

JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

DR. MOHANLAL MEHTA



Gujarat Vidyapith,
Ahmedabad - 380 014

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR JAINA STUDIES
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FOREWORD

Founded by Mahatma Gandhi on 18th October, 1920, as an institution of higher learning, the Gujarat Vidyapith (G.V.) has been constantly striving to work through Education, towards a Society based on the principles of non-violence and '*Sarvadharmā Samābhava*' (Respect for all religions). The objects of the Gujarat Vidyapith among other things prescribe :

There shall be complete toleration of all established religions in all institutions connected with the Vidyapith, and for the spiritual development of pupils, knowledge of religion shall be imparted in consonance with truth and non-violence.

The teaching-research and extension programmes of the G.V. are wedded to this integrative aim. In early years after its foundation, the Gujarat Vidyapith has had the distinction of the services of the great scholars of Jainism and Buddhism, like Muni Jinavijayaji, Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Pt. Bechardas Doshi, Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh and Acharya Dharmanand Kosambi. Their outstanding research works which were published by the Gujarat Vidyapith continue to stimulate the rising generation of scholars in their studies on Jainism. Punjabhai Granthamala was instituted in 1928 for this purpose with an endowment

of Rs.25,000, under which 22 works were published. Publications of *Prakrit Kathasamgraha* by Muni Jinavijayaji, *Prakrit Vyakarana*, *Bhagawan Mahavirni Dharmakathao*, etc. by Pt. Bechardas Doshi, *Sanmati-Tarka-Prakarana* and *Tattavartha Sutra* by Pt.Sukhlalji are worth-mentioning in this context.

Establishment of the International Centre for Jaina Studies (1993) through a permanent endowment, is a major step for strenghtening the tradition of teaching and research in Jaina Philosophy and Culture. The Centre is developing an integrated interdisciplinary approach towards the academic discipline of Jaina Studies. The teaching-research programmes being offered by the Centre since the academic year 1993-94 include *Parangata* (M.A.), *Anuparangata* (M.Phil), *Vidya-Vachaspati* (Ph.D.), *Vidya-Varidhi* (Post Ph.D. - D.Litt) in Jaina Studies, along with short term vocational courses in various fields of Jainism, particularly for international visiting students and scholars. A Resource Centre in Jainism with computerised Data Base in also being developed for the benefit of the scholars and the community.

Epistemology is an important branch of philosophy. All the schools of Indian philosophy have dealt with their own epistemological theories. Jaina philosophy is a significant system of Indian thought. It has produced hundreds of works on ontology, epistemology and ethics in Prakrit, Sanskrit etc. Jaina epistemology, i.e., Jaina theory of knowledge deals with the concept of knowledge

comprehensively. The Jaina thinkers have given a full account of sensory and extra-sensory perception. The present work presents an authentic exposition of the Jaina concept of knowledge.

The author Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta is an international scholar of Jainism. He has authored a number of books on Jaina philosophy, psychology, culture, literature etc. He is the principal author of the 'Prakrit Proper Names', a monumental work in two volumes, published by the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. Dr. Mehta has been the founder Director of P.V. Research Institute, Varanasi and the founder Professor of Jaina Philosophy at the University of Poona.

I trust the present booklet will enlighten the students of Indian Philosophy in general and those of Jaina Philosophy in particular. Our International Centre for Jaina Studies feels proud in publishing it.

31-12-95

Ramlal Parikh

PREFACE

My aim in preparing the present booklet has been to make an humble contribution to one of the most significant schools of Indian thought, viz., Jaina Philosophy. Like other thinkers of India, the Jaina philosophers have also contributed to the field of epistemology. The Jaina thinkers have defined knowledge as the essence of soul. The soul has other characteristics also, but the Jaina thinkers always emphasized knowledge as the chief characteristic possessed by the self.

The knowledge or cognition of an object can be of two kinds : either it is restricted to the grasping of the object in its existential generality which is called indeterminate cognition, undifferentiated knowledge or apprehension, or it grasps the object with its individual attributes which is called determinate cognition, differentiated knowledge or comprehension. The present work gives an authentic account of various sub-divisions of these two kinds.

I am thankful to the authorities of Gujarat Vidyapith for publishing this booklet. My thanks are especially due to Prof. Madhu Sen, the Director of the International Centre for Jaina Studies, for taking keen interest in its publication.

B-18, Angal Park
Chatuhshringi
Pune-411 016
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Mohan Lal Mehta

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CHAPTER I

JAINA THEORY OF APPREHENSION

Consciousness is the essential attribute of soul. It is present even in the state of deep sleep. If it is not admitted, the pleasant experience of a comfortable and sound sleep recalled in the subsequent waking state would be impossible. The Jaina holds that consciousness is not merely a chain of successive momentary flashes but a constant factor undergoing various changes. It is the permanent faculty of soul undergoing various modifications.

Consciousness is said to be of two chief types : determinate and indeterminate. Determinate consciousness is the state of comprehension. It is divided into eight categories. They are known as non-verbal (sensory and mental) comprehension (*mati-jnana*), verbal (mental) comprehension (*sruta-jnana*), clair-voyance (*avadhi-jnana*), telepathy (*manahparyaya-jnana*), omniscience (*kevala-jnana*), wrong non-verbal comprehension (*matia-jnana*), wrong verbal comprehension (*sruta-ajnana*) and wrong clairvoyance (*vibhanga-jnana* or *avadhi-ajnana*). Indeterminate consciousness is nothing but apprehension. It is divided into four categories. They are called visual apprehension (*caksurdarsana*), non-visual apprehension

(*acaksurdarsana*), apprehensive clairvoyance (*avadhi-darsana*), and apprehensive omniscience (*kevala-darsana*).¹

COGNITION AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF SOUL :

The defining characteristic of a living being is consciousness. The main line of demarcation between a living being and a dead entity is consciousness. Existence, origination, decay, permanence, etc., are the general characteristics of all entities. When the Jaina defines a living being as an entity that possesses consciousness, he does not exclude other universal qualities (*sadharana dharmas*). The definition of a particular substance is through its differentia, i.e., those special qualities that are not found in other substances.² When a substance is taken as a whole, or in other words, if we are to describe all the characteristics of a substance, we analyse the complete structure of the entity. This type of analysis is not a definition. It is proper to call it a description.

In the Tattvartha-sutra, soul is defined as the substratum of the faculty of cognition (*upayoga*)³. Cognition is nothing more than the manifestation of consciousness in a particular form. It consists of apprehension and comprehension (*daṛsana* and *jnana*) as its constituents. This definition is very liberal having bliss and power included in it. Strictly speaking, soul is an entity having 'four types of infinity' (*ananta catustaya*) as its attributes. These four types are known as infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss, and

infinite power. An emancipated soul enjoys all these infinities. The worldly souls do not possess them in all perfection, inasmuch as they are obscured by the veil of the four obscuring (*ghatin*) karmas, viz., comprehension-obscuring karma, apprehension-obscuring karma, deluding karma, and power-obscuring karma. The liberated souls as well as the omniscients are absolutely free from the association of these four kinds of karma⁴, hence, they possess the four types of infinity in all perfection. Thus, the definition of soul consists in the possession of the four types of infinity. The first two types are nothing but two different forms of cognition. Hence, cognition is regarded as an important attribute of soul.

DIFFERENTIATION OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION :

The main line of demarcation between apprehension (*darsana*) and comprehension (*jnana*) is that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are known. In the technical language of the Jaina theory of knowledge, apprehension is called '*nirakara upayoga*' and comprehension is termed as '*sakara upayoga*'. Herbert Warren writes : 'Before we know a thing in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way, without going into its ins and outs. We simply know it as belonging to a class. This is the first stage of knowledge. It may be called detailless knowledge or indefinite cognition. If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing⁵'.

This statement is correct to some extent, because 'to know a thing as belonging to a class' is the first stage of comprehension which arises after apprehension, according to some Jaina writers. They say that the cognition of a thing as belonging to a class is sensation - '*avagraha-jnana*' (a kind of comprehension)⁶. According to them, apprehension is the primitive stage, i.e., the first stage of knowledge where we have only a general awareness of the object. This simple 'awareness' without any reference to a class is named apprehension. In this awareness, the cognition has mere 'existence' (*satta matra*) as its content. This stage of cognition emerges just after the contact between the subject and the object. This state of cognition is a preceding stage of sensation proper. According to these writers, sensation is divided into two stages. The first stage where we have mere awareness of an object is called apprehension, i.e., the sensation of existence. The second stage where we have knowledge of an object as belonging to a class is known as the sensation of class-character. There are, of course, some other thinkers who define apprehension as the cognition of generality, i.e., class-character. They regard '*avagraha*' as a stage of apprehension⁷. According to this view, we may use the term 'cognition of generality' for apprehension. However, the difference between apprehension (*darsana*) and comprehension (*jnana*) consists in the fact that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are known. In a different language, apprehension is indeterminate, indefinite, indistinct, whereas comprehension is determinate, definite, distinct.

CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL :

Consciousness which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of soul is treated by the *Vaisesikas* and *Naiyayikas* as an adventitious (*aupadhika*) quality⁸, which enters temporarily into soul as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition. Consciousness or knowledge is, thus, something different from soul. This is refuted by the Jaina in the following way :⁹

If knowledge is supposed to be absolutely distinct from soul, the knowledge of Mr. Caitra is in the same position with respect to his soul as the knowledge of Mr. Maitra, that is to say, both the knowledges would be equally strangers to the soul of Mr. Caitra, and there is no reason why his knowledge should serve him better than the knowledge of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own knowledge, all knowledges being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the Vaisesika : 'Knowledge is absolutely distinct from soul but it is connected with it by inherent relationship (*samavaya-sambhandha*) and hence, the knowledge of Mr. Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the knowledge of Mr. Maitra, for the former is connected with him by inherence, while the latter is not so'. But this explanation can be easily turned aside. According to the Vaisesika, the category of inherence is one, eternal, and all-pervasive,¹⁰ therefore, it is impossible that the knowledge should reside in Caitra and not in

Maitra; and since the souls are also all-pervasive according to him, the knowledge that takes place in one soul must take place in all the souls. Consequently, any knowledge that Caitra has acquired would belong to Maitra as well.

Granted it is possible for a particular knowledge to be connected with a particular soul by inherent relationship. But a question still remains to be answered. By what relation is the inherence connected with the knowledge and the soul ? If the answer is that it is connected by another inherence, that would mean an unending series of inherent relationships and it will lead to an infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself', why should not the knowledge and the soul be connected of themselves without requiring an inherent relationship to accomplish the connection?

The opponent again argues that soul is no doubt conscious, but that is not without a cause but is owing to consciousness coming to reside in it by inherent relationship as is shown by experience. The counter argument advanced by the Jaina is as under : If you are prepared to accept the evidence of experience, you must admit that soul is essentially of the nature of consciousness (*upayogatmaka*). Nobody is aware of being first unconscious and afterwards becoming conscious in consequence of the connection with consciousness. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower which implies the unity of soul and consciousness.

It may be further held that the consciousness 'I have knowledge' would prove a distinction between knowledge and soul, for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that which possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses knowledge in the theory of the opponent ? Not the self, because it is supposed to be essentially devoid of consciousness like a pitcher. By this theory, it cannot be asserted that the self is unconscious and, yet, it is capable of becoming conscious. Hence, that substance which is conscious of having knowledge (*jnanavanaham*) cannot in itself be unconscious by nature. Therefore, soul is not in itself unconscious which afterwards comes to possess consciousness by inherent relationship. It is, on the contrary, essentially conscious.

The most significant characteristic of a living being is its capability of cognition. If a soul is quite free from the impeding influence of karma, it is capable of cognising everything in all conditions. If it is infected by karmic matter, this faculty in its perfection disappears. Karma veils the omniscience of the self, as a compact veil of clouds hides the light of the sun. But as, although the light may be veiled, some light, however, breaks through the clouds, so there also, notwithstanding the influence of karmic matter, a fraction of the faculty of cognition is preserved to the self, for if it would also lose this, it is no longer the self.¹¹

PSYCHOLOGY ON INDETERMINATE COGNITION :

As we have already discussed, the cognition of an object can be of two kinds : either it is restricted to grasping of the object in its existential generality which is called indeterminate cognition, undifferentiated knowledge or apprehension (*anakara upayoga*), or it grasps a thing with its individual attributes which is called determinate cognition, differentiated knowledge or comprehension (*sakara upayoga*). In the language of psychology, we are, perhaps, justified in calling the first kind of cognition as pure sensation and the second one as perception (including memory etc.). The function of sensation is mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication.

William James records the same fact more lucidly by admitting that there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable. We may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the colour blue when I see it, and the flavour of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time when I feel it pass; an effort of attention which when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it. All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the

simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either not be known at all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge about. In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyse a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.¹²

INDETERMINATE COGNITION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY :

The Indian school of Philosophy hold slightly different views about the nature of indeterminate cognition from the standpoint of modern psychologists. The opinions of the schools of Indian Philosophy also differ from one another with respect to the nature and objects of indeterminate knowledge.

The Buddhist holds that indeterminate knowledge does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz., generality, substantiality, quality, name, and the like, since all these qualifications are the forms of thought which is always determinate. Indeterminate knowledge is always free from

all forms and determinations. Its object is the unique momentary thing-in-itself (*svalaksana*) devoid of all qualifications.¹³

The Sankhya maintains that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character possessing no element of representation.¹⁴ It is the first act of immediate knowledge that apprehends an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relationship between the qualified objects and its qualifications. It is the function of the external senses which give us a non-relational apprehension of an object unqualified by its properties. The external senses cognise an object as merely 'this' and not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. Discrimination and assimilation, analysis and synthesis - all these are attributed to the function of mind.¹⁵

Prasastapada, an exponent of the Vaisesika school, remarks that just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object. Indeterminate cognition is nothing but this apprehension. It perceives an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the first stage of perception and not the result of any other prior cognition.¹⁶ Sridhara holds that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object which is purely a presentative process free from all determinations and representative elements. It cognises both the general and particular

characters of its object as indistinguishable mass, and does not apprehend the general character as general and the particular as particular. It cannot be denied that indeterminate cognition apprehends both the general and individual qualities of an object. It cannot recognize them as such, since it is purely a presentative process, and as such cannot revive the past impressions.¹⁷

Vatsyayana, an ardent advocate of the Nyaya school, recognises indeterminate cognition as the apprehension of an object without its name. It is free from verbal images which constitute the nature of determinate cognition. He argues that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate cognition has. The differentiating factor of the two is that determinate cognition is the knowledge comprehending the name of its object revived in memory by association, whereas indeterminate cognition does not cognise the name and the like, since it is not entangled in verbal images.¹⁸ Gangesa, the founder of the Neo-Nyaya (*Navya Nyaya*) system, defines indeterminate cognition as the nonrelational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like.¹⁹

Kumarila, the founder of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa, maintains that just after peripheral stimulation there arises an undefined and indeterminate cognition. It is pure and simple, just like the simple apprehension of a baby. It arises purely out of the object itself and apprehends only a particular object which is the substratum of general and individual qualities. It cannot apprehend its object as

specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects; nor can it cognise its object as generic, for it cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object as pure and simple, and not as qualified by its general or particular character.²⁰

Prabhakara, the founder of the Prabhakara system of Mimamsa, holds that in indeterminate cognition, we apprehend not the mere individual object which is the substratum of its general and particular qualities, but also cognise the generic and specific attributes of the object without apprehending their distinction. He remarks that the Buddhist is not justified in maintaining that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unique momentary thing-in-itself, since we are clearly conscious of the generality. Indeterminate cognition apprehends both the generality and particularity but not their distinction from each other.²¹

As regards the Sankarite, indeterminate cognition is not capable of cognising any qualifications what so ever. According to him, it cannot apprehend even an object and its general character unrelated to each other, as the Mimamsaka, the Vaisesika, etc., hold, since the cognition of these various aspects presupposes the comprehension of their difference which falls outside the province of indeterminate cognition. Hence, he concludes that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unqualified 'being' (satta). It is absolutely undefined, devoid of all determinations. It knows neither a particular object nor its characters. It is strictly confined to mere existence.²²

Ramanuja holds that indeterminate cognition is neither the apprehension of mere existence, as the Sankarite believes, nor the cognition of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to each other, as the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsaka recognise. On the contrary, it apprehends an object attributed by some qualities²³. It can never apprehend an object devoid of all qualifications. An entirely unqualified object never enters into our cognition, since discrimination is the most fundamental character of consciousness.

JAINA CONCEPT OF INDETERMINATE COGNITION :

With this background in mind we, now, proceed to the Jaina concept of indeterminate cognition. According to the Jaina, indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the existence of an object, and not its other attributes. This view resembles the concept of the Sankarite to a certain extent. In the language of modern psychology, it is pure sensation of the existence of objects. The Jaina does not deny that in this state of cognition we apprehend the qualifications of an object. He recognises the apprehension of the qualifications in the form of existence, and not in the shape of qualification, since the cognition of a quality as qualifying an object presupposes distinction and determination. Moreover, the Jaina writers are not unanimous with respect to the nature of indeterminate cognition. The aforesaid view is more prevalent in the

works of the Jaina logicians and is generally ascribed to the Jaina system.

INTROSPECTION AND OBSERVATION :

Virasena observes in his commentary Dhavala on the Satkhandagama of Puspadanta that which cognises an external object of the nature of both generic and specific qualities is comprehension, i.e., determinate cognition (*jnana*), and the introspection of the self of the same nature is apprehension, i.e., indeterminate cognition (*darsana*). He criticises those philosophers who hold that comprehension cognises only the particular, whereas apprehension knows only the general. Particularity without generality is a figment and generality bereft of particularity is an impossibility. The cognition that knows a particular aspect of an object without a general one is invalid. Similarly, the cognition of the universal bereft of the particular is not valid. In his opinion, therefore, both apprehension and comprehension cognise the object as it is. Since the object is a complex of universality and particularity, each of the two cognises both the particular and the general. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former apprehends the internal entity, i.e., the self, whereas the latter cognises external objects. In a different language, apprehension is introvert, while comprehension is extravert. As regards the nature of the object itself, the internal entity as well as the external object is a complex of both generality and particularity²⁴. Thus, according to Virasena, the object of both apprehension and comprehension is a complex of generic

and specific qualities. They can be differentiated on the ground that the function of apprehension is to introspect, while that of comprehension is to observe external objects.

Brahmadeva also records a similar view. According to his interpretation of the nature of apprehension, there are two different views. They are distinguished from the standpoint of scripture and from that of logic. The ordinary view of apprehension as the cognition of existence is from the standpoint of logic.²⁵ The view from the standpoint of scripture is as under : The cognition of one's own self, consisting in the striving for the origination of comprehension in it's wake, is apprehension, and the subsequent cognition of external objects is comprehension.²⁶ The same faculty of cognition is called apprehension when it intuits the self and comprehension when it knows external objects. In other words, the self-conscious and other-conscious states of the same consciousness are apprehension and comprehension respectively. It is further observed by him that the position of apprehension as the knowledge of the general and comprehension as the cognition of the particular is accepted for the sake of non-Jaina logicians who are not capable of grasping the real significance of the Jaina tenets. For those possessing a good intellect, the other explanation is given which is in accordance with the scriptures.²⁷ *Nemicandra*, the author of the *Dravya-sāṅgraha*, however, did not point out any distinction of this kind. He simply defined apprehension as the knowledge of general characters of objects without knowing their particularities.²⁸ Thus, according to him,

apprehension is the cognition of general features without details, whereas comprehension is the knowledge with details.

REALISTIC ACCOUNT OF APPREHENSION :

Vadideva, a Jaina logician, defines apprehension as follows : First of all, there is a contact of the object with the sense, and then there is a stimulation in consciousness. This is the first stage of cognition where a person is barely conscious of the existence of a particular object. It is known as apprehension. The second stage consists in apprehending the general features of an object. This is the first stage of comprehension known as '*avagraha*' (perception of the general)²⁹ What Nemicaandra regards as apprehension is regarded to be 'perception of the general' by Vadideva. Apprehension, according to him, cognises merely the unqualified being. It cannot cognise even an object and its general features unrelated to each other, since the knowledge of these features presupposes the awareness of their difference which is not within the range of apprehension. Hence, as regards the view of Vadideva, apprehension is not competent to cognise any qualifications whatsoever. This view is very similar to that of the Sankarite who holds that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unqualified 'being'.

Hemacandra prescribes the following process to give rise to apprehension : 'A sense-organ is of two kinds - physical and psychical. An object is the composite of

substance and modes. The contact between them is a relation which is a sort of competency constituted by the situation of the object in a spatio-temporal context which is neither too far, nor too near, nor intercepted by an obstructive barrier'.³⁰ And this competency of the sense and the object is specifically determined. As, it has been observed : 'One hears a word when it is in conjunction with the auditory organ but sees a coloured figure even without conjunction.'³¹ Apprehension is the cognition of an object which does not take into account specific determinations. It takes place immediately after the sense-object-contact.³² He further elaborates this point. Apprehension is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. It is an established fact that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing existent, is totally destroyed. Thus, apprehension itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state, i.e., comprehension.³³

This account of Hemacandra is a realistic one. He agrees with the Sankhya who holds that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character. It cognises an object as merely 'this' and not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. He agrees with the Vaisesika as well in maintaining that just after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object. Like Sridhara, he also maintains that apprehension cognises both the general and particular features of its object as indistinguishable mass, and does not know the general

character as general and the particular as particular, since this kind of distinction is comprehended in the latter stage of knowledge, viz., comprehension. Apprehension is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. Vatsyayana is also in perfect agreement with him in holding the view that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate has. The difference between the two lies in the fact that determinate cognition is the knowledge comprehending the name of its object revived in memory by association, whereas indeterminate cognition does not cognise the name and the like, since it is not involved in verbal images. Jayanta Bhatta's criticism of the Buddhist view that if indeterminate cognition apprehends only the unique individuality of its object, how do its general features suddenly enter into the succeeding cognition, viz., determinate knowledge, is quite similar to the observation of Hemacandra who holds that it is a truism that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing existent suffers absolute destruction. The consciousness of generality must be already embedded in apprehension, which is only brought to relief by the latter stage of cognition. The consciousness of generality which is implicit in apprehension becomes explicit in the succeeding state of knowledge. The object of comprehension is essentially the same as that of apprehension. William James records the same fact when he states that there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable; we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about.

**TEMPORAL RELATION BETWEEN
APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION:**

There are four kinds of apprehension : visual apprehension, non-visual apprehension, apprehensive clairvoyance, and apprehensive omniscience. As regards temporal relation between apprehension and comprehension, there is no unanimity among the Jaina thinkers. The canonical conception is that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. Even two perfect conscious activities, viz., perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension are not an exception to this rule. This fact is recorded in the *Avasyaka-niryukti* as 'the omniscient cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously'.³⁴ Therefore, as regards the canonical conception, it is free from doubt that apprehension and comprehension, whether they are sensory or extra-sensory, cannot occur simultaneously. Regarding their occurrence in an imperfect person, the Jaina thinkers are unanimous, inasmuch as all of them admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in an imperfect being. But with respect to the case of a perfect person (omniscient) there is a controversy among them. Their opinions can be classified into three varieties. Some of them hold that the apprehension and comprehension (both extra-sensory) in an omniscient person occur simultaneously, some stick to the canonical conception and regard them as successive and not operating at the same time, while others assert that they are mutually identical.

SIMULTANEITY OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION :

It has been observed by Umasvati that the conscious activities (*upayoga*) manifesting themselves as sensory cognition, scriptural cognition, clairvoyance, and telepathy (*mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya*) occur successively and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient, possessing perfect cognition which comprehends all objects and is independent and pure, occur simultaneously at every moment.³⁵ Umasvati, thus, upholds the view of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the case of the omniscient. Kundakunda also holds the same view. It is observed by him that the comprehension and apprehension of an omniscient person operate at the same time even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.³⁶ Pujyapada is also of the same opinion. According to him, comprehension and apprehension occur in succession in the imperfect who is under the influence of obstructive karma, while in the perfect who is completely free from the veil of obscuring karma, they occur simultaneously.³⁷ Akalanka also supports the same view. He says : 'If the comprehension and apprehension of an omniscient person were to occur in succession, his perfection would be conditional and accidental. To the omniscient who has destroyed all the obstructive karmic veils, the universal and the particular reveal themselves simultaneously'.³⁸ The same position is possessed by Vidyananda who holds that the awareness of the generic form is apprehension, and the cognition of the

specific characters is comprehension. The apprehension-obscuring karma and the comprehension-obscuring karma obstruct these faculties. Because of the presence of these two, people like us are not in a position to possess apprehension and comprehension in all perfection. There is no reason why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession and not simultaneously due to a particular kind of purification of the self.³⁹

SUCCESSIVE OCCURRENCE OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION :

Now, we proceed to the problem of the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient. Jinabhadra is a great advocate of this view. He has very elaborately dealt with the problem in his *Visesavasyaka-bhasya*. He has recorded all the three positions and advanced arguments for and against all of them. His own opinion is in favour of the successive occurrence, since he sincerely recognises the authenticity of the scriptural texts. He argues that if perfect apprehension and comprehension are identical and not separate, what is the sense in recognising two separate veils of karma, viz., apprehension-obscuring karma and comprehension-obscuring karma ? Moreover, the scriptural conception of five types of comprehension and four types of apprehension is condemned by those who are not prepared to accept the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension.⁴⁰ The view of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension is also unjustifiable,

since two conscious activities cannot occur at the same instant.⁴¹ The opponent may argue that the simultaneous occurrence of the two in the imperfect is not possible, since he is under the influence of the veil of obstructive karma and thus, not completely free from it; but in the case of the perfect who is completely free from obstructive karma, it is not an impossibility. This argument, according to Jinabhadra, is also futile. The faculty of the self is qualitatively the same whether it is partially free or completely free.⁴²

The cognition of the self is of the same sort whether it is imperfect or perfect. The only difference between the two is that perfect cognition comprehends all the objects with all their modes, whereas imperfect knowledge does not claim to comprehend so. Thus, Jinabhadra supports the alternate occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient.

APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION AS IDENTICAL :

Now, we come to Siddhassena who does not recognise the apprehension and comprehension of an omniscient being as two separate faculties. According to him, both these faculties are identical as regards the case of the omniscient. He observes : 'We can distinguish between apprehension and comprehension up to telepathy (*manah-paryaya*). In omniscience, however, comprehension and apprehension are identical'.⁴³ He elaborates this in a systematic and logical

manner. When perfect comprehension dawns just after the complete destruction of the veil of the relevant karma, perfect apprehension must also dawn immediately after the complete destruction of the relevant karma. And as it is unanimously admitted that both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawnings of perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension also occur at the same time.⁴⁴ As it is accepted that there is no sensory cognition, i.e., the senses do not serve any fruitful purpose as regards the cognition of the omniscient who has completely destroyed the karmic veil that obscures cognition, so also it should be admitted that there is no separate faculty of apprehension in one who has completely destroyed the relevant karmic veil.⁴⁵ The contention that comprehension is determinate and distinct, whereas apprehension is indeterminate and indistinct is true only in the case of an imperfect person. As regards a person who has destroyed all the relevant karmic obstructions, such distinction has no meaning. In his case, there is no distinction between determinate knowledge and indeterminate knowledge.⁴⁶ The difference of distinct and indistinct, determinate and indeterminate is true only in the case of the knowledge of imperfect beings and not regarding the knowledge of perfect ones. He further argues: 'If it is admitted that the omniscient apprehends the uncomprehended and comprehends the unapprehended, the conception of all perfection would be ridiculous'.⁴⁷ According to the view of the successive occurrence of the apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient, a perfect person comprehends a fact that was not known

before and apprehends a feature which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience ? Moreover, in the scriptures omniscience has been described as having beginning but no end.⁴⁸ Those who have any regard for the commandments of the scriptures must realize the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect apprehension, comprehension is not possible, and at the moment of perfect comprehension, apprehension is an impossibility, it would mean to admit breaking of continuity of both of them but this is absurd, since it goes against the scriptures which do not prescribe any break.⁴⁹ If the destruction of apprehension-obscuring karma and comprehension-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension, should spring forth first, naturally the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both of them, for two conscious activities never synchronise. If the removal of the obstruction of both of them takes place at one and the same moment, does the question at all arise as to which of the two arises first ? There is no reason why apprehension should emerge first and comprehension afterwards. Now, if the believer in the successive occurrence persists in maintaining that apprehension arises first and comprehension afterwards, then with the same force of argument, the opponent may hold that comprehension appears first and apprehension

afterwards. Besides, why should we admit succession at all when the removal of the obstruction is simultaneous ? To refute the position of the advocates of simultaneity, Siddhasena remarks that even the view of the simultaneous occurrence is not logical, since two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. He further observes : 'If the omniscient knows all in one instant, he must continue to know all for ever, or otherwise he does not know all'.⁵⁰ If it is admitted that the omniscient cognises all the modes of all the objects at one and the same time, it must be admitted that it is so at all times, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore, Siddhasena concludes that the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient arise simultaneously, last for ever, and remain identical. This interpretation of the controversial problem of the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient does not go against the scriptures. A doctrine that holds that there is an interval of one moment between the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension should not be accepted as a real Jaina doctrine, and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainas.⁵¹ A perfect person apprehends and comprehends directly the whole of the universe in its generic and specific forms. His conscious activity as the cognition of generic features is apprehension and the same conscious activity as the cognition of specific features is comprehension.⁵² Hence, it is not illogical to believe in the identity of apprehension (*darsana*) and comprehension (*jnana*) of the omniscient. This finishes our discussion of the position of Siddhasena as regards the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in perfect personalities.

We have already stated that all the Jaina thinkers are unanimous with respect to the problem of the temporal relation between apprehension and comprehension in the case of imperfect beings. All of them believe in the successive occurrence of the two. In other words, two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously in the case of an imperfect being.

Now, how to reconcile the conflicting views we have just discussed ? It is beyond any doubt that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. To distinguish between two conscious activities that occur at the same moment in the same person is impossible. Temporal distinction always presupposes temporal break. There is no temporal break between two simultaneous occurrences. Hence, two conscious activities that occur simultaneously cannot be distinguished. From this logical statement it follows that Siddhasena is right in advocating the conception of identity between apprehension and comprehension in the case of a perfect being. If the relation is viewed from the standpoint of the object that is cognised by the two, there is, no doubt, a vast distinction between the two. The object cognised by apprehension is generality, whereas the object of comprehension is individuality. One apprehends the generic features of the universe, whereas the other comprehends the specific ones. Those who believe in the separate existence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient can be reconciled in this manner. The same fact is expressed by Yasovijaya in a different language.⁵³ According to him, he who admits separate identity of

apprehension and comprehension but does not recognise succession, is right from the empirical standpoint that entertains distinction, the believer in the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension is correct from the analytic standpoint that distinguishes the borderline between cause and effect, while the upholder of the identity of apprehension and comprehension is right from the synthetic standpoint that tends to abolish distinction and establish identity. Therefore, none of these three position is improper.

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CHAPTER II

JAINA THEORY OF COMPREHENSION

Comprehension is the determinate and definite cognition of an object. The Jaina thinkers, just like other ancient philosophers of India, recognise two varieties of comprehension : sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory comprehension is conditioned by the senses and mind, whereas extra-sensory comprehension is directly derived from the source of consciousness, i.e., soul. It perceives the object directly and immediately without any assistance of the senses and mind, hence, it is also called direct perception, immediate perception, or extra-sensory perception.

An objection is raised here that the statement about sensory comprehension that it is conditioned by the senses and mind is inadequate. For example, visual perception has for its additional conditions the presence of the object and light. In answer to this, it is said : 'The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference (vyatireka) between the two.' The meaning is that the external object and light are not the direct conditions of visual perception, though it is not denied that they are remote (vyavahita) conditions just as

time, space and the like are. Of course, it is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of the removal of knowledge-obscuring karma and also of direct service by benefiting the sense of vision. The question is : Then why should not they be held to be the direct conditions of the visual perception ? The answer is : Because there is no concomitance in difference between them which is the most essential form of universal relationship. For instance, it is observed that the perception (illusion) of water takes place in mirage (*maricika*) in the desert in spite of the absence of sensation of water in it and the cats and owls have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness.

NON-VERBAL COMPREHENSION :

Sensory (including mental) comprehension is of two kinds : verbal (*sruta*) and non-verbal (*mati*). As regards the number of the varieties of non-verbal comprehension (*matijñana*), there is a slight difference of opinion among the different authors of the school. This difference lies in the fact that some of them have unconsciously undergone a confusion between apprehension and comprehension. Or let us express the same fact in a different way. They have dealt with the process of cognition in general without indicating its two divisions, viz., apprehension and comprehension. They regard even the first stage of cognition, i.e. the contact of an object with a sense-organ as a kind of comprehension (*jñana*). We have already recorded the fact that up to the stage of the awareness of the existence of an object that

arises just after the sense-object-contact, is the province of apprehension (*darsana*). According to them, this stage of cognition also constitutes a kind of comprehension. In other words, according to their treatment, apprehension itself is a form of comprehension that arises immediately after sense-object-contact. Non-verbal comprehension is generally divided into four kinds : sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*itha*), perception (*avaya*), and retention (*dharana*).

SENSATION :

Umasvati defines sensation as the implicit awareness of their respective objects by the senses. According to him, receiving, holding, prehending etc., are the synonyms of sensation.² In the Avasyaka-niryukti sensation is defined as the awareness of sense-data.³ It has no explicit reference to the specific characters of its object. Mere awareness of an object without any distinction is the proper province of sensation. This view cannot be defended, since from our previous discussion it is clear that comprehension (*jnana*) is always determinate and distinct, whereas apprehension (*darsana*) is never of this character. Now, how can sensation which is indeterminate, be a kind of comprehension which is always determinate? Siddhasena in his Sanmati-tarka-prakarana remarks that the same cognition in its lengthy process is named two-fold. At its preliminary stage when the object is indistinctly apprehended, it is called apprehension and at its latter stage owing to the distinct awareness of the object, it is called comprehension. The primary stage of cognition, viz.,

sensation is nothing but apprehension,⁴ since it is indistinct and the next stage such as that of cognising the object distinctly is called comprehension. But this is not convincing, since sensation is recognised as a kind of comprehension (*jnana*) and as such if apprehension (*darsana*) were held to be nothing but sensation, it would follow that apprehension is a sort of comprehension which is a contradiction.

Now, let us turn our attention towards the view of those logicians who define sensation in a different way. Puṣyapada says : "The first comprehension arising immediately after the contact of a sense-organ and its object, is sensation. On the contact of the object and the sense-organ, there occurs apprehension. The cognition of the object there-after is sensation. As for example, the comprehension 'this is white colour' by the visual organ is sensation".⁵ This definition obviously distinguishes apprehension from sensation. Sensation follows apprehension and apprehension necessarily precedes sensation. In other words, the differentiating factor of the two is that apprehension necessarily precedes sensation but sensation never precedes apprehension. Sensation is not apprehension (*darsana*) but a kind of comprehension (*jnana*) that follows apprehension. The same view has been expressed by Akalanka in the *Tattvartha-raja-varttika* nearly in the same language⁶ and in the *Laghiyastraya* slightly differently. 'Sensation is a determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object following the apprehension of pure existence emerging just after the contact of a sense-

organ with its object'.⁷ Immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with the object there arises the apprehension of mere existence. This very apprehension further develops into a determinate cognition. This developed state of cognition is the first stage of comprehension known as sensation. At this stage our cognition comprehends the distinctive nature of the object. Because this stage of cognition is determinate and distinct, therefore, it is a kind of comprehension. Vidyananda defines sensation as 'the cognition of the specific characters of an object that follows the apprehension of the object in general born of the contact of the sense-organ with it.'⁸ Just after the contact of the sense-organ and the object there arises an apprehensive cognition that prehends the object in its general form. This is the first stage of cognition known as apprehension. Sensation follows this stage and cognises the specific features of the object. Vadideva observes : 'Sensation is the first stage of comprehension of an object determined by a secondary common feature born of the apprehension that follows the contact of the sense-organ and the object, and has mere existence as its object'.⁹ Every object is in possession of two types of general attributes : primary and secondary. The primary generality is that of existence (*satta*). This is the highest type of universality. It is cognised by apprehension that arises just after sense-object-contact. Every other generality is secondary, because it covers a limited number of things. Sensation cognises a secondary generality and not the primary one. The primary generality, i.e., mere existence is exclusively cognised by apprehension. Thus, sensation is the first stage of cognition of an object

determined by a secondary common character. Now, let us record the definition of sensation formulated by Hemacandra in the *Pramana-mimamsa* : 'Sensation is the cognition of an object that follows in the wake of apprehension upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object'.¹⁰ As we have already discussed that the contact between a sense-organ and its object is a relation competent for the rise of cognition. It is a sort of competency constituted by the situation of the object in a spatio-temporal context which is neither too far, nor too near, nor intercepted by an obstructive barrier. Apprehension is that cognition which does not comprehend the specific characters of an object. It arises immediately after sense-object-contact. Apprehension itself is transformed into sensation when it attains the stage of specific determination. That very object which could not be specifically determined at the apprehensive stage of cognition, attains the stage of specific determination at the subsequent stage of cognition, viz., sensation. In other words, apprehension itself undergoes transformation into the succeeding state, viz., sensation. It has been observed by Hemacandra that this state of cognition must not be taken to be a sheer mental construction, since it depends for its emergence on the active exercise of a sense-organ such as sight and also because it is not discarded by our discursive thought. A sheer mental construction is cancelled by discursive thought, but sensation is not done so. Therefore, it is not a sheer mental construction.¹¹

Those who hold sensation to be an indeterminate cognition, i.e., a state of apprehension, divide it into two

sub-classes: contact - awareness and object-awareness. Let us discuss their nature.

CONTACT-AWARENESS AND OBJECT-AWARENESS :

Sensation is of two types : contact-awareness (*vyanjanavagraha*) and object-awareness (*arthavagraha*).¹² Jinabhadra defines contact-awareness as follows : 'What reveals an object as a lamp reveals a jar is contact-awareness. It is nothing but a relation between the sense-organ and the object in the form of its sense-datum such as sound'.¹³ Suppose, a man is asleep and is being awakened by a call. Now, according to the Jaina, sound which is material reaches his ears and he is awakened. But this process is not completed in a moment. It requires some time to occur. The sound-atoms reach the ears of the person in succession. Innumerable instants have to pass before the ears become full of the sound-atoms so that the person may be conscious of the call. For instance, a clay-cup (*sarava*) is to be made full of water. Before it is filled, some drops of water sink into it without demonstrating any overt sign of their separate existence. Gradually the cup is filled and the water in it becomes apparent. Similarly, the sound-atoms gradually reach the plane of consciousness of the person who is being awakened by the call.¹⁴ Contact-awareness is nothing but an awakening of consciousness. Of the five sense-organs and the quasi-sense, i.e., mind, only four sense-organs, viz., the auditory sense-organ, the olfactory sense-organ, the tactual sense-organ, and the gustatory

sense-organ are competent to establish a close contact with their objects. Hence, there are only four types of contact-awareness. The visual sense-organ is incompetent to establish a close contact with its object, inasmuch as there is no possibility of physical contact between the eye and its object. To see a coloured shape a conjunction of the visual sense-organ with the shape is not required. The object is visualised by the sense of sight while remaining the former in its own province. This competency of the sense and its object is a specifically determined characteristic. The mind is also incompetent for contact-awareness, since it has no physical contact with its object.¹⁵

‘This is sound’ is an example of object-awareness. In this state of knowledge, the person does not cognise the exact nature of the sound.¹⁶ He is conscious of some sound but does not cognise the definite nature of it, such as from where the sound has come, whose sound is this, and the like. This is one opinion. The other opinion is that in this state, the person is aware only of the occurrence of the cognition and not of its specific content, since it lasts only for a moment.¹⁷ How is it possible that an instantaneous apprehension should be of a definite form ? ‘This is sound’ is a definite cognition which is not instantaneous. Besides, it is determinate and distinct, for it is exclusive of everything else other than sound. As we have already mentioned, according to this opinion sensation is indeterminate and indefinite, and hence, the cognition which is definite and determinate cannot be accommodated in the region of sensation. Hence, object-awareness is always confined to

the mere occurrence of a cognition which is indeterminate and indistinct. It does not reach the stage of the cognition of specific contents, since the stage of the cognition of a specific content is determinate and definite.

SPECULATION :

It is the cognition that follows in the wake of sensation. After sensation which is the primary stage of sensory perception, there arises a cognition that enquires more facts about the specific characters of its object. In other words, speculation is the cognition knowing the object more distinctly. In sensation there is only a general awareness of the object. In speculation our enquiry advances towards a distinctive awareness, although we are not quite sure of the distinctive characters. We approximately grasp the distinctive features. For instance, in sensation we simply hear a sound and do not know the nature thereof. There we have a mere acquaintance of the sound. In speculation we are able to cognise the nature of the sound to a great extent. The *Tattvartha-bhasya* differentiates sensation and speculation as follows : 'Sensation cognises only a part of the object, while speculation cognises the rest and strives for the determination of a specific feature'.¹⁸ Sensation, according to it, is an indistinct awareness of the object, that is why it cognises only a part of its object, while speculation is a distinct cognition, and hence, it knows the rest and strives for the determination of the particular character of its object. Pujyapada defines speculation as 'the striving for a

specific determination of the object that has already been cognised by sensation'.¹⁹ For Jinabhadra speculation means an enquiry for the distinctive feature.²⁰ Akalanka defines speculation almost in the same terminology²¹. Vidyānanda defines speculation as the enquiry for a particular feature of the object generally cognised by sensation. Speculation is different from doubt for the reason that it positively possesses the element of ascertainment.²² Vāḍideva also defines speculation similarly.²³ Hemacandra gives the following definition of speculation : 'Speculation is a striving for the specific details of the object cognised by sensation.'²⁴ On the reception of an objective datum by sensation, for instance a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound comes from a conch or a horn, and the faculty of cognition begins to consider the specific points of agreement and disagreement in the form of the judgment 'it seems to be sweet which feature belongs to the sound of conch and not to be harsh which attribute belongs to the sound of horn'. This type of mental enquiry is called speculation. Now, what is the ground on which speculation is distinguished from doubt ? The mental state that relates to many contradictory features, is not able to differentiate the true from the false, is incapable of excluding the wrong from the right, is called doubt. On the other hand, the mental state that strives for the ascertainment of the truth on the ground of reason, which is to be successful at the next stage which tends to accept the true and reject the false is called speculation.²⁵

PERCEPTION :

Perception is the third variety of non-verbal sensory comprehension. It follows in the wake of speculation. The enquiry that begins in the state of speculation attains completion at this stage. In speculation our mental state tends towards the inquiry for the right and the wrong and in perception we attain the stage of the ascertainment of the right and the exclusion of the wrong.²⁶ In other words, perception is a determinate cognition of the specific feature of an object. It arises from the exclusion of the wrong and the ascertainment of the right. Now, how does perception involve the ascertainment of the existent specific feature and the exclusion of the non-existent character ? Take the same instance of sound. On hearing the sound the person determines that this sound must be of a conch and not of a horn, since it is accompanied by sweetness which is the quality of conch, and not by harshness which is the quality of horn. This type of ascertainment of the existent specific feature of an object is called perception.²⁷ It is without any reference to indeterminateness, as is the case with speculation. This is one view. The other view regards this stage of cognition as the mere exclusion of the non-existent qualities. It ascribes the function of comprehending the existent qualities to the latter stage of cognition, viz., retention (*dharana*).²⁸ Retention, according to this view, is an ascertainment of the right feature. The third stage is only an exclusion of the wrong one. Jinabhadra, a staunch supporter of the former view, criticises this conception as absurd. He holds that whether a cognition merely excludes

the non-existent qualities or only determines the existent characters or performs both the functions, it is perception.²⁹ Puṣṭyapada defines perception as a 'cognition of the true nature because of the comprehension of the specific features'.³⁰ On account of the cognition of the particular qualities of an object our knowledge becomes definite. This definite state of cognition is called perception. Akalanka supports the same view.³¹ Vidyānanda defines perception as 'the ascertainment of a specific feature'.³² Vāḍideva defines it as 'the determination of the particular feature of the object cognised in the state of speculation'.³³ Hemacandra also holds the same view.³⁴ Perception, according to him, is the final determination of the specific character regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition 'the sound must be of a conch and not of a horn'. Thus, with respect to the nature of perception, there are two opinions in the Jaina system. One opinion regards perception as only the exclusion of the non-existent characters, whereas the other holds that perception involves both the determination of the existent qualities and the exclusion of the non-existent ones. The latter view seems to be more logical and consistent with the Jaina theory of knowledge. The later Jaina thinkers supported this view.

RETENTION :

Retention follows in the wake of perception. At this stage the determination that took place at the stage of perception is retained. The Nandī-sūtra defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgment for a number of

instants, numerable or innumerable.³⁵ According to the *Tattvartha-bhasya*, retention is the final determination of the object, retention of the cognition, and recognition of the object in the future.³⁶ Thus, according to the opinion of Umasvati, retention develops through three stages. Firstly, the nature of the object is finally determined, secondly, the determination of the object is retained, and thirdly, the object is recognised on future occasions. Jinabhadra defines retention as 'the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition'.³⁷ At this stage the judgment which has been acquired in the third stage of comprehension, becomes so firm that it does not lapse. Like Umasvati he also admits three stages of retention. As he says : 'The absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment of the object, the formation of mental trace, and the recollection of it in the future constitute the fourth category of non-verbal comprehension. All of them follow in the wake of perception'.³⁸ These three varieties are quite similar to the stages admitted by Umasvati. Puṣyapada defines retention as 'the condition of the absence of forgetting in the future of what has been cognised in the state of perception'.³⁹ Akalanka defines it as 'the absence of forgetting the same of what has been cognised by perception'.⁴⁰ Vidyānanda defines it as 'the condition of recall'.⁴¹ Vāḍideva gives a different definition. According to him, retention is the consolidation of perception.⁴² It is the gradual consolidation and the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition for some time because of the mindfulness of the cogniser.⁴³ He criticises the view of those who regard retention as the condition of recall in the future. It has been observed by him that retention is

nothing but the consolidation of perception for a certain length of time. It is not the condition of recall in the future, since it is a kind of perceptual cognition and, hence, cannot last upto the time of recollection. Furthermore, if it were to last up to that time, it would be impossible to cognise anything else during that interval, inasmuch as even the exponents of the said view are not prepared to admit the presence of two conscious activities at the same time. Thus, how can retention be defined as the condition of recall ? We recollect our past experience on account of the special capacity of soul to remember past events. Retention cannot be regarded as the cause of recollection. However, it can be admitted as a remote cause of recall, and not as the immediate one, since it is not an impossibility to admit so many remote causes of an event.⁴⁴ Hemacandra does not totally agree with this view. He supports the other view also. According to him, 'retention is the condition of recollection'.⁴⁵ This condition is nothing but the causal stuff capable of change into the effect called recall that consists in the recollection of past events. To express the same idea in a different manner, retention is nothing but the latent mental trace left over as legacy by previous experience. It is, thus, the continued existence of a particular perceptual judgment for a certain length of time. Hemacandra further remarks that this latent mental trace should be admitted as a species of cognition on the ground that it is a kind of non-verbal comprehension. It should not be supposed that it is different from cognition as such, because if it were not cognitive in character, it could not produce recall which is a kind of cognition. One kind of existence is impossible to

be transformed into another kind of existence which is oppisite in nature. If retention in the form of hidden mental trace were not cognitive in nature, it could not be an attribute of the self, inasmuch as the attribute of a conscious entity cannot be nonconscious in nature.⁴⁶ Now, as regards the controversy between the two views as to the nature of retention, Hemacandra tries to reconcile it. The older Jaina thinkers assert that the absence of lapse is also a case of retention. The following statement of the *Visesavasyakabhāṣya* 'the absence of lapse is retention' may be quoted in support. How then have you stated that the condition of recollection alone is retention ? This is the problem that has been put before him. He gives the following answer : True, there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention. But it is included within the fold of perception. This is the reason why it has not been separately mentioned. Perception when continued for a certain length of period is entitled as retention in the shape of absence of lapse. Or let us hold that absence of lapse is also a condition of recollection, and it has been included within the fold of retention as defined by us. Mere perception bereft of absence of lapse cannot give rise to recollection. The perceptual cognitions which are not of the nature of attentive reflection are almost on the level of the unattended cases of perception as the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion and such cases of cognition are incapable of giving rise to recollection.⁴⁷

RECOLLECTION :

Recollection is the cognition that has the stimulus of a latent mental trace for its condition. It refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'.⁴⁸ The latent mental trace is nothing but the disposition retained by our past experience. Its emergence to the surface of consciousness constitutes the stimulation of recollection. The emergence of recollection is necessarily conditioned by this sort of stimulation. Unless and until this type of stimulation is present, recollection cannot emerge. But how does the latent mental impression serve as the stimulus for the emergence of recollection ? It requires another stimulus. The disposition of past percepts, though it may have continued for a certain length of time, does not operate as the cause of recollection unless it is awakened by another stimulus. The stimulus to excite it is admitted to be two-fold by the Jaina.⁴⁹ First of all, the person reproducing his past experience must be competent to do so. Now, what is this competency ? It is nothing but the destruction-cum-subsidence of the obscuring karmic veils. This condition is common to every type of cognition. Even the highest type of knowledge, viz., omniscience cannot emerge unless complete destruction of the knowledge-obscuring veils takes place. For the emergence of recollection also this condition is necessary. The second factor is nothing but the external conditions that bring the disposition to maturation. It includes the observation of similar objects and the like. Now, mere observation of similar objects and such other conditions are not enough to arouse recollection, since

sometimes it happens that such conditions as the observation of similar objects and the like being present recollection does not arise. All the external conditions may be there to arouse recollection and, yet, recollection does not emerge because of internal incompetency. Unless the mental make-up is efficient enough to recollect what has been experienced in the past, no emergence of recollection is possible. Mere external causes cannot give rise to internal activities. In cooperation with internal states only external conditions can produce certain mental functions. For this very reason the Jaina thinkers admit both internal and external conditions as the cause of recollection. One without the other is incapable of giving rise to it. However, when the requisite conditions such as the destruction-cum-subsidence of the obstructive veils, observation of similar objects, and the like are at work to bring the latent mental trace to maturation, the disposition produces recollection. The contents of recollection are expressed by a form of the pronoun 'that', inasmuch as it refers to our past percepts. Thus, all the cognitions that point to their contents as that jar, that cloth, that ear-ring, and the like are the cases of recollection. The line that distinguished recollection from perception is that perception always refers to its content as existing in the present, whereas recollection always has reference to its content as existed in the past.

RECOGNITION :

Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of perception, i.e., direct sensory observation and recollection.

It is represented by such forms of deliverance as 'that necessarily is it', 'it is like that', 'this is dissimilar to that', 'this is different from that', and so on.⁵⁰ Recognition is a complex mode of cognition. It includes both perception and recollection. Perception is the direct observation of the objects existing before our sense-organs. Recollection is reproduction of the latent mental trace. These two are the conditions of recognition. Thus, recognition is a kind of synthetic judgement. When perception and recollection are combined in a particular form, recognition emerges. It delivers its contents in forms like the following : 'That necessarily is it' is one of the forms. It is the judgment of identity. All such judgments as 'this is necessarily that jar', 'this is necessarily that cloth', 'this is necessarily that man' are the cases of this type. When the same object is cognised on different occasions, such judgments occur. 'This is like that' is the judgment of similarity. When we happen to come across an object which is similar to another one that has already been experienced, such judgment as 'this is like that' emerges. All such judgments as 'this book is like that one', 'my watch is like that of yours' are the cases of the judgment of similarity. There are certain judgments that are just reverse to the judgments of similarity. 'The buffalo is dissimilar to the cow', 'the horse is dissimilar to the ass' and the like can be mentioned as examples of this variety of judgment. This is called the judgment of dissimilarity. There is also the judgment of difference. All such judgments as 'ten is less than twenty', 'five is more than three', 'the elephant is heavier than the camel' are cases of the judgment of difference.

REASONING :

We have so far discussed how materials of sensory cognition are picked up in the forms of sensation, speculation, and perception. We have also seen how these materials are preserved and recalled in various forms of memory. Now, we propose to take up reasoning that helps us in arriving at certain conclusions in our experience. Reasoning elaborates and expands the materials collected and conserved by the above-mentioned processes. It is an immense extension of the bounds of our experience. It enable us to rise above the particular and grasp the universal. It helps us in getting a glimpse of the remote past, unseen present, and distant future. It is through reasosning that we discover mutual relations of different facts and form different concepts. It is the power of reasoning upon which our inferential judgments are based.

Reasoning may be defined as the mental process of passing from some given judgments to a new one. For instance, we observe smoke and fire together in our experience. This observation is not confined to one or two cases only. We observe the same on so many occasions and reach the final conclusion that smoke is necessarily related to fire. On the basis of this, we infer the existence of fire form the sight of smoke. Our inferential judgment develops through the process of reasoning somewhat in the following way : 'I saw smoke and fire together so many times, and I never saw smoke withour fire, although I sometimes saw fire without smoke; because here is smoke, therefore, here

must be fire'. In short, our reasoning derives the conclusion that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire. Take another example. A burnt child dreads fire. His fear is based on reasoning, 'Fire once burnt me; what I see before me is fire; therefore, it will burn me again if I put my hand into it'. This is a simple instance to show how the process of reasoning begins and arrives at a definite conclusion. Thus, reasoning is a synthesis of different judgments in the form of premises and a conclusion in the shape of inferential judgments. The former, i.e., the form of premises is called inductive reasoning and the latter, i.e., the form of inferential conclusions is called deductive reasoning. Thus, reasoning takes two main forms : induction and deduction. Induction is that form of reasoning in which we draw a general conclusion from particular cases. In deduction, on the contrary, we draw a particular conclusion from general premises.

We have discussed the first variety of sensory and mental comprehension, viz., non-verbal comprehension (*mati-jnana*). Now, we come to the problem of verbal or scriptural comprehension (*sruta-jnana*) which comes next in order. The mind and the auditory sense are the chief organs that give rise to verbal comprehension.

VERBAL COMPREHENSION :

As non-verbal comprehension is essentially conditioned by the destruction-cum-subsidence of *mati-jnanavarana* karma, so also verbal or scriptural comprehension is

necessarily conditioned by that of *sruta-jnanavarana* karma. Verbal comprehension is the knowledge derived from the reading or hearing of words of trustworthy persons. The knowledge embodied in scriptures, i.e., in the works of reliable authorities is also called verbal knowledge. Verbal comprehension is necessarily preceded by non-verbal comprehension (*mati-jnana*). As has been observed by Umasvati : 'Scriptural comprehension is preceded by non-verbal comprehension. The difference of the two is that non-verbal comprehension comprehends only what is present, whereas scriptural comprehension knows what is present, past, and future'.⁵¹ As regards the types of scriptural comprehension, there may be as many as the number of letters and their different combinations, since the very foundation of scriptural comprehension is verbal assertion, and such being the case, it is not possible to enumerate all the types.⁵² *Bhadrabahu* mentions fourteen salient features of scriptural comprehension. They are : alphabetic, discursive, right, having beginning, having end, containing repetition, that which is included in the original scriptures, non-alphabetic, non-discursive, wrong, having no beginning, having no end, containing no repetition and that which is excluded from the original scriptures.⁵³ He further enumerates eight qualities of intellect necessary to give rise to verbal comprehension. These qualities are : desire for hearing, repeated questioning, attentive hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention and right action.⁵⁴ To properly grasp the importance of verbal comprehension let us understand the nature of alphabet. The Nandi-sutra recognises three varieties of alphabet : script, sound and

learning. The shape of a letter is called script or alphabet proper. The spoken letter is nothing but sound. Learning is the competency to follow the meaning of the letters and their combinations.⁵⁵ The first two varieties are only material symbols written or spoken. The third variety is verbal comprehension proper, inasmuch as it is a kind of cognition which is different from material symbols. It can be produced through any of the senses and mind provided it involves verbal assertion. When we hear a sound or see a coloured shape, there arises in the wake of sensory perception, i.e. non-verbal comprehension, a cognition having appropriate words composed of various letters following the conventional vocabulary. This type of cognition is called verbal comprehension.⁵⁶ Now, a question may be raised in this connection. If the objects of all the sense-organs can produce verbal comprehension, where lies the differentiating factor of non-verbal comprehension and verbal comprehension ? The answer is as follows : Conscious exercise of the faculty of language is the essential condition of verbal comprehension, but such is not the case with non-verbal comprehension. A perception that does not involve conscious reference at the time of the application of vocabulary, falls in the category of non-verbal comprehension. Such perception is not scriptural in nature. Mere verbal application is not said to be of the nature of scriptural cognition. The perception must involve conscious attempt on the part of the knower at the application of vocabulary if it is to be entitled to be called verbal comprehension. Jinabhadra gives the same answer in the following manner : 'The knowledge that emerges on

account of the activity of the sense-organs and mind, is possessed of proper words according to the conventional application, and is capable of expressing its object clearly, is verbal comprehension, whereas the rest is non-verbal comprehension'.⁵⁷ Speculation, simple perceptual judgment, and the like are also possessed of proper language, nevertheless, they fall in the category of nonverbal comprehension, since there is no deliberate application of language in these cases. Mere verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of verbal comprehension. True, in our usual perception we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not proceed any further. There are cases of perceptual cognitions which do not stop at simple verbal association but continue further into discursive thought with the assistance of language. It is only this continuation that leads them to the category of verbal comprehension.

EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION :

Indian philosophers have distinguished between sensory perception and extra-sensory perception. Extra-sensory perceptions are above the laws of sensory perceptions. They do not require any help of the general laws and conditions of normal cognition. They transcend the categories of time, space, and the like.

There has been ample research work in the field of Psychical Research that shows the possibility of cognition independent of the assistance of the senses and mind. Such

phenomena as clairvoyance, telepathy, clairaudience and the like have been recorded to prove the validity of the occurrence of extra-sensory perception. 'Clairvoyance and telepathy are a primary datum of scientific observation. Those endowed with this power grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals without using their sense-organs. They also perceive events more or less remote in space and time. This quality is exceptional. It develops in only a small number of human beings. But many possess it in a rudimental state. They use it without effort and in a spontaneous fashion'.⁵⁸

Sensory and mental comprehension, as we have already discussed, is of the rank of normal cognition conditioned by the senses and mind. The following three varieties fall in the category of extra-sensory perception, i.e., super-normal cognition. They are limited direct perception (*avadhi*), direct perception of mental processes (*manahparyaya*), and perfect perception (*kevala*). In the language of parapsychology, 'limited direct perception' and 'direct perception of mental processes' can be called clairvoyance (including clairaudience and the like) and telepathy respectively. Perfect perception is nothing but omniscience.

The self, according to the Jaina, has the inherent capacity to know all things irrespective of time and space. Temporal and spatial distances are immaterial if the self were in all perfection. To put it in a different language, the self is inherently capable of cognising all things together

with all their characters irrespective of temporal distinctions, i.e., past, present and future, and spatial differences, i.e., here, there, near, far and the like. It is only because of the karmic veils that this capacity of the self is obscured. Pure perception occurs on the total destruction of the corresponding karmic obstruction. But when there is variation in degrees of this destruction, there occur different varieties of perception. That is to say, pure perception occurs on the complete annihilation of the relevant karmic veils. But when there is variation in degrees of this annihilation, there is variation in degrees of perception as well. As regards the occurrence of our normal perceptions, they are produced through the senses and mind. Regarding the occurrence of super-normal perceptions, the Jaina holds that they are derived directly from the self. They are not dependent on the services of the senses and mind. Nevertheless, there is variation in degrees of their occurrence. Perfect perception occurs on the complete destruction of the obscuring veils. But when there are differences in the destruction of these veils, there occur two varieties of super-normal perception, viz., clairvoyance and telepathy.

CLAIRVOYANCE :

Clairvoyance is confined to the objects having form. Only those things which have shape, colour, etc., can be perceived through the faculty of clairvoyance.⁵⁹ This faculty differs in scope and durability with different personalities due to the difference of destruction-cum-subsidence of

karmic veils. The highest type of clairvoyance can perceive all the objects having form. With regard to space, it extends over a space that could be occupied by innumerable space-points (*pradesas*) of the size of the universe. As regards time, it penetrates innumerable cycles of time, both past and future. It cannot perceive all the modes of all the things. It knows only a part thereof.⁶⁰ The lowest type of clairvoyance can cognise an object occupying a very small fraction of space. In the technical language of the Jaina, it can extend to a very small fraction of an '*angula*' and know the things having form that lie therein. As regards time, it can penetrate only a small part of time which is less than a second. Regarding modes, it can know only a part of all the modes of its object.⁶¹

Clairvoyance is regarded to be of six types. First, a clairvoyance which continues to exist even if a person leaves a particular place and goes elsewhere. This type is called *anugamin*. Second, a clairvoyance that does not continue to exist in the aforesaid situation. This variety is known as *ananugamin*. Third, a clairvoyance that extends in scope and durability as time passes. It is called *vardhamana*. Fourth, a clairvoyance which embraces deterioration as regards its scope and durability. It is called *hiyamana*. Fifth, a clairvoyance that neither faces growth nor embraces deterioration. This variety is known as *avasthita*. Sixth, a clairvoyance that sometimes increases and sometimes decreases with respect to its scope, durability, etc. It is known as *anavasthita*.⁶² In the *Visesavasyaka-bhasya* there

is a detailed description of clairvoyance from fourteen standpoints.⁶³

TELEPATHY :

The mind, according to the Jaina, is made up of a particular material substance. Its modes are the different changes of states emerging into acts of thought. Every state of our thought is a particular mode of the mind. As our state of thought changes, so also the mind changes. Thus, every state of our thought is reflected in the different modes of our mind-substance. In other words, a state of thought is nothing but a particular mode of the mind-substance. The direct cognition of these modes of the mind-substance is called *tepelathy*. A person possessing the faculty of telepathy can directly cognise the states of our thought. This cognition of the states of thought is nothing but a direct perception of the modes of the stuff of which the mind is made up. Now, as regards the genral nature of telepathy as the direct cognition of the various states of thought, the Jaina thinkers are unanimous. But regarding the knowledge of the external objects of thought, they are not in a unanimity. We shall record this fact in the course of our discussion.

Telepathy preceives the objects thought by the minds of different persons. It is confined to the plane of human beings. Its emergence is conditioned by a particular capacity possessed by one having a particular mode of right conduct.⁶⁴ The faculty of telepathy is not acquired by an

ordinary person. It is conditioned by a strict mental and physical discipline. The Jaina prescribes a definite course of character that is essential in acquiring the capacity to cognise the contents of the different states of minds. The person possessing the faculty of telepathy is necessarily a homeless ascetic. His character must be of a higher type. Such conditions are not set down in the case of clairvoyance. The faculty of telepathy is far more superior to that of clairvoyance. The Jaina thinkers recognize two varieties of telepathy : *rjumati* and *vipulamati*. The latter is purer and everlasting, i.e. lasts up to the dawn of omniscience, whereas the former is less pure and sometimes trembles, too.⁶⁵ The latter perceives less number of objects than the former but cognises them more vividly. It is only who is at the upward stage of spiritual advancement, is possessed of the latter, whereas the former is possessed by one who is sure to descend the spiritual ladder. The latter is more lucid than the former.⁶⁶ One possessed of telepathy perceives only a part of the objects of clairvoyance directly, since the mind is a portion of the whole material world. But he knows a greater number of states of the material objects that constitute the contents of the thinking process indirectly. With respect to this position, the Jaina thinkers are not unanimous. Umasvati holds that one possessed of telepathy cognises only an infinitesimal part of the objects of clairvoyance. He knows a greater number of states of the material objects that form the contents of the invisible thinking process of the mind.⁶⁷ Now, this position seems to be slightly paradoxical. The implication of this statement is that the states of the material objects thought by the minds

of others are cognised by telepathy through the medium of the mind. Pujiyapada explains it as follows : 'Because of its association with the mind, the object of the mind is called 'mind'. The knowledge of that mind is entirely on account of the destruction-cum-subsidence of the respective karmic veil, although it is associated with the mind-substance'.⁶⁸ Thus, according to him, the external objects are directly perceived by telepathy. He holds that the states of the mind are nothing but the states of the objects themselves. Owing to its association with the mind-substance, the object itself is called mind. Hence, the modes of the mind are nothing but the modes of the objects. The person possessed of the faculty of telepathy perceives the modes of the mind, that means, he perceives the modes of the objects. The states of the mind are not different from the states of the objects of the mind. Thus, Pujiyapada concludes that the external objects themselves are directly perceived by telepathy. Akalanka also supports the same view.⁶⁹

Jinabhadra, Maladhari Hemacandra, etc., hold a different opinion. 'A person possessing the faculty of telepathy perceives the states of the mind-substance directly, but cognises the external objects thought by the mind only through inference'.⁷⁰ Maladhari Hemacandra, commenting upon the statement of *Jinabhadra*, says that a thinker may think about a material (*rupin*) as well as a non-material (*arupin*) object. It is a unanimous fact that for one who is not omniscient, it is impossible to perceive a non-material object directly. Hence, it is admitted that one possessed of the power of telepathy knows the object thought by others

only by way of inference, and not directly.⁷¹ The function of telepathy is limited to the perception of the various modes of the mind-substance which is engaged in thinking. In other words, only the mental states of a person can be directly perceived by the power of telepathy. As regards the external objects that form the contents of those states, it is not possible to cognise them in a direct manner. It is the function of inference to know them. Telepathy is directly associated with the states of the mind, and not with the objects. The knowledge of the objects follows in the wake of the perception of the states of the mind-substance. Hence, it is indirect and inferential. It is only through the media of the states of the mind that the external objects are comprehended. True, the knowledge of the contents is not of the rank of an ordinary inference, as is the case with deductive reasoning.

OMNISCIENCE :

Omniscience is the highest type of perception that comes under the category of extra-sensory perception. It is the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self. It is the pure manifestation of the real nature of the conscious substance. The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of all the obstructive veils, is called omniscience.⁷²

The self possesses consciousness as its essence. It is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the conscious substance is nothing but

the self as manifested in the act of knowledge. It occurs on the annihilation of the obscuring veils. The annihilation is nothing more than the total destruction of all the veils of the obscuring karmas. The person possessing the super-normal faculty of omniscience perceives all the substances with all their modes.⁷³ For him nothing remains unknown. No object or any mode thereof remains unperceived. His knowledge is pure and perfect.

Now, there arises a question : If the self is luminous by its very nature, why should it be subject to obscuration ? And if obscuration is possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. Though luminous in nature, the light of the moon, the sun, and the like is liable to be covered by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud, and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these cases when it is found to be obscured by different veils of karma. The removal of the obscuration of the self is possible by the practice of a particular course of meditation and the like in the same way as the veil of the light of the sun, etc., is removed by a blast of wind.

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