




Precepts and Practice

Puran Chand Nahar
Krishnachandra Ghosh



Brāhmaṇic and *Śramaṇic*, these two religious traditions, fairly epitomised the religious ethos of ancient Indian people. The former, in some form or the other, barks upon the Idea of God, and, consequently depends upon the Grace of God for achieving *mokṣa* or Absolute Freedom. Whereas, in *Śramaṇic* religious tradition God is replaced by Man himself, and, for achieving *Nirvāṇa*, one has to rely solely upon one's own Grace. Jainism, very much like Buddhism, subscribes to the *Śramaṇic* view of man's predicament and shows the way out of it.

For Man of Today, using Nietzsche's phrase, God is Dead. Now, he must seek light from *Śramaṇic* view, while doing away with the Idea of God.

Vardhamān Mahāvira (6th B.C.), the last and twenty fourth *tirthaṅkara* in the Jaina religious tradition, through his own efforts, without any aid from divine or human agency, discovered *Kevala Jñāna* or perfect knowledge and shared it with his contemporaries, now preserved in Jaina *Āgamas* or Scriptures, in Prakrit language.

This book provides an ample opportunity for those interested in an authentic Jaina version of *Śramaṇic* religious tradition, worked out both in the background of western philosophy and orthodox Indian philosophical systems.

JAINISM
PRECEPTS AND PRACTICE

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**PURAN CHAND NAHAR
AND
KRISHNACHANDRA GHOSH**

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM

BEING A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS META-
PHYSICS, ETHICS, AND HISTORY &c.
IN RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT.

BY

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
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1. From Life of Parshwanath (Kalpa Sutra Mss.)
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From *Kalpa Sūtra* M. S.

(Life of Parshva Nath.)



Pre-Mahomedan Period.

PREFACE.

In humbly placing the present book entitled *An EPITOME OF JAINISM* on the table of the World-library, a few words of explanation by way of an *apologia* are, it appears, needed to justify the claims, it lays upon the valuable time of its various readers. And we may state at the outset that it is not an attempt to supersede any of the modern treatises on Jainism. Its claim to attention, if it has any, arises from the fact that it is but a compilation forming an *epitome* having for its basis the most orthodox principles, doctrines and tenets as found in the Jain original works of authority and high antiquity, or promulgated on the subject by Jain speculative writers and conformed to by accurate thinkers in their spiritual inquiries.

But to connect together these detached fragments of a subject never yet treated as a whole, from the real Jain point of view, in these days of transition under Western refinement; to harmonise the different portions of the seemingly discordant notes

lying scattered over the grey pages of works handed down from the spiritual sire to the spiritual son, by freeing them from errors which they have become more or less shrouded with, through the revolution of ages and empires, or through long-standing conventions which have come down to us from time immemorial, must require a power of interpretation and original speculation. To other originality than this, the volume lays no claim. For it goes without saying that in the present age of the cultivation of universal learning when the literati of both the East and the West are sedulously engaged in exploring the rich and almost inexhaustible mines of the ancient lores of India, it would indeed be very presumptuous on the part of any one to imagine even that he had contributed something new and original in the domain of ideas and ideals. But still for all that there is ample scope for thinkers to improve upon the methods of philosophising and interpreting the old ideas and ideals, tenets and doctrines in perfect keeping with the changed conditions of the times to suit newer environments without deviating in the least from the real spirit

and import which they are replete with. For it is only the form that changes and must change, spirit always remaining essentially the same all through. And if there is any deviation anywhere from the real spirit, it should be understood as due to something wanting in the qualification of the interpreter.

To do this we had, therefore, had to begin with the enunciation and interpretation of the Jain principles of epistemology as propounded by the omniscient sages and scholars of bye-gone days. Epistemology really supplies the key-note to the interpretation and understanding of a system of thought and culture. It gives us the standpoint to have a clear and correct vision into the metaphysics of things and thoughts. This is the reason why every system of thought and culture in India really begins with a clear exposition of the principles of its epistemology, the moment it has done with describing in the briefest manner possible, its own hypothesis, its necessity and sublimity, and finally its right to be heard.

So is the case with Jainism itself ;

and having, therefore, explained all these, in brief in our Introduction and in Chapters I and II from the Jain point of view, we have begun discussing its science and philosophy from Chapter III headed as 'Knowledge and Its Forms'. But with Chapter IV on 'Epistemology and Logic' begins the real discussion which ends with Chapter VIII on '*Syadvāda*' ultimately and finally indentifying logic with ontology. A patient perusal of these chapters will clearly show the readers as to how the formal logic of the other schools of thought becomes, in the hands of the Jain sages, metamorphosed, as it were, into transcendental logic in and through the processes of the dialectical movements of thought and Being inherent in their very nature.

But however it is generally held by students of modern thought and culture that this *dialectic* method of reasoning identifying logic with ontology is of Hegelian origin and meaning. Indeed the word *dialectic* means reasoning *for* and *against*, exposing thereby fallacies and inconsistencies, and clearing them away. Socrates used this method of

reasoning in his ontological polemics with the sophists of his time, putting them between the horns of two definite alternatives. But in modern philosophy of the West, it was Kant who revived it in his exposing the contradictions involved in the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic philosophy and in the popular conceptions of Soul, World and God. But it was left to Hegel to give a new meaning to *dialectic* and to interpret it in a new light altogether. For with Hegel, Being contains within itself oppositions and contradictions. Every thought, every reality is but a mixture of Being and non-Being. Dialectic with Hegel, therefore, is equivalent to Self-development or unfoldment, and the world-process itself is a process of dialectic, of antithesis and synthesis, making differences serve as means to higher unities. The legitimate out-come of working out the Hegelian interpretation of the world-process as shown in his dialectic, is the pronouncement of the eternity of the world-process. And with it the soul is also declared to be in the never-ending process of higher and higher evolution without any ultimate rest or quiescent anywhere.

But those who have followed our exposition of the Jain principles of epistemology ending with *Syadvāda* running up to Chapter XII, will be at one with us when we state that the dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with metaphysic was not Hegel's own making. It originated with the Jain sages and omniscient *kevalins*, and has been prevalent in the field of philosophy in India from a time when Greece and Rome those cradles of European civilization, were still steeped in the darkness of ignorance. It is true that with the Jains the Absolute is but an Expression of Unity in Difference as distinguished from the Absolute beyond the Relative of the Vedāntins, (Vide Chapter XI), and that the world-process is also without beginning and end (Vide Chapter XII to XV) ; but the soul according to Jainism does not remain for ever entangled in the meshes of the dialectic process of evolution without knowing any rest or repose anywhere. The Jains, as well as every other system of Indian thought and culture, hold that the *Jiva* will never remain eternally caught up in the never-ending process of evolution. It

is bound to get at that state of being and beatitude which is all free and divine. For freedom is our birth-right. Every soul is constitutionally free and potentially divine. And the struggle for existence in this nether world means with the Jains not only the struggle for bare existence in this mortal coil, but for the realization as well of this *Ideal* Freedom and Divinity.

With this end the enquiries constituting the Right Vision—the basis of Right knowledge.

But Right Knowledge which proceeds from Right Vision by a coherent train of thought and reasoning and which can only lead to Right Conduct without which the attainment of the Goal in vision is held to be impossible, is the knowledge which embraces concisely or in details, the relations in which the constituent factors of the world stand to soul and the changes as well of these relations in the dialectic movement of thought and being. And all these, more technically speaking, begin with Chapter XVIII on the 'Karma Phenomenology'. The readers will find much interest to enter on a new kind of

discussion on metaphysical issues of vital importance in regard to the relation in question and its changes as well. The question as to when and how the soul which is constitutionally free and potentially divine came to be entangled into the meshes of the dialectic movements of the world-process without beginning and end, and which irritates the metaphysicians and speculative writers most in these days of scientific enquiry, has been discussed and solution given once for all. Every other position being untenable, the Jains hold that both the Soul and the *Karma* (i.e. the materialised units into which *jivic* energetics resolve themselves) stand to each other in relation of phenomenal conjunction, which reveals itself in the continuity of the display from time without beginning, neither of the two being either prior or posterior to the other in the order of time, so far the question of their metaphysical entity is concerned—*anādi apaschānupurvi sanyoga sambandha pravāha*. Such is the position of the *jivas* in the ocean of *samsār* whereon tumultuous waves furiously surging in various names and forms, ruffle the vast expanse. And just as the angularities of

the gravels at the bottom of the grugling stream of strong currents are rubbed off by being drifted from place to place, so the angularities of the *Jiva* sunk in the ocean of *Samsâr* are also rubbed off by being driven from womb to womb, from region to region, under the strong pressure of *Karma*-causality. In this way with the rubbing off of the angularities and thinning out of the gross meterial veil and covering, when the *jiva* gets a comparatively improved vision into its own nature and ideal, it struggles to work out its own emancipation as a free-centre of origination. All these and such allied subjects as Rebirth and the like which are required to determine our place and function in the world, have been discussed with comparative details up till Chapter XXVI on the 'Classification of *Karmas*' with which end the enquiries into the constitution of Right Knowledge.

From Right knowledge of our ultimate Ideal, of our place and function in the world, arises the possibilites of Right Conduct which is imperative in the attainment of the Ideal. And the enquiries into the constitution

of the Right Conduct open with Chapter XXVII 'From Metaphysics to Ethics.' No system of Indian thought and culture has such a stage-by-stage exposition in a systematic way of the ways and means to the attainment of that Goal which we all have in view. The very arrangement, it will appear on a careful perusal, is not only most psychological so far the unfoldment of knowledge itself is concerned, but appears to be modern as well when we judge it from the scientific and practical point of view. Having cleared up the Jain Conceptions of Virtue and Vice (Vide Chapter XXVIII), of their fruitions here and hereafter, the problems of evil and the like rudimentary notions of the Jain Ethics, the moral categories have been taken up one by one in consecutive order beginning with 'Influx' (Vide Chap XXXI) of the alien matter into the constitution of the soul and the consequent bondage of the same under subreption (*Mithyâtta*) which is nothing else than taking a thing for something which is not that thing (*usate sat buddhi*). This *mithyâtva* is the prime root of all troubles. Such being the case we have discussed

at some length, the psychology and philosophy of the matter and form of this *mithyâtva*. A little reflection will be sufficient, we believe, to convince an impartial student of the history of Indian schools of thought that the theory of *Mâyâ* resolving into *âvaran* and *vikshepa* as interpreted by Shankar and others of his line of thinking, is but a distorted shadow of the Jain theory of *mithyâtva*. For, to deny *Mâyâ*, therefore, of any positive entity and to posit it at the same time as the great impediment in the way to the true self-realisation is to be guilty of substantializing the abstraction. In order to escape from this difficulty, Ramanuja, another interpreter of the *Vedânta Sûtras*, had to draw inspirations from the teachings and writings of the Jain sages, and, in consequence, had to fall back upon the Jain doctrine of Unity in Difference or the Theory of *Bhedâbheda vad*, the legitimate outcome of the *Syadvâd* or the dialectic method of reasoning giving a more comprehensive view of thought and Being. It is true that Ramanuja speaks of Bodhâyana as his authority for the enunciation of the doctrine of Unity in

Difference, but nowhere in his scholium on the *Brahm Sūtras* could he quote direct from the writings of Bodhāyana. What Bodhāyan taught no body knows. Had there been the existence of any commentary by him on the *Sūtras* in question even at the time of Shankar, then Shankar, the upright and audacious, would never have left him unnoticed in his unrivalled commentaries and writings because he is found to freely draw upon his predecessors, friend or opponent.

Be that as it may, the Jain sages have made sifting enquiry into the nature and matter of this *mithyātvā* and found possibilities of its removal through *Samvar* or Stoppage of the Influx and through *Nirjarā* or gradual dissipation of what already found its way into the soul. With the completion of this dissipation, the soul gets rid of all the veil and covering of Karma and shines in perfect freedom and omniscience enjoying bliss divine for all time to come; this is what called *Moksha* of *Nirvāṇ* or Extinction of all pain and suffering, the grand *Summum Bonum* of one and all life and living (Vide Chapters XXXII to XXXV).

But this final and ultimate state of being in bliss and beatitude cannot be attained all of a sudden. Great indeed is the vision but only the few behold. Great is the goal, but only the few attain. Great really is the struggle but only the few can withstand. For the goal in fact is gradually reached by steady and strenuous striving subjecting the self to gladly undergo a series practical disciplines in a manner and along the lines as enjoined in the Jural (*Charan*) and Teleological (*Karan*) Ethics of the Jains. And the stages which the *mumukshin* has to pass through, are fourteen in number and are called *Gunasthānas* which can be squeezed up into four stages to suit modern intellect.

We have seen that according to Jainism, Freedom is our birth-right and that its philosophy declares this freedom to be already in us. Freedom is constitutional with man. Feel that you are great and you will be great. Feel that you are free and all quarrels will cease. With the Jains it is but a question of realization in the very heart of hearts where life throbs and the soul of religion

really dwells in. But whatever might be the merit of this philosophy, those who have studied its principles as well as the march of Western civilization, will naturally doubt as to the possibility of the growth and formation of a religion without any God-head to preside : for, there is no denying the fact that throughout the history of the Western world, we find Philosophy and Religion to be at war with each other. There religion is based on the unstable basis of Belief. And surely there is nothing strange in the fact that the corner-stone of religion there, begins to shake and give way whenever a new philosophy rises against it armed with new ideas and ideals having incontrovertible reasons behind them to support. Not only this. If a system of philosophy fails to drive Belief out of consideration and thus crush the foundation-stone into dust, it cannot be expected to thrive and drive its roots into the soil and create a school of its own. From all these it is clear that in the West, Philosophy is but a sworn enemy to Belief. But quite reverse is the case in the East. Here each school of philosophy is chiefly meant to

serve as a basis or ground-work of a particular form of Faith or Religion. For instance, the School of Jaimini stands to support the *Karma Kānda* of the Vedic Hindus. The *Nyāya* and the *Vaisheshika* have been to serve as the basis of the Dualistic forms of worship as are advocated in the Hindu *Smritis* and the *Purānas*. The *Sāṅkhya* and the *Yoga* philosophies which clear the ways of renunciation and moral apathy to all that is worldly, not only support other dualistic and *Tāntric* forms of worship but themselves form the science and psychology of the *Uttar Mīmāṃsā* by Vyāsa. But when we direct our attention to the West, we find Socrates, the sage, poisoned with hemlock for preaching a philosophy that went against the religion of his time and nativity. Who does not know how Christianity trembles even now to hear the names of David Hume, Mill, Comte, Kant, Fichte, Hoefding or Hegel ?

Now what is the lesson that we gather from a comparative study of the attitude of minds of both the East and the West ? We learn that India all along enjoyed a kind of intellectual freedom and religious toleration

which is unique in the history of the world. And this is why life in India really throbs in religion, where as in the West, it has been more or less a fashion to attend the Church.

But to return to the point at issue : as in India the function of philosophy is to support a particular form of Faith, so the function of Jainism is to harmonise all the contending religions of the world. And it is here that Jainism supersedes all the other forms of faith and creed. For, it is philosophy and religion both rolled in one. A little reflection on the theory itself and its predominance from time to time, along with its growth and spread, will prove the truth and validity of our statement. Will any one tell the world what is it that so boldly declares the glorious dignity of man ? Is it the civilization that creates for man new wants and desires only to bind him down more tightly to the mires of the world ? Or is it that reconciles for man all the seeming differences without sacrificing anything of permanent interest, kills that egotism by virtue of which his envenomed passions howl at every disappointment, and ultimately opens out to him the way to perfection, real happiness and

eternal beatitude where all wants and cares cease for ever, and all passions as well for good, and which makes man really to be *his own real* self in infinite delight divine? Surely you will have to pronounce judgment in favour of the latter, and in that case we state once for all, and that without the slightest fear of contradiction, that Jainism is the means to the introduction into this mundane world a reign of peace, ordered harmony and reasonable sweetness which are most wanting in these days of rank materialism and uncompromising self-aggrandisement wherewith this blessed land of Bharat has become surcharged.

It has, therefore, become highly imperative to repress this growing ardour of our youth in poetical polemics and practical tactics that are detrimental to and destructive of the felicity of their temporal and future lives, by a revival of the humble instructions of the ancient *Kevalins* and peaceful preceptors of old, and reclaiming them to the simple mode of life led by their forefathers from the perverted tendencies finding a firm hold on them under the influence of Western refinement. It is this degeneracy of our

rising generation from an utter ignorance of the superiority of their own code and adoption, in consequence, of foreign ideas and ideals, habits and manners, that ought to engage the serious attention of our educated children of the soil.

Now apart from the question of any sublimity, necessity and utility of the cultivation of the Philosophy of Jainism roughly consisting as it does in outward peace (*Shanti*) and internal tranquility (*Chitta Prasānti*) united with contentment (*Santosh*) and apathy (*Varāgya*) to the alluring pleasures of the world, a glance at the description of the Jain Church as portrayed in Chapter XXXVII, a survey of the Jain places of Pilgrimage, of Art and Architecture &c. (Chapters XXXIX &c. XLI), a study of the great and not yet fully accessible complex of writings making up the Jain Literature and recording the appearances of the Tirthankars in the era of *avasarpini*, and chronicling the organisation of the *Sanghas*, the great split in the original camp into the Swetāmbaris and the Digambaris. the consecutive succession of the *āchāryas* and the list of *gachchas* which originated with them, and

finally other secular events of historical importance to a considerable extent, will make it pretty clear that Jainism is a religion that is not only born of the depths of ages but also that its Tirthankars were real historical persons who lived, moved and had their beings amongst our forefathers.

Besides, these pages contain historical statements and allusions of no mean value. What we want to point out is that apart from the question of religious merit as is manifest in the literary works of the Jains, they go to a great extent to clear up many a historical anomaly and settle dates of important historical events. For instance, it is from the perusal of these pages that we could settle the date of Mahavira's *Nirvāṇ* or the accession of Chāndragupta. And it is from these pages we find that during the time of Rishava Deva, the systems of *Jaina*, *Shuiva* and *Sāṅkhya* philosophies were exant. The *Mimāṃsā* and the *Nyāya* flourished during the period of Sitalnath whereas the *Bouddha* and the *Vaisheshika* came to prominence during the time of Parshwanath and Mahavir. This account of the chronological developments of the different Schools of Philosophy may read

very strange. But when one remembers that none of the systems of philosophy came to being all of a sudden, but they were more or less in extant in a still remoter age, and that this development into systems of philosophy means their embodiment in the forms of Sutras at different periods, things becomes easy to understand. For this is further corroborated if we interpret the religious upheaval in view of the fact that in the great religious Congress of the Indian saints and sages of yore in the *Naimishāranya*, when the authority of the Vedas were being made as binding upon the free thinkers of those days, those who left the Congress in silent protest against such actions of the Brahman-Rishis, were dubbed as *Nāstikas*. The word *Nāstika* (atheist) in the Indian scripture does not mean one who did not believe in the existence of God, but rather one who did not accept the infallibility and ultimate authority of the Vedas. Were it otherwise then the System of *Sāṅkhya* in which Kapil, like Laplace, did not care for getting in a God in the scheme of his universe, would not have been taken as one of the six theistic systems of philo-

sophy as distinguished from the six atheistic schools beginning with that of *Chārvāka*. Now with the settlement of the final authority of the Vedas, its ritualism became a mercilessly dominant religion for sometime, so much so that the priest-class seemed to be in the sole possession of the Key to Heaven. And in consequence sincerity which is the soul of all religiosity almost disappeared from the people yielding place to downright hypocrisy and dry formalism. The Kshatriya kings and the princes could not stand to this want of sincerity in the people and to the religious monopoly in the hands of the Brāhmans. They entered a protest against the same in the form of Vedāntic militarism finding expressions in such great *Upanishadic* declarations as, 'Brahman is Atman' 'That Thou art,' 'That I am' : in reality there is no essential difference between one soul and another. All are One and the Goal of all is Freedom, which cannot be reached by the weak and the powerless. So all conventions, all privileges must go. Thus ensued an era of war between the Brāhmans and the Kshatriyas. The enmity and implacable

hatred of the two families of Vasistha and Viswamitra for generations form subjects prominent throughout the vidic antiquity. The cursing on Harish Chandra, the King of Ajodhya, by Vashistha, the leader of the priest-class, and the consequent appointment of Viswamitra by Harish Chandra as his priest is also another instance to illustrate the spirit of Vedantic militarism against Brāhmanic ritualism and monopoly. Thus the idea militant in the *Upanishads* became the idea triumphant in hands of the Kshatriya kings and princes. And this why we find later on that the Brāhmins are betaking themselves as pupils to the Kshatriya kings and princes in order to have the Atman expounded to them. The Brāhman Nārada receiving instructions from Sanat Kumar ; Gargya Balaki from the king Ajātsatru of Kasi. All these are further confirmed by the words of the king Pravan Jaivali to Aruni, a Brāhman pupil whom the king says—"Because, as you have told, O Goutam, the doctrine has never up to the present time been in circulation among the Brāhmins, therefore in all the worlds the Government has remained in the hands of the warrior caste".

Now this philosophy of Vedântic militarism, though it was fully developed in the *Upanishadic* period, could not later on adapt itself to the changing conditions and to the yet prevailing society of the time which was in and through saturated with Vedic ritualism and ceremonialism. And in the course of events things took turn in such a manner that the Brâhmans whose sole occupation was priest-craft, began to devise schemes with a view to make each caste flourish in its respective profession : so much so that they discouraged the study of the *Upanishadas* and the like by other castes, and the preaching as well of the philosophy of the 'One' to the mass. And thus when the gates to higher knowledge were effectively barred against the other classes by the mechanism of the Priest-class, a general degradation followed. People became degenerated, self interested and low in character. All sorts of abominable things like *Tântrikism* which brought in virginity, mysticism and love to bear upon religion, began to be practised in the name of religion only. At this critical juncture Parshwanath, the 23rd Tirthankar appeared

to save the situation, and preached the Truth and the Law to one and all without disturbing the constitution of the social structure prevailing at the time. A general religious up-heaval ensued ; but so engrained was the soulless ritualism in the constitution of the society that two hundred years after the *Vivān* of Parshwanath, Mahavir Swami appeared as the 24th Reformer, and gave a re-statement of Jainism later on taking the form of the philosophy of pragmatism, to stem the tide of degradation, and save the soul of the nation from running into narrow old grooves and gutters of ritualism and mysticism (*tāntricism*). Goutam Buddha also followed suit from another direction. He represented the Indian school of spiritual democracy, and preached the principles of what they now call 'Romantic Improvement' in modern philosophy which resulted in the formulaton of the subjective idealism, in the breaking of the social fetters, and in the curbing off the power of the Brāhmans to enforce Vedic ritualism upon the people. Such is the history of the religious transition through which India had to pass uptill the time of Mahavir and Goutam Buddha who are

said to represent the Indian schools of Ideal-Realism and Real Idealism respectively. And this is what we gather from the old and worn out pages of the Jain literature of high antiquity.

The above is but what we could glean from the scattered pages of the Jain literature so far the contemporary events and Religious movements in India were concerned. But there are other materials in the movements of the Jain genius such as inscriptions and epigraphs which go by the technical name of external evidences helping us a good deal in filling up the gaps and blank pages of Indian history. We get from these inscriptions various informations on the reigning sovereigns, their geneologies and dynasties, chronological list of the gacchas, and the description of the different sections into which the Jain laymen are socially divided. Now both from the external and internal evidences which have been available to us up till now for our study and examination, we can well state without the slightest fear of contradiction that the whole Jain Community is deeply indebted to the Swetāmbar Church for the pre-

servation, maintenance and improvement of almost all their important places of pilgrimage. The inscriptions both on the pedestal of the images and foot-prints and tablets (*Prashastis*) commemorating the erection or the repairs of the temples at these places at different times, undoubtedly show that the whole credit belongs to our worthy and venerable Swetâmbar Achâryas under whose religious direction and advice, the Swetambari lay-followers did all they could to keep up their tradition and guard the sanctity of these sacred places all over India, excepting the Southern countries, the homes of the Digambar School. But who cares to devote to the study of these movements of culture from a historic point of view? We have inspected and examined numbers of Digambari images still preserved and worshipped in Swetambari temples but have not seen the reverse. It is a matter of satisfaction indeed to find the Digambari temple in Mathian Mahalla in Behar, side by side with a Swetambari temple, like the twin sister churches in charge of the Swetambaris. The Digambari brothers are always welcome to every

Swetambari temple. The mere location of the Digambari images in a corner of the Swetâmbari temples, does not show that these temples belong to them also. Far from this. It rather shows the magnanimity and generosity of the high-souled Swetâmbari custodians of these temples. But this does not go to establish their managing claim over the temples which exclusively belong to the Swetambari sect. All along they were allowed the privilege of worshipping there for the simple reason that they did not cherish the idea of any selfish motive. Living in wealth and opulence in a period of peace and prosperity under the benign care of the British Government, it is indeed a matter of great regret that instead of paying attention towards the intellectual and spiritual advancement of the community, and other social reforms which have of late become imperative to adapt ourselves to the newer conditions of life and living, our Digambari brethren have now come forward to set the machinery of litigation agoing to unrighteously snatch away from the Swetambaris, the founders and repairers, nay, the real owners of these places of Pilgrimage, so to speak,

all rights and privileges which so long belonged exclusively to them. Our Digambari brethren are squandering away good money in the name of religion. They are showing a great enthusiasm, at the present moment, to set up claims and run to the Courts of Law for the settlement of issues. Everywhere, whether at Sametsikhar, at Pawapuri or at Rajgir, we hear of litigations cropping up from their endeavours to get equal rights in the control and management of the sacred places which the Jain Swetambari Community have been doing since the foundation of these shrines and temples. If things really go on in this way, then the Jain Community, as a whole, will have not only to pay dearly for it; but those monumental works as well of the Jain genius in art, architecture and sculpture will shortly disappear into the surrounding ruins. And it grieves us much therefore to find that the Digambaris are quarrelling with the Swetambaris without any just cause to advocate in claiming equal share with them. In the South, the Digambaris have their well-known images at Sravana Belgola and other temples in their sole management. No

Swetambari ever thinks of interfering with the just rights of the Digambaris in those provinces. The Digambaris have got lands from the Swetambari Sangha for erection of their temples, sometimes they have also purchased land for the purpose and have built separate temples. But indeed deeply regrettable it is on their part that inspite of these stupendous facts, they have not put a stop to their policy of aggression.

We, therefore, sincerely appeal to the Digambaris, at least to the sensible and educated members amongst them, to put an end to such sort of dealings and avoid litigation especially in matters of religion. Even before the Court of Justice, there is a limitation to everything. For centuries after centuries, the Swetambaris have tried their best to build, maintain and improve the sacred places. They hold *Firmans*, *Grants*, *Sunnads* and *Parwanas* from the reigning Sovereigns of the past and have been managing the affairs generation after generation, without any co-operation from the Digambaris from time immemorial without any clamour, dissension or intervention. And it is a disgrace that they

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should now come forward to disturb the working of an organisation born of the depths of ages and devise all sorts of unrighteous means to gain their objective before the Courts of Law.

In fine, however, we beg leave to apologise to our readers for the numerous errors and mistakes which have found their way into these pages through the *pramāda* of their printer and reader.

P. NAHAR.

K. GHOSH.



श्री श्री लक्ष्मी नारायण
 श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः
 श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः

Metal Image (Ardha Padmâsan)
 with inscription in Southern character (back).

An Epitome of Jainism.

“प्रधानं सर्वधर्माणाम् जैनं जयति शासनम् ।”

INTRODUCTION.

Om, Salutation to the ‘Arihantas’ or the Killers of the enemies ; Salutation to the ‘Siddhas’ or the beatified Achievers of the Good ; Salutation to the ‘Acharyas’ or the accomplished Masters legislating the rules of our conduct ; Salutation to the ‘Upadhyayas’ or the Teachers imparting lessons on the Siddhantas ; Salutation to all the ‘Sadhus’ or the Saints of every region and clime who live, move and have their being for the good of others.

This five-fold Salutation purging out all sins, is the noblest of all propitious utterances and the choicest of all blessings and benedictions — ‘Navakara.’

The Jains, the followers of the *Jina* or *Arihanta*, have been a well-known community of India. They are mostly confined to Hindusthan and are numerous particularly in the Punjab, Rajputana, Gujrat and some Southern Districts of India. They hold a

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prominent place in the Empire owing to their wealth, intelligence, commercial energy and unswerving loyalty.

The Arihanta is the killer of the enemies. He is also called the *Jina* or the Victor for killing or conquering all his passions, desires and appetites. A *Jina* is the possessor of perfect knowledge. He is omniscient and is the revealer of true nature of things. The *Jinas* or the Victors, who in every age (past, present, and future) preach truths and organise the Order, are known by the name of *Tirthankars*—the Founders of *Tirtha*, *Sangha*, or the Order which consists of *Sadhu*, *Sādhvi* and *Shrāvaka*, *Shrāvika* i. e. male and female ascetics and devotees.

The Jain friars and nuns were formerly designated as *Nigganthas*, lit. 'those who are freed from all bonds.' These *Nigganthas* are frequently met with in ancient Buddhist works. For instance, the *Mahāparinibbana Sutta*, one of the earliest books on Buddhism, composed in Pali before the 5th century B.C., mentions "*Niggantha Jñātiputta*" as being one of the six religious teachers of the time. This last *Tirthankara* of the Jains is so called

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on account of his being born of the *Kshatriya* or military clan known as *Jñāt* or *Nāt*. Numerous references are also to be found in Bráhmínical writings about the *Nigganthas* and their faith.

Important mention has also been made of the Jain System of Philosophy in several of the most ancient Indian works. And so far its antiquity is concerned, it is now admitted on all hands that Jainism is not an off-shoot of Buddhism. It had been in existence long before Buddhism was conceived. Its independent existence has also been conclusively traced out both by external and internal evidences from various works of high antiquity in recent years. Special mention may be made of the discovery of a *Jaina Stupa* at Mathurá which gives evidence of its existence from nearly two thousand years back. It is very likely that future researches will throw a flood of light on the theory that Buddhism is rather a branch of Jainism. From a reference to Jainism in the *Rig Veda*, it has been held that the system in question must have been contemporary with the *Vedic* culture or even earlier than the latter.

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After its supremacy in the East in the kingdoms of Magadha, Anga, and Koshal, Jainism flourished both in the South and in the West of India. At various epochs, it was the State Religion in different parts of the country; and the fact is fully corroborated by the old inscriptions, a few of which have only been, of late, brought to light and deciphered by the scholars and antiquarians of the modern time.

Jainism is an original system of thought and culture, quite distinct from and independent of all other Indian philosophical speculations. In the words of Dr. Jacobi, "It (the Jain Philosophy) has, truly speaking, a metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it a distinct position apart from the rival systems, both of the Bráhmíns and of the Buddhists." And it now goes without saying that the Jains possess a high claim to the preservation of the ancient history of India.

According to the Jains, Truth exists from time eternal; and the world composed of the living and the non-living substances, has been in existence from all eternity, and undergoing an infinite number of variations, produced simply by the physical and superphysical

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powers inherent in the substances. But variations must be variations in time. So the Jain sages divide this time according to the two great cycles, called *Avasarpini* and *Utsarpini*.—Involution and Evolution. The idea is that of a serpent in infinite space coiled up, so that the tail shall touch the head. The world is now moving down this serpent from the head to the tail,—this is *Avasarpini* (Involution). When it arrives at the extremity of the tail, it cannot go on further but it must return ; and its progress upwards is *Utsarpini* (Evolution). Now each of these periods is again divided into six eras,—

- (i). *Sukhama Sukhmd.*
- (ii). *Sukhmd.*
- (iii). *Sukhama Dukhmd.*
- (iv). *Dukhhama Sukhmd.*
- (v). *Dukhmd.*
- (vi). *Dukhama Dukhmd.*

In every great cycle, twenty-four Tirthankars appear in the field of action. These Tirthankars are not only pure and perfect beings and attain *nirvāna* as soon as they shuffle off their mortal coils, but also they lay down rules of conduct for the

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purification of our hearts and minds and establish the *tirtha* or the order. According to the Jains, the first Tirthankara '*Rishava Deva*' of the present era, gave to the world a systematic exposition of Truth in all its aspects, both secular and spiritual. He also laid down rules of conduct for the proper guidance of the church as well as of the laity. *Rishava Deva* is also mentioned in the Hindu Scripture, the '*Srimat Bhagvat*', as the second in the list of kings, who, towards the end of his life, abandoned the world and went about as a naked ascetic and rose from manhood to divinity by meditation. '*Pārshwanatha*', the twenty-third, and '*Mahavira*', the twenty-fourth, were not founders but they were merely reformers like other Tirthankars in different ages. On the face of such overwhelming evidences as can be collated from pages of high antiquity, there cannot be any doubt as to the existence of Mahāvira or Pārshwatha as historical personages. M. Guérinot, in the Introduction to his learned Essay on Jain Bibliography, indicates the important points of difference between the life of Mahavira and that of Buddha.

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MAHAVIRA

BUDDHA

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Born at Vaisāli (Kunda-
grām) about 599 B. C. | 1. Born at Kapilavastu about
557 B. C. |
| 2. His parents lived to a
good old age. | 2. His mother died soon after
giving his birth. |
| 3. Assumed the ascetic life
with the consent of his
relatives. | 3. Made himself a monk
against the wishes of his
father. |
| 4. His preparation in the
ascetic stage lasted for
12 years. | 4. Obtained illumination at
the end of 6 years
only. |
| 5. Died at Pawa in
527 B. C. | 5. Died at Kusinagar about
488 B. C. |

Pārshwanātha was born at Benares in 877 B. C, and reached *nirvāna* in 777 B. C. on a hill which is still known as Pareshnath Hills in Bengal. Mahāvira or Vardhamāna, the last Tirthankara of this age, only improved upon the then existing doctrines and customs according to the exigencies of the time, and it was he who gave Jainism its final form. The current tenets and practices of Jainism, as embodied in the existing Sutras or canons, are his utterances

Mahāvira was the son of Siddhārtha, the chief of the *Nat* clan of Kundagrama near the city of Vaisāli, who belonged to a noble

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warrior race. His mother was Trishalâ, sister of king Chetaka of Vaisâli. Chetaka's daughter Chelanâ was married to king Shrenika or Bambhsâra who was a staunch admirer and adherent of Mahâvira. Shortly after the death of his parents, Mahâvira renounced the world and became an ascetic in his 31st. year. For the first 12 years, he led a life of austerities and wandered through various countries preaching the truth of Jainism. He acquired perfect knowledge in his 42nd. year and attained *nirvâna* at Pawapuri, a few miles from modern Behar, in 527 B. C. at the age of 72.

He was a senior contemporary of Gautam Buddha and the country of Magadha and those round about it, were his chief spheres of spiritual activity. It is interesting to note that both the great preachers, in spite of the fact of being contemporaneous, avoid mentioning each other in their utterances.

About two centuries after Mahâvira's death, when Chandra Gupta was the reigning Prince, a severe famine, lasting for twelve years, visited the country of Magadha. Bhadrabâhu was then the head of the Jain church,

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and in view of the gravity of the situation he led his disciples towards the south (Carnât country), placing Sthulbhadra in charge of the section that remained behind. During this long famine, the Jain monks began to forget the *Siddhānta* ; and towards the end of the famine, while Bhadrabâhu was still absent in the South, a council assembled at Pataliputra to collect the canons or the sacred texts of the Jains. Gradually the manners and customs of the church changed and the original practice of going abroad naked was abandoned. The ascetics began to wear the 'White Robe'. On the other hand, when the emigrating party who made the rule of nakedness compulsory on all their members, returned to their country after the famine, they refused to hold fellowship with those that had remained at home, on account of their departure from the practices that were common before, or to accept the canons collected at Pataliputra, declaring that for them the canons were lost. This led to the final separation about the year 82 A. D. And thus they were divided into two branches, the original being styled as *Shvetām-*

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bara, and the other became known as *Digambara*.

The *Digambars* believe that absolute nudity is imperative for perfectness; while the *Shvetāmbaras* assert that perfectness can be attained even by those who clothe themselves. The difference really speaking has its origin in the idea that a person attaining to *Kevala jñān* (perfect knowledge) comes no longer under the sway of appetites or passions and does not therefore require any food or clothing. According to the *Shvetāmbaras*, such a holy personage, although he need not wear any clothes, does not appear before society unclothed but clad in white robes, while the *Digambars* hold that he does not use any clothes and appears before us all nude.

But this is not the only point of difference between the two branches. There are also other differences as regards some eighty-four minor dogmas, which resulted in the production of sectarian literature and rules of conduct for the church and the laity. One important point of disagreement to be noted, is the exclusion of women from the Order by the *Digambars*. As they hold,

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women cannot attain to salvation ; and they are so strongly biassed in this that they take even the Virgin lady Malli Kumari, the 19th Tirthankar, not as a female but a male. But the *Shvetâmbars* hold that both men and women are alike entitled to and can actually attain to *nirvâna*.

Jainism is not a monastic religion but truly an evangelic or a missionary religion,—religion intended not for the ascetics only (male and female) but for the world at large in which the majority are lay people. Some remark that Jainism lacked in that missionary spirit which gave life and scope to early Buddhism. But this view is not based on right observation of facts and correct interpretation of the Jain religious thought and culture. For in the Jain canonical rules for the ascetics, it is distinctly enjoined that a monk, excepting the *Chaturmāsya*, or the period of four months during the rainy season, should generally on no account stay at a fixed place for more than one month ; rather he should go on wandering from city to city, from village to village, preaching the cardinal truths of his

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faith and doctrine and thus work among the laity, for their moral elevation and spiritual enlightenment. Equal consideration was given to both the church and the laity and a *Sangha* was accordingly organised by each *Jina*. The characteristic of a true *Jina* is most aptly expressed by Ratna Shekhara in the opening lines of his *Sambodha Sattari*, which reads as follows :—“No matter, whether he is a *Shvetāmbara* or *Digambara*, a Buddha or a follower of any other creed, one who has realised himself the self-sameness of the soul i. e. one who looks on all creatures alike his own self, is sure to attain salvation.”

Jainism is a religion universal—its object being to help, as it does, all beings to salvation and to open its arms to all, high or low, by revealing to them the real truth. The Highest Good is found in *Moksha* or *Nirvāna*—the Absolute Release of the soul from the fetters of births and deaths.

The attainment of *Nirvāna* is usually preceded by development of *kevala jñān* or absolute and unimpeded knowledge. This is the fifth or last kind of knowledge, the other kinds of knowledge in the order of developments

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being (1) *Mati*, (2) *Sruti*, (3) *Abadhi*,
(4) *Manahparyaya*.

The *first* is intellectual knowledge, derived from the peripheral contact of the senses with their objects or from mental illumination due to observation and inference. The *second* is clear knowledge derived from the study of scriptures, books or from the interpretation of symbols or signs. The *third* is the determinative knowledge of events and incidents taking place somewhere beyond the range of sense-perceptions. The *fourth* is the knowledge of others' thoughts. The first two are natural or commonsense knowledge. The other three are super-sensuous knowledge. The third is the perception of visible objects which proceeds directly from the soul without the mediation of sense-organs. Though super-sensuous, still it cannot go beyond the limits of physical regions ; while the fourth goes further beyond and can penetrate into the secrets of the heart. The last only covers everything whatsoever, present, past or future, visible or invisible. It is pure and non-determinative in its character. The possessor of this fifth form of knowledge is called a

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Kevalin. When the soul of a *Kevalin* leaves its material frame, it passes out of this mundane world and soars up straight towards the hyper-physical region (*Aloka*), the Heaven of the Liberated which lies at the top of the Universe. There it continues on to shine forever in all its purity and perfection. It remains there in a state of perfect equanimity and delight infinite disturbed by nothing. And this is *Nirvāṇa* or *Moksha*. It is, in fact, the absolute release of the soul from all *Karma*-matter by the complete decay of the causes of bondage and physical existence. No soul is wholly disembodied unless it is thus liberated from the burden of *Karma*-matter. And this release is not the annihilation of the soul as the Buddhists hold, nor is it the merging of the Individual with the Supreme wherein it loses its own identity and individuality as Shankar, the lion of the Vedāntists, roars, but it is the *Jiva's* going beyond whence there is no return to *Sansār* again.

CHAPTER I.

JAINISM—ITS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

Consideration of the term Philosophy—As they understand it in the West,—Aristotle, Spencer and Hegel—Philosophy as defined and taught by the Jinas or the Victors.—Right Knowledge, Right Vision and Right Conduct—The Triune of Jainism—Some Rudimentary Ideas and Metaphysical Notions.

We now turn to our enquiry into the Philosophy of the *Jinas* or the Victors—the more immediate subject-matter of the present treatise. But philosophy is one of those words which are often used rather loosely, leading to much confusion of thought with regard to its real end and import. To guard against any such misapprehension which a student of modern thought and culture might labour under, it is important that we should first discuss in brief what the West mean by philosophy and what we the Jains understand by it.

Necessity
of a Definition—
of the
word 'Philosophy.'

Aristotle defines philosophy to be the "science of principles" or "first beginnings." Another takes it to mean a "completely

Aristotle.

Spencer.

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Hegel.

unified knowledge". "Philosophy" according to a third, "is the science of the Absolute," in the sense that it takes the world of Nature not as a product of chance but of a Single Infinite Power whose activity consists in the working out of a plan or purpose in the course of which It evolves this world out of Itself. Thus has philosophy been variously defined by different thinkers of different ages and climes.

Philosophy
as defined
by the Ji-
nas.

The Jains, however, teach that philosophy consists in the voluntary and consistent striving, intellectual and moral, manifest in the removal of impediments on the way to Right Vision (सम्यक् दशन) into the metaphysics of things and thoughts leading to Right Knowledge (सम्यक् ज्ञान) of the world as a whole, and of our own function and place—Right Conduct (सम्यक् चारित्र) therein with the express object of realizing finally the free and beatific state of our being—the ultimate end and purpose of all life and activity.

Its Method
of enquiry.

Taking philosophy, then, as an attempt to attain to a free and beatific state of being by the virtue of Right Conduct—(सम्यक् चारित्र) proceeding from Right Know-

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

ledge (*samyak jñāna*) acquired through Right Vision (*samyak darshan*) into the realities of things and thoughts, we can ascertain beforehand what the principal branches and problems of our enquiry will be. We can see that there are two fundamental factors of the world : (i) *Jiva*, the Cogitative Substance or the Soul, including the system of finite minds either in *Nigoda*, fixed, fettered, or free, in the various gradations of their being ; (ii) *Ajiva*, the Non-Cogitative Substance, the Non-living or the Non Soul, including objective things and processes and the like. Hence our enquiry into philosophy, roughly speaking, will branch out into,—

The two
fundamental
factors of
the world.—

(i) *Jiva*.

(ii) *Ajiva*.

(i) The Cogitative Substance or Soul (*jiva*),

(ii) The Non-Cogitative Substance or the Non-Soul (*ajiva*), and finally,

(iii) The End or Freedom (*moksha*) of the soul in relation as to how it is attained.

Necessary
Ideas and
Notions.

But from a consideration of these fundamentals, it becomes evident that we have to make a frequent use of such metaphysical ideas and notions as *Dravya* (substance), *Guna* (quality), *Paryāya* (modality or modi-

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fication), *Karma* (action, motion or change of relative position), *Kāran* (causality) and the like; and no consistent result of our enquiry into philosophy can be expected until appropriate and complete understanding has been arrived at in regard to these fundamental ideas and notions. But an understanding of the content and origin of these ideas involves, to a great extent, analytical psychology of cognition.

And understanding of these involves analytical psychology of cognition and question on the means or conditions of knowledge.

Furthermore, philosophy, as we have seen above, claims to know the realities as they are, and therefore it must proceed with the justification of its rights by showing what the conditions or means (*Pramāṇas*) of attaining knowledge are, and proving as well, that knowledge of realities corresponding to the above ideas is within its power and competence. Otherwise, instead of explaining the relations which the *Jīvas* and *Ajīvas* bear to each other, it will go on only dogmatising, sometimes sinking into the lower level of scepticism and agnosticism, or at other times rising into pseudo-rationalism—only to add to the impediments of which there are plenty already to obscure

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our right vision into realities of ideas and ideals and forge thereby fresh links to the chains of misery that tie us down to the mires of this suffering world. But to avoid such pitfalls and to know the realities in conformity with the rules and canons required to be observed in the acquirement of a correct knowledge, we must proceed from such and other notions and ideas as form the subject-matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

PREDICAMENTS BY PRE-EMINENCE.

Fundamental Notions.—Categories or Predicaments by pre-eminence.—Their Necessity and Origin.—How determined.—Advantages of such determination.—*Dravya, Guna, Paryaya and Karma.*—*Papa and Punya.*—Classification and description in general of the Predicaments.—Their enumeration.

We have already seen that Right Vision, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct are the three principal departments of our philosophical enquiry.

Origin and context of the fundamental Ideas and Notions such as :—

But in dealing with these, as we have remarked, we have often to make use of such and certain fundamental ideas or notions as are not only the necessary forms according to which we ourselves must conceive things but which must also be regarded as necessary forms and relations of the things themselves. For in thinking, to be more clear, we think something about a thing and what we think about a thing is that it has powers

PREDICAMENTS.

of producing effects (अर्थ क्रियाकारौ) in other things, and stands in certain relations to them. For finite things exist and manifest their existence by acting and reacting, thereby exercising causality (कारणात्त्व) on one another ; we distinguish these powers of action and re-action by the effects which they mutually produce, and, it goes without saying that we call these powers as their qualities (गुण). But the degree of the effect which a thing produces on other things depends on certain relations in which it stands in regard to them *i. e.* relations of time and space (काल and अवकाश सम्बन्ध). Then, again, we cannot think of any change or any action excepting as tending towards the realisation of some particular *end* or *idea*. It is true that some hold that all actions and changes are due to the blind operation of material forces and fortuitous concourse of atoms and molecules without any *idea* or *end* to realise ; but there are also other angles of vision which find reason as underlying all phenomena. From this point of view we see

Causality.

Quality.

Idea, End or Purpose.

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Highest
Good—Free-
dom

Merit and
Demerit.

Predicates—
how deter-
mined.

that all actions and changes are co-ordinated according to a plan made to co-operate in such a way as to realise a *purpose* or an *end*. If it is the case, it must be that the *end* is something *good* and the subordinate *ends* must be such as to lead towards the realisation of the *Highest Good* or *Freedom* (अपवर्ग, निःश्रेयस, मोक्ष or निर्व्वर्णा). But all this involves such questions as, What is *good*, virtue or merit (पुण्य) and What is *Bad*, vice or demerit (पाप), and finally, How a man should regulate his life and thought i. e. What would constitute Right Conduct (सम्यक् चरित्र) for the realisation of the Highest Good or *Freedom*?

Having perceived, however, that a thing acts in a certain way upon other things, we integrate the idea of the thing by acts of judgments and thenceforth we think of them as attributes inherent in the thing ; but in order to express this fact we put them into conception of the thing by an act of judgment and we call them *Categories*, *Predicates* or *Predicaments* by *pre-eminence*.

Now the thing or the subject, which the predicates are ascribed to, is styled

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as and included among the fundamental *predicaments* or *categories* for convenience.

We call it *substance* or *reality* by which we mean that it is *Sat* i. e., it has an independent existence of its own for its characteristic indication (सत्द्रव्यलक्षणम्). *Sat* is, again, defined as what persists in and through its own qualities and modifications (सौदति स्वकीयान् गुणपर्यायान् व्याप्नोति). It (*Sat*) is further characterised as standing under, supporting and holding together as well, the attributes or qualities (गुण) and modifications (पर्याय) revealed in the forms of origination or effects (उत्पाद), and destruction disintegration—(व्यय) in and through which the substance asserts and maintains its own existence and continuance (ध्रौव) as perceived during the course of its interaction with other things (उत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौवयुक्तं सत्).

Sat and its tripartite indications.

Thus the characteristic indication of *Substance* being as such, we may define it as the underlying *entity* (द्रव्य) which itself, remaining essentially the same in and through all its modes of being, gives support and connection to all its qualities, modalities and the like.

Definition of—
(i) Substance

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Quality (गुण) of a substance is its power of producing effects of changes in other things through time and space. It is ever-present in the substance. Neither being found to be without the other, they both stand in the *relation of invariable concomitance* or *simultaneity* (योगपट्य) with one another, instead of being in *relation of antecedence and consequence in time* (क्रम-पौर्वापर्य सम्बन्ध).

(ii) Quality.

(iii) Modality.

Modality or *Modification* (पर्याय) again, is the successive variation (प्रणमन्) in the atomic arrangement and configuration which a thing undergoes in the course of time and in space.

Predicaments and their enumeration.—
Nine

Now *Substantiality*, *Quality* and *Modality* being, in short, the three characteristic indications of substance so called, *quality* and *modality* are also at times considered as substances under certain circumstances and relations when each of these three is thus characterised again with the *tri-partite* indications of substance. The Jain teachers, however, have come to the enumeration in general of nine categories or predicaments by pre-eminence as in the following,—

PREDICAMENTS.

I. *Jiva* (जीव)—Cogitative substance, Soul, Self or Subject is that which has *Intelligence* (चैतन्य) for its characteristic indication. It is marked out from *Ajiva* (अजीव)—Non-cogitative substance, Non-soul, Not-self or Object by *knowing consciousness* (ज्ञान) which essentially belongs to the *Jiva* only. This individual *Jiva* is not all-pervading, nor is it only *one* in number; neither is it absolutely eternal or unchangeable; nor is it absolutely non-eternal or transitory. It is innumerable in number and is both eternal and non eternal in accordance with the viewpoint we take to look at these.

Jivas not all-pervading, nor one in number, absolutely eternal nor non-eternal.

This *Jiva* exists in the germinal state in the form of what is technically called *Nigoda* (निगोद). It contracts or expands, as the requirements may be, to fit in with the corporeal frames it takes on at different stages of its migratory existence in order to enjoy pleasures or suffer from pains. In order to reap what it sows, it migrates here, there and everywhere through the processes of repeated births, developments and deaths. On account of its ever striving to break off the fetters of

The germinal state of the *Jiva* and its characteristic indications,—

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Its constitutional Freedom,

bondage and attain to a free and beatific state of being by means of the Truine Gems (रत्नत्रयो), the *Jiva* is held to be constitutionally free and essentially all bliss (आनन्द). It is potentially *divine* in the sense that it attains to Divinity or Perfection in the end when it shines in all its glory and effulgence beyond all thought and speech near the regions of *Aloka*.

Its Divinity,

And its Infinitude, not in magnitude but in number.

Now there are an infinite number of these *Jivas*—filling the entire space and void of the universe and are mainly grouped into,—

(1) The Freed *Jiva*.

(A) Freed *Jivas*—are those beings who have attained to divinity and become self-conscious and self-luminous near the hyper-physical regions: and,

(2) The Fettered *Jiva*.

(B) Fettered *Jivas*—are those who are still bound down with the chains of *karma* either on Earth, in Heaven, or in Purgatory.

Which is classified again into,

These fettered *Jivas* are again subdivided into (i) *Sthāvāra* and (ii) *Tras*.

(i) The *Sthāvāra* and

(i) *Sthāvāra Jivas*—are those which are devoid of all power of locomotion and have only one organ of sense, viz, that of *touch* (स्पर्श). Earth, water, fire, air and all those that come within the

PREDICAMENTS.

range of the vegetable kingdom, are known as *Jivas* belonging to the *Sthāvara* class. Symptoms of life in these *Sapraṇ Sthāvar* (सप्राण स्थावर) or living fixtures consist, amongst other phenomena, in *responsiveness* which evidently involve memory as displayed in the mental activity of *feeling, cognition* and *re-cognition*

(ii) *Tras Jivas*—are those who have the power of locomotion and are grouped into four kinds according to the nature and number of the sense-organs they are possessed of. The four kinds of *Tras Jivas* are ;—

(2) The *Tras*.

The four kinds of the *Tras*,

(a) those that have the organs of *touch* and *taste*, (स्पर्शेन्द्रिय and रसेन्द्रिय) e.g., leeches, worms, etc.

(b) those that have three organs such as *touch, taste* and *smell*, (स्पर्शेन्द्रिय, रसेन्द्रिय and गन्धेन्द्रिय) e.g., ants, lice, etc.

(c) those that have organ of sight (नयनेन्द्रिय) in addition to the above three organs, e.g., bees, scorpions, etc.—

(d) and, lastly, those that have all the above four organs in addition to that of the hearing (शब्देन्द्रिय) This last kind of

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Jivas includes birds, acquatics, animals and human beings and all those that people Heaven, Earth and Purgatory.

Ajiva defined.

II. *Ajiva* (अजीव)—Non-cogitative substance, Non-soul, Not-self or the Object is all what is absolutely bereft of all *intelligence*, and consequently of the tripartite modes of *consciousness*. This *Ajiva* or Non-cogitative substance is of five kinds, viz ;—

Ponderable
Ajiva--*Pudgal*
and its
indications
—*Lakṣaṇa*.

(i) *Pudgala* signifies what *develops fully only to be dissolved again*.—It is that kind of dead dull ponderable (रूपी) matter, which is qualified with touch, taste, smell and colour. It is found to exist generally in two modes of being :—(a) *Anu* (अणु)—atom, and (b) *Skandha* (स्कन्ध),—compound. When the dead and dull matter exists in the last indissoluble stage where the ingredients admit of no further analysis, it is called *anu* or atom. And *Skandha*-compound is the natural conglomeration of *pudgal*-atoms under chemical and physical laws. It is these *Pudgala*-atoms that incessantly enter and leave our bodies and are infinitely more numerous than the *Jivas*. *Karma* is a kind of fine *Pudgal*-atoms.

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The *Pudgala*-matter is also classified in the following manner according to other modes of its being :—

Pudgala
Classified.

(a) *Sthula-Sthula* (स्थूल-स्थूल) or the Grossesst of the gross, as, for example, logs of wood or blocks of stone ; i.e., solids which can be cut into equal parts.

(b) *Sthula* (स्थूल) or the Gross-simple, milk or water, i. e., liquids, which are restorable to their original mass-forms even after their measurable divisions.

(c) *Sthula-sukshma* (स्थूल-सूक्ष्म) or the Compound of the *gross* and the *fine* (e.g. gases which is visible in the light of the sun or the moon but cannot be caught ; as for example smokes and the like)

(d) *Sukshma-Sthula* (सूक्ष्म-स्थूल) or the Compound of the *fine* and the *gross* is what is not visible to the eye but is perceptible by the auditory or olfactory nerves ; as, for example, music and smell.

(e) *Sukshma* (सूक्ष्म) or the Fine.

(f) *Sukshma-Sukshma* (सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म) or the *Finest* of the *fine*, the ultimate atoms which admit of no further divisions. These finest of the fine, are mere simples as oppos-

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ed to compounds and like points have positions but no magnitude.

Imponderable
Ajiva.

(ii). *Dharma* or *Dharmāstikāya* is that simple imponderable (अमूर्त) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to move. *Dharma* here seems to be a reality, corresponding to the *Rajas* (रजस) of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, helping to the mobility of material things.

(iii). *Adharma* or *Adharmāstikāya* is that simple imponderable (अमूर्त) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to be at rest. *Adharma*, like *Dharma*, appears to be a reality corresponding to the *Tamas* (तमः) of the Sāṅkhya philosophy tending to bring things to a rest.

(iv). *Ākāśh* or Space is the uncontained container of all that exists.

(v) *Kāl* or Time is what reveals itself in a series or succession of events or changes. It is in the course of time that things wear out, unfold themselves or undergo changes. It is this time that is conventionally divided and termed as moments, minutes, hours and the like for which reason it is technically called *Kalanātmak Kāl*.

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III. *Punya* or Virtue or deeds of merit *Punya*
is that which helps the Jiva in his enjoyment of health, wealth and pleasures.

IV. *Pāpa*, or Vice or deeds of demerit is that *Pāpa*,
which adds to the pain and suffering of the Jiva.

V. *Asrava* or Influx, infection or transmutation of *Pudgal*-particles into the soul.—
The *Pudgal* particles, which are foreign to the soul, find their way into the soul through mind, speech and other sense organs and thus cause discoloration of the latter giving rise to love, hatred, and the like.

VI. *Bandha* or bondage is the wrong identification of the soul with the Non-soul owing to the atomic transmutation of the latter into the former. *Bandha*.

VII. *Sambar* is the gradual cessation of this influx into the soul along with the development of knowledge. *Sambar*.

VIII. *Nirjarā* is the *absolute* purging of the soul of all matters foreign to it. *Nirjarā*.

IX. *Moksha* is the Freedom of the soul from the fetters of the bondage due to matters alien to it. *Moksha*.

The above is but a general statement with reference to the nine categories or

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predicaments as taught by the Jain teachers. As to their details we shall see later on in their proper places. Some, however, taking *Punya* and *Pāpa* under *Bandha* hold that categories are only seven in number. Others again leaving aside the moral categories beginning with *Pāpa* and *Punya* opine that there are only six *Padārthas* or Predicaments viz : *Jiva*, *Pudgal*, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Akāśh* and *Kāla*. But, be that as it may the question is : what do we know of these categories? And in this is involved another question : what is knowledge? Unless we satisfy ourselves in regard to this it would be difficult for us to precisely state what we understand by these categories, a right vision into the metaphysics of which, we are told, will bring on right knowledge of the verities of thought and life helping in the right regulation of our conduct for the attainment of Freedom—the *Summum Bonum* of all life and living.

CHAPTER III.

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS FORMS.

The Correlativity of Jiva and Ajiva—Polarity of Knowledge.—Self and the Not-self—Consciousness and its Origin—Knowledge and its Growth. Definitions of Right Vision and Right Knowledge—Different forms of Knowledge and the Possibility of the Kevala Jnana.—Kevalin is the Ideal Real—Pure Intuitions—the true characteristic of Real Pratyaksha.

To begin with knowledge, therefore, we must first see as to how do we become conscious of the Self and the Not-Self; what we *are* and what we *see, hear, taste, touch* or *smell*.

A sifting analysis of the contents of our knowledge of the world as a whole makes it pretty clear that we can arrange our ideas relating to the same under two pairs of contrasted alternatives, *Jiva* and *Ajiva*, as complementary aspects of reality, each of which suggests the other by a dialectic necessity and combines with the other into one more complex conception. Now these two contrasted alternatives are but two conditions of thought: All thinking implies a *subject* which thinks—Cogitative principle or Soul. But as all

Correlativity in our conception of the world—*Jiva* and *Ajiva*.

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Polarity of
Subject and
Object in
thought.

thinking is thinking of *something*, it means that it requires a material on which the thought-activity is exercised and a *fortiori* therefore, it implies an *object* which is discriminated and understood by thought. Thus we can neither imagine a subject or a thinking principle without an object to think upon, or a world without conceiving a cognitive principle as thinking it. And this is how we become conscious of the Self or Subject and the Not-Self or Object.

Conscious-
ness and
knowledge
from action
and interac-
tion between
the two—
the Self and
the Not-Self.

And from this it is evident that consciousness arises only from the action and inter-action of the Self and Not-Self as such ; and constituted as we are, our knowledge must therefore begin with sensations from the peripheral contact of the senses with their respective objects, and consists in the interpretation of the sensations which they arouse in us ; for, merely having sensations and feelings would not constitute knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of a thing is the interpretation and understanding of the sensation in such a manner as would correspond to the existing relations between the self and the Not-Self and other sur-

Sensation,
Interpre-
tation know-
ledge and its
formation.

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rounding things, the fundamental forms of which are called categories. It is thus quite apparent that interpretation precedes knowledge and the more accurate the interpretation of the sensation, the more correct would be the knowledge thereof. When the sensations, caused in us by the powers inherent in the objects in contact with the peripheral extremities, are interpreted and understood quite in accordance with the forms and relations in which they subsist and for which they are called categories, we come to know them as objective relations. And when this is done in perfect accordance with the instructions imparted by the Teacher (गुरु), without which a *correct* interpretation is held to be impossible, *absolute faith* (श्रद्धा) in the instruction (i. e. in knowledge produced by the imparted teaching) is called 'Right-Vision' (सम्यक् दर्शन) —the basis of Right Knowledge. And the knowledge which embraces concisely or in details the predicaments, as they are in themselves, is called 'Right Knowledge' (सम्यक् ज्ञान), and without which Right Conduct (सम्यक् चरित्र) is impossible.

Right Vision is the Absolute Faith-Sraddhā in the instruction of the Teacher in the interpretation.

Definition of Right Knowledge.

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Five Forms
of Know-
ledge,—

Now knowledge is of five different forms, such as, (1) *Mati* (मति), (2) *Sruti* (श्रुति), (3) *Abadhi* (अवधि) (4) *Manaparyaya* (मनःपर्यय) (5) and *Keval* (केवल). Thus,—

Mati is that form of knowledge by which a *Jiva* (जीव) cognises an object through the operation of the sense-organs, all hindrances to the formation of such knowledge being removed.

(2) *Sruti* is the clear knowledge formed on some verbal testimony of the Omniscient, all obstruction to the formation of such knowledge being removed.

(3) *Avadhi* is the knowledge in the form of recognition of particular physical occurrences that happened in some time past, all obstruction to the way being removed ;

(4) *Manaparyaya* is the knowledge of what is in others' thoughts, originating, as it does, from the removal of hindrances to the formation of such knowledge.

(5) *Keval* is the pure unimpeded knowledge—knowledge absolute, which precedes the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*. It is characterised by *omniscience*, transcending all relativity of discursive thought involving

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the idea of succession and series. Being devoid of every sort of ratiocinative element, we may call it '*Intuition*' power. By Intuitive knowledge we mean, of course, what we get by a single stroke of cognition, unadulterated by any of the processes of representation. As for us, finite beings, conditioned naturally by the relativity of thought, we cannot have this sort of cognition; because a careful analysis of the psychological processes seems to show that by virtue of the frame and constitution of our mind, in every cognition which we can have, both the presentative and the representative elements are, as it were, inseparably blended together. Indeed, some philosophers may hold the quite opposite view and affirm that we can perceive objects directly by our senses and that formation of the percept requires no help of representation. But, surely, we can meet them in the language of Kant by saying that mere sensations, unalloyed with any reactionary and representative processes, are as good as nothing, because they are no better than manifold of senses quite undifferentiated and homogeneous in character. But this—though an im

Characteristic Indication of *Keval* or Intuition.

Impossibility of Intuition by ordinary minds.

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But possible
for an Omni-
scient Being
—*Kevalin*;
and,—

His charac-
teristic Indi-
cations—
Lakshana.

possibility for us—is nevertheless possible for an Omniscient Being (केवलोन) who has attained to perfection and Divinity. In fact, we may go so far as to say that the opposite—a discursive knowledge—is inconceivable for Him by virtue of His very nature. Unless we deny the very existence of such a being it must necessarily follow that as perfect knowledge means infinite knowledge, his knowledge embraces the whole sphere of thought and covers the whole span of time. Being immortal and eternally present, for him the present vanishes not in the past, nor the future shoots out from the womb of futurity ; but all offer themselves as Ever-present. For him everything is eternal *Now*. In short, He is above time, because the question of time comes in where there is a succession of events or changes. But changes are not possible to an Eternal Being ; for, all changes are in Him as it were, but He is not changed. For him there is no succession, but an eternal and everlasting Present. Now this being the case what necessarily follows are the facts. The mind which is at once perfect

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is not merely objective nor merely subjective, but *absolute*. It is the measure of all things, the central and comprehensive reality. Such a mind, such a man, such a *Kevalin* (केवलौन), we need hardly add, is not the man in the street nor the man in the making, but the mind, the man whose cardinal characteristics are Pure Intuitions or Transcendental perceptions (प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान). Indeed such a man, such a *Kevalin* is the ideal of all aspirations, the fountain-head of truth and wisdom. In short, he is named, *God*.

Kevalin—
The Ideal
Real.

— —

CHAPTER IV.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC.

Further consideration of the Processes of Knowledge.
—Judgment and its Three Elements—Rules and Canons
which a Judgment should obey.—Insufficiency of the
Perceptual Source of Knowledge—Hence other Sources
of Knowledge.

Re-capitu-
lation.

In the preceding pages we have discussed that Knowledge implies a Subject or a thinking principle which knows and an Object on which it exercises its knowing power. We have seen also that to know an object is to know the relations it bears to Self and other surrounding things as well. We have also seen the particular forms of knowledge which the Jain *savants* teach in their own peculiar way. We have seen further that the last form or the *Keval jñāna* is not only a form of knowledge but a source of knowledge as well, free from all mediate processes. It now behoves us to enquire as to what other possible sources of knowledge we are ordinarily aware of.

It is but a truism to say that you and I depend upon our mind to know the world.

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This implies that we are dependent upon our organs of perception and upon our ability to re-organize the data of perception into the system we call *Knowledge*. To know, we are necessarily dependent on our sense organs ; for, without them the world would be to us a perfect blank. Rob us of our eyes, of our ears, touch and the like, how little should we know of the world in which we live, move and have our being ! But inspite of such a bold and an undeniable piece of evidence in this matter-of-fact world, there crops up a question as to the trustworthiness of these our evidences of the sense organs—the channels of our perception. We all know how the sages and philosophers of yore differed widely from one another in placing their reliance on these channels of perception in their quest of truth. Some went even so far as to urge all manner of evidence to bring in question the absolute trustworthiness of the senses ; others held it to be the only anthoritative source of knowledge. In these days of modern culture and refinement we can have indeed little patience with those who seriously urge

Ordinary
Sources of
Knowledge
—the Sense-
organs or
Indriyas.

Reliability
of Sense-evi-
dence ques-
tioned.

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Sense-evidence not wholly reliable.

such evidence to be absolutely reliable. A little reflection, however, will be sufficient to convince anyone that, really speaking, we are not wholly justified in having such attitude of mind as just referred to. For in this are involved grave questions of vital issues and far-reaching consequences in all forms of philosophical speculation. If we remember aright, experience shows on many an occasion that the evidences of the senses are not wholly and entirely reliable. We have not only illusions and dreams but some of us are colour-blind even. Besides, there are many things in heaven and earth which escape our visions—sense perceptions. There are many things which lie hidden from our view either by being too big or too small to come within the range of our direct perception. We have not seen the globe as a whole nor have we visualised the chemical atoms. Now if these be the things whose existence we never perceive but infer, how many—perhaps infinitely many—are there whose existences escape our notice and knowledge and thus keep clear for fresh inquiries and discoveries !

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Then, again, you and I perceive objects and so we know them. But how do we know them? Clearly because they make impressions on our brains through the senses and thus give rise to certain processes and states in our mind; and the question is whether we have only mental processes and states and not the real objects with which they do not correspond at all like an image in a mirror and the real object imaged. This world of ours gives rise to perceptions with which they cannot be identified. The image of the book is evidently not the book itself. If you shut your eyes, the image of the book vanishes, but the book existing objectively in space does not. Supposing, again, that you go away to a certain distance from where the book lies and look back from there at it, surely the image of the book will be smaller and smaller as you go away from it farther and still farther and look back at it from time to time. Clearly you see the book as it does appear to you and not the book as it really is. And thus the whole thing grows at once perplexing and irritating; and you are irresistibly led to the question—what

Pre-suppositions of Judgment.

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would be the nature of this knowledge and how do we come to it?

Knowledge
and Judg-
ment.

It would be well to state at the very outset that this our knowledge is not perception only as such : it consists also of 'Judgment.' It is true that, speaking psychologically, knowledge exists in the form of perception and this may indeed seem to involve a contradiction. But on a little reflection it is found to involve no such thing. For, all instances of knowledge perform the same office as a Judgment does. To take, for example, the case of a baby. When the baby stretches forth its tiny arm towards some object—say, a red ball hanging at a distance before its eyes,—we have something very much akin, to be sure, to an adult's request that the given object be brought to him. Here the baby does not, by words of mouth, ask us to get it the red ball ; but for its intellectual companion it has said something fully. So in fact though no request is expressed in words, still the attitude of the baby does not fail to be construed as a request, and in fact it is

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so construed by its intellectual companion. In other words, we may say, as we have done before, that all knowledge would take some form of Judgment, be it expressed in words or by implication.

Thus the question as to the nature of knowledge ultimately resolves into the question with regard to the nature of Judgment, and a final answer can be given by analysing it into its component elements. By an *element* of Judgment is meant *whatever is necessary to its being a Judgment from our point of view as an interpreter*. There are *three* such elements in a Judgment. A Judgment to be as such must have an object to be interpreted; for, an interpretation of nothing whatsoever is no interpretation at all. So, one of the elements involved in interpretation is the object to be interpreted. This must be given to us. It must stand there revealed to us. This object of knowledge is termed as *the given*. The second element is the actual *interpretation* itself. To deny this would involve self-contradiction. Thirdly, we have, as the final element of Judgment, those *laws* or

What constitutes a Judgment.

Its three Elements,—

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The observ-
ance of which
is essential
to the
formation of
a correct
Judgment.

canons that a Judgment must obey in order that it might be true. A good and correct Judgment has some responsibility, and this responsibility takes on the form of rules, laws and canons that a Judgment must obey, or else be an untrue or false claimant of the respective demands. To disobey these rules would, therefore, be tantamount to treason to knowledge itself.

We have already dwelt on the first two elements of Judgment. We are now to deal with the third one, or the laws and canons for the formation of correct Judgment.

Etymolo-
gical signi-
ficance of
Pramān.

Students of Indian systems of thought all know that the word *pramāna* (प्रमाण) originally meant an instrument of measurement—from *mān*-to measure and *pra*-forth. It may be translated as a measured, standard authority.

Function of
Pramān.

But the *pramāna* which serves as a means (साधन) of determination produces *pramiti* (प्रमिति) which means accurate or right knowledge, just as *sādhana* (means) produces *siddhi* (truth or certainty). This *pramāna* is a means of information and determination and has variously

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been admitted, divided and defined from different points of view by different sages and scholars of different ages and climes to suit their respective systems of thought.

The Châr-
vâka Criti-
cism of
Knowledge.

Whoever has a little acquaintance with the different Indian systems of thought knows full well that the followers of the Châr-vâka School admit of but one source of knowledge, viz. Experience, i. e. sense-perception (प्रत्यक्ष), contemptuously rejecting the other sources, viz. Inference, (अनुमान), Testimony (शब्द), Tradition (ऐतिह्य), Implication (अर्थपत्ति), Probability (सम्भव) and Non-entity (अभाव), which are warranted in drawing from facts of experience. Little indeed do we know what is really taught by the Sage *Brihaspati*, the oldest propounder of the most uncompromising materialism and thorough going Epicuranism or whence he drew his inspiration to rely solely on sense perception or facts of actual experience and to overlook other logical inferences and the like which have been in vogue from time immemorial; for, where we perceive smoke we infer at once the fire there, or, when a reliable person informs any one that there are fruits he

There is but
one Source
of Know-
ledge and
that is *Pra-
tyaksha*.

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requires on the bank of the river, he runs to the place and plucks fruits. Thus, Infererence and Testimony along with others have all along been held to be valid sources of knowledge. But, curiously enough, the Chârvâkas question the validity of these. And so far we could gather from the fragments of this philosophy, scattered here and there in the different systems of thought and as collated by Mâdhavâchârya in his *Sarvadarshana Samgraha*, he begins his enquiries into Epistemology with such startling questions as, what is the value of Inference? How can ever its conclusions be certain?

Invalidity of
Inference
—*Anuman.*

The most elementary form of conclusion must invariably have three terms—two extremes and a reason, mark or middle term (हेतु, लिङ्ग or साधना). To give a conclusion, the middle-term or mark (हेतु, लिङ्ग or साधना) must be universally and unconditionally connected with the major-Sâdhya (व्यापक, साध्य) on one side i.e., according to the phraseology of European logic must be *distributed*, and on the other side with the minor term-*paksha* (पक्ष). But what evidence can we

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ever have that the connection between the *major* (साध्य) and the *middle* or *sign* (व्याप्य, हेतु or लिङ्ग) is necessary and universal? For,—

(a) Sense-perception (प्रत्यक्ष) cannot prove it in as much as universal connection is not a fact of *experience*. Experience can give only one particular fact and that only of the present moment and not of the long past nor of the distant future. The eye by fact of its exercising its functional activity only in the present reveals the objectivity of a particular thing *here* and *now*. But a universal truth goes infinitely beyond what the eye can give. Hence sense-perception cannot prove any necessary connection between the *major* (साध्य) and the *minor* (पक्ष)—any universal proposition or *Pratijñā*—(व्याप्ति प्रतिज्ञा)!

Sense-evidence cannot establish Inference.

(b) But here a *prima facie* objection might be raised to the effect that perception being both internal and external it includes intuition of reason which gives necessary and universal truth. 'Not even that,' thunders forth the thorough-going materialist; 'there is no such thing as intuition

A *Prima Facie* objection raised and set aside.

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c. f. Reid,
Hamilton,
Mill and
Comte.

or internal perception. For mind has no perception except through the senses and therefore external. It is interesting to compare the Chârvâkas with Reid and Hamilton, who on the one hand deny the possibility of internal intuition of universal truths, and Mill and Comte on the other hand who reject all 'Introspective knowledge' as ever possible.

Inference
cannot give,
for it is only
assumed.

(c) Then again, "*Inference*," says the Indian materialist, "cannot give it; for *Inference* (अनुमान) itself always requires universal proposition affirming the connection between the *major* and the *middle* as universally true." For example when we say that a man is mortal: Socrates is a man and therefore mortal, we are assuming a necessary connection between humanity and mortality. But the possibility of such a connection, at least of our knowing such a connection, even if it existed, is just what we require to prove. Thus we can see that mere *Inference* cannot prove it; for *it is only assumed*. To say that the connection, though assumed yet makes inference possible is to argue in a circle. And hence we cannot

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arrive at universal truths by means of *Inference* (अनुमान). It is important note to here that J. S. Mill bases his theory of reasoning on universal propositions. But are these axioms themselves proved? No, reasoning assumes them—they being mere generalisations from facts of experience. But this cannot yield absolute certainty.

c. J. Mill's
Theory of
Reasoning.

(d) Nor *Testimony* can prove it. For the validity and truth of *Testimony* depends on *Inference*. Moreover *Testimony* itself depends on a middle term (लिङ्ग or हेतु) in another sense viz. the language used; in as much as the meaning of the language used and its correspondence with reality is always uncertain. To illustrate the import, we have the communication of the old man with the child, neither understanding the other's language. Hence absolute *certainty* can never be founded on authority, we cannot accept the *ipse dixit* of Manu even. And if *Testimony* could convey universal truth, yet there could be no knowledge of universals to one who had not himself received the testimony of one already in the know of them. But where is

Nor can
Testimony
establish it.

For esti
mony has
itself to
depend on
Inference.

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Hence Perception is the only means of Knowledge,

such a person to be found? To say that any one already knows universal truths and can bear *Testimony* to it, is but begging the question. Hence sense-perception (प्रत्यक्ष) is the only form of valid knowledge (प्रमाण).

Still has the use of other means of Knowledge been from time immemorial.

So argue the Chârvâkas in defiance of the usage of all times. There was never a time when the acts of seeing and inferring etc. were not performed. The use of these acts are well known ; for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another, and though the use of the *Pramânas* are well-known to all, coming as it does from time immemorial, yet it is imperative that we should make a sifting enquiry into the truth and validity of the materialistic and sensationistic arguments as put forth by such thinkers as Chârvâkas so that it might serve as an warning to the foolish people from taking false knowledge for true : for it is said ;—

And therefore require a searching enquiry into the truth and validity of the Chârvâka attachment.

प्रसिद्धानं प्रमाणानं क्षुब्धबोद्धौ प्रयोजनम् ।

तद्व्यामोह निवृत्तिः स्याद् व्यामृद्ध मनसामिह ।

— *The Nâysvatâra.*

Such is the trend of the Chârvâkas' argument who admit only one *pramâna*.

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And while the Buddhists and the *Vaiśeṣikas* admit of only two *Pramāṇas* viz. *Perception* and *Inference* (प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान), the *Sāṅkhya* School acknowledges three i. e. *Testimony* (शब्द) in addition to the previous two. The School of the *Nyāya* Philosophy adds *Analogy* (उपमान) to the above three and thus admits of four only. The *Prabhākar* School accepts *Implication* (अर्थार्पण) as an additional means and thus agrees to five *Pramāṇas*. The two *Mīmāṃsakas*, *Purva* and *Uttara* (पूर्व and उत्तर) grant six, adding *Non-existence* (अभाव); and finally, the *Pūrāṇikas* taking *Tradition* (ऐतिह्य) and *Probability* (संभाव) into consideration, acknowledge that the sources of knowledge are after all eight in number.

The means of knowledge as admitted by other schools of Indian thought.

The scholiasts have, however, defined these means of knowledge variously. But they all agree substantially to the following :—

(1) *Sense-perception* (प्रत्यक्ष)—Knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the sense-organs with their corresponding objects.

Sense-perception.

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Inference. (2) Inference (अनुमान)—Knowledge born of the apprehension of an unseen member from an invariable association (व्याप्ति) by the perception of another known member.

Analogy. (3) Analogy (उपमान)—Knowledge from the recognition of likeness based on resemblance i.e. from the detection of the points of identity and difference through the process of comparison and recognition of similarity with something well-known before.

Testimony. (4) Verbal Testimony (शब्द)—Knowledge derived from the pronouncements of authoritative persons who have *sensed* truths as it were.

Implication. (5) Implication (अर्थापत्ति)—Such knowledge as can be determined of a thing not itself perceived, but implied by another.

Non-existence. (6) Non-entity (अभाव)—Knowledge arising from the cognition of *absence* or *Negation* or *Non-being* as we conclude from the fact that Deva Datta is not in the house, that he must have gone out.

Tradition. (7) Tradition (ऐतिह्य)—Knowledge gained from such accounts, legendary or otherwise, which have been handed down to generation to generation from time immemorial.

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(8) Probability (सम्भव)—Knowledge accruing from the perception of equivalence as in the instance of twelve pences making up a shilling Probability.

The above are the eight classified sources of information by means of which they generally determine the accuracy of knowledge. And it is interesting to note that Jain teachers do neither admit them all, nor do they agree to these definitions. They admit of only two *pramāṇas*: one is *Direct or Immediate Perception* (प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान) which has been discussed at length under *Keval* (केवल ज्ञान) as a form of knowledge; and the other is *Indirect or Mediate Perception* (परोक्ष ज्ञान) which is generally explained by the peripheral contact of the senses with their respective objects (इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्ष).

The Jain View of the means of Knowledge—Sense-perception in the Mediate or Indirect means.

The reason why knowledge born of the contact of the senses with their respective objects (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष ज्ञान) which is admitted on all hands to be derived through the *Direct means* (प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण) has been considered by the *Jain* Sages to be *Indirect* or *Mediate* (परोक्ष) is best explained when we take into our analytic consideration of the

The reason why the sense-perception is Mediate or Indirect.

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states and processes of the psychology of cognition of extra-mental realities.

Intermediary Stages of the formative of such Knowledge.

Knowledge born of the contact of the senses with their corresponding objects (इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षज ज्ञान) is not direct. There are, remark the *Jain* Psychologists, five intermediary stages from sense to thought: viz. (a) *Vanjyandvagraha* (व्यञ्जनावग्रह), (b) *Arthdvagraha* (अर्थवग्रह), (c) *Ihā* (इहा), (d) *Avaya* (अवय) and (e) *Dhārand* (धारणा) as will be presently explained.

CHAPTER V.

PRATYAKSHA IS REALLY PAROKSHA.

The Jain dissension with reference to *Pratyaksha* *Praman*.—Direct Perception is really Indirect.—Analysis of the Psychological Processes of Cognition.—The Different Stages—From Sense to Thought—Proof of the Truth and Validity of the Jain Point of View.—The sensuous '*Pratyaksha*' is really '*Paroksha*'.

While discussing the questions of epistemology and logic in the previous chapter, we have seen how the different schools of Indian thought substantially agree as to the character of the different instruments of knowledge. And so far the characteristic indication, specially of the Direct Perception (*प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण*), is concerned, we have seen too that almost all the schools, from the out-and-out materialist *Chârvâka* down to the all-believing *Paurânîkas*, agree with one another. But the Jain *savants*, as we have stated already, do not fall in with this view. According to them, the so-called *Pratyaksha*—Direct Perception—is but an *Indirect* source of knowledge. The so-called *Pratyaksha* is really *Paroksha*

The Jain criticism of the so-called *Pratyaksha Pramân* or Direct Perception. —

But the Direct is really Indirect.

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This will indeed strike curious in the face of such over whelming opinions of so many schools of thought as well as in opposition to the evidence of the everyday experience. But an analysis of the psychological processes involved in the sense-given knowledge, as the Jain *savants* hold, will confirm the truth and validity of their statement when they say that the so-called *Pratyaksha* is, to all intents and purposes, *Paroksha*.

(i) Acquisitional Stage.

To enter into details, there is no denying the fact that we think in relations. Relativity is the very soul and cement of our knowledge ; for, all knowledge not only implies a Self or Subject which knows and a Not-Self or Object which is known but a relation between them as well. The Object or the external world, by acting on the peripheral ends of our sense-organs, rouse in us a certain kind of stimulus through the channels of our sensation ; and this brings the Self or Subject to stand in particular relation with it, the Not-Self or the Object. This is *vyanjandvagraha* (व्यञ्जनावग्रह) or the stage of acquisition of materials for knowledge.

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The relation having thus been established between the Self and the Not-Self in the processes of which stimulus is carried on from the outside to the cerebro-hemisphere where all the in-going nerves meet, there takes place an excitation in our mind whereupon it re-acts on the stimulus by way of converting it into sensation as well as of interpreting in knowing the contents of the same in and through the process of which, the mind comes to the formation of the notion of its being imposed by something *other* than itself from without. This notion, thus formed, of the extra-mental object, is homogeneous and indefinite in character in as much as the distinction between the Self and the Not-Self only begins to dawn on the mind in the most rudimentary forms. In our psychology it is called *Arthāvagraha* (अर्थावग्रह) or the presentative or cognitive stage in the processes of perceptual elaboration.

(ii) Presentative or cognitive Stage.

Ihā (इहा) is the third stage. The mind does not rest with the formation of the vague notion of the Not-Self, as referred to in the above. Rather it goes on with its search-

(iii) Comparative Stage.

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ing inquiry, initiated in the previous stage, as to the real character and contents of what is imposed on it from without through the assimilation of the present sensation and its comparison as well with the other past but similar sensations, revived in the mind according to the laws of association and concomitant detection of the points of identity and difference between present and past sensations.

(iv) **Recogni-
tive Stage.** Then follows the re-integration of the present sensation along with other sensations, received in some past time and now revived in our consciousness according to the law of contiguity. In this stage of *avaya* (अवयव), the presentative element which is known as sensation is fused with other elements, represented in the consciousness ; and thus there results the recognition of the object, more definitely expressed in such vocabularies as *this* and not *that*.

(v) **Reflec-
tive or con-
ceptual
Stage.** The last stage in the present perceptual elaboration is *Dhārṇā* (धारणा) through the processes of which we are by a natural and coherent train of thought led to reflect that sensation reveals qualities of things. But sensations

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must require grounds for them ; for, they cannot be self-caused. The qualities also, which these sensations reveal, cannot stand by themselves : for the qualities must be qualities of something, which not only gives them support and connection, but which as well exists extra-mentally and objectively somewhere in space. Thus through the processes of objectification and localisation we are led to the knowledge of things as extra-mental realities existing objectively in space. *Dhṛand* (धारणा), *thought*, is but a name for this particular phase of knowledge of the thing when it is uppermost in our mind with special reference to the intensity and duration of the knowledge as such.

Such is the analysis of the sensuous perception; and this reminds us of a tendency in the modern psychology of perception to detect whether there is any interval of time between the *contact* and the (formation of) *concept* in addition to the question raised of late by the psycho-physiologists as to whether perception does not involve inference—a subject which was long ago discussed and solved by the sages of India.

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The whole
process
from sense
to thought
is thus medi-
ate.

Now the above analysis of the successive stages as to how the sense-given fragments and feelings are generalised and compressed into an intimate unity—a habitual mood of mind—is sufficient to indicate that whole process from *sense* to *thought* is not only indirect but mediate through and through in the acquirement of experiential knowledge. The facts of experience, mediately received, are generalised through the principle of induction in the course of which the details only re-arrange themselves into a concentrated form called,—*Thought*. The extra-mental realities causing sensations and feelings in us from their contact with our peripheral extremities, are not only cemented together into a unity but are stripped of their sensible nature, as it were, and are reduced to their simple equivalent in terms of thought through the operation of induction. In this way from sense-fragments and feelings, an image or idea, representative of reality, being generated, there appears next the thought or notion proper which holds the facts in unity. The principle holds good in all cases of empirical knowledge, historic or other-

PRATYAKSHA IS PAROKSHA.

wise. The decadence of nations in the lengths of time and the displacement of things all around us in the breadths of space are but condensed through reading or observation and induction into a frame of thought, naturally shedding a judgment on the issues involved therein. Thus *sensuous* perception which enjoys the privilege of being reckoned as a *direct* source of knowledge is really, to all intents and purposes, an *indirect* or *mediate* means (परोक्ष प्रमाण) to the acquisition of knowledge.

It is worthy of note here that *Mati-jñāna* and *Sruta-jñāna* come within the jurisdiction of this indirect means to the acquirement of knowledge.

This indirect means of knowledge or proof is again sub-divided for the sake of convenience into :—

Sub-divisions of the Indirect means.

(1) *Smṛiti* (स्मृति)—is the memory which reveals in the form of recollection of what was seen or heard of or experienced otherwise sometime before.

(2) *Pratyābhijñāna* (प्रत्याभिज्ञान)—is the knowledge derived from a semblance between things. It manifests itself in recognising a

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thing from the resemblance of the same with the description of what was known from some other source.

(3) *Tarka* (तर्क)—is the knowledge arising from the confutation according to the canons of invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति).

(4) *Anumān* (अनुमान)—is the knowledge of something arising from the presence of the characteristic insignia (लिङ्ग) of the same in something else.

(5) *Agam* (आगम)—is the verbal testimony of some Omniscient Being.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC.

Meeting the Charvakas on their own grounds.—
Refutation of their hypothesis and Demonstration of the
legitimacy of Inferential-knowledge—The Jain Theory
of Formal Logic and definitions of "Pratyaksha".—
"Paroksha" includes Inference and Testimony—Defi-
nition of Inference and Forms of Syllogisms—Testimony
or the Word—Definition of Praman or Valid know-
ledge—the World of Reals and not of Phantoms as hold
the Buddhists.

So we see how in addition to *Direct*
Perception (प्रक्षत्य प्रमाण), Inference (अनुमान)
is also admissible as an *Indirect* means
(परोक्ष प्रमाण) according to the *Jain*
epistemology. But then the *Purva Pakshin*,
Chârkvâk, will, indeed, remark that our
classification of the means of knowledge
—*Pramânas* and our definition and inter-
pretation of the logical terms—*Pratyaksha*
and *Paroksha*—are in clear contravention to
the common acceptation and interpretation
of the same and as such should be rejected ;
for where is the person so insane as to
accept this our view, the import and uses
of the logical vocabularies of which, are

Prima-facie
Objection
against the
interpretation
of the Jain
Pramânas.

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The supposed abandonment of original position by the Jains.

in manifest opposition to the uniformly accepted sense and signification of the terms in question? Besides, this would be construed as an abandonment on our part of the original position (प्रतिष्ठा सत्यास) taken up by us in the demonstration of the logical possibility and validity of *inferential* knowledge (परोक्ष ज्ञान) in addition to the *perceptual* and yielding as well to the view held by our adversary, in so far, indeed, as the epistimological side of the question is concerned, simply by a cunning display of *pun* upon words and terms from their etymological significations. Specially such is your position when we, Chârvâkas, do not admit of Pure Intuitions or Transcendental Perceptions which are impossible on your own statement to the ordinary mortals living, moving and having their being in the empirical world of ideas and ideals.

Vindication of the Jain-position and examination of the Chârvâka hypothesis.

Indeed! we, the Jains, reply. There is much of sense in your argument. But that is only apparently in as much as they vanish altogether like cob-webs on searching analysis, as we shall see presently. True it is that our definition and interpretation of

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the logical terms in question are in contra-
vention to the too common acceptance
and uses of the same. But common
is the common place and being too
common would not diminish the weight
and gravity of our philosophy. We walk
straight along the lines of *Riju-sutra*
(ऋजु सूत्र) and interpret and explain things
both as they *are* and *appear* instead of
wrangling and beating about the bush.
In our empirical life and thought, we indeed
admit *Perception* as the *direct* and *Infer-*
ence as the *indirect* means of knowledge.
But, however, to meet you on your grounds;—

First,—You hold that direct *Perception*
(प्रत्यक्ष) in the common acceptance of the
term is the one and only means of know-
ledge and that the so-called *Inference* (अनुमान)
being not possible according to your view
is not to be recognised as valid knowledge.

Summary of
the Hypo-
thesis.

Now, do you or do you not adduce any
proof in support of your contention? If you
do not, your assertions would be but *ipse*
dixit and none will care to listen to you. On
the other hand, if you adduce proof, yours
would be a suicidal procedure making yourself

The Châr-
vâkas in a
Dilemma.

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guilty of a crime for the abandonment of the original position (प्रतिष्ठा सत्यसि) already taken up by you in some form or other.

Unconscious admission of induction in sensuous perception.

Secondly,—Again when you maintain that excepting *Perception* all other forms of evidence are alike fallacious and as such homogeneous, you admit yourself the legitimacy of *induction* which is but a form of *inference*.

Vindication of inferential knowledge.

Thirdly—Then again you reject every kind of *inference*; but how do you carry on your debate? Surely by means of words which are but symbols of thought: and when you attack your antagonists for their mistaken faith in *inference* without which you could not so much as surmise that your antagonists held erroneous opinions, such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with your organs of sense but are only supposed to exist on the strength of *inference* (अनुमान) from the symbolic movement of thought. And,

Finally,—you can not but admit of *interference* being another means of knowledge as will be evident from the following. To take for example, I have been very often into

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the kitchen room as well as in other places and I have invariably observed that where there was smoke there was fire. Having met with not a single exception to the rule, I become convinced of the fact that there is an universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke. Afterwards I go to a hill for a trip. I see smoke there and I doubt somehow whether or not there is fire in the hill and the moment I observe smoke on it, I recall to my mind the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke of which I had become pretty well convinced before, and I conclude that the hill has fire in it as there is smoke on it. Surely this is a case of *inference* to the point and and you cannot but admit the legitimacy of the issue in question.

Demonstration of the legitimacy of Inference.

Having thus refuted the Chârvâka hypothesis so far their means of knowledge is concerned and having demonstrated as well the legitimate possibility of *Inference*(अनुमान) beyond all shadow of doubt according to the general acceptation of the logical term in question, it is imperative that we shall, ere we enter on any other topics bearing upon

Necessity of a brief Survey of the Jain Theory of formal logic.

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our subject-matter, here set forth in brief, our own view of the means of knowledge—*Pramāṇas* (प्रमाण).

The Jain view of *Pramāṇ* as distinguished from other schools of thought.

The question, therefore to begin with, is, What is *Pramāṇa*, from our point of view. *Pramāṇa*, we define, is the valid knowledge which reveals itself as well as its knowable. It is worthy of note that by this we, *first*, put aside the Buddhist view that there being nothing external, knowledge only reveals itself and *secondly*, we contradict as well the *Naiyāyika* and the *Mīmāṃsaka* schools of thought who teach that knowledge does not reveal itself but reveals external relations. We hold, however, that just as colour reveals itself as well as the object to which it belongs, so knowledge revealing itself reveals the knowable as well.

Now such being the characteristic indication (लक्षण) of *Pramāṇa* or Valid knowledge as we hold it, our sages have, (apart from Immediate Intuition or Transcendental Perception which is the truest indication of what is meant by Real Direct Knowledge), for the sake of convenience of the ordinary mortals breathing in the world

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of relativity of thought and form, deemed it wise to classify it into two kinds, viz. (i) Direct and (ii) Indirect (प्रत्यक्ष and परोक्ष), Inference (अनुमान), Testimony (शब्द) and the like all coming within the purview of the latter.

To take the first, the *Pratyaksha* or the Direct knowledge is such that it reveals the objects as lying within the range of the senses; while the other is called *Paroksha* or *Indirect* only in reference to the procedure of its revealing the objects of knowledge such as *Inference* (अनुमान) which is not object of direct perception.

The Jain definition of formal *Pratyaksha*

Inference, again, is that kind of valid knowledge which is determinant of what is *to be proved*, technically called *Sādhya*, arising from the sign or insignia called *Linga* standing in the relation of invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) with the same.

Do of *Anu-mān*.

Such being the characteristic indication of *Inference* according to our logic, we thereby set aside *first* the view which maintains that (i) non-perception (अनुपलब्धि), (ii) Identity (समाव) and (iii) Causality (कार्यत्व) are but *grounds of inference*; and *secondly*, also the view which declares that

This *Anu-mān* excludes Buddhist and

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Naiya yika
grounds of
Inference.

effect (कार्य), cause (कारण), conjunction (संयोग), co-existence (समवाय), opposition (विरोध) or such forms of ratiocinations as are known by the names of *a-priori* (पूर्ववत्) or *a-posteriori* (शेषवत्) or analogy (सामान्यतोदृष्ट), as *grounds of inference*.

Classifica-
tion of Infer-
ence.

Now this Inference, we divide into two kinds, (a) *Svārthanuman* (स्वार्थानुमान) i.e. Inference *for one's own self* and (b) *Parārthanuman* (परार्थानुमान) i.e. Inference *for the sake of others*.

(i) Inference
for one's own
self, Illustrat-
ed.

(a) *Svārthanuman* (स्वार्थानुमान) or Inference *for one's own self*, is the valid knowledge arising in one's own mind from repeated observations of facts as in the case of having been in the kitchen many times and having invariably seen that where there was fire there was smoke, one concludes within himself that the hill must have fire in it in as much as it has smoke on it.

It is worthy of note here that this *inference* for one's own self, corresponds *totidem verbis* to the first form of Aristotle's syllogism :—

All that smokes is fiery,
The mountain smokes ;
Therefore the mountain is fiery.

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Such is the process when we reason for ourselves. But if we have to convince some body else of what we by inference know to be valid, the case is different. We then start with the assertion, the hill is fiery. We are asked, why? and we answer, because it smokes. We then give our reason or the major premise, that all that smokes is fiery as you may see, for instance, on a kitchen hearth and the like. Now you perceive the hill does smoke and hence you will admit that I was right when I said the hill is fiery. Such being the processes of reasoning we generally adopt when we try to convince any one of the truth and validity of our statement, it is called *Parārthānumān*.

Inference
for others—
illustrated.

(b) *Parārthānumān* (परार्थानुमान) is a statement expressive of *reason* (हेतु) or middle term standing in relation of invariable concomitance with what is to be *proved* (साध्य) or major term having been composed of the *minor term* (पक्ष).

Parārthānumān Defined.

It is important to note that *Paksha* (पक्ष) which corresponds with the *minor term* of the European logic is defined to be

Comparative
study of the
sylogistic
vocabularies

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that with which the *reason*, *Hetu* (हेतु) or the *middle term* is related and whose relation with the *major term* has got to be demonstrated. The *major term* stands for *Sādhya* or what is *to be proved*, while *Hetu* (हेतु), *Linga* (लिङ्ग) or *Sāadhan* (साधन) can be exchanged for the *middle term* or *reason* which cannot stand without being in relation with the *Sādhya* or the *major term*.

Formulation
of Syllogism.

In language a sentence must have a subject and a predicate. In a proposition (प्रतिज्ञा) which is but a form of sentence, the subject is the *Paksha* or the *minor* and the predicate is the *Sādhya* or the *major term*. To illustrate, let us take the proposition ;—

(1) The *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term).

(2) Since it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

(3) Whatever is full of smoke is full fire, just as the *kitchen* (example)

(4) So is this hill full of smoke (application)

(5) *Therefore* this hill is full of fire (conclusion).

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Now the exposition of this form of inference for the benefit of others is more rhetorical in language, persuasive in its elaboration and more useful therefore in controversy. When this form of exposition takes on five members in which it usually expresses itself as in the above, it is called *Madhyama* or mediocre type and when it takes on less than five members it is called *Jaghanya* or the worst type. But the *Uttama* or the best type of exposition consists of the following *ten members*—*Dashāvayava* (1) *Pratijñā* (प्रतिज्ञा) or Proposition, (2) *Pratijñā Suddhi* (प्रतिज्ञाशुद्धि) or Correction of the Proposition, (3) *Hetu* (हेतु) Reason or the middle term, (4) *Hetu-suddhi* (हेतुशुद्धि) or Correction of the reason or the middle term (5) *Drishtanta* (दृष्टान्त) or Example, (6) *Drishtanta-suddhi* (दृष्टान्तशुद्धि) or Correction of the example, (7) *Upanaya* (उपनय) or Application (8) *Upanaya-suddhi* (उपनयशुद्धि) or Correction of the application (9) *Nigaman* (निगमन) or Conclusion and (10) *Nigaman-suddhi* (निगमनशुद्धि) or Correction of the conclusion.

The best type must have ten members.

II. *Testimony* (शब्द) is the valid knowledge arising from *words* which being taken

Testimony,

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in their proper significance and acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what is established by perception.

and its
classification

This *Testimony* is of two kinds--(a) *Loukika* (लौकिक) and (b) *Shastraja* (शास्त्रज्ञ).

(a) *Loukika sabda* (लौकिक शब्द) is the Verbal Testimony from reliable persons having authority to speak.

(b) *Sastraja sabda* (शास्त्रज्ञ) is the Scriptural Testimony. By *scripture* is meant that which was invented by self-realized persons who have *seen* truths and whose pronouncements in consequence are not incompatible with truths derived from perception.

Now the Jain sages hold the Scriptural Knowledge to be of three different kinds, viz ;—

Classifica-
tion of the
Shastraja
Testimony.

(1) Knowledge derived from the teachings, recorded or otherwise, of *ku devas* or bad spiritual teachers.

(2) Knowledge derived from the *Naya Sruta* or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us as to the ways of comprehending things and realities in one or the other of the many aspects they are possessed of.

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(3) Knowledge derived from *Syadvāda sruta* or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us how to test and comprehend things and realities in *all* their aspects for which reason it is also called *Anekāntavāda* or the doctrine of the versatility of aspects.

Of these three kinds of scriptural knowledge, we shall deal with the *Nayavāda* and the *Syadvāda* in the subsequent chapters and leave the first to be dealt with later on for the sake of our arrangement and convenience.

CHAPTER VII.

THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE "NAYAS."

Other lines of Logical or Ontological Inquiry—Analysis and Synthesis—the *Nayas* and the *Saptabhangi*—the two kinds of *Naya*—(i) the Noumenal and (ii) the Phenomenal—Consideration of the Ten Subdivisions of the Noumenal *Naya* or the Analytic Method of Inquiry into the Ontology of Thought and Form.

Importance
and function
of the *Naya*
and the
Saptabhangi

In the forgoing discussion on the means of knowledge, we have seen how the Formal Logic of the Jain philosophers differs from the systems of Logic belonging to other schools of thought and culture. But what we have stated in brief is not all that we know of the Jain Logic. In addition to this, it has other means of logical enquiry into the ontology of things identifying thereby logic with ontology which is of vital importance to deal with in the correct estimation of *thought*, *form* and *being*—a general conception of which is only attained by sense perception and the like ordinary means of knowledge. But to enter into a more detailed and complete apprehension of the actual realities which we come to

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conceive of through the ordinary channels in more or less indefinite forms, there are two other lines of ontological investigation which owe their origin and development to the empirical knowledge of things ; and these are (1) *The Nayas* and (2) *The Sapta-bhangi*. The *first* is the *analytical* process of ontological enquiry and the *second* is the *synthetical* treatment of things in their versatility of aspects for which reason this latter is called the *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine (teaching) of the Versatility of Aspects. It is these two—the *Nayavāda* and the *Anekāntavāda*—which form, as it were, the very ground-work on which the whole structure of the Jain metaphysics is safely and securely built up.

Naya is the analytic and the *Sapta-bhangi* is the synthetic method of study.

To deal with *Nayavāda* first, *Naya* is the analytical process of ontological investigation helping us to dive deep into the net-work of inter-related parts of the thing known through the ordinary means of knowledge and select, as well, one or the other attribute from the innumerable attributes, the aggregate of which makes up the being and expression of the said known thing with a

Definition and function of the *Naya*.

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What constitutes the fallacy in *Naya*?

view of interpreting and understanding the selected attribute for a correct and complete conception of the ontology of the same. Thus a *Naya*, it is clear, predicates one of the innumerable attributes of a thing without denying the rest : for, wherever it does so involving a denial of the rest of the attributes, it is no longer a *naya* proper but a *nayābhāsa* (नयाभास) or fallacy involved in the analytical reasoning.

Now there are two kinds of this analytical reasoning. One is the *Dravyārthika Naya* or Noumenal *Naya*, and the other is the *Paryāyārthika Naya* or the Phenomenal *Naya*.

I. THE NOUMENAL *NAYA*.

The Noumenal *Naya*.

The *Dravyārthika* or Noumenal *Naya* is that process of the analytical enquiry which which has for its subject-matter the substratum or the *noumenon* of a thing.

But what is *Dravya* or Noumenon? *Dravya* is what persists in and through its qualities and changes (गुण and पश्येय) which are but outward appearances of the same. We can well take *Dravya*, therefore, for the

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substantial entity or reality (सत्), which is thus discernible by the eye of reason to exist behind its appearances or phenomena.

Noumenon is the Object of Reason and Phenomenon, of Sense.

Hence, while phenomena or *paryâyas* enter into experience in the form of sensation and feeling, the substantial reality (सद् or द्रव्य) has to be filled in by rational thought, so to speak, as necessary to explain and understand them. Thus *Dravya* or Noumenon is the object of reason in contra-distinction with *paryâyas* or phenomena which are but objects of sense.

Such being the subtle difference and distinction between *Dravya* (Noumenon) and *Paryâyas* (Phenomena) according to the Jain philosophy, there are various ways of analytically enquiring into the metaphysics of a thing which have been for convenience' sake classified under ten different forms, viz,—

Ten kinds of Noumenal Naya viz:—

(i) *Anvaya dravyârthika*—deals directly with reference to that feature of the thing which constitutes the universal characteristic indication of the same. We cannot, for instance, know a substance without knowing its qualities or modalities at the same time; nor qualities or modalities without an underlying

(i) *Anvaya dravyârthika*—

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substance : for a substance without quality or modality is as unthinkable as the quality or modality without a substance.

(ii) *Svadravyādi grāhaka*—has for its subject matter those *particularising* aspects of a thing in and through which it asserts its existing individuality as distinct and separate from what it is not. A particular thing does not assert itself *as such* simply by the virtue of its *substance*, the abode of its many qualities and modalities ; but it asserts its own individuality as such equally through its own *locality* of existence, the *period* of its coming into existence and the *mode* of its existence. For instance, when we know that 'there is the jar,' we do not simply know that the jar of clay or of any other *particular substance* whereof it has been manufactured is there ; but we know as well the *particular locality* (स्वक्षेत्र) where the jar stands, the *particular period of time* (स्वकाल) when the jar is said to have come into existence and the *particular mode* (स्वभाव), capacity, colour and the like in and through which the jar has been asserting its own existence and individuality as distinct and separate from all others that

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lie around it. Thus it is evident that a finite thing asserts its own individuality in and through (i) its own substance (सद्रव्य); (ii) its own period of existence in time (सकाल); (iii) its own locality of existence in space (खक्षेत्र); and (iv) its own mode of existence (स्वभाव). And these are the *four particularising elements* which the *sadravyādi grāhaka naya* deals with.

(iii) *Paradravyādi grāhaka*—is the negative method of studying the metaphysical aspect of a finite thing with the light of what is *other* than itself. Every finite thing, because it is finite, must stand in relation to what gives limit to it by reason of which the distinction, determination and finitude of the thing is marked out from its surroundings contributing to the individuality of the same. To amplify the import, a particular thing surely stands in relation to *other* things in its neighbourhood in sharp contrast to the *four particularising elements of which* the individuality of the thing in question is marked out. Now when the particularising elements of these *others* which surround the thing in question,

(iii) *Para-
dra v y ā d i
grā h a k a*

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predominate in our minds and give tone and colouration to our consciousness, the entity as well as the individuality of the latter is lost sight of by certain psychological processes, making the same sink into subconscious regions for the time being. And it is thus clear that when we say, 'there the jar exists', the jar, we mean to say, exists only as such *in so far* its own particularising elements are concerned ; but it *enters into a nullity*, as it were, the moment our minds, by a movement of thought, *become occupied* with the *four particularising elements* of those *other* things which surround the jar for which reason they are said to be but negations of the jar.

(iv) *Parama bhāva grāhaka—*

logical enquiry taking into consideration the supremely outstanding feature of a thing which is singular and unique in its characteristic indication. For instance, consciousness is the supremely outstanding and unique quality of the soul in as much as it is not to be found in anything else but soul.

(v) *Kramopādhi nirapeksha suddha* etc. —means the consideration of a thing purely

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in regard to its noumenal aspect in quite disregard of the changes and variations it undergoes by the virtue of its own *karma*. From this point of view all living beings are, spiritually speaking, pure souls constitutionally free from all taint or blemishes.

(v) *Karmo-
pādki nira-
peksha
suddha* etc.—

(vi) *Utpāda vyaya gounatve sattā grāhaka
suddha* etc.—takes into consideration the persisting element of a thing. A thing undergoes a variety of changes. Ice melts down into water ; water evaporates up into vapour. Nevertheless, we know that in spite of all these changes, nothing is lost. Whatever form it may take, still the substance maintains itself through and through. Thus all through these transformations there is an element which persists, and it is this persisting reality which forms the subject matter of the present form of enquiry.

(vi) *Utpāda
vyaya gou-
natve sattā
grāhaka
suddha*
etc.—

(vii) *Bheda kalpanā nirapeksha*—treats substance as non-different from its qualities and variations in and through which it manifests itself.

(vii) *Bheda
kalpanā
nirapeksha*—

(viii) *Kramopādhi śāpeksha asudha*—means taking the thing into consideration

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(viii) *Kramo-
pāddhi sāpek-
sha asuddha—*

under the immediately present external mode of its appearance as in the case of taking a redhot piece iron for fire itself ; or taking a man to be insane for the temporary fit of insanity he has displayed for the moment.

(ix) *Utpāa-
vyaya sāpek-
sha sattā
grhāka a-
suddha—*

(ix) *Utpāda vyāya sāpeksha sattā grhāka asuddha—*implies taking a thing in its tripartite aspects of origination, destruction and permanence at one and the same time ; as in the case of casting a gold necklace into the mould of a bracelet, the substance remaining the same substance all through the time, involving, as it does, in it the idea of the origination of the bracelet from the destruction of the necklace, gold remaining essentially the same all through.

*Bheda kal-
panā sāpek-
sha asuddha.*

*Bheda kalpanā sāpeksha asuddha—*is the consideration of the thing after resolving it through the processes of mental abstraction into substance and quality, though the two are really non-different and inseparable from each other : for instance, consciousness is the essential quality of the soul ; but we often draw a line of distinction between consciousness and soul in our ordinary

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parlance when we say, "the soul's consciousness," or "consciousness of the soul", though soul is non-different from consciousness or the latter from the former.

ON *PARYAYAS*.

Before we come to the discussion of the second class of *Naya* known as the *Paryāyārthika*, it is imperative that we must have a clear understanding of what we mean by a *paryāya*.

A *paryāya* is but a mood or state of being. Or whatever has origin and end or destruction in time is *paryāya*. The ripples in waters or the surging waves ruffling the vast expanse of the ocean are but typical illustrations of what is really meant by *paryāya*.

Definition of
Paryāya.

Such being the nature of *Paryāyas*, they are but phenomena or appearances and as such they must be appearances of something with which they stand in certain relations. Following up the character of these relations, the Jain sages have classified *paryāyas* primarily into (i) *Sahabhāvi* and (ii) *Kramabhāvi*.

Classification
of *Paryāyas*.

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- Of these two kinds of *paryāya*, the first,
- (i) *Sahabhāvi* *Sahabhāvi* refers to the quality which is *co-existent* with what it reveals ; as for example, consciousness (विज्ञान) is the *Sahabhāvi paryāya* which is co-existent with soul, and the second, *Kramabhāvi* stands for the
- (ii) *Kramabhāvi* *paryāya* proper. *Kramabhāvi paryāyas* may be described as *contingent* in the sense that their presence depends on the variable circumstances so that they may differ in the same thing at different times just as happiness and misery or joy and grief which are not co-existent with the mind like consciousness but are moods which depend on the environment, the mind finds itself placed in by the virtue of its own *karma*.

It is also interesting to note, by the way, how the Jain philosophers have otherwise classified *paryāyas* as in the following :—

- (a) *Svabhāva dravya vyānjana paryāya* —means substantive variation in the ultimate constitution (चरम शरीर) which a thing undergoes in the course of its adaptation to the environment as we find in the cases of *siddha* souls whose nature differ only

*Svabhāva
dravyavyan-
jana.*

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slightly from the ultimate and real nature of the soul which is essentially free and full of bliss.

(b) *Svabhāva guna vyāñjana paryāya*

—means variations in the natural quality of a thing as we find in the case of the finitude of vision and imperfection of the embodied soul whose real and essential quality consists in the infinitude of vision and perfection which become manifest of themselves in the pure and disembodied state of being on the attainment of Freedom.

(b) *Svabhāva
guna vyāñ-
jana paryāya*

(c) *Bibhāva dravya vyāñjana paryāya*

—is an accidental variation in the general constitution of a substance as is observed in the soul's transmigrations through various kinds of *organic* beings.

(c) *Bibhāva
dravya vyāñ-
jana paryāya*

(d) *Bibhāva guna vyāñjana paryāya*—

means an accidental variation in the form of knowledge which is but a quality of soul, as in the case of *matijñān* and the like as distinguished from the immediate intuitive knowledge possible to the *kevalīns* only.

(d) *Bibhāva
guna vyāñ-
jana paryāya*

The above is but a kind of classification of *paryāyas* as applied to living beings. But the Jain philosophers hold that the same classi-

As applied
to Inorganic
world.

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fication is also applicable with equal logic to the inorganic world of *pudgal*-matter.

(a) Indivisible atoms or electrons are examples of the first kind of classifications as applied in the non-living world.

(b) Each kind of colour, smell, taste and two non-conflicting sensations of touch are but instances of the second class of variation in the non-living.

(c) The binary and tertiary compounds of the *pudgal*-matter are illustrations of the third kind of variation.

(d) Chemical compounds stand for the fourth.

In fine, it is also to be noted that *Unity* (एकत्व) and *Variety* (पृथक्त्व) are but *modes* of appearance—*Paryāya*. *Unity* is complete *Identity* and *Variety* consists in *Differences* of feature. Combination (संयोग), Configuration (संस्थान), Division (विभाग), Number (सङ्ख्या), Newness and Oldness under the influence of time are but other characteristic indications of *paryāya* or phenomenon. For it is said,—

एकत्वं च पङ्क्तं च संख्यां संठणमेवय ।

संजोगो य विभागो य पञ्जयाणं तु लक्षणम् ॥

Unity, Variety etc., are but Other modes or *Paryāyas*.

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SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY.

From the above classification of *Paryāyas* into *Sahabhāvi* and *Kramabhāvi*, we are constrained to discuss, in brief, qualities and attributes as distinguished from substances. For without having made our ideas and notions about *quality* and *substance* pretty clear, it would be difficult for us to understand and – appreciate the utility and importance of *Naya* as applied in the study of the phenomenology of thought and being.

Substance, as we have seen, is what has some degree of independent existence of its own, preserving itself as it does by reacting on and resisting other things. This power of self-preservation constitutes the *essence* or *reality* (सत्ता) of the thing and manifests itself in the different effects which it produces by re-acting on other things. And the powers of re-action which thus manifest themselves in producing effects in other things are known as *qualities* or *properties* of the thing and are represented in terms of the effects they produce. To illustrate, when a thing has the powers of occasioning in us

Substance
and quality
distinguished

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the sensations of colour, taste, smell, weight, we say that it has the qualities of colour, smell etc., for which reason qualities are understood to be inherent in or to constitute the *nature* of the thing in as much as they are but different ways in which the self-preservative power which is the real essence of the thing manifests itself outwardly.

(1) Generic
qualities.

But qualities of things appear to us as being of two kinds, so different that one may be described as *essential* and the other as *non-essential*. For, some of the qualities which perception reveals appear to constitute the very *essence* of things—qualities without which there cannot be any conception whatsoever of things as extra-mental realities and these are called *generic* (सामान्य) qualities which are common to all things and beings.

The Jain sages hold that the generic qualities without which a thing becomes wholly inconceivable to us are ten in number viz ;—

(1) Entity (अस्तित्व)—which may be described as having the characteristics of

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reality (सत्ता) and permanence (धौव) in and through the principle of which it manifests itself as the ground for the phenomena of both the *Universal* (सामान्य) and *Particular* (विशेष).

(2) Thinghood (वस्तुत्व)—may be described as the property revealed in and through the relations of the universal and particular in which objects subsist (सामान्य विशेषात्मक वस्तु).

(3) Substantiality. (द्रव्यत्व)—means the power of self-preservation constituting the *essence* or reality (सत्) which is characteristic indication of *Dravya*.

(4) Knowability (प्रमेयत्व)—may be described as the capacity of being known or measured by the means of Valid-knowledge.

(5) Subtlety (अगुरुलघुत्व)—may be described as the capacity of being in the state of irriducible minimum with a maximum intensity (of vibration) defying thought and speech.

(6) Extension (प्रदेशत्व)—may be described as the property of occupying space.

(7) Sensibility (चेतनत्व)—may be described as the capacity of responding to stimuli.

(8) Insensibility (अचेतनत्व)—may be described as the property incapable of giving any response to a stimulus.

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(9) Ponderableness (**मूर्तत्व**)—may be described as the quality of existing in some *form* or other.

(10) Imponderableness (**अमूर्तत्व**)—may be described as the power of existing without having any particular *form*.

These are, then, the ten *generic* qualities of things or substances in general.

(ii) Specific qualities.

But there are certain other qualities which do not appear to constitute either the essence of or common to all things. Because the things may have them or be without them and yet remain essentially the same in kind for which reason these are understood to be but modifications of our consciousness and are termed as *specific* qualities.

Enumeration
of Specific
Qualities as
belonging
particular
substances.

(i) Consciousness (**ज्ञान**), (ii) Vision (**दर्शन**),
(iii) Pleasure (**सुख**), (iv) Vigour (**बोध्य**), (v)
Touch (**स्पर्श**), (vi) Taste (**रस**), (vii) Smell (**गन्ध**),
(viii) Colour (**वर्ण**), (ix) Mobility (**गतिहेतुत्व**),
(x) Inertia (**स्थिति हेतुत्व**), (xi) Volumeness
(**अवगाहनहेतुत्व**), (xii) Becomingness (**वर्तनाहेतुत्व**),
(xiii) Sensibility (**चेतनत्व**), (xiv) Insensibility
(**अचेतनत्व**), (xv) Ponderableness (**मूर्तत्व**),
(xvi) Imponderableness (**अमूर्तत्व**). Of these

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sixteen specific properties, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 13th, and the 16th belong to the *Jiva-soul*; the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th 14th and the 15th belong the *Pudgal*-atoms; the 9th, 14th and the 16th belong to the *Dharmāstikāya*; the 10th, 14th and the 16th belong to *Adharmāstikāya*; the 11th, 14th and 16th to the *Akāśh* and finally the 12th, 14th and the 16th to *Kāla*.

II. THE PHENOMENAL NAYA.

Having seen what is implied by a *paryāya*, it would be easy now to comprehend the process of analytical enquiry into *paryāyas* or Phenomena which form the subject-matter of the *Paryāyarthika* or Phenomenal *Naya*. Of these *nayas* the first is,—

(a) *Anādi nitya suddha* &c—is what deals with that kind of *poudgalic* variations, the series of which remaining unbroken from time without beginning puts on, in consequence, the appearance of permanence, inspite of the ravages of time upon the same. As for example, the Himalayas, though time has wrought havoc on the same, yet the high mountain ranges appear ever the same from time immemorial.

(a) *Anādi
nitya suddha
&c—*

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(b) *Sādi nitya suddhaparyāṛthika* &c.

(b) *Sādīnitya-
s u d d h a -
p a r y ā r t h i k a
&c.—*

—has for its subject such particular class of variations as have origination in time but undergoes no subsequent transformation : as for instance, when the embodied soul enters on a liberated state of existence, it attains to a state of variation which has, as a matter of fact, a beginning in time but knows no subsequent change ; because a soul once liberated cannot enter into any bondage again.

(c) *Sattā gounatvena utpāda vyaya*

(c) *Sattā
gounatve n a
utpādayaya
grāhaka
nitya suddha
&c.—*

grāhaka nitya suddha &c.—enquires into that kind of variations which flow in rapid successions of destruction and origination consisting as it does in the ever-changing character of the phenomena without looking into its permanent feature underlying the same.

(d) *Sattā sāpeksha nitya asuddha*—

(d) *Sattā
s a p k s h a
n i t y a
asuddha—*

not only investigates into the origination and destruction of variations but takes also into consideration the persisting element underlying them as well. The word *paryāya*—variation—usually means variations in quality, modality and configuration, a thing undergoes without any reference to the substance itself which persists all through the changes

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and which on that account is generally left out of consideration. But here, as the persisting element is taken into consideration along with the changes in its appearances, it is called *asuddha* i.e. improper.

(e) *Kramopādhi nirapeksha nitya suddha* etc.—deals with regard only to the essential and real nature of the noumenon irrespective of the phenomenal variations it undergoes. It consists in looking into things with reference to its real nature as apart from the temporal variations which the thing might happen to undergo.

*Karmopādhi
nirapeksha
nitya suddha
etc.*

(f) *Kramopādhi śāpeksha anitya asuddha* &c.—is an enquiry into the temporal and perishable aspect of variations in so far only as they are subject to causality of *karma*.

*Karmopādhi
śāpeksha
anitya asud-
dha etc.*

THE SEVEN NAYAS.

It is now clear how the two *nayas*, Noumenal and Phenomenal, differ from each other. The one enquires into the very substance of a thing under consideration and the other investigates into the phenomena in and through which the substance makes its appearance to us.

The Seven
Nayas.

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A *Naya* is the stand-point of the Knower.

A *Naya*, as we have seen, is the stand-point of the knower. A thing can be viewed from different stand-points. And the Jain sages are of opinion that there are as many moods of statements, so many are the *nayas* or view-points of the knower and there are as many *nayas*, so many are the number of doctrines. The Jain philosophers have thought it wise, therefore, to classify these view-points into seven kinds of which the first is,—

- (i) *Naigam*. (1) *Naigam*—is the stand-point whence the knower takes the most general view of the thing under consideration without drawing any hard and fast line of distinction between the *generic* (मामान्य) qualities and the *specific* (विशेष) qualities of the thing. To amplify the import, when by the word *mangoe*, we understand not only certain properties which specifically belong to that fruit only, but we understand as well the other qualities or properties which the mangoe has in common with fruits in general. The *Nāya* and the *Vaisheshika* schools of the east and the Realists of the west survey things from this *Naigam* stand-point.

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(2) *Sangraha*—is the stand-point from which *only* the *generic* qualities are taken into account. And though these are generally accompanied by specific qualities, yet the enquiry from this stand-point keeps in view the generic qualities only. As for instance, when by the term *man*, we understand not the human kind only but the whole range animal world. The *Sāṅkhya* and the *Advaita* schools explain things from this point of view. (ii) *Sangraha*.

(3) *Vyāvahāra*—is knowing things by the cash value. It is the pragmatistical point of view from which *only* the *specific* qualities of a thing are taken into consideration without any reference to their *generic* qualities, independent of which the former cannot stand. It consists in taking cognizance of things only in their such effects as are most prominent, acute and hence pretty well-known. Thus by *Vyāvahāra naya* we know things only as they affect and appear to us. The *Chārvākas* of the east and the Positivists and the Pragmatists of the west speak from this point of view. They both measure things by their *Cash Value*. (iii) *Vyāvahāra*.

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(vi) *Riju Sutra*. (4) *Riju Sutra*—is the position taken to look straight into the thing *as it is*. It is important to note here that *Riju-sutra* does not refer to the past or future of the thing. It concerns itself only with the *present state* of things and affairs. As when we know a thing, we mean thereby to know it only with reference to its present substantive state (द्रव्य), name (नाम), and form (or image—रूप) without concerning ourselves as to how came it to be as such or what will it be afterwards, holding these enquiries to be but wild goose chase. The *Buddhists* of the east and Subjective Idealists of the west take this as their stand-point.

(v) *Sabda*. (5) *Sabda*—is the terminological stand-point whence the knower is in a position to recognise a thing simply by hearing the name of the same, though the etymological significance of the name might be in reference to something other than the thing referred to by the terminology used. For instance, *Jiva*, *Atma*, *Soul*, and *Prani* are synonymous terms and though these differ from one another in their etymological bearings, yet they all refer

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to the one and the same thing conventionally. Certain Conventionalists of the grammarian school in the east and the Empiricist of the west hold their own from this stand-point.

(6) *Sanbiruddha*—is the position from which one is able to draw a hard and fast line of distinction between the words of synonymous character and to follow up the line of enquiry in strict conformity with the nicety of distinction thus drawn. The *Sabda-vādi* philosophers of the east who propound the doctrine of eternal relation (*नित्य सम्बन्ध*) between words and their objects and the Objective Idealists of the west study from this stand-point.

(vi) *Sanbiruddha.*

(7) *Evambhuta*—is the view-point of the knower from which one is able to designate a thing in strict conformity with the nature and quality as displayed by the thing to be designated; as in the case of calling a man by the name of 'Victor' for having qualified himself as such by conquering his enemies. The grammarians in general hold this point of view.

(vii) *Evambhuta.*

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These are the seven famous *Nayas* or metaphysical view-points of looking into the nature of things. Of these, the first three, *Naigam*, *Samgraha* and *Vyāvahāra* have for their subject-matter *dravya* or substance, and the remaining four beginning with *Riju-sutra* have for their subject-matter *Paryāyas*—Phenomena. It is important to note here that like quality (गुण), *mood* (स्वभाव) also comes within the perview of *Paryāya* with this difference only that while quality inheres in substance, *mood* (स्वभाव) inheres in both, —substance and quality.

With *Nayavāda* ends the second part the Jain Logic, the Logic of Consistency being the first part.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD.

Defects of the Realistic Method of Inquiry—*Saptabhāṅgī* supersedes the Realistic.—It is a better Organon of Knowledge—It leads to the higher Knowledge—*Anekantavād* and Idealism—True Glimpse of Concrete Reality—Unity and Multiplicity—Correlativity as Essential to Unity—Dialectical Vision of things as Expression of a Unity.

Preliminary.—A little reflection on what has been discussed in the foregoing sections of *Naya* will make it pretty clear that our ordinary thinking consists, for the most part, of generalised images or conceptions derived from the phenomenal world and so charged more or less with the inherent characteristics of their sensuous origin. Now if we carefully analyse this form of thought, it will be seen that it labours under three serious defects. *First*, we cannot get rid of the material or sensuous origin which consequently tend to betray the mind into illusion and error; *secondly*, it must fail to give the real or organic connection, to be explained hereafter, and unity to objects which it deals

Defects of the realistic Method. Its inadequacy for true insight.

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with ; *thirdly*, it is incapable of solving contradiction, or reconciling the seemingly antagonistic elements which, on close examination, all thought is found to contain.

How it is
supersided
by a better
method
*S a p t a -
bhāgi.*

Now when these draw-backs of the ordinary or *naïve* realistic method of reviewing the world are perceived and realised, men must supplement it with a newer mode of cognition in order to look upon the world in a more rationalised and synthesised way and apprehend the spiritual entities in their ideal form and which in turn gives rise to the famous *Anekānta* forms of cognition. This is the case everywhere and always ; for philosophic speculation develops most when men, not content with the facts of experience, strive to get hold of their reasons and ultimately into their unconditioned reason i.e. their rationality or necessity. Thus we find that the ordinary way of looking at the Universe and its objects, or to term it better, as the *naïve* realistic method, falls far short of the standard and is quite inadequate for the apprehension of that kind of Unity which belongs to spiritual things. For the method which regards everything as self-identical,

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self-subsisting individual realities, cannot by the very nature of it, take cognizance of that kind of Unity, which exists not in things juxtaposed or following in succession, but in elements which internally involve and contain one another, so that no element can be known fully in *abstraction* or *isolation* from the rest. The apprehension of such a truth then presupposes a deeper and sounder organ of knowledge, a subtler speculation, a deeper insight, a true penetration into the very heart of things. This being attained everything seems to be, though apparently divergent and often conflicting, yet bound with one tie,—an expression of one underlying principle contributing to the substantiveness of all thought and being. And this is exactly what *Saptabhangi* rules try to explain.

Saptabhangi is a better organon of knowledge.

Hence it is obvious that the knowledge which *Saptabhangi* leads to, must be the highest ideal of knowledge—a knowledge from which the above mentioned defects have vanished altogether and in which the ideal element is grasped in its purity and entirety, in its coherence and harmony. It is the only adequate form

Saptabhangi leads to higher form of knowledge.

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of knowledge so far as we are concerned ; because it has the characteristics of necessity i.e. the constituent elements of it are apprehended, not as isolated or independant terms or notions but as related to or flowing out of each other so that one being given, the others must necessarily follow and the whole body of knowledge constitutes one *organised* system.

Ordinary
way of think-
ing *Ajivas*.

A penetrating insight into things will make us sure of this existing unity among the factors of the world. To the unreflective observer, the objects present themselves as separate individual realities quite simple in character. But this is not the case, for they are essentially complex. They are made up of parts which lie outside of one another in space; they do not remain absolutely the same through successive movements of time.

Ordinary
Parplexities
—How can
the world
seem to be
a unity?

They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things inspite of the changes ? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with

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unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling, and perception etc. But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence ; because in trying to give unity to a number of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations what will be left of your substance ? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the

Criticism of
the Solutions
offered by
the Jaina
Realistic.

Idealistic
solutions
superside the
Realistic.

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existence of anyone involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected that this particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant, we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought the differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

Regarding
mental world
or *Jiva*.

In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements, each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual

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being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen, in a sense, to be the rest. You can not, for example, take the combination of two externally independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity.

True glimpse
of the Con-
crete Reality.
Its nature.

Now it is this characteristic of things which renders impossible the correct apprehension of them by ordinary mode of cognition; because they are only to be grasped in a thought which embraces and solves contradictory elements. The ordinary or realistic way of looking at things can express and take cognizance of the nature of those things which are subject to the conditions

Reasons why
the Realistic
method must
necessarily
fail.

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of time and space and regards the world as made up of individual existences, each of which has a nature of its own, self-identical or self-complete.

Spiritual
vision of
things as ex-
pression of a
unity.

But when we rise to a higher spiritual vision of things, when it becomes necessary to apprehend objects which are no longer self-identical units, but each of which is, so to speak, at once itself and *other* than itself, when we cannot *affirm* without at the same time *denying* or *deny* without *affirming*; thus when the seeming contradictions interpenetrate and give reality and life to each other, the resources of ordinary thought fall short of the requirement and we are to take recourse to the other mode of cognition which is more synthetical and harmonizing. For if the sphere of reality be that in which nothing exists as a self-identical entity, how is it possible that formal logic or realistic method whose fundamental principle is the law of identity should be other than baffled in the endeavour to grasp them?

Inadequacy
of Formal
Logic.

The only device of the rationalising intellect which comes uppermost in the mind at first sight, for attaining unity is that of

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abstraction or properly called substantialising the abstraction which proceeds by elimination rather than by the harmonizing of differences. In philosophy, for instance, it gets hold of one of the indivisible elements and rejects the other equally necessary and important element and thus gives rise to all sorts of confusion and controversy hitherto known. Either it tries to evolve dogmatically all things out of the objective element and so produces a system of materialism or sensationalism (which is its own condemnation) or insisting with one-sidedness, the subjective element, and thus gives rise to pseudo-idealism—a view which hardly can be cherished without giving up the most certain convictions of the mind.

Unity cannot be found by abstraction as attempted by Realists and so gives rise to confusion.

The next question which comes uppermost in the mind is ; how thought can be capable of grasping the reality in its true essence in such wise that all its constituent elements shall be seen not as isolated notions but as correlated members of an organic whole. In reply to the above, we may safely say that it can rise to a universality which is not foreign to, but the very inward nature of

Can thought reach to such a higher stand-point.

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True unity
by a more
synthesised
vision.

things in themselves and not the universal of an abstraction from the particular and different elements but the unity which finds in them its own necessary expression ; not an invention of an arbitrary mind unifying things which are essentially different but an idea which expresses the inner dialectic which exists in and constitutes the being of the objects themselves. This deeper unity, we may designate as ideal or true unity or organic Universality. This Universality or Unity is presupposed by the divergent elements through which it manifests itself as the different limbs and function of an organism are mere expressions of a living unity of the organism which we may call "life"—*Jiva* (जीव). They are its manifestations. Unity of life manifests itself in them and fulfils itself in their diversity and harmony ; consequently any limb of the organism loses its significance for which it stands when it is severed from the organism—the expression of the living unity of life.

True univer-
sality—what
it is.

Notion of
correlativity
essential to
the apprehen-
sion of unity.

So in order to apprehend this unity and universality through your thought of what *it is* you must inseparably connect

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that also with what *is not*. They are mere correlations. The thesis does not exist in and by itself but on the contrary in and through what is *other* than itself. In other words it can exist only as it denies or gives up any separate self-identical being and life, only as it finds its life in the larger life and being of the whole. Its true being is in ceasing to be and its true notion includes affirmation of its existence as well as denial of its existence. But this is not all. It involves the idea of growth or development; because denial is the life of reality. A thing stagnant altogether, not subject to changes, is no better than non-entity. Mere being in the sense of *bare* existence whose modifications are stagnant and not subject to phenomenal changes is a mere *zero*. "Pure Being" as Dr. Ward puts it "is equal to Nothing." Being to be real in any sense of the term must be becoming or changing. Its ideal nature, therefore, must be synthetical comprehending and explaining all contradictory tendencies—the sharp *antithesis* merging in the wide universality of the

Dialectical
movement of
Realities.

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

synthesis. But this notion of universality in particulars cannot be apprehended in this light unless we interpret it as a process involving perpetual affirmation and perpetual negation reconciled in continual re-affirmations.

The same dialectical movement as revealed by the relation of reciprocity or mutual determination.

This would appear quite obvious if we view the problem from another light which will clearly reveal the unity of the universe which permeates through every object in it. The world is a complicate system including innumerable factors of manifold character working in it for a certain goal. Whether this goal would be attained at all at any point of time in future is not our present consideration and should not, therefore, occupy our thought. So much is certain that the world is a system of factors co-operating for the same end. Now every factor, therefore, must be determined by all the rest in such a way that without any of them, the world-end can hardly be realised. Having this in view all philosophers of every clime and age have pronounced unanimously that every thing which is real is rational *i. e.* having reason behind it and this is what we

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have spoken of before. Things being so reciprocally determined what follows obviously is that every factor is *real* so long *it stands in relation and co-operates* with other factors. In fact, we may go so far as to say that in the co-operation and the mutual determination, the life of the factor consists. In fact, it owes its reality, individuality and being to this relation with other factors standing and working for the common end. Or as Lotze rightly remarks "To be is to stand in relations." Any change in the relation of any factor of the world, would then, it is quite apparent, involve a change in all the rest ; because of their mutual determination and correlativity. So nothing can be truly apprehended unless we take it in the light of not only what *it is* but also what *it is not* ; because this *not-ness* of the factors imparts individuality and reality to what it is. True being, it appears less paradoxical to assert, consists in self abnegation or denial of one's individuality, for where lies its individuality, its self-sufficiency, if it depends for its existence upon other realities co-operating for the

Saptabhang i
supersides
formal logic
as the latter is
inadequate
to explain
unity in
difference.

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same end and to which it owes its existence and life? So true apprehension can only be possible if we take it in the light of not what *it is* only ; but also what it *is not* as well. But this may appear paradoxical to an untrained mind because it obviously transgresses the law of contradiction. The most firm convictions which we have cherished from our cradles without the least hesitation, are backed up and supported also by the vigorous rules and canons of formal logic whose fundamental principle, as we have seen before, is the law of identity and contradiction that *A* is *A* cannot be *not-A*.

In the New
Vision of
things,—*A* is
not merely
A, but *Not-A*
as well.

But now we come to a new vision of things in which *A* appears to be not merely *A* but *not-A* as well ; because *A* is real in so far it stands in relation with what is *not-A*. The true life of *A* would then consist not only in *A* as formal logic teaches us but also in *not-A*. The ideal nature of a thing consists, therefore, not only in assertion of its being but also at the same time in the denial of it—in that which comprehends those antagonistic elements and yet harmonises and explains them. So if there be any knowledge in the

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proper sense of the term, if there be any vision we may call spiritual and far from being *naïve* realistic, it is undoubtedly this notion of ours in which all antagonistic and contradictory elements are reconciled and find repose in a higher universality which includes them all and yet is not aggregate of them, which explains all and yet does not merge in them. This is what the *Syādvād* or the Doctrine of the Assertion of Possibilities explains and emphasises.

SAPTABHANGI FORMS.

With these preliminary remarks we come straight to our subject-matter or to be more definite to the *Saptabhangī* or the Heptagonic forms of our ontological enquiry. We have mentioned before that *Saptabhangī* is the method which supersedes all other methods of cognition in matters of apprehension of the spiritual realities by virtue of its universal and synthetic character of vision. Now we shall try to explain how by the help of this heptagonic vision, *Saptabhangī Naya* we get, as it were, into the real coherence and harmony which permeate through the world

Saptabhangī
Forms.

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

revealing themselves through a system of interrelated parts.

FORM I.

“स्यादस्तेष्व सत्त्वमिति सदंश कल्पना विभजनेन प्रथमोभङ्गः” as for example—स्यात् अस्तेष्व घटः *i.e.* *May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar exists.*

The First
Form—*Some
how the thing
exists.*

Although this form is applicable to every thing or being in affirming its existence still the *ghata*, the jar, is only here taken into consideration as a concrete instance for the illustration of this heptagonic principle. This is no more than affirming the existence of the jar as such and none can ordinarily deny the existence of it when clearly perceived. So this affirmation relative to the existence of the jar as such presupposes an anterior perception of the object. It may be contended, indeed, that we often rely upon the words of others and do not perceive things directly. But if we dive deep into the question, we find that everything, the existence of which we either affirm or deny, is in relation to some particular thought or perception having a finitude of expression—a fact so emphasised by the ontological argument.

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Thus we find that we can affirm the existence of the jar only when we have previously perceived it and the formation of the percept presupposes, as a careful psychological analysis reveals, comprehension of the thing in respect of the four particularising elements viz,—substance *dravya* (द्रव्य), duration *kāla* (काल), locality *kshetra* (क्षेत्र) and attributes *bhāva* (भाव).

How the thing is said to exist.

There is no percept which does not involve, as we have elsewhere seen before, these elements, and unless a percept is formed we cannot be conscious of the thing at all. So the understanding of every object involves, comprehension of the object in these four aspects. We may go so far as to say that these four elements or aspects so interrelated as in this case of the *jar* go together to make up the identity of the jar as such. Take away or change one of these elements and the jar loses its identity. From these facts we may safely state that the identity of the jar is kept up and reveals itself through these four elements which stand mutually into peculiar relationship to one another.

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So long these four elements exist in this particular combination, the jar is said to exist there as such.

Another way
to arrive at
the truth.

We may arrive at the same conclusion in another way. We know that there is a distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of a thing. Phenomenal aspect is that in which a thing presents itself to us or as it appears to us. Clearly then it follows that we are conscious of an object only as it appears to us. But a deeper reflection reveal to us that what we know of the thing is only knowledge of its powers and properties. What is an orange to us except a peculiar combination of different qualities viz. size, shape, colour, taste etc. These peculiar qualities in such particular combination as is found in an orange constitute what we call the knowledge of it. Of course it may be objected that these qualities cannot exist by themselves and so require a ground for their inference ; so that these qualities themselves cannot make up the orange itself. But we are far from denying this as we hold the view that all that we know of the thing is merely its

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qualities or attributes which exist in such peculiar combination. What the thing or substance is apart from these modes or modifications, we don't know except this that it is a principle which manifests itself in and through these attributes linking them together and constituting what we call the knowledge of the object. Therefore we may well say that so long these qualities are intact and exist in such peculiar and particular combination the object is there.

FORM II.

सगान्नास्तीव सर्वमिति पर्युदास कल्पना विभजनेन
द्वितीयो भङ्गः—*as स्यात् नास्तीव घटः : i.e. May be,*
partly or in a certain sense the jar does
not exist.

In the previous form we have taken the jar as a self-subsisting, self-complete reality as if subsisting in and by itself and possessing different attributes which go together in making up the knowledge of the object. We thought of the jar as an individual independent object as it were amidst innumerable objects of the same kind in the neighbourhood. In short, we took it in the light of a self-identical unit. But this is only a

The Second
Form—*Some*
how, the thing
does not
exist.

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Every thing
exists in rela-
tion to and
distinction
from some-
thing else,

partial and dogmatic view of the reality as it overlooks one important truth viz., the world is a system of interrelated parts in which nothing is so self-identical, self-complete as we suppose the jar to be. Every thing which is, exists only in relation to and distinction from something else. The jar exists there, not alone as a self-complete reality but exists in relation to and distinction from what is *not-jar*. In fact, the existence of the jar as a self-complete unity is possible only because it differentiates from what is *not-jar*. If, on the other hand, it loses its distinction and merges in the rest that is *not-jar*, then how can it present its own self-subsisting and identical character. We may, therefore, well state that because it keeps itself in distinction from what is *not-jar*, and yet bears at the same time essential relation to it as the principle of mutual reciprocity postulates that it can lead a life of self-completeness, self-identity. But this self-completeness cannot obviously be absolute in character simply for the reason that it has to depend for its existence upon other things from which it rigidly distinguishes itself and yet stands

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as well in essential and vital relationship. To be more clear and precise, we may say that the true life of a being consists in self-abnegation or in ceasing to be. So if in a sense we emphasise the fact that the jar is a self-complete reality amidst various factors of the world possessing numerous attributes to act and react with, we can also with equal logic and emphasis state that it does *not* exist in the *above sense*; because for its existence, it has to depend upon what is not-jar to which it must oppose itself to preserve its so-called self-subsisting aspect. Thus to sum up, we may say, the jar is a jar only in contradistinction with what is not-jar, expressing a vital relationship between the positive and negative character of it co-existing simultaneously in the same stroke of cognition of the thing in question and making way thereby for the third form which is as follows.

FORM III.

स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति क्रमेण सदंशासदंश कल्पना
विभजनेन तृतीयो भङ्गः as-स्यात् अस्ति नास्त्येव घटः—
May be, partly or in a certain sense

The Third
Form—Some
how the thing
exists and
does not exist
as well.

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the jar exist as well as in a sense it does not exist.

Another way
of arriving
at the same
truth.

We may explain this from two different stand points. We will arrive at the same conclusion if we proceed from the world showing it to be a system in which everything is determined by everything else in such a way that nothing is self-identical and self-complete in the sense in which the untrained mind takes it to be. Everything being determined by other things in this system of reals, the doctrine of pluralism propagating the view of self-sufficiency of objects falls to the ground as we have discussed at length in the preliminary remarks as well as in the Form II.

Besides, we may explain the above otherwise which will, we believe, throw sufficient light on the close relationship which exists between the self and the not-self or between mind and matter. We must of course bear in mind on this occasion that though these forms apparently deal with concrete instances such as the jar, still they are no less applicable to every thing and being which this universe contains. So

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it would be convenient for us if, instead of dealing with concrete instances, we proceed and manipulate the subject in its generic aspect. In fact we will try to show that instead of 'saying the jar *is* and *is not*,' we may say more generally that in a sense matter exists and does not exist at the same time. Of course it is necessary first of all to clear up our position and to defend our cause and vindicate our themes by defining the relationship as graphically as possible which exists between self and not-self or between mind and matter.

But before stating the exact relation between them let us try to depict as clearly as possible the view cherished by the common people regarding it.

To the untrained intellect, things are before us,—rather matter and material objects exist apart in themselves just as we perceive them—as a world of realities independent of any mind to perceive them ; on the other hand we, who perceive the world are here in our complete and independent existence. In short, matter is matter and mind is mind and there exists neither any

The view of
the common
people.

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similarity nor anything commensurate between them.

Of the other
Schools of
Thought.

Many attempts have been made to define the exact relationship. Some have uncritically asserted the hard and fast opposition between them giving rise to absolute dualism like the *Sāṃkhya* materialist; others have again tried to solve the problem at a stroke as it were by explaining away one or the other term giving rise to materialism of the Chārvāka School or Subjective idealism of the *Buddhist* School. As materialism ultimately fails to evolve this world and all thought out of matter or material forces, so subjective idealism fails in showing that the whole objective world is but a phantasm of the heated brain. We won't speak of the rigid dualistic theory as it obviously fails to explain knowledge owing to its own inherent inconsistency of thought as revealed in its presupposition that the constituent elements of knowledge stand in hard opposition and cannot be reconciled. Now if we try to account for this failure in solving the problem of mind and matter, we will find no doubt that its main cause lies in

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the false presupposition that nature and mind, the world without and the world within, constitute two fixed independent realities, each by itself complete in its own self-included being.

The real solution however of the problem in question lies not in the assertion of self-individuality and self-sufficiency of objects constituting the external world, but in the surrender of this false identity and substantiality for that principle of organic unity which we have discussed at length and explained before in the preliminary remarks. Beginning with the rigid isolated existences separated by the impassable gulf of self-identity, no theory or doctrine can ever force them into a rational coherence or consistency. But when we begin to see in nature without and mind within not two independent things, one existing in isolation from the other, but two members of one organic whole having indeed each a being of its own, but a being which implies and finds itself in the living relation to the other, then and then only can we bring such two factors into a rational coherence. Nature in

In what lies
the real solution?

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Correlativity
of Matter and
mind—*Bho-
gya* and
Bhoktā.

The true view
of things.

its very essence is related to the mind and mind in its very essence is related to matter. For what is matter, if it is not matter in relation to thought, and what is mind if it cannot enter into relation with matter? We cannot obviously think of any matter which by its very nature cannot enter into relation with thought; because it involves a contradiction of thought. Again we cannot think of mind which is, not capable of thinking about something, because in it, its essence lies. So from this standpoint whatever is, *is not* as a self-complete reality existing in and by itself, but as being determined by something else. So the true view of anything would be not only its *being* but also of its *non-being* to which it owes its reality and individuality. In short it is by virtue of this self-abnegation that any being can be real or can exist as such. So the true point or view of the right vision or understanding of any object would include not only a view of things in their positive aspect or in their aspect of thesis but also a view of what they are not or the aspect of antithesis, which again

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ultimately lose their hard opposition in the view of things which are necessarily related and so containing and involving one another, —in short, in the view of the world as a system of reals mutually determining and co-operating for the same end.

FORM IV.

स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति समसमये विधिनिषेधयोर
निर्वचनीय कल्पनाविभजनया चतुर्थो भङ्गः as
स्यादवक्तव्य एव घटः—*May be, partly or in a
certain sense, the jar is indescribable.*

There is no doubt that in a certain sense it is impossible to describe the jar. The indescribable nature of the thing is here referred to. Of course, we do not mean here that any object is absolutely indescribable, but that we cannot describe what it *is* and what it *is not* at one and the same moment. The necessity for this way of speaking is that the two natures—positive and negative—what it *is* and what it *is not*,—exist in the same thing at one and the same time. We have seen before that in a certain sense or to be more definite, while putting stress upon the positive aspect of an object as in the Form

The Fourth Form—explains impossibility of our affirming and denying at one and the same moment.

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I., we may say that it *is*: while again emphasising with equal one-sidedness, on the negative aspect of the same as in Form II., we may well say as well that it *is not*. But a critical examination will reveal to us that both the positive and negative aspects exist in the same object simultaneously, although we cannot describe them in one moment.

Thought transcending quality of aspects conceives the co-existence contradictory attributes in the same thing.

Here we think it is worthy of note that only our incapacity for describing at one and the same moment both the seemingly antagonistic natures existing simultaneously is only referred to. We need not imagine, however, that our thought cannot apprehend them at one moment. On the other hand, it is thought only that by virtue of self-consciousness can transcend this duality of aspects existing in the same thing. Even, we may go so far as to say that the *positive* aspect, namely, what it *is*, can scarcely be known without the knowledge of the *negative* aspect namely, what it *is not* and *vice versa*. Either is known simultaneously in and through the other. We cannot question about the relative priority of the process of assimilation

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or discrimination ; because none of them is possible without the other. Thus, although it is quite obvious that we can take cognizance of both these aspects—positive as well as negative—in the same stroke of cognition, yet we cannot describe this fact of experience at one moment. With this view in mind, it is held that the *true* nature of a thing is indescribable.

FORM V.

स्यादस्ताव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिप्राधान्येन युगप-
द्विधिनिषेधा निर्वचनीय ख्यापना कल्पना विभजनाय
पञ्चमो भङ्गः as स्यादस्ताव स्यादवक्तव्य घटः—*May be,*
partly or in a *certain sense* the jar
exists as well as in a *certain sense* it is
indescribable.

The Fifth
Form—takes
into consi-
deration the
existence and
indescrib-
able nature
both at once.

The fifth way is to say what the thing is, the thing being indescribable in one moment. Although here we assert the inexpressibility at one and the same moment of what the thing *is* and what it *is not*, yet what it is i. e. its *existence* is taken into consideration. We have seen in the Form I., that in a certain sense, a thing may be said to exist. Of course we should bear in mind that we do not take it in the absolute

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The relative
existence
and indescrib-
ableness of
the thing.

sense; because we deny the self-identical and self-complete nature of anything. In asserting existence of anything what we mean, on the other hand, is that it exists only so long it has a particular substance (द्रव्य), a particular locality (क्षेत्र), a particular period (काल), and a particular attribute (भाव) in their particular combination. So long these four elements are present in their particular combination, any object to which these elements belong may be safely said to exist. In short, the perception of these four elements in any object is quite sufficient to convince us of its *relative* existence—an existence illusively thought of as absolute or self-complete by the realists or the common-sense philosophers. This we have discussed at length in the Form I. So, although in the Form V, we have emphasised on the indescribable nature of any thing, Judging it from the standpoint from which all the seemingly antagonistic elements namely, positive and negative aspects of a thing (*c.f.* Form III.), resolve themselves into a higher concrete reality without losing their respective distinctions, yet from the practical point of view

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we may over-estimate the positive aspect only and assert its existence, the idea of which is already forced upon us, so to speak, by the undeniable presence of substance, period etc, (द्रव्यकालादि) inferentially or immediately cognised by the senses. Thus, although we have repeatedly described a thing to involve both the positive and the negative aspects or to put in other words, involve being and non-being as well, yet it would not be a contradiction of thought or language, if we contend *being* as essential, and say it *exists*, because we look at it now from a standpoint which is relatively much lower than the former and from which we lose sight altogether of another important correlative aspect namely, what it *is not*.

FORM VI.

स्यान्नास्तौव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधप्राधान्येन युग
पनिषेध विध्यनिर्वचनीय कल्पनाविभजनया षष्ठो भङ्गः as
स्यान्नास्तौव स्यादवक्तव्य । *May be, partly* or in
certain sense the jar is *not* and indescribable
in a *certain sense* as well.

The Sixth Form—explains the negative character of the thing as well as the indescribable nature of the same.

We have described what the thing *is not*, being unable to describe at one and the same moment what it *is* and what it

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is not. As in the previous form, we have described what it is : so in this form we describe what it *is not* without losing sight of the indescribable nature of the thing owing to our incapacity to give expression to both the positive and the negative aspects of it at the same moment. In what sense it does not exist, we need not discuss here, because we have done so at length in the Form II., which emphasises on the negative aspect of the thing. We have seen before that we can't say 'a thing exists' as a self-identical unit ; because it has to depend upon other factors to maintain its existence and to which it bears relations which are essential for the preservation of its own reality. So in this sense we may equally deny any self-existing character of anything without committing ourselves to any inconsistency in thought or language.

FORM VII.

The Seventh Form — stands as a synthesis of the V and VI Forms.

स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादक्तव्यमेवेति क्रमात् सदंशास-
दंशप्राधान्य कल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधा निर्वचनीय कल्पना
कल्पना विभजया च सप्तमो भङ्गः as स्यादस्त्येव नास्त्येव
अवक्तव्य । *May be partly or in a certain sense*

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the jar is and *is not* and is *indescribable* as well in a *certain sense*.

In the seventh form, one speaks of what the thing *is* and *is not* and that it is *impossible to express both at the same moment*. In the Form III, we have seen how the true nature of a thing implies being as well as non-being or positive as well as negative aspects. The only point in which it differs from the third form is this that while agreeing with the former in every respect, it goes further and says that we cannot describe because it involves contradictory elements. This latter point we have discussed at length in the Form II. In this form we get a reconciliation of the fifth and the sixth forms already discussed.

CHAPTER IX.

SHANKAR AND SYADVAD.

Vyasa, and Shankar against the Doctrine of Syadvad.—Impossibility of the co-existence of the contradictory attributes in one—Shankara's summary of the Syadvad and its interpretation—Its critical examination by Shankar—Inconsistencies and fallacies in Syadvad.

The unique position of the *Saptabhāṅgī* in the arena of philosophical speculation.

The above, in short, is the principle and character of the *Saptabhāṅgī Naya*, the grand heptangular stronghold of the Jain philosophers. It is from these angles that the Jain philosophers see into the realities of all thought and being. It is from within this heptagonal fortress that they throw off their gauntlets as a challenge to their antagonists to outwit them. Being guarded by the seven trenches of this their logical synthesis, they measure the strength of their adversaries and test the truth and validity of their knowledge and doctrines. Such being the high and prominent position ascribed to the *Saptabhāṅgī* in the arena of philosophical speculation in quest of truth, many a scholar and philosopher, ancient or modern, have invariably been

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found to cannonade on this heptagonical fortification which has been from time immemorial shielding the whole structure of the Jain philosophy against any attack. Many have brought in their heavy artilleries to damage one or the other angles of this fortification and force an entrance into the same and many have been baffled in their attempts and thus become the buttend of all ridicule before the whispering galleries of the Jain philosophers and Omniscient beings. At least such has been the case with the venerable Krishna Dwaipāyan *Vyāsa*, the compiler of the *Vedas*, maker of the *Brahma Sutras* and the author of the Great Epic, *Mahābhārata*, who flourished towards the end of third age.

It is the target of attack by the enemies of the Syadvad.

Vyasa and the Syadvad.

To come straight however to the point, the venerable old Vyāsa fired his first artillery "नैकस्मिन्सम्भवात्" as the thirty-third canon in the Second Section of the Second Chapter of his *Brahma Sutras*. By this he wants us to understand that on account of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory attributes as abiding in the same substance,

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the doctrine of the Jainas is not to be recognised. In his famous scholium on the *Brahma Sūtras*, Achārya Shankara, the ablest exponent of the *Advaita Vedānta* philosophy while commenting on the canon referred to, writes :—

The Rudimentary Principles of Jain philosophy as summarised by Shankar.

The Jainas admit of seven predicaments such as (1) *Jīva* (2) *Ajīva* (3) *Asrava*, (4) *Sambara*, (5) *Nirjarā*, (6) *Bandha*, and (7) *Moksha*. These seven they admit and nothing beyond these.

Summarily speaking, the *Jīva* and the *Ajīva*, are the two primary predicaments. The others are included in either of these two. Besides they admit of five composites or compounds from the above two categories and are designated as “*Astikāyas*” or composites such as *Jivāstikāya*, *Pudgalāstikāya*, *Dharmāstikāya*, *Adharmāstikāya*, and *Akāśhāstikāya*. They fancy, again, an infinite number of variations of these ‘*astikāyas*’ or composite and to all and each of these, they apply their so-called synthetic logic known by the name of *Saptabhāṅgī naya* in the following manner :—

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- (1) In a sense it *is*. (2) In a sense it *is not*. (3) In a sense *it is* and *it is not*. (4) In a sense it *is not predicable*. (5) In a sense *it is* and *is not predicable*. (6) In a sense *it is not* and *is not predicable*. (7) In a sense *it is* and *is not* and *is not predicable*.

Now this *Saptabhangi* form of reasoning is also directed to the determination of such notions as, unity, plurality, eternity, identity, difference and the like. In other words following up the principle of *Saptabhangi naya*, they hold that existence itself is a contradiction ; for instance unity is not only *unity* but also a *plurality* as well. A thing is not only *eternal* but *otherwise* as well and so on.

Having thus summarised the fundamentals of the Jain philosophy, and taking his stand on the above *Vyasa Sutra* Shankar Swami remarks.

Examination and criticism view point of the Law of Contradiction

I. It would be contrary to reason to accept the Jain doctrine. Why?—Because of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory attributes in one. Just as a thing cannot be hot and cold simultaneously, so

Being and Non-being can not at the same time belong to one thing.

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being (अस्तित्व) and *non-being* (नास्तित्व) cannot, at the same time, belong to one thing.

II. And to speak of the *seven* predicaments which have been determined to be as *so many* and such if they really be *so many* in number and *such-and-such* in character, then they must as the Jains teach exist in either of their modes of *suchness* (तथारूप) and *unsuchness* (अतथारूप) at one and the same point of time. If it were so, it would follow that because of the indefiniteness as desiderated to be expressed in their *being* as such and *not-being* as such at the same moment of time, the knowledge of the same would be also equally indeterminate like diffidence or doubt for which reason it cannot be held as a true criterion of right knowledge.

The Knowledge, the knowabilities and the knowingsubject—all being indeterminate in themselves, the Syadvada cannot be a source of valid knowledge.

III. If the Jains contend here that the thing itself being instinct with multiplicity and versatility of modes or aspects (अनेकान्त स्वभाव) is really of determinate character *as such* and the knowledge of the thing, therefore, both as being and non-being, cannot be non-determinate and consequently *non-authoritative* like that of doubtful knowledge, Shankar

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rejoins, it is not right on your part to say all that ; for, every thing being admitted to be instinct with a multiplicity of nature, without having any check or rest anywhere, the determination of the nature of very determination itself through the means of '*partly-is*' and '*partly-is-not*' being not excluded it would simply result in non-determinate knowledge. And for the very reason as well the means of knowledge (प्रमाण), objects of knowledge (प्रमेय), the knowing subject (प्रमाता), and the act of knowledge (प्रमिति), all would remain themselves non-determinate. And where the determinator and the result of determination, both are thus non-determinate, how can then the teacher, who is thus of indefinite opinion himself, can give definite instructions on a doctrine the matter and the principles of the epistemology of which are themselves indeterminate in their very nature and character? Again, what would prevail upon the followers of such a doctrine to actualise in life and conduct the moral principles inculcated in the same? For, if the effects of their actualisation in life and conduct be of themselves instinct

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with uncertainties, nobody would have any inclination to work for the same. Therefore the doctrine, pungently retorts Shankar, of those undecisive masters who have nothing definite to teach or preach, is not to be accepted.

Further demonstration of the unsettling character of reasoning—Fewer more than five.

IV. Then, again, applying this unsettling principle of reasoning to that portion of their doctrine which teaches that the composites (अस्तिकाय) are five in number, one has got to understand that on the one hand they are five and on the other, they are not five *i. e.* from the latter point of view, they are fewer or more than five which is a ridiculous position to uphold.

Involving an abandonment of Original Position.

V. Also you cannot logically maintain that the predicaments are *indescribable*. If they were so, they could on no account be described; but as a matter of fact they are described and as such you abandon your original position.

Ridiculous self-contradictions.

VI. If you say, on the contrary, that predicaments being so described are ascertained to be *such* and *such*; and at the same time they are *not* such and such;

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and that the consequence of their being thus ascertained is Right Vision (सव्यक् दशन) and *is not* Right Vision as well at one and the same point of time; and that Un-Right Vision *is* and *is not* opposite of Right Vision at one and the same time, you will be really raving like a mad cap who is certainly not to be relied upon.

VII. If you argue further that Heaven and Freedom, are both existent and inexistent at once or they are both eternal and non-eternal at one and the same moment, none will be inclined to work for the same the very nature of whose existence is so uncertain and indeterminate in nature and character. And,

Heaven and Freedom—both are uncertain

VIII. Finally, it having been found to follow from your doctrine that *Jiva*, *Ajiva* etc. whose nature you claim to have ascertained and which have been in existent from all eternity at once relapse into the condition of absolute indetermination, and that the being excluding the non-being and *vice-versa*, the non-being excluding the being, and that further more it being impossible to decide whether of one thing there is to be

On account of the impossibility of any definite ascertainment, the doctrine of the Syadvada must needs be rejected.

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predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness and the like, your doctrine of *Syādvāda* must needs be rejected.

CHAPTER X.

EXAMINATION OF SHANKAR.

Examination of Shankar's animadversion and his position—Further discussion of the Principle of Syadvad and the Law of contradiction—Thought is not simply a distinction—It is a relation as well—Reply to Shankar point by point.

Such is the criticism which Shankar makes taking his stand on the *Sutra* "Not; because of the impossibility in one."

The ground of Shankar's objections—

—("नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्") of the *Vedānta Sūtras*

by *Vyāsa*. Or in other words, 'it is impossible', remarks Shankar, 'that contradictory attributes such as *being* and *non-being*

Contradictory attributes cannot co-exist in the same thing.

should at the same time belong to one and

the same thing.' This is the long and

short of his whole argument as urged for the

rejection of the doctrine of *Syādvād* which

forms the metaphysical basis of our religion.

And it is imperative, therefore, that we

should examine the above animadversion

as briefly as possible and see how far his

reasonings reveal his real insight into the

heart of things as well as how far is

Shankar correct in his understanding and

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estimation of the principle of our dialectic movement as applied to thought and being—a form of reasoning which originally and exclusively belongs to the Jain philosophy.

To begin with, therefore, so far the fundamentals of our doctrine as summarised by Shankar are concerned, we must at once admit that he is not guilty of misrepresentation.

Thus Shankar lays stress on the Law of contradiction.

But when he starts his criticism with the startling remark that, *being* and *non-being* cannot co-exist in one and the same thing, we beg to differ from him. Shankar puts all through his arguments, a great stress on the Law of Contradiction. And as it is a law of thought which cannot be transgressed without committing ourselves to contradictions and inconsistencies as the Formal Logic teaches, any theory which does the same, he says, cannot be accepted as having any worth at all.

When the Formal Logic laid down the Law of Contradiction as the highest law of thought, what it evidently meant is simply this that distinction is necessary for thought. Unless things are definitely

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what they are and are kept to their definition, thought and knowledge become impossible. For instance, if *A* and *not-A* be the same, it is hardly possible to find any meaning even in the simplest statements, for the nature of the thing becomes absolutely indefinite and so indeterminate. Hence Formal Logic teaches that thought is distinction and is not possible without it.

But is thought simply a distinction and nothing else? Is the distinction absolute and ultimate? We, the Jains, would undoubtedly say that it can never be absolute distinction. If thought is distinction, yet it implies at the same time relation. Everything implies something other than it; 'This' implies That; 'Now' implies 'Then' 'Here' implies 'There' and the like. Each thing, each aspect of reality, is possible only in relation to and distinct from some other aspect of reality. If so, *A* is only possible in relation to and distinct from *not-A*. Thus, by marking one thing off from another, it, at the same time, connects one thing with another. A thing which has nothing to distinguish from, is as impossible as equally unthinkable is the thing which is

Is thought a
determination
simply?

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Nothing can
be taken as
absolutely
self-identical

absolutely separated from all others so as to have no community between them. An absolute distinction would be self-contradictory for it would cut off every connection or relation of the thing from which it is distinguished. The principle of absolute contradiction is suicidal ; because it destructs itself. So when we, the Jains, deny the validity of the Law of Contradiction, we only dispute the claim of absolute validity. That every definite thought by the fact that it is definite, excludes other thoughts and specially the opposite thought is unquestionably true, indeed. But it is half-truth only, or one aspect of the truth and not the whole of it. The other side of the truth, or rather the complimentary side of this truth is also that every definite thought, by the very fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and cannot be separated from it without losing its true meaning. It is definite by virtue of its opposition with what it is not. So nothing, however definite it may be, can be conceived as self-identical in the absolute sense of the term.

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To illustrate let us take the instance of the jar. I say that the jar is a finite object. Now what do we mean by finite thing is this that it is limited in extent. And the question may be raised : is the limit self-imposed or imposed from without. Or, in other words, is the limit created by the object itself or is it due to the presence of another which limits it. The answer must be that it is limited by something else. Now, may it not be said that the jar is finite only by virtue of some thing else? It is what it is only in relation with something else, without which its existence as such would be impossible. So the law of contradiction, if it speaks of absolute difference, is manifestly a suicidal principle.

Illustrations

Take any thought-determination and the same principle will hold good. The jar is what it is, because it serves certain purpose, has certain shape, certain colour etc. These different ideas constituting one whole is what we know as the jar. May it not be said then that this whole of the different ideas is what it is only by virtue of some thing or some other which is its negative? For

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if we try to hold this *common place* whole of ideas to the exclusion of its negative, if we try to hold it to itself, it disappears.

Further elucidation of the dialectic principle.

I. We submit, therefore, that such a remark as made by Shankar is due to his gross misunderstanding of the dialectic principle of our reasoning. For, as we interpret and use the principle, it is all right. We, the Jains, hold that every thought or being *is* only in relation to the fourfold nature of *itself* but *is not* in relation to the fourfold nature of the *other* (सर्व्वमस्ति स्वरूपेन पररूपेन नास्ति च): for instance, the jar when it is thought of in relation to (i) its own constituent substance,—earth ; (ii) its own locality of existence in space—Calcutta ; (iii) its own period of coming into existence in time—Summer and (iv) its own mode existence as revealed in its colour (red or the like) and capacity for containing and carrying such and such quantity of water, the jar is said to exist *i.e.*, only in relation and particular combination of the four-fold nature of itself known technically as *svachaturstaya*, the jar *is* (अस्ति), and has the nature and character of *being* (मत्तत्त्व). But when thought of in

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relation and particular combination of the four-fold elements viz, constituent substance, locality, period and mode (द्रव्यत्वे द्रव्यकालभाव) as belonging to the *other*, say, the picture, the jar is *not* (नास्ति) and is of the nature of *non-being* (असत्स्वरूप). Thus the picture is the *negation of the jar* and *vice-versa* the jar is the *negation of the picture*. Every-thing is in relation only to the four fold elements of *itself* but is *not* in relation only to the four-fold elements belonging to the *other*. If it were otherwise, were everything said to exist in either relations of *itself* as well as of the *other*, then every thought and being, making up this our universe, would have been transformed into one uniform homogeneous whole; then light and darkness, knowledge and ne-science, being and non-being, unity and plurality, eternity and non-eternity, knowledge and the means thereof, all that go in pairs of opposites, and the like must needs be one homogeneous mass, so to speak, of one uniform nature and character without any difference and distinction between one and the other or between the parts of one and the same thing. But such homogeneity

Existence is
contradictory
itself.

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of nature and character in things all around us is contradicted by our sense perception which reveals but differences and diversities in things and realities.

Table turned
against
Shankar.

And now to turn the table, when you, Shankar, say 'Being is *Brahman*', You must have to admit that when *Brahman* is thought of in relation to what is *other* than Being, it is equal to *Non-being* (*असत्*). If you don't admit this, the Non-being of *Brahman* as what is *other* than the nature of Being itself, then your *Brahman* would be of the nature of *Non-being*, say of Ne-science or illusion as well. But this would lead to the deterioration of the true nature of your *Brahma* which is but *existence* pure and simple.

II. To the second objection that the cognition of a thing in its form of *suchness* and *unsuchness* results in the generation of indefinite knowledge which is no more a true source of knowledge than doubt is, we reply ;—

The seven
Predica-
ments.

That the seven predicaments as they *are* in and by themselves *i.e.* so far as their own four-fold nature (*सप्ततुष्टयापेक्षा*) is concerned,

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they are in fact *so many* in number and *such and such* in character ; but as *Other* than themselves *i.e.* relative to the four-fold nature of the *Other* (परचतुष्टयापेक्षा), they cannot but be otherwise. If this were not, if you Shankar do not agree to this, or when you say that 'True knowledge infinite is Brahman' (सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्मा), if you do not thereby admit that Brahman *as such* has its *being* ; but has *not its being* as otherwise, that is say as Ne-science which is but an opposite of what is true knowledge, then must you be implicitly identifying Brahman which is knowledge (ज्ञान) with Ne-science (अविद्या) which is non-knowledge so much so that you reduce them both to a state of unity which is devoid of all differences and distinctions in it (स्रगतादिभेद-विरहित). And this tantamounts to saying that Brahman is but a synonym of Ne-science which is dull (जड़) and devoid of consciousness (ज्ञानसम्बन्धित). But you, the Vedântins, hold that 'Brahman is true knowledge infinite'. Hence we the Jains rightly hold that the knowledge of things as determined by our dielectic movement of

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thought in the forms of both *suchness* and *unsuchness* (तथारूप and अतथारूप) is *not invalid* (अप्रमाणिक) like doubt or diffidence as you contend.

Denial of
definite cha-
racter dis-
proved.

III. To meet the third objection in the form of your denial as to the definite character of our determination of the nature of things which are admitted to be instinct with multiplicity of character, we have to submit that our determination of the nature of things is not indefinite in itself. Why?—Because of the fact that whatever is acknowledged by us *exists* only in so far as its own four-fold constituent elements in their particular combination are concerned; but relative to the four-fold constituent elements as manifest in the particular combination of the *Other*, the former does *not exist*. For, as we have seen already, the jar *as such* i.e. in respect of the four-fold constituent elements under particular combination making up the being and individuality of the jar, there it exists only *as such* and *does not exist* as the picture. And this logic holds good with equal force in regard to the deter-

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mination of the nature of our determination itself. The determination *is* determination only as such; but as otherwise it is *not* (determination). Similarly, in respect of the determining subject and the resultant of determination being as *such* and *such*, they both have their being; but as *otherwise i.e.*-as other than themselves, they *have not* their being as well. If it were not the case, then being and non-being, knowledge and Ne-science, and all that go in pairs of opposites would become merged into such a homogeneous whole of one uniform for character as is not warranted by the evidences of the senses. Hence you must have to admit that our determination of things *as such* and *not as such* being thus in and by itself definite, cannot but be a true source of knowledge and that our omniscient *arhats* are therefore the real teachers of right knowledge and hence there is every reason why people should flock round them and be inclined as well to act up to their instructions to lead a life of perfection and beatitude, the only end and aim of human evolution.

Our principle of determination is but a true source of knowledge

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The Number
five—of the
composites.

IV. With reference to objection regarding the *composites* (अस्तिकाय) being numerically five, we point out that the number five as such is really five, but as the *other* than five itself, *i.e.* relative to such numbers as four, six or seven, the five is *not*. Let us take otherwise—the number Five only. Here we have undoubtedly a definite concept. Now the definite concept of five by the fact that it is definite excludes other thoughts and specially the opposite thought. We, the Jains, admit this; but proceed still further and hold that every definite thought or concept by the fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and so cannot be separated from it without losing its own meaning. Five is five as distinguished from eight, nine, ten, or *not*-seven and so bears essential relation with them. Hence we hold that the composites which are numerically five can thus be neither more nor fewer than five.

Indescrib-
ability.

V. Then again the seven predicaments, they are certainly never absolutely indescribable. They are indescribable in the sense

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that they cannot be described all at once and simultaneously (अवक्तव्य युगपदपेक्षायाम्); but surely they are describable gradually and successively (वक्तव्यक्रमपेक्षायाम्).

VI. To repudiate the sixth, we submit that the knowledge accruing from the ascertainment of the predicaments both as *such* and *not such*, according to the four-fold constituent elements of themselves and as belonging to the *Other* than themselves and our determination as well of their existence and non-existence in like manner being Right Knowledge (सम्यक् दर्शन); and Un-right Knowledge (असम्यक्-दर्शन) being opposite to Right Knowledge, the Right Knowledge exists only as *such* i.e. in so far its own matter and form are concerned but *does not exist* in the matter and form of the Wrong Knowledge and *vice-versa*, the Wrong Knowledge *exists* in its own matter and form and *does not exist* as the matter and form of the Right Knowledge. And likewise the Heaven and Freedom, they are in their own matter and form; but they are not as the matter and form of what are known as Hell and Bondage.

Final Repu-
diation.

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Also such is the case in respect of eternity which is real and actual only in its own matter and form as distinguished from its opposite, the matter and form of what it is not. Or in other words, the predicaments are eternal in relation to noumenon only but non-eternal in relation to *paryāya*—phenomenon.

And this is how to a thing, being is ascribed in relation to Its own matter and form as well as non-being in relation to the matter and form of the Other.

CHAPTER XI.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNITY IN DIFFERENCE.

The dialectic reasoning leads to the Theory of Bhedabhed i.e. of Unity in difference—Distinction presupposes Unity—The world system is an expression of thought—The Jain conception of the Absolute distinguished from the Absolute beyond the relative of the Vedantins.

Now what has been discussed in the preceeding pages on *Syadvād*, it is quite apparent that the law of contradiction is the negative aspect of the law of identity. We have seen that with the Jains, everything implies 'something' opposed to it. 'This' implies 'that', 'here' implies 'there', 'now' implies 'then'. The trend of the argument is that everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. This being so, the law of contradiction is not virtually denied absolutely. What the Jain philosophers want us to understand is this that absolute distinction which the ordinary interpretation presupposes is not a correct view of things. Rather it is to be borne in mind that distinction presupposes a unity of which, the *Jiva* and *Ajiva* and the like that

The law of contradiction is the negation aspect of the law of identity.

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go in pairs of opposites are but two expressions.

The world-system is the expression of thought.

The world system is not alien to thought. Thought is not accidental to world. Thought is embodied in the world-system. Popular view is that thought is connected with man's brain and so accident to the world system. In opposition to this the Jains teach that the world system is the expression of thought. The world system is that in which thought goes out of itself. Though is thus made the essence of the world. It is the Vedânta that somewhere teaches that Nature is the working out of the will and is real in so far the intelligence of man is concerned. But we differ from the Vedântins and hold that thought which is the essence of the world is objective, is something universal or absolute in which the particular thoughts of particular men partake.

An objection

But then there is a *prima facie* objection we have to meet. Some says it is impossible to take thought as the essence of the world. For it would tantamount to our ignoring the feeling or willing which is as important as thought. True, the objection

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would have been valid had we conceived thought as excluding will and feeling. Thought is not one thing, and feeling another thing. Will is not apart from thought. How are we to conceive of will if it is exclusive of thought ?

Again thought implies will. Dynamic thought is Will. When I identify myself with the end, I am said to will. But I cannot do so unless I am conscious of the end. So activity is impossible without thought. Thus our thought is not exclusive of will. With us thought is concrete, thought inclusive of feeling and will and is the constitutive principle of the universe.

Dynamic
thought is
will.

Now therefore the Absolute is the ultimate unity of thought which expresses itself as *Jiva* on the one side and correlative of the subject as *Ajiva* on the other side. This unity is all inclusive unity which embraces everything that is real.

Absolute is
the ultimate
unity.

But this conception of the Absolute has to be distinguished from the absolute beyond the relative of the Vedântins. These philosophers hold that our intellect deals with the relative only. The world of experience

Jain concep-
tion of the
absolute as
distinguished
from the
Vedântic.

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is the world relative only. So the absolute lies beyond the world of the relative—beyond the world of phenomena. Shankar thinks in this way. We hold, however, that absolute is not beyond the phenomena: rather all phenomena are but particular aspects or phases of this all inclusive unity which is Absolute.—The whole and the aspects of The whole. The whole of reality conceived as a single ultimate unity is noumenon and phenomena are but its partial phases.

Noumenon
and Phenomena.

But then the question is, What is a Noumenon? Is it an aggregate of phenomena. The Noumenon, we hold, is superior to phenomena; because it is all inclusive whole. Phenomena are but fragmentary aspects of Noumenon. This all inclusive whole (noumenon) cannot stand apart from those which it includes (phenomena). If it is an all inclusive unity and phenomena are fragmentary aspects of this unity, then is it an aggregate of phenomena? No. The Self is not apart from its various determinations or states of the Self. It is not something above and over the psychoses. What is the Self? It is not a mere sum of its determinations as the

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Vijnānvādī Buddhists hold ; nor is it different from the sum of its determinations as the Vedāntins try to explain. It is a unity of all its determinations. It is an ideal unity which realises itself through these particular determinations.

So the partial phases of the Absolute are phenomena and these are related to the Absolute as the members of a living body are related to the body itself. The particular things of experience are aspects of the Absolute which is the all inclusive unity expressing itself through particular determinations. It is the subject ; but not as correlative of the object ; rather a unity implied in the correlation.

Phenomena are but partial phases of the absolute.

The Absolute is thus the ultimate Unity. But here again the familiar conception gives us trouble. If the Absolute is One, then the Absolute is not Many. If it is unity then it is not a Plurality. The Vedāntins of the type of Śaṅkar hold that the absolute is the Unity. It is not a plurality therefore. But Plurality is a stupendous fact which cannot be denied. So plurality, according to those Vedāntins, is but an illusion—Māyā (माया) and not a reality.

Supposed difficulty in the acceptance of the two conception of the absolute.

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From the stand-point of the relation between the One and the Many.

Plurality is a fact, although it may be another kind of experience. Anyhow to give it the name of Illusion (माया) is not to explain it. The question then turns to this. How thus Illusion comes to be reconciled with the Absolute? How is this solution possible, if the Absolute is the One without a second to stand by it (एकमेवाद्वितीयं). And the Ultimate Reality without anything to aid or stand by it being One, what is the source of this Illusion of Plurality. Thus the whole question resolves itself into the Relation of Unity and Plurality.

Difficulties in the establishment of the Relation.

If the ultimate reality be many, how can you explain a single self-existent coherent system? If there is a relationship between A. B. C. D., and so on then these are elements of a single whole and so related to each other.

Set out in a Definite alternative.

If you begin with the Absolute separation between Unity and Plurality, then you must either deny Plurality like Shankar or deny Unity like Kanād, the propounder of the Specific (Vaisheshika) school of thought. But these difficulties crop up only on the assumption that the ultimate Reality is either One or

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Many. And we, the Jains, therefore, reject this disjunction altogether. From our point of view, all differences are differences of a Unity which is expressed in the differences. One is One not apart from the Many ; but One is in the Many. So Plurality must be taken as the self-expression of this unity—the Absolute. To conceive of the Absolute as the One is not to conceive the facts of experience as Illusion—*Māya* (माया). Or, the Many is real in as much as the Many is galvanised into life by the One ; because Many is the self-expression of the One. The absolute is a Unity but the Unity which is immanent in the Many. The Many, in Jainism, do not vanish in the luminosity of the One like clouds before the rising sun as taught in the philosophy of Vyāsa and Vasistha : rather the Many is vitalised by the One and is as real as every other facts of experience. In Jainism, One is shown to come out of its own privacy as it were and appears Itself as the Many. The Many vanishes in the One (Shankar) : but the One presents itself to us as the Many (the Jains). The One reveals itself in the Many and the Many is the self-

But this disjunction in the form of definite alternatives is rejected by the Jains.

All differences being differences of a unity expressed in the differences—the two aspects not excluding one another.

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expression of the ultimate Unity. In our philosophy, the ordinary disjunction of 'either-or' falls to the ground. The two aspects of one truth do not exclude each other. The concrete whole is the abstract which is One in the Many and Many as grounded in the One.

The Absolute is the Universal revealing itself in the Particulars.

The Absolute is the Universal. This Universal is not the abstract Universal of the formal logic but the concrete Universal. The absolute expresses itself in A, but not limited to A. A is the particularisation of the Universal. Hence the Universal goes beyond A, to B, to C and so A, B, C, D are immanently and vitally connected with one another. The Universal comes out of Itself and particularises Itself in the particular objects of the world system and which, therefore, is vitally and essentially and immanently connected with one another constituting the world system. The Universal of the Jains does not fight shy of the Particulars of the world—the categories of thought and being—like the Universal of the formal logic ; but reveals itself in the particulars of the world.

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Such being the Jain conception of the Absolute, the whole universe of things, we see, must needs be ordered in perfect agreement with our cognitions. We are conscious of things as different and non-different at the same time. They are non-different in their causal or universal aspect (कारणात्मना-जात्यात्मना चाभिन्नम्) and different in so far as viewed as effects or particulars (कार्यात्मना-व्यक्तात्मना च भिन्नं).

Everything is different and non-different at the same time.

But some hold that cognition of things as such is impossible and remark that like light and darkness, the identity and difference can not co-exist in the same thing. But we reply, the contradictoriness that exists between light and darkness is of two kinds. One is of the nature of impossibility of co-existing in one and the other of the nature of co-existing but in different things. But such contradictoriness is not perceived in the correct interpretation of the true character of the relation in which the cause and the effect or the universal and the particular mutually stand together. On the contrary we really perceive that the one and the same thing is possessed of

Reply to the critiques of the above vend.

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dual aspect (प्रत्युत एकमेव वस्तु द्विरूपं प्रतीयते).

Things are naturally of dual character.

Thus when we say 'This jar is clay'; Ram is a human being. Here in the instance of 'clay' and 'the Jar', clay is the cause and the jar is the effect thereof. The jar is but a particular state of being of the cause which is clay. Were co-existence of the cause and effect contradictory, it would never have been possible for clay to exist as in the form of the 'Jar': in the second instance 'Ram is a human being' humanity is the universal (जाति) and Ram is but a particular (व्यक्ति) expression of humanity. Were Universal and Particular contradictory, one excluding the other, then Ram could never have been a human being. Nor even any one of many experience has ever perceived anything having an absolutely uniform character absolutely devoid of all distinction and difference whatever in the same. Nor can it be upheld that just as fire consumes straw and other combustibles so non-difference (समवेद) sets at nought the difference on the ground that Identity being unity, it is a nullity of all Difference. And therefore the admission of identity and difference as co-

Identity is not always destruction of differences

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existing in the same involves a contradiction. But this, we contend, is not borne out by facts of experience ; nor is there any absolute law to the effect that identity should always and everywhere be destructive of difference. On the contrary, we have things with two-fold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. For, the same thing which exists as clay or gold, or man &c. at the same time exists as jar, diadem or Ram. And no man is able to distinguish in an object,—e.g. Jar or Ram,—placed before him, which part is clay and which the Jar or which part is the universal character of Ram and which the particular. Rather our thought finds its true expression in the following judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a man'. Nor can it be maintained that a distinction is made between the cause and the universal as objects of the idea of persistence and the effect and the particular as objects of the notion of discontinuance—difference, in as much as, truly speaking, we have no perception of these two factors, in separation. However close we may look into a thing, we won't be able still

Impossi-
bility of rigidly
distinguish-
ing between
the Cause
and the
Effect or the
Universal
and the
Particular.

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They are
neither abso-
lutely differ-
ent nor abso-
lutely non-
different.

Rather they
stand in
relation of
unity in
differences.

A fresh ob-
jection to the
doctrine of
Unity in
Difference.

to find that this is the persisting and universal element in the thing and that is the non-persisting particular aspect of the thing. Just as an effect or a particular thing gives rise to the idea of one thing. so the effect *plus* cause and the particular *along with* the universal gives rise to the idea of one thing only. And this is how we are enabled to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is amongst a multitude of things differing in *place, time, capacity* and *substance*. Each thing being thus endowed with double aspect, the theory of cause and effect or universal and particular, being absolutely distinct and different falls to ground under the weight of the overwhelming evidences of sense-perception.

It might be contended here that if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the consequent of idea oneness, the judgment 'this Jar is clay' is taken to mean the relation of unity in difference i.e. both difference and non-difference as well, then we are led by a coherent train of thought to infer from such judgments as 'I am a man' or 'I am a god',

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that the self and the body also stand in relation of unity in difference—*Bhedābheda*.

But we, the Jains, hold this to be an uncritical observation in as much as it is not based on right interpretation of the true nature of co-ordination establishing the *bhedābheda* relation. The correct interpretation is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination however of the identity of the self and the not-self (body) is sublated by all means of proof applicable to the self: it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope and does not therefore prove the identity of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is meant by the judgment 'the cow is short horned' is never observed to have been disproved in any way and hence establishes the doctrine of Unity in Difference (भेदाभेदवाद).

Defutation
of the objec-
tion and
establish-
ment of the
bhedābheda
Relation.

CHAPTER XII.

THE UNIVERSE AS A SELF-EXISTENT UNIT.

The Self and the Not-self are but members of a complex Whole—Difficulties in the transformation of the Subject into Object and 'vice-versa' Object into Subject—Each pre-supposing the other, we have to take the Universe in the light of single unified System.

Difficulties in the formulation of an adequate Theory of the Universe.

The task of philosophers is to find law, order and reason in what at first sight seems accidental, capricious and meaningless. And the arduousness of that work grows with the complexity and intricacy of the phenomena to be explained. The freer the play of difference, the harder is to find the underlying unity, the fiercer the conflict of opposites, the more difficult is it to detect the principle out of which it springs. And unless this is satisfactorily done, any theory of the Universe can hardly be attained to. Unconscious of the greatness of the work they were undertaking, the early philosophers tried to solve the whole problem of the Universe at a stroke and find some one principle or unitary method which

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would account for everything. But it soon became obvious that the principle, and the problem of universe are not so easy to be solved and the citadel of knowledge was not to be taken by storm. Thus earliest and most secure triumphs of science were won by separating off some comparatively limited sphere of reality and treating it as a world by itself. And it is just because they narrowed the problem that they succeeded in solving it. The general nature of the difficulties to be met with, is known and also the methods by which they can be overcome. The field is not, and cannot be exhausted; but such light has been thrown upon it that no room is left for fear that within that department the progress of science will ever meet with any unsurmountable obstacle. Hence the conviction that there is no sphere of existence which is exempt from the reign of law has been gaining ground with the development and progress of philosophic speculation.

Nothing is
except from
the reign of
law.

Now we should attempt to investigate into the general nature of the Universe.

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Universe—
Subject, Ob-
ject and the
Unity be-
tween the
two

When we consider the general nature of the Universe or of our life as rational being, endowed with the powers of thinking and willing, we find that it is defined and, so to speak, circumscribed by three ideas which are closely and even indissolubly connected with each other. These three ideas are the ideas or the constituent elements of the universe or the factors of it which are inseparably connected with each other and so involve each other. These are (i) the idea of the Object (भोग्य) or Not-self (अजोव) (ii) the idea of the Subject (भोक्तृ) or the Self (जोव) (iii) and the idea of the *Unity* which is presupposed in the difference of the Self and the Not-self and in and through which they act and react on each other.

Explanation
of the above
three terms.

To explain these terms more fully, the Object (भोग्य) is the general name under which we include the external world, and all things and beings in it, all that we know and all that we act on, the whole environment which conditions the activity of the ego and furnishes the means and sphere through which it rea-

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lises itself. All this we call Object (भोग्य) in order to indicate its distinction and its relation to the Subject (भोक्तृ) for which it exists. We call it by this name also to indicate that we are obliged to think of it as one *whole*, one *world*, all of whose parts are embraced in one connection of space and all whose changes take place in one connection of time. All these elements or parts and changes therefore make up the elements in *one whole* and in *one system* and modern science teaches us to regard them all as connected together by of links of causation. There is again only one thing which stands over against this complex whole of existence and refuses to be regarded simply as a part of the system and that is the Ego, the Subject or the Self for which it exists : for the primary condition of the existence of such Subject is that it should distinguish itself from the Object as such, from each object and from the whole system of objects. Hence strictly speaking there is only one Subject and one Object for us ; for in opposition to the Subject, the totality

Self and Not-self—they are but members of a complex Whole.

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Our thought
and life move
between
these two.

of objects constitute one world, and in opposition to the Object, all experiences of the Subject, all its thoughts and actions are merged in the unity of one Self. All our life, all our conscious thought then moves between these two terms which are distinct from and even opposed to each other. Yet though thus set in antagonism which can never cease, because with its ceasing the whole nature of the both would be subverted, they are also essentially related, for neither of them could be conceived to exist without the other. The consciousness of the *one* is, we might say, inseparably blended with the consciousness of its relation to the *other*. We know the object only as we bring it back to the *unity* of the Self and we know the Self only as we *realise* it in the Object.

And lastly these two ideas within the spheres of which our whole life of thought and activity is contained and from one to the other of which it is continually moving to and fro, point back to a third term which embraces them both and which in turn constitutes

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their limit and ultimate condition. For where we have two terms which thus are at once essentially distinguished from and essentially related to, which are obliged to contrast and oppose to each other, seeing that they have neither of them any meaning except as opposite counterparts of the other, and which we are obliged to unite, there we are necessarily driven back to think of these terms as the manifestation or realisation of a third term which is higher than either. Recognising that the Object only exists in distinction from and relation to the Subject, we find it impossible to reduce the Subject to a mere Object among other objects as Materialism does. Recognising, again, that the Subject exists only as it returns upon itself in the Object, we find it impossible as well to reduce the Object to a mere phase of the Subject—a fallacy committed by the Buddhistic Subjective Idealism or Solipsism. But recognising them as indivisible yet necessarily related, we are forced to seek the secret of their being in a higher principle which includes and explains them both. How otherwise can

Untranslatability of the psychical into physical and vice versa of the latter into the former.

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Subject and
Object—
each presup-
posing the
other cannot
be the pro-
duct of the
either.

we do justice at once to their distinction and their relation, to their independence and their essential and vital connection? The two—Subject and Object—are the extreme terms. Each of them presupposes the other and therefore can neither be regarded as producing the other. Hence we are compelled to think of them both as rooted in a higher principle or to put it otherwise in the idea of an Absolute Unity which transcends all opposition of the finitude and specially the last opposition which includes all others. Hence we cannot understand the real nature of the universe unless we take it in the light of a unified system, whose constituent elements are necessarily related in the way above described.

Contingency
of the world.

So long we have been dealing with the nature of the universe, depicting the relation which exists between different factors of the world. But if we consider the question more fully we cannot get rid of one idea—the idea of contingency of the world. The contingent world exists or the world of our immediate experience is contingent,

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therefore absolutely necessary Being exists. It starts from the thought that the world as presented to our immediate experience has in it no substantiality or independence. Its existence cannot be explained from itself and the mind in trying to account for it is forced to fall back in something outside of it and finds rest only in the idea of a Being who is necessarily self-dependent and substantial. The movement of thought which this argument involves may be stated in various ways and under different categories. It may be put as an argument from the world viewed as an effect to the first cause or more generally from the world viewed as finite and relative to an Absolute and Infinite Being on whom it rests. But in all these and other forms, the gist of the argument is the same. If we take it, for example, in the form in which it turns on the idea of causality, it is the argument that whatever does not exist necessarily exist only through another Being as its cause and that again itself not necessary through

Certain anomalies pointing to the origin of the world at a certain point of time.

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another and as an infinite regress of finite beings related as cause and effect is unthinkable, mind is compelled to stop short and place at the head of the series—a First Cause, a Being which is Its own cause or which exists in and by Itself unconditionally or necessarily.

Clearing up
the difficulties.

This is in short the argument often forwarded to prove that the world was created at a certain point of time. But when we attempt to translate this experience into the language of formal reasoning or if we take it to be a syllogism proving the existence of God as the First Creator, our argument becomes open to serious objections. In short, we will find that this sort of argument is not at all tenable. The first objection which may be urged is that the result it gives is purely negative. You cannot in a syllogistic demonstration put more into the conclusion than what the premises contain. Beginning or assuming an Absolute or Infinite Cause you might conclude to finite effects ; but you cannot revert the processes. All that from a finite or contingent effect, you can infer is a finite or contingent

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cause or at most an endless series of such causes. But if because the mind cannot rest in such infinity you try to stop short the infinite regress and assert at any point of it a cause which is not an effect, which is its own cause, infinite and unconditioned, the conclusion in this case would be purely arbitrary. To assert the existence of such a Being as the Creator of the world is simply to conceal under a phrase the breakdown of the argument.

To posit a God is to acknowledge a breakdown of the argument.

Again the argument does not prove that which it claims to prove, for such a Being is related to the world as cause is to an effect. But the cause is as much conditioned by effect as effect is by the cause. So in this case also the supposed Being would not be Absolute as this argument tries to prove.

Impossibility of God as the creator of the world.

Again another difficulty presents us if we dive deep into the question. How can we conceive God before any such creation? Why was He so long inactive? What led Him to create this Universe at a certain point of time after such a long period of inactivity? In short innumerable difficulties

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trouble us if we suppose that world was created at a certain point of time. This is sufficient to prove that the world exists from eternity and we cannot conceive of a time when it was not.

CHAPTER XIII.

THEORIES OF EVOLUTION.

Theories of Evolution and Creation by External Agency—Spencerian Formulation of the Principle of Evolution—Difficulties in Spencerian hypothesis.

In the preceeding chapter, we have seen that from our point of view, the Universe has been in existence from all eternity. We cannot conceive of a time when it was not. But still for all that there are other hypothesis which either speak of the alternate eras of evolution and dessolution of the Universe as a whole or take it to have been created by the some all powerful external agency from the materials that lay by Him when all these abounding in names and forms were not. And ere we enter on any further details as to the phenomenal changes, transformation of the world as these present themselves to us, it is important that we should discuss in brief the different important hypothesis which are also prevalent more or less in these days of scientific culture and refinement.

Examination
of the other
theories of
the world.

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The three
Hypotheses.

To begin with therefore, there are only three possible hypothesis which can be reasonably entertained in regard to the past history of Nature.

The *First* is the Theory of Self-existence which teaches that the order of Nature which now obtains has always obtained from all eternity.

The *Second* is the Theory of Evolution or Self-creation according to which the present order of Nature has had but a limited duration but it supposes that the present order of things proceeds by natural processes from an antecedent order and that from another antecedent order and so on thus making way for alternate eras of Evolution and dissolution. And

The *Third* is the Theory of Special Creation by external agency teaching that nothing comes of itself: That from dull dead matter absolutely bereft of all intelligence, this phenomenal Universe which bespeaks of subtle organisation and most wonderful design cannot spring forth without the intervention of some intelligent cause operating upon the materials whereof Nature is composed.

THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Of these three principal hypotheses, we have already dealt with the first—the Theory of Self-existence. We are now to deal with the Theory of Evolution—the second of the three hypotheses: for some hold that the Universe cannot be conceived as Self-existent from all eternity; for ‘to conceive existence through infinite past-time’, to quote the language of Spencer, ‘implies the conception of infinite past-time which is an impossibility’.—How far this argument of Spencer against the Self-existence of the Universe from all eternity stands to reason, we shall see later on. Suffice it to say here that because of this supposed difficulty amongst the many others in the theory of Self-existence, some have been inclined to fall upon the Theory of Evolution and Mr. Spencer is the ablest exponent of this theory in modern times so far the Empirical School of European thought on the subject is concerned.

To consider, therefore, first, the theory of Evolution, we must begin with its definition. By evolution or development was meant primarily the gradual unfolding of a living germ

Difficulties
in conceiving
the World as
Self-existent
from eter-
nity.

Theory of
Evolution as
formulated
by Spencer.

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Evolution
was original-
ly Teleo-
logical.

from its embryonic beginning to its final and mature form. This adult form was regarded as the end *aimed* at through the whole process, so that the whole process was the working of an idea—entelechy or soul shaping the plastic material and directing the process of growth. Evolution, in short, implied ideal ends controlling physical means—in a word was '*teleological*'. But now the term 'Evolution', though retained, is retained merely to denote the process by which the mass and energy of the Universe have passed from some assumed primeval state to that of distribution which we have at present. It is also implied that the process will last till some ultimate distribution is reached whereupon a counterprocess of dissolution will begin and from which new Evolution will proceed.

Spencerian
definition of
Evolution.

"An entire history of anything" Mr. Spencer tells us "must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible. Be it a single object or the whole Universe, any account which begins with it in a concrete form is incomplete." In these and such like instances Mr. Spencer sees the formula of evolution

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and dissolution foreshadowed. He again goes on saying that "the change from a diffused imperceptible form to a perceptible concentrated state is an integration of matter and concomittant dissipation of motion and the change from a concentrated perceptible state is an absorption of motion and concomittant disintegration of matter."

Now there is one obvious and yet serious objection to this theory. It proposes to treat the Universe or in fact requires us to treat the Universe as a single object. Every single object is first evolved and then dissolved and so the Universe. The Universe also, he thinks, emerges from the imperceptible and into the imperceptible it disappears again. Surely Mr. Spencer commits here the fallacy of composition. What is predicable of the parts, he thinks, can be predicated of the whole collectively. Again, we may ask on what grounds is it assumed that the Universe was ever evolved at all? A given man, a given nation, a given continent have their general finite histories of birth and death, upheaval and subsidence. But growth and decay, rise

Examination of the Theory.

The universe can not be treated as a single *Object*

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Alternate
eras of Evo-
lution and
Dissolution
cannot be
established.

and fall, evolution and dissolution are everywhere contemporaneous. We have but to extend our vision to find a permanent totality made up of transeient individuals in every stage of change. But so enlarging our vision we are not warranted in saying as Mr. Spencer does "there is an alteration of evolution and dissolution in totality of things." But now what we find so far our observation and experience can carry us is that, be it small or great, once an object is dissolved in the imperceptible state in Mr. Spencer's sense, that object never reappears. We do not find dead man alive again, effete civilisation re-juvenated, or worn out stars re-kindled as of yore. It is true of course that the history of many concrete objects is marked by periodic phases ; but never by dissolution and re-evolution *i.e.*, by the disappearance of the concrete individuals followed by the re-appearance of the same. So this form of evolution or the philosophy of evolution as formulated by Spencer is more mythological than philosophical. What we admit on the other hand and which we think almost free from every

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savour of immatured reflection is that within a given totality, one individual may succeed another, but so far that totality, the Universe, is concerned it remains permanent—"One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever."

Again, we cannot understand what led Mr. Spencer to conceive this world as finite or a single object. What Mr. Spencer calls a single object must surely have an assignable beginning and end in time and assignable bounds in space. It is precisely through such time and space-marks that the notion of singleness or identity becomes possible. The Universe then we, may safely say, not only is not, but can never be a single object in this wise. Mr. Spencer's attempt to treat it after the fashion of a single object, evinces an unexpected paucity of imagination and is philosophically unsound. Experience provides us with instances of evolution and dissolution of the most varied scales but of a single supreme evolution embracing them all we have no title to speak. On the other hand, we have no evidence to show what we call the 'Universe' is coming

Another difficulty.

No evidence to show the universe coming to an end.

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Rather it is
permanent
theatre of
perpetual
changes.

to an end, for we have no evidence to show that it is finite. If taking for granted we had any such evidence we should probably then and there conclude that we were dealing with but a part of the true Universe and not with the totality of things or Universe as a whole. Again there is no evidence either earthly or unearthly prevailing upon us to apply of such conceptions as increase and decrease, ebb and flow, or development and decay to this absolute totality or the Universe as a whole. On the other hand, we may safely say that the world, so far as we can judge from the physical constitution and our actual experience, is just what it has always been—THE PERMANENT THEATRE OF PERPETUAL CHANGES.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY

Sankhyas principles of Evolution—Traceable in the 'Rigveda'—'Purush' and 'Prakriti'—The Three 'Gunas' in their Equilibrium form 'Prakriti' or the Root Evolvent—'Prakriti' is the first Category—The Three other Categories—Inconsistency of the Sankhya Hypothesis.

Spencer's formulation of the principles of the Evolution, however, strongly reminds us of the Sankhya Philosophy as propounded by the sage Kapil in India. And there is no denying that in comparison with the Spence-
rian theory, Kapila's doctrine is by far more consistent and logical. According to this doctrine, the world is really a world of experience—the experience of the individual *Purush* or *Psyché* (as in the system of Fichte) caught in the snares spread out by the bewitching *Prakriti* evolving the twenty-four categories whereof the world system is composed for the enjoyment and beatitude of the individual Self. Thus according to Kapil, the ultimate realities are primarily two in number—*Purush* and *Prakriti*.

Spencer
Kapi

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Kapila's
Subject and
Object.

We think in relations. To us therefore the conception of the world-system is nothing beyond the conception of the relation between the subjective and the objective realities. *Purush*, Kapil says, is, the self or the spirit. Empirically it is the Subjective reality or the Experiencer (भोक्तृ) and *Prakriti* or Nature is the Objective Reality or the Experienceable—(भोग्या). The whole universe where in we live, move and have our being is the outcome of the unfoldment of this relation between *Purush*, the Spirit or the Subject and *Prakriti*—the Nature or the Object.

The Origin
of Kapila's
Doctrine

Some Oriental scholars hold that this Dualistic hypothesis as to the past history of Natures which finds its echo in the Cartesian Theory of Dualism, was originally formulated by the sage Kapil and is of far later origin in comparison with the Vedas. But such is not the case. We are of opinion that the doctrine is as old as the Vedas themselves. And the sage drew inspirations from the Vedas and this is why the System of Sankhya Philosophy though indirectly denying the existence of God for want of evidence has

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been taken by the Hindus as one of their six orthodox Systems. For even the *Rigveda* has in it amongst others a hymn wherein the whole doctrine as expounded by Kapil is contained in a nut-shell. We have in the *Rigveda*—स्तमार्चगर्भा भुवनस्य रेतो विष्णोस्त्रिष्टुप्ति
प्रदिश विधर्मिणि—*Rik. V. 2-21-164.*

Tracable in
the *Vedas*.

The hymn means to say that the mysterious conjunction between *Purush* and *Prakriti* invariably results in the evolution of the seven-fold subtler principles-*tatvas* beginning with *Mahattatva* i.e. (1) *Mahattatva*, (2) *Ahankartatva* and the five *tanmâtras*,—*Rupa*, *Rasa*, *Sabda*, *Gandha* and *Sparsha*—and though such is the consequence of the conjunction, it is worthy of note that owing to the *utter* and *absolute* indifference on the part of *Purush* which is above time and variability on the part of *Prakriti* denoting in her the equipoise of the *gunas*, it is She alone that conceives and yields up, in consequence, the seven-fold principles beginning with *Mahat* etc. making up the Universe without *Purush* being in the least affected by her in any way. This is the reason why the word *ardhagarbhâ* (अर्धगर्भा)

Prakriti and
the seven
fold prin-
ciples.

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(*lit* : half-descendants) has been used in the text. The text says further that the seven-fold principles are the germinal sperms or seeds, so to speak, for the evolution of the whole universe and are contained in a portion of the Omnipresent Deity-Vishnu for which reason the phrase *प्रदिश विधर्मिणि* i.e. *in a portion*, we find in the text.

Psyché or
Purusk.

Now *Purush* or the *Psyché* being entirely and absolutely indifferent, very little has it left with us at the present stage of enquiry to deal with. We shall therefore concern ourselves with *Prakriti* or Nature for the present.

PRAKRITI.

Prakriti or
Nature.

By *Prakriti*, Kapil wants us to understand the equipoise state which the three correlative powers or qualities have arrived at. Any differentiation being impossible in the *Prakriti* which is no other than the *gunas* in equilibrium, *Prakriti* is also technically termed as the *Avyakta* (अव्यक्त)—the Undifferentiated or the Imperceptible.

GUNAS—THE CONSTITUENT OF PRAKRITI.

The three *gunas*, however, which in their equilibrium constitute *Prakriti* or the

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Evolution are (i) *Satva* (सत्त्व) or Passivity, (ii) *Rajas* (रजस) or Activity, and (iii) *Tamas* (तमस) or Inertia.

Characteri-
sation of the
gunas.

(I) *Satva* is the passive principle revealing itself as it does in receptivity, quickness, lightness, luminosity and transparency of things. It is by the virtue of this principle that things are capable of being worked upon or that they become intelligible or they are conducive to pleasure (सुख).

(II) *Rajas* is the active principle which is not only mobile by its very nature but which also galvanizes both the *Satva* and *Tamas* into functional activities of their own. Revealing itself as it does in *striving*, it is contributive to pain or misery (दुःख).

(III) *Tamas* is the principle of inertness or inertia which retards motion and growth. It is this principle of inertia that not only deludes us but obscures as well the real nature of things or adds to their weight (मोहात्मक गुरु-आवरक).

CORRELATIVITY OF THE GUNAS.

Now these *gunas*—*Satva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, are characterised by their essential correlativity so much so that they are

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(a) Universally Co-existent ; (b) Universally Inter-dependent, (c) Universally Inter-mutative and lastly (d) Universally Inter-antagonistic. Thus,—

(a) They are Universally Co-existent, because the existence of one of the *gunas* requires the existence of the other two as necessary accompaniments.

(b) But from the fact that they are Universally co-existent and concomittant as they are equally fundamental, it follows that they stand to one another in relation of *mutual inter-dependence* so that none of them can have any functional activity of its own without the co-operation of the other two. Again,

(c) The *gunas* being thus mutually dependent upon one another, they are also *inter-mutative* so that just as heat is *convertible into* electricity so anyone of the *gunas* may become *converted into* one or the other of the remaining two *gunas*. And lastly,

(d) These *gunas* stand to one another in relation as well of Universal *inter-antagonism*. Though these are always present as

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constituent factors making up the being of a thing yet they are not present in the same degree of intensity and quantity. These *gunas* are always at war with one another in the course of which one or the other gets stronger and predominates over the other two in intensity giving to a particular phenomenon in which the particular *guna* predominates, a certain form, colour and character after its own.

Now it is these powers of *Satva*-Passivity, *Rajas*-Activity and *Tamas*-Inertia, reaching their equilibrium at the dissolution of the previous evolution that constitute *Prakriti*, or Evolvent—Nature.

CATEGORIES.

The categories of the *Sankhya* system are classified mainly into four groups, viz—

(a) That which is simply *Prakriti* or Evolvent.

(b) That which is both *Prakriti-Vikriti* i.e., Evolute as well as Evolvent.

(c) That which is simply *Vikriti* i.e., Evolute only.

(d) That which is Neither.

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The reason
why *Prakriti*
is called the
rootless Root

Of these four principal categories, the first is that which is simply *Prakriti* or Evolvent, denoting in itself the equilibrium of the *gunas*-powers or forces. Being itself not derived from anything else as its root (cause), it is called the Rootless (causeless)-Evolvent (मूला प्रकृति) of everything else, excepting the *Psyché* or *Purush* which is neither evolvent nor evolute. Moreover if we were to look again for a separate root for this Rootless-Evolvent (causeless cause) we should have, say the *Sāṅkhyas*, *regressus ad infinitum* unwarranted by all manner of evidence. *Prakriti*, therefore, is the First Category.

DEVELOPEMENT OF CATEGORIES.

What is equilibrium of
Forces.

Now the state of equilibrium of several forces is that state in which any one of those forces exactly neutralizes the effects of all other. And the disturbance of the same would mean that state in which some force (or forces) produces its own effects though modified to some extent by the presence of others.

But the state of equilibrium of the three *gunas*, the Ultimate Imperceptible Cause,

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Prakṛiti—in which any one of the several forces *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, standing to one another in relation of equality, exactly neutralizes the effects of the other two and into which in consequence the whole universe of diverse names and forms dissolves at the end of the previous cycle,—is *unstable* in the sense that when the season, for the fruition of the seeds of sown by way of *Jīvas*' deeds done in the previous period of their existence, arises, the equilibrium receives an impact as it were and gets disturbed. By this disturbance of the equilibrium of forces, the *Sāṅkhyas* mean that the state in which some one force (or forces—*Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) predominates over the other in intensity and produces with the help of the others its own effects though modified to some extent by the presence of those which help in the production.

Equilibrium
and Distur-
bance of
gunas.

THE ORDER OF EVOLUTION;

This is how from a single ultimate and undifferentiated homogeneous Cause—*Mūla Prakṛiti* or the Root-evolvent comes to being the Universe with all its amazing para-

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phernalia of diversities and differences in names and forms according to the merits and demerits of the *Jivas*.

No absolute Time. But this coming to being of the Universe, this evolution from the state of homogeneity to heterogeneity is but a process in time. Time has no absolute existence with the *Sankhyas*. It reveals itself as a series or succession ; and evolution being but a process in time, it must have a certain order of succession. The successive order of evolution as held by the *Sāṅkhyas* is as follows :—

From the Root-evolvent *Prakṛiti*, first comes to being *Mahat* with which begins the set which is both evolvent-and-evolute. From *Mahat* (महत्) appears *Ahankār* (अहङ्कार) which in turn yields up *Manah* (मनः), the ten *Indriyas* (इन्द्रिय), and the five *tan-mātrās* (पञ्चतन्मात्रा) with which end the series of the evolvent-and-evolute (प्रकृतिविकृति).

The simple evolutes are but the five *Bhūtas* (भूताः) originating from the five *tan-mātrās* or the elemental rudiments.

But *Purush*, the *Psyché* or the soul is neither evolvent nor evolute. Being eternal it stands outside the history of developement.

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Admitting in it no change which is but a property of time, it is above time, whereas all developement is in time. Itself being purely absolute, it really enters into no relation either with *Prakriti*, the Evolvent or with its subsequent variations—*Vikriti*.

Now, of the above series of evolvent and evolutes, the *Mahat*, the *Ahankâr* and the *Manas* constitute what is called *Antahkaran* or the Internal Organ, the External organs, *Bahihkaran*, being the five organs of sense (ज्ञानेन्द्रिय) viz., the ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, the nose *plus* the five organs of action (कर्मेन्द्रिय) viz. speech, hand, feet, and the organs of excretion and of generation.

Organs—
Internal and
External.

But the question is, what is *Mahat*—the first offspring of the Root-evolvent or *Prakriti* and first item as well of the Internal Organ or *Antahkaran*?

(I) The
Mahat

The word *Mahat* has for its synonym *Buddhi*-Intellect. Intellection (बुद्धिवसाय) is the function (धर्म) of the Intellect. But intellection is a kind of intellectual activity of determinate character and activity being identical with what is active, intellection

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Intellection.

adhyavasāya, hold the *Sāṅkhyas*, is the same with Intellect or *Buddhi*. The *significance of certitude* is its characteristic indication. It is best revealed as the *decisive principle* in the oughtness of a particular thought and action in the different spheres of our life.

But is intellection a purely psychical process?

The *Purush*
is simple.

‘No’, reply the *Sāṅkhyas*, ‘as it is characterised by the presence of the three-fold rudimentary currents under particular combination and condition which is nothing but the integration and intellectualisation born of the disturbance of the *gunas* in equipoise where-as the *Purush*, the *Psyché* or the Soul being neither evolvent nor evolute, is quite opposite of them both *i.e.* ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE.

(II) Ahankār

Next the word *Ahankār* is synonymous with *Abhimān*, pride or *conceit*, bearing the sense of self-estimation or self-consciousness as conveyed in such expressions in our ordinary parlance as ‘I am : and I feel all these that surround *me* are *mine* : I can use them as materials of *my* knowledge to answer *my own* purpose.’ The *Sāṅkhyas* say that just as he who makes the jar is called *Kumbhakār* or

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the Jar-maker : so what generates the notion of subjectivity, personality or I-ness (अहंभाव) is called *Ahankār*. Thus it is a principle (तत्त्व) of differentiation, individuation and subjectification revealed in the form of self-consciousness and is intellectual in essence proceeding as it does from intellection.

This *Ahankāra*, when affected by the Sattva-सत्त्व, evolves the eleven organs and when affected by the *Tama guna*, it evolves the five *Tanmātras*. The third *guna*, *Rajas*, is manifested in the activity implied in this two-fold creation.

These are the five elemental essences viz., visibility, audibility, the capacity of producing odour, the capacity of producing taste, and tangibility. The principle which generates the notion of subjectivity (*ahan-kāra*), also generates under the influence of inertia or तमः, the five rudimentary essences or *Tanmātrās*. (III) Tan-mātrās.

Just as the *Tanmātrās* are evolved by *Ahankāra* under the influence of the quality of तमः, so the eleven organs are evolved by the same principle under the influence of the quality of सत्त्व (Sattva). The eleven organs. IV. The eleven organs.

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include **मनस्**-mind the central co-ordinating organ which corresponds to the 'central sense' or 'common sense' admitted by Aristotle in his '*De Anima*'.

V. The five
Mahābhutas.

The five *Mahābhutas* or gross elements viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether, are respectively produced by the corresponding *Tanmātrās* or suitable essences, viz. smell, taste, form, touch and sound. The gross elements have each an organ corresponding to it. Thus, earth, water, fire, air and ether have for their organs, nose, tongue, eyes, skin and ear, respectively.

These five *Mahābhutas* and the eleven organs constitute what the Sāṅkhyas call the sixteen *vikāras-variations*.

The five gross elements are the ultimate outward limits of cosmic evolution just as *Prakṛiti* is the ultimate limit in the opposite direction.

VI. Purusha

Last of all, we mention, *Purusha*, the 25th *tattva*; we do so, not because *Purusha* is chronologically the last which it is certainly not, but because it is outside the cosmic evolution and is a distinctly separate principle by itself. It is, as the

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Kārikā says, न प्रकृतिः न विकृतिः ; i.e. neither evolvent nor evolute. This *Purusha* is never in bondage and is outside time. It stands absolutely apart from *Prakriti* and her products. Yet owing to its proximity to *Buddhi* (Intellect), it seems to think that it enjoys and suffers, while in reality, it is above weal or woe. It is, always, free and its apparent bondage disappears as soon as it becomes cognisant of its true nature.

Purush is
ever free.

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The *Seshvara* Sāṅkhya or, as it is more often called the *Yoga* system is, in fact, the Sāṅkhya system itself, only modified to satisfy the religious side of human nature. It develops a system of practical discipline, mainly ethical and psychological by which concentration of thought could be attained.

Kapila had declared that the existence of *Ishvara* God did not admit of proof. Patanjali controverts this assertion and proceeds to prove the existence of God by an argument which, as Maxmuller remarks, reminds one of the theistic argument of Eleuther and Boethius. Patanjali's argument as explained by *Bhoja*, is that different de-

Theism of
Patanjali.

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degrees of excellences such as omniscience, greatness, smallness etc., proves the existence of a Being possessing the *non plus ultra* of excellence. This Being, Ishvara, was, with the *yogins*, originally, no other than One among many *Purushas*, only with this difference that Ishvara had never been implicated in metempsychosis and was supreme in every sense.

Patanjali
and Kapil.

Whether this theism of Patanjali's Philosophy is consistent with its Sāṅkhya basis is often disputed. The simplest solution seems to be that Kapila was never directly hostile to theism, but was rather indifferent in his attitude towards the question and that this made it possible for Patanjali to foist his theistic *yoga* upon the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Soleity is the
summum bonum
of *yoga*.

In the *Yoga* system, however, no such importance has been accorded to God as could very well be expected, and as we find in such European systems, otherwise analogous with the *yoga*, as those of Martineau, Lotze and other Personal Idealists. Devotion to God, in Patanjali's system, is merely one of *Kaivalya* or Soleity

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which is the highest object of the *Yoga* system.

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Nyāya has always been translated by 'logic', and there are important considerations which partially justify such an interpretation of the system. For, here, in the *Nyāya* system, a greater amount of space has been allowed to logical questions than in any of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, and, the theory of inference (*anumān*) is, undoubtedly the predominant feature of the system.

'Nyāya' is not merely logic.

Nevertheless, we must not imagine that *Nyāya Sūtras* are mere treatises on Formal Logic. Logic is not the sole nor even the chief aim of Gotama's Philosophy. Its chief end like that of all other Indian systems, is the attainment of liberation or as the *Nyaya* calls it, *Niḥśreyasa*, the *non plus ultra* of blessedness. This liberation which the *Nyaya* Philosophy promises to all, is not a state of pure unmixed pleasure, as the Vedāntin affirms, but a state of pleasure which supposes pain as its pre-condition. In fact, the doctrine of a pure continuous happiness as the *summum bonum* of life, is, according

The real end of 'Nyāya'.

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to the Naiyāyika, a chimera : it is a psychological fallacy to assert that any such state exists, for, pleasure is always accompanied by pain and without pain there could be no pleasure.

Liberation
of 'Nyāya'
—how it is
attained.

Liberation, thus according to the *Nyāya*, is a state of negative pleasure and is produced by deliverance from pain. The next question that naturally presents itself to the Naiyāyika, is 'how this deliverance is to be secured ?' Liberation, says the Naiyāyika, arises from the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of the cause of pain and of the means of its removal. Liberation, however, must not be supposed to arise immediately after the knowledge of the truth has been attained, for, the causes of pain form a series which can only be annihilated in succession, and succession is a process in time. The series of the successive causes of pain is : (1) false notions (*mithyagnanam*), giving rise to (2) faults (*doshani*) which lead to (3) activity (*karma*) which again is the cause of birth (*janma*) and birth is the cause of pain (*dukkha*). Hence in order to shake off pain we have to strike at the very root

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viz, *Mithyagnanam*, and the annihilation of *Mithyagnanam* will be followed by the annihilation of the entire series of causes.

The Naiyâyika proceeds to prove the existence of God by an argument which is much like what is known as the cosmological argument in the European Philosophy. Like the latter, the Naiyâyika's proof also reasons from the world as effect to God as its First Cause : ' चित्तादिकं सकलकं कार्यत्वात्. The four *mahâbhutas* require, as effects, a cause.

Theistic argument of the Nyaya.

This, however, looks, at first sight, like a *petitio principii* ; for, to admit that a thing is an effect, is to say that it has a cause. The real difficulty lies, it will be said, not in showing that an effect must have a cause but in proving that a thing is an effect, that it has a हेतु or a mark possessed by the *Paksha* by means of which, its जन्यत्व (effect-hood) can be inferred. The Naiyâyika finds such a mark in सावयवत्व or the fact of possessing parts. Thus सावयवत्व (being possessed of parts) leads to जन्यत्व (effect-hood) and जन्यत्व to कृतिजन्यत्व (the fact of being effectuated or caused by an agent).

Effect-hood implies an intelligent agent to effectuate.

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But the Naiyāyika does not stop at the conception of a mere cause which a purely cosmological argument leads to, but shows that कृतिजन्यत्व or कार्यत्व (the fact of being effectuated or produced) implies, not only an agent but an intelligent agent—'बुद्धिमतृ कृतिजन्यत्व'.

CHAPTER XV.

CAUSATION AND COMPOUND EVOLUTION

The world is the permutation and combination of atoms—Causes of differences—Science fails to explain—The principles of causation—Criticism of Mills conception of the law of causation—Patient and Agent—The Jain view of causation, and compound evolution.

Having discussed in a previous chapter how we look upon the Universe as self-existent something having its being from all eternity, and having briefly reviewed as well the other principal systems of thought bearing mainly on cosmology, we are led to enquire into how, according to our philosophy, old things change giving place to newer combinations and forms. We have seen that the Universe taken as one undivided whole must be in-create, eternal, self-existent and ever-permanent. But viewed from the standpoint of its inter-related parts, it is transitory, phenomenal and evanescent. And it goes without saying that the assertion of self-existent is simply an indirect denial of creation

Universe
being a self-
existent
unit.

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Denial of
God.

involving as it does the idea of an existence without beginning. But this tantamounts to a veritable denial of an extra-cosmic personal God who builds the cosmos out of the chaotic matter which, according to the creationists and other deists, lay diffused homogeneously filling up the entire space, at the dissolution of the Universe with the end of the so-called previous cycle or created it out of Himself or His own energy (at a particular point of time) through a kind of dialectic process as taught in the other theistic systems of philosophy such as the Yoga, the Nyāya or the Vedānta.

If no God
whence this
vissicitudes
of Nature?

The question, therefore, is, if God is denied where are we to look for a rational solution for the various mysteries which underlie the flashes of lightning dazzling our vision, or the thundering cataracts deafning our ears? Is it that the sprouting forth of the small seed bringing into existence a big tree, the bursting of the eggshells giving birth to beautifully moving bipeds and a variety of other awe-inspiring phenomenal changes, astonishingly mysterious in character, which not only infuse in us

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a feeling of wonder and admiration but morally prevail upon us to posit and believe, as it were, in an Intelligent Designer and Maker behind,—is it that all these and the like changes are but so many results of chances? Wherein lies the necessity and utility of the philosophy then, if it denies God but cannot reasonably account for the amazing occurrences in the world of phenomena?

Indeed and it is worth while to remark that a patient perusal of the preceding pages on the predicaments, their character and their developments will convince anyone in the truth of the summary statement we make here that speaking of the Universe as a whole or in part, it is but permutations and combinations of our four primary rudiments *viz.*, time, space, soul and *Pudgal* matter. These rudiments are resolvable into the minutest of their minute parts which give a limit to fresh divisions by not admitting of any further analysis.

Universe—a permutation and combination of atoms.

Now a study of the nature of these ultimate ingredients reveals to us that these—each and everyone—are surcharg-

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Corrobor-
ation from
science.

ed with innumerable powers having the potentiality of being developed in various ways and of bringing as well into existence such an infinite variety of their permutations and combinations which will account for the amazing phases and phenomena of Nature. Even modern science has had to acknowledge the truth of this. Chemistry demonstrates beyond doubt that all compound substances owe their existence to the permutations and combinations of the atoms of Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, and Carbon etc.—Heat, light, electricity, hold Physics, are but different arrangements of molecules-in-motion constituting the same. Biology teaches that all organisms—vegetable or animal—are only composed of cells under a variety of their combinations. This is not all. Science dives deep to fathom the amazing mysteries underlying the differences between things chemical, physical or biological ; and like a master-surgeon she dissects and analyses Nature and attributes the cause of the mutual differences between things to the said principle of permutation and combination

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of atoms, molecules or cells forming the structure and character of the chemical, physical or biological evolution. Thus even according to the researches of modern science, Universe is nothing more than an ever changing permutations and combinations of the atoms, molecules and cells forming the character and composition of the same.

But what are permutations and combinations which seem to play the part of unitary method as it were in explaining the differences and diversities in and through which the Universe reveals to us its being? Permutation and Combination, we know, are but processes of mathematical calculations to find order in the atomic or molecular arrangement of things having their being in time and space. We all know that in the science of mathematics, the members 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. or a, b, c, d, and the like are but so many symbols, each giving us a definite idea of something conditioned as represented by the same. And Permutation is their arrangement in a line reference being had to the order of sequence ; as for

What is
Permutation.

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Combina-
tion.

instance, a-b and b-a are but two permutations of a and b. Similarly Combination is their arrangement in groups without reference to the order of sequence; as for example, 'a-b-c' is a combination involving a, b, and c, and 'b-a-c' is but another combination, both consisting simply of a, b, and c, grouped together. In Combination, it is worthy of note, we take notice only of the presence or absence of a certain thing and pay no regard to its place in order of time and space. There being but a, b, c, d and so on, it finds out only how many combinations could there possibly arise by taking at a time the two, three, or four of the symbols.

Application
of the laws
of Permuta-
tion and
combination.

While investigating into the structure and composition of chemical things we substitute,—H, N, O, C as symbolic representation of Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Oxygen and Carbon, the ultimate rudiments or atoms of which are innumerable in number, in the places of a, b, c, d. Now experiment shows that it is due to the innumerable variety of atomic combinations of H, N, O and C.; that we have differences between the different

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compounds. To take Carbo-hydrates and fats for examples : Analysis shows carbo-hydrates to be a compound of C, H, O ; and if we analyse fats, we get the same three chemical elements. Therefore the question is : What makes for the differences both in colour, character and configuration between the two compounds, the component parts of a molecule of carbo-hydrate being found to consist of $C_6 H_{12} O_6$; and a molecule of fat to consist of $C_{51} H_{98} O_6$. Then, again, to take the cases of Strychnine, Quinine, and Gluten : Analysis of these three shows them to be but combinations of C.H.N.O. And it is needless to add that the three compounds are wholly different from one another. Strychnine and quinine are poisonous whereas gluten is nutritious. A molecule of quinine is a combination of $C_{20} H_{24} N_2 O_8$ whereas a molecule of strychnine is a combination of $C_{21} H_{22} N_2$ and O_2 .

in finding out the causes of differences in things.

Now from a reflective study of the results of the above analysis, one might venture to remark that the mutual differences existing either between carbo-hydrate and fat or between strychnine and quinine, are due,

Scientific explanation as to the causes of difference.

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Pattison
Muir on the
point in ques-
tion.

it is apparent, to the numerical differences in the combination of the component atoms constituting the structure of a molecule of each of them. But is the numerical differences in the combination adequate to explain the causes of differences in question? The molecule of Ammonium of Cyanate is composed of two atoms of Nitrogen, one atom of Oxygen, one atom of Carbon, and four atoms of Hydrogen; and the molecule of Urea is composed of the same number of the same atoms. How, then, can the properties of the two molecules be different from one another? "What can that circumstance be", rightly enquires Pattison Muir in answer to the above question, "except the arrangement of the atoms that compose the molecules?"

But the answer of Pattison Muir given in the form of interrogation, will it satisfy the reflecting mind yearning for a rational solution for the differences in question in things we everyday find around us? To say that the difference is due to the difference in the arrangement of atoms forming the composition of the two molecules is to

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simply state a fact. It is an attempt to explain X by Y both of which are unknown quantities. It does not clear up the mystery that underlies the real question at issue. The question is : Whence is the difference ? Every other condition being the same, what is it that leads to the difference in the combination of the component parts forming the composition of the two compounds ? Modern science is quite out at sea here and her helm of Reason is lost. She can explain how things happen but gets hopelessly comfounded and confused to answer why they do so. And unless this 'Why' is cleared up, we cannot expect to get at the reason that lies behind the differences in the world of phenomena.

Scientific explanation is inadequate.

The reason why modern science cannot answer the point in question, lies simply in the fact that she takes only a partial view of things and does not look straight to the two principles of Causation. We have stated that the Universe is a system of interrelated parts and the parts, as such, are conditioned. But things conditioned, it is a truism to say, are but products, *effects* of something

The two principles of Causation.

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Causes--Sub-
stantial and
Determining

else which is termed as *cause*. A cause is what brings about an *effect*, the latter being what follows from the cause. Such being the definitions, in general, of the *cause* and the *effect*, many a logician have drawn a line of distinction between the circumstances and the active agents which co-operate to bring about an effect. One has been termed as the *Substantial* cause and the other as *Determining* or *Efficient* cause otherwise known as *Patient* and *Agent* in European logic. The reason why such distinction is drawn consists in this. We see the potter manufactures the jar out of clay by means of *Danda-chakra*,—the mill-stone-and-the-lever. The jar is thus the product or effect of the co-operation of clay, the lever, the mill-stone, and the potter *i.e.* the manufacturer himself. Such being the case, all these beginning with clay must have to be taken as the *cause*, the *effect* of which is the jar—the product or the output of the co-operation; for a *cause* is the aggregate of all such accidents both in the agents and the patients as concur in production of the *effect* propounded. The manufacturer, the mill-stone and the like have

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all co-operated indeed to bring about the jar ; but they have got their peculiar functions of their own. So long the jar is there, clay is there too. The actual existence of the jar cannot come to be as such if you extract out clay from it. But after the production of the jar, if the manufacturer or the mill-stone is separated from the jar, it is not in the least affected. Again the function of the manufacturer is not the same with that of the mill-stone or the lever or clay even. It is clay that is cast into the mould and moulded into the form of the jar, and it is for this reason that clay is named as the *substantial cause* and that by means of which the effect already *existing imperceptibly* in the substantial cause is brought about or developed into a perceptible form is the *efficient or determining* cause. That without which nothing can there be, that which invariably precedes something else which is but an effect, is the true nature of the cause. When we see that the jar cannot come into existence either without the manufacturer or without the mill-stone, and the lever, it follows *a priori* therefore

Nature and functions of the two causes explained.

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that the manufacturer, the wheel, the lever are also but causes which combine in the production of the jar.

Every effect
requires a
Determining
cause.

It is thus clear that every-*product* or *effect* requires also a *Determining* cause (in addition to the *Substantial* one) to bring the same into actual existence. We have stated already that the primary ingredients—each and every one of these—are surcharged with infinite powers of their own having the potentiality of being developed in innumerable ways and these being but materials giving constitution and structure to all earthly existences are worked upon by the *Determining* cause to bring the same into varieties of combinations. And therefore it is due to the intervention of this *Determining* cause that we find the difference in the arrangements of atoms constituting the structure of the two molecules of Ammonium of cyanate and of Urea and it is this that accounts as well for other various differences in things in all the three worlds, chemical, physical and biological. But would not the ascription of Causality to the *substance* which is worked upon involve the difficulty

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of making the *Patient* to be the *Agent*?

Indeed there is a school of logic predominant in these days of scientific culture which refuses to make any distinction between the *Determining* cause and the *Substantial* cause in the law of causation. Even the most classical of the English logicians, as Mr. Mill, has taken exception to this distinction. "In most cases of causation," writes Mill, "a distinction is commonly drawn between something which acts and some other thing which is acted upon, between an *agent* and a *patient*. Both of these, it would be universally allowed, are conditions of the phenomenon; but it would be thought absurd to call the latter the cause—that title being reserved for the former."

Mill on the
Determining
cause and
Substantial
cause.

The distinction, contends Mr. Mill in support, is a verbal one and not real, because of its vanishing on examination: for the object which is acted upon and which is considered as the scene in which the effect takes place is commonly included in the phrase by which the effect is spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as a part of the cause, the seeming incongruity would

Arguments
of Mill.

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Illustration
of Mr. Mill's
contention.

arise of its being supposed to cause itself. To cite an instance we have the falling of bodies. "What is the cause which makes a stone fall?" observes Mill, "and if the answer had been 'the stone itself' the expression would have been in apparent contradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The stone, therefore, is conceived as the patient and the earth (or according to the common and most unphilosophical practice, an occult quality of the earth) is represented as the agent or cause. But that there is nothing fundamental in the distinction may be seen from this that it is quite possible to conceive the stone as causing its own fall provided the language employed be such as to save the mere verbal incongruity. We might say that the stone moves towards the earth by the properties of the matter composing it, and according to this mode of presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might without impropriety be called the agent; though to save the established doctrine of the inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe the effect to an occult quality and

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say that the cause is not the stone itself but the weight or gravitation of the stone."

"Those who have contended for a radical distinction between agents and patients have generally conceived the agent as that which causes some state of, or some change in the state of another object which is called the patient. But a little reflection will show that the license, we assume of speaking of phenomena as *states* of the various objects which take part in them (an artifice of which so much use has been made by some philosophers, Brown, in particular, for the apparent explanation of phenomena) is simply a sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as one among several modes of expression but which should never be supposed to be the enunciation of a scientific truth. Even those attributes of an object which might seem with greatest propriety to be called states of the object itself, its sensible qualities its colour, hardness, shape and the like are in reality (as no one has painted out more clearly than Brown himself) phenomena of causation in which the substance is distinctly the agent or producing cause, the patient

The distinction is a logical fiction.

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Patients are
a l w a y s
agents.

being our own organs and those of other sentient beings. What we call states of objects, are always sequences into which the objects enter generally as antecedents or causes ; and things are never more active than in the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be acted upon. Thus in the example of a stone falling to the earth, according to the theory of gravitation the stone is as much an agent as the earth, which not only attracts but is itself attracted by the stone. In the case of a sensation produced in our organs, the laws of our organism and even those of our minds are as directly operative in determining the effect produced as the laws of the outward object. Though we call prussic acid the agent of a person's death, the whole of the vital and organic properties of the patient are as actively instrumental as the poison in the chain of effects which so rapidly terminates his sentient existence. In the process of education we may call the teacher the agent and the scholar only the material acted upon. Yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed in the scholar's mind exert either co-opera-

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ting or counteracting agencies in relation to the teacher's efforts. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision but light coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain and with those of the visible object. The distinction between agent and patient is merely verbal : *patients are always agents.*"

Taking stands on these and the like arguments, Hume, Whately and Mill and many other scholars of the same attitude of mind under European culture made themselves so bold as to attribute weakness to the exponents of our philosophy in regard to our drawing a sharp line of distinction as between the *Determining* cause and the *Substantial* cause. And as the Jain cosmology is based on the law of causation as stated herein before, it is imperative to enter into an examination, by the way, of Mill's doctrine on this point.

Examination
of Mill—Pa-
tient and
'*Upādān*' are
not identical.

Let us begin with the remark at the outset, that the *upādān* or substantial cause and patient of the European logicians are not one and the same either in meaning or in their bearing. Nowhere in our works on the subject has it been taught that the

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Karakas' or
the cases in
our grammar
and their
agencies.

substantial cause has not the least possible agency in any form in the causation of things. '*Kârak*'—case, in our grammar, is the general term signifying agency and the nominative, objective, ablative and the like are but specific terms implying different forms of the functional activity of the cases. The nominative, objective and the like,—they all act or operate no doubt ; but they never act of themselves and in the same way, form and matter. Each of the cases has to act differently and in its own way. By the term '*Kriyâ*'—verb, we generally understand the changes in their most gross and visible form ; but in any case, we should not lose sight of the important fact that visible changes are but resultants of the co-operation of all the cases beginning with the chief agent or the nominative in bringing about a phenomenon.

Now though each of the various cases has its own agency peculiar to itself ; the reason why they are not all of them attributed with the principal agency will be found in the fact that the agency of the chief or the nominative is not of the same

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type and character as that of the other cases. The chief agent or the nominative case is quite independent of the functional activities of the other cases which hold but a subordinate position in relation to the principal agent in so far its acting of its own accord is concerned. For, whatever is powerless to act of itself, must be dependant—like the ball in motion—on another for its activities. The ball has the power to roll on ; heat has the power to expand bodies : but the ball would not roll or of itself, unless it is set in motion ; nor heat will expand bodies, unless the two, heat and body, are brought in close relationship to each other. This is the reason why these are said to be dependant on the agency of something else which must be competent enough to set the ball in motion or to bring the two in such relation as will enable the heat to act on the body so as to expand it. But it may be contended that at times, when we say, 'The ball rolls' or 'heat expands bodies' we really ascribe in our speech independence and agency to them so much so that we have to parse the words 'ball' or 'heat' as

The agency of the Nominative is not of the same type character with the agencies of other cases.

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Where the
chief agency
is super-im-
posed on the
dependant
agent?

but nominatives to the verbs 'rolls' or 'expands.' Indeed we do so in such and similar other expressions as, 'the stone is falling' or the 'sword cuts well.' And the question is, Why do we do so? What is it that prevails upon to acknowledge the independence of what we really know to be of dependant character? To all this we have but to submit in reply that such forms of expressions are indeed resorted to when the principal agent stands beyond the range of our vision or where the subordinate agents are required to show as if they were playing the role of the principal agent notwithstanding the actual presence of the latter. When the other agents stand in close proximity with the principal, it is then that the subordinate character of their position and function becomes apparent. But where the principal stands in the background there the one or the other of the subordinate agents stands out as the principal in as much as these have their agencies in their respective functional activities and this explains the ascription of primary agency to the ball, heat, or to the

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sword, in the above mode of our speech. In the case of the expression 'the stone is falling to the earth', as cited by Mill, we can remark that here the principal agency of that by dint of which all bodies attract one another, whose law the stone dares not disobey, or which mysteriously abiding in the stone and the earth actuates them as it were from within, not having been desiderated to stand out, the stone though a patient (*Upādān*), yet it puts on the appearances of both the patient as well as of the agent. It is but a recognised rule in our grammar that where we find a verb (*kriyā*) change but no nominative or agent as governing the same, there the change is presumed to be going on of itself. And this is how we meet Mill's objection to the ascription of causality to the patient—*Upādān*.

How the
causality of
substance
'Upādān'
worked upon
is established

Now to resume the thread of our discussion as to the causes of differences in the Universe of phenomena around us with the remark that law of causation is but a law of change. Every change stands in relation of antecedent and consequent that is known to us as the relativity of the cause and

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The principle
of causation
so stretched
as to posit
God behind.

the effect. Of these two terms the second is the phenomenon of changes, the first being what brings about the change i.e. the *cause*. The cause as we have discussed above is divided into two kinds—the *Determining* and the *Substantial*. We have invariably seen that in every act of causation these two co-operate together to bring about a change, a phenomenon, an effect. And it having been held that every change must have an antecedent cause, it seems naturally to follow that the universe itself being but an eternal process of becoming, mutability being its very nature, it must have a cause antecedent to its becoming as such ; and thus in their zealous attempt at the ascertainment as to the nature of this antecedent condition some have unfortunately stretched this principle of causation to such an extent as to reach its breaking point. They have gone so far as to posit a God, an extra-cosmic Personal Ruler of the Universe, creating, regulating and controlling the changes and affairs of the Universe from without just as a potter would do with regard to the manufacturing

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of jars. But little do they think of the grave difficulties that would arise if we were to assume the existence of an extra-cosmic personal God, not Himself the Universe, one Who has created good and evil, pain and sufferings for His creatures, but He Himself stands above and unaffected by these. On no theory of Divine dispensation and intervention in the affairs of the world from without, can evil and suffering be explained. The creation of evil and suffering except by an implied manicheism which practically annuls the Godhead in attempting to justify its ways or excuse its work.

Theistic arguments involve grave difficulties.

In order to avoid these difficulties some take recourse to another line of reasoning making the agent and the patient to be one and the same and have made themselves bold to declare for an Ultimate Reality whose very nature is existence, knowledge and bliss infinite ; Whose consciousness is in its nature creative or rather self-expressive force capable of infinite variations in phenomena and forms, and Who is endlessly enjoying the delight of those variations, and Who, therefore, might well be regarded as evolving

Pantheistic arguments.

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the world of nature including finite minds—out of his own energy, in sport, as it were. Just as we find all things to be mutable forms of one immutable being, finite results of one infinite force, so we shall find that all ideas and ideals are but variable self-expressions of One Invariable and All-Embracing Delight of Self-existence. And this explains the causes underlying diversities and differences between all things and beings the totality of which go to make up this our phenomenal Universe.

Difficulties
in the Pan-
theistic con-
ception.

But this theory of Cosmic origin is confronted with graver difficulties which cannot but stand for its own condemnation. The whole thing, briefly speaking, stands thus. The One Ultimate Reality which has thrown It-self out into name and form, is a true Existence, Knowledge, Bliss—*Sachidānanda*. Sachidānanda, it may be reasoned, is God and Who is not only a conscious Being but Who is also the Author of existence and all these. And, therefore, the question is, How could a God who is All-bliss Himself and from whom flow the dews of delight as water

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springs from a fountain, evolve a world out of Himself in which He inflicts sufferings on His creatures, sanctions pains and permits evil. If it is contended that these are but trials and ordeals, we do not solve the real problem at issue. We only mince matters and thus refuse to look straight into things. How could a God who is all Good and All-love Himself has made room for what is called as 'bad' or 'hatred' in the Universe of His own make? For One who keeps pitfalls of ignorance, allows sufferings, sanctions pains or permits rooms for evils in the scheme of His universe as trials and ordeals through which the so-called poor *Jiva* has to pass, stands Himself convicted of holding thought-out temptations, deliberate cruelty, and moral insensibility; and if a moral being at all, He must be to all intents and purposes—far inferior to the moral excellence of His own creatures. Again, we do not squarely face the question by the statement that they are but resultants of the *Jivas'* *karma* for which reason he or she undergoes pain and suffers misery in as much as there is the ethical problem that

Moral incongruities.

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Pan-entheistic conception of the Vedanta.

confronts us in the form—who created or why and when was evolved that moral evil which provokes the punishment of pain and suffering? One might well contend that the Self-same Ultimate Reality who is of the nature of All-knowledge-bliss-absolute being but One Existence without a second to stand by It ; all that exists being but He ; it having been repeatedly declared that ‘That Thou Art’ and ‘That Am I’ too—all what is said to exist as evil or suffering, it is He that must labour under the same in the creature who is no the other than He Himself. For just as a spider spins its web out of itself and nestles in or creeps on it, so it is He who throws Himself out into the world of names and forms, in sport, as it were, and it is He that crawls on them in the form of a child ; it is He that enjoys the pleasures of His own make in the form of a youth and it is He that totters on the road leaning on the stick in the form of the old and worn out. Indeed when thus viewed, the whole problem shifts the ground and there cannot crop up the question as to how God came to create evil and suffering for His creature. But still

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it is worth while to enquire as to how the Self-same Reality Who is absolute Existence, Simple without a second to stand by It, Who is of the nature of True Knowledge and Delight Infinite, comes to admit in Itself what It is not ? All-delight being necessarily All-good and All-love, how can evil and hateful standing in hard opposition to love and goodness and being; therefore, but a visible negation of All-delight, be said to exist in what is All-delight ? How could the Absolute, in short, enter into the meshes of Relativity of subject and object ?

Thus the inexorable law of *Karma* being irreconcilable with a Supremely Moral and Personal Deity, the pantheistic origin of the cosmos being found to involve graver ethical difficulties, the pan-entheistic conception of the Universe being concived to stop short in explaining the riddle of the Absolute entering into the meshes of Relativity, we decline to agree in the Divine dispensation and intervention in the affairs of the world, we deny the very existence of any free and all-governing personal God ; for all personality we hold to be but a creation.

Law of
Karma and
God cannot
go together.

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of ignorance and subject to the laws of *Karma*.

Addition of
the 'Chance'
—theory is
the invalida-
tion of the
Law of
Causation.

What, then, is the cause of all these diversities and differences? Either in the material world, or in the vegetable or the animal—no two things are alike. Are, then, the visible differences which are evident between things or organisms—mere chance-results or fortuitous concourse of lifeless atoms? To admit them as but results of chances is to invalidate the very law of causation. The doctrine of 'the results of chance' can no more find rooms in a philosophy which seeks to arrive at a rational explanation for the changes we experience at every moment of our being. Change is the soul of all activities and stagnation is but cold death. Change, therefore, constitutes the life of all that is. The development of the seed into a tree or of an ovum into an animal is but a series of changes constituting an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure. It is this series of changes gone through during the period of development and decay that makes up the life history of a plant or an animal. In

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its primary stage, says the Biologist, every germ consists of a substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first step, in the development of the germ, is the appearance of a difference between the two parts in this substance or as the phenomenon is called in physiological language—'differentiation'. And the question is, whence is the difference or this 'differentiation'? In the primary stage of the germ, it was all uniform both in texture and composition. But there appears a difference in the same afterwards. The substantial cause being the same, What is it that accounts for the difference? Reason whispers that there must be something working from within, some cause behind it. But what is it? "No thoughtful person," to speak in the language of Wallace, "can contemplate without amazement the phenomena presented by the development of animals. We see the most diverse forms—a mollusc, a frog, and a mammal—arising from apparently identical primitive cells and progressing for a time by very similar initial changes but thereafter each pursuing its

Whence is
the differ-
ence?

Wallace at
hault.

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The principle of Natural Selection cannot explain.

highly complex and circuitous course of development with unerring certainty by *means of laws and forces of which we are totally ignorant.*' Here too the original substantial causes in all the three instances are, according to the investigation of Wallace, apparently identical ; but what is it that *determines* one to be a mollusc, another a frog and the third one to be a mammal ? The principle of Natural Selection can't explain this amazing phenomena ; nor the law of the Struggle for Existence and the Survival of the Fittest, however ambiguously it might be twisted, can account for it. All that these can do, is to explain as to how the weakest go to the walls ; but not why they should. They cannot throw any light as would explain the causes of differences which are evident in the different spheres of evolution of organisms. The theory of Special Creation, too, cannot account for the differences, for that would require the establishment of a Deity, which is, as we have seen, an impossibility. Why should one be made a king surrounded with all the pleasures the world can afford to supply with for his enjoyment

Nor the theory of Special Creation.

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and another a slave to starve, serve, and suffer under his tyranny all the indignities of life and living which the humanity will shudder at, to think of ; nor the theory of Evolution from One Self-same Reality, Who is of the nature of pure felicity, can touch at the root cause of the present diversity, which is but a visible nullity of the pre-supposition of such an Entity beyond all duality. Such being the position and situation of the above theories and doctrines involving grave difficulties as shown up, let us turn to what our Teachers have to say on the point at issue. Our philosophy teaches at the outset that whatever is real is rational. Reality is synonymous with activity. And by this they mean persistence in existence. Wherever we turn, theresoever differences appear to our visions. And these differences are not mere appearances. In every thing, at every turn of life, we are persistently conscious of these differences. These are real differences. And whatever is real being rational, it cannot but irresistibly follow that there must be some reason behind these differences. The Jain teachers are at one

Reality is
synonymous
with activity.

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Causes of
diversity ac-
cording to
the Jains.

when—they say that (i) Time (काल) (ii) External Nature (स्वभाव) (iii) Necessity (नियति) (iv) Activity (कर्म) and the desire to-be-and-to-act (उद्यम) these five co-operating constitute the reason which accounts for the diversities in Nature. It is these five that by co-operating, determine the manner and form of the development of the seed or the ovum into a tree or an animal. Indeed it may ring curious to the unaccustomed ears who had not had the opportunity to peruse and ponder over the truths of these philosophical pronouncements of the Jain teachers regarding the differences and diversities in nature. But in order to be able to form a calm judgment on the point in question, it is imperative that we should try to grasp the principle inculcated in these our present philosophical pronouncements bearing on the point.

It has been said that summarily speaking the universe is compound of the four primary ingredients *viz.*, Time, Space, Soul and *Pudgal*. These are resolvable into the minutest of the minute parts which do not admit of any further analysis. Now

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these ultimate rudiments having nothing for their material cause *Upādān*, stand by themselves as unresolvable units. And a patient study of these ultimate units will make it clear that they—every one of them—are instinct, as it were, with infinite power by the virtue of which they are capable of being developed in innumerable ways through the processes of permutation and combination of these four original ingredients which form the true character, composition and make up of the Universe revealed in a diversity of names and forms. This diversity of names and forms in and through which the self-existent Universe is revealed to us owes its origin to the variety in the arrangement and combination of the ingredients composing the same. But what is it really due to? The variety in the arrangement and combination is due to (1) *Kāl*—Time, (2) *Swabhāva*—Nature *i.e.* favourable environment; (3) *Niyati*—Destiny or Necessity, (4) *Karma*—Action or motion and (5) *Udyama*—Self-assertion or Effort—the five-fold Determining Causes (निमित्त कारण) all acting in conjunction

The five
determining
causes.

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The characteristic indications.

with one another on the substance (*द्रव्य*) produce changes and variations in the same, regulate their manner of unfoldment and determine its growth, form and configuration as well. It is important, therefore, to dwell briefly on the characteristic indications (*लक्षण*) of these five-fold *determining* causes by virtue of which the self-existent Universe has been the permanent theatre of perpetual changes and diversities—a strange array of ever-occurring phenomena that bewilders us at every moment and turn of our life and thought.

(1) Time.

(1) Time (*काल*)—to begin with—is an aggregate of one dimension ; of itself and from its very nature, it flows on uniformly revealing itself as it does in relation of sequence and seasons. Succession being thus the very property of time all changes are possible in time only.

(2) Nature.

(2) Nature (*स्वभाव*) is the natural or External environment of a thing or organism. It consists of the soil, the air, the water, the heat and the light. The growth of a plant may be referred to the seed which is the *substantial* (*उपादान*) cause of the plant and

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to the soil, the air etc., to the circulation of the sap and to the chemical action of the heat and light—in short, to the External environment which determine the growth. This is why it is said that the life of an organism depends on the external Nature whose function is to supply the wants and demands of the living organism which happens to enter into relations, the continuous adjustment of which is called life. A living organism is a seat of chemical changes divisible into (i) *Anabolic* or Constructive processes in the course of which the so called non-living matter is taken in and assimilated by the organism from without and into (ii) *Catabolic* or Disintegrative, destructive processes during which living matter or stored-up substances are expended. Metabolism (*प्राणव्यक्रिया*) is but a name for these two processes of construction and destruction and forms the chief feature of a living organism. And the normal growth of an organism means normal metabolism requiring the supply of food quantitatively and qualitatively of the proper kind, the laying up of the food within the body

Metabolism.

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and regular chemical transformation of the tissues and the preparation of the *effette* products which have to be given out. It is thus clear that the External Nature (वाह्यप्रकृति) stands to supply the needs, demands and requirements of the organism for its proper nourishment and normal growth. If she in any way fail to supply what is demanded of her by the organism, the latter deteriorates and becomes weak to carry on the struggle, to cope with the undesirable forces and elements, or to propagate species and thus goes to the walls in the long run.

- (3) Destiny. 3. *Niyati* (नियति) means, Fate or Destiny. According to some school of thought, it means Divine Decree which must come to pass to bear its command over our thoughts and activities. Thus interpreted, it takes away from us all the moral responsibility which lies only in our option of doing a thing, and not in compulsion. But in Jain philosophy, however, the term *Niyati* signifying 'Necessity' is described as the concatenation of causes whence all things must necessarily follow as the four follows from two plus two or as three angles of a triangle

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must be equal to two right angles clearing away everything standing in the way to offer it even the least possible resistance.

4. *Karma* (कर्म) means Action or Deed done. Revealing itself as it does in the taking of the one concomitantly with the leaving of the other, it implies a change of relations or relative positions which is nothing else than motion itself in some form or other. The cause of motion or action being the *substance itself* which by exertion of power produces action, operation or *Karma*, the substance or the organism itself has to bear the consequences of its own *Karma* in any stage of its existence, past, present or future. And this explains the origin of the common adage "As you sow, so you reap."

(4) *Karma*—
Deed.

5. *Udyam* (उद्यम)—Exertion, assertion or effort which is in its simplest form is the *desire* to realise a particular end or idea. Sifting analysis of the affairs of the world of phenomena in question brings us to the "*desire-to-be*" evident in the form of exertion or assertion as the supreme reason for all existences. It is the desire-to-be, to exist distinct and separate from what

Self-assertion.

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The pleasure
to-be or not
to-be.

it is not, that is evidently the cause of of the world of distinctions and forms. If it is asked what was the root cause of the organism coming into existence, we must reply, "*Itself*." Who was the creator of the being? '*Itself*', is the ready answer we have to make in response to the question. '*Itself*' is its own object and *itself* alone is its reason for existence. And, therefore, it has been well said that all the true reasons and transcendant motives a man can assign for the way in which he acts can be rendered into the simple formula "*in that was my pleasure*." And likewise is the case with the wherefore of the other things and beings. The highest philosophy brings us no other reply : beings and worlds are because it was their pleasure-to-be. To-be or not-to-be is but a matter of option for self-assertion, or otherwise wherein lies deep the primordial root of all responsibility.

Now Time (काल), the External Nature (स्वभाव), Necessity (नियति), Action (कर्म), and Exertion (उद्यम) whose natures have been just discussed in brief, speak for the differences and diversities in the world of forms

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and phenomena. To illustrate for a more thorough grasp of the point at issue as to how these *determining* causes and conditions co-operate in bringing about the countless differences and diversities in the processes of the compound evolution let us take the case of a huge tree developing from its own seed.

We have already stated that every thing in the universe is surcharged with infinite powers of developing itself after its own type. So also is the case with the seed. The seed of a particular tree is also instinct with infinite powers of developing itself so much so that the huge form of the tree together with its bark, branches, twigs, leaves, flowers and fruits in the course of time, lie hidden in a potential state of existence in the seed. The protoplasm which ultimately developes into the seed being the substantial cause, it changes and transforms itself into the seed and ultimately into the tree by the help of such causes, and conditions as time, nature and the like—which determine its manner and growth of development. On close examination of the seed we

Illustration of
the principle
of causation
in question.

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The seed is
the seed
under parti-
cular condi-
tions.

find that the granular protoplasmic particles—the contents of the outer shell, the cuticle, which holds together the granules in a particular combination is all through uniform both in texture and chemical composition without any difference and differentiation between its parts in the primary stage of its being. If you crush the seed so instinct with the potency of development, it will not bud forth and why not ? There are the component parts of the seed—the granules not an atom of which has been lost in any way. Why would it not then develop into a tree ? The answer is simple enough and we need not travel far to look for it. The seed is the seed under a particular arrangement and disposition of its constituent elements and as such it is the substantial cause having the potency of developing itself into a tree of its own type, if only the determining causes conjoin with one another to help its growth. But the crushing of the seed interferes with the relative disposition and arrangement of its constituent elements and thus has rendered it impossible for the five-fold determining causes to act on the seed.

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So we see the seed has the potency to develop itself into a tree after its own type, but it has to wait for the proper *time*—the arrival of the season which might be the rainy one. The season is there but the seed must be planted in the soil with such other natural environment as would allow a reasonable circulation of the sap and chemical action of heat and light and would as be well able to supply the requisitions of the seed.

Causes and
conditions
for the deve-
lopment

Again, granted that the time, the external nature, the necessity—all the three are present, the seed, if not planted by some body, does not fall on earth by the virtue of its own *exertion* and weight, making all the necessary transformations thereby impossible.

Then, again, though the season is there and the seed too has been planted in the desirable soil with favourable environment, yet the seed will not grow into the tree of such and such bulk and configuration for the manifestation of which it has the potency unless there be the concatenation of the causes and conditions which is but

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another name for 'Necessity' that operates irresistibly.

of the seed
into a tree of
its parent
type.

The seed fructifies, as is often observed, but yet it may not sprout forth into a tree indential with the parent one and bearing leaves and flowers and fruits or seeds of the same size, taste, colour, beauty and grandeur of the tree whereof the seed was born. And why? Surely these are the effects of *karma* of the seed in one or the other periods or stages of its existence and it is due to this very *karma* even done in some time past, that the seed has come to be a seed of this and not of another organism.

To enter a bit more into details as to the causality of *karma* in bringing about the phenominal diversities and differences, the existence of various kinds of vegetable organisms all around us, is undeniable. In the organic world, it is but a truism to say that the like produces the like. The mango seed will develop into a mango tree and to nothing else. So with the other kinds of seeds. Now in the processes of metabolism every living organism grows and undergoes through the adjusting and regulating influ-

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ences of the two-fold nature—*Inner* and *Outer*. (अन्तरबाह्य) The seed is the *inner* nature of the tree where as the *outer* nature comprises the soil, the water, the heat, the light, and the air. The seed has the potency to develop into a tree and it is only the *outer* nature that stands as a help to the seed in the exertion of its latent powers for its proper development into a tree; but this *outer* nature is almost the same to all the different trees. The real difference, therefore, lies in the *inner* natures' of the different trees i. e. in the seeds. And the same old question comes round yet, Whence is this difference? If it is said in reply that the difference is due to the difference in the relative disposition of the particles constituting the two seeds, then the difference is only explained by another difference which tantamounts to explaining 'X' by 'Y' both of which are unknown quantities and therefore the second difference again has yet to be inquired into. Science stops short here. She does not know. The mystery, though pushed back, remains un-

Yet whence
is the differ-
entiation?

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Biology misses the mark

altered. However may a Lamarck take recourse to the principles of conservation (Heredity) and progression (Adaptation) and touch upon the struggle of each against all ; or a Darwin may twist and stretch his so called principle of Natural Selection to show the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man or however may a Spencer write volumes on the interpretations of the Law of the Survival of the Fittest through the processes of which the weakest go to the walls, or to explain the unsurmountable gaps in the gradations of the organic beings—vegetable or animal or however may a Haeckel knock his brains out to find out the missing links in the ever-evolving chain of organic evolutions from *Monera* to Man, the present and the last expression of the organism of the highest type, Biology only misses the mark and beats about the bush when she says that protoplasms are alike and identical but does not assign any reason for their subsequent differentiations and variations. And years afterwards she will have to admit that there is no other alternative course

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than to take recourse to the Law of *Karma* to explain the causes of differentiations and differences as manifest in their combinations and subsequent variations. The granules of protoplasm were registered with impressions of the acts and deeds they have done in their past lives whereof they have developed a kind of disposition or tendency towards each other under the influences of which they have come to the existing forms of combination making up the different 'Inner Natures' in the different species of trees and other organic beings. Or what else is there to explain the diversities of Nature? They can't be explained as her mere freaks or as fortuitous concourse of what is invariably conditional—a fact which is but a visible contradiction and negation of the chance-hypothesis; nor can they come out of nothing, for, we are unable on the one hand to conceive nothing becoming something or on the other something nothing. It being thus impossible to establish in thought a relation between *something* and *nothing*, we cannot but deduce thereof the indestructibility of matter (*pudgal*) and conti-

The differences are not mere freaks of Nature but are caused and conditioned by *Karma*.

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Indestructibility of *puṇya* and continuity of *karma*.

nuity of motion—*karma*. Other determinant conditions being there, it is the continuity of *karma* that explains why the properties of a molecule of urea and that of cyanate of ammonia are different, though they are composed of the same number of chemical elements and it is also this continuity of *karma* that accounts for the development of the diverse forms of a mollusc, a frog and a mammal though arising from *apparently* identical primitive cells.

CHAPTER XVI.

GOD.

Jainism makes no room for an extra-mundane God—Laplace and Napoleon—The idea is not singular in India—Yet the Jains are not dependant on any All-mighty Ruler standing in the without—Dr. Bose and the Super-physical Power.—Spencer and Spinoza—"Tertium Quid" nature of the Power—The Coalescence these powers in different beings on the attainment of "Nirvan" is the idea of the God-head of the Jains.

In the last chapter on the compound Evolution and the Law of Universal Causation, it has been made clear as to how from the stand-point of phenomenal *Naya* the universe is ever changing and transitory, and how from the stand-point of Noumenal *Naya* according to which the universe is taken as one undivided whole of inter-related reals, it is self-existent and permanent. We have also seen that because it is self-existent and permanent, therefore, it is not an effect of some anterior cause working from behind the universe ; and further that the diversities and differences in the world of phenomena and forms owe their existences to the operation of

No necessity of an extra-mundane God.

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the five-fold determinant causes such as Time, External Nature, and the like. Such being the trend of thought and progressive retiocination, the Jain philosophy leaves no room whatsoever for an iron-willed capricious God in the Jain scheme of the universe. The Jains hold that a correct understanding, according to the teaching of Victors, of the true principles of causality and phenomenology, dispenses with the necessity of any divine intervention in the affairs of the world. They are of opinion that the very attempt to posit an all-ruling extra-mundane God is to conceal the ignorance of the true principles of causality under a pomp of delusive reasonings—an ignorance unaware of itself.

To posit God is to conceal *ignorance* unaware of itself.

Such a doctrine may indeed strike curious and atheistic to the adherents of the various European schools of Monotheists and to other doctors of Divinity so as to give them a rude shaking. But there is no help to it. Truth must be told. When Laplace, the world-renowned French scientist went to make a formal presentation of his famous work to the world-conquering

Laplace and Napoleon on God.

GOD.

Emperor Napoleon, the latter remarked, "M. Laplace, they tell me, you have written this large book on the System of Universe, and you have never mentioned its Creator". Whereupon M. Laplace drew himself up and answered bluntly, "Sir I had no need of any such hypothesis." And this piece of dialogue between the two greatest minds of the Eighteenth century, does not strike singular in India, and the reason is that from the time when Greece and Rome, those cradles of western civilization, were still steeped in profound ignorance ; nay, from long before the pyramids of Egypt had raised their hoary heads to have a look down upon the valleys of the Nile, such doctrines which do not find any rhyme or reason or necessity to call in the existence of the so-called Diety have been in vogue in India. The followers of the Numerical philosophy of India—The *Sāṃkhya* School of thought—not only do not postulate any such Divine being but make a definite pronouncement to the effect that "God is not in existence ; because of the want of all manner of evidence." Nor the *Mīmāṃsaka* atheists

The Sāṃkhya, the Mīmāṃsaka etc. in God.

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yield an inch in their astute denial of an omnipotent extra-mudane God. The *Chārvaḍka* materialists openly and avowedly teach and preach that there is not only no God but there is no soul at all for the so-called redemption of which one should toil and moil all the day and night forsaking all pleasures of life and thought.

Are the
Jains athe-
ists?—No.

One might well venture to remark here that all these schools being more or less atheistic, are the Jains too atheists of similar type ? 'No', is the emphatic answer, we have to offer to the enquirers. The Jains do believe in a God after their own way of thinking—a belief which is in and through saturated with all the vigour and strength of life. It does not make us dependant on any Almighty Ruler for our being and beatitude here or hereinafter. It does not cast us into the moulds of those weaklings who love to creep with a quivering prayer on their lips to the silent doors of the Deity ; nor of those who crawl, beating breast at every step before his fictitious feet or figure to adore. Rather it makes us feel that we are independent autonomous individuals

GOD.

who can curve out paths for ourselves here and herein-after both for enjoyment of pleasures and emancipation of our souls by our own will and exertion.

Here-in-before we have fairly discussed what sort of God we do not believe in ; we have seen there what it is not. We shall see now what He is to us as taught by the Jain Teachers.

According to the Jain philosophy the universe is not a fortuitous concourse of dead, dull matter (*pudgal*) only ; for that would mean crude materialism which Jainism does not allow. The Victorians say that the series of changes as presented by the organic and inorganic worlds, show, as has been recently demonstrated by Dr. J. C. Bose, that in addition to the dead dull *pudgal*-matter, there is something *superphysical* both in the living and in the so-called non-living. When this something superphysical departs from the constitution of the living and the so-called non-living, we say it is dead by which we mean that it does not respond. Experiments have shown that like plants and animals, a piece of metal responds in a like manner,

The Jain
idea of God-
head.

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'Vital Force'
and Dr.
Bose's super-
physical
Power.

if suitably influenced. But when "killed by poison," like the plant or animal, it does not respond. European thinkers and biologists have so far assigned the presence of a separate '*vital force*' in the physical phenomenon connected with the living organism. In place of any real explanation, a hypothetical nomenclature was used either to explain away or to clothe in a greater mystery the most complex phenomena that we ever come across. From this position with its assumption of superphysical character of response, it is clear that on the discovery by Dr. J. C. Bose, the most renowned Bengalee scientist of the day, of similar effects in inorganic substances, the necessity of theoretically maintaining such Dualism in Nature, must fall to the ground. There is, therefore, not any unknown arbitrary *vital force* as Physiologists have taught us to suppose but a law, the working of which, knows no change, nor any deviation; but which, as the Victorians hold, acts uniformly from within throughout the inorganic and the organic worlds.

GOD.

Now that (call it soul, spirit, superphysical something or by any other name you like) by the departure of which the living becomes dead is of the highest spiritual essence and is common to all. The manifestation of this divine principle may differ in different living beings but the collective idea derived from such observations as of this something inherent in the living and in the so-called non-living, is called God. According to the Jains there are energies present both in the material and dynamic worlds. Living apart the material or mental energies, the spiritual ones as a whole is God giving materiality, mentality and substantiality to all things and beings.

God is what gives substantiality, materiality or mentality to all things and beings.

The Ultimate Spiritual Power, often called by Spencer, as Primal Energy, forming the last limit of the knowables, reveals itself in various forms and with varying degrees of perfection in different grades of being. The universe with all its bewildering manifestation, is nothing but the revelation of this Ultimate Power or Energy. This is by its nature a *tertium quid* being matter conscious only when it reveals itself through a senti-

Spencer and Spinoza.

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

ent organism, and remains unconscious so long its embodiment is the sentient one. This is the Primery Reality from which other realities owe their existence and this is the sap which supports every thing what we call real. The same or allied thought is expressed also by Benedict Spinoza when he says that mind and matter are but two among infinite aspects of the Ultimate Reality which can neither be designated as material or psychical in the sense of being conscious.

The true
idea of God-
head.

God is, in short, the coalescence of this spiritual principle emancipated from the bondages of matter in all its purity, perfection, freedom and blessedness. They do us wrong when they say that we are agnostics ; for we worship this Supreme Essence.—the Ideal of all of life and thought. We bow down to this Ideal, because we desire to realize the Ideal in every acts of our life and thought. We worship the Tirthankaras, the pure and perfect souls, merely for the sake of their purity and perfection ; but not for the expectation of any reward in return. 'Lives of great men remind us that we can make

GOD.

our lives sublime.' By following the foot-prints on the sands of time of the Ideal Tirthankaras who were real heroes, pure and free, who attained to omniscience and quietude, *Nirvāna*, by the dissipation of their *karma*, we shall be able to raise ourselves from the mires of the world and to attain to *Nirvan* by a like dissipation of our own *karma* and by freeing ourselves from the eighteen blemishes that inevitably lead ultimately to omniscience, the next door to *Nirvānam*.

By dissipation of *Karma* *Nirvan* has to be reached.

CHAPTER XVII.

SOUL.

Souls and the God-head—Materialistic conception of Soul—A bye-product of matter—Eastern and Western materialism compared—Charvak and Hækel and Girardian, the socialist—Cosmological and Moral difficulties involved in Materialism—Admissions by Huxley, Spencer and Darwin—The Jain conception of Spirit and Matter—Their Correlativity—Pradeshas—Parts or Soul-units.—Conscious effulgence form the spiritual essence of the Soul.—Soul's constitutional freedom—Its Transmigration through the grades of Sansar and Emancipation.

Soul and God. While dealing with our conception of God, we have seen that the individual soul, when it becomes free from all taints and blemishes, reaches perfection characterised by omniscience and realizes itself as a self-conscious spirit of the nature of all-delight, distinct and separate from other than itself, it becomes God.

Conceptions of Soul. But what is this soul which is thus potentially divine and attains to God-head, He being no other than the coalescence of the pure and free self-conscious spirits existing in a

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higher unity without losing the traces of their individuality in the same? What is the nature of this soul-substance? Is it a spark from the anvil of the Blacksmith, a bye-product of matter of the Physicist, the nascent or the just-born of the Chemists? The *Chārvāka* school of thought teaches that there is no plausible reason and evidence to demonstrate the existence of soul as something distinct and separate from matter and material forces; for consciousness which is a quality of the soul-substance is but the resultant of the concussion of the brain-matter. Just as liver secretes bile so brain produces consciousness. This phenomenon of matter and material powers which is characterised by consciousness in different forms in the living and the so-called non-living, is soul for which reason, we often take recourse to such forms of expressions as consist in saying in our common parlance that the plant lives, the brute lives and feels, and the man lives, feels and thinks. It is thus evident that more the subtle is the organic mechanism, by far the more clear

Soul—a bye-product of matter and material forces.

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Immortality
does not be-
long to the
Soul but to
the Deed
done.

is the manifestation of the forms of this bye-product of matter and material forces revealing as these do in the phenomenon of consciousness which is otherwise called by the name of soul or *Atman*. Just as lightning flashes across the horizon from the action and interaction of the stored-up energies and powers in the etherial space of the sky, so the consciousness flashes across the so-called mental horizon wherein matter and material energies are stored up in their most subtle character. Such being the attitude of mind of the followers of the system of *Chārvāka* philosophy towards the soul, they say it is not the soul that is immortal ; but the deeds done by the mighty minds that are imperishable and immortal. In the moral as well as in physical world, the great ones only immortalise themselves by their great achievements, but their souls die and cease to be with them at the death and dissolution of the organisms wherein they appear to be encased as it were.

This denial by the *Chārvākas* of the different entity and immortality of the soul

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seems to receive additional support from the researches in Biology by some of the master-minds of the west. In summing up his 'Last Words on Evolution, Earnst Hæckel says, "the very interesting and important phenomena of impregnation have only been known to us in details for thirty years. It has been conclusively shown after a number of detailed investigation that the individual development of the embryo from the stem-cell or fertilised ovum is controlled by the same laws in all cases. * * * * One important result of these modern discoveries, was the phenomena given to one fact that the personal soul has a *begining of existence* and that we can determine the precise moment in which this takes place ; it is when the parent cells, the ovum and the spermatazoon, coalesce. Hence what we call the soul of man, or animal, *has not presisted* ; but begins its career at the moment of impregnation. It is bound up with the chemical constitution of the plasm which is the vehicle of heredity in the nucleus of the maternal ovum and the

Hæckel on
the origin of
Soul.

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

Shelly and
Plato—Im-
mortal in
mortality.

paternal spermatazoon. *One cannot see how a being that has thus a beginning of existence can afterwards prove to be immortal.*"

(The italics are ours :). Such is the idea of the soul and its immortality according to the researches of Modern science in the west ; but there is nothing new in it. The idea such an origin and nature of the soul is traceable as far back as Plato's time and since 'to the pure, all things are pure', it will not be labour lost to inform our readers, by the way, that the most famous lines,

"All things by a law divine

in one another's being mingle"

in Shelley's 'Love Philosophy' contain an unmistakable reference to the passage of Plato's *Symposium* which Shelley himself translates as follows (see Shelley's Prose Works, Ed. R. H. Shepherd, Vo, II, p. 95) : — "The intercourse of the male and the female in generation, a divine work, through pregnancy and production, it were something *immortal in mortality*." Similar ideas occur also, it would be interesting to note, in the concluding portions of the '*Brihadāranyaka Upanishat*' of the Hindus.

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But to return to the Materialistic hypothesis of the modern scientists and biologists of the west, we can well say without the slightest fear of contradiction that it is but the revised echoe of the *Chārvāka* School of Indian Thought. So much so that even the very spirit of the moral doctrine which the followers of that ancient sage *Chārvāka* or Brihaspati openly and avowedly taught and preached for the regulation of the activities of man so far his moral nature is concerned, persists in the notable declarations which M. Emile de Girardian laid down not merely as his own creed but as that of the vast majority of his socialistic countryman. Girardian's pointed aphorisms are ;--

Chārvāka
and M.
Emile Girardian the
French Socialist.

(i) That the world exists for itself and of itself solely.

(ii) That the man has no original sin to ransom.

(iii) That he bears about him memory and reason as flame bears in it heat and light.

(iv) That he lives again in the flesh only in the child that he begets.

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(v) That he survives intellectually only in the idea or the deed by which he immortalises himself.

(vi) That he has no ground for expecting to receive in future life a recompense or punishment for his present conduct.

(vii) That moral good and evil does not exist substantially, absolutely, inconsistently by themselves ; that they exist only nominally, relatively and arbitrarily,

(viii) That in fact there only exists risks against which man obeying the law of self-preservation within him, seeks to insure himself by the means at his command.

Man does
not live for
bread alone.

Such has been in the main the consequential development of moral ideas of the out and out Materialistic philosophers of the past as well of the present age. And constituted as we are, it sends, as it were, a thrill of shudder to think of these ideas and ideals of the most grovelling nature curiously chalked out to pave the way for the satisfaction of the most lower instincts and brutal propensities of our life and living. Man does not live for bread alone, not for mere animal living ; nor for the satisfaction of

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the lower instincts and propagation of species. Man has a moral nature and possesses a soul to save and a conscience as well by the virtue of which he is enabled oftentimes to subdue, nay sacrifice himself for the progress of thought, culture and humanity. If lives were but bubbles that break at every breeze, why should we not make the best use of the short span of life, we have at our disposal by drawing our sharp knives from your ear to ear for the satisfaction of our own interests and instincts. What bar is there against our doing this? But, as we often see, they do not do it always and invariably. They organize society and live in it for the common weal and progress. Not only they are often found to subdue their own personal or communal interests ; but they sacrifice themselves at the sacred alter of humanity for progress and perfection. And these and the like ideas and ideals are not compatible with the gladiatorial theory of life and living as measured by the standard of crude materialistic hypothesis either of the *Chârṡāka* school or of Darwinian thought and culture.

Moral difficulties—man has a soul to save.

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Besides the above moral difficulties there are lots of other psychological difficulties of the gravest character involved in the very philosophy of materialism whereon these de-humanising moral codes are based. To cite only a few of them here, it is admitted on all hands that all phenomena of matter and material energies are modes of motion. But consciousness in and through which soul reveals itself is not a mode of motion, and hence consciousness cannot be a bye-product of matter and material forces. Again, the presence of consciousness does indeed make a great difference to the working of the organism. It is mind that controls the organism and life-work could not be the same if consciousness were to cease to be in it. The monumental works of a genius are produced by a hyperphysical power infinitely superior to and higher than the forces accruing from the rushings to and fro and collisions and frictions of the cells and ganglions and molecules or other matter contained in the human skull.

These and similar numberless difficulties are involved in the Materialistic concep-

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tion as to the origin of consciousness for which reason Huxley aptly remarks in his 'Physical Basis of Life,' "I individually am no materealist ; but on the other hand I believe materialism to involve grave philosophical errors." "Anti-materialistic", writes Spencer in his Essays, "my own view is * * *

I agree entirely with Mr. Martineau in repudiating the materialistic interpretation as utterly futile." Darwin enquires, "Is there a fact or a shadow of fact supporting the belief that these elements acted on only by known forces could produce living existence ? At present it is to us absolutely inconceivable."

Admissions
by Huxley,
Spencer and
Darwin.

Such and similar other passages might be gleaned in numbers from the pages of the works of other scientific minds of position and authority to show that materialism fails to dive deep into the metaphysics of things and fathom the underlying mysteries, unless it admits of the existence of a super-physical principle by the virtue of which the atoms and molecules combine and work, according to the inviolable law of *karma*, so as to present to us the bewildering phenomenal

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

No hard opposition between spirit and matter.

activities of nature. And this superphysical principle is our soul-substance. But such an admission of the soul-substance as distinct and apart from dead dull *pudgal* involves dualism of spirit and matter — Jiva (जीव) and Ajiva (अजीव). Indeed, it does involve, for spirit is as self-existent reality as matter itself is. But the Jains say there is no hard opposition between them as would render them incapable of being united in such manner as we find in the case of milk and water. For the attributes of matter are not absolutely contradictory to the attributes of the soul. Matter is only matter in relation to what is not matter i. e., spirit and so is the ease with the spirit itself, and thus there being an organic unity between the two, they stand to each other in relation of object and subject in as much as if there were any *absolute* distinction between them, a distinction which by its very nature would be self-contradictory, it would cut off all connection between the things it distinguished. It would annihilate the relation implied in the distinction itself. An absolute difference, teach the Victorians, is

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something which cannot exist within the intelligible world and the thought which attempts to fix such a difference is unconscious of its own meaning. Thus there is no reason why these two would not enter into relation with each other. "Body and soul", to talk in the language of Young, "are like the peevish man and wife, united jars, yet loath to part." Then, again, we often find ourselves placed in so very uncongenial circumstances that do not suit our constitution at all, and from which, in consequence, we necessarily try to extricate ourselves. The sooner we do it, the better for us. So is the case with the soul. However mysteriously and inconveniently it might have got into the granules of plasms yet the fact is that it is there. We may not see it with our eyes or feel it with the other senses. But what of that? Constituted as we are, do we see force? All that we know of, is motion in and through which both matter and force reveal themselves to us. So mysteriously subtle is this soul-substance in essence, so abstrusely abstract is the idea we can have thereof that it has been taught as belonging

Body and
Soul.

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Soul-Unit's
and self-cons-
ciousness.

to the regions of the un-extended which accounts for the plurality of its existence. The conception of *pudgal*-matter is that it has weight and fills up space ; but the essence of the soul is conceived in self-consciousness absolutely devoid of any tinge of materiality whatsoever. The soul being as such it is according to our philosophy a self-existent ultimate reality without beginning and end. Bereft of all colour, taste, smell and touch, it is metaphysically formless though it takes on the form of that wherein it happens to dwell by virtue of its own *Karma*. Like the vacuous space it has innumerable *pradeshas*. By *Pradeshas* are meant the minutest parts, the soul-units, which do not admit of further psychological analysis. These indivisible parts of the soul or soul-units which are infinite in number are all alike in essence for which reason the soul is said to be characterised by unity with a difference. They are essentially of the nature of conscious effulgence which seems to have been put out, as it were, by the super-imposition of the *Karma* matter on the various parts of the soul, just as a mirror becomes clouded

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with dusts falling on it and appears non-reflecting in consequence. This soul-substance of the Jains, is not a single all pervading reality without a second of its kind to stand by it. There is an infinity of these souls. And though true it is that an infinite number of these has become free from the turmoils of the world ; yet there remains an infinite number struggling for freedom ; for, if infinity is taken from infinity the remainder is infinity itself. It is these souls in plasms that lie scattered in every nook and corner of the universe and each is the doer of good or bad deeds to reap the consequences of which each takes to the repetition of births and deaths according to the merits of its own *karma* and thus traverses through the various grades of *Samsâr*, Heaven, Hell or purgatory or ultimately releases itself from the fetters of bondage by the dissipation of its own *karma* whereupon it becomes pure and perfect and fixed as it were in the regions of *Aloka*.

Souls and
Sansâr.

Thus we see as a reality the soul has no beginning nor end ; but viewed with the light of its own states or grades of existence,

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Emancipation is the attainment of *Nirvānam Shāntam*.

it has a beginning and an end, and herein lies the reason why the soul is stated to be both with and without form. So long it has to go round and round through the repetition of births and deaths it has a form. But viewed with the light of bliss and beatitude which it attains to by being freed from *karma*, it has no form. For, if on the one hand, the soul is to have a form by the virtue of its own, then it cannot but be dull insentient matter-*pudgal* devoid of all consciousness and intelligence (ज्ञान चैतन्य or सखीत) ; on the other hand, if it be absolutely formless then by the virtue of its being free from all activities too (क्रिया-राहित्यात्), bondage and freedom would become incompatible with its own nature and *Sansār* too would be impossible and there would, therefore, be no necessity for teachers to impart instructions on the real nature of the soul nor for scriptures enjoining duties which are required to be performed for the attainment of *Nirvānam Shāntam*.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE KARMA PHENOMENOLOGY.

Constitutional Freedom and Divinity of the Soul—
'Karma' and Soul—How could Soul get enfeathered in
the Chains of 'Karma'—Different Theories as to the
Relation between Soul and 'Karma'—Law of 'Karma'
and Re-birth—The Basis of the Jain Ethics—Heredity
cannot explain differences between *Organisms*—Heredity
and 'Karma'.

In the last chapter we have dwelt on
soul or *jiva* as an eternal self existent reality.
We have seen also that soul is the cogitative
substance in the living world and that it
has ever been trying to break off its adaman-
tine chains of *karma* which binds it down
to the mires of the world. From the fact
that it has been incessantly struggling to free
itself from the shackles of *karma*, that it has
been ever striving to attain to Divinity
by becoming pure and perfect through the
dissipation of its own *karma*, we understand
it to be constitutionally free and potentially
divine. And here it may be question, why
what is constitutionally free and potentially

Constitution-
al Freedom
of the Soul.

AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

Some difficulties--How the absolute became Relative.

pure and divine came to be chained down to the mires of the world. Soul being but a self-existent reality from all eternity must be existing from periods prior to *jiva's karma*. How then what is of subsequent growth can affect the soul which is constitutionally free, pure and formless?

To this the Jain Teachers say that such a question as the present one cannot even be raised. *Karma* is a phenomenon in time ; but soul stands far above time and causation, and until we can logically formulate the question, we cannot reasonably look for an answer to the same. When clearly put, it stands thus, -- How, what is above time and causation came down into the meshes of relativity of the cause and effect? How what is uncaused and increat came to be caused and created as it were? How what is truly pure and free became impure and fettered? How what is essentially divine forsook its very nature? Constituted as we are, we cannot answer this question. We think and we think in relations. So it is impossible for us to think of what stands above all relations or causes and conditions. Is it not absurd to enquire as to how the

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Absolute became Relative or how the Un-caused came to be caused as it were? This is why the Jain Philosophy vehemently objects to the raising of such purile questions.

But yet the fact is there and we cannot deny it. The soul lies there fettered in the *plasms* subject to causes and conditions, to the law of *karma* by the virtue of which it is forced, as it were, to travel through the various grades of *Sansār*. And how are we to account for this? If *karma* be posterior to soul which is pure and perfect and which, in consequence, has nothing to do or perform, how would it come to perform *karma*? Hence *karma* cannot be taken as posterior to soul. Nor can we take *karma* as something anterior to soul; for in that case it would come to be interpreted as the product of *karma*; but the characteristic indications of the soul as taught in our philosophy show nothing as such. It is not a compound of any ingredients standing for the substantial cause of the soul which is self-existent, and, as we have seen, has no beginning nor end so far it is concerned as a metaphysical entity. Then, again, the soul is formless

How do
Soul and
Karma,
stand to
each other

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There is no
room for
God—the
Creator.

and there is no functional activity of the agent in the manufacturing of what is formless. Therefore *karma* cannot be anterior to soul which is but a simple and formless cogitative substance. If it is contended as a third alternative position that both the soul and *karma* came into existence at one and the same time, then it would lead to the difficulty of explaining which would lead whom?—there being no subject in relation to an object. And such being the position the soul cannot suffer under the consequences of *karma* which being co-eternal with the soul has, like the latter also, nothing to stand for its substantial cause. We cannot hold that their Creator stands for the *substantial* cause as well as for the *determinant* cause to bring about the existence of soul and *karma* ; for it would involve the difficulty of explaining as to where was God, the Creator, when these were not. If it is remarked that there was neither merit nor demerit in the begining of things, save and except the soul which is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss, it becomes difficult again to

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explain the various diversities in the phenomenal world—the causes being absent thereof.

All these positions being thus untenable, the Jains hold that both the soul and *karma* stand to each other in relations of phenomenal conjunction, the continuity of which is without beginning in the sense of unbroken series or succession in time (*anādi apaschānupurvi somyog apravāhasamvandīa*). And such is the ocean of *sansār* whereon tumultuous waves variously swelling in names and forms come one after the other and break off dashing against weight of the adamantine chain of the phenomenal law of *karma* causation. *Sansār* is thus subject to the laws of causes and conditions, to the laws of *karma* and omnipresent is the effect thereof in the phenomenal universe. It is mete here to note that suffering is not limited to the human world only, but spreads over all the abodes of existence ; such, as Hell (*narak*), the World of the goblins (*Pretaloke*), Life among the brute-class (*Tiryakayoni*), the World of demons (*Asuraloka*) and the World of Gods (*Devaloka*).

Soul and Karma stand to each other in relation of beginning less conjunction.

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Key-stone
supporting
edifice of the
Jain Ethics.

It is *karma*—the abiding consequences of our own actions—which subject us to revolve round the wheel of births and deaths through all these stages of existence. Our present state of being is not an allotment of a power working upon us from without, but rather is the consequence of our own deeds done in the past, either in the present or in our previous lives or stages of existence. Whatever happens is the effect of some anterior causes and conditions and whatever one reaps, is nothing but the harvest of what one had previously sown. This is the key-stone supporting the grand edifice our ethics which declares the dignity and equality of all souls in any form of their existences and teaches as well that every soul stands erect and independent of the so-called inscrutable will and power of any superior Being to whose silent doors we need not creep for the gratification of our desires and ambitions, nor need we crawl weeping and moaning with a view of purging our souls of sins and iniquities of our own make by His grace. The Jain ethics based as it is on this automatic law of *karma*

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phenomenology, teaches that we are the makers and moulders of our own fate, and infuses life, strength and vigour by awaking in us our high sense of moral obligation and responsibility—the fountain-head of all virtuous deeds.

Karma—what it is and what it means.

Now what is this *karma* on the phenomenology of which the whole of the Jain ethics is based. Etymologically it means *action* or *deed*. But as a philosophical terminology, it signifies not only—*action* but the crystalised *effect* as well of the *action* in so far it modifies the futurity of the doer even beyond death and moulding his career to a great extent in the subsequent states of his existence. A close examination, for instance, of the appearance of man, of the anthropoid ape and of the bat, from almost identical embryos, will make it clear as to what we mean and understand by the operation of the Law of *Karma* in its most general signification.

The embryos of the above named organisms are identical in structure and composition. Hence the embryo of the bat ought to develop into a man. But it does not

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happen. And why? Because of the difference of 'heredity,' as they say, which is the conservative principle accounting for the comparative persistency of the type of the organism. But the validity of this principle of transmission into the offsprings, is still open to question.

Why is it that the children of the same parent show marked dissimilarities to their parents and to one another? Why do the twins develop dissimilar characters and possess irreconcilable tastes and tendencies, though coming almost at the same time, from the same stalk and nurtured and brought up with the same care and affection under similar conditions and environments? These cannot be explained away as accidents. There is nothing as such in science. Nothing in the universe of phenomena and form is exempt from the inexorable law of the cause and effect. There must be some reason, therefore, underlying these inequalities. And what is that reason? To say that these inequalities in children are due to the parents is to admit the truth and validity of the principles of heredity

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and adaptation to the environment as working out these differences in the spheres of organic evolution. But such eminent biologists as Dr. August Weisman and a good many others of equal authority and repute deny that hereditary tendencies of the parents predominate in one ; of the grand-father in another ; those of the grandmother in the third and the like. Not this alone. Weisman goes further and reasons out that the acquired tendencies are never transmitted to the offsprings. He believes in the '*continuity of germ-plasm*' and is of opinion that the inequalities are caused by the differences in '*germ-cells*'. "I have called this substance *germ-plasm*", says Weisman, "and have assumed that it possesses a highly complex structure, conferring upon it the power of developing into a complex organism" Heredity—Vol. I. p. 170). Dr. Weisman states further : "there is therefore continuity of the germ-plasm from one generation to another. One might represent the germ-plasm by the metaphor of a long creeping root-stock from which plants arise at intervals, these latter representing the

Dr. Weis-
man and
Heredity.

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Hereditary
transmis-
sion impos-
sible,

individuals of successive generations. Hence it follows that the transmission of acquired characters is an impossibility, for if the germ-plasm is not formed anew in each individual, but is derived from what preceded it, its structure, and above all, its molecular constitution can not depend upon the individual in which it happens to occur, but such an individual only forms, as it were, the nutritive soil at the expense of which the germ-plasm grows, while the latter possessed its characteristic structure from the beginning, *viz.*, before the commencement of growth. But the tendencies of heredity, of which the germ plasm is the bearer, depend upon this very molecular structure and hence only those characters can be transmitted through successive generations which have been previously inherited, *viz.*, those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the *germ-plasm*. It also follows that those other characters which have been acquired by the influence of special, external conditions during the life-time of the parent, cannot be transmitted at all." (vol. I. p. 273-)
"But at all events," sums up Dr. Wiesman,

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"we have gained this much that the only fact which appears to directly prove a transmission of acquired characters, has been refuted and that the only firm foundation on which this hypothesis had been hitherto based, has been destroyed."—(Vol. I. p. 461).

So we see how the theory of heredity and adaptation, in short, the theory of Natural Selection through the cosmic processes of which Charles Darwin and a host of others of his line of thinking attempted to show the origin of species, fails to explain the real causes and conditions for the specific differentiations in the spheres of organic evolution.

In suffi-
ciency of
Natural
Selection.

The real causes and conditions determining the origin of the different types of organisms are to be found out in the principle of metempsychoses. And if the remarks of Dr. Weisman are read between the lines, it will be quite apparent that the Dr. stands on the very threshold of a revelation. He is knocking at the gate and it will open to give him an entrance into the mysteries of Transmigration, "the undivorceable spouse of *Karma*"; for, according to

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Difficulty involved in Weisman's theory.

the Doctor's hypothesis, the characters of each of the children referred to in the above by way of concrete illustration, are not the results of hereditary transmission but are a manifestation of "those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm." And the, question, therefore naturally crops up in our minds, where did the potential characters and tendencies of the *germ-plasm* originate from? He says, "from the common stock." But what and where that *common stock*, we are to look for? Dr. Weisman does not inform us anything on the point, nor does he solve the real problem at issue.

Besides the physiological principle of hereditary transmission involves grave moral difficulties. It means the iniquities of the fathers visited upon the children. One commits the wrong but another receives the punishment! Can absurdity go any further? The reason why the embryo of the bat cannot develop into a man, consists in this that human organism, according to the Jain philosophy, is the product of a different set of causes and conditions; or

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to put the idea with all the Orientality we can command, because the *karma* of the human being is different. *Karma*, here, does not mean heredity' through the principle of which the offsprings are alleged to inherit the qualities of the fathers. In Jain philosophy, it signifies what the soul carries with itself from an anterior stage of its being by virtue of its prior deeds and desires. The idea is that every thought we think, every act we do, tells upon our souls and thereby leaves an impression upon them, as it were, which continues to exercise influence on them in their subsequent careers. And accordingly our present happiness or misery is not the award of any power existing outside ourselves but is rather the consequent of what we ourselves had done in the past either in this life or in an anterior birth. None is exempt from the operation of *karma*—Nor Krishna, nor Buddha, nor Christ Jesus. This doctrine of *karma* thus unquestionably furnishes the key to the interpretation of the phenomenal greatness in humanity. Christ Jesus of Nazereth was a Christ by the virtue of his own *karma*. So angels

Karman accounts also for all organic changes.

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become angels or they loose their angelhood by the force of their own *karma*. "The experience gained in one life", to quote the language of Hartmann, the great German philosopher, "may not be remembered in their detail in the next, but the impressions which they produce will remain. Again and again man passes through the wheel of transformation, and changing his lower energies into higher ones until matter attracts him no longer and he becomes—*what he is destined to be*—A GOD."

CHAPTER XIX.

CHURCHIANITY AND THE LAW OF KARMA.

Christian Criticism of 'Karma'—Empty Heart of Jainism—Examination of the Criticism—Inconsistencies and Difficulties of the Christian Theology—God and Satan—Good and Evil.—Indian Widows Christian unmarried Girls.

From what has been discussed in the preceeding pages so far the inexorable Law of *Karma*-causality is concerned, it is perfectly clear that man is the maker of his own Destiny. This is the main principle whereon the grand edifice of the Jain ethics is securely based. But this belief in the ethical autonomy of man making him thoroughly free and independent of the iron will of any Being outside himself cannot but irritate Christian minds.

Man is the maker of his Destiny.

"Instead of a God delighting in mercy, who rules and judges the fair world that He has made," writes Mrs. Sinclare Stevenson in her latest contribution, 'The Heart of Jainism,' "the Jain have set in this place a *hædious* thing the accumulated

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Mrs. Sinclair
on the Law
of *Karma*
and Rebirth

energy of his past actions, *Karma*, which can no more be affected by love or prayer than a run-away locomotive. On and on it goes remorselessly dealing out mutilation and suffering, till the energy it has amassed is at last exhausted and a merciful silence follows. The belief in *Karma* and transmigration kills all sympathy and human kindness for sufferers, since any pain a man endures is only the wages he has earned in a previous birth. It is this belief that is responsible among other things for the suffering of the thousands of child-widows in India who are taught they are now reaping the fruit of their own unchastity in a former life."

So writes Mrs. Sinclair in exposing the so-called 'Empty Heart of Jainism' and in vindication of her Christian creed. But alas! she can not explain the world of inequalities and diversities from the stand-point of her *own* Christian Theology. If an All-merciful Personal God created this universe out of nothing, could He not make all things good and beautiful and all beings happy? Why one is a born saint and another a murderer?

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Why one waddles in wealth and opulence and another starves to death ? If God created one to enjoy the pleasures of life which the world can afford to supply with and another to labour life-long under the stifling, tyranny of his master, how could he be an embodiment of All-love and All-mercy ? Need she be told in the language of the poet that "A God All-mercy is a God Unjust."

Christianity teaches that man has but one life on earth to live either for an eternal existence in Heaven or to be condemned into Hell according to the merits or demerits of his deeds. But this naturally encourages a man to make the most of his opportunities here. Besides an appeal for mercy at the hands of an Omnipotent God best suits him who has consciously failed in the discharge of duties. But the great disadvantage of such form of faith is that it makes some violently reckless so much so that when the poet Henri Hein was asked if he believed in Divine Grace, he replied, "God will forgive me, for that is his profession".

Mercy made
for Sinners.

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This dramatical piece incident reminds us of the famous lines of another poet who sang in the following strain;—

“He who does not sin, cannot hope for mercy ;

Mercy was made for sinners ; be not sad.”

The pit-fall
of Original
Sin.

But with the Jains such conceptions do not count for anything. If the Supreme Being *delighting in mercy* is the Prime Author of all that is, He should have shown mercy and perfect forbearance, from the very beginning to man,—His own handi-work, instead of allowing him to fall into the pit-fall of Original Sin. Man is not omniscient, and according to the Christian theology, nor a perfect being as well, and as such he must have his shortcomings and failures ; but as he was living under the protecting and paternal care of his All-mercy Maker, could he not naturally expect that if he were to commit any mistake in his movements, his Omniscient Father and Guardian who must have fore seen things long before he himself could realise, should protect his son, showing thereby, His perfection of forbearance and mercy to his creature which he is to delight in ? We have

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already remarked that we the Jains cannot persuade ourselves to believe in a God in the sense of an extra-mundane Creator who caused the down-fall of mankind but afterwards taking pity on them dropped down from Heaven his only Son through whose crucifixion mankind was saved.

Some Christian Divines hold, however, that the pit-fall of Original Sin which caused the down fall of the entire human race was but dug out by the Devil. They teach that God created all that is good and beautiful and it was Satan who brought in the Evil and spoiled man—the handi-work of God. But little do these Divines think that good and evil are but relative terms. Good can not be without evil and *vice versa* evil without good. There is a soul of goodness in things evil and conversely there is a soul of evil in things good. And when God created what is good he must, at the same time, have created the evil too. Similarly, when the Satan created the evil, he too must have created, at the same time, what is good. Now to view things as they stand, we cannot but logically infer that God

God and
Satan work-
ing together?

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and Devil worked together to create this universe of ours which is therefore but a mixture of good and evil. And to push the question still further, both of them being equally powerful and limited by each other, it follows that neither of them was omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. Does Mrs. Sinclair wish us to set up within the shrines of our tender hearts such a God the very conception of which is logically absurd.

The widows
of India vs.
the unmar-
ried girls of
Europe.

Turning to the effects of *karma* on social matters it is true, indeed, that here the earth is soaked by the tears of the child-widows, but will Mrs. Sinclair inform her readers as to why the Christian world echoes with the sighs of the unmarried? Here the Indian widows had had a chance for the husbands to love and to loose in this life as these were written in the their own *Karma* and there is every reason to hope that they would receive their beloved back more cordially in their warm embraces during the subsequent turn and term of their natural life quite in accordance with their own *Karma*. But what hope

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can Christianity, believing as it does in a single term of life on earth, hold out to the thousands of unfortunate girls who never get any husband to love, while the favoured few who have once been married still have many a chance to grant favours to other men who may win the woman's heart and marry them again? Are there any reasons to assign for the poor unfortunate girls' never getting any husbands to love at all? And did not the poet sing—

What hope
can Chris-
tianity hold
out?

“It is better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.”

Besides if the fear of Hell or the hope of Heaven be a powerful incentive to good conduct in this life, the prospect of countless births and deaths, during the courses of which there are numerous chances for amendments of conduct and which repetition of births and deaths can only end with the attainment of emancipation from the thralldom of servitude must be far more so. With its firm conviction in the inexorability of the law of *Karma*-causality, Jainism regards every successive life as the moulder of the next untill through the entire and

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absolute exhaustion of the individual's *Karma*, liberation is surely and inevitably attained, sooner or later.

In fine Mrs. Sinclair would do well to bear in mind that the law of *Karma* which in the Physical world speaks of the continuity of motion and indestructibility of matter teaches in the domain of Ethics, the immortality of deeds and the inevitability of the moral responsibility in the case of an individual, family, or nation.

CHAPTER XV.

BELIEF IN RE-BIRTH.

'Karma and Rebirths, Complimentary aspects of one and the Same Law Governing the Universe—Buddistic Nihilism - all without an Ego—Belief in the Law brings in Solace and Comfort in ones failures—Wide range of the belief in Asia and Europe—Poets Scientists and Philosophers—Transmigration has its root in reality—Karma Sarir.

While investigating into the causes and conditions for the differences and diversities in the world of names and forms, we have seen that we cannot explain the differences unless we accept the Law of *Karma* and of Rebirth as determining them. *Karma* and Re-birth which are thus, potent factors in the evolution of the world of particulars constituting *Sansâr* are but, two complimentary aspects of one and the same Law governing everything having its being as a part, as it were, of this ocean of *Sansâr*. Boundless is the ocean of *Sansâr* with countless waves ruffling its expanse in the shape of individuals and phenomena. *Sansâr*

Karma and
Rebirth—
potent fac-
tors.

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Even Bud-
hism admits
of Karma
and Rebirth.

is thus a composite existence subject to the control of the Law of *Karma* and Rebirth. Almost all the ancient systems of philosophy, excepting only that of the sage *Brihaspati*, are at one here. Even Budhism which denied the very reality of everything, could not deny the force and validity of the Law of *Karma* and Rebirth. All is impermanent, says a Budha, so that there is no eternal entity passing over to *Nirvân* across the ocean of *Sansâr*. All is without an *ego* so that there is no soul to survive the shocks of death and dissolution. Thus rejecting, on the one hand, the metaphysical entity of *Sansâr* and immortality of soul, Budhism, on the otherhand, teaches that it is *Karma* that sets revolving the '*Wheel of Becoming*.' Or more plainly, it is our *Karma*—the abiding consequences of our actions which subject us to the repetition of births and deaths.

The belief in the law of *Karma* has been very strong in the Indian mind from time out of mind so much so that it has almost become constitutional with the Indians inhabiting this vast penen-

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sula. Not to speak of the higher philosophical treatises of the soil, even the ordinary Indian vernaculars abound in such passages and proverbs which unequivocally bespeak of their staunch faith in one's own *Karma* in such a manner as makes it pretty clear that the belief in question has become a source of solace and comfort in one's disappointments and failures in life. Thus lamenting over the cruelty of fortune, a melodious bird of Bengal sings—"सखि रे कि मोर करमे लिखि"—'Ah! my dear, what alas! was written in my *karma*'.

Wide range
of the belief.

It is important to note that this belief in *Karma* and repetition of births is not confined within the precincts of India only. It is also prevalent in China and Japan. There is a Japanese proverb—"Resign thyself as it is the result of thine own *karma*."

Not the Eastern countries only: an enquiry into the literary contributions of the Christian lands unmistakeably shows how far the doctrine of *Karma* and metempsychoses has influenced the civilization of Egypt and Greece. Even the mighty minds of Europe and America have

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Young, Dryden, Shelley and Wordsworth.

been much swayed by the doctrine. To quote a few verses from the best poets of the Christian world: In the 'Night Thoughts' of Young, the poet sings,—

"Look Nature through, 'tis revolution all,
All change, no death; day follows night, and night
The dying day, stars rise and set, and set and rise.
Earth takes the example. All to re-flourish fades;
As in a wheel—all sinks to re-ascend;
Emblems of man, who passes, not expires."

In Dryden's Ovid we read,—

"Death has no power the immortal soul to slay,
That, when its present body turns to clay,
Seeks a fresh home, and with unlesened might,
Inspires another frame with life and light."

Shelley sings in 'Queen Mab, :—

"For birth but wakes the spirit to the sense
Of outward shows, whose inexperienced shape
New modes of passion to its frame may lend,
Life is its state of action, and the store
Of all events aggregated there
That variegate the eternal universe,
Death is a gate of dreariness and gloom,
That leads to azure isles and beaming skies
And *happy regions* of eternal hope."

In his 'Intimations of Immortality',
Wordsworth informs,—

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"The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar."

In the 'Two Voices' muses Tennyson—

"Or if through lower lives I came—
Tho' all experience past became,
Consolidate in mind and frame—
I might forget my weaker lot ;
For is not our first year forgot ?
The haunts of memory echo not."

Tennyson
and Whit-
man, Hero-
dotus.

Walt Whitman confirms in his 'Leaves
of Grass',—

"As to you, Life, I reckon you are the leavings of
many deaths,
No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times
before."

Such and similar other passages might be culled in numbers to show how the doctrine of metempsychoses influenced the best of the European minds in the domain of Poetry.

Again, Egyptian culture and polity was in and through saturated with the idea of metempsychoses. "The Egyptians propounded," says Herodotus, "the theory that the human soul is imperishable and that where the body of any one dies, it enters

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into some other creature that may be ready to receive it”.

Egypt and
Greece.

Pythagoras says, “All has soul ; all is soul wandering in the organic world and obeying eternal will or law.” According to Maxmuller, claimed a subtle ethereal clothing for the soul apart from its grosser clothing when united with body.”

In Greece, the doctrine was held by Empedocles. The students of Plato must have noticed that the doctrine of metempsychoses forms, as it were, the key note to the principles of causation and compound evolution.

In Plato's *Phædo* we find: “They (souls after death) wander about so long until through the desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are again united in a body and they are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves up to during life or even into the same human species again.”

“The soul leaving body,” says Plotinus, “becomes that power which it has most developed. Let us fly then from here

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below and rise to the intellectual world, that we may not fall into a purely sensible life by allowing ourselves to follow sensible images etc."

Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of Christ, says : "The company of disembodied souls is distributed in various orders. The law of some of them is to enter mortal bodies, and after certain prescribed periods (as according to our *ayuh-karma*) be again set free".

Modern philosophers,
scientists.

Besides these, copious passages could be gleaned from the philosophical writings and dissertations of such eminent men and leaders of thought as Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Goethe and the like. Even the most astute moulder of the Sensationist school of thought, Hume, the sceptic, in his Essay on the 'Immortality of Soul' had to acknowledge the truth and validity of the theory of rebirths. He says : "The metempsychoses is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can harken to".

Prof. Huxley of the modern scientific world somewhere remarks : "None but the

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hasty thinkers will reject it * * * Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its root in the world of reality.'

Christian
Theological
Leaders.

Among the Christian theologians many prominent theological leaders have maintained it. Dr. Julius Muller, the eminent German theologian, supports the theory of Re-births in his work known as "The Christian Doctrine of Sin." Besides Swedenborg and Emerson believed in metempsychoses.

CHAPTER XVI.

RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA.

Prof. Huxley and Re-birth—Huxley's Character and our Karma-matter—Character—Inner Nature—Linga-deha of the Hindu Philosophers—The Five Koahas or the Concentric Circles—Pranas of the Hindus and of the Jain Philosophers—Transmission of Character through Heredity-Vs.-Transmigration of Karma-Sarira through Re-birth.

In another place of his last Romane's Lectures, says Huxley, "Every day experience familiarises us with the facts which are grouped under the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him the obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps remote relationship. More particularly the sum of tendencies to act in a certain way which we call 'character' is often to be traced through a long series of progenitors and collaterals. So we may justly say that this 'character'—this moral and intellectual essence of a man—does veritably pass over from one fleshly tabernacle to another and does really transmigrate from generation to generation. In the new born in-

Huxley on
Law of
Karma.

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fant the character of the stock lies latent, and the ego is a little more than a bundle of potentialities ; but very early those become actualities ; from childhood to age, they manifest themselves, in dullness or brightness, weakness or strength, visciousness or uprightness ; and with each feature modified by confluence of another, if by nothing else, the character passes on to its incarnation in new bodies.

'Character
and Karma'
of Huxley.

"The Indian philosophers called 'Character' as thus defined, '*Karma*'. It is this *karma* which passed from life to life and linked them in chains of transmigrations and they held that it is modified in each life, not merely by confluence of parentage, but by its own acts. They were in fact strong believers in the theory, so much disputed just at present, of the *hereditary transmission of acquired characters*. That the manifestation of tendencies of a character may be greatly facillitated or impeded by conditions, of which self-discipline or the absence of it are among the most important, is indubitable : but that the 'character' itself is modified in this way is by no means so

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certain ; it is not so sure that the transmitted character of an evil-doer is worse or that of a righteous man better than that which he received. Indian philosophy, however, does not admit of any doubt on the subject ; the belief in the influence of conditions, notably self-discipline, on the *karmas* was not merely a necessary postulate of its theory of retribution, but it presented the only way of escape from the endless round of transmigrations."

Huxley's misrepresentation and wrong interpretation of the Law.

Such is Prof. Huxley's interpretation and presentation of the law of *karma* and metempsychoses in Indian philosophy. But we differ from him in as much as neither the interpretation, nor the presentation, on that account, is correct. For we must have to draw a line of distinction between a man and his conditions. According to our philosophy a man may, indeed, be roughly taken as the embodiment of intellectual, spiritual and moral (दश^० न ज्ञान चरित्र) essences which Huxley sums up by the word '*character*.' And the man as such is not different from the sum-total of the the energies summed up by '*character*' as just explained. But then there

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Transmission through
Heredity
or through
Re-births?

is another inviolable physical condition in the shape of a medium for the manifestation and operation of the above energies and it is the mortal physical frame which the *man* takes on. And there is invariably a kind of chemical affinity under the secret influence of which the man is drawn to a particular body wherein he is to take birth. It is true that *man* passes from body to body through the repetition of births and deaths, and as he progresses or retrogresses quite in accordance with the good or bad deeds he performed in the past, it is evident enough that he passes out with his own self-acquired habits, qualities and desires fitly called *karma-sarira* according to our philosophical terminology. But this does not necessarily mean that the habits and qualities he acquired through the processes of natural selection or through the processes of self-discipline he might have undergone—be these for good, or for bad—are transmitted to the offsprings through the physiological principle of heredity. True it is that the offsprings display at times such habits and tendencies as can well be traced out

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as if coming down from the parent or some remote ancestor. The way in which this hereditary transmission is explained by the modern physiologists cannot, as we have seen elsewhere, give us a satisfactory solution of the problem in question. The phenomenon of apparent transmission through the physiological principle of heredity as explained in our philosophy seems to clear up the difficulties involved in the question. According to our philosophy, the re-incarnating soul, bearing as it does about it the *karma-pudgal* which the *Jiva* acquired by dint of its past experiences and unfulfilled desires, forming its character in the past, automatically develops with a mathematical precision, a sort of affinity or tendency of attraction, for the appropriate physiological and moral conditions wherein it may find a fit and favourable soil for moulding out of the same, a suitable body as the manifesting media for the display of its powers and qualities, either to cope with nature in the fulfilment of its unsatisfied desires and enjoyment of the pleasures of the world, or to strive for the

Transmission
through
transmigration
of the
karma-Sarira.

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attainment of bliss and beatitude, as the case may be, according to its *karma* in a previous birth.

Exposition
of the prin-
ciple.

To enter a bit more into details : we have stated before that there is some 'super-physical' power in every living body, by the presence of which the body is enabled to respond, if suitably influenced. Responsiveness, here, forms a predominating phenomenon of life, and death of the body means the departure of the 'super-physical' power, called *atman—Jiva* (soul)—from the living body after which it can no longer respond to any stimulus.

At the time of death, when this soul or the 'super-physical' power shuffles off its mortal coil, it passes out assuming the form of a subtle unit of energy clothing itself, as it does, in a subtle body as its vehicle which is built out of the fine *karma*-matter—the crystalised particles of the soul's past experiences and unfulfilled desires etc. with which it happens to pass out. According to our philosophy, these fine *karma*-matters or the crystalised particles of past experiences and unfulfilled desires, embodied in which the

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soul passes out leaving the body dead, form the very germ of physical life in future.

The use of the phrase "*karma-pudgal*"—*karma*-(matter) is singular in our philosophy. All *karmas*, the other systems of Indian Thought, accept unwaveringly the truth and validity of the doctrine of *karma*-causality and re-births ; but with them *karma* is *amurta*-imponderable. None has yet been found to take the word *karma* in the sense and significance as we find it to have been used in our philosophy. It is true that *karma* of the *Jiva* means its past activities or energies—forces of its own making that tend it to be a murderer or a saint in the next life. But the energies or forces, as they are in themselves are formless and as such they cannot act and react on any thing and produce changes in the tendency of the same. Sky, like void space, because of its being formless, cannot affect us. In order to act and re-act and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies and forces must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces. So are the cases with *Jiva's karma*—its past-activities or energies—

*K a r m a -
pudgal and
Character.*

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forces of its own making, which become metamorphosed as it were into the form of *karma*-particles wherein remain stored up in a potential state all the experiences, desires and tendencies which Prof. Huxley sums up by the word '*Character*.'

*K a r m a -
Sarira.*

The experiences and forces of its own, metamorphosed into a material particles, which the *Jiva* carries with it at the time of its departure from the body wherein it had been encased in a previous birth, and known as the *karma*-pudgal of the *Jiva*—form, according to our sages, the physical basis of a future life. It is also technically called—*Kārman Sarira* of the *Jiva* which along with the *tejas sarira* which is also inseparable from it, clings round to the soul until it reaches final liberation. Here again we find another display of the grand truth teaching us of the indestructibility of matter and continuity of motion—*Karma*.

After shuffling off the gross mortal frame like a pair of old worn-out shoes, the individual soul, taking the form of a subtle unit of energy clothed in the *karma*-pudgal as explained, instinctively flies off to one or the other of the different grades of *sansâr* or

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gati, as it is called, for which it has developed a strong affinity and where, on that account, it may find a more favourable soil for fuller expressions of the energies and forces of its own making during the course of the previous term of the physical life. It may happen to be located for some time in the regions of hell (नरक) or go to some other world. It may travel among the brutes and beasts (तियाँक योनि) or may become a god or a demon in the world of gods and demons (देवासुर लोक). It may also by the virtue of its own *karma* under which it willingly laboured, run to Heaven, the region of the gods, there to enjoy the sweetest pleasures of life which he so much hankered after or be born again to such parents in the human world (मनुष्य लोक) as is consistent with its prior deeds and desires, either to waddle in wealth and prosperity, or to starve to death in poverty, or to strive after bliss and beatitude, forsaking all the pleasures of wordly life and living.

Gatis or the different grades of Sansâr.

So we see that the 'Character' of Prof. Huxley is somewhat the same with the *karma-sarira* in the Jain philosophy. The Hindu

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philosophers also hold that the death of a living being means the departure from the same of a subtle body technically called, *Linga-deha* or *Sukshma sarira*.

Linga-deha
and the five
Koshas of
the Hindus.

The Hindu sages have thought it wise to analyse an organism into five sheaths or *koshas*. The first is the *Annamaya kosh*, (ii) *Prānamaya kosh*, (iii) *Monomaya kosh*, (iv) *Vignānamaya kosh* and lastly (v) *Anandamaya kosh*. It is in the centre of the *Anandamaya kosh* or the innermost sheath that the soul is stated to reside—the outermost being the gross nutritious vesture or sheath called the *Annamaya*. Excluding the out-ermost one, the *Annamaya*—the other four, one coming consecutively within another like concentric circles taken together, constitute the *Linga* or *Sukshma-sarira* or subtle organism of the *Jīva*. The Hindus further hold that this subtle body consists of *chitta* or the mind-stuff with the organs of sense and actions there held together by the energy called *Prān* playing through the medium of the organism. According to the functional activities this *Prān* is further analysed into—

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(a) *Prāṇ* or the inhaling power which moves the lungs.

The *Prāṇas*.

(b) *Apāṇ* or the exhaling power manifest in throwing out foreign and *effete* matter from the system.

(c) *Samāṇ* or the digestive and distributive energy in the system.

(d) *Udāṇ*—is the power of speech. It also helps to the descent of foodstuff through the alimentary canal to the stomach. And lastly,

(e) *Vyāṇ*—is the energy which sustains the body and galvanizes its parts into life and vigour thus protecting it from putrefaction.

Now these organic energies which are but functional activities of one and the same Power—called *Mukhya-Prāṇ* or the Primal Physical Energy along with the five elemental rudiments of the nutritious vesture, bearing the impress of desires, experiences, and ideas formed in the past, make up the *sukshma-sarira* of the Hindu philosophers that passes from body to body through the various grades of *sansār* according to the merits and demerits of the embodied soul.

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Prānas as
detailed in
the Jain
philosophy.

But the *kārman-sarira* in our philosophy is of different make. It is true that the Jain philosophy speaks of *prānas* as organic and bodily powers ; but these develop only as the *Jiva* ascends up the scale of evolution from lower to higher organisms. The highest type of organism of a *Jiva* has ten *prānas* and the lowest type must have at least four. Of the ten *prānas* or powers which are to be found in the higher types of organism as man,—five belong to the five organs of sense, viz., touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Add to these five, the three powers of body, mind and speech (काय मन वचन). The ninth is the power of inhalation and exhalation termed (आन पान) and the tenth is the *ayu-bal*—or the power whereby is determined the longevity of the *Jiva* during which it has to keep to a certain definite configuration of the body in which, it might happen to enter in a particular stage of its existence determined by its own past *• karma*. The Jain philosophers hold, however, that of these *prānas* in their abstract or etherial forms, accompany the *karma-sarira* clothed in which the soul departs from an organism wherein it dwelt for a certain period

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of time by the virtue of its *ayu-bal*, accruing from *ayu-karma* of which we shall have occasion to speak later on. And these abstract (*bhava*) *prāṇas* or powers develop only when the *kārma-sarira* enters a particular organism according to its own *karmas*. But all the types of organism do not possess the five senses ; neither all can speak, nor all have the intellect to think. While dealing with the *Jīva* in the chapter of categories, we have seen that *jivic* organisms are classifiable according to the number of the organs of sense they possess. It is important to note by the way that each of these types of organism is again divisible into two sub-classes—known by the names of *Paryāpta* and *Aparyāpta*. The *paryāptas* are six in number, viz., *ahār* or the seed of life ; *sarira*, or the body ; *Indriya* or the senses, *svāshochchāsa* or breathings, *bhāṣā* or speech, and *mana* or mind. The *pāṇas* and the organs develop as the *jīva* migrates on and on through the processes of metempsychoses. It is impossible to exhaust in the short space at disposal, the list of the different types of organism which the *karma-sarira* takes on,

Paryāptas
and Apar-
yāptas.

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The *Jiva* migrates out with the potentialities of the organs of its future body.

according to the ideas and desires registered on it. In fact, it shows to our wonder and admiration how could the Jain sages amass in that ancient time such wealth of biological informations on morphological variations of organisms.

But to return to the direct subject matter : Prior to its migrating from the *oudārika* body or the gross physical frame, the *jiva* fixes its *gati* or the particular abode, and actually migrates out with the potentialities of developing these *prāṇas* and the organs. But these are developed as necessity arises for the formation of the particular new organism it is going to enter into. And the developments are quite in keeping with its previous *karma* and take place subsequent to its entering into the new body as determined.

Thus we see the *karma-sarira* of a *jiva*, as explained in the Jaina philosophy, is simply a kind of organism born of its own experiences i.e. energies and forces of its own making which become materialised, as it were, into *karma-pudgal* or *karma-matter* enveloped in which the individual soul, reducing itself into a unit of energy, passes out.

RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA.

Every thought we think, every word we speak, every act we do, every desire we form—becomes rarified and stored up in our Experiential body. It remains dormant there for sometime only to reappear again in the form of mental waves with all the potentialities of strong desires etc. Nothing can prevent the courses of desires. Desires must be fulfilled. This is the law of Nature. The will is equally and indistinguishably desire and thought. It is the will to be, to assert and thereby exist as a distinct and separate from all the rest, that is the root of everything we see around us in the world of particulars. It is but a truism to say that different thought-activities manifest themselves in different outward forms. The science of physiognomy and thought-reading owe their development to the study of the changes in the outward manifestation of the organism, corresponding to the changes in the mental constitution. And organisms may vary not only in respect of their structures, but in respect of their tendencies to do this or the other in all kinds of ways. The thought-currents for tasting finally results in the organic

Organism
is but an out-
ward mani-
festation of
its thought
and will.

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'The will is
simply the
man.'

formation of the tongue. So the ear, the nose etc, can like wise be traced to the thought-currents for hearing music, for smelling fragrance and the like respectively. Every bodily structure corresponds to each set of thought-currents called, *upânga-nâma karma* of the *jiva* to which it belongs. So is the case with the human organisms in general. Human organism, to speak more pointedly, is but the objectification in a gross form of the human action-currents of will and thought. Kant, the great German philosopher, says of man that "his will" is his 'proper self.' "The will is simply the man," says T. H. Green. "Any act of will is the expression of the man as he, at the time, is. The motive issuing in his act, the object of his will, the idea, which for the time he sets himself to realise, are but the same thing in different words. Each is the reflex of what for the time, as at once feeling, desiring and thinking the man is" Man is thus but a visible expression of his will which is equal to and indistinguishable from his thought-activities. But will and thought, simply as they are in themselves, are mere abstractions,

RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA.

and cannot therefore as such modify the character of our organism ; for how, what is merely a pure abstraction, can affect our material constitution ? but we feel that every act we do, every thought we think, and every desire we form, does actually produce changes in us and there can be no denial of it. Therefore the actions and desires to be in a position to effect any change in us must transform themselves into a medium of homogeneous nature with our physical constitution itself. But the question arises how can it be conceived ? Psychology shows quite unmistakeably that no desire, no feeling, no connotation passes the threshold of our mind without, in some-way, modifying the neural processes. We forget what we felt or did before. But the whole system vaguely experiences a sort of diffused effect of what has been. Modern psychology would tell us that they abide in the region called, "subconscious." But our psychology teaches that just as a volume of water rushing out, leaves its traces of watery particles on the person who stands close by : so the action-currents of the human thought and will leave vestiges on its

K a r m a -
sarira and
modern psy-
chology.

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experiential body which brings about a new arrangement in the atomic distribution of the *karma-pudgal* composing the *karma-sarira*.

The Inner
Nature and
the Outer
Nature.

Whatever might be the mystery, it is clear and certain that human thoughts and desires are embodied in or objectified into the human *karma-sarira*. Thus the *karma-sarira* then forms the 'inner'-nature of which the visible man is but an 'outer' expression. The Inner and the Outer, according to our philosophy, are not essentially different. They are the same essentially with this difference only that one manifests through the other and stand to each other in the relation of mutual intermutation. Just as there is no essential difference between force and exertions ; for force is only known in and through exertion making it to be the effect of the cause which is no other than the force itself : so what is 'inner' is but the invisible cause of what is outer which is but an effect in a visible form.

CHAPTER XXII.

KARMA-SARIRA AND OUDARIKA-SARIRA.

Relations between the 'Karma' and the 'Oudârîka'—
Stages of development—'Karman' produces the
'Oudârîka'—'Oudârîka' produces 'Karma'—Not Identical but Two distinct Entities—Co-existence Inexplicable—Then no Inter-action possible Relation of Concomitant Variation—Difficulties of Parallelism—The 'Karman' body and the 'Oudârîka' stand to each other in Relation of Intermutation.

We shall now discuss the relation between the *Karma* body including *Tejas*, or the 'inner nature' and the *Oudârîka* body or the 'outer nature' of man. And as it is a stumbling block for the beginners, it deserves a careful consideration. Without asserting any thing dogmatically, we shall only discuss every possible hypothesis which can be framed with regard to this relation and show that, for the contradictions involved therein, none of them appears to be rationally tenable save and except the position held by our sages. Our procedure here, therefore, will be more or less dialectical i.e. we should point out poverty of each

How to treat
the question.

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hypothesis by bringing into light the inconsistencies involved therein.

Stages of
development
of the same
thing—its di-
fficulties.

One may suppose that the relation in question is simply that of development. The inner nature develops itself into the outer nature as the plant grows into a tree or the world develops itself into the present form from the primal state of nebulous matter. What lends plausibility to this hypothesis is the fact of the inner nature being more subtle than the outer nature which is grosser than the former. The very characteristic indication of an effect, is its grossness and the reason of it, is to be found in the fact that what remains unmanifested in the cause becomes manifested in the effect.

But unfortunately the advocates of this theory overlook the serious difficulties which lurk in it. First of all we draw attention to this that if they be the different stages of development of the same thing, then by the very nature of the case, they cannot be co-existent. Development implies change; change implies time. And 'stages' have any significance only with reference to different periods of time. As the plant

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ceases to exist, when it has grown up into a tree, so the inner world would cease to have its being after its transformation into the outer world, for they belong to the same thing although at different periods of its development. The fact of co-existence being thus inexplicable, the mutual interaction between them, which cannot be denied becomes inexplicable also.

The relation of cause and effect and its difficulties.

Of course if the *purvapakshin* say that the earlier state is not altogether lost in the later state of a thing *developing*, but is retained there : our obvious retort will be that if it is retained at all, it is retained in such a transformed manner that it loses its distinct existence. For what is accidental to the different stages of a *developing* thing, vanishes away with the lapse of time and what persists is the essence or the substance in abstract which reveals itself through these different stages of development.

To get over the difficulties as exposed in the above, some may erroneously hold that the inner nature produces the outer nature of a man. The relation is that of a cause and effect.

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Ouddārika is the cause of the *Kārman*: its difficulties.

This theory also labours under serious difficulties. The first question which we put to such theorists is, how does it produce the outer nature of man? Mere being or the fact of existence of the inner nature cannot account for the origin of the outer nature. The mere being of a thing cannot explain the origin of another thing, so we are led to assert that the *Kārman-sarira* transforms itself into the *Ouddārika sarira*. Here the same difficulties re-appear! How to explain the fact of (1) Co-existence and (2) Inter-action.

Others may think that the right theory is this: *Kārman-sarira* does not produce the *Ouddārika sarira*, but on the contrary *Ouddārika* produces the *Kārman-sarira*.

Ouddārika is the cause of the *kārman-sarira*: but this theory is open to another fresh objection in addition to the previous difficulties. The activity of the *Ouddārika-sarira* is possible only when it is actuated by desires and will. Has any body heard of unmotivated activities? And these desires and will belong to the *Kārman-sarira*: so the obvious mistake is here to make the presupposition of a thing, the product of it. That without which the

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activity of the *Oudārika* is not possible, cannot be reasonably conceived to be the product of the activity itself.

So the only way of escape from this difficulty, at first sight, seems to be this : neither of them produces the other, but both are co-existent. They have been maintaining their distinct existence from eternity so to speak. —

But to say this, is also not enough. We have got to define the precise relation existing between them. It will not do to simply say that they have been eternally existing as distinct entities, for the fact of inter-action between them requires to be explained.

The different
relation and
its difficulties

Now different hypothesis may be framed with regard to the precise nature of inter-action. Some may suppose that there is no interaction proper, but the relation of concomitant variation subsists between them. The changes in the one correspond to the changes in the other, though they are two distinct entities or worlds, having nothing in common.

Our reply is that it sees the half-truth only. In fact there is a relation of con-

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comitant variation, for the change in one manifests itself in a corresponding change in the other. But this relation is not possible and cannot be satisfactorily explained, if they be not ultimately the same, or to put it in other words, if a common blood does not run through their veins. But this is negated by the hypothesis, for by *ex-hypothese* they have been assumed to be two distinct worlds having nothing in common.

The relation of concomitant variation : its difficulties.

Others, in order to escape from these difficulties, may suppose that some influence in some form or other, passes into the thing called effect and produces changes in the same. The interaction is not apparent here as in the former case, but real. The cause exerts some influence upon something else and thereby produces changes in the same which we call effect.

This at first sight seems to possess much of plausibility, though it cannot stand to a careful scrutiny of reason. The difficulty here is this : where does the influence rest before its being received by the thing for which it is meant ? We cannot conceive of any influence passing out of a thing and

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resting in nowhere and then entering another thing we call effect ; for, the conception itself is a psychological impossibility. So here too is a big chasm in our thought. Thus we see none of these hypotheses can stand the test of reason and we are thus led by an immanent process of dialectic to our own theory, the only theory logically tenable and free from these short-comings as we shall presently see.

By *Karma sarira* we mean that *Experiential body* where the effects caused by the *Oudārika* are stored up as it were in a subtle form. The operation of the *Oudārika* or the Perceptual organism leaves a permanent vestige upon the *kārman*, known as *karma*-vestige, just as the agitation of the brain molecules in thought, leaves a permanent vestige upon the brain itself. This is what we mean by *kārmic* effects. These *kārmic* effects, again, as we shall show hereafter, determine the nature of the perceptual organism or the *Oudārika* body. The operation of the *Oudārika* body leaves this *karma*-vestige upon the *Experiential* body and thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while on the other hand,

The two stand to each other in relation of Inter-mutation.

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the *kārman*, the organ of thought, desires and will, determines the character of the former by its preferential interest. So the relation is intermutative. And this is borne out by our analysis of the question at issue.

How they
act a n d
re-act ?

The relation between *karma*-body and the *Ouddrika*—this is our immediate topic. And we begin our discussion by defining the two in the clearest possible manner. By *kārman*-body we mean the *Experiential*-body where the effects caused by the *Ouddrika*-body are stored up, as it were, in a subtle form. The operation of the *Ouddrika*-body or the Perceptual organ leaves a permanent vestige upon the *karma*-body known as *karma*-vestige, just as the agitation of the brain molecules in thought, leaves a permanent vestige upon the brain itself. This is what we mean by *karma*-matter. This *karma*-matter again,, we shall show hereafter, determines the nature of the perceptual organ or the *Ouddrika*-body. The operation of the *Ouddrika*-body leaves thus vestiges upon the experiential body and thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while on the other, the *karma*-body or the organ

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of thought, desires and will, determines the character of the former by its preferential interest. So the relation, from one aspect is one of correlativity. We shall prove this in various ways.

Perception
belongs to
the *Oudārika*
and,

We all know that we have both perception and conception of a thing. And we know further that perception is directly related to the object, for it follows the direct presentment of the object to the senses, whereas conception is indirectly related to the object through perception. The former, we are of opinion, belongs to the *oudārika* body (औदारिक शरीर) or the perceptual organism where external objects are directly presented to and the latter namely, conception, desire, and will belong to the *kārman* body (कर्मण शरीर ;) for these are referred to the object only indirectly through the senses. But what is a conception ? Is it not perception universalised ? A conception becomes a chimera, barren and empty, if it is not capable of being fulfilled by the direct presentment of the object on the senses which constitutes perception. How are we to know otherwise which conception is

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Conception
to the *Kār-*
man-body.

valid? Validity can well be established by the actual sensory contact of the object conceived. The conception thus becomes something general, universal in character, which differentiates itself, so to speak, without losing its unity and character, into so many individual actual objects capable of being presented to the senses. The individual objects, the subject-matter of the perceptual organ, becomes so many concrete embodiments of the conception itself which cannot be, like the former, presented to the senses. From the point of view of the perception also, it may be shown that they are unintelligible, unless they are interpreted with the light of the concept itself. An individual, or a single perception, caused by the actual contact of the object with the senses, remains unintelligible, unless it is subsumed under its respective concept which is, again, nothing but perceptions universalised. The conception we thus see, is the perception itself in its universal character and embodies itself in the actual objects forming the subject-matter of the perceptual organism (*चौदारिक शरीर*) and the perception is nothing but specific differen-

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tiation and fulfilment of the conception. To say this is therefore to say that they are but two aspects of the same thing—one is universal and the other is specific in characters. And as through perception, the conception becomes fulfilled, we may call the perceptual organism (औदारिक शरीर) to which belongs the attribute of perception, as *instrumental* to the fulfilment of the conceptual organism (कर्मण शरीर) to which belong these concepts, and both of them thus stand in the relation of mutual inter-dependence.

Constitution
of the *Kār-*
man body.

Thus from what precedes it follows logically and necessarily, that all the varying experiences, which we get from time to time from the peripheral contact of the external objects with the senses, are contained in a nutshell, as it were, in the conception itself ; for here all the various perceptions which occur from time to time are preserved, they being but specific fulfilments of the concept itself. This is then what we mean by saying that *kārma* matter (कर्म पुद्गल) is being stored up in the *karman* body (कर्मण शरीर ।)

To discuss the question from another point of view by drawing a distinction

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another point
of view.

between the experiences of the *Ouddarik* body (**औदारिक शरीर**) and the experiences of the *kārman* body (**कार्मण शरीर**). By *ouddrika* (**औदारिक शरीर**) we mean our neural organism which is the vehicle of the sensations, gross in form. While the experiences of the *kārman* body (**कार्मण शरीर**) is confined within its thought, ideas, desires and will. Here there is an important matter to note. The experiences of the *Ouddrika* body (**औदारिक शरीर**) which follows on the direct presentment of the actual objects, have no interest for us unless they are owned by us i.e. referred to our own *inner nature* or *kārman* body (**कार्मण शरीर**). To be conscious that I am experiencing such and such things, the whole of objective experience requires to be viewed as the experience of my *inner nature* or in other words the objective experience, belonging to the *ouddrika* body (**औदारिक शरीर**) must be referred back to and determined by the *inner nature* ; otherwise the experience, being devoid of every subjective reference, will lose all interest for us, and cannot be viewed as my own experience. The *outer* experience, unless they are referred

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back to and determined by our *inner nature* stands on the same level as other phenomena occurring in Nature. But these states of changes become the source of interest for us as soon as as they are viewed as experiences of the *kārman* body (कार्मण शरीर) itself. So our *inner* experience or the experience of the *kārman* body is not only the *outer* experience merely condensed and materialised, but it is something more.

The Outer and the Inner mutually and partly determine each other.

It is not another kind of experience to be set by the side of the *outer* experience, but one which includes the latter and goes beyond it. It is the *outer* experience itself focussed and referred to and determined by our *inner-nature*. Hence it follows that they are not two distinct worlds of experience, but ultimately the same, with this distinction only that one is devoid of every subjective reference while the other is not.

Hence (1) if the operation or the activity of the *oudārika* body (औदारिक शरीर,) when not referred to and determined by the *inner nature*, standing on the same level as other phenomena of Nature, becomes morally blank, and assume moral quality, only on their refer-

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The *Kârman* body as suggestive of the persistence of personality and re-birth.

ence to the *inner nature*, and if (2) human experience be possible only on this ascription or reference, it follows necessarily that every activity or karma leaves behind an effect either good or bad in the shape of vestiges on the *kârman* body (कर्मण शरीर)—our *inner nature* or the *Character* of Prof. Huxley.

Having discussed the relation between the *Inner-nature*, *Kârman* body (कर्मण शरीर), and *Oudârîka* body (औदारिक शरीर), or *Outer-nature* we come to the question of re-birth. So long we discussed the problem of relation in theoretical terms. But the world, we live in, is a moral world, nay, even more, a practically significant world than it is a theoretically definable world. And we may, at once, simply say that the concept of the *individual* in its primary and original sense is distinctly an ethical concept and that is so whether you speak in theoretical terms or in terms of being. So from this conception of individuality we hope to see to the possibilities of rebirth, not merely as a logical necessity but as that without which the purpose of man's individuality will be altogether balked.

KARMA AND OUDARIKA-SARIRA

As a mere theoretical thinker, we cannot get any idea of individuality, nor can we form any clear conception of it. We can prove all this by psychological analysis of the development of a child's mind. A child's first ideas are all unconsciously universal or vaguely abstract ideas. Even the child's first conscious ideas must be of what we call the universal as such. The many presentations he cannot yet know as so many individuals ; for he cannot grasp single facts for their own sake. He only learns to recognise the type which persists through many presentations. He knows things by types, by universals. The one that persists through the many, he comes to recognise as the one, the universal, the type, the idea. As a mere theoretical thinker his progress has stopped and cannot go beyond it.

The idea of individuality
—how it develops?

But observe another side of his nature. He has a doll ; and say, he loves it. He breaks it. Now offer him another doll as nearly as possible like the former one. Now will the child accept this as compensation ? No. And what is the reason of this ? It is this that the love for this toy is in its

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The point of
individuation

subjective, instinctive, pre-conscious type an exclusive love, and is such a feeling that the idea of the two objects that can be conceived as giving equally possible satisfaction of this feeling is an absurd idea. At this moment he consciously individuates the toy and this is so because he loves the toy with an *exclusive* love that permits no other. With such exclusive interests, one learns to love one's home, books, children etc. Hereby one becomes conscious of a thing not as an object that represents a class, for exclusive interest does not permit it, but views it as a single member of a single class. This is the point where he individuates it.

Thus we see ethical love, or organising interest is precisely that sort of interest that cannot serve two masters. It first individuates the master and then others in relation to it, that come in the way of means to it. It is this individuating interest in living one kind of life for one *purpose* in view that a man becomes a moral individual, self-same personality and not a totality of passing states as the Sensationist School or the Buddhists hold.

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Now to consider our own theory regarding *kârman* body (कार्मण शरीर) : *Jiva* incessantly tries and struggles to get rid of the bondages of limitations, through *Karma*, as we have seen before. This becomes its *exclusive interest*. The love for particular mode of living i.e. the mode in which the liberation can easily be achieved, becomes the exclusive interest for the man and tends to individualise him. This exclusive love for this state of autonomy or self-rule, which no body can attain just in the way open to him, tends to individuate his activities and conduct, as well as the outer organism the *oudarika* body (औदारिक शरीर), by means of which actions conducive to the self-rule or autonomy are performed. Thus we may say that though the *kârman* body (कार्मण शरीर) may resemble others of the same kind in types universal in character, still, considered as *individualised* that is in the sense we have expounded above, they are quite distinct and separate entities. Individuals they are and must be, for all have exclusive interest for the attainment of that state of autonomy, of bliss and beatitude which is

Freedom from bondage—the exclusive interest.

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the real and ultimate goal of all that live, move and have their being in the different abodes of the *Sansār*. Now do we not see that without immortality and re-birth of the *Jīva*—i.e., without the persistence and continuance of the *Kārman*-body through the ravages of time and the processes of metempsychosis the whole purpose of such life and individuality as manifest in the incessant struggling of the *Jīva* becomes absolutely meaningless !

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