] which is to-be-grasped is present also in [case] of these [acts of omniscience]. That which operates aloof from the perceiving organs, [i.e., the senses], is indirect cognition. The intent is as follows: the cognition which determines an object indirectly by the operation of the mind, independent of the operation of the perceiving organs (sc. the senses) is the indirect cognition.’
also it was Siddhasena Mahāmati who formulated the first descriptive definition of pramāṇa in the history of Jaina epistemology.  

The keywords, as it were, are in STP upayoga, five kinds of jñāna, and four kinds of darśana. The cognitive faculties are discussed at length especially in the second chapter, e.g. in STP 2.1-5, 18 ff., 30. The distinction between the two kinds is due to their respective provinces (STP 2.1, vide supra p. 4): conation, or insight (darśana), grasps the universal (sāmanya-grahaṇam darśanam), whereas cognition (jñāna) grasps the particular (viśeṣitam = viśeṣa-grahaṇam) jñānam; this way they are related to two viewpoints: the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (dravyārthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive viewpoint (paryāyārthika) respectively. However, none of the cognitive faculties is entirely bereft of the other viewpoint, STP 2.2: insight, being basically related to the substantial viewpoint, comprises secondarily the modal viewpoint, and the same rule applies mutatis mutandis to cognition. The difference between insight (darśana) and cognition (jñāna) remains on all stages, including telepathy (manah-paryāya), but their distinct character disappears on the level of the absolute cognition-insight (kevala), according to Siddhasena Divākara.

3.3. To prove this identity of jñāna and darśana in case of an omniscient person (kevalin) is one of the main points of STP, for which the work was subsequently criticised by many Jaina thinkers. The thesis that jñāna and darśana have their end in the absolute cognition (kevale sanidhane) was apparently so important for Divākara that he considered it imperative not only to restate the same idea in

44. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xiv-xv) and (2005, n. 31).

45. Another difference is mentioned in STP 2.11: jñāna is sākāra (distinctive) and vyakta (manifest, distinct), whereas darśana is anākāra (non-distinctive) and avyakta (not manifest, indistinct). See also STP 2.14 on the distinction sākāra-anākāra.

46. STP 2.2: davvattāthio vi heuṇa daṁsanē paįjvavattāthio hoi / uvasamīyāibhāvam pađucca nāne u vivariyāni //

47. STP 2.3: manapajjvava-nānamio nānassya dārisaṇassya yā vīseso / kevala-nānam puṇa daṁsanaṁ ti nānāṁ ti ya samānaṁ // –

‘Up to the telepathy, cognition and insight are different; however, [in case of] the absolute cognition insight and cognition are the same.'
STP 2.8⁴⁸, but also to introduce the pārva-pakṣa verse of STP 2.22⁴⁹ that claims the conditional difference between the absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna) and the absolute insight (kevala-darśana), which is subsequently refuted. This treatment of kevala is entirely – with one exception⁵⁰ – different from its treatment in NA 27 (vide supra p. 8, n. 41). In NA there is not slightest trait of this highly debatable issue and the kevala knowledge is plainly stated there to be a special kind of pratyakṣa.

Furthermore, there is even an indirect indication as regards the real standpoint of NA. According to NA 7, the representation (pratibhāsa), or the mental ‘mirroring’ of an object, is a characteristic fea-

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⁴⁸. STP 2.8: sanītami kevale daṇḍaṇamamī nāṇassā saṁbhavho nāththi / kevala-nāṇamamī ya daṇḍaṇassā tamāḥ sanīhānāṁ //

⁴⁹. STP 2.22: daṇḍaṇa-puvvam nāṇamī nāṇa-nimittam tu daṇḍaṇam nāththi / tena suvīnicchityāmo daṇḍaṇa-nāṇaḥ anāttaṁ //

– ‘[The absolute] cognition is preceded by [the absolute] insight, but [the absolute] insight is not conditioned by [the absolute] cognition; hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both [the absolute] cognition and [the absolute] insight.’

This verse, in my opinion, does refer to the alleged distinction between kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana in view of the second hemistich of STP 2.21 that introduces it: ‘Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...’ (jaha ettha kevalāna vi viṣesāṇam ettiyan cēva //).

⁵⁰. This is the description of the absolute knowledge (kevala) in NA 27 and in STP 2.17. There is indeed some conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined):

(1) NA 27: sakalāyaraṇa-muktaṁ kevalāṁ yat prakāśate / pratyakṣam sakalārthāmo-sattā-pratibhāsanam // – ‘That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.’

(2) STP 2.17: tamāḥ cauvvi-bhāgo jujjai na u nāṇa-daṇḍaṇa-jīnāṇam / savalam anāyāranaṁ ānāṁtum akkhayaṁ kevalāṁ jāmhā // – ‘Therefore it would follow that [cognition would be] four-fold [not five-fold], but there [would be] no [separate] cognition and insight [in case of] Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, eternal, imperishable.’

The verse of STP 2.17 is a rejoinder of Siddhasena Divākara’s opponent who draws the conclusion from Divākara’s thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. It does not express Siddhasena Divākara’s own position! Hence the similarity of expression is only apparent and by no means conclusive since it may be due simply to a general, standard way of describing the nature of the absolute cognition.
ture of cognition (jñāna)⁵¹. At the same time, NA 27 defines the absolute cognition (kevala) as ‘a perception that is a representation [revealing] constantly the essences of all objects’ (p. 8, n. 41). Thus, the absolute cognition (kevala) is defined with the help of the characteristic mark of jñāna, and the only difference between kevala and ordinary jñāna is that the former is a representation of all things, whereas the latter is a representation limited only to some of their aspects. This can be interpreted as a proof that the kevala of NA is jñāna and the aspect of darśana is either not relevant or not important for Siddhasena Mahāmati, in so far as the author of NA does not consider it imperative to explain the nature of kevala explicitly. This would be surprising, if we assumed that the same person wrote also STP and was once in pains to prove that both jñāna and darśana become one single unity on the level of kevala.

4. In STP we come across the fivefold division of cognition: (1) mai-ñāṇa = mati-jñāna (STP 2.6, 23, 27) that corresponds to ahiṇībohe = ābhinibodhika-jñāna (STP 2.32), (2) suya-ñāṇa = śruta-jñāna (STP 2.16, 27, 28), (3) ohi = avadhi (STP 2.16, 29), (4) maṇapajjava = maṇah-paryāya (STP 2.3, 16, 19, 26) and (5) kevala (STP 2.3, 5, 8, 14, 17, 20, 34, 36, 37). This is the typology well known from TS 1.9-12 (vide supra n. 10) as well as from Ţhān 60⁵² (vide infra p. 11 ff.).

⁵¹. NA 7: sakala-pratibhāsasya bhrāntatvāsviddhitāḥ sphysaṁ / pramāṇoṁ svānya-nīścāya dvaya-siddhau prasiddhyati // – ‘Since it is incorrect to assume erroneousness of all representation, cognitive criterion, which is patent [and] which determines itself and something different [from it], proves to be correct with regard to establishing the dyad.’

Cf. NA 12: pratyakṣa-pratipannārtha-pratipādī ca yad vacaḥ / pratyakṣaṁ pratibhāsasya nimittatvāt tadbucyate // – ‘And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external sign for the representation.’

⁵². This must have been the tradition from which TS evolved. In Ţhān 336 we come across another strand of epistemological tradition (vide infra, n. 56). In fact, the epistemological ramifications of STP are even closer to Ţhān 60 than to TS 1.9-12, inasmuch as both STP and the divisions found in Ţhān 60 lack the ‘pramāṇa’ element, in other words, pramāṇa does not occur in the classification at all. Clearly, this strand is not the tradition from which NA stems from. We do, however, find in the Jaina Āgamas another strand – in Viy 5.4.26[3] and in Ţhān 336 [partly AnD 436] (vide infra, n. 56) – that goes back to the four-fold division of cognitive criteria, viz. pratyakṣa-anumāṇa-aupamya-āgama, apparently derived from the Nyāya and
What is now the relation between the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna, ābhinibodhika-jñāna) and the opposition pratyakṣa-parokṣa according to the author of STP? In other words: under which heading did STP classify the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna, ābhinibodhika-jñāna)?

4.1. If we first take recourse to the Āgamic tradition to decide whether the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna, ābhinibodhika-jñāna) is to be classified as direct or indirect according to the Jaina tradition, we can easily find out that the Āgamic tradition was not at all unanimous as regards the divisions and subdivisions of upayoga and jñāna. Accordingly, as far as classifications of cognitive faculties are concerned, we find at least five irreconcilable strands in the Canonical tradition prior to STP:

Model I: upayoga: (I) jñāna: (1) ābhinibodhika-jñāna, with its four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) īhā, (c) apāya, (d) dhāraṇā, (2) śruta-jñāna, (3) avadhi-jñāna, (4) manāḥ-paryāya-jñāna, (5) kevala-jñāna, (II) darśana: (1) caḳṣur-darśana, (2) acāḳṣur-darśana, (4) avadhi-darśana, (5) kevala-darśana.

Ānvikṣiki tradition. These two traditions find their partial reconciliation in AnD 435-440 (p. 173-174). I do not find anything in AnD 435-440 that would essentially contradict the typology of NA, granting that NA subsumed under the parokṣa head the categories of anumāna-aupamya-āgama found in AnD and leaving aside the fact that NA is silent on the issue of the relationship of the pramāṇa theory and the upayogas. Thus, it might have been the tradition from which the theoretical considerations of NA partly evolved.

53. Cf. e.g. Shastri (1990: 196-213, ‘Divisions of Knowledge’), who gives a reliable account of various canonical positions regarding divisions of cognitive faculties (the tables on pp. 202-211 are generally quite handy). He distinguishes four strands, overlooking two models: my Model III, which is basically of non-Jaina origin, and Model VI. In the scheme of six models, Model I emphasises the subdivisions that could contribute to our case. Principally, I leave aside all sub-divisions of testimony (śrūta), telaesthesia (avadhi) and telepathy (manāḥ-paryāya), since they are not directly relevant here.

54. Vyī 8.2.22-23 (p. 336): ...paṁcavihe nāṇe pannatte, taṁ jahā – ābh nibho-
hya-nāṇe suya-nāṇe ohī-nāṇe manapajava-nāṇe kevala-nāṇe. ... ābh nibhohiya-nāṇe catuvvihoe pannatte, taṁ jahā – uggaho iḥā avāo dhāraṇā. Cf. NaḥS 6[28-29] and 8 (pp. 6, 9): ...nāṇa-danmsana-guṇāṇam... nāṇam paṁcaviham paṇṇatam. taṁ jahā – abh nibhohiya-nāṇam suya-nāṇam ohī-nāṇam manapajava-nāṇam kevala-nāṇam.

Vyī 2.10.9[2] (p.115): ...five naṁ anuṁṭaṁ ābh nibhohiya-nāṇa-paṭjaṇvānaṁ evaṁ sut-a-nāṇa-paṭjaṇvānaṁ ohī-nāṇa-paṭjaṇvānaṁ manapajava-nāṇa-paṭjaṇvānaṁ
Model II: jñāna: (I) pratyakṣa: (1) kevala, (2) no-kevala: (a) avadhī, (b) manaḥ-paryāya, (II) parokṣa: (1) ābhinibodhika: (a) śruta-niḥ śrīta (arthavagraha + vyañjanavagraha), (b) aśruta-ni – śrīta (arthavagraha + vyañjanavagraha), (2) śruta 55.
Model III: pramāṇa / hetu: pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, aupalpa, āgama 56.
Model IV: pramāṇa: (I) jñāna: (1) pratyakṣa: (a) indriya-pratyakṣa (śrotra, caksur, ghrāna, jihvā, sparṣa), (b) no-indriya-pratyakṣa: (avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya, kevala), (2) anumāṇa: (a) pārvavat, (b) śesavat, (c) sādharmya, (3) aupalpa [...], (4) āgama [...], (II) darśana: (1) caksur-darśana, (2) acaksur-darśana, avadhī- 
darśana, kevala-darśana 57.

kevala-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam mati-ānṇāṇa-pajjavāṇam sutā-ānṇāṇa-pajjavāṇam vibhananga-nāṇa-pajjavā- nam cakkhu-damsana-pajjavāṇam acakkhu-damsana-pajjavāṇamohi-damsana-pajjavā- nam kevala-damsana-pajjavāṇam uvaogam gacchati, upayaoga-lakkane nam jive...
55. Ṭhān 60 (p. 14-15): duvihe nāṇe pannatte, tam jahā – pacchakkhe ceva parokkhē ceva. pacchakkhe nāme duvihe pannatte, tam jahā – kevala-nāṇe ceva no-kevala-nāṇe ceva. kevala-nāṇe duvihe pannate, ...no-kevala-nāṇe duvihe pannate, tam jahā – ohi-nāṇe ceva maṇapajjava-nāṇe ceva. ...maṇapajjava-nāṇe duvihe pannate, ...parokkhā-nāṇe duvihe pannate, tam jahā – abhinibohiya-nāṇe ceva suya-nāṇe ceva. abhinibohiya-nāṇe duvihe pannate, tam jahā – sutā-nissite ceva asuta-nissite ceva. sutā-nissite duvihe pannate, tam jahā – atthogghae ceva vanjanogghae ceva. asuya-nissite vi emeva. suya-nāṇe duvihe pannate, tam jahā – aniga-pavithte ceva aniga-bāhire ceva...
Model V: ķāṇāna: (I) pratyakṣa: (1) indriya-pratyakṣa (five sensory kinds), (2) no-indriya-pratyakṣa: (a) avadhi-pratyakṣa, (b) maṇha-paryāya-pratyakṣa, (c) kevala-pratyakṣa, (II) parokṣa: 58: (1) ābhiniḥbudhihika: (a) śruta-niḥśrita (with four stages: avagraha, ihā, apāya, dhāraṇā), (b) aśruta-niḥśrita, (2) śruta 59. This classification is in so far inconsistent as it virtually classifies cognitive processes of mati-ķāṇāna both as indriya-pratyakṣa and parokṣa. Besides, this classification does not know the notion of upayoga 60.

Model VI: (A) pramāṇa (= ķāṇāna): (I) parokṣa: (1) mati with four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) ihā, (c) apāya, (d) dhāraṇā, (2) śrutā, (II) pratyakṣa: (1) avadhi, (2) maṇha-paryāya, (3) kevala; (B) upayoga: (I) jñānopaṇyoga (sākāra): (1) mati-ķāṇāna, (2) śrutā-ķāṇāna, (3) avadhi-ķāṇāna, (4) maṇha-paryāya-ķāṇāna, (5) kevala-ķāṇāna, (6) maṭy-ajñāna, (7) śrutājñāna, (8) vibhāṅga-ķāṇāna, (II) darśanopaṇyoga (anākara): (1) cakṣur-dārsana, (2) acakṣur-dārsana, (3) avadhi-dārsana, (4) kevala-dārsana. 61 This model offers two very similar sub-models (pramāṇa and ķāṇānopaṇyoga) that partly overlap.

58. The indirect cognition (parokṣa) is in fact said to be homogenous, its two subdivisions (ābhiniḥbudhihika and śruta) being in fact identical (NaṁS 44).
60. The term upayoga occurs only once in 47 [ga. 66] (p. 21) in a different context. Similarly, the term darśana occurs only once in 71[1] (p. 28) in the context of divisions of the Canon (daṁsana-dhara).
61. TS / TBh 1.9-12.2.8-9.
The idea of pratyakṣa as the direct cognition occurs in Model II, Model IV, Model V and Model VI 62, it is still absent from Model I, while pratyakṣa in Model III corresponds to sensory perception of other systems.

Excluding Model III as genetically non-Jaina, Jaina divisions of pramāṇa in the Āgamic tradition could hardly accommodate the pan-Indian idea of pratyakṣa as sensory perception directly, perhaps with the sole exception of Model V and Model VI. The most frequently recurring point in these models (with the exception of Model I and III) is that avadhi, manah-paryāya and kevala are classified as direct types of cognition (pratyakṣa), whereas śruta is catalogued under indirect types of cognition (parokṣa). The most controversial – and in our analysis crucial – issue is, therefore, the proper assignment of the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna).

Clearly, such a diversity of opinions points to the fact that there was no unanimity among Jaina thinkers and the author of STP could have either subscribed to any one of the Canonical models or could have devised his own model.

4.2. Since, as we have seen before, NA follows the general Indian epistemological tradition as regards the nature of pratyakṣa as different from more advanced acts of conceptualisation, and the notion of the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna) – with its four traditional stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (īhā), perceptual judgement (apāya) and retention (dhāraṇā) – does not fit into the framework of NA 63. If we analyse all the six models, the idea of the four

62. Kundakunda’s standpoint follows the same lines, cf. PSā 1.57-58:

*para-davaṁ te akkhā neva sahāvo tī appāno bhanidā /
  uvaldham tehi kadham paccakkhaṁ appaño hodi //
  jarī parado vinnānaṁ tamī tu parokkhaṁ ti bhanidam aṭṭhesu /
  jadi kevalena nādaṁ havadi hi jīveṇa paccakkhaṁ //

— ‘These perceiving organs are [made] of different substance. Under no circumstances can they be said to be the essential nature of the cognitive subject (soul). How could possibly what has been grasped by them become direct cognition for the cognitive subject (soul)? As regards objects, what is the discernment through other [means (i.e. senses)] is called indirect cognition; for when cognition arises through the living element (soul) completely is direct cognition.’ See also PSā 1.54.
63. See Model 2 in BALCEROWICZ (2005, § 5).
stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-īhā-apāya-dhāraṇā) occurs in all of them, with the exception of Model III. What these models have in common is their treatment of the four stages (avagraha-īhā-apāya-dhāraṇā) as indirect (parokṣa). And it is not surprising, since only the first stage of sensation (avagraha) could correspond to the perception (pratyakṣa) of other philosophical systems. The remaining stages – speculation (īhā), perceptual judgement (apāya) and retention (dhāraṇā) – involve the process of conceptualisation, rationalising, memorising, etc. Even if one admits that the notion of pratyakṣa does not necessarily have to be taken strictly in the Diinnāgian-Dharmakirtian sense of ‘being free of conceptualisation’ (kalpanāpoḍha) but it may allow, as the Jainas would have it, for pronounced conceptual component (savikalpaka), beside the non-conceptual variety (nirvikalpaka), nevertheless the set ēhā-apāya-dhāraṇā entails deep and extensive involvement of exclusively mental activities. Furthermore, a clear indication of the truly indirect, i.e. conceptual character of the sensuous cognition is a series of expressions synonymous to mati-jñāna from TS 1.13: matiḥ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhini-bodha ity anarthantaram. Similar lists of synonyms can be found in other Jainā works.

4.3. In STP, Siddhasena Divākara clearly admitted of the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna, ābhini-bodhi-kha-jñāna) himself, since he speaks of it explicitly, mentioning its name four times (STP 2.6, 23, 27, 32). Was this mati-jñāna for Divākara just the same kind of cognition as it was to the Jainā tradition prior to him only nominally, whereas in reality he took it to correspond to the sensory perception (pratyakṣa) of non-Jainā traditions and considered mati-jñāna to be in fact ‘direct’ in the sense of direct sensory grasp? I am convinced that such a supposition would neglect the available internal textual evidence.

In fact, Divākara definitely subscribed to the notion of the four stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-īhā-apāya-dhāraṇā), since he refers to the first stage avagraha twice, namely in STP 2.21 : [The

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64. E.g. VABh 396: ābhini-bodhiya, īhā, apohā, vimaṁsā, maggaṇā, gavesanā, saññā, sa, mai, paññā.
65. STP 2.21: damsanaṁ oggahamettiṁ 'ghado' tti niivvaṇanā havai naṇa / jaha etthā kevalāṇa vi visesaṇam ettiyam ceva //
prima facie position to be refuted: ‘Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates "[this is] a pot", [hence it] becomes [the sensuous] cognition. Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...;’ and in STP 2.23-24 66: [Rejoinder:] ‘If you maintain that insight is nothing but [ocular 67] sensation, [or] a qualified cognition, [then], if it were so, it [would] follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be [the case] with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct. [The opponent argues:] “If in [the case of] these [remaining senses] only cognition is understood 68, in the very same way in [the case of] eyes [only cognition should be understood]” 69.’

Avagraha is a well-known technical term and it unequivocally implies the acceptance of the remaining three members of the sensuous cognition, viz. ihā, apāya and dhāranā. Such being the case, the use of the term avagraha not only indicated that Divākara subscribed to the tradition that subdivided the sensuous cognition (mati-jhāna) into the four steps, but he must have classified the sensuous cognition as indirect in view of the indirect, i.e. mental, or conceptual character of the triad: speculation (ihā) – perceptual judgement (apāya) – retention (dhāranā). This is confirmed also by two rejoinders above (STP 2.21,23) quoting the position of a hypothetical opponent. The oppo-


67. In view of the phrase sesimdiya (śeṣendra) in STP 2.24, the sensation here must refer to caksur-avagraha (*cakkhuggaha = ālocana).

68. The form gheppai corresponds to *vgrhp / *vgrhpyate, a root parallel to √grbh (see: PISCHEL (1981: § 212, p. 182, § 534, p. 434 and § 548, p. 441). I would be inclined, nonetheless; to relate it to √khyā / khyāpyate (‘to predicate’; cf. NA 19c: khyāpyate yatra drṣṭante).

69. The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be only respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (gṛhāna-jhāna), and the idea of an olfactory insight (gṛhāna-darśana) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (caksur-jhāna) and reject the idea of ocular insight (caksur-darśana). In the preceding section (STP 2.20) Divākara – following tradition – recognises caksur-darśana as one of four subdivisions of darśana.
nent’s criticism jointly points to a seeming affinity between Jaina avagraha and darśana that could be understood to tally with non-Jaina pratyakṣa. Divākara’s reply shows his intention to prove that darśana is something more and above avagraha.

5. A separate question is the exact semantic relationship between the term daṁsaṇa occurring in STP in a variety of meanings and the term pratyakṣa employed consistently in NA, i.e. whether there is any sense in which the daṁsaṇa of STP corresponds to the pratyakṣa of NA.

5.1. Indeed on some occasions one might have an impression that the daṁsaṇa of STP is used in the sense of perception as such an operation of the cognitive apparatus (not necessarily sense organs in the case of STP) that provides some awareness of an external object, either indistinct (vyañjita) or non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka). This happens for instance in the case of STP 2.25: ‘The cognition as regards an object not [directly] touched [by senses] and beyond the province [of senses] becomes insight (perception?), with the exception of such [cognition that pertains] to the provinces of the future and the past through the [inferential?] sign.’

Similarly, the verses of STP 2.27-29: ‘[27] In [case of] a conditioned person (in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sensuous cognition and testimony; there is no insight in any one of them; wherefrom [should there be] insight [in them]? [28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly, therefore the word “insight” (perception?) does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all.

71. STP 2.25: nānaṁ apuṭṭhe avisae ya athammi daṁsaṇani hoi / mottūna liṅgao jan ānāgayātaya-visaesu //
[29] Since entities not [directly] touched [by senses] become direct[ly cognisable] for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word "insight" is [correctly] employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia.’

Of course, the verses explicate in the first place the three – out of four – subdivisions of darśana (insight / conation) as a subtype of the cognitive faculties (upayoga), viz. caṅṣur-darśana, acāṅṣur-darśana and avadhi-darśana. The issue of the proper interpretation of the term daṁśaṇa in these contexts would, however, require a separate detailed analysis.

5.2. What concerns me here is the peculiarity of expression in STP 2.28 and its comparison with even more peculiar statement of NA 12 73: ‘And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation.’ This startling statement of Siddhasena Mahāmati should be viewed in the context of his thesis of parārtha-pratyakṣa and his attempt to prove that the idea of efficacy for others (pārārtha) and efficacy for oneself (svārtha) is applicable both to perception (pratyakṣa) and to inference (parokṣa). What is important, NA explicitly accepts the idea that perception can be directly generated in other people also through verbal communication 74. In other words, objects are amenable to direct comprehension also on the verbal level and verbal statements can be classified as perception under special conditions.

This stands in contradiction with the statement of STP 2.28 quoted above that ‘objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly’ (paccakkha-ggahaṇaṁ na inti suya-ṇaṇa-sammiyā attāḥ). And it is STP 2.16ab (paṅṇavaṇijjā bhāvā samatta-suya-ṇaṇa-daṁśaṇā-visao /) that links ‘communicable entities’ (prajñāpaniyā bhāvāḥ) with testimony (śrūta).

73. NA 12: pratyakṣa-pratipannārtha-pratipādi ca yad vacah / pratyakṣaṁ pratibhāṣasya nimittatvāt tad ucyate //

74. Cf. NAV ad loc: pratibhāṣasya nimittatvāt pratipādyā-pratyakṣa-prakāśa-het-utvād upacārenācyata ity arthah. – ‘because it is the external factor for the representation’, which means that [an utterance] is called metaphorically [perception] because it is the cause of revealing [an object] through perception to a [person] to be taught.’
6. It is well known that the author of NA is innovative in his attitude with respect to Jaina tradition and seems to go against the Canon, e.g. in his new division of the pramāṇas and in his new definition of pramāṇa, even though ‘everyone knows what it is’ \(^{75}\). Nowhere in the whole text of NA does Siddhasena Mahāmati takes recourse to tradition or the scriptures to corroborate his statements. He solely relies on the power of logic and argument.

This attitude largely differs from the ‘Āgamic’ approach typical of STP, viz. the attempt to remain faithful to the Jaina tradition and to the authority are the Āgamas, even though the ‘Āgamic tradition’ is not always unanimous \(^{76}\).

A good example of such an ‘Āgamic’ attitude is provided by STP 3.10-12. In the first step, Siddhasena Divākara introduces the pārva-pakṣa position: ‘As a matter of fact, two viewpoints were distinguished by the Lord (the Jina), viz. substantial viewpoint (dravyārthika) and modal viewpoint (parvāyārthika); but since there is additionally the “quality” particular, [hence] also qualitative view-point (guṇārthika) should be adopted \(^{77}\).’ This is rather a logical and consistent conclusion, if one accepts that the main divisions of view-points (naya) are derived from the main ontological aspects: the substance and its modes. Since there is also quality (guṇa) as the third aspect underlying the being, and it is even more fundamental ontologically, one would expect a separate viewpoint corresponding to it. Siddhasena Divākara’s rejoinder to this argument is not based directly on logic or reasoning but takes first of all recourse to the stand of the

\(^{75}\) NA 2-3: prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavāhāraś ca tat-kṛtaḥ / pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyōktaḥ jñāyate na prayojanam // prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakṣaṇo kartau prayojanam / tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmāṇaḥ-amanasaṁ iha //

– ‘[The prima facie position to be refuted:] Cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them; [therefore] no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion. [Rejoinder:] The purpose for stating the definition of cognitive criteria, [although they are] well-known, should be the eradication of disorientation concerning that [definition of cognitive criterion] in the case of the disoriented-minded here.’

\(^{76}\) For instance comp. above the lack of unanimity as regards the divisions of the cognitive faculties (upayoga).

\(^{77}\) STP 3.10: do unā nayā bahavayaḥ davvaṭṭhiya-pajjavaṭṭiyā niyayaḥ / etto ya guṇa-viṣeṣe guṇaṭṭhiya-nao vi jujaṁito //
scriptures and the authority: ‘But because what the Venerable One (the Jina) distinguished and expounded to Gautama and other [disciples] in those sūtras is the notion of mode (paryāya), hence [we have] modal [viewpoints]. Even though it is understood that “mode” and “quality” in many ways have the same meaning, nevertheless [we] do not say quality (viz., qualitative viewpoint), because [there is] the designation “modal viewpoint”’.78

7.1. Now, I would like to devote some space to recent arguments brought forward by Bansidhar BHATT (2000), who asserts that: ‘we arrive at a certain conclusion that the author of NV [= Nyāyāvatāra – P.B.] lived after Prajñākara / Darmottara (both: 700-750 A.D.) – terminus a quo…’ (p. 77). This ‘certain conclusion’ has, however, a rather weak basis. In the first place, BHATT practically treats NB and NBT jointly throughout his paper, from the very moment these two works are first mentioned (p. 70), and whenever he refers to the Nyāya-bindu, he consistently writes ‘NB/NBT’, without making much distinction as regards the contents of NB and NBT. It is not surprising that via this petitio principii device one has to finally arrive at the conclusion that Siddhasena Mahāmati lived after Dharmottara.

Secondly, from the fact that NA follows ‘the Buddhist texts on logic, e.g. Pramānasamuccaya, Nyāyapraveśa etc. of Dignāga…, Pramānavigrtti, Nyāyabindu (NB) of Dharmakirti…, Prajñākaraguptabhyāśya…, but more often Dharmottara’s commentary on Nyāyabindu (NBC)…’, BHATT (2000: 71) comes to conclusion that NA must be posterior to all these works! Clearly, Prajñākaragupta in his PVA or Dharmottara in his NBT had to follow the pattern of the works which they decided to comment on, viz. Dharmakirti’s PV and NB respectively. But there is nothing that would logically compel us

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78. STP 3.11-12: jaṁ ca puṇa arihayā tesa tesu sutesu goyamāṇaṁ / pajiṣṭhā-sannāṁ niyāyā vāgariyā tena pajiṣṭhā // parigamaṇaṁ pajiṣṭhā aṅega-karaṇaṁ gaṇaṁ tī tālātrāḥ / tatha viṇa gaṇaṁ tī bannai pajiṣṭhā-nāya-desanā dhamnaḥ //

to assume that NA, which did follow the pattern of NB, is posterior to NBT, which follows the identical structure.

His third and final argument to prove that Siddhasena was posterior to Prajñākaragupta, to which he devotes a few more lines, is based on the rather curious idea of ‘perception for others’ (parārtha-pratyakṣa), most probably the innovation of Siddhasena Mahāmati himself and clearly modelled on Diṅnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s distinction of two kinds of inference, but later on dropped by most, though not all, thinkers of the Jaina tradition. BHATT (2000: 73) maintains that: ‘A new variety of pratyakṣa, viz. parārtha pratyakṣa in Indian logic is introduced by the NV [= Nyāyavatara – P.B.] (v. 11). This represents a clear influence of Prajñākara who provided the NV-author with an idea of parārtha pratyakṣa (cp. yady anumā-notpādanā vacanam anumānam, pratyakṣotpādanāt, v. 1.: vacanam api parārtham pratyakṣam bhavet. PVB [= Pramāṇa-vārttikālāṅkāra P.B.] 3/4.1.1., p. 476; cp. also: NV v. 10cd with this PVB-statement).’

7.2. The first part of the argument about Siddhasena’s authorship of the idea of parārtha-pratyakṣa is indeed sound, however, its latter part is a result of some confusion. When we read the whole passage of Prajñākaragupta from which BHATT extracted just a line (vide infra, bolded), we realise that the quotation referred to by BHATT is, in fact, an objection against Prajñākaragupta’s position (!), which he subsequently refutes. In the excerpt, Prajñākaragupta explains why it is possible that genuine inferential process (svārthānumāna), which has been essentially carried out by the cogniser himself who witnessed the events that are the basis for generalisation, can be demonstrated verbally to another person and evoke a similar cognition in the hearer; hence, even though the proof formula is, strictly speaking, merely a verbal statement, it is metaphorically called inference for others (parārthānumāna), because it generates the same inferential conclusion in the hearer as it did in the speaker. Prajñākaragupta insists that

80. See: BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xii ff.).

81. E.g. by Vādideva-sūri in PNTĀA 3.26 or by Guṇaratna-sūri in TRD, p. 223 ff., see BHATT (2000: 76, nn. 27, 28).

82. See above § 5.2; cf. also BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 367-368, § 8).
this metaphorical transference, does not, however, apply to perception. The complete passage of PVA, p. 467.15-26, reads as follows:

‘However, the comprehension of the inferable property which has become the subject of the debate [is possible] by means of the demonstration of the triple-formed inferential sign, therefore [its] statement (sc. verbal demonstration of a proof formula) [which is inference for others (parārthānumāna)] is not pointless. Because inference is produced on the account of this [verbal statement], also it is inference due to metaphorical transference of the genuinely inferential character of the inference for oneself (svārthānumāna)].

[Objection:] “If the statement, [which is called the inference for others, is] inference because it produces inference, then [a verbal statement] is also perception for others, because it produces perception”. No such quadruplet [is possible, viz. inference for oneself (svārthānumāna), inference for others (parārthānumāna), perception for oneself (svārtha-pratyakṣa) and perception for others (parārtha-pratyakṣa)].

2] Perception never arises with respect to anything in the same way (sc. on account of the statement) as inference is produced: when one remembers the relation (sc. invariable concomitance) on account of the statement [of the logical reason].

3] When one remembers the triple-formed inferential sign, there necessarily arises inference. However, when a statement [is formulated by one person which describes] only an object that one has cognised oneself, no one [else except for the speaker] cognises [this object] through perception [on account of the statement].

[In other words,] no perception arises on account of merely a statement.

[Objection:] “[When one person exclaims:] «Look! A deer is running!», [the other person] looks [in that direction], [and in this way] there arises perception [in that person]”.

No, also in this case [on account of the statement] there immediately arises inference [and not perception]. For it is as follows:

4] [A person] is enjoined to direct one’s sight towards this object as follows: “Look!” [in the sense that:] “[This object which] I have [just] cognised [myself], has been demonstrated in the context”.

[So,] this is a statement of injunction [formulated by the speaker]: “Direct your sight there!” in the sense of taking a look at the deer. And [further]: “Just as I have directed my sight [towards this deer], so you, too, [look there]”. Then, when [the other person] is directing [one’s] sight towards [that deer] in this way, there [takes place] the operation of logical reasons: remem-
As we can see, there can be no doubt that Prajñaśkaragupta rejects even a slightest possibility of ‘perception for others’ \(^85\). In his opinion, what the opponent – doubtlessly a Jaina thinker – considers to be perception for others is an inferential process, triggered by the verbal instruction: ‘Look! A deer is running’, which can be summarised as

\[^{83}\text{PVA, p. 467.15-26: tri-rūpa-linga-prakāśana-dvārena tu vivādāspadibhātānu-meyapratipatitī iti na vacanasya vyarthāt. tato 'numānām udeśī tadd apy anumānām upacārāt. yady anumānānāpādanād vacanam anumānāṁ pratyaśiptādanāt pratyaśakṣam api parārthaṁ bhavet. nēdām caturasram.}
\[^{2}\text{yathā grhīta-sambandha-smarane vacanāt sati / anumānādoyasa tadvan na pratyaśiptādayaṁ kvacit /}
\[^{3}\text{tri-rūpa-linga-smarane niyamenānumādayaṁ / sva-pratārtho mātrasya vacanā 'dhyākṣaṁvin na tu / na vacana-mātrād adhyākṣaṁ parasyo-dēti. nanu 'paśa mrgo dhāvatītī drśyate darśanādayaṁ. na, tatrāpy anumānāsāyānantaratvāt. tathā hi –}
\[^{4}\text{tad-arthānukṣhataṁ sa paśyey evaṁ niuyyate / mayā pratītam etat ca sāmārthyaṁ pratipāditaṁ / abhimukhī-ḥavaṁ mṛga-darśaṇa iti niyoga-vacanam etat: abhimukhī-ḥava sa yathā mama tathā tavāpi. tata evam abhimukhī-ḥavane hetūṁānā vyāpāra iti smaran pravartata ity anumānam eva. tato 'numānāṁ pratyaśakṣaṁ-sambhavam álocaṇa pravartate.}
\[^{84}\text{The same idea is elaborated also by Durveka Miśra in DhPr, p. 89: nanu ca parārthānāmānādāpaka-vākyavad asti kiñcīna vāyānāḥ yat para-pratyaśiptayogī. yathā "eṣa kalabho dhāvatī" vākyam. atāḥ parārthānāmānāvat parārthāh pratyaśakṣam kiṁ na vyupādayata iti? atrācyate – parokṣārtha-pratipatte yā sāmātī – lingāsya pakṣa-dharmatā sādhyā-vyāpīte ca – tad-ākhyaṁ nādyam vacanām upacārataḥ parārthānūnāmānām ucyate. na tu tatra kathānic ca āṅga-ḥavā-mātenā, svāsthyāder api tathā prasangāt. idāṁ punah 'ayaṁ kalabhaḥ' ity-ādi-vākyam na pratyaśiptāy yā sāma-grindriyālokaṁ tad-abhidhānāṁ tan-nimīttāṁ bhavat tathā vyapadeśam āśnute yena vyupādayātām api aśnuita. kiṁ tarhi? kasyacid didrkṣā-mātra-jananaṁ. yathā kathaṁcit para-pratyaśiptatāv āṅga-ḥavā-mātenā śādāpye netroṣave vastuṁ sannihite 'pi kathānic parāṁ-mukhasaḥ parena yad abhimukha-karanāṁ śirasas tad api vacanāmakaṁ parārtha-pratyaśakṣaṁ vyupādayātīr vyupādayātām āpadyeta. etac ca kah svaṣṭhāṁ manasi nīveśayet. kiṁ ca bhavatu tathā-vidhāṁ vacanām parārthāh pratyaśakṣaṁ. kiṁ naś chinnam?...}
\[^{85}\text{See also Manorathanaśand in PVV ad PV1 1.3bc (p. 4.2-4): artha-kriyānirbhāsaṁ tu pratyaśakṣaṁ svata evārtha-kriyānubhāvātpakṣaṁ na tatra parārtha-kriyāpekyata iti tad api svato niścita-pramāṇaṁ.}
follows: ‘He has seen a deer; if I look there the way he does, I will also see it’.

Instead of finding in the above passage ‘a clear influence of Prajñākara who provided the NV-author with an idea of ‘parārtha pratyakṣa’, we see just the opposite: it is Prajñākaragupta who criticises the idea formulated in NA. This criticism cannot prove that the person whom Prajñākaragupta had in mind was Siddhasena Mahāmati and his NA. All we can with certainty say is that the criticism is directed against the same idea which we find in NA, and which may have been also maintained by some other thinker(s) who might have directly provoked Prajñākaragupta censure. We cannot, however, claim with absolute certitude – but with a high degree of probability – that it was indeed Siddhasena Mahāmati who was the inventor of the notion of parārtha-pratyakṣa.

Additional corroboration for the above hypothesis is provided by Siddharṣi-gaṇin, the commentator on NA. In his Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, he refers to Prajñākaragupta critical remarks, and reasserts the genuineness of parārtha-pratyakṣa:

‘If perception were conjectured to be superior, on account of [the argument that] in certain cases the indirect cognition proceeds by the force of the relation which has [first] been grasped by perception, [then] the superiority of the indirect cognition would follow immediately on account of [the argument that] it is [also] an empirical fact that [1] a perception the province of which is a deer [that is observed] due to a sudden movement of the neck by the force of the speech element (sc. expression): “Look! A deer is running!” etc., [or] similarly [2] a perception the domain of which is a forest or a temple, etc. [that are recognised] either due to the recollection [of the forest or the temple, etc.] as such or due to grasping the linguistic convention [relating the word “temple” and the object temple] as such with curiosity, etc., to see objects not seen before, is preceded by the indirect cognition [in both cases].’

86. NAV 1.8, p. 341: kvacit pratyakṣa-parigṛhita-sambandha-balāt parokṣaṁ pravartata iti pratyakṣasya jyeṣṭhatva-kalpane “paśya mṛga dhāvaṭity” -ādi-sābbad-balāt kṛkāti-koi-motana-dvāreṇa mṛga-visayam, tathā smaranāt saṅketa-grahaṇād vāpurvāvpurvārthā-darśana-kūṭalādānā vana-deva-kulādi-gocaraṁ parokṣa-pārvatī pratyakṣaṁ ḍṛṣṭam iti parokṣasya jyeṣṭhata-saṣajeta. A rejoinder to Siddharṣi-gaṇin’s position seem to have been formulated subsequently by Durveka Miśra, see n. 84.
The injunction within the bolded phrase is exactly the same as the one found in Prajñākaragupta, and the detailed description of the whole process which finally leads to ‘perception for others’, triggered by a verbal statement, is to explicate the perceptual nature of this process, as against Prajñākaragupta’s position.

The fact that it is Siddharṣī-gaṇin who, in his commentary on NA, defends the idea propounded by Siddhasena Mahāmati in NA may lend some additional support to the claim that it was indeed the Nyāyāvatāra which Prajñākaragupta had in mind. And that may be taken as a corroboration of the hypothesis that the time of composition of the Pramāṇa-vārttikā-lakāra is terminus ad quem for Siddhasena Mahāmati. As long as we do not prove that it was indeed Siddhasena Mahāmati who was the first to introduce the idea of parārtha-numāna this remains only a very probable postulate. This does not have much bearing on the dating of Siddhasena Mahāmati in view of the fact that the date of Prajñākaragupta is to be assigned to the similar time, i.e. circa 800\(^87\), as the date of Haribhadra-sūri\(^88\), which is accepted as the upper limit for that Nyāyāvatāra.

8. Is has been frequently suggested that the structure of NA is not intact, or that some of the verses of the text are interpolations. As a matter of fact, if we analyse all secondary literature written on NA, we see that reservations have been occasionally expressed about the genuineness of perhaps half of all the verses of NA! Recently a similar suggestion has been voiced also by Bhatt (2000), who drew our attention to a number of verses which may imply, in his opinion, that they were not originally an integral part of NA. On subsequent pages I shall try to evaluate such arguments and discuss the place of the spurious verses in the general structure of NA.

8.1. We should approach with special caution, as Bhatt (2000: 73) warns us, the verses of NA 8-9: ‘However, the original text of the NV does not appear to be intact. NV v. 8-9 describing sābda pramāna have almost similar expressions, e.g. drṣṭeṣṭāvyāhata- (v. 8a); adṛṣṭeṣṭa-virodha- (v. 9b); tattva-grāhita- (v. 8c); tattvopadeśa- (v. 9c)

etc. It is certain that v. 9, being confined furthermore to the śāstra and not referring to the śābda in general, is spurious in general, is spurious in the logical treatise, viz. the NV. Moreover, it is not in agreement with the scheme the NV-author certainly had in mind, viz. to encompass precisely the subject matter of logic in a small compendium.’ As a matter of fact, in expressing his reservations about NA 8, BHATT revives the arguments brought forward, among others, by P.L. Vaidya in his introduction to NA3 (p. xiii-xiv, xxviii) and MUKHTAR (1956).

The repetition of a phrase is hardly a conclusive ground to question the authenticity of any verse in NA. On the contrary, we can see that some verses in such a relatively short treatise reveal a repetitive character, just to compare three cases of pairs of adjoining verses:

2a, d: prasiddhāni pramāṇāni ... jñāyate na prayojanam and
3ab: prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakshanāktau prayojanam
22a: anyathānupapanntavam and
23b: yo ‘nyathaivōpapadyate
24ab: sādharmyeṇātra dṛṣṭānta-dōṣā nyāya-vid-īritāḥ
25ab: vaidharmyeṇātra dṛṣṭānta-dōṣā nyāya-vid-īritāḥ

By applying the suggested method to discard all verses that contain repetitions one would end with perhaps with a handful of verses. The main point, as a matter of fact, concerns the occurrence of śāstra, which might seem ‘spurious in the logical treatise’. A closer analysis will reveal that the reference to śāstra / āpta not only is relevant to the discussion of epistemological issues, especially in the context of debate with Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, but also it is absolutely essential in the structure of NA, which offers a new model of pramāṇas. The sequence of the verses runs as follows:

NA 8

NA 9: definition of a reliable source of verbal cognition (śāstra + āpta / āptopajñā),

89. See n. 30.
90. NA 9:

āptopajñānam anullaṅghyam adṛśṭēṣṭa-virodhakam /
tattvopadeśa-kṛt sārvam śāstraṁ kāpatha-ghaṭṭanam //

‘Authoritative treatise is that which has been discerned by an authoritative per-
NA 10\(^91\): definition of *parârthânānumāna* as a special kind of verbal cognition, in which the reliable source is what the speaker himself experienced.

Thus, Siddhasena’s idea is to prove that there are only two *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, the latter comprising all categories of cognitions that are not *pratyakṣa*. In this way, Siddhasena emulates Diśnāga’s manoeuvre who first (PS 1.3) describes the nature of *pratyakṣa* as being free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and then subsumes all other kinds of cognition under one general heading of *anumāna*, including inferences for oneself and for the others (PS 2.1ab and PS 3.1ab) as well as verbal cognition (*sābda*, PS 5.1: *na pramāṇāntaram sābdam anumānāt*), along with testimonial cognition derived from an authority (*āpta*, PS 2.5: *āpta-vādāvi-sanvāda-sāmānyād anumānātā*). In the case of NA, all kinds of cognition other than *pratyakṣa*, which is defined as first, are subsumed under the heading of *parokṣa*. Just as Diśnāga specifically singled out *sābda* and emphasised that also verbal cognitions, including those based on testimony of authority, are comprised under *anumāna*, Siddhasena Mahāmāti holds that verbal cognition (*sābda*, NA 8,9) and inference (NA 10), with its two subtypes ‘for oneself’ and ‘for others’ (*svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *parārtha-pratyakṣa*, NA 11), are likewise different varieties of *parokṣa*\(^92\). Therefore the place of NA 8 and 9 is justified in the whole scheme of cognitions. In other words, not only does Siddhasena do precisely what Diśnāga did when he comprised *sābda / āpta-vāda* under *anumāna*, but even terms used in both cases are almost identical!

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son, which is not negligible, which does not contradict what is accepted or what is experienced, which gives the instruction about reality, which is for everybody [and] which obliterates errant paths.”

91. NA 10:

\[
\textit{sva-niścayavad anyesāṁ niścayātpādanam budhaiḥ /} \\
\textit{parārthām mānam ākhyātāṁ vākyāṁ tad-upacārataḥ //}
\]

– ‘A sentence which brings about the determination for others – just the way [it brings about] the determination for oneself – is called by the learned the cognitive criterion for others because of the metaphorical transference of this [cognitive criterion onto the sentence].’

92. For further details see: BALCEROWICZ (2005, §§ 3, 4).
In addition to that, Siddhasena’s peculiar, as it were, usage of the term śāstra in a logical-epistemological treatise finds its precedence again in Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Diṅnāga. In the well-known opening verse, which is a homage to the Buddha, we read:

‘Having paid to [the Buddha] who is a cognitive criterion, who strives for the welfare of the world, who is the teacher (śāstṛ), the well-gone, the rescuer...’

And further Diṅnāga explains that ‘the cause [why the Buddha is a cognitive criterion] is his perfection in inner disposition and in its application. The application [of being a cognitive criterion] is his being a teacher because he edifies the world.’ Instead of śāstṛ, Siddhasena speaks of śāstra, but in an active sense of śāstṛ: ‘authoritative treatise is that ... which gives the instruction about reality’ (tattvopadeśa-kṛt śārvaṁ śāstraṁ). As we can easily notice, the idea, the wording and the epistemological context are very similar in both cases.

Thus, there remains nothing that could seriously disprove that either NA 8 or 9 are out of place or are some later interpolations.

8.2. Bansidhar Bhatt (2000: 74) expresses his further reservations: ‘The NV v. 27 defining the pratyakṣa as kevala appears all of a sudden between the final topic on the parāṛtha anumāṇa (v. 26) and the conclusion of the entire thesis, viz. pramāṇa-phala (v. 28), without any specific hint of it at the initial stage (v. 1, 4, 6 etc.). It is an interpolation.’

We should remember that the concern of the author of the Nyāyāvatāra, which is so closely tight to epistemological-logical issues, is not only to present a new model of epistemology, but also to present it in such a way that it may further serve as the basis of and proof for both Jaina ontology and soteriology, the latter being of paramount interest to the Jainas. This should, again, come to us as no surprise: it suffices to recall the opening verse of Pramāṇa-samuccaya, which correlates soteriological issues and epistemology, as well Dharmakirti’s two introductory verses to his Pramāṇa-vārttika. Even

93. PS 1.1ab: pramāṇa-bhātāya jagad-dhitaiṣīne praṇamya śāstre sugatāya ṭāyine/, quoted in PV1 (Pariśīṣṭa, p. 518.26).
94. PSV: tatra hetur āśaya-prayoga-sāmpat. ... prayogo jagac-chāsanāc chāṭṛtvam.
the chapter called Pramāṇa-siddhi of PV is formally a commentary on the idea of the Buddha’s pramāṇa-bhātvatva. Therefore there should be nothing extraordinary if we come across any soteriological discussion in NA. And precisely such is ultimately the relevance of NA 27 (n. 41), as I shall try to demonstrate in subsequent lines.

The verse NA 27 introduces the idea of perfect perception (kevala), after all ‘mundane’ varieties of cognition, direct and indirect, have been discussed in the preceding. Thus, the placement of the verse after the parārthānumāna section does not seem illogical or unjustified. On the other hand, it is hardly conceivable that NA could do without even mentioning the notion of kevala-jñāna, because it has always played paramount role in Jaina epistemology, ontology and soteriology. And the most suitable place to mention perfect perception, which is the consummation of all cognitive processes, is in the concluding portion on epistemological issues.

The emphasis on perfect cognition (kevala) was understood, for it fulfilled at least three cardinal functions in Jainism: ontological, epistemological and soteriological. According to Jaina ontology, the structure of the world was highly complex, in which all elements were related to the rest; consequently, the proper description of the reality, of its multiplex character (anekānta), would have to take into consideration all these intricate relations. A complete account of the multiplexity is possible on the level of perfect cognition, which can grasp all complexities. In such a way, only absolute perception (kevala) which perfectly reflects all relations in the world is the warrant for the idea of ontological premise of anekānta.

Besides, being staunch realists, the Jainas maintained that one of the proofs of the multiplexity of reality is the multiplex representation of the world as it is reflected in cognition. A typical argument ran as follows: since any piece of knowledge has a multiplex character, so must be also the world reflected through it. 95 Absolute cognition was

95. See e.g. (1) SVīV 1.27 (p. 115.11 ff.): ata evānekānta-siddhiḥ. ... tad evaṁ paramārthānatah siddhiḥ anekāntāt. — ‘Precisely on the basis [of this act of grasping] the multiplexity [of data] is established. ... Thus, in exactly such a way, [we arrive at] a proof [of multiplex reality] on the level of the ultimate truth, because of multiplexity [of appearance]’; (2) NAV 29.1: iha yat pramāṇāni tat parasparāvivartanāh dharmān parikartāt vastro grāhakāni tabalva tatra pratibhāsānāvād; iha yad
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considered the most perfect and full representation of the complexity of the world. For this very reason, extrasensory cognition of kevala-jñāna (NA 27), being the paramount representation of anekānta, is followed almost immediately by its mundane equivalent, viz. the naya-vāda (NA 29), that also proves anekānta, albeit in an imperfect manner.

The soteriological dimension of kevala was equally important. Absolute cognition served as a necessary link to prove that liberation is possible, and was used in the so-called ‘purification argument’. The full argument boils down to the following: ‘You can purify yourself completely, because there is a method. Since your nature is consciousness, when you become absolutely pure, you are by nature endowed with absolute knowledge.’ This kind of popular proof was possible only within Jaina ontology thanks to two crucial elements: (1) peculiar understanding of the soul’s nature as intrinsically pure and omniscient and (2) the idea of karman as subtle matter, or dirt, that obstructs innate capacities of the soul. In Jainism ātman was conceived of as both the cognitive subject and cognitive instrument.

yatra pratibhāti, tad eva tad-gocaratayāḥhyupagantavyaṃ; tad – yathā nirādīnava-nayana-prabhava-dārśane pratibhāṣamānaṃ pātalayā japa-kusumāṇa tathāva tad-gocaratayāḥhyupagamyate; parasparāvidvabhaktāneka-svabhāvākṛanta-mārtikāṃ ca bahir antaś ca vastu sarva-pramāṇo prathata ity; atas tad eva teṣāṃ gocaraḥ. – [1. The thesis:] in this world, whatever is a cognitive criterion, it [also] grasps the real thing that is accompanied by multiple properties not detached from each other; [2. the logical reason:] because this [multiplex object] alone is represented in that [cognitive criterion]; [3. the invariable concomitance accompanied by the example:] in this world, [if an object] x occurs in [a cognitive criterion (cognition)] y, this [object] x alone should be accepted as the domain of this [cognitive criterion (cognition)] y; thus, [for instance]: just the way a [scarlet] China rose flower is being represented as roseate in perception having its origin in flawless eyesight, exactly as such (sc. as a roseate object) it is accepted as the domain of that [cognitive criterion]; [4. the application:] and [similarly] the real thing, both external and internal, endowed with a form that is under the sway of multiplex essential natures not separate from each other, unfolds itself in all cognitive criteria; [5. the conclusion:] hence, this [multiplex object] alone is the domain of those [all cognitive criteria].’ (3) NAV 29.9: tasmāt tasyayā va tatra pratibhāsanāt “sarva-sanvidāṃ anekāntām makaṇāṃ vastu gocara” iti sthitam. – ‘Hence, it is established that the real thing, whose essence is multiplex, [forms] the domain of all acts of awareness, because this [multiplex object] alone is represented in that [cognitive criterion].’

96. In its elaborate form it runs in two stages. The first stage has the form: ‘The cognitive subject is such whose complete purification is possible, because the means
Accordingly, a reference to this most important notion from the Jaina point of view finds its most adequate place in the structure of the Nyāyāvatāra: NA 27 concludes the discussion of pramāṇas, whereas the subsequent verse (NA 28\textsuperscript{97}) discusses their practical relevance and results (phala). After strictly epistemological issues have been dealt with, NA 29 describes the nature of the object of cognitions, NA 30 relates ontological concerns to epistemology and establishes the rela-

for [his] purification exists. In this world, whatever is such the means for the purification [of which] exists is [also] such the complete purification of which is possibly existent, like a particular gem for the purification of which the means exists, [namely] prolonged calcination in a clay furnace with the alkali, etc. And indeed the cognitive subject is such for whose purification the means exists, [namely] repeated practice of cognition, etc., hence [the cognitive subject is] such whose complete purification is possibly existent.' (NAV 27.4; sambhavat-samasta-śuddhika ātmā, vidyamāna-śuddhy-upāyatvād; iha yo yo vidyamāna-śuddhy-upāyaḥ sa sa sambhavat-samasta-śuddhiko; yathā vidyamāna-kṣāra-mṛt-puṭa-pākādi-śuddhy-upāyo ratna-viśeṣas, tathā ca vidyamāna-jñānādy-abhyaśa-śuddhy-upāya ātmātāh sambhavat-samasta-śuddhika iti.) This first stage of the argument only proves that purification of the soul is possible, but it still does not prove that supernatural perception or omniscience is possible. In the second stage, the following equation is established: cogniser = cognition (because of the same nature): 'And the cognitive subject, [when] completely purified, is called the absolute, because there is no difference at all between cognition and cogniser.' (NAV 27.4; sāmasyā-śuddhās cātmā jñāna-jñāninoḥ kathaṃcid abhedat kevalam abhidhiyata iti.) Both stages of this argument was formulated as early as in Kundakunda's works; SSā 278 recounts simile of a transparent crystal (= the knower) which is in its nature unaffected by colours (= passions) but is seemingly changing, the implication of the simile is that the crystal can be cleansed from colours that affect it. The idea that the soul can be omniscient by nature and the soul's knowledge can embrace everything is found e.g. in PSā 1.20, 28. The proof is formulated also by Hemacandra, who instead of the precious stone, speaks of clouds veiling the sun and the moon: 'The veiling of [the self] of knowing essence is possible through cognition-veiling and other types of karman just like the moon and the sun [can be covered] by dust, fog, cloud, veil etc.; and like a blow of wind strong enough can remove [the veils obscuring] the moon and the sun, so can meditation and contemplation [remove veils obscuring the knowing self].' (PMīv 1.15 § 50 (p. 12.20-22): prakāśa-svabhāvasyāpi candrārkāder iva rajo-nihāhārabhrah-paṭalādibhir iva jñānāvaraṇiyādi-karmabhir āvaranasya sambhāvāt, candrārkāder iva prabala-pavamāna-prāyair dhyāna-bhāvanādibhir vilayasyeti.)

\textsuperscript{97} NA 28: pramāṇasya phalaṁ sāksād ajñāna-vinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekṣe sēṣasyādāna-hāna-dhiḥ //

– 'The direct result of cognitive criterion is the cessation (sc. removal) of nescience; [the result] of the absolute [cognition] is [both] happiness and indifference; [the result] of the remaining [ones] is the faculty of appropriation and avoidance.'
tionship between cognition and the reality, NA 31 \(^{98}\) characterises the cognitive subject. The structure of the work in itself appears to be quite coherent.

Conspicuously, this structure of NA 27-28, 31 corresponds also to that of the last chapter of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. In TS, first the causes of the *kevala* knowledge are mentioned, viz. ‘the destruction of confusion (sc. delusive *karman*) as well as the destruction of [the *karman*] veiling cognition, of [the *karman*] veiling insight (conation) and of the obstructive [*karman*], all of them infecting innate cognitive capacities of the soul. \(^{99}\) The contents of TS 10.1 corresponds to NA 28ab: ‘The direct result of cognitive criterion is the removal of nescience’ (*pramāṇasya phalam sāksād ajñāna-vinivartanam*). Secondly, Umasvāmin describes the result of perfect cognition, which is liberation, and defines it as a complete freedom (*vipramokṣa*), or destruction of (*kṣaya*) of all *karmans*, which are both the cause and manifestation of suffering. \(^{100}\) Again, this corresponds to NA 28c: ‘[the result of the absolute [cognition] is [both] happiness and indifference’ (*kevalasya sukhōpekṣe*). The subsequent portion of TS is an account of the final journey of the liberated soul to the top of the world, the abode of perfected beings (*siddha-loka*), which has no relevance in epistemological context. Clearly, it is understandable that it finds no equivalent in NA. However, the final aphorism of TS describes the nature of a perfected soul \(^{101}\), and is echoed by NA 31. The final verse of NA 32 is merely a summary.

As we can see, also final verses of NA do not only form a consistent whole, but even comply with the contents of the traditional Jaina

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98. NA 31: pramātā svānya-nirbhāśi kartā bhoktā vivṛttimān /
sva-saṁvedana-saṁsiddha jīvah kṣity-ādy-anātmakāḥ //

‘The cogniser is the observer of himself and of something different, the agent, the experiencing subject, is subject to change, is well-established by self-cognition, is the living element [and is someone] whose essence is not of earth, etc.’

100. The Śvetāmbara recension reads it as two separate sūtras TS1 10.2-3: bandha-hetv-abhāva-nirjarāhṛtyām, kṛṣna-karma-kṣayo mokṣāḥ; the Digambara recension reads it as one sūtra, with a slight modification TS2 10.2: bandha-hetv-abhāva-nirjarāhṛtyām kṛṣṇa-karma-vipramokṣo mokṣāḥ.
textbook. In view of the above, it is most debatable whether one should consider any of these kārikās an interpolation.

8.3. In addition, Bansidhar Bhatt (2000: 74) dismisses the authenticity of NA 27 on metrical grounds (‘it is an interpolation’), whereupon adds: ‘In contradistinction to v. 27, the authenticity of v. 26 cannot be questioned despite of its defective meter. ... Probably, this verse has been somehow disturbed.’ No additional reasons are offered, why one of the two verses is accepted as spurious, whereas the other one is taken as authentic. Indeed, both the verses have defective meter and both have irregular number of syllables: NA 26 has only 7 syllables in pāda b, whereas NA 27 has 9 syllables in pāda a! Since NA 26 and 27 share the same fate of being abhinna-yoga-kṣema (sc. are based on identical productive-supportive principle) in metrical terms, such a conclusions seem arbitrary. Either one should reject the authenticity of both, or accept them both as genuine constituents of NA, at least in terms of metrical analysis.

8.4. Concluding the main section of his paper, Bhatt (2000: 75) briefly points to some terminological affinity between Prajñākara-gupta’s Pramāṇa-vārttikālāṅkāra and NA, which should, as far as I can understand, prove that NA is posterior to PVA: ‘Some of its [of NA 32] expressions can be compared with those of PVB e.g. saṁvyavahārikam etad (= pramāṇam)..., and vyavahārataḥ ... pramāṇatva-vyavasthitī – (PVB 1.5.197, pp. 25-26).’ Apart from the fact, that there is only a loose similarity in terms of terminology with the above-quoted expressions (NA 32 has: pramāṇādi-vyavasthēyam and sarva-saṁvyavahartīṁāṁ), so it would not be easy to prove any direct relationship between PVB and NA on this basis only, the way the conclusion is reached is rather problematic. Indeed, when we compare expressions found in NA 32 with terminology found in other

102. NA 32: pramāṇādi-vyavasthēyam anādi-nidhanātmikā / sarva-saṁvyavahartīṁāṁ prasiddhāpi prakīrtitā //
− ‘The distinctive character of cognitive criteria etc., by nature with no beginning nor end, even though [it is] well-known to all [people] absorbed in everyday life, is [here] declared.’
works, we discover similarities not only with Prajñākaragupta and his PVA, but with a number of other Buddhist works that precede Prajñākaragupta. The two expressions which BHATT has in mind bear also resemblance to some expressions found in the Pramāṇa-vārttika: PV1 2.58cd: arthakriyānurodhena pramāṇatvam vyavasthitam //, PV1 1.5ab: prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāreṇa śāstraṁ moha-nivartanam //, PV1 4.183: anumānānumeyārtha-vyavahāra-sthitis tv iyaṁ // This only shows that both Siddhasena and Prajñākaragupta were influenced by Dharmakirti. On this basis it would not be possible to establish any relative chronology between Siddhasena and Prajñākaragupta.

9. The authenticity of NA 16, viz. the illustration of a skilled archer, has frequently been questioned, most recently by BHATT (2000: 72). Indeed it is rather surprising to find, in such short treatise, a single explicit example which does not seem absolutely necessary at all: one could easily imagine the treatise without it.

Let us first take a closer look at the context in which this puzzling simile transpires, viz. NA 14-16:

'[14] The thesis is the acceptance of the inferable property; [it] is not revoked by perception, etc.; the pronouncement of it has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason.

[15] Otherwise, for a [person] to be apprised, who is confused regarding the domain of the logical reason intended by the proponent, the logical reason might appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like...

[16] ...for a person watching an archer’s skill, the archer who hits without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both] skill and its opposite.'

Conspicuously, NA 16 is announced with yathā in NA 15d, through which both verses are syntactically connected. One might,

103. NA 14-16:
[14] sādhyābhyyapagamaḥ paksāḥ pratyaksādy-anirākṛtaḥ / tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dipakaḥ //
[16] dhānuśka-gūna-samprekiṣi-janasya parividyāyaḥ / dhānuśkasya vinā lakṣya-nirdeśeṇa guṇētarav //
however, easily argue that yathā was a later modification after a new verse (NA 16) was inserted.

On the other hand, we can see that the three verses follow in a logical sequence: NA 14 defines the subject of the thesis (pakṣa) and, most importantly, verbalises the necessity to formulate it as a required member in a proof formula; NA 15 is a prasaṅga-type of argument: without a clear pronouncement of the thesis, the debaters and spectators may come to the conclusion that one’s thesis is a fallacy (pakṣāb- hāsa); NA 16 is a typical dṛṣṭānta to illustrate the idea. So much effort (and space!) just to express the importance of pakṣa in the proof formula? That appears striking. Clearly, NA 15 and 16 must have been formulated against an opinion of someone who maintained that no pratijñā / pakṣa is necessary at all.

In the Pramāṇa-vārttika we find the context for this puzzle. Dharmakīrti argues that statement of the thesis (pakṣa-vacana) is not a necessary member of the proof formula, because it does not possess any capacity to prove anything, PV 4.18-22:

‘[18] The assertion of the incapability [to prove anything on the part] of this [statement of the thesis (pakṣa-vacana, PV 4.16)] is made on the ground that [the statement of the thesis] has [merely] as its contents the object (sc. inferable property) of the logical reason.

[Objection:] “Also this [statement of the thesis must] have the capability [to prove], because it facilitates the statement of the logical reason”.

[19] [Rejoinder:] [Then,] for a person who wishes to know [the true state of affairs] due to his doubt as regards this [inferable property (sc. whether it is present or not)], there should [also] be a ground for an opportunity [to produce this doubt as a proving member of the proof formula]. Also, when one accepts a counter-proposition, this [should be accepted] as equal [member of the proof formula, that proves the thesis]. Thus, there would be infinite regress (sc. no limit to the number of efficient members that prove).

[20] However, the intrinsic efficacy [to prove the thesis] lies in three features [of the logical reason]. Only the statement of these [three features] prevails as that which activates the memory as regards these [three features, and thus has the capacity to prove.]

[21] [Objection:] “For when [the logical reason] is established [to have its scope] only on account of the demonstration of the scope – because
the operation of the logical reason would be impossible, if the scope [of inference (sc. thesis)] were not demonstrated – this [logical reason] is capable of proving the thesis].”

[22] [Rejoinder:] [A reply] to this has already been given [in PV 4.19], [namely that] also without this [scope being demonstrated (sc. without the statement of the thesis)], even when one asserts [only]: “Sound is [something] which has been produced, [hence] all [entities] like this are impermanent”, [then] the comprehension of the impermanence of this [sound] should occur by implication.’

With the purpose to disprove Dharmakīrti’s position, Siddhasena Mahāmati inserts the simile in order to show the proper role of the thesis. He does agree that pakṣa is not an integral part of the proof formula in the logical sense, inasmuch as it has no ‘proving capacity’. Its role is rather didactic, to clearly demonstrate what the proof formula is intended for. But also the thesis corroborates the soundness of the

104. PV1 / PV3 4.18-22:
hetv-artha-viśayatvena tad-aśaktōktir īritā /
 śaktis tasyāpi ced dhetu-vacanasya pravartanāt //
 tat-saṁśayena jiññāsor bhavet prakaraṇādṛśrayaḥ /
 vipaksōpagame ’py etat tulyam ity anavasthitā //
antar-aṅgam tu sāmarthyaṁ triṣu rūpeṣu sanīśhitam /
tatra smṛti-saṁādhānaṁ tad-vacasya eva sanīśhitam //
akhyāpīte hi viṣaye hetu-vṛttte asamābhavāt /
viṣaya-khyāpanād eva siddhau cet tasya śaktatā //
uktam atrā vināpy asmāt kṛtakah śabda idṛṣṭāh /
sarve ’nityā iti prokte ’py arthaḥ tan-nāśa-dhir bhavet //

My translation differs in some crucial points from that of Tillemans’ (2000:30-36).

a. Cf. PV2 4.21cd: viṣaya-khyāpanād eva sāmarthyaṁ iti cen matam // For variae lectionis see Tillemans (2000: 35, n. 130). It seems to me that the translation in Tillemans (2000: 35) slightly distorts the logical connection of the elements of the verse, which is as follows: The condition in the clause is siddhau, to be connected with hetu-vṛttte (primarily related with asamābhavāt, but here supplemented). Its justification is viṣaya-khyāpanād eva, as the necessary single condition; the ground for the fact the operation of the logical reason can be warranted ‘only on account of the demonstration of its scope’, is 4.21ab, which explains why and under what conditions the logical reason is not operational. When the condition is fulfilled ([/hetu-vṛttte] siddhau), it is effective (tasya śaktatā).


A similar idea is expressed succinctly in NB 3.34: dvayor apy anayoḥ prayogayor na avaśyaṁ pakṣa-nirdeśāḥ.
proof formula by indicating that no fallacy is involved. The role of the simile of the skilled archer is not simply to point to some empirical instance of a contest, but to illustrate that in a well-defined context (e.g. when all onlookers see the archer’s target) any explicit mention of the target can be easily dispensed with. In this way, not only the verses of NA 14-15 are necessary elements in the argumentative structure, but also NA 16.

10.1. The idea of ‘perception for others’ is referred to not only in Buddhist sources, but also in later Mīmāṃsā literature, i.e. by Sucaritamiśra in his MŚVT (III: p., 38.5-8) ad MŚV 5.4.53-54: athānumāṇa-gocari-kṛtārtha-pratipādana-samartha-vacana-parārthāyād anumāṇam prārthām ity upacaryate, tataḥ pratyakṣa-pratipannam aprī arthaṁ bodhayad vacāḥ prārthām iti pratyakṣam api prārthām āpa-dyeta. Interestingly, the context in which the distinction svārtha-parārtha is mentioned is the critical evaluation of the Buddhist concept of twofold inference. Both Umīveka Bhaṭṭa and Sucaritamiśra reject the distinction into svārtha- and parārthānumāṇa in their respective commentaries on MŚV 5.4.53-54, viz. ŚVVT (p. 317.15-318.16, esp.: na tu parārthānu-mānam nāma kiṁcid astity uktam) and MŚVT (III: p., 37.11-40.21) respectively. Both argue that what the Buddhists call parārthānumāṇa is, in fact, just a verbal statement which communicates the result of an inference drawn by the speaker to the hearer; the hearer, on the basis of the utterance, subsequently draws his own inference, and there is no room for ‘inference for others’. Interestingly, Sucaritamiśra avails himself, in addition, of the Jaina concept of parārtha-pratyakṣa and argues that in the same manner as one were to accept parārthānumāṇa one would also have to consent to parārtha-pratyakṣa, because both inference and perception can be indirectly triggered by a verbal statement.

It would be quite natural that anyone who is willing to refute the idea of parārtha-pratyakṣa and is at the same time acquainted with the notion of parātha-pratyakṣa, would use the latter to disprove the former. However, Umīveka Bhaṭṭa does not seem to know the idea of parārtha-pratyakṣa at all; he is silent on it in his commentary on the same verses (MŚV 5.4.53-54), which are an occasion for Sucarita-
miśra to speak of this kind of perception, see: ŚVVTT (p. 317-318)\textsuperscript{105}. That may be a hint (not a decisive proof!) that Siddhasena Mahāmati composed NA either after Umveka Bhaṭṭa or at the same time, but NA and the ideas contained in it did not reach any prominence outside Jaina circles by the time of Umveka. Alternatively, in case the idea of parātha-pratyakṣa was not Siddhasena’s own invention, but he borrowed it from some earlier Jaina source, one may likewise suppose that the inventor of the idea of parātha-pratyakṣa, who inspired Siddhasena, lived either after of contemporaneously with Umveka Bhaṭṭa. The date of Umveka Bhaṭṭa is uncertain, but can be roughly assigned to the first half of the 8\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{106}. That might mean that Nyāyāvatāra was not composed before 700.

10.2: We can be quite certain that NA was composed also after Pātravāmin (alias Pātrakesarin / Pātrakesarivāmin), the author of the Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana. In his lost work Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana\textsuperscript{107}, Pātravāmin criticises Dharmakīrti’s concept of triple-formed logical reason (traṇirūpya) and the three restriction criteria of validity imposed on it (traṇividhya- niyama\textsuperscript{108}), and offers instead his own definition of valid hetu, viz. the relation of ‘the inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānupapatti), which was meant to replace Dharmakīrti’s definition. That clearly indicates that Pātravāmin was posterior to Dharmakīrti\textsuperscript{109}. Both Jaina and Buddhist traditions regard him to be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} On this discussion compare also Govardhan P. BHATT (1989: 248-249).
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Either c. 700-750 (according to K. Kunjunni Raja in his ‘Preface’ [p. x] to ŚVVTT) or c. 710 (according to EIPHI I: § 371).
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Anantavirya in SVIṬ (ad SVI 6.1, p. 371.19-372.6) mentions the title of Pātravāmin’s (= Pātrakesarin’s) work: Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana, and quotes a verse from it:

\begin{flushright}
  nānyathānupannatvam yattra tatra trayena kim / \\
  aṇyaḥnupannatvatvaṁ yattra tatra trayena kim //
\end{flushright}

The verse is also quoted also in: TSa 1369 and SVR ad 3.13 (p. 521.5-6). Importantly, it is incorporated by Akalaṅka in his NVI 323 (p. 74.1-2) = NVI 2.154 (II: p. 177.22-23), and the fact that the verse was not a later insertion of the commentator Vāḍirāja-sūri is confirmed by the fact that Vāḍirāja-sūri comments on the verse in his NVII exactly in the same manner as he does in the case of other Akalaṅka’s verses.

\item \textsuperscript{108} Cf. SHIGA (2003: 489).
\item \textsuperscript{109} Cf. also SHIGA (2003: 489): ‘Pātravāmin knew and criticised Dharmakīrti as well as Diṅnāga’.
\end{itemize}
the inventor of this new notion of the logical reason. Furthermore, Pātravāmin’s use of examples of invalidating Dharmakirti’s *trai-rūpya-hetu*, which partly overlap with those used by Kumārila, shows that Pātravāmin was posterior to Kumārila as well. In his turn, Pātravāmin influenced Siddhasena Mahāmati, who uses the idea of *anyathānupapatti* as some-thing already well known.

11. To recapitulate, there are some points that speak in favour of the separate authorship of STP and NA, namely (1) the peculiar use of the concepts *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* and their application to the terms *darśana* and *jñāna* that indicates STP was composed before Diinnāga and Dharmakirti (§§ 1.1, 2.1-2.2), whereas NA was definitely con-

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110. For instance, Vādirāja-sūri (NViV 2.160, II: p. 186.24-26: *sa prasiddhaḥ sa vā pātrakṣaravīḍānā nirāpitaḥ avināḥhāvā eva sambandho hetu-sādhayaya vina tādātmāyādī ṭasyāvyāpakavārī*) confirms that it was Pātravāmin who introduced the notions of ‘inexpressibility otherwise’ (*anyathānupapatti*) as the definition of valid logical reason and of relation of inseparable connection (*avināḥhāvā*) as the single logical relation between the logical reason and the inferable property (*sādhya*). This is further corroborated by Vādideva-sūri in SVR (ad 3.13, p. 521.5-6: *taḥ uktam pātravāminā*, see also NViV 2.171ab (II: p. 198.30-31). The same information is also supplied by Śantaraksita, who mentions Pātravāmin as the source of the idea, see TSa1 1364 (p. 405.1: *anyathēty-ādīnā pātrasvāmi-matam āsāṅkate...*), and quotes a number of verses from the lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadārthāna* in TSa 1364-1379. As regards the correct reading of the verses, TSa 1365cd should be emended to: *eka-lakṣaṇaḥ – so *r̥ḥat catur-lakṣaṇaka na vā ṛḷ*, instead of *r̥ḥaś*, see STEINKELLER (forthcoming).

Furthermore, Kamalāśila quotes two more verses (TSaP ad TSa 1386 (p. 409.12-14)), which I believe (see BALCEROWICZ (2003: 359)) to stem from the same work of Pātravāmin:

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vinā sādhyād adṛṣṭasya adṛṣṭante hetuttēṣyaie
parair mayā punar dharmīṇy asambhāṣīṇo vināmūna ṛḥāḥpaṭteis ca sābāryā bhākṣavāca cūnūnānataḥ
anyad evānmūnaṁ na nara-simhavad isyate //
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[a TS1: *bhākṣavāśa*. For the emendation cf. PATHAK (1930: 156-7) and KUNST (1939: 26, n. 3).]

My ascription of these two verses to Pātravāmin is corroborated by Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-tīkā*, as confirmed by Ernst Steinkellner in private communication: ‘PST B’(i.e. the second manuscript) folio 54a2 says (after first quoting the stanza of TS 1365, and explaining *anupapannatvam* as *akṣiptār asambhāvah*): *slokam apy āha: vinā sādhyād ...* = Tibetan translation of the verse (Q 5766, 92a8f.): dpe la bsgrub bya med pa las / rtags ņid ma mthong gêan gyis ’dod / bdag gis ’di ni med par yang / chos can la ni mi srid pa’o /

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111. For instance MŚV 5.4.64cd-65ab = TSa 1372, MŚV 5.7.46 = TSa 1377, MŚV 5.4.67d = TSa 1378. See BALCEROWICZ (2003: 343 ff.).

ceived after Dharmakīrti (§ 2.2); (2) the assignment of either sensory (NA) or strictly suprasensory (STP) character to pratyakṣa, taken either as perception (NA) or as blanket term ‘direct cognition’ (STP) as well as the relation to concept of cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) (§§ 3.1-3.2); (3) the (un)importance of the unity of jñāna and darśana at the kevala stage and different treatment of kevala (§ 3.3); (4) role of the four-phased sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna) in the epistemic schemes of STP and NA (§ 4); (5) divergent opinions on the direct, i.e. perceptual character (pratyakṣa) of verbal utterances and on the thesis that things conveyed through language are grasped directly (§ 5.2); (6) different attitudes to the Āgamic tradition and to novel solutions (§ 6). These points are additionally strengthened by a number of minor differences and incongruences (§ 1.1) that by themselves are not only inconclusive but could probably be explained away.

Furthermore, the text of the Nyāyāvatāra does not seem to contain any serious interpolations, perhaps with the exception of some minor changes in the wording, conspicuous in the defective meter of NA 26 and 27 (§ 8.3).

In view of the lack of any hint that that author of STP knew of any novel concepts introduced by Diṅnāga, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 CE, viz. at least about 150 years before the composition of NA.

Finally, considering Siddhasena Mahāmati’s dependence on Pātravrāmin (§ 10.1), the Mīmāṃsaka evidence (§ 10.2) and Prajñākaragupta’s reaction (§ 7), we may suggest roughly the following relative chronology:

**Siddhasena Divākara (STP): 450-500**
Diṅnāga: 480-540
Dharmakīrti: 600-660
Pātravrāmin: c. 660-720
Uśīnaka Bhaṭṭa: c. 700-750

**Siddhasena Mahāmati (NA): c. 720-780**
Prajñākaragupta: c. 800
Haribhadra-sūri: c. 800
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AṇD = Ṇuoga-ddārāṁ (Anuyoga-dvārāṇi). See: NaṁS.


NAV = Siddharṣi-gaṇin: Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti. See: NA.

NB = Dharmakirti: Nyāya-bindu. See: DhPr.

NBT = Dharmottara: Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā. See: DhPr.
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PMiV = Hemacandra-sūri: Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā-svopajña-vṛtti. See: PMi.


PSV = Diinnāga: Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti. See: PS.


TBV = Abhayadeva-sūri’s *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyini*. See: STP.


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