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IS 'INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE' (*ANYATHÂNUPAPATTI*)
OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE?*

In the 8th century we can observe a sudden change in the Jaina
epistemology. This was brought about by the introduction of a new
model of inference (*anumāna*), based on a new interpretation of the
logical reason (*hetu*). The logical reason has been from now on defined
as 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapatti,
anyathânupapannatva*), and its sole feature is its inseparable
connection (*avinâbhāva*) with the inferable property (*sādhya*), which is
known though suppositional knowledge (*tarka, ūha*). This triple
innovation is found in Siddhasena Mahāmati's *Nyāyâvatāra*[1],
Akalaṅka's *Laghīyas-traya*[2], Vidyānanda's *Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭīkā*[3] and
in Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣâmukha-sūtra*[4], just to mention but a few.

1. Pātrasvāmin, the innovator?

The way (i.e. with the word *īritam*) Siddhasena Mahāmati in his
Nyāyâvatāra (which would seem at first to be the original source) refers
to the idea of *anyathânupapatti* indicates that he was not the innovator
(NA 22ab: *anyathânupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam /*). These
innovations apparently go back to a certain Pātrasvāmin[5], as it is
attested by Śāntarakṣita, who mentions a Pātrasvāmin as the source of
the idea, see TSa (1).1364 (p. 405.1): *anyathêty-ādinā pātrasvāmi-
matam āśaṅkate...* This is further attested also by Jaina sources, in
particular by Vādideva-sūri[6]. Apparently the treatise in question is the
lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana*[7], conceived to refute the Buddhist idea of
tri-lakṣaṇa-hetu,[8] and apparently the only available fragments of the
work are to be found in *Tattva-saṅgraha* 1364–1379 (pp. 405–407).

'[1364] If "inexplicability otherwise" is there, then [the logical reason] is
   seen to be the correct logical reason; if it is not present, then also the
   triple [logical reason] is not [the correct logical reason]. Therefore,
   the three characteristics [of the logical reason] are impotent.
[1365] What possesses "inexplicability otherwise" is accepted as [the
   correct] logical reason. This [correct logical reason] is something
   possessed of one characteristic [only], not [something] possessed of
   four characteristics or of any other [number].
[1367] The relation of inseparable connection is not at all [present] in the tree
   forms of [the logical reason]; [the relation] is observed exclusively in

logical reasons that possess [only] one constitutive element [in the form] of "impossibility otherwise" (= "inexplicability otherwise").

[1368] Only that which possesses "inexplicability otherwise" is the [proper] logical reason. [It does not matter if] both types of the example can be [cited] or not, because [the example] is not any basis [for inference].

[1369] Where there is no "inexplicability otherwise", what is the need of the triplet [of characteristics the logical reason]? Where there is "inexplicability otherwise", what is the need of the triplet [of characteristics the logical reason]?

[1371] As regards this, the logical reason which is possessed of one characteristic is free from two types of the example: [somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being (are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended. ...

[1379] Therefore let first of all the logical reason be for us that which leads to the comprehension'; but what is the use [of other pointless conditions of the logical reason] falsely conceived [by others], such as the presence of a property in the locus, etc.?!'[10]

A number of examples of valid inference, offered by Pātrasvāmin, are meant to demonstrate that we *can* infer correctly, even though none or some of the *trairūpya*-conditions are not fulfilled:

1) only the condition of *pakṣa-dharmatā* (inherence of a property in the locus) is satisfied, but there are no positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) instantiations of the logical reason in the form of *sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta* or *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta* respectively (TSa 1371);
2) no example based on similarity (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) can be cited (TSa 1372–4, 1377);
3) no example based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) can be cited (TSa 1375–6);
4) the condition of *pakṣa-dharmatā* is not fulfilled (TSa 1378).

Moreover, according to Pātrasvāmin the inference can be invalid, even though it fulfils the three conditions of valid logical reason (*trairūpya*), which is exemplified by the case of the fallacious proof: '*x* is dark-complexioned, because *x* is the son of *y*, like the other [sons] of *y* (TSa 1371ab: *sa śyāmas tasya putratvād dṛṣṭāḥ śyāmā yathêtare*)[11].[12]

It is not important whether these verses are exact quotations or not. What is decisive is that at least the *ideas* the verses quoted in TSa express are (1) authentic and (2) ascribed to a particular representative of Jaina tradition prior to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

On the other hand, even though Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not always offer quotations in the form we know them from extant text editions,[13] their account is as a rule quite faithful to the original ideas. That Śāntarakṣita's account seems authentic—at least when it comes to

the essence, not necessarily to the wording—is corroborated by at least three factors:

1) At least one of the verses (TSa 1369) is quoted in other works as well;[14]
2) Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* on TSa 1369 explicitly mentions that Śāntarakṣita interchanged the *pādas* ab with cd (p. 406.7: *anyathânupapannatvaṁ yatrêty asyânantaraṁ nânyathânupapannêty asyârdhasya pāṭhaḥ kartavyaḥ*);
3) Furthermore, the ideas ascribed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to Pātrasvāmin are in complete agreement with Jaina accounts that *directly* follow Pātrasvāmin (e.g. NA, LT₃ YAṬ, for details see below) as well as with later elucidations[15] pertaining to the issue of *anyathânupapatti* and *trairūpya*.

Even if Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla alter slightly the wording, their account seems very reliable. Methodologically, in my examination I shall never refer to Pātrasvāmin's account in TSa alone. Instead Pātrasvāmin's ideas found in TSa will always be additionally supported by 'authenticated' Jaina sources.

Some features in Pātrasvāmin's model of logic in the above account, based on 'inexplicability otherwise', deserve special emphasis:

1) There is no need for any additional characteristic of the logical reason other than *anyathânupapatti*;
2) No additional instantiation (*dṛṣṭānta*) is necessary to have valid inference (TSa 1368);
3) The definition of 'inexplicability otherwise' as *impossibility* in any other way: *anyathânupapatti* = *anyathâsambhava* (TSa 1367c);
4) The correlation of the notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapatti*) with the relation of the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) (TSa 1367), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (*sādhyâvinābhāva*).

I do not intend to evaluate the idea of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its logical rigidity or to demonstrate how far it was accurate or inaccurate, or logically sound or not. My intention is to show how this concept developed and what motives prompted Pātrasvāmin and other Jaina logicians to introduce it.

2. *Anyathânupapatti*

Let us first analyse some other earliest Jaina accounts of the notion of *anyathânupapatti*.

A series of the *kārikās* of the *Nyāyâvatāra* (*c.* 620–800) are in agreement with other accounts:

'(5) Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the probandum on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the probandum. ... (13) Such an utterance that demonstrates the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum is the inference for others, whose essence are propositions, like the thesis, etc. ... (22) The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed [to be] inexplicability otherwise ... '[16]

Akalaṅka (8th century) in his *Laghīyas-traya* characterises the basis for inference as follows:

'Inference is the comprehension of the sign-possessor through the inferential sign, which has [as its] the sole characteristic the determined cognition of [its] inseparable connection with the inferable property. Its result is "the faculty of avoidance etc."[17],[18]

And he adds in his auto-commentary:

'For it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of "inexplicability otherwise"; [and] because [the logical reason is also operative] precisely without these two [relations of essential identity and of causality], this is the proof that [the logical reason] has a sole characteristic. For a tree etc. [from which we infer its shadow][19] is neither the essential nature nor the effect of the shadow etc.'[20]

Vidyānanda (c. 850) also avails himself of the idea of *anyathānupapatti* in his *Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭīkā*, while commenting on Samantabhadra's *Yukty-anuśāsana*[21]:

'And accordingly, what [Samantabhadra] revealed [in the verse] amounts to the following: the persuasion [based on] logical reasoning (*sc. anumāna*) is the description (sc. comprehension) of the object to-be-inferred on the basis of the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule "inexplicability otherwise". [This is so] because what is not contradicted by what is perceived or by testimony [would] otherwise [be] inexplicable. The above has been determined adequately enough[22] in holy scriptures etc.'[23]

All the above accounts of Pātrasvāmin, Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Mahāmati and Vidyānanda are unanimous as regards at least two crucial point points:

1) The correct logical reason has only one defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), which is a single notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathānupapatti*) (TSa 1364d, TSa 1365c, TSa 1379, LTV 2.12, NA 22ab);
2) The logical reason (*hetu*) in based on the relation of the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) (TSa 1367, NA 5a, NA 13a, LT 2.11c,

TŚVĀ p. 203[24]), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (*sādhyāvinābhāva*).
3) Occasionally we also find the idea that valid inference requires no instantiation (*dṛṣṭānta*) (TSa 1368, NA 20[25] and LT 2.16, however absent, or at least not stated explicitly, in YAṬ).

Since Pātrasvāmin, Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Mahāmati and Vidyānanda avail themselves of well-established terms familiar from other systems, the Jaina idea of inference must clearly have been conceived after the triple condition of validity of the logical reason (*hetu*) and the notion of inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) had been formulated by Diṅnāga. Furthermore, they could not have failed to know the Mīmāṁsaka usage of *anyathānupapatti*.

The term *anyathānupapatti* is by no means a Jaina invention, and it is generally associated with presumption (*arthâpatti*), the fifth cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), accepted by the Mīmāṁsaka. *Locus classicus* for the idea is Śabara's commentary:

'Also presumption [is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*); it is] an assumption of [another] object [in the form]: "an object either seen or heard is not explicable otherwise." For instance, as regards Devadatta, who is alive, the assumption of [his] being outside, which is unseen, on the basis of seeing his absence at home.'[26]

Kumārila specifies:

'A case [of reasoning] in which an object, which [is already] known through [any of] the six cognitive criteria, could not occur otherwise, [and on the basis of it] another unseen [object] is assumed, is called presumption.'[27]

The similarity between the Mīmāṁsaka notion of presumption and Jaina notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' is not only superficial, based on the occurrence of the same expression *anyathānupapatti*. There are some deeper similarities.

According to the Mīmāṁsaka, in *arthâpatti* we presume either some other object (Śabara: *artha-kalpanā*) or something unseen (Kumārila: *adṛṣṭaṁ kalpayed anyaṁ*) on the basis of something grasped directly (by perception—Śabara: *dṛṣṭaḥ*) or indirectly (by testimony—Śabara: *śrutaḥ*), or on the basis of any valid piece of knowledge we have (Kumārila: *pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto 'rhaḥ*), because we could not *otherwise* explain the situation we are confronted with.

In the section on *anumāna*, Akalaṅka says[28]:

'[Even] common people [not to mention the experts!] comprehend the absence of invisible [events, grasp the existence of] consciousness of

other people etc.[29] either through their form (sc. on the basis of symptoms that accompany such events) or through their dissimilarity (sc. contrary symptoms), because [these events are] otherwise inexplicable.'[30]

In *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Prabhācandra explains that even ordinary people infer things which they do not perceive directly, such as imperceptible things, consciousness of other people, both other people's mental disorders (lit. 'possession by ghosts', *bhūta-graha*) and physical diseases *on the basis of something directly perceived*, i.e. from symptoms sensed directly such as fever etc., the presence of which is not explicable without assuming those unseen events.[31]

This idea is also expressed by Siddharṣigaṇi. According to him we can infer whether a creature is alive or dead—i.e. we are able to conclude that the material body of a creature is inhabited by the soul, *jīva*, that is imperceptible, or not—[32]on the basis of external symptoms:

'... It is an empirical fact that [a person can be] known [to be] alive or dead—even though there is no (lit., 'there might be the harm of') perception that [could] grasp directly the living element (*sc.* soul)—due to presence or absence, [respectively,] of [such] characteristic marks of the living element [like] breathing-in and breathing-out, etc.; these characteristic marks are concluded with [the help of the relation of] inexplicability otherwise in all cases. Otherwise [that would lead to] the undesired consequence that no everyday practice [could] take place among people[33].'[34]

Another similarity between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Jaina accounts is that the basis for inferring something beyond our perceptive reach is something else grasped either through perception or through testimony.[35]

Presuming something unseen or unspoken on the basis of something seen or heard is certainly not the sole invention of the Mīmāṃsaka, for we find it in the Nyāya tradition[36] as well, but also much earlier in *Kauṭilīya-artha-śāstra.*

'Something unspoken which is arrived at through the meaning (or, rather more general: due to circumstances), that is presumption.'[37]

That is why this feature, viz. acquiring knowledge of something beyond our senses on the basis of any valid piece of available evidence, does not prove that there is any direct link between the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsā. In fact, presumptive model seems to be quite a natural element of our reasoning, naturally embedded in our language and argumentation.[38]

However, the fact that the Mīmāṃsaka and Jaina use of the term *anyathânupapatti* is not coincidental is confirmed by a series of similar examples of reasoning which we find both in MŚV, either as untypical (i.e. lacking *pakṣa-dharmatā, sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*) cases of inference (*anumāna*) or as instances of presumption (*arthâpatti*), and in Jaina sources, as instances of inference (*anumāna*) based on 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapatti*):

1) From the rise of the constellation of *Kṛttika* we infer the rise of another constellation: MŚV 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 13ab (p. 249): *kṛttikôdayam ālakṣya rohiṇy-āsatti-kḷptivat* (an instance of inference concerning individual cases, see n. 74), LT 2.14 (p. 459): *bhaviṣyat pratipadyeta śakaṭaṁ kṛttiôdayāt*, NAV 5.2: *kṛttikôdayāc chakaṭôdayam.*

2) On the basis of linguistic convention that stipulates that any word that is synonymous to '*candra*', e.g. 'the natural satellite of the earth', refers to the moon, one infers that the moon is spoken of, or else one knows that, say, 'the natural satellite of the earth' is not something which is different from the moon: MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 64cd–65ab (p. 261): *candra-śabdâbhidheyatvaṁ śaśino yo niṣedhati // sa sarva-loka-siddhena candra-jñānena bādhyate /*, and TSa 1372 ('Pātrasvāmin's section'): *candratvenâpadiṣṭatvān nâcandraḥ śaśa-lāñchanaḥ /*.

3) When we determine that a particular person is in a particular place on the basis of one of his aspects (e.g. voice), we infer that he is nowhere else: MŚV 5.7 (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*) 46 (p. 327): *puruṣasya tu kārtsnyena yad ekatrôpalambhanam / tasyânyathā na siddhiḥ syād ity anyeṣv asya nāstitā //* —'But if there is perception of a man as a whole in one particular place, it is proved that he cannot be otherwise; hence [we infer] his absence in other [places],' as well as MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 66cd–67ab (p. 261), TSa 1377: *tvadīyo vā pitâtrâsti veśmanîti avagamyate bhāvatka-pitṛ-śabdasya śravaṇād iha sadâtmani.*

4) Such things as words or lamps, etc., have communicative or revealing power (*jñāpaka, abhidhāyaka*): MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 67d (p. 261): *śabde cânabhidhāyake //*, TSa 1378 ('Pātrasvāmin's section'): *anyathânupapattyâiva śabda-dīpâdi-vastuṣu ... dṛṣṭā jñāpakatā.*

The above list does not exhaust all instances of reasoning considered in Jaina sources to be valid despite the fact that they do not satisfy one or all validity conditions of the logical reason, i.e. they lack either *pakṣa-dharmatā, sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, or all. The list can easily be extended:

1) 'From [the reflection of] the moon in the water [we infer] the moon in the sky' (NAV 5.2: *jala-candrān nabhaś-candram*, LT 2.13cd, p. 450);

2) 'From one blossoming mango-tree [in the proper season we infer] that all mango-trees are blossoming' (NAV 5.2: *puṣpitâika-cūtāt puṣpitâśeṣa-cūtāṁ*, cf n. 12 above);

3) 'From the rise of the moon, [we infer] the opening of clusters of *kumuda* white water lilies' (NAV 5.2: *candrôdayât kumudâkara-prabodham*, cf. n. 12 above);

4) 'From a tree [we infer its] shadow' (NAV 5.2: *vrksâc châyâm*, LTV 2.11cd–12ab; cf. n. 12 above);

5) '[Somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being (*sc.* they both are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended' (TSa 1371);

6) We infer that our skin has got in contact with an insect or a mosquito on the basis of a sensation, the bite (TSa 1373: *pata-kîta-krtêyam me vedanâ*);

7) From the perception of a visible thing as an effect of the operation of seeing which takes place in the eye, we infer that the eye possesses the exclusive capacity to perceive (TSa 1374: *caksû rûpa-grahe kârye sadâtisaya-sâktimat I tasmin vyâpâryamânatvât yadi vâ tasya darsanât II*);

8) Since perceptible and imperceptible objects such as a pot or the soul are sometimes invisible, such as a non-existent donkey's horn, one can argue that in a way they are likewise non-existent (TSa 1375: *kathañcid asad-âtmâno yadi vâtma-ghatâdayah I kathañcin nôpalabhyatvât khara-sambandhi-srngavat II*);

9) Since non-existent objects, such as a hare's horn, can be somehow comprehended (e.g. we can formulate their idea or they can be expressed in language), like the soul or a pot, one can argue that they are also in a way existent (TSa 1376: *kathañcana sad-âtmânah sasa-srngâdayo 'pi ca I kathañcid upalabhyatvâd yathâvâtma-ghatâdayah I*);

10) The sun will rise tomorrow (LT 2 14cd).

We also have a case of a reasoning which is invalid despite the fact that it satisfies the *trairûpya*, which is not found in the early Mīmāṁsā literature, viz. TSa 1371ab[39].

Interestingly, Kumārila himself emphasizes that all the *implied* instances of genuine *anumāna* mentioned in MSV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 66–68 (p. 261) are valid *because of* presumption (*arthâpatti*), that rests on the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapatti*): *bâdhas tatrârthâpattito bhavet.* Furthermore, the inferences *implied* by Kumārila in MSV 5.4.66–68 are meant to refute invalid cases of reasoning expressed in the verses, for instance: the reasoning 'Caitra is not outside, because he is not in the house' (MSV 5.4.66cd–67ab); 'fire does not burn' (MSV 5.4.67c)[40]; 'the word has no denotative capacity' (MSV 5.4.67d); 'non-existence of the hearing faculty' (MSV 5.4.68a); 'the [verbal] proof of impermanence of words' (MSV.5.4.68b). Moreover, to close the chapter on presumption (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*), after having offered a few examples of *arthâpatti*, Kumārila explicitly links the notion of presumption to that of inference:

'[In all above mentioned instances] there is no observation of [any inferential] relation whatsoever. Hence all these and other [cases] would be unsound, if this [presumption] were not different from inference. If [presumption] having such a nature would assume the name of inference, we do not mind, if [you] wish.'[41]

We can easily see that the Jaina exposition of *anumāna* resembles to a certain degree the Mīmāṁsaka notion of *arthâpatti*. The similarities of expression and structure of arguments make it highly plausible that the Mīmāṁsaka paved the way for the development of the Jaina innovation.

Now, how should we precisely understand the (Jaina) expression *anyathânupapatti*? One of numerous replies is found in NKC p. 449.10–12 *ad* LT 2.12:

sâdhyâbhâva-prakârena anyathâ yâ anupapattih aghatanâ sâdhanasya tasyâh sambandhi grâhakatvena tarkah ...—

—'By assuming the absence of the inferable property, i.e. "otherwise"; such inexplicability, i.e. inconceivability,[42] of the logical reason; related to this [inexplicability]—as that which grasps [inexplicability]—is suppositional knowledge...'

And this brings in another important element entailed by the concept of 'inexplicability otherwise', viz. the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*, see § 4, p. 354 ff.).

3. *Sâdhyâvinâbhâva*

Like many others, the Jainas were convinced that not all knowledge they had could be derived either through experience (*pratyaksa*) or through extrapolation from individual experience (*anumāna*). Moreover, they must have been aware that much of their scriptural knowledge (*âgama*) could be censured as a matter of ungrounded belief by non-believers. That is why Jaina thinkers already at an earliest stage attempted to combine inference (*anumāna*) with testimony (*âgama*) into a category of indirect perception (*paroksa*), which found also its ethical dimension in combining knowledge, conation and conduct.[43] This was probably the same fear that we find with Bhartṛhari[44] and others contemptuous of reasoning and reasoners[45]. The fear was also that things vary due to their various conditions, place and time, and accordingly everything by nature would be susceptible to relativism, if we were to rely on pure reasoning.[46] Furthermore, it would be

impossible to reach agreement on interpersonal level, or even subjective certainty, if we were to rely on our reason alone.[47] Also the suppositional knowledge (*tarka, vitarka, ūha*), which warrants the reliability of inference, could be censured by opponents as ungrounded belief: '[The claim] that "the cognition of the inseparable connection is based on the presumptive knowledge" is also a mere belief.'[48]

What was necessary was an invariant rule that would guarantee reliability and certainty of inferences. The Buddhist theory of inference based on three conditions of validity (*trairūpya*) and on two relations of essential identity (*tādātmya*) and of causality (*tad-utpatti*) as the basis for the logical reason[49] proved insufficient for two reasons. It suffered from the fault of over-extension (*ativyāpti*), because it also embraced such cases that did satisfy all the *trairūpya* conditions but were fallacious (*alakṣya-vṛtti*),[50] as well as from the fault of under-extension (*avyāpti*), because it did not comprise all valid cases but only some (*lakṣyâikadeśâvṛtti*).[51] The query was also how one can infer from individual cases (the problem of induction) or about individual cases (*kevala-vyatirekin* cases), which are uninstantiated except for the subject of inference.[52] This also entailed the problem of universally present properties (*kevalânvayin*), much debated in *Navya-nyāya*, and the problem of inferences that do not satisfy the first condition of the property present in the locus of inference (*pakṣa-dharmatā*), e.g. the case of the constellations of *Kṛttikā* and *Śakaṭa / Rohiṇī*.[53]

The Mīmāṃsaka solution was not satisfactory, in as much as it took recourse, beside the *vyāpti* relation, to the presence of the property in the locus of inference (*pakṣa-dharmatā*),[54] which the Jainas considered faulty[55].

The Jainas took the Buddhist relation of *avinābhāva* instead[56]:

> *hetu* is necessarily related to (does not deviate from) *sādhya*, or:
> *sādhya-avinā hetu-abhāva.*

In other words:

> '*x* extrapolates *y*, in case there is no *x* without *y*,'[57] or:
> *y-avinā x-abhāva.*[58]

However, they remodelled it, so that it required no additional positive (*anvaya*) or negative (*vyatireka*) instantiations. For Diṅnāga this was 'a "no counter-example" relation'[59].[60] In this context, Prabhācandra refers to an interesting objection:

> 'This expression of the inseparable connection states that if there is no occurrence of inferable property, there is no occurrence of logical reason; therefore this is merely an expression of the negative concomitance, but not an expression of the relation.'[61]

Prabhācandra's reply runs as follows:

> '...The expression of the inseparable connection is not restricted only to the negative concomitance, because of the undesired consequence that—even if there was no pot etc.—this [relation would still be] operative. But it is an expression of the relation. And this relation is determined through two modes: [either] by explicability in this way or inexplicability otherwise. Hence both these [modes] are expressed through the expression of the inseparable connection: "wherever there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke either." Now [this can be objected as follows:] "How can it be known that «where there is no fire, there is no smoke either»? Since smoke is invariantly not cognised when there is no fire, then only if this [fire] is present, that [smoke] can be there. Otherwise just like even though smoke is not present, in some cases fire is perceived, in the same way if the fire is not present, smoke would be perceived in some cases. If *x* is not inexplicable without *y*, then *x* is not invariantly related to *y*, just like even if smoke is not present, fire is perceived [because] it is not invariantly related to smoke; but smoke is inexplicable without fire; therefore this [smoke] is invariantly related to fire.'[62]

Even though this quotation is of later origin, its contents is very similar to, for instance, NAV 17.1[63] and NAV 18.1, as well as to *Parīkṣâmukha-sūtra*[64], and the detailed expressions of Prabhācandra can easily be derived from such statements which we find in NA 17[65].

We find another explanation of the *avinābhāva*-rule in NKC:

> '*x* occurs only when *y* is there, hence it does occur otherwise [i.e. if there is no *y*, *x* does not occur].'[66]

Conspicuously, the functioning of the relation of *avinābhāva* is here directly linked to the idea of *anyathânupapatti*.

Historically speaking, there still can be some doubt what different authors considered to be *vyāpti*?[67] Was it *avinābhāva* or *anyathânupapatti*? Certainly, in most cases I have examined *vyāpti* is considered to be *avinābhāva*. NA 22ab is clear enough that *anyathânupapannatva* is *hetor lakṣaṇam*, and similarly, Pātrasvāmin (TSa 1364–5) takes *anyathânupapannatva* to replace *tri-lakṣaṇāḥ*, hence the *vyāpti* for them is *avinābhāva*. Akalaṅka himself (LT 2.12cd) as well as his tradition follows the same line[68]. The only exception seems to be Vidyānanda. The expression *niyama* is generally taken to mean *vyāpti*, especially in the Mīmāṃsā tradition[69], but also among the Jainas[70] or Buddhists[71], and therefore Vidyānanda's usage (YAṬ *ad*

YA 49, p. 122.20–123.2: *tathā cânyathânupapannatva-niyama-niścaya-lakṣanāt sādhanāt*—'the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule "inexplicability otherwise"'; see n. 23) implies that he apparently equates *vyāpti* with *anyathânupapannatva*. The interpretation depends on how we construe the compound *anyathânupapannatva-niyama*, which I would naturally construe as a *karma-dhāraya* (*anyathânupapannatvaṃ niyamaḥ*). Only if we took the compound to be a *tat-puruṣa* (*anyathânupapannatvāt niyamaḥ*), we could infer that Vidyānanda was no exception.

A question arises whether what the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise' amounts to is our inability to offer any other explanation of a particular event apart from the one to which we find no other alternative? In other words, does *anyathânupapatti* express that out of a range of possible explanations of a particular event we chose the one which still remains unfalsified after we have eliminated all other rival answers that have proved unsatisfactory? That would be tantamount to saying that by *anyathânupapatti* we choose the solution which we are only able to conceive of, but this solution does not have to be the correct one: we may simply not know the proper answer, and the answer we favour has so far not been falsified. The implication would be that the rule of 'inexplicability otherwise' merely points to most likely answers and expresses probability, but warrants no certainty. This is precisely what would seem the case to be at this stage of analysis. To overcome the problem of mere likelihood, the Jaina logicians had to combine it with an invariant relation, viz. that of *avinâbhāva*, that aimed at revealing not only the most probable but also the only legitimate explanation, thus securing the veracity of our cognitions.

4. *Tarka*

The Jainas had now the new logical reason (*hetu*). Its sole defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) was 'inexplicablity otherwise' (*anyathânupapatti*), which replaced the three characteristics of the *hetu*. The invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), or the invariant rule (*niyama, sambandha*) which relates the inferable property (*sādhya*) and the logical reason (*sādhana*), assumed, in its turn, the role of inseparable connection (*avinâbhāva*), and thus it replaced the idea of the Buddhist relations of essential identity (*tādātmya*) and of causality (*tad-utpatti*).

Then another problem arose: how can we know the *avinâbhāva* relation with certainty, 'because just by seeing [two things] together in some cases it is not proved that one [of them] does not occur without the other one in all cases'[72]? It does not suffice *not* to observe two things together to have negative example, either[73]. Like the Buddhists, the Jainas rejected the idea of repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) of either co-presence or co-absence of two particulars as the basis for our inference, propounded by the Mīmāṃsaka[74], because repeated observation, like repeated practice[75], does not warrant any certainty, and as such could not be classified as valid form of inference.

The problem concerns the extrapolation from individual cases to a universal rule:

> 'Since inseparable connection is a relation, and it is preceded by grasping two relata, and [these] two relata are two separate particulars, how then it is possible to grasp [their] invariable concomitance as something which applies to everything?'[76]

The Jainas tried to solve the dilemma in the following way:

> '...the invariable concomitance is possible as indeed something which applies to everything [when we take it as a relation that relates] two particulars characterised by (*sc.* typifying) the universal. Therefore, the fault of infinite regress etc. does not find room here.'[77]

In other words, classes of individuals are tokened by their actual particular representations. This move was possible due to the Jaina ontology that recognised that that the notions of the particular and the universal are mutually dependent[78], and that 'manifold particulars are grounded in the universal (homogeneity)'[79]. Accordingly, at the moment of perceiving a particular, we cognise the universal in which this particular is grounded.[80]

But this still does not solve the question how to know that two separate universal-tokened particulars are related in a necessary way. Repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) does not suffice, because it entails a number of problems, pertaining both to the issue of universally binding validity and to the possible method of arriving at such an extrapolation.[81] We cannot know the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) either by *pratyakṣa*—one of the reasons is that the *vyāpti* associates different times and places, which is impossible in case of *pratyakṣa*—[82] or by *anumāna*, because that would lead to the faults of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), lack of foundation (*anavasthā*) or *regressus ad infinitum*[83]. The conclusion is that we must accept a special cognitive criterion called *tarka* to be able to cognise the *vyāpti*.

Both the criticism and the conclusion are stated by Akalaṅka in the *Laghīyas-traya* in the verse 2.11cd–12ab and in his auto-commentary:

'No inferential sign can be known through non-conceptual comprehension (viz. perception) or through inference, because it is not established; [hence] another cognitive criterion (suppositional knowledge, *tarka*) is immediately [called for].

For perception is not capable of carrying out such operations as for instance: "a particular smoke is an effect of nothing else but some fire at some other time and some other place, not [an effect] of any other thing," because [perception] cannot examine [things], insofar as it arises by force of proximate things. Neither [can this be accomplished by] inference, because there is no difference with regard to all cases (*sc.* levels) [of inference][84], for—if the invariable concomitance between the inferential sign and the sign-possessor is not established as a whole—there cannot be anything like inference with regard to anything. It is not correct to say that there is no non-perceptual cognitive criterion which is different from inference, because the faculty of comprehending the inferential sign is another cognitive criterion.'[85]

What is meant here is the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), being only a subdivision of the indirect cognition (*parokṣa*),[86] one of two main types of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) recognised by the Jainas, which replaces the knowledge based on *tādātmya* and *tad-utpatti* (LTV 2.12cd–13.ab: 'it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of "inexplicability otherwise"', see p. 346 and n. 20). Suppositional knowledge warrants the reliability and certitude of inference, because it is maintained to be capable of legitimate extrapolation beyond the present instant.[87]

Further, Akalaṅka states that

'Observation of one [thing] *without reflection* does not show the invariable concomitance of the logical reason with the inferable property; [and] this is the suppositional knowledge that has as its object uncognised [things] in their totality.'[88]

The cognising of an uncognised object renders additional support to my claim (p. 347 f.) that there is deeper similarity between the Mīmāṃsā notion of *arthâpatti* and Jaina notion of *anyathânupapatti*.

Still, these descriptions are not sufficient to understand the proper nature of *tarka* (suppositional knowledge), also called *ūha* (presumptive knowledge). More revealing on this point is Siddharṣigaṇi:

'[Suppositional knowledge] arises in the point of time posterior to [either] perception or non-comprehension, grasps positive concomitance or negative concomitance, is undeviating and its domain pervades the three times, which is based on the sensuous cognition.'[89]

This is in complete agreement with another statement of his:

'Presumptive knowledge is disposed towards grasping the relation of the inferential sign, characterised by inexplicability otherwise, with the probandum that cannot be sensed by perception or by inference.'[90]

How this presumptive knowledge (*ūha*), or suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), works—in a twofold manner—is explained by Devabhadra:

'Presumptive knowledge is the cognition of invariable concomitance by reason of comprehension or non-comprehension, e.g.: x occurs only when y is there ($x \rightarrow y$), and [y] does not occur only when [x] is not there ($\neg x \rightarrow \neg y$),'[91]

which is in agreement with Prabhācandra[92].

If we also take into consideration the passage of NKC p. 423.10–424.3 *ad* LT 2.10 (*vide supra*, n. 62), we notice that suppositional knowledge (*tarka*) of the Jaina seems to proceed as follow:

whenever there is y, there must be x too ($x \rightarrow y$); or
only when there is no x, there is no y ($\neg x \rightarrow \neg y$).

Thereafter the *avinâbhāva* relation is established:

x is necessarily related to y (y-*avinā x-abhāva*)
[i.e. occurrence of y logically follows from the occurrence of x, and non-occurrence of x logically follows from the non-occurrence of y];

and *anyathânupapatti* states:

If there were no y, there would be no x.

Hence the conclusion:

but there is x,
so there must be y.

In the reasoning, we presume a counter-thesis contrary to 'y is P' and draw a conclusion that is contradicted by observation or other cognitively valid procedures.

This is not a very different way of reasoning from the *tarka* / *ūha* recorded in the *Nyāya* tradition:

'Suppositional knowledge [consists in] presumptive knowledge in order
to cognise the truth (*sc.* essence) [of an object]—in [the case of] an
object the essence of which is unknown—by explicating [its] causes.'[93]

A closer description is found in the *Bhāṣya*:

'Suppositional knowledge is not reckoned among cognitive criteria,
[because] suppositional knowledge is not another cognitive criterion; [it
merely] assists cognitive criteria, as an ancillary, to [obtain] the
cognition of the truth (*sc.* essence) [of an unknown object. So, here] is
an illustration of that [suppositional knowledge]: is this birth (*sc.*
mundane existence) brought about by a cause in force or by a [cause]
not in force, or [is it] fortuitous? In such a manner proceeds
presumptive knowledge with regard to an unknown matter by
explicating [its] cause: "If [this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)] [were]
brought about by a cause in force, then at the destruction of the cause
the destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence) [would] take place.
If [this birth (sc. mundane existence)] were brought about by a [cause]
not in force, then the destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence)
[could] not take place [at all], because the destruction of the cause
would be impotent. If [this birth (sc. mundane existence)] were
fortuitous, then the cause of [its] termination would not be explicable,
since [this birth (sc. mundane existence)], once being fortuitously
brought about, would not terminate in its turn; hence [the result would
be] the non-destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence)".'[94]

Here the reasoning is as follows:

Is *x* *P* or *R* or ... or *S*?
x is *P*   → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x is *R*   → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x is *S*   → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x ...   → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
therefore   *x* is *Q*.

Here we draw a series of conclusions that are not contrary, but are
various possible solutions to the question. Then we eliminate all
conceivable conclusions but one by showing that they are in the end
contradicted this way or another by various cognitive criteria. What
remains is the only correct solution left. Not only have we here more
than one thesis (*x* is *P*, *x* is *R*, *x* is *S*, ...), but also we do not presume its
counter-thesis (*x* is non-*P*).

There seems to be some kind of link between the *tarka* of the
Naiyāyika and that of the Jainas. Both the Naiyāyika and the Jainas
must have been aware that they apply the same term, but classify it
either as an additional tool (*anugrāhaka*), which in itself is not a
pramāṇa, or as a genuine *pramāṇa*. In the light of the passage quoted
above from NBh 1.1.1, that claims that *tarka* is not a separate *pramāṇa*,

it becomes easier to explain the insistence of Jaina authors on the
tarka's status of a separate *pramāṇa*.

5. Conclusion

The question now arises whether my demonstration is based on loose
associations and verbal analogies?

Revealing for us would therefore be what the Jainas themselves had
to say on this matter. Let me refer to two verses quoted from Jaina
sources (unidentified, Pātrasvāmin?) by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā*:

'Some accept what is not observed in the example without the inferable
property to be [the correct] logical reason. However, I [accept] what is
impossible in the property-possessor without this [inferable property to
be the correct logical reason].
Our inference is accepted as indeed different from the presumption of
the Mīmāṃsā school as well as from the inference of the Buddhists,
like a man-lion.'[95]

These verses confirm my supposition that the Jaina model of
inference evolved as a blend of Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist ideas. The
image of *nara-siṁha* is both different from the man and from the lion,
but to have this notion at all, we need essential similarity to both the
man and the lion. The Jaina author of these two verses was well aware
that the novel model of logic he wanted to apply resembled both
Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā models, and therefore he considered it crucial
to emphasize the new elements.

In their novel concept of inference, the Jainas combined three
elements: (1) *anyathânupapatti* of the Mīmāṃsaka, (2) *avinābhāva* of
the Buddhist, and (3) *tarka* of the Naiyāyika. Jokingly we may say that
this safeguarded their open attitude in the spirit of *anekânta-vāda*!

It is a matter of sheer speculation at this stage of investigation who
was the first to combine and reinterpret various elements into a new
definition of *hetu* and a new framework of *anumāna*, and what motives
prompted that shift.

Perhaps the inspiration came from the side of the Sāṁkhya. In the
Yukti-dīpikā[96] we come across a highly interesting and relevant passage,
which only confirms the appositeness of the subtile of the Wezler–
Motegi edition ('The Most Significant Commentary on the
Sāṁkhyakārikā'):

'This [presumption] is twofold: deviating (fallacious) and undeviating
(legitimate). ... The [kind of presumption] which is characterised by

inseparable connection and which is undeviating (legitimate) is [merely] inference, for instance: After one has seen a fight between a lion and a boar in vicinity, and after one has seen the lion roaming alone with its body marked with wounds [inflicted] by the boar, it is understood that the boar has been defeated. Why? Because there is an undeviating relation between the victory and defeat in the case of the lion and the boar. In this case, if one has seen the victory of the lion, the defeat of the other (viz. the boar) is understood in an undeviating manner. What else could that be except inference?! For—[in the case] of someone who understands the association of two related [objects *x* and *y*] that have been comprehended—such an understanding of the related [object] *y* from one [object *x*] of two related [objects *x* and *y*] previously perceived is inference. And accordingly, presumption cannot be different from that [inference].'[97]

This is in all probability the first, historically speaking, extant source in which we find the idea of *arthâpatti* (based on *anyathânupapatti*) combined with the relation of *avinâbhâva* to form a variety of *anumâna*.

We do find another attempt to subsume the *arthâpatti* procedure under the *anumâna* scheme in *Praśastapâda-bhâṣya*:

'Presumption [derived] from an object of perception is nothing but fallacious. [Presumption derived] from hearing is inference [based] on something inferred.'[98]

It is however very unlikely that this tradition influenced the development of the Jaina concept in question, because we lack here even one of the two crucial elements (*avinâbhâva* and *tarka*).[99]

Despite serious drawbacks, this was a crucial move: the Jainas claimed to have one invariant relation that allows extrapolation irrespective of whether we could cite any positive instantiations (*sapakṣa*) or negative instantiations (*vipakṣa*). In general, this invariant relation no longer necessitated empirical exemplification, and tended to become an autonomous logically valid rule, and not merely an extrapolation from experience. Perhaps for the first time in Indian philosophy we can observe a strong tendency to emancipate reasoning from empirical instantiations.

There was a price to pay. The burden of proving the invariability of our assumptions was shifted from the logical reason (*hetu*) onto the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*). The situation did become different though: we no longer had inferential rules and relations (*hetu* and *vyâpti*) that were liable to falsification. Instead, in the Jaina model, we were told to be able to infer by using what were believed to be infallible rules. In this way the question of verification of the logical reason was dissociated from the level of the logical reason. The verificatory

principles no longer constituted the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of the logical reason, but were transferred to the second-level domain of the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*). What remained uncertain were still the methods to know infallible principles on which *tarka* rests.

Consequently, I would view Jaina concept of logic based on the notion of *anyathânupapatti* as an attempt to solve the problem of induction, which is entailed by the generally empirically oriented Indian logic. The problem of induction involves primarily two phases: (1) one has to established an invariant relation between two individual particulars (*viśeṣa*), which typify two classes, and subsequently (2) one has to extrapolate in order to establish a invariant relation between the two typified classes (*sâmânya*). The difficulty is that the two phases are equally defeasible and open to possible revision, if a counter-example obtains, and thereby that contributes to the increase in unreliability of the established relation. From the point of view of Jaina ontology, the two phases merged. We no longer had a two-phased inductive reasoning: by observing a relation between two particulars one instantly could extrapolate to whole classes. As soon as one could establish an invariant relation between two classes, the inference would loose its induction-based deficiency.

A question now arises: how far is the distinction between induction and deduction relevant to Indian logic at all? The mere fact that Indian models of inference in general, it seems, resorted to empirical exemplification and left no scope for deductive reasoning would rather speak against ascribing a deductive character to Indian logic. In Indian logic we link not ideas or propositions, but events. That is why the inductive–deductive distinction seems not at all applicable to the realm of *anumâna*. Where it does seem highly relevant is a kind of 'meta-*anumâna*', viz. second-level patterns that underlie first-level patterns of particular cases of *anumâna* that pertain to events. What the Jaina seemed to attempt to achieve was to formulate conditions of validity of patterns of reasoning which we could classify as second-level inference, viz. proper logic where the distinction between inductive and deductive starts to apply. That would be the *anumâna* based on the principles of *avinâbhâva* and *anyathânupapatti*, whereas the problem of traditional first-level *anumâna*, which needs to be inductively instantiated, is shifted to the realm of *tarka*. That is why in my opinion the Jaina solution, albeit unique in India, cannot be deemed successful.

The Jaina verses, allegedly by Pâtrasvâmin, quoted from Kamalaśîla's *Pañjikâ*, as well as several other formulations also show that we can dispense with *dṛṣṭânta*s because our inference is concerned

with the subject alone. This was the next step in the 'economical' trend[100] to dispense with all unnecessary elements of our reasoning, and it opened a genuine possibility of developing strictly formal logic, in the sense of being independent from circumstances. Mere understanding of the logical rules allows us to infer correctly, without taking recourse to empirical instantiations:

> 'If a [person] to be taught recollects the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum in all cases, how could he then—having [re]cognised this [logical reason] in the thesis—not understand the probandum?'[101]

Additional positive and negative instantiations have no logical or formal value, because the inference is valid anyway.[102]
Nonetheless, they do have practical, or didactic value of instruction[103]. The examples do not fulfil any formal role any longer and they are not necessary to validate the inference: the determination of two properties (*sādhya* and *sādhana*) in the example is already established, hence it can be recalled (*sambandha-smaraṇāt*)[104]. That is why the Jainas advise to apply a ten-membered proof formula for educational purposes alone.[105] However, under certain conditions and provided one remembers the invariant relation, one can argue by applying a single-membered proof formula, that consists of the logical reason alone![106]

For Siddhasena Mahāmati, even the thesis (*pakṣa*) does not have to be necessarily expressed, if it can be understood from the context; the demand for a thesis is to disambiguate one's own statements, in case they cannot be easily understood from the context:

> '[14cd] the pronouncement of this [thesis] has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason. [15] Otherwise, for a [person] to be apprised, who is confused regarding the domain of the logical reason intended by the proponent, the logical reason might appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like... [16] ...for a person watching an archer's skill, the archer who hits without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both] skill and its opposite.'[107]

Would that mean that this decrease in the number of members of the proof formula finally entails the consequence that the reasoning of the *anyathānupapatti* type, based on the *avinābhāva* relation, tends to gravitate towards a deductive formula with two variables (*sādhya* and *sādhana*)? At the same time, however, as a counter-development, the procedures of reasoning seem to become more context-dependent,

which gradually requires further developments in the context-disambiguating tools of the theory of *syād-vāda* and *naya-vāda*.

NOTES

[*] I would like to thank Jonardon Ganeri for his comments and suggestions.
[1] 'Inexplicability otherwise' in mentioned in NA 22ab: *anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam I* —'The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed [to be] inexplicability otherwise.' The inseparable connection of *hetu* with *sādhya* is mentioned in NA 5ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhya-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam I anumānam...*, NA 13ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam I parārtham anumānam...* (vide infra, p. 16).
[2] 'Inexplicability otherwise' in mentioned in Akalaṅka's auto-commentary (*Sva-vivṛtiḥ*) ad loc. (vol. 2, pp. 434–435.1–2): *na hi tādātmya-tad-utpattī jñātuṁ śakyete vinānyathānupapatti-vitarkeṇa, tābhyāṁ vināiva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ*, vide infra n. 20. The inseparable connection of *hetu* with *sādhya* is mentioned in LT, vol. 2, p. 434 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 11cd–12ab), *vide infra* p. 346.
[3] YAṬ p. 122.20–123.2, ad YA 49 (*vide infra*, n. 23) and YAṬ p. 127.2–3 (ad YA 50): *tato jīvādi-padārtha-jātaṁ parasparājahad-vṛtty-ekāneka-svabhāvaṁ vastutvānyathānupapatter iti yukty-anuśāsanaṁ*.
[4] PĀ 3.10: *sādhyāvinābhāvitvena niścito hetuḥ*.
[5] Alias Pātrakesarin / Pātrakesarisvāmin (?), cf. Paṇḍita Dalsukh Mālvaṇiya's note (p. 270.15–18) in his *Ṭippaṇāni* to Śānti Sūri's *Nyāyāvatāra-sūtra-vārttika* p. 102.27. Pātrasvāmin is occasionally (SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928), CHATTERJEE (1978: 331)) identified with Vidyānanda. Pātrasvāmin, however, preceded Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788—cf. STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 56)), the teacher of Kamalaśīla; cf. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi–ixvii): 'In that case Pātrasvāmin must be an earlier author than both Śāntarakṣita and Vidyānanda, and he must have first propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term... cir. 700 A.D.' Therefore, he must be some other Vidyānanda than the author of the *Śloka-vārttika* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* which was composed around 850 CE; see UPADHYE (1971: *14–15), PATHAK (1930: *passim*) and PATHAK (1930–31: *passim*), who refers to him as Pātrakesari Vidyānanda or as Pātrakesarisvāmi, and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 45).
[6] SVR ad 3.13, p. 521.5–6: *tad uktaṁ pātrasvāminā: nānyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim I anyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim II iti* [= TSa 1369]
[7] A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kishor Mukhtar's article: 'Saṁmatisūtra aur Siddhasena' in *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsa par Viśada Prakāśa*, Calcutta 1956: 538–543 [the work was not available to me].
[8] PS 2.5cd: *anumeye 'tha tat-tulye sadbhāvo, nāstitāsati*. Cf. TŚ 2.1, p. 13.16–17: *asmābhis tri-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ sthāpitaḥ. tad yathā: pakṣa-dharmaḥ sapakṣatvaṁ vipakṣa-vyāvṛttiś ca*; and NP p. 1.5–6: *hetus tri-rūpaḥ. kiṁ punas trairūpyam? pakṣa-dharmatvaṁ sapakṣe sattvaṁ vipakṣe cāsattvam iti*.
[9] The use of *gamakaḥ* may be an additional clue to post-Kumārilan date of Pātrasvāmin, cf. MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 4 (p. 248.3.7): *sambandho vyāptir iṣṭātra liṅga-dharmasya liṅginā I vyāpyasya gamakatvaṁ ca vyāpakaṁ gamyam iṣyate II* and MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 22cd–23ab (p. 251): *tasmād ya eva yasyārtho dṛṣṭaḥ sādhana-śaktitaḥ II*

sa eva gamakas tasya na prasaṅgânvito 'pi yaḥ |

[10] [TSa 1364] *anyathânupapannatve nanu dṛṣṭā suhetutā* |
nâsati try-aṁśakasyâpi tasmāt klībās tri-lakṣaṇāḥ ||

[TSa 1365] *anyathânupapannatvaṁ yasyâsau hetur iṣyate* |
eka-lakṣaṇakaḥ so 'rthaś catur-lakṣaṇako na vā ||

[TSa 1367] *avinâbhâva-sambandhas tri-rūpeṣu na jātucit* |
anyathâsambhâvâkâṅga-hetuṣv evôpalabhyate || ,

[TSa 1368] *anyathânupapannatvaṁ yasya tasyâiva hetutā* |
vântau dvāv api stāṁ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam ||

[TSa 1369] *nânyathânupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim* |
anyathânupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim ||

[TSa 1371] *tatrâika-lakṣaṇo hetur dṛṣṭânta-dvaya-varjitaḥ* |
kathañcid upalabhyatvād bhâvâbhâvau sad-ātmakau || ...

[TSa 1379] *tenâika-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ* |
pakṣa-dharmâdibhis tu anyaiḥ kiṁ vyarthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ ||

For verses TSa 1372–1376, see below pp. 349–350. The above fragment is also translated in KUNST (1939).

[11] Cf. NAṬ ad NAV 5.2 (H: p. 54.1 and V: p. 35.4): NAṬ *ad loc.: tat-putrâdīnām iti. atrânumānam. sa śyāmaḥ tat-putratvāt, paridṛśyamāna-putravad iti. ādi-śabdāt pakvāny etāni āmra-phalāni, eka-śākhā-prabhavatvāt, upabhujyamānāmra-phalavad ity-ādi parigrahaḥ.*—'[A gloss on the phrase]: "being his son," etc. Here the inference [is as follows]: "He is dark-complexioned because he is his son, just like the son who is just being seen". By the word "etc." a reference [is made to the erroneous following reasoning]: "these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being eaten".'

Devabhadra clearly regards the above examples as cases of unwarranted inference from sampling. However, in their structure they do not seem to differ from some cases of inference from sampling regarded as valid ones, for instance:

—invalid inference: 'these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being eaten,'

—valid inference: 'all mango-trees are blossoming, because one mango-tree is blossoming' (see below, n. 12, NAV 5.2).

[12] Interestingly enough, Pātrasvāmin's register, found in TSa, of valid inferences that do not fulfil the *trairūpya*-conditions does not overlap with those mentioned, e.g. in NAV 5.2: *niyamena sādhyâvinābhâvitvasyâvôddīpanāt, tac ced asti kiṁ trailakṣaṇyâpekṣayā, tasyâiva gamakatvāt. tathā hi: jala-candrān nabhaś-candraṁ, kṛttikôdayāc chakaṭôdayaṁ, puṣpitâka-cūtāt puṣpitâśeṣa-cūtān, candrôdayāt kumudâkara-prabodhaṁ, vṛkṣāc chāyām ity-ādi pakṣa-dharmatva-virahe 'py anumimīmahe.*—'If [you concede that it is indeed] that [inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum that is alone the condition of inference, then] what is the use of requirement of the triplet of characteristics [of the logical reason]? Certainly, that being the case, the triplet of characteristics of the logical reason is useless] because this [inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum] alone leads to the comprehension [of the inferendum]. For it is as follows: we do infer—even without [the characteristics of] the inherence of a property in the locus—like in the following [examples]: (1) from [the reflection of] the moon in the water [we infer] the moon in the sky, (2) from the rise of the constellation of the Pleiads [we infer] the rise of the *Rohiṇī* constellation, (3) from one blossoming mango-tree [in the proper season we infer] that all mango-trees are blossoming, (4) from the rise of the moon, [we infer] the opening of clusters of *kumuda* white water lilies, (5) from a tree [we infer its] shadow, etc.'

[13] Cf. KELLNER (1977: 97 n. 146).

[14] E.g. in TŚVA p. 203 (the discussion of *anyathânupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is found there on pp. 198–217), in TBV (vol. II, p. 569.28–29), in NASV 43 and PMī 2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.17–18).

[15] E.g. Hemacandra's criticism against the Buddhist idea of *trairūpya* in PMī 2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.1–16) closely follows the exposition of Pātrasvāmin's aphorisms quoted in TSa.

[16] NA 5ac: *sādhyâvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhya-niścayakaṁ smṛtam* | *anumānaṁ* ...

NA 13: *sādhyâvinā-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam* | *parârtham anumānaṁ tat pakṣâdi-vacanâtmakam* ||

NA 22ab: *anyathânupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam* |

[17] As regards the expression *hānâdi-buddhayaḥ*, cf. YS 2.16 ff. and NBh on NS 1.1: *heyaṁ tasya nirvartakam hānam ātyantikam tasyôpāyo 'dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry artha-pādāni samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati*, as well as NA 28: *pramāṇasya phalaṁ sākṣād ajñāna-vinivartanam* | *kevalasya sukhôpekṣe śeṣasyâdāna-hāna-dhīḥ* || . On the issue of 'the avoidance of things which should be avoided, in the appropriation of things which are worth appropriating and in the indifference to things which deserve indifference', see WEZLER (1984).

[18] LT 2.12cd–13ab (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 12cd–13ab; Vol. 2, p. 434):
liṅgāt sādhyâvinâbhâvâbhinibodhâka-lakṣaṇāt |
liṅgi-dhīr anumānaṁ tat-phalam hānâdi-buddhayaḥ ||

[19] Since in the Diṅnāga's–Dharmakīrti's logic, the probans (*sādhana*) can either be the logical reason as essential property (*svabhāva-hetu*) in case of relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*) or the logical reason as effect (*kārya-hetu*) in case of the relation of causality (*tad-utpatti*), therefore since in Akalaṅka's example the tree is examined as either the essential nature or the effect of the shadow, it is clear that the inference Akalaṅka has in mind is that from the tree to the shadow: *vṛkṣāc chāyām*, for the same example comp. n. 12 and p. 350.

[20] LTV 2.12cd–13ab (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2: *Parkoṣa-pariccheda* 12cd–13ab; Vol. 2, p. 435.1–3): **Vivṛtiḥ:** *nahi tādātmya-tad-utpatti jñātuṁ śakyete vinânyathânupapatti-vitarkeṇa tābhyāṁ vinâiva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ. nahi vṛkṣādiḥ chāyādeḥ svabhāvaḥ kārya vā. na câtra visaṁvādo 'sti.*

[21] The verse (YA 49, p. 122) reads:
dṛṣṭâgamābhyām aviruddhaṁ[b] artha-prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanaṁ[a] te |
pratikṣaṇaṁ sthity-udaya-vyayâtma-tattva-vyavasthaṁ sad ihârtha-rūpam ||
—'[O Jina!] Your persuasion [based on] logical reasoning (*sc. anumāna*)[a] is the description of an object, which is not contradicted by what is perceived[b] or by testimony. Here [in your teaching] the being is an [external and internal] object, determined as an entity the nature of which consists in continued existence, rise and annihilation.'

[a] Samantabhadra's and Vidyānanda's description equate *yukty-anuśāsana* with *anumāna*, as a separate indirect cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), in addition to testimony (*āgama*). However, the Jainas of the 'non-Āgamic' tradition recognise one indirect cognitive criterion (*parokṣa*) that bifurcates into two main divisions, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

[b] Comp. similar idea in NA 8ab (*dṛṣṭêṣṭâvyāhatād vākyāt paramârthâbhidhāyinaḥ*) and NA 9b (*adṛṣṭêṣṭa-virodhakam*). See also Vidyānanda's comments *ad* YA 49: **Ṭīkā:** *dṛṣṭaṁ câgamaś ca dṛṣṭâgamau tābhyām aviruddham abādhita-viṣayaṁ yad arthāt sādhana-rūpād arthasya prarūpaṇaṁ tad eva yukty-anuśāsanaṁ yukti-vacanaṁ te tava bhagavato 'bhimatam iti pada-ghaṭanā. tatrârthasya prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanam iti vacane pratyakṣam api yukty-anuśāsanaṁ prasajeta tad-vyavacchedârtham arthāt prarūpaṇam iti vyākhyāyate sāmarthyād arthasya tad iti pratīteḥ.*

[22] For the peculiar use of *prāyam* as the last member of the compound (e.g. *nirṇita-prāyam*) see for instance NAV 29.17: *vyāpi-rūpasya vicārākṣamatvād ity ukta-prāyam.*

[23] YAṬ *ad* YA 49, p. 122.20–123.2: *tathā cânyathânupapannatva-niyama-niścaya-lakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhyârtha-prarūpaṇaṃ yukty-anuśāsanam iti prakāśitaṃ bhavati dṛṣṭâgamābhyām avirodhasyânyathânupapatteṣ iti devâgamādau nirṇita-prāyam.*

[24] See also Vidyānanda's discussion of *anyathânupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is on pp. 198–217.

[25] Siddhasena maintains that *dṛṣṭânta* is not an essential part of 'syllogistic' reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis, see NA 20:

> *antar-vyāptyâiva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhṛtiḥ |*
> *vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve 'py evaṃ nyāya-vido viduḥ ||*

—'Since the probandum is proved only by the intrinsic invariable concomitance, an exemplification from outside would be pointless; experts in logic have recognised that also in its absence [this exemplification is] such (pointless).'
Conspicuously Siddhasena refers to some earlier tradition (*nyāya-vido viduḥ*).

[26] ŚBh 1.1.5 (p. 11): *arthâpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vârtho 'nyathā nôpapadyate ity artha-kalpanā. yathā: jīvati devadatte gṛhâbhāva-darśanena bahir-bhāvasyâdṛṣṭasya kalpanā.*

[27] MŚV 5.7 (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*) 1 (p. 320):

> *pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatrârho nânyathā bhavet |*
> *adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayed anyaṃ sârthâpattir udāhṛtā ||*

[28] LT 2.16 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462–463):

> *adṛśya-para-cittâder abhāvaṃ laukikā viduḥ |*
> *tad-ākāra-vikārâder anyathânupapattitaḥ ||*

[29] *Sc.* people infer the existence of various invisible events, e.g. assume that other people are endowed with consciousness, etc., even though these are not directly perceived.

[30] LT 2.16 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462):

> *adṛśya-para-cittâder abhāvaṃ laukikā viduḥ |*
> *tad-ākāra-vikārâder anyathânupapattitaḥ ||*

[31] NKC, p. 463.1–6: *adṛśyaś câsau para-cittâdiś ca, ādi-śabdena bhūta-graha-vyādhi-parigrahaḥ, tasyâbhāvaṃ laukikā viduḥ. kuta ity atrāha—tad-ākāra ity-ādi. tena adṛśya-para-cittādinā saha-bhāvi śarīra-gata uṣṇa-sparśâdi-lakṣaṇa ākāraḥ tad-ākāraḥ anyathā-bhāva ādir-yasya vacana-viśeṣasya tasya anyathânupapattitaḥ.*

[32] This is an interesting point to notice how differently the same—ostensibly obvious—case can be described depending on cultural background and presuppositions. In European cultural context in general the question whether a person is dead or alive is determined *in terms* of what the Jainas would consider mere symptoms.

[33] This attests to practical usefulness of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its indispensability in any activity ascribed by the Jainas.

[34] NAV 1.8: ... *sarvatrânyathânupapannatâvadhāritôcchvāsa-niḥśvāsâdi-jīva-liṅga-sadbhāvâsadbhāvâbhyāṃ jīva-sākṣāt-kāri-pratyakṣa-kṣūṇe 'pi jīvan-mṛta-pratīti-darśanād, anyathā loka-vyavahārâbhāva-prasaṅgāt.*

[35] For the Mīmāṃsaka position, comp. see above nn. 26, 27 (ŚBh: *dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vârtho,* and MŚV 5.7 [*Arthâpatti-pariccheda*] 1). For the Jaina examples, comp. above nn. 21, 23 (YA 49, p. 122: *dṛṣṭâgamābhyām aviruddham,* NA 8ab: *dṛṣṭêṣṭâvyāhatād vākyāt paramârthâbhidhāyinaḥ,* and NA 9b: *adṛṣṭêṣṭa-virodhakam*). Similarly, commenting on LT 2.12 (p. 435.4–5), Prabhācandra states explicitly that 'the invariable concomitance [consists in] the inseparable connection with the inferable property that

is qualified by a distinctive feature not subverted by what is accepted (sc. testimony)' (*sādhyena iṣṭâbādhitâsiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭena avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ ...*).
The idea that we may rightfully presume the existence of something perceptually inaccessible, either because of subtlety (e.g. some invisible potential, as in the example below), distance or time, is accurately expressed by Siddharṣigaṇi in
NAV 1.14: *arthâpattis tu pratyakṣâdi-gocarī-kṛta-sphoṭâdi-padârthânyathânupapattyā dahana-śakty-ādikaṃ pāvakāder arthântaraṃ pūrva-darśana-gocarāt samadhikam avyabhicaritaṃ parikalpayantīti pramāṇatāṃ svī-karoty eva, tal-lakṣaṇa-yogāt.*—
'However, taking into account that [people] conclude from fire, etc., another object, which is additional to the domain of previous perception [and] undeviating, [namely, that fire] is possessed of the power of burning, etc., inasmuch as such entities as blisters, etc., that constitute the domain of perception, etc., are otherwise inexplicable, presumption [too] appropriates undeniably cognitive validity, because it satisfies the definition of this [cognitive criterion].'

[36] Cf. NBh 2.2.1: *arthād āpattir arthâpattiḥ. āpattiḥ prāptiḥ prasaṅgaḥ. yatrâbhidhīyamāne 'rthe yo 'nyo 'rthaḥ prasajyate so 'rthâpattiḥ, yathā megheṣv asatsu vṛṣṭir na bhavatīti. kim atra prasajyate? satsu bhavatīti.*

[37] AŚ (*Tantra-yukti*) 15.29: *yad anuktam arthād āpadyate sârthâpattiḥ.*

[38] See, for instance, the usage of the presumptive scheme in Dharmottara's reasoning in NBṬ 1.9 (p. 62.2): *itarathā cakṣur-āśritatvânupapattiḥ kasyacid api vijñānasya—*
'*Otherwise,* it would be *inexplicable* how the [sensory] consciousness could be based on the eye.'

[39] See above p. 344 and n. 11. Despite some similarity, this is a different kind of reasoning that the one found in MSV 2 (*codanā-sūtra*) 182ab (p. 74–75): *śyāmatve puṃstvavac câtat sādhāraṇye nidarśanam |*

[40] Interestingly, this case is first classified by Siddharṣigaṇi as a proper instance of presumption in NAV 1.14: *arthâpattis tu pratyakṣâdi-gocarī-kṛta-sphoṭâdi-padârthânyathânupapattyā dahana-śakty-ādikaṃ pāvakāder arthântaraṃ pūrva-darśana-gocarāt samadhikam avyabhicaritaṃ parikalpayantīti pramāṇatāṃ svī-karoty eva, tal-lakṣaṇa-yogāt.* Immediately afterwards Siddharṣigaṇi adds that even this case is an instance of indirect cognition (*parokṣa,* or in Samantabhadra's terms: *yukty-anuśāsana*), NAV 1.14: *sarveṣāṃ câteṣāṃ parokṣe 'ntar -bhāvo, 'nyathânupapannârthântara-darśana-dvāreṇa prastutârtha-saṃvedana-caturatvād iti.*—'And all these [sub-varieties] are included in the indirect cognition because they are apt to [produce] a sensation of the object under discussion by the means of perception of another object which is otherwise inexplicable.'

[41] MSV 5.7 (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*) 87d–88 (p. 335):

> *sambandha-dṛk tatra kācid asti ||*
> *tat sarvam ity-ādy asamañjasaṃ syān na cet iyaṃ syād anumānato 'nyathā |*
> *evaṃ-svabhāvâpy anumāna-śabdaṃ labheta ced asti yathêpsitaṃ naḥ ||*

[42] Cf. 'impossibility otherwise' (*anyathâsambhāva*) in TSa 1367 (*vide supra,* n. 10).

[43] Cf. TS 1.1: *samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ.*

[44] Cf. VP 1.30:

> *na câgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate |*
> *ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgama-pūrvakam ||*

—'And the normative principle cannot be established by reasoning without testimony; even the knowledge of [Vedic] seers, too, was preceded by testimony.'
Also Siddhasena Divākara (probably around the same time, c. 500 CE) expresses a similar idea that the application of reason is limited and subordinate to scriptural testimony (*āgama*); the eschatological aim, *ergo* the truly ethical dimension and

soteriological destiny (e.g. one's capability to attain liberation), cannot be known without the scriptural testimony, see STP 3.43–45:

duviho dhammā-vāo aheu-vāo ya heu-vāo ya /
tattha u aheu-vāo bhaviyâbhaviyâdao bhāvā //
bhavio samma-daṁsaṇa-ṇāṇa-caritta-paḍivatti-saṁpanno /
ṇiyamā dukkhaṁta-kaḍo tti lakkhaṇaṁ heu-vāyassa //
jo heu-vāya-pakkhammi heuo āgame ya āgamio /
so sasamaya-paṇṇavao siddhaṁta-virāhao anno //

—'The exposition of normative principle (or: of properties) is two-fold: the exposition without reasoning (scriptural; *āgama*) and the exposition based reasoning. Further, the scriptural exposition (*āgama*) [distinguishes / deals with] beings competent for liberation and incompetent for liberation.
The characteristic feature of the exposition based reasoning is [to argue rationally] that the being competent for liberation, who is endowed with the understanding of conation, correct cognition and correct conduct, will necessarily bring an end to suffering.
The one who [applies] reasoning to a topic [within the scope] of the exposition based reasoning (sc. in rational discourse) and [who applies] scripture to scriptural exposition, demonstrates his own doctrine. The other one [who fails to do so] abuses teachings.'

[45] See e.g. GANERI (2001: 1–2).

[46] Cf. VP 1.34:

avasthā-desa-kālānāṁ bhedād bhinnāsu saktiṣu /
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //

—'Since the endowments [of things] are different due to difference in condition, place and time, the proof of things through inference is most difficult.'
Notice the pun on it by way of quoting the same verse with some modification in its very refutation found in TSa 1476:

avasthā-desa-kālānāṁ bhedād bhinnāsu saktiṣu /
bhāvānām anumānena nâtaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā //

—' ... the proof of things through inference *is not so difficult on their basis.*'

[47] Cf. VP 1.34:

yatnenânumito 'rthaḥ kusalair anumātṛbhiḥ /
abhiyuktatair anyair anyathâivôpapadyate //

'Even [when] a thing is inferred with much effort by expert logicians, it is [still] explicable in another way by other more skilled [logicians].'
Notice the pun on it by way of refutation in *Tattva-saṅgraha* 1477:

yatnenânumito 'rthaḥ kusalair anumātṛbhiḥ /
nânyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatair api //

[48] NKC *ad* LT 2.12 (p. 444.16): *tad-pratipattis ca ūha-jñānāt ity api sraddhā-mātram.* Here *tad-pratipattis* = *avinābhāva -pratipattiḥ,* and *ūha* = *tarka.*

[49] Cf., e.g. PVSV 3.24–25 (p. 185): *tasmāt svabhāva-pratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyaṁ gamayati. sa ca tad-bhāva-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇo vā. sa evâvinâbhāvo dṛṣṭântābhyāṁ pradarsyate,* and NB (1).3.31: *sa* [= *svabhāva-pratibandhas*] *ca dvi-prakāraḥ sarvasya: tādātmya-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇas cêty uktam.*

[50] E.g. the cases mentioned in TSa 1371ab and NAṬ ad NAV 5.2; see also n. 11 and p. 344.

[51] See the examples on pp. 349–350.

[52] See the criticism in NKC p. 440.11–441.9.

[53] Cf. NKC *ad* LT 2.12 (p. 440.4 ff.).

[54] Cf. e.g. BHATT (1989: 218 ff.).

[55] *Vide supra* pp. 344 and 349. The above counters the supposition of UNO (1993: 160) that 'there is no divergence of opinion among Indian philosophical systems that these two (i.e. *vyāpti* and *pakṣa-dharmatā*—P.B.) are postulated as indispensable factors, either separately or jointly, for obtaining the conclusion, or the final inferential cognition (*anumiti*).'

[56] See e.g. PV (P) 1.287cd (p. 61) = PV (S) 1.287ab (p. 109): *anumānâsrayo liṅgam avinâbhāva-lakṣaṇam /* —'The basis for inference is the inferential sign, which is characterised by the inseparable connection;' and PVV *ad loc.*: *avinâbhāvaḥ sādhyâvyabhicāritvam tal-lakṣaṇaṁ yasya tat tathā.*
The term *avinâbhāva* was, however, not the sole property of the Buddhist and it were probably not the Buddhists who coined it (*vide infra,* n. 60). However, I deliberately speak of 'the Buddhist relation of *avinâbhāva*', for this relation is always discussed by the Jaina authors in the context of such Buddhist notions as *trairūpya* or *tādātmya* and *tad-utpatti.*

[57] Cf. also Prajñākaragupta's analysis in PVA (p. 70 in *sva-vṛtti*): *avinâbhāva eva hi niyamaḥ, sādhyaṁ vinā na bhavatîti kṛtvā.*

[58] GANERI (2001: 152). Cf. also the Chapter 4.7 in GANERI (2001: 114–118).

[59] GANERI (2001: 152). This idea goes back probably to the *Vāda-vidhāna* [VāVi], an earlier work of Vasubandhu (?), see Fr. AI 7: *hetur vipakṣād visesaḥ*—'The logical reason is the difference from dissimilar cases'.

[60] The term *avinâbhāva* was not an innovation of Diṅnāga, for it is already attested in *Vāda-vidhi* [VāVi] of Vasubandhu as a relation validating the logical reason [Fr. B 5]: *tādṛg-avinâbhāvi-dharmôpadarsanam hetuḥ*—'Logical reason is the demonstration of a property which is inseperably connected with [a property] of such a kind (to be infered)', cf. FRAUWALLNER (1957:118, 136) and FRANCO (1990: 202). We find it also in PBh (2.12.2b.0) [250], p. 46–47: *evaṁ sarvatra desa-kālâvinā-bhūtam itarasya liṅgam.*—'In this way the inferential sign of the other (viz. of the sign-possessor) is inseparably connected [with it] as regards place and time in all cases,' as well as in PBh (2.12.2b.0) [261], p. 49: *sambhāvo 'py avinâbhāvitatvād anumānam eva*—'Equivalence [as a cognitive criterion] is nothing but inference, in so far as it is based on the inseparable connection.' Cf. also NENNINGER (1992: 124 ff.).

[61] NKC p. 4218–9 *ad* LT 2.10: *ayam avinâbhāva-sabdaḥ sādhyâbhāve sādhanâbhāvaṁ vadatîti vyatireka-mātra-vacanaḥ, na sambandha-vacanaḥ.*

[62] NKC p. 423.10–424.3 *ad* LT 2.10: *yac côcyate—avinâbhāva-sabdo vyatireka-mātra-vacano na sambandha-vacanaḥ, tad apy ukti-mātram; yato 'vinâbhāva-sabdo na vyatireka-mātre paryavasyati ghaṭâdi-bhāve 'pi tat-pravṛtti-prasaṅgāt, kintu niyame. sa ca niyamaḥ tathôpapatty-anyathânupapatti-prakārābhyāṁ vyavasthitaḥ* [see NA 17 n. 65]. *ataḥ tāv ubhāv api avinâbhāva-sabdena ucyate, "yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra tatrâgniḥ, yatrâgnir nâsti tatra dhūmo 'pi nâsti" iti. nanu "yatrâgnir nâsti tatra dhūmo 'pi nâsti" ity-etat kuto 'vagamyate ity cet? agny-abhāve dhūmasya niyamena apratiyamānatvāt tat-sadbhāva-niyata evâsau, anyathā yathā dhūmâbhāve 'pi kvacid agnir upalabhyate tathā agny-abhāve dhūmo 'pi kvacid upalabhyeta. yasya yena vinā nânupapattir na sa tena niyataḥ yathā dhūmâbhāve 'py upapadyamāno 'gnir na dhūmena niyataḥ, agninā vinânupapattis ca dhūmasya, tasmād asau tan-niyata iti.* Comp. also PNT 3.29: *hetu-prayogas tathôpapatty-anyathânupapattibhyāṁ dvi-prakāraḥ.*

[63] Cf. NAV 17.1: *tayā tathôpapattyā, yathâgnir atra, dhūmasya tathâvôpapatter iti. anyathâpi vêty anenâvayave samudāyôpacārād anyathânupapattiṁ lakṣayati. anyathā sādhya-vyatireke 'nupapattir avidyamānatâiva tayā vânyathânupapattyā hetoḥ prayogaḥ syād, yathâgnir atra, dhūmasyânyathânupapatter iti,* etc.

[64] PĀ (V) 3.89 = PĀ (J) 3.90: *vyutpanna-prayogas tu tathôpapatty-anyathânupapatter vā.*

[65] NA 17:

hetos tathôpapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathâpi vā |
dvi-vidho 'nyatarenâpi sādhya-siddhir bhaved iti ||

[66] NKC p. 448.8 (*ad* LT 2.12): "*idam asmin saty eva bhavati ato 'nyathā na bhavaty eva*". This passage occurs in NAṬ as a rule for suppositional knowledge (*ūha, tarka*), cf. n. 91. Interestingly, seemingly a similar formulation is found in TSa 1692:

asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asatīti ca |
tasmād ato bhavaty eva yuktir eṣā 'bhidhīyate ||

This reasoning principle is called *yukti* and is attributed by Śāntarakṣita to Caraka the physician (TSaP *ad loc. Caraka-vaidya*) in TSa 1693ab:

pramānântaram evêyam ity āha carako muniḥ |

The main difference between Caraka's *yukti* and Jaina suppositional knowledge lies in the fact that Caraka avails himself of a causal relationship (*kāryā-karanatā*, cf. TSa 1696), which is pointed out by Kamalaśīla (TSaP *ad loc. tad-bhāva-bhāvitvena yat-kāryatā-pratipattir iyam yuktiḥ*), whereas for the Jainas suppositional knowledge extends to all kinds of *anumāna*. Furthermore, we can notice apparently different position of *eva*: for Caraka the restrictive particle binds the result in the causal relationship (*bhavaty eva*), whereas for the Jainas, *eva* binds the antecedent in an inference (*asmin saty eva*).

[67] On this issue comp. UNO (1993).

[68] E.g. NKC p. 434–435 *ad* LT 2.11cd–12ab: *sādhyena iṣṭâbādhitâsiddha-viśeṣana-viśiṣṭena **avinâbhāvo** vyāptiḥ*, NKC p. 420.1 ff. *ad* LT 2.10: *tathā hi: vyāptiḥ sambandho 'rthānām, sā ca deśataḥ kālato vā kasyacit kenacit syāt? na*, NKC p. 418.15–419.1 *ad loc.* (LT 2.10): *vyāptir hi sādhya-sādhanayor avinâbhāvaḥ*, see also: NKC p. 315.9 etc.

[69] E.g. NRĀ: *ad* MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 4ab (p. 248.4): *vyāptiḥ niyamaḥ.*

[70] E.g. NKC p. 423.11–424.3, or NKC 5.3: *tathā kārya-svabhāvânupalabdhi-rūpa-liṅga-traya-niyamo 'pi kila tādātmya-tad-utpatti-lakṣana-sambandhâstitvam eteṣv evêti*, and NAV 18.1: **sādhanam** *tad-gamako hetuḥ, tayoḥ **sādhya-sādhanayor vyāptiḥ**, idam anena vinā na bhavatîty-evam-rūpā ...*

[71] E.g. PV (P) 3.1c: *avinâbhāva-niyamād*, and PV (P) 3.31c: *avinâbhāva-niyamo.*

[72] NAV 18.1: *na hi saha-darśanād eva kvacit sarvatrêdam amunā vinā na bhavatîti sidhyati.* Cf. also PV (P) 3.31:

kārya-karana-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt |
avinâbhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na darśanāt ||

—'The law of the inseparable connection is [based] either on the cause-and-effect relationship or on the [essential] identity; [it is not based] on non-observation or on observation,'

as well as PVin II.63 (p. 94.23–26):

| rgyu daṅ ᶜbras buᶜi dṅos poᶜam |
| raṅ bźin ṅes par byed pa las |
| med na miᶜbyuṅ ṅes pa ste |
| ma mthoṅ las min mthoṅ las min |

[73] Cf. PV (P) 3.13b: *na câdarśana-mātrena vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā |*

[74] MŚV 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 12–14 (p. 249–250):

bhūyo-darśana-gamyā ca vyāptiḥ sāmānya-dharmayoḥ |
jñāyate bheda-hāneḥ kvacic câpi viśeṣayoḥ ||
kṛttikôdayam ālakṣya rohiny-āsatti-klptivat |
vyāpteś ca dṛśyamānāyāḥ kaścid dharmaḥ prayojahaḥ ||

"asmin saty amunā bhāvyam " iti śaktyā nirūpyate |
anye para-prayuktānām vyāptīnām upajīvakāḥ ||

[75] Cf. VP 1.35:

pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate |
mani-rūpyâdi-vijñānam tad-vidām nânumānikam ||

—'The experts' knowledge of precious stones and coins, which cannot be conveyed to others, arises from from repeated practice. It is not inferential.'

[76] NKC p. 421.8–9, *ad* LT 2.10: *kiñca, avinâbhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa ca sambandhi-grahana-pūrvakaḥ, sambandhinau ca dvau dvau viśeṣau, ataḥ katham sarvôpasamhārena vyāptir grahitum śakyā?*

[77] NKC p. 423.8–10, *ad* LT 2.10: *yad apy abhihitam "avinâbhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa ca sambandhi-grahana-pūrvakaḥ " ity-ādi; tad apy anenâiva pratyākhyātam; sāmānyôpalakṣita-viśeṣayor vyāpteḥ sarvôpasamhārenâiva sambhavāt. na hi tatra ānantyâdi-doṣo avakāśam labhate.*

[78] Cf. NAV 29.23: *tasmāt kathañcid bhedâbhedināv evâitau*—'Therefore these two, [i.e. the universal and the particulars], are somehow truly [both] different and not different from each other.'

[79] Cf. LT 2.47cd (p. 646): *dravya-paryāya-sāmanya-viśeṣâtmârtha-niṣṭhitam*, as well as YA 40 (p. 94):

sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ padam viśeṣântara-pakṣapāti |
antar-viśeṣântara-vṛttito 'nyat samāna-bhāvam nayate viśeṣam ||

[80] Cf. NKC p. 423.3–5: *kasya kena vyāpti iti, tatra yasya yena avyabhicāraḥ tasya tena vyāptiḥ, sāmānya-viśeṣavataś ca dhūmâdeḥ sāmānya-viśeṣavatâgny-ādinâvyabhicārāt tasya tenâiva vyāptiḥ.*

[81] Both the criticism of *bhūyo-darśana* and the discussion of how *vyāpti* is cognised is found in NKC p. 429.9–434.11 *ad* LT 2.11.

[82] Cf. e.g. NKC p. 429.19–20 *ad* LT 2.11: *kiñ ca pratyakṣa-mātram bhūyo-darśana-sahāyam anvaya-vyatireka-sahakṛtam vā pratyakṣam vyāpti-grahanam prabhavet? na ...* , and NKC p. 431.12 ff. *ad* LT 2.11: *etena bhūyo-dṛṣṭânvaya ity-ādi pratyuktam ...*

[83] Cf. e.g. NKC p. 433.16 ff.

[84] To establish a first-level inference we have to establish the *vyāpti*, for which we would require a second-level inference, for the *vyāpti* of which to establish we would require a third-level inference, etc. Cf. NKC *ad loc.* (p. 433.21-22): **sarvatra** *ity-ādi.* **sarvatra** *prathamânumānavat dvitīye 'py anumāne **aviśeṣāt.*** Very similar argumentation is found in NAV 1.19: *pratyakṣânumānayoś ca prāmānyam kuta iti cintyam. na tāvat pratyakṣāt ...*

[85] LT 2.11cd–12ab (p. 426):

avikalpa-dhiyā liṅgam na kiñcit sampratīyate |
nânumānād asiddhatvāt pramānântaram añjasam ||

Vivṛtiḥ: *na hi pratyakṣam "yāvān kaścid dhūmaḥ kālânttare deśântare ca pāvakasâiva kāryam nârthântarasya " iti iyato vyāpārān karum samartham sannihita-viṣaya-balôtpatter avicārakatvāt. nâpy anumānântaram, sarvatrâviśeṣāt. na hi sākalyena liṅgasya liṅginā vyāpter asiddhau kvacit kiñcid anumānam nāma. "tan na apratyakṣam anumāna-vyatiriktam pramānam " ity ayuktam; liṅga-pratipatteḥ pramānântarāt.* Prabhācandra explains at an earlier portion of NKC p. 418.14–419.2 *ad loc.* (LT 2.10): *kaḥ punar ayam tarko nāma iti cet? vyāpti-jñānam. vyāptir hi sādhya-sādhanayor avinâbhāvaḥ. tad-grāhi jñānam tarko bhidhīyate, tatra tasyâiva pramānyāt* (recte: *prāmānyāt*), *jñānântarānām tad-grahane sāmârthyâsambhavataḥ tatra prāmānyânupapatteḥ.*—'What is it what you call suppositional knowledge? This is the cognition of the invariable concomitance. For the invariable concomitance is the

inseparable connection of the inferable property (*sādhya*) and the logical reason. Such a cognition that grasps this [invariable concomitance] is called suppositional knowledge, because only this [suppositional knowledge] possesses cognitive validity as regards that [invariable concomitance], in so far as cognitive validity of other kinds of cognition is inexplicable as regards that [invariable concomitance], because [they are] have no efficacy to grasp that [invariable concomitance].'

[86] Cf. NKC p. 434.9–10 *ad* LT 2.11: *liṅga-pratipatteḥ avinābhāva-pratipatteḥ tarkâkyāyāḥ pramāṇântaratvād aliṅgajâviśada-svabhāvatayā pramāṇa-dvayânantar-bhūtatvāt.* Akalaṅka follows the Canonical tradition subdivides *parokṣa* into *mati-jñāna*, or sensuous cognition, and *śruta-jñāna*, which comprises testimony, inference etc., see LT 2.10 and LT 2.61 (p. 682):

> *tat pratyakṣaṃ parokṣañ ca dvidhâivâtrânya-saṃvidām |*
> *antar-bhāvān na yujyante niyamāḥ parakalpitāḥ ||*

The tradition of Siddhasena Mahāmati (and probably Pātrasvmin) differs from this tradition, see BALCEROWICZ (2001: xii).

[87] See also NAV 1.19: *tasmād anumānam abhilaṣatā gaty-antarâbhāvāt tat-sambandha-grahaṇa-pravaṇas tri-kāla-gocaro 'vyabhicāri vitarko 'bhyupagantavyaḥ.*—'Therefore, since there is no other logical alternative, anybody postulating inference should [also] accept suppositional knowledge, which is disposed towards grasping that relation, the domain of which are three times [and] which is undeviating.'

[88] LT 2.49ab (p. 652.1–2): *vyāptiṃ sādhyena hetoḥ sphuṭayati na vinā cintayâkatra dṛṣṭiḥ, sakalyenâsa tarko 'nadhigata-viṣayaḥ.*

[89] NAV 18.2: *anvaya-vyatireka-grāhi-pratyakṣânupalambhôttara-kāla-bhāvino 'vyabhicarita-tri-kāla-vyāpi-gocarasya mati-nibandhanasyôha-saṃjñitasya pramāṇântarasya sambandha-grāhitayêṣṭatvāt.*

[90] NAV 1.13: *ūho 'pi pratyakṣânumānâsaṃvedya-sādhyârthânyathânupapannatva-lakṣaṇa-liṅga-sambandha-grahaṇa-pravaṇaḥ pramāṇântaram.*

[91] NAṬ *ad* NAV 1.14.: *upalambhânupalambha-nimittam vyāpti-jñānam ūhaḥ, yathêdam asmin saty eva bhavati, asati na bhavaty evêti ca.* Note that the same passage occurs in NKC, see n. 66; but there it is the formulation of *avinābhāva!*

[92] NKC, see p. 351, comp. n. 66.

[93] NS 1.1.40: *avijñāta-tattve 'rthe kāraṇôpapattitas tattva-jñānârtham ūhas tarkaḥ.*

[94] NBh 1.1.1: *tarko na pramāṇa-saṅgrhitaḥ, tarko na pramāṇântaram, pramāṇānām anugrāhakas tattva-jñānāya kalpate. tasyôdāharaṇam—kim idaṃ janma kṛtakena hetunā nirvartyate āhosvid akṛtakena athâkasmikam iti? evam avijñāte 'rthe kāraṇôpapattyā ūhaḥ pravartate—"yadi kṛtakena hetunā nirvartyate, hetûcchedād upâpanno 'yaṃ janmôcchedaḥ. athâkṛtakena hetunā, tato hetûcchedasyâśakyatvād anupapanno janmôcchedaḥ. athâkasmikam, ato 'kasmān nirvartyamānaṃ na punar nivartsyatîti nirvṛtti-kāraṇaṃ nôpapadyate, tena janmânucchedaḥ" iti.*

[95] TSaP *ad* TSa 1386 (p. 409.12–14):

> *vinā sādhyād adṛṣṭasya dṛṣṭānte hetutêṣyate |*
> *parair mayā punar dharminy asambhūṣṇor vināmunā ||*
> *arthâpatteś ca sābaryā bhaikṣavāc^a cânumānataḥ |*
> *anyad evânumānam no nara-siṃhavad iṣyate ||*

^a The text in Embar Krishnamacharya's edition *bhaikṣavaś* should be emended as above, cf. PATHAK (1930: 156–7) and KUNST (1939: 26 n. 3).

[96] If we concern the latest proposal of evaluating the data, YDī is a much earlier work than any of the Jaina sources discussed in my paper: MEJOR (2000: 263): 'all that gives a solid basis for the lower limit of the *Yukti-dīpikā* at ca. 550 C.E., which is in agreement with the date proposed by FRAUWALLNER.', and MEJOR (2000: 273): 'In this case YD cannot be placed later than 600 C.E.'.

[97] YDī (*ad* SKā.4) p. 73.7–18: *sā [arthâpattiḥ] tu dvi-vidhā vyabhicāriṇī câvyabhicāriṇī ca. ... yā tv avinābhāvinī avyabhicāriṇī yathā kesari-varāhayor upahvare sannipātam upalabhyôttara-kālam kevalaṃ kesariṇaṃ varāha-vraṇâṅkita-śarīraṃ prayāntam upalabhya pratipadyate jito varāha iti tad anumānam. katham. yasmāt kesari-varāhayor yau jaya-parājayau tayor avyabhicāri sambandhaḥ. tatra yadā kesariṇo jayam upalabhyâvyabhicāriṇam itarasya parājayam pratipadyate kim anyat syād ṛte 'numānāt. adhigatôbhaya-sambandhi-samudāyasya hi pratipattuḥ pratyakṣi-bhūtânyatara-sambandhino vā sambandhy-antara-pratipattis tad anumānam. itthaṃ cârthâpattir ato na tasmāt pṛthag bhavitum arhati.*

[98] PBh (2.12.2b.0) [260], p. 48–49: *darśanârthād arthâpatthir virodhi eva. śravaṇād anumitânumānam.*

[99] Interestingly, Dharmottara (c. 740–800) seems (or pretends) not to know the notion of *anyathânupapatti*, for he does not refer to it, at least not in NBṬ, even in the discussion of two forms of the examples in NB 3.28 ff. (= DhPr 3.26 ff.). A reference to it is made by Durvekamiśra (970–1030), commenting on NB 3.26 in DhPr p. 167.21–22.

[100] Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2000: 33): 'In NA 20 Siddhasena maintains that *dṛṣṭānta* is not an essential part of "syllogistic" reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the "economical" trend in Indian logic—that starts with Vasubandhu and his *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-vidhi*—to limit the number of necessary members of the proof formula, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves: NA 20: ...' (*vide supra* n. 25).

[101] NAV 20.1: *yadā sarvatra sādhyâvinābhāvinam hetuṃ smarati pratipādyas, tadā pakṣe 'pi tam avabudhya kathaṃ sādhyaṃ na pratipadyeta?*

[102] Cf. e.g. TSa 1368, 1371 p. 344, nn. 10, 25.
; LTV *tābhyām vināiva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ*, n. 20.

[103] Cf. NA 17.1: *ete ca dve apy ekasmin sādhye prayoktavye' iti yo manyeta, tac chiṣyanârtham āha anyatareṇâpi ... prayogasya ca sādhya-sādhanaṃ phalam; tac ced ekenâiva sidhyati, dvitīya-prayogaḥ kevalaṃ vaktur akauśalam ācakṣita.*—'And in order to instruct someone who might maintain: "Both of these two together have to be pronounced with regard to one [and the same] probandum," [the author] says: **"precisely in either way"**... [T]he result of [either] pronouncement is the proof of the probandum. If this [probandum] is proved just by one [of these two ways of pronouncement], the pronouncement of the other one would only evince the ineptitude of the speaker, because it is purposeless.' Further, in NAV 18, we find an opinion that all we need for valid inference are two members: *pakṣa* and *hetu*. Prabhācandra refers to an interesting (hypothetical?) objection that if a person knows the context very well, he can understand the argument without stating the logical reason and only the thesis is enough, in other words, in certain circumstances it is enough to express the thesis only, not the *hetu*, see NKC p. 436.13–20: *prayojanâprasādhakatvañ ca asiddham; pratipādya-pratipatti-viśeṣasya tat-prasādhya-prayojanasya sadbhāvāt. pratipādyo hi kaścin manda-matiḥ kaścit tīvra-matiḥ. tatra yo manda-matiḥ na tasya prakṛtârtha-pratipatti-viśeṣaḥ pratijñā-prayogam antareṇôpapadyate, nāpi naiyāyikādeḥ pañcâvayava-prayoge pratipanna-saṅkatasya* [recte: *saṅketasya*] *amanda-mater api, tad-aprayoge tena nigraha-sthānâbhidhānāt, "hīnam anyatamenâpi nyūnam"* [NS 5.2.12] *iti-vacanāt. tīvra-mates tu tat-prayogam antareṇâpi hetu-prayoga-mātrāt prakṛtârtha-pratipatti-pratītes tasya vaiyarthye hetu-prayogasyâpi vaiyārthyaṃ syāt, niścitâvipratāraka-puruṣa-vacanād 'agnir atra" ity-ādi-pratijñā-prayoga-mātra-rūpād eva kasyacit prakṛtârtha-pratipatti-darśanāt.*—'And it is not established that one does

not [have to] indicate [one's own] purpose [in argument], because a particular understanding of the [person] to be taught is the purpose of the matter to be indicated to him. For the [person] to be taught can be someone slow-witted or someone sharp-witted. Out of them, for the one who is slow-witted a particular understanding of the matter in question cannot be accomplished without the pronouncement of the thesis, neither [can this be accomplished] for someone who has understood the linguistic convention [governing] the pronouncement of the five-membered proof formula of the Naiyāyika and others [and] who even is not slow-witted, because when the pronouncement of this [thesis is] not [made] thereby a the point of defeat can be announced, in compliance with NS 5.2.12: "[The proof formula] is deficient even when one of the [members] is missing." However, if for someone sharp-witted—who has acquired the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of the logical reason, even without the pronouncement of this [thesis]—this [pronouncement of the thesis] were [considered] purposeless, then also the pronouncement of the logical reason would [have to] be [considered] purposeless, because it can be empirically observed that someone [may acquire] the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of a person who has certain knowledge and who is not deceitful which has merely the form of the thesis 'There [on the hill] there is fire", or similar.' This opinion is subsequently rejected by Prabhācandra as follows. First, we have to state the thesis in order to show what our argument aims at (NKC p. 437.4–11); here Prabhācandra uses the analogy of an archer, well-known from NA 16 (*vide supra*, n. 107). Secondly, even if our argument can be understood by stating the thesis alone, we still have to formulate the logical reason as the rule that warrants the correctness of our reasoning (NKC p. 437.12–438.4).
[104] Cf. NA 18:

sādhya-sādhanayor vyāptir yatra niściyate-tarām |
sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambandha-smaraṇān matah ||

—'Such [a statement] in which the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans is determined in the best possible way *because of the recollection of the relation* is known as the example based on similarity.'

[105] NAV 13.2: ... *tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣābhidhānasya śroṭṛ-saṃskārākāritayā nairarthakyād.*—' the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (*sc.* it suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining [members of the proof formula]—inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer—is purposeless.'

[106] NAV 13.2: *evaṃ manyate naikaḥ prakāraḥ parārthānumānasya, kiṃ tarhi yathā parasya sukhena prameya-pratītir bhavati tathā yatnataḥ pratyāyanīyaḥ. tatra daśāvayavaṃ sādhanaṃ pratipādanôpāyaḥ. tad yathā ... tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣābhidhānasya śroṭṛ-saṃskārākāritayā nairarthakyāt.*—'[The author] maintains that there is not [only] one variety of the inference for others, but also [that the cognoscible object] should be conveyed meticulously [to another person] in such a way so that the awareness of the cognoscible comes about easily [on the part] of the other person. For this [purpose], there is the ten-membered proof as the means of demonstration [of the cognoscible object], namely ... Then the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (*sc.* it suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining [members of the proof formula]—inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer—is purposeless.' Comp. however PV (P) 3.27cd: *viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ.*—'Since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated.'
[107] NA 14cd–16:

tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dīpakaḥ ||

anyathā vādy-abhipreta-hetu-gocara-mohinah |
pratyāyyasya bhaved dhetur viruddhârekito yathā ||
dhānuṣka-guṇa-sampreksi-janasya parividhyatah |
dhānuṣkasya vinā lakṣya-nirdeśena guṇêtarau ||
The same idea is expressed in NKC p. 437.4–11.

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