KAMALAŚĪLA’S INTERPRETATION OF ‘NON-ERRONEOUS’
IN THE DEFINITION OF DIRECT PERCEPTION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS

by

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I. Introduction

Dignāga (ca. 480–540) defined direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the cognition which is free from conception. Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) added to it the further element ‘non-erroneous’ (abhrānta); i.e., “(The cognition which is) free from conception and non-erroneous is direct perception.”¹ 'Non-erroneous' was added for the first time in the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Of course Dharmakīrti was not the first person who mentioned it in the history of Indian epistemology. It corresponds to avyābhiḥcāra (non-erroneous/non-deviating) in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4² and, in Buddhist literature, to avibhrānta (non-erroneous) in the Yogācārabhūmi.³ Also, the word abhrānta is found in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya.⁴ Therefore Dharmakīrti’s addition was the re-adoptation of what had once been dropped in Dignāga’s definition.⁵

I will examine in this article some special features remarkable in the chapter Pratyakṣalaksana-parikṣa of the Tattvasamgraha by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795). It is a commentary on the Tattvasamgraha 1212–1360 by his teacher Śaṅkarācārya (ca. 725–788). They followed Dharmakīrti’s philosophy as the main basis of their own philosophical investigations.

In the chapter concerned, Tattvasamgraha 1311–28⁶ is the section which explains the significance of ‘non-erroneous’. I want to inspect Kamalaśīla’s explanations in connection with other texts in order to understand what kind of theoretical changes were actually developed in the

¹ pratyakṣam kalpanāpādham abhrāntam. Alternatively, the subject and the predicate of the sentence can be reversed (i.e., “Direct perception is free from conception and non-erroneous.” Funayama [1992: 46; 59f. n. 39]).
² NS 1.1.4: indriyārthasamnikarosparipānā rājānām avyāpadeśām avyābhiḥcārā vanavasyāṃsakaṃ pratyakṣam Ṣ.
³ “Perception is the cognition which is generated through the contact of the sense organ with the object, which is not expressible, which is non-erroneous and which is essentially of a determining character.”
⁴ YBh (Yaita [1992: 517]): pratyakṣam katamat / yad aviparokṣam anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam avibhrāntam ca l. “What is the object of perception? (It is the entity which is) not beyond the sense organ and which is neither conceived nor to be conceived.” I surmise that this is one of the main sources for Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s definitions of direct perception; anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam in YBh corresponds to kalpanāpādham, though the expression is different, and avibhrāntam in YBh to abhrāntam in Dharmakīrti’s definition.
⁵ Schmithausen [1965: 153f.; 1972: 154]. ASBh 152,30: abhrāntaghaṇasyam alāttacakramātya- mārīcākādiveyuddāsārham iti l. “‘Non-erroneous’ is employed in order to negate (erroneous cognitions) such as (a vision of) a circle in a (rapidly whirling) fire-brand, a phantom and a mirage.”
⁶ Jap. tr. in Ishibashi [1993]. Also see Jha’s translation of the whole text.
eighth century. It is an attempt to shed new light on what is called by Stcherbatsky\textsuperscript{7} ‘The Philological School of Commentators’. I will make my intention clear by summarizing here the basic structure of the concerned section. Šantarākṣita opens the section by pointing out that ‘non-erroneous’ is necessary in the definition in order to rule out from direct perception an erroneous cognition of ‘hair-mesh’ (‘hair-net’) and the like (keśondukađijñāna) [1311]. Such a cognition is considered to be a perceptual error (bhrānti) caused by a sense organ (indriya). This idea Šantarākṣita owes to Dharmakīrti. Much more interesting is his disciple Kamalaśīla’s elucidation of ‘non-erroneous’: Kamalaśīla takes it to be an equivalent of ‘non-deceptive’ (non-belying/consistent; avisamvādin/avisamvādaka) which is found in the general definition of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). As pointed out in previous studies, this equivalency is also indicated by Vinītadeva, and his idea was severely criticized by Dharmottara. This is one of the most important features of Kamalaśīla’s theory of perception. I believe that the same idea is presupposed by Šantarākṣita, too. I will take up this topic below and discuss the origin and the significance of this peculiar interpretation (see Section IV).

After the above-mentioned introductory stanza, Šantarākṣita introduces and criticizes the contrary idea that a cognition of ‘hair-mesh’, etc., is generated by the mind, and not by a sense organ [1312–13]. This idea is found in the Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti,\textsuperscript{8} so Šantarākṣita’s opponents must have existed before Dharmakīrti and not been his real contemporaries. Discussions are then expanded in the succeeding part through a further objection and reply [1314–1322], but I can’t see any essential difference from Dharmakīrti’s intention. Hence I suppose that stanzas 1312–22 are more or less a reproduction of Dharmakīrti’s arguments.

Next, Šantarākṣita proceeds to a new point [1323–28]. The following objection is raised: A cognition of a yellow conch (piṭaśaṅkādiśiśiśāna) for a white conch, etc., is direct perception. Such a cognition is certainly erroneous in terms of its color. However, inasmuch as it is a cognition of ‘conch’ when its color is disregarded, it realizes the efficacy of a real conch, so that it is a means of valid cognition as direct perception [1323]. This objection is more minutely explained in the Pañjikā, according to which the propounders were certain Buddhist insiders who followed only Dignāga’s definition and insisted that ‘non-erroneous’ should not be added, because it contradicts the cognition of a yellow conch, etc. Kamalaśīla’s opponents refer to a passage of Pramāṇa-samuccaya, too, and interpret the disputable word sataimira of the Pramāṇasamuccaya I 8b. I consider that the interpretation is based on the statement of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasaṁuccaya-tikā. I shall discuss this below in Section V.

Against this, Šantarākṣita’s own idea is stated in 1324–28. He never admits the validity of the cognition of a ‘yellow’ conch. To Šantarākṣita what there really is is only the color (varṇa) of the object; the shape (samsthāna) of the object does not exist as distinct from its color. That is why there is no validity in the cognition of ‘a yellow conch’ insofar as the shape is no more than the secondary construction through erroneous color-cognition [1326].

In this way, the discussions of Tatvasaṁgraha 1311–28 and the corresponding Pañjikā are

\textsuperscript{7} Stcherbatsky [1932: 39f.].
\textsuperscript{8} PV III 294–298 and PVin I 76.26–78.5.
divided into three sections: first, the general explanation for the necessity of 'non-erroneous'[1311]; second, the refutation of the opponents’ idea who attributed all perceptual errors to conceptual construction [1312–22]; and third, the criticism to those who did not admit the necessity of 'non-erroneous' with special attention to a cognition of 'a yellow conch' for a white conch. Among them, as pointed out above, the second group does not closely reflect the actual philosophical situations of Śāntarakṣita's age. Therefore, the other two groups are more important, as representing the actual philosophical circumstances in the eighth century. Namely, why did Kamalaśīla consider that 'non-erroneous' is a synonym of 'non-deceptive' and in which way was the problem of 'yellow conch' propounded and refuted?

II. Kinds of Illusion

Generally speaking, erroneous cognition is expressed by the word bhrānti (error; = bhrānti-jñāna). It is often explained by the formula 'taking non-X to be X' (atasmīṃs tadgraḥah). The Yogacārabhūmi enumerates five kinds of bhrānti with illustrations:

1. Error regarding the representation (śamjñābhṛānti); e.g., a cognition of water for a mirage of water.
2. Error regarding the number (śamkhyaḥbhrānti); e.g., a cognition of many moons for the moon by a person who suffers from timira-disease.
3. Error regarding the shape (śamsthānabhṛānti); e.g., a cognition of a circular form in a rapidly whirling fire-brand.
4. Error regarding the color (varṇabhṛānti); e.g., a cognition of yellow for a non-yellow object by a person who suffers from jaundice.
5. Error regarding the movement (karmabhṛānti); e.g., a cognition of moving trees by a person who is running fast with his fists firmly clenched.

Other texts refer to yet other examples: e.g., a cognition of silver for a white conch, and a cognition of a snake for a rope [these will correspond to śamjñābhṛānti in the above list]; and 'travelling on a boat' (nauyāna), which means that the trees on the coast seem to move in the case of a person on a fast-moving boat (karmabhṛānti). Yet another stock example in many texts is a cognition of hair-mesh (keśondukajñāna) by a person who suffers from timira-disease.

A cognition of many moons for the moon’ in the Yogacārabhūmi is essentially the same as a more popular illustration: ‘a cognition of a double moon’ (dvicandrajñāna), very often connected with timira-disease. However, some texts state it not as a result of sickness but as a cognition which occurs to a sound person. For instance, the Fang bian xin lun states, “One sees a double moon when he presses his eye with a finger.”

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9 NBh 113.3f.: yad atasmīṃs tad iti tad vyabhicārī yata te atasmīṃs tad iti tad avyabhicārī prayākṣam iti (see also Schmithausen [1965: 154]). PVSV 49.3–7: ... vastūpattār abhrāntir iti cet / na / atatpratibhāsinas taddhyavasādhy/or maniḥprabhdhaḥ maniḥbhṛatidarsanam va vyabhicārī ca / bhṛānter avastusamvāda iti cet / na / yathoktāna va vyabhicārī / vitathapratibhāso hi bhṛānti/laksanam /. PVII 11.1: atasmīṃs tadgraḥo bhṛāntir api ... VV 138.2: atadātmanī taddhyprayaptir bhṛāntih /.

10 Yaita [1992: 520f.; 556f].

11 For timira see Tillemans [1990: vol. 1, 236 n. 156; 275 n. 370] and Kanazawa [1987: 31–41].

12 This is essentially the same as ‘a cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch’ in TS(P).

13 方便心論 (T vol. 32: 25b); 以指按目，則覩二月. According to the Chu san zang ji ji (出三藏記集; T vol. 55: 13b), the text was translated in 472 A.D.
explains it in like manner in his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā.14

Further, Dharmakīrti and his followers noticed the distinction between two kinds of erroneous cognition: a perceptual error caused by a sense organ (indriyabhṛṇti) and that caused by the mind (manobhṛṇti).15 They are paraphrasable in turn by indriyajā bhṛṇtiḥ and mānasī bhṛṇtiḥ.16 Here, indriya of course signifies five kinds of sense organ (pañcendriya). Mānasī bhṛṇtiḥ belongs to conceptual cognition (vikalpajñāna).

III. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

Dignāga’s definition of direct perception, pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham, suggests the denotative identity between ‘being direct perception’ and ‘being free from conception’. According to this, any cognition that is free from conceptual construction is direct perception; any erroneous cognition is of the conceptual character. As far as the definition of direct perception (pratyakṣa) and that of pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa) are concerned, Dignāga never admitted the existence of a cognition which is free from conception but still erroneous (I call such a cognition ‘sensory illusion’ hereafter). In the Nyāyamukha, Dignāga enumerated, as pseudo-perception, cognitions such as collection (smārta), inference (anumāna), cognition related with wish (ābhilāṣika), doubt (samsāyā), illusory cognition (bhṛṇtiḥāna) and cognition of empirical reality (saṃvrtisajñāna), and he attributed their causes to conceptual construction.17 The same is true of the corresponding passages of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. However, the situation is different in the case of the Pramāṇasamuccaya I 7c–8b, upon which that very commentary is made:

ḥṛṇtiḥaṃsāṃvṛtaśajñānaḥ anumāṇānumāṇikam // 7cd
smārtaḥbhilāṣikam ceti pratyakṣābham sataimiram // 8ab18

14 Bu ston’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā 128.2f. (Tosaki [1990: 62 n. 20]): mig btsir ba sogs dbang po ‘gyur na ‘gyur ba’i phyir te / (a commentary on PV in I 76.30 = indriyavikāre ca vikārā).
15 The exact meaning of manas (the mind) is a problem in the case of the Buddhist pramāṇa-tradition. First of all, it would not be correct to distinguish manas from manovijnāna in the very strict sense, as Dharmakīrti sometimes uses manas in the sense of manovijnāna; see, e.g., PV III 243 and 252. A similar tendency is traced in Ratnakīrti’s explanation of manas in the context of mānasapratyakṣa in SS (17,23): atrocēta / manahsābedena tavad āsmaṇam anakṣajāṃ vijnānam evābhīpretam / . . . “Here we reply: First of all, the word manas signifies in our theory the very cognition that is not generated through any sense organ. . . .” Further, it is considered to be true that the five sense organs (pañcendriya) are physically existent, but manas is not; see Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation of mānasapratyakṣa in PST I (P 30a6f.; cf. D 26b4f.); dbang po la mi bltos pa ‘i phyir zhes ste // gugs can gyi dbang po la bltos pa med pa nyid kyi phyir zhes pa dgongs pa ’o // gang gi rten yid kho na yin gyi dbang po gugs can na yin pa de yid kyi mgon par byod do // “Because (self-cognition of desire, etc.) is not dependent on any sense organ [= PSV ad PS I fab: indriyānapekṣāvṛtis].” This intention of this is as follows: Because it does not depend on any sense organ that is made of substances. When the basis (ādhāra) of (a cognition) is manas, and not any sense organ that is made of substances, (that cognition) is stated to be a mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa).” And last, to Dharmakīrti the mind (manas) could mean even the mental cognition of the present moment (PV III 243 and 520–521). This is not the same with the scheme of the Sarvāstivāda school which maintains that manas as an organ is actually the mind at the preceding moment as the saṃtanantarapratyaya, and that manovijnāna is the mind at the present moment (see the Abhidharmakosā I 17ab and 44cd).
16 E.g., TSP 480,19 and 481,17.
17 T vol. 32: 3bc; Katsura [1982: 90].
18 The verse is translated in Vetter [1964: 39]; Schmithausen [1965: 213]; Hattori [1965: 122; 1968: 28] and
In particular, satāmirā is not commented upon in the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, and no direct explanation is available in Dignāga’s works.19 Dignāga’s silence was the starting point of all the subsequent history.

It was a principle of Dignāga’s epistemology to explain all wrong cognitions as being caused by the mind.20 Consequently even a cognition of a double moon is considered to be produced by the mind. However, such denial of sensory illusion was not consistently held throughout his writings. First, in the context of the criticism of Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi, Dignāga admits that a sense organ is the cause of such cognitions as the representations of something blue, etc., or of a double moon, etc.21 Second, his approval of sensory illusion is found in the Alambanaparikṣāvṛtti: “A cognition of a double moon (arises) owing to the defect of the sense organ (indriyavaiśākyāyā). Though it appears as that, (i.e., as a double moon), it is not the object (of the cognition).”22 Here, Dignāga seems to consider a cognition of a double moon to be an error caused by some defect of the eyes. This is not compatible with Dignāga’s epistemological principle.

In this way, two different views about the origin of perceptual error are found in Dignāga’s works: one, his unique epistemology that every erroneous cognition belongs to conception, including a cognition of a double moon; and two, the rather commonplace idea that a cognition of a double moon is caused by some kind of sensory defect. These two attitudes were not fully integrated by Dignāga himself.

In the Pramāṇavārttika III 294a, Dharmakīrti introduces an objection: “Certain people hold an idea that the (cognition of a double moon, etc.) is also of the conceptual character” (mānasam tad apiḥ eke). It is not clear who ‘certain people’ were, but the passage suggests that certain Buddhists at the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti insisted on the utter negation of sensory illusion.23

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Tosaki [1979: 382].

19 For a detailed discussion see Franco [1986].

20 Such an attitude is evident when Dignāga states, in connection with ‘avyabhiśārin’ (non erro- neous) of the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4, “Nor is there a possibility of [sense-cognition’s] having an erroneous object because an erroneous cognition necessarily has as object an illusion produced by the mind (manobhrānt vibeśāvatād vyabhiśārinah).” Hattori [1968: 36, 96 n. 1.53; 122 n. 3.6f.] and Franco [1986: 90–94].

21 I.e., te ‘pi hi paramārthaḥ ‘nyathā vīdyamānta nīlādyābhābhasya dvicandrādyābhābhasya ca jānasya kāraṇībhavanti. See Hattori [1968: 35; 120 n. 2.26]. The passage is cited by Dharmakīrti, Devendrabuddhi, Manorathanandin (Tosaki [1979: 389 n. 22]) and Jinendrabuddhi (PST I P 33a5f.; D 29a6f.) as expressing the evidence of Dignāga’s approval of sensory illusion.

22 ĀP ad ĀP 2b (Frauwaller [1930: 176]): dbang po ma tshang ba‘i phyir zla ba gnyis mthong ba ni der snang ba nyid yin du zin kyang de'i yul ma yin no //.

23 This assumption can be corroborated by a description in NP 7,18–20: kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣābhāsām / yaj jñānam ghaṭata pta i ti vā vikalpayatah samutpadyate tad arthasvalaṃkāranāvādāyanāt pratyakṣābhāsām //. “Conceptual cognition for an object other (than the cognition itself) is pseudo-perception. A cognition arises in the person who is conceiving (the object) in the form ‘(This is) a pot’ or ‘(This is) a cloth’. It is pseudo-perception, because it does not have as object the particular of the thing.” This is the whole explanation of pseudo-perception in this handbook of Dignāga’s logic. Needless to say, it was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang, a Chinese contemporary of Dharmakīrti. Therefore, it is likely that not a few people before Dharmakīrti’s time got the idea, from this text, that all errors are due to conception. Further, see van der Kuijip [1965: 85] for Glo bo mKhan chen’s idea that mānasam tad apiḥ eke (PV III 294a) is a reference to Śīvarasena’s view.
At the same period, however, there must have been yet another Buddhist who did approve of the existence of sensory illusion. I surmise that Dharmapāla was such a person. He commented on the above-cited passage of the Ālambanaparikṣāvärttī in the following way:

"'Like a double moon' [ĀP 2b] means: As the second moon (as a real entity) cannot generate the cognition’s form of the second moon. (Objection:) If that is the case, through which cause such a manifestation arise? (Reply:) ‘Owing to the defect of the sense organ’ [Vṛtti ad 2b]. When the eyes as organs lack their property ‘clearness’ (and become obscure) through damage such as timira-disease, as a result, the cognition of a double moon arises through such defective organs."  

This is an explanation for the process of the generation of a double-moon-cognition, where conceptual construction is not mentioned at all.

In the Pramāṇavārttīka III 288–300, Dharmakīrti enumerated four kinds of pseudo-perception: three kinds of conceptual perception and one perceptual error which is derived from the defects of a sense organ. This fourth type is, Dharmakīrti states, the exception (apavāda) in Dignāga’s system of epistemology. According to Dharmakīrti, the word timira implies all kinds of defects of the sense organ, without specifying eye-disease; its derivative form taimira signifies any cognition caused by the defects of the sense organ; and therefore sataimira means ‘together with taimira’. Thus, Dharmakīrti interpreted the Pramāṇasamuccaya I 7c–8b to mean that “erroneously conceptualized cognition (bhṛānti), cognition of empirical reality (saṃvṛīṣajjāna), inference (anumāna), its result (ānumānaka), recollection (smārta), and cognition related with wish (ābhilāṣika) are pseudo-perceptions, together with (sa-) cognition caused by the defects of the sense organ (taimira).”

At this period, Dharmakīrti had already propounded a new definition of valid cognition, pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam, but followed Dignāga concerning the definition of direct perception, pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpodham. He added ‘non-erroneous’ for the first time in the Pramāṇa-viniścaya. The first emergence of this addition runs as follows:

“Among them, direct perception is free from conception and non-erroneous [= PVin I 4ab]. Direct perception is the cognition which is not of the conceptual character and which is not affected by the illusions owing to the troubles (viz., the malfunctions of a sense organ) caused by timira-disease, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, and so forth.”

What then is the difference between the opinion expressed in the Pramāṇavārttīka and that in the Pramāṇa-viniścaya? In the Pramāṇavārttīka, Dharmakīrti criticized the idea of attributing

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24 視相論論 (T vol. 31: 890b): 猶如二月。如第二月不能生識第二月相。若爾、何因有斯現相。根損害故。若時眼損由賢等損其明徳、遂即從斯損害處、見二月生。
25 bhṛānti, saṃvṛīṣajjāna and anumānānumānāka, etc.
26 PV III 293c: kevalam tatrā timiram upagbhāṣopakṣaṇam //
27 I tentatively follow Dharmottara’s commentary on saṃkṣobha (‘khrugs pa) in PVinI P 48a7f.: rab ṛb dang myur du bskor ba dang grur zhus pa mamus kyis bya ba’i dbang po’i gyur ba ni ‘khrugs pa ste’. Cf. NBṬ(Dh) 55,1–8 (in this commentary Dharmottara’s interpretation is quite different from that in PVinI; see also Yaita [1984: n. 34]).
28 tatra / pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpodham abhrāntam (= 4ab) / timirāḥubhramanāvāyānasamkṣobhādy-anāhītavibhramam avikalpakam jñānam pratyakṣaṃ (= PVin I 40,1–5). A similar passage is found in NB I 4–6: tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpodham abhrāntam // abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāṣā pratihiṃ kalpanā // tayā rahitam
all illusions to the mind and maintained the existence of sensory illusion. As a result, he had to state that sensory illusion is the exceptional case in Dignāga's system which principally admits only conceptual illusion. Next, in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dharmakīrti modified the definition by adding 'non-erroneous'. At the same time, the notion of 'exception' was deleted from Dharmakīrti's own system, because it was no longer necessary to resort to such an escape after the change of definition. To summarize, I think that Dharmakīrti's original intention of adding 'non-erroneous' was very simple and clear. It was postulated in order to rule out sensory illusions from direct perception. 'Non-erroneous' functioned just as a subordinate condition, attached to the main condition 'free from conception'. There was not any essential change in Dharmakīrti's own epistemology itself before and after the addition of 'non-erroneous'.

IV. 'Non-erroneous': Kamalaśīla's Idea and Its Origin

Dharmakīrti's followers, as commentators, paraphrased 'non-erroneous' by 'non-deceptive'. First, I will trace an example of such a paraphrase in Kamalaśīla's statement in the Tatvasaṃgraha-pañjikā.29

"Having thus demonstrated that direct perception is 'free from conception', (the master Śāntarakṣita now) states the motif of the employment of 'non-erroneous' in the following stanza:

'Non-erroneous' is employed in order to deny (i.e., exclude from direct perception) a cognition of 'hair-mesh' and the like. (Such a cognition) is not maintained (by us) to be a (means of) valid cognition because it is erroneous. [1311]

Here, 'non-erroneous' should be understood in the sense of 'being non-deceptive', and not in the sense of 'having the form of the object as it is placed (in cognition)'. For, otherwise, the definition of direct perception which (is to) be maintained on the basis of both standpoints (viz., Sautrāntika and Yogācāra,) would be too narrow (avyādīpin), because the object of cognition (as being externally existent) is not established in the Yogācāra viewpoint.

'Being non-deceptive' means the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfillment of a desired purpose, and not the attainment itself, because there may possibly be a hindrance (to the actual attainment) and so on.30

(Objection:) If so, only 'non-erroneous' should be employed (in the definition of direct perception). What is 'free from conception' to be employed for?

(Reply:) That is not the case, because (without that) the undesirable conclusion would follow that the inference which is (essentially) the conceptual cognition would also belong to direct perception."

I find four peculiarities in this statement: 'non-erroneous' is here a synonym of 'non-deceptive' (point A); 'non-deceptive' means 'the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfillment of a desired purpose' (point B); the definition of direct perception should be applied also to the Yogācāra standpoint (point C); and 'free from conception'

29 For the text see Appendix I.
30 The notion of 'hindrance' (impediment; pratibandha) comes from PV I 8 and its PVSV. 'And so on' would mean the transformation (paripāda) of the causal complex (kāraṇadīpagṛhi) which is also assumed in the same stanza.
excludes all the conceptual cognitions, and ‘non-erroneous’ excludes a cognition of ‘hair-mesh’ and the like (point D).

When compared with other texts, Kamalaśīla’s statement has the closest relationship with Vinītadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭikā.31 He states as follows:32

“‘Non-erroneous’ means (the cognition which) does not err. It is in the sense of ‘non-reversed (cognition) with regard to the object of attainment’ (prāpanaviṣayam praty aviparystam ity arthaḥ). (Objection:) Why are the two qualifiers (viśesānadvaya) stated?
(Reply:) First of all, ‘non-erroneous’ is employed in order to exclude (vyavaccheda) the erroneous cognition of the person who suffers from tiṃira-disease (and so on),33 and ‘free from conception’ is employed in order to deny inference (as belonging to direct perception) (anumānaṁānirāsrtham).
In this way, ‘being non-erroneous’ is admitted with regard to the object of attainment (prāpanaviṣaye) and not with regard to the object of cognition (na tv ālambanaviṣaye).
If ‘being non-erroneous’ were maintained with regard to the object of cognition, the view of the Yogācāra school (yogācāra-mata) would thereby be negated, for the people of the Yogācāra school maintain that all cognitions are erroneous with regard to the object of cognition (as externally existent). Consequently this would lead to the undesirable conclusion that the treatise (prakaraṇa; i.e., the Nyāyabindu) was composed by negating their view. However it is maintained (by us) that the treatise was composed in conformity with the views of the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra schools (iṣṭate ca sautrāntika-yogācāramatātāṁnaḥ śrṣaṇaṁ prakaraṇāṃrthbhah) and both parties admit ‘being non-erroneous’, which is defined to be ‘being non-deceptive’, with regard to the object of attainment (prāpanaviṣaye34 visamvādakatvalaksanaṁ abhārāntavatvaṁ dvābhyyām abhyupagamyate).
(Objection:) If that is the case, even inference would come to be direct perception, for it is also non-erroneous because it is non-deceptive.
(Reply:) For this reason, ‘free from conception’ is employed in order to deny inference (as belonging to direct perception). . .”

Vinītadeva’s idea corresponds to Kamalaśīla’s except for Point B among the above-stated four specific features. In other words, there is very little originality in Kamalaśīla’s commentary on Tatvāsāṃgraha 1311.

Point A: abhrānta = avisamvādaka

It is known very well that Vinītadeva’s idea on the equivalency between abhrānta and avisamvādaka was severely criticized by Dharmottara.35 One of the main arguments made by Dharmottara was that ‘non-erroneous’ as a synonym of ‘non-deceptive’ would become redun-

31 Vinītadeva’s life should be dated to about 690–750 A.D., because his Hetubinduṭikā is composed on the basis of the Pramānānavarttikaṭikā by Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720), and some of Vinītadeva’s statements therein are considered to be utilized in the Hetubinduṭikā by Arcaja (ca. 710–770), Funayama [1995b: 55f., 59f. n. 4].
32 For the text see Appendix II.
33 ‘And so on’ (ādi) should be added in this context.
34 The Skt. fragment prāmāṇyaavāsya (Ṭāparya <9> in Appendix II) should be emended to prāpanaviṣayya with the help of the Tibetan translation thob par byed pa’i yul la.
35 E.g., Yaïta [1982: 5f.] and Ishibashi [1993: 4–6]. According to Dharmottara, ‘non-erroneous’ should be interpreted regarding the essence of the thing. PViNṬ I P 44b1f.: don byed nas pa’i rang byin la ma khrul pa gang yin pa de ni ma ’khrul pa yin no //. NBṬ(Dh) I 41,5–42,2: abhrāntam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe viparyastam ucyate / arthakriyākṣamaṁ ca vasturūpaṁ saṁśivopādhihvarṇātmakam / tatra yan na bhūmyati tad abhrāntam /.
dant, because it is the same as the general definition of a means of valid cognition.\textsuperscript{36} This argument is so persuasive and so logical that one may get the impression that Dharmottara's idea was the one and only correct interpretation and the preceding teachers had just talked about nonsense. However, seen from the point of view of the history of the interpretations, Vīṇātadeva's and hence Kamalāśīla's interpretation of the term is in a sense much closer to Dharmakīrti's original descriptions. Moreover, there is a very interesting point in Kamalāśīla's explanation. Taking it into account that Kamalāśīla knew Dharmottara's critical analysis,\textsuperscript{37} Kamalāśīla's implicit assent to Vīṇātadeva's interpretation will suggest that Kamalāśīla intentionally adhered to the traditionally established interpretation of 'non-erroneous' after the activity of Dharmottara.

The equation of 'non-erroneous' with 'non-deceptive' was not Vīṇātadeva's invention.\textsuperscript{38} Though it is not so clear in the statements of Dharmakīrti's disciple Devendrabuddhi and grand-disciple Śākyabuddhi, the equation of the two notions had possibly been made by the end of the seventh century. It is known from one of the pūrvapākaśas on the interpretation of 'erroneousness' in Maṇḍanamisra's Vidhīvīvaka:

"But what is this 'erroneousness'... (Buddhist opponent:) Non-erroneousness means non-deceptiveness in terms of the fulfillment of a (desired) purpose. (Maṇḍana:) If it meant the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of suffering as based on the object, then the cognition of (the object), the taking and rejecting of which are not possible,\textsuperscript{39} would come to be erroneous.\textsuperscript{40}

Maṇḍana was active around 700 A.D. during the period between Kumārila and Umbeka, and he knew Dharmakīrti's philosophy.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, it is highly probable that some followers of Dharmakīrti at this period actually construed abhrānta in the sense of avisaṃvādaka.

\textsuperscript{36} NBT(Dh) I 147.3–7: na tv avisaṃvādokam abhrāntam iha grahiyam / yataḥ samyagjñānam eva pratyakṣam nānyat / tatra samyagjñānāt vād evāvisaṃvādakatve labdhe punaravisaṃvādakagrahanam nispayojanam eva / evam hi vākyāntah svātṛ / pratyakṣakāhyam yad avisaṃvādakam jñānam tait kalpanāpodsah avisaṃvādakam ceti / na cāṇena dvaravisāmvaḍakagrahanena kimciṣi / tasmād grahye 'rthakriyāksame vasturūpe yad aviparyastam tad abhrāntam iha vedātasyam /.

\textsuperscript{37} In not a few cases the sub-commentators on NBT(Dh) mention Vīṇātadeva by name as Dharmottara's target of criticism. But some references seem to be inappropriate. For example, Dharmottara criticizes the idea of taking the relation between pratyakṣam and kalpanāpodsah abhrāntam to be samajñāsajñāsambandha. PVinT I P 43b5: minding ming can gya 'brel pa yang skabs su bab pa ma yin pa nyid de /.

\textsuperscript{38} In the following passage, Maṇḍana names Vīṇātadeva andvikarama as vṛtṭatmakāvaliśajñāsajñāsambandha in: NBT(Dh) I 17.4f: anena lakṣayakṣanabhabhaṃ darsayati vinātadevacāryaḥ samajñā- saṃjñāsambandharūpaṃ pratyakṣam /.

\textsuperscript{39} E.g., it is impossible that one sees a moon and verifies the validity of that cognition by reaching the real moon. In that case, there would be an absurd conclusion that even a cognition of a moon would be erroneous.

\textsuperscript{40} V V 137.1–138.1: kā punar iyaṃ bhrāntataḥ / / atarārthakriyāsamvāditaṃ abhrāntataṃ / yady artha nibhandhanau sukhadhikapṛātiparīharaṇau, upāddanaparitīyāgāyavyadanasyā bhrāntatvaprasaṅgah /

\textsuperscript{41} Schmithausen [1965: 216 n. 150] and Thrasher [1979].
I conjecture that the equation of the two notions was derived from some of Dharmakīrti’s statements. I am not speaking about his ‘real intention’ which nobody can determine exactly, but about his way of describing the issue. See, for example, the following statements:

“A cognition which manifests itself vividly, such as of the person who is, say, asleep or awake, does not contain any conception. Any (cognition that appears) in another way in either case is conceptual. A cognition of that (i.e., a cognition of a double moon, etc.,) is negated as invalid because it is deceptive (visamvädät), even though it is (proved to be) free from conception on account of that (= vivid manifestation). And the two kinds of pseudo-perception (i.e., savikalpa- and nirvikalpakapratyaksābhasa) were stated for that purpose (i.e., for the purpose of negating a cognition of a double moon, etc., as direct perception).” [PV III 299–300]

“(Objection:) Then, an undesirable conclusion would follow that a cognition in a dream, which manifests itself vividly because of its non-conceptuality, would be direct perception. (Reply:) That is not the case, because I stated ‘non-erroneous’ (in the definition of direct perception). For this very reason, it is stated that pseudo-perception is of two kinds; conceptual cognition is (pseudo-perception) because it does not have the manifestation of reality, and illusion (upaplaya) is (pseudo-perception) because it is deceptive (visamvädät).” [PV in I 76, 8–14]42

Here, Dharmakīrti introduces the viewpoint ‘deceptive/non-deceptive’ to the context of direct perception and pseudo-perception, and seems to use ‘deceptive’ in place of ‘erroneous’ and ‘non-deceptive’ in place of ‘non-erroneous’.43 Of course he did not state that the two notions were perfectly replaceable. He may have meant that wrong perception’s erroneousness is testified only with recourse to the criterion whether it is deceptive or not regarding ‘fulfillment of a desired purpose’ (arthakriyā) at a later moment, because direct perception can never be proven either to be correct or to be false at the very moment of that cognition. In short, it is not at all a surprise that Dharmakīrti’s expressions as mentioned above came to influence the commentators to interpret ‘non-erroneous’ in the sense of ‘non-deceptive’.44

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42 PV III 299–300: suptasya jāgraṭo vāpi yaiva dhīt sphutabhāsinī / sā nirvikalpabhāyathāpy anyathaiva vikalpika //299// tasmāt tasyāvikalpe ‘pi prāmāṇya pratiṣṭhātye / visamvādā tadartham ca pratyaksābham dvidhoditam //300//. PVin I 76, 8–14: ‘o na ni rnam par rtog pa med pa’i phyir gsal bar snang ba’i rmi lam gyi shes pa mgon sum du ’gyur ro zhe na / ma yin te / ma ’khrul pa zhes bstan pa’i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir / rnam rtog dngos mi snang phyir dang // nye bar bslad pa slu ba’i phyir // mgon sum [tar snang [= v. 33 abc] rnam pa gnyis su brjod do //. The importance of PV III 300 and PVin I 33abc in this respect has already been pointed out in Ishibashi [1993: 4]. I follow his idea in that these two passages could have been the sources for the interpretation of ‘non-erroneous’ as paraphrasable by ‘non-deceptive’.

43 Note that a yogin’s perception (yogipratyakṣa) is also discussed just in the same way, i.e., in terms of non-conceptuality (≡ vividness of a cognition) and non-deceptiveness. PV III 285–286: tasmād bhūtam abhūtam vā yad yad evadbhihvavate / bhavânāparinīsptatau tathābhūvihīpādhyālam // tatra pramāṇaṃ samvāḍi yat prānirnirātvasvata / tad bhavānājām pratyakṣam istam seja upaplavā / // PVin I 28: bhavānābalataḥ spastam bhavādāviva bhāsaṭāyaj jñānam avsaṁvādi tat pramāṇam akalpakam // (Sktt. fragment by Steinkeller [1972: 203]). In particular, the last stanza suggests the closeness between ‘non-deceptive’ and ‘non-erroneous’.

44 Jinendrabuddhi also seems to interpret ‘non-erroneous’ in the sense of ‘non-deceptive’. See the text and translation of PST in Section V: gang rtog pa dang bral zhing ‘od pa’i don la mī bslu ba de mī mgon sum ste / “That cognition which is free from conception and is non-deceptive concerning a desired object is direct perception.”
Point B: prāpaṇaśakti

The notion of prāpaṇaśakti (the efficacy to realize the attainment of an object) was mentioned in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapāṇijikā. In explaining pramāṇa as non-deceptive cognition, he says in effect that the validity of cognition consists in the efficacy to realize the attainment of an object (prāpaṇaśakti) and not the attainment itself (na tu prāpaṇam eva). Subsequently, Śākyabuddhi stated that ‘efficacy’ (śakti) is significant because its attainment may not be realized owing to the possible emergence of a hindrance (pratibandhasambhavāḥ). Thus, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi used the notion of prāpaṇaśakti in the context of the general definition of pramāṇa. Kamalaśīla’s expression abhimārthakriyāśamartha-prāpaṇaśakti was made with this background, via the equation of ‘non-erroneous’ with ‘non-deceptive’ in the context of direct perception. Further, his appreciation of this notion might have been influenced by Dharmottara who emphasized it shortly before his activities.

Point C: Sautrāntika-Yogācāra Problem

Vinițadeva and Kamalaśīla held the common view that the definition of direct perception was made from the standpoint of both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools. The reason was their belief that Dharmakīrti composed his works not only as a Sautrāntika but also as a Yogācārin. Vinițadeva expressed this idea in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu, but we should not limit his idea only to this handbook, because it was criticized by Dharmottara as a problem of interpretation of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Therefore, this is a problem relating to the whole work of Dharmakīrti, namely, in what sense was he a scholar of what is called the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school.

The definition of direct perception is the basis for all the epistemological discussions and in some cases Dharmakīrti shifts his position to the Yogācāra standpoint; nevertheless, he does not speak about any change in the definition. This is presumably the reason for the arguments of Vinițadeva and Kamalaśīla. On the other hand, Dharmottara criticized this, and propounded that the definition issues only from the Sautrāntika standpoint. Dharmottara maintains that Dharmakīrti was indeed a scholar of the Yogācāra school, but his ideas were not always expressed from that standpoint; for example, Dharmakīrti’s statements, such as “Direct perception is also a means of valid cognition, because it does not exist when its object does not exist” (PVin I 3ab), are expressed only from the view of assuming the existence of external objects (*bāhyārthanaya). Dharmottara’s claim is understandable enough, but it leads to the following question: Did

45 PVP II P 3a8–b2, D 3a2f. The passage is translated into Japanese in Inami (1993: 92f.).
46 PVṬ II P 88b7–89a1, D 73a7–b2. The passage is translated into Japanese in Inami (1993: 98).
48 E.g., PVIII 320ff. and PVin I 84,1ff.
49 DhP 44,17–20: naṁ evam abhāṅtāte yogācāramatam asamgrhitaṁ syāt / grāhāgraḥakākāratvā pravṛttiḥ sarvaṣayeśvarvaiṣavijñāvatvāsvālaṁbante bhāṅtāvatvā / tat katham pūrvavākhyāntvājīṭaṁ na kriyata iti cet / ucyate / na yogācārayyaṁ laksanam idam / kim tu sautrāntikānaya eva / na ca sarvaṁ vijnānavāde yojayitum sakṣam / tasyān vijnāvāde yodaksanam (NB I 12) ināderi adakṣayojanavatā / . NBṬṬ 19,10f.: nanyātasya yogācāramatam asamgrhitam śyād iti / ucyate / bāhyārthayā [sic!] sautrāntikāmatāntasyadvāc ārthayaṁ laksanam kriyāṁ iti adosāḥ / . PVin I P 44b8–45a3: gchan dag mdo sde pa bzhin du rnal ’byor spyod pa’i gzhung bsdu ba’i don du mi slu bar byed pa la ma ‘khrul par shes pa de ni mi rigs so // gang gi phyur slob dpon gyis ma ‘khrul pa’i sgral’i don de la bu byar gyur pa yin pa
Dharmakīrti indicate his Yogācāra position without the special definition of direct perception in that position, if pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhārtam is limited to the Sautrāntika standpoint? Unfortunately I have not found any concrete answer to this problem.

**Point D: The Roles of Two Qualifiers**

According to Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla, the qualifier ‘free from conception’ excludes all conceptual cognitions, and the other qualifier ‘non-erroneous’ excludes a cognition of ‘hair-mesh’, etc. This idea is also criticized by Dharmottara who maintains that the wrong ideas (vipratipatti) on the definition are negated by a set of two qualifiers.50

Kamalaśīla presents further viewpoints regarding the function of the two qualifiers. He introduces the objection that ‘non-erroneous’ is employed in order to exclude a cognition in a dream from direct perception, and he gives his assent to this idea.51 It is remarkable here that a cognition in a dream is considered to be free from conception but still erroneous, just like a cognition of a double moon, etc. Similar ideas can be traced in Dharmakīrti’s works and Śākyabuddhi’s commentary.52

After the commentary of the last stanza [1360] of the chapter Pratyakṣalakṣanaparīksā, Kamalaśīla adds a discussion, independently of Śāntarakṣita’s statement. It is an excursus on the definition of direct perception in general.53 Kamalaśīla therein examines the opponent’s idea that ‘non-erroneous’ is not necessary in the definition because whether an indeterminate cognition (e.g., a cognition of water) is erroneous or not cannot be determined at the very moment of cognition; for it is ascertained by the criterion ‘fulfilment of a desired purpose’ (e.g., quenching the perceiver’s thirst) only at a later moment. This viewpoint reveals Kamalaśīla’s idea about the relationships between direct perception (pratyakṣa), impression (vāsanā), cognition of ascertainment (niścayajñāna) and action (pravrtti). It seems to be connected with the ideas of Devendra-

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50 E.g., PVinṬ 1 P 44a7f.: ‘dir youn mithsan ngyed gzhon par bcad pa ni ma yin gyi // ’on kyang log par rtoogs pa [vipratipatti] bsla ba'i don yin no //, as well as NBT(Dh) I 44.1 and 46.6f. For this topic in detail see the previous studies in n. 35.  
51 TSP 480,12–15: nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasam tathāpy abhārtanagrahanam kartavyam eva / na hy anenendrivajñānasayava [sānca MKS : om. Tib.] pratyakṣalakṣaṇam kartum ārādbhām / kim tarhi / mānasasyāpya yogijānādeḥ* / tātra ca svapnāntikasayāpya nirvikalpakatvam asi / saptatparambhasītāt / na tv abhārtanavat iti tanniśṭvyathāṃ abhārāngagrahanam yuktām eva / satvam etat ... *The opponent here assumes yogin’s perception to be mental perception. This is an idea of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, too; e.g., TSP 484,19: yad vā yogijānām iha mānasam. For a previous study on this problem see Hattori [1968: 93f. n. 1.46].  
52 For Dharmakīrti see PV and PVin in n. 42; for Śākyabuddhi see Inami [1993: 102].  
buddhi and Śākyabuddhi on the general definition of pramāṇa, as well as Kamalaśīla’s own discussion developed in the opening section of the Tattvasamgrahapañjakā. This interesting issue will need further examination.

V. The Relationship between Jinendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla

Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭṭikā is an indispensable source for the study of the eighth century developments of the pramāṇa school. In a previous paper I have assumed him to be a contemporary of Śāntarakṣita. The assumption that the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭṭikā was written before Kamalaśīla’s composition of the Tattvasamgrahapañjakā holds good in the following examinations, too. I will show further relations between Devendrabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla.

The pratyaksābhāsa-section of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭṭikā has connections with other texts. First of all, it is evident that some of its passages are identical with those of Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapāñjakā. This means that Jinendrabuddhi composed this section of the work on the basis of Devendrabuddhi’s commentary.

Second, some passages of Devendrabuddhi on the interpretation of sataimira (PS I 8b) are identical with Kamalaśīla’s passages. Kamalaśīla introduces the opponents’ idea, which is well-known among modern scholars, in the following way:


‘On the other hand, certain Buddhist insiders do not wish to employ ‘non-erroneous’ (in the definition of direct perception), because (they consider that) a cognition of a yellow conch (for a white conch in reality), etc., is direct perception, even though it is erroneous. Namely, it is not inference because it is not generated from an inferential mark; it is a means of valid cognition because it is not deceptive. For this very reason, (they state,) ‘non-erroneous’ is not employed in the master Dignāga’s definition. Because pseudo-perception is indicated by the statement ‘Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference ...’, such a kind of (definition) as ‘(cognition which is) non-deceptive and free from conception’ is maintained to be the definition of the master. On

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54 For Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi on this topic see the translations in Inami [1993].
55 Funayama [1995a].
56 For a previous study on this section see Hattori [1968: 95–97 n. 1.53f.].
57 See Appendix III.
59 bhrāntisamvyrtisajñānam M : bhrānti(h) samvyrti(h) sājñānam K : bhrānti(h) samvyrti(h) sā jñānam S.
60 See below for the translation of TS 1323.
61 I.e., PS I 7c–8b: bhrāntisamvyrtisajñānam . . . pratyaksābhāsa.
the other hand, sataimira (of PS I 8b) means as follows: the word timira is a synonym of ‘ignorance’<sup>62</sup> “just like (in the expression) ‘cutting off the ignorance (timira) of the dull’.”<sup>63</sup> As Taimira means that which stems from ignorance.<sup>62</sup> “(It should be understood) in the sense of ‘deceptive (cognition’).”<sup>63</sup>

Note that this is a pūrvapakṣa for Kamalaśīla. In the subsequent discussions Sāntaraksitā and Kamalaśīla criticize this idea. As I see it, Kamalaśīla is here referring to Jīnendrabuddhi’s own idea in his Pramāṇasamuccayaṭṭikā, so that ‘certain Buddhist insiders’ signifies Jīnendrabuddhi and his followers. Now I will show this in detail.

Jīnendrabuddhi presents two kinds of interpretation of the word sataimira of the Pramāṇasamuccaya I 8b. His first interpretation is that the word means the cognitions caused by the defect of a sense organ, such as timira-disease.<sup>64</sup> This is based on Dharmakīrti’s interpretation in Pramāṇavārttika III 293<sup>65</sup> and the above-cited Pramāṇavārttikapaṭṭikā by Devendrabuddhi. After this, Jīnendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti’s notion of avisamvādaka<sup>66</sup> and refers to several kinds of cognition which can be controversial in terms of this notion: (a) cognition which has the manifestation of ‘hair-mesh’, etc., owing to timira-disease; (b) cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch by the person whose eyes are affected by jaundice; (c) cognition of the object as having the non-vivid blue form, etc., for a vivid blue entity caused either by the perceiver’s eyes being affected by timira-disease for a long time or by his viewing the object from afar; and (d) cognition in which the trees are manifested as being possessed of movement, the movement being wrongly superimposed upon those stationary trees as a result of trouble (in a sense organ) caused by the perceiver’s travelling on a boat.<sup>67</sup> Thus, making much of the notion of avisamvādaka in the context of direct perception, Jīnendrabuddhi develops a special discussion on the cognition

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<sup>62</sup> Pāṇini 4.3.53: tatra bhavaḥ // (= Siddhāntakauṃḍika §1428. An affix comes after a word in the 7th case in construction, in the sense of ‘who stands there’).

<sup>63</sup> A similar expression is found in Dharmottara’s statement, too. PVinṭ I P 45bl–3 (Yaita [1984: 25]): kha cig zla ba gnyis pa la sogs pa’i shes pa yang cha ga’gzhig la mi slu ba des na nshad ma yin pa de’i phyir de bzlog pa’i don du ma ’khrul pa smos pa ni rigs pa ma yin te / de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon phyogs kyi gling pos kyas ma ngsad pa yin no / ... de yang rigs pa ma yin te / Cf. TṢop 280,10–13: abhrānta-grahaneṇāpi śuklaśankhādau pitaśāṅkhādivijñānām nirayate / saty api bhrame “ṛthakriyāvisamvādābhāvāt / nāpi tad anumāṇāṃ yujyate ’lingjavat / atāha pratyakṣam iti / (This is probably based on Kamalaśīla’s statement.)

<sup>64</sup> PST I P 32a7fl.; D 28b2: rab rib bcas zhes pa’i dis dbang po la nye bar gon dpo la skyes po rab rib la sogs pa’i shes pa [indriyopaghātajām timirādījjñānam] mgon sum ltar snang ba bzhis pa gsungs so zhes pa’o //, elucidated by Hattori [1968: 95 n. 1.53]. See also Appendix III.


<sup>66</sup> PST I P 33b1–4; D 29b3–5: de’i phyir gang ’di skra shad la sogs par snang ba rab rib la sogs pa’i shes pa ni gang gi yang dag par ’dod pa skra shad la sogs pa’i drangs po la mi [P : om. D] bslu [P : slu D] ba med cing de nshad ma nyid du mi ’gyur mod / gang ’di mig ser gis nye bar bsldad pa’i mig can gyi [P : gis D] dungs dkar po la sogs pa dungs ser po la sogs par snang ba dang / gang yang yun rig du rab rib kyis mig bsgrigs pa nyid kyi phyir ram thag ring ba nyid kyi phyir gsal ba’i snog po la sogs pa rnam la mi [corr. : mig PD] gsal ba’i snog po la sogs pa rnam pa dang / gang yang yun dang bzhon pa bskyod pas byas pa’i ’khrul pa shing snog la sogs pa gnas pa rnam la yang ’gro ba’i bya ba dang ldan pa’i rkang ’thung la sogs par snang ba dang ’di la bu’i rnam po gchan yang .
of a yellow conch (b) in the following manner:

. . . de'i phyir de rams kyang yang dag par 'dod pa'i don bya ba nus pa dung la sogs pa'i dngos po tsam la gang du mi bslu ba de la tshad ma nyid du mi 'gal bar mihong zhirg / smra bo.68 nus te / shes pa gang la rab tu zhugs pa'i skyes bus gegs med na nges par mngon par 'dod pa'i don sgrub pa de de la de'i tshad ma st / dper na mngon par 'dod pa'i mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa69 bzhin [f] ji skad bshad pa'i shes pa las rab tu zhugs pa'i skyes bu yang gegs med na nges par mngon par 'dod pa dung la sogs pa'i dngos po tsam sgrub par byed do // zhes pa rang bzhin no // "di yang rjes su dpag pa ma yin te / rtags las ma skyes pa nyid kyi phyir" dang rnam par rtog pa med pa nyid kyi phyir ro // tshad ma gsum pa 'dod pa yang ma yin te / de'i phyir mngon sum kha no'o zhes khas blangs70 par bya'o // gang rtog pa dang bral zhing 'dod pa'i don la mi bslu ba de ni mngon sum st / dper na mngon par 'dod pa'i mngon sum bzhin / skabs kyi shes pa'ang de la bu'o // rang bzhin no //

di 'gyur mod [f] dung la sogs pa tsam gyi dngos po 'dod par byas pa la mi bslu ba'i phyir de kha na la de mngon sum nyid du 'dod kyi [f] ser pa la sogs pa?71 rnam pa dang ldan pa'i khyad par la ni bslu72 ba med par mi 'dod do zhes pa de la na rab rib bcas zhes pa dmigs bsal73 gyi tshig 'dis phyi dang nang gi nyer gnod kyi rkyen can dbang po nye bar bcom pa'i shes pa rtog pa dang bral ba nyid na yang mngon sum ltar snang bar gsungs pa dang / rab rib bcas zhes pa tshig der rab rib ni dbang po la nye bar gnod pa'i rkyen can thams cad nye bar mishon pa tsam 'ba' zig go zhes pa 'di ltar bshad par bya ba ma yin te / dbang po la nye bar gnod pa'i shes pa yang 'ga' zhig kha cig tu mngon sum yin pa nyid kyi phyir ro // ma 'khrul pa zhes pa'i khyad par yang bya ba ma yin te / 'khrul pa yang 'ga' zhig kyang 'ga' zhig tu mngon sum nyid du 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

dei phyir rab rib bcas zhes pa dmigs bsal gyi74 tshig 'di rnam pa gzhan du bshad par bya st / <"rab rib kyi sgra di ni 'dir mi shes pa rjod par byed pa st>/ <"dper na dman rams rab rib kyi bcom pa zhes pa la sogs pa'i ngag la bzhin75 no> // "rab rib la yod pa ni rab rib can st d> / . . . rab rib can66 de dang lan cin 'jug go zhes pa ni rab rib bcas pa st [/ "bslu ba can no zhes pa'i bar ro> // rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i bslu ba can yang 'khrul pa la sogs pa'i sgra yis77 nye bar blangs pa'i phyir / 'di rnam par rtog pa med par rongs par bya'o // dran dang mngon par 'dod pa yang zhes pa'i yang gi sgra 'di bslu ba'i don dang rim pa tha dad pa te / rab rib bcas pa yang zhes pa 'di ltar bItla bar bya'o / des na don 'dir 'gyur te [/ bslu ba'i shes pa ni mngon sum ltar snang ba'o zhes pa st / de la na 'khrul pa rnam par rtog pa med pa yang gang la mi bslu ba der mngon sum nyid yin la / gang la bslu ba der ni de ltar snang ba nyid do zhes pa 'di grub par 'gyur ro // . . . (PST 1 P 33b7–34b4; D 29b6–30b4).

68 bar P : bar yang D.
69 pa D : om. P.
70 blangs P : blang D.
71 pa'i D : pa P.
72 bslu P : slu D. D reads slu instead of bslu in all the subsequent passages.
73 bsal D : gsal P.
74 gyi P : kyi D.
75 bzhin D : gzhin P.
76 rab rib can corr. : rab rib PD; see n. 82 below.
77 sgra yis P : sgras D.
“... Therefore, if these (cognitions of a yellow conch, etc.,) are also non-deceptive regarding a
certain (object) such as the thing just as a conch, which has the efficacy to realize the desired
purpose, they are understood without contradiction to be the means of valid cognition for that
(aspect of the object). (The same) can be stated as follows:

(Major premise:) If the person who acts on the basis of a cognition (of an object) necessarily
attains a desired object when there is no hindrance (pratibandha), such a cognition is for him
the means of valid cognition for that (object), just like any direct perception and inference.

(Minor premise:) The person who acts on the basis of the cognition as stated above necessarily
attains a desired (object) such as the thing just as a conch when there is no hindrance.

(Conclusion: A cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is the means of valid cognition for the conch,
etc.)

This is a svabhāva(hetu inference).

“This (cognition of a yellow conch) is not an inference, because it is not generated from an infer-
ential mark (na caitad anumānam / alingajavāt/)\(^\text{78}\) and because it is not conceptual cognition. A
third means of valid cognition is not admitted, either. Therefore, it should be admitted that the
cognition is certainly direct perception.

(Major premise:) That cognition which is free from conception and is non-deceptive\(^78\) concern-
ing a desired object is direct perception, just like any direct perception.

(Minor premise:) So is the cognition of the present topic.

(Conclusion: A cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is direct perception.)

(This is) a svabhāva(hetu inference).

One may assume as follows: (A cognition of a yellow conch, etc.,) is maintained to be the means of
valid cognition for the very object because (the cognition) is non-deceptive regarding the object
inasmuch as it is intended to be the thing just as a conch, etc.; it is not maintained to be non-de-
ceptive concerning (the object's) specific attribute (viśeṣa) such as having the form of yellow,
etc. (piṇādyākāra). Therefore, the following should not be stated: ‘By the word sataimira (which
shows) the exception (apavāda) (in Dīnāga's system), the cognition whose sense organ becomes
injured through external and internal defects as the cause (pratyaya) is stated to be pseudo-percep-
tion; and timira in the word sataimira implies (upalaksanā) all the cognitions that are caused just
by the defects of sense organs'.\(^79\) (This statement of Dharmakīrti and his followers is not correct)
because in any case any (indeterminate) cognition whose sense organ is defective is direct percep-
tion. Moreover, the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) 'non-erroneous' (abhrāṇā) should not be added (in the
deinition), because in any case any (indeterminate) cognition, even though it is erroneous, is
maintained to be direct perception.

(Reply:) Therefore, the word sataimira (which shows) the exception (in Dīnāga's system) is ex-
plained in a different way. (Namely,) \(^78\) in this case, the word timira (timirasabdo 'yam) designates
'ignorance' (ajñāna),\(^78\) \(<\) just like in the sentence (expression) 'cutting off the ignorance of the
dull' (timiraghnam mandānām).\(^78\) Ta'mira signifies 'that which stems from ignorance' (timire

\(^78\) This expression reveals that 'non-erroneous' was taken to be a synonym of 'non-deceptive' by Jinendrabuddhi.

\(^79\) This is the exposition of Dharmakīrtī's idea in PV III 293 as based on Devendrabuddhi's commentary and
therefore it also corresponds to Jinendrabuddhi's first interpretation of sataimira; see the passages of PVP and PST
in Appendix III.
bhavam taimiram\(^{60}\) (\ldots)\(^{81}\) Sataimira is that which occurs along with taimira.\(^{82}\)  \(\text{\textit{\textquoteleft\textit{It should be understood\textquoteleft}}}\) in the sense of ‘deceptive (cognition)’ (visaṁvāditī yāvat).\(^{82}\) Since deceptive (cognitions) which are connected with conceptual cognition are meant by the words ‘erroneous cognition’ and so forth (\(=\) PS I 7c–8b), this (\(=\) direct perception) should be understood to be free from conception. Further, (in this case,) the word ‘\textit{and (ca)}’ in \(\textit{smārtābhilāsikam ca-iti}\) (8a) means addition (\textit{samuccayā}) and (it is interpreted to be) put in a different place; i.e., it should be taken in the sense of ‘\textit{and sataimira}’ (and not in the sense of ‘\textit{and smārtābhilāsika}’). Therefore, the following is meant here: It is established to be true that deceptive cognition is pseudo-perception, and hence even a (cognition) which is erroneous and free from conception is direct perception of (a thing) inasmuch as it is non-deceptive concerning that thing; and that (a cognition which is) deceptive concerning (a thing) is pseudo-perception. \(\ldots\)"

These passages might suggest that there existed certain Buddhists, at the period between Dharmaṅkīrti and Jinaṇḍrabuddhi, who followed only Dignāga’s definition of direct perception and did not admit Dharmaṅkīrti’s idea in the Pramāṇavārttika nor his addition of ‘non-erroneous’ in the Pramāṇavānīścaya and the Nyāyabindu. However, it would also be possible to assume that such a criticism is made by Jinaṇḍrabuddhi himself in the form of a hypothetical pūrvapakṣa. A point of criticism is directed at Dharmaṅkīrti’s interpretation of timira on the basis of the opponent’s peculiar assumption that a cognition of a yellow conch is direct perception (!). According to this opponent as well as Jinaṇḍrabuddhi himself, a cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch is affected by jaundice, nevertheless, it is direct perception because it is non-deceptive concerning the ‘conchness’ of the object. This idea is incompatible with Dharmaṅkīrti’s interpretation of timira as implying all the kinds of defects of the sense organs,\(^{83}\) because his interpretation leads to the consequence that a cognition of a yellow conch is pseudo-perception, and not direct perception, as long as it is a product of jaundice. That is why the (hypothetical) opponent insisted that Dharmaṅkīrti’s interpretation in the Pramāṇavārttika should be wrong.

Interestingly enough, Jinaṇḍrabuddhi does not aim at a straight refutation of this idea. Rather, he opens his second interpretation of sataimira under the influence of this idea. Jinaṇḍrabuddhi’s own view can be summarized as follows:

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\(^{60}\) See n. 62 above.

\(^{81}\) The omitted passages are as follows: \(\text{\textit{ngag ni rnam par gcod pa\textquoteright i bras bu can nyid kyi phyir ngag thams cad nges par gzung ba dang bcas pa\textquoteright i [P : pa\textquotesingle i D] zhes pas rab rib kho na la yod pa zhes nges par gzung ba dang bcas pa\textquoteright i ngag don la de phan [\textit{\textquoteright taddhita\textquoteright} du \textit{\textquoteleft gyur ro\textquoteright} yang \textit{\textquoteleft di bslu\textquoteright} [P : slu D] ba ci zhe na / de gal te \textit{\textquoteleft gyur na mi shes pa kho na la \textit{\textquoteleft gyur g}y\textit{i} / shes pa la la nyin te / de mthu\textit{\textquoteleft g}cig tu mi bslu [P : slu D] ba nyid kyi phyir ro / \textit{\textquoteleft di \textit{\textquoteleft j}i\textit{\textquoteleft r}ten na shin tu grags pa yang yin no \textit{\textquoteleft l}.}} The exact meaning is not clear to me.

\(^{82}\) The Tib. \textit{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft rab rib de dang \ldots\right(=\textit{\textquoteleft\textit{Skt. *tena tiimirena saka vartata iti sataimiram}} \right)\text{should be emended to} \textit{\textquoteleft\textit{rab rib de dang \ldots\right(=\textit{tena taimirena \ldots\right)}}\text{, when the derivative sequence tiimira > taimira > sataimira} \text{is taken into account. CF. Kamalāśīla’s parallel wording: tiimire bhavam taimiram / visaṁvāsakam ity arthaḥ /, where the grammatical explanation for \textit{so-} is omitted. For the grammatical explanation of the compound \textit{sataimira} see \textit{Pāṇini} 2.2.28: tena saheiti tulayogas // (= Siddhāntakārnadī \textsection 848. The word \textit{saka ‘together’} is compounded with a word ending with the third case-affix and the compound is Bahuvrihi; provided that, the companion and the person accompanied are equally affected by any action or thing, \textit{in the same manner} and \textit{Pāṇini} 6.3.82: vopasarjanasya // (= Siddhāntakārnadī \textsection 849. \textit{Sri} is optionally the substitute of \textit{saka}, when the compound is a Bahuvrihi).}

\(^{83}\) PV III 293cd: \textit{kevalam tatra tiimiram upaghatopakāsanaṃ //}.
1. *Sataimira* indicates the ‘exception’ (*apavāda*) in Dīnāga’s system. It is a reference to a special kind of pseudo-perception, in addition to the explicitly enumerated three kinds of pseudo-perception (viz., [a] bhṛnti, [b] samvṛtisajñāna and [c] anumāna, ānumānika, smārtī and ābhilāṣīka). However, there are two possible interpretations concerning its meaning.

2. According to one interpretation, *taimira* signifies that any cognition that is caused by the defect of a sense organ is implied in pseudo-perception. The whole stanza (PS I 7c–8b) means as follows: “Erroneous cognition (= erroneously conceptualized cognition), cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and cognition related with wish are pseudo-perceptions, together with (sa-) cognition caused by the defects of a sense organ (taimira).” [This is the same with Dharmakīrti’s interpretation.]

3. According to the other interpretation, *sataimira* signifies that any deceptive cognition is pseudo-perception. It is the exception in Dīnāga’s system, since the notion ‘deceptive/non-deceptive’ was not used by him. Hence the stanza means as follows: “ Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, . . . and (ca) any deceptive cognition (sataimira) are pseudo-perceptions.” [This is a modification on the basis of Dharmakīrti’s notion of non-deceptiveness.]

Jinendrabuddhi’s idea would not reflect the original intention of Dīnāga. It is only a product of the integration of Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti’s theories.

The supposition that Jinendrabuddhi’s own idea, as seen above, is the *pūrvapakṣa* in Kamalaśīla’s text would be important on several points. In the first place, there is no room to doubt Jinendrabuddhi’s historical precedence to Kamalaśīla. Word-for-word correspondences in the five passages <a><a><a><a><a> between their texts clearly show that Kamalaśīla is indebted to the *Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā* and nothing else. It also reveals Kamalaśīla’s criticism of Jinendrabuddhi. As far as I know, Vīnāṭe’sa’s Nāyābinduṭīkā does not mention a cognition of a yellow conch as a problem in the definition of direct perception. In this respect, the cognition of a yellow conch may have been taken up as an important topic about the middle of the eighth century. It was a special problem raised in the context of direct perception when people began to interpret Dīnāga’s wording *sataimira* by using Dharmakīrti’s notion of non-deceptiveness. Those people who maintained the validity of a cognition of a yellow conch, etc., are called by Durvekaṃśa Aṃśasamvādādin or ‘propounders of the partial agreement/non-deceptiveness’. It should be noted here that Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion on this point was constructed on the basis of the somewhat astonishing thesis that a cognition of a yellow conch is non-deceptive. Therefore, his second interpretation of *sataimira* no longer holds when this thesis is denied. This is the reason why Kamalaśīla introduced Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary only as a *pūrvapakṣa*. Šāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara do not think such a cognition is direct perception as *pramāṇa*, so that to them only Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of *sataimira* is correct.

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84 Here I mean by Kamalaśīla the author of the Tattvasamgrahapañjikā. The text is considered to have been composed between ca. 760–780/790. Schmithausen [1965: 216 n. 150] and Krasser [1992: 157].


86 TSP 483,14–19 (ad TS 1324f.): prāmāṇyaṁ hi bhavat dvābhyaṁ [MK: dvābhyaṁ] ākārābhyaṁ bhavati/yathāpratibhāsān avasaṁvādād yathādhyavasāyam vā/tatraḥ na yathāpratibhāsān avasaṁvādāḥ/pitasva pratibhāsānāt tasya tathābhūtasyaḍāpyāpeṇ [tathā- MS: yathā- K]/nāpi yathādhyavasāyam avasaṁvādāḥ/pitasvaīva
Thus it is certain that the *Pramāṇasamuccayajīka* was written at the period between Devendra-buddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikapāṇjikā* and Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṃgrahapaṇjikā*. This will raise another question: Did Jinendrabuddhi precede Śāntarakṣita or vice versa? The problem of the cognition of a yellow conch is discussed in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1323–28:

“(Pūrvaṇa): Other people hold an opinion that a cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is the means of valid cognition (as direct perception), even though it is erroneous, because it is not deceptive in terms of the fulfillment of a purpose. 87 [1323]

(Uttaraṇa): This is not true, (because) also in the above case there is not such a realization of the fulfillment of a purpose as representing the conceptually determined appearance (i.e., yellow). Otherwise this fallacy of over-extension would follow: Since (even) a cognition which has the manifestation of ‘hair-mesh’, etc., is (certainly) non-deceptive concerning light and the like, such a cognition would irresistibly come to be the means of valid cognition! (However this is not the case, of course). [1324–25] Further, it cannot be assumed that a shape exists as distinct from its color. 88 And non-deceptiveness is not found in the manifesting color (i.e., yellow). If (opponents) assume, independently of the shape (of the object), the validity of cognition on the basis of non-deceptiveness in terms of the fulfillment of a purpose, then it would be surely contradictory to all the statements (of the master Dignāga), such as ‘because the ascertainment of the object conforms with that (i.e., the manifestation in cognition)’ 89 and so forth. 90 Therefore, non-deceptiveness comes about, as generated through the cause which ripens the subconscious impression.” 91 [1327–28]

Śāntarakṣita’s idea is possibly a more developed one than that of Jinendrabuddhi, because Śāntarakṣita shares the idea in common with his younger contemporaries in not accepting a cognition of a yellow conch as direct perception, while Jinendrabuddhi accepts it. This seems to suggest that Jinendrabuddhi was an elder contemporary of Śāntarakṣita.

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87 It would be a problem whether this *pūrvaṇa* is a reference to Jinendrabuddhi’s own idea. This point is related with another problem as to whether Jinendrabuddhi’s *pūrvaṇa* in the same context (‘One may assume as follows: . . .’) is a hypothetical one or based on the existence of those who maintained such a *pūrvaṇa*. Śāntarakṣita mentions here just the validity of the cognition concerned, while Kamalaśīla positively relates it with Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of PS 18b.

88 This is a statement from the Sautrāntika viewpoint in contrast to the view of the Sarvāstivāda school which admits the existence of both *samsthānārūpa* and *varṇarūpa* (Mimaki [1972: 86]).

89 PS 19b: *tādṛṣṭaḥ* *ḥy arthānīśayacah*. See Hattori [1968: 103 n. 62].

90 Kamalaśīla refers to PSV ad PS 19d as an example of ‘and so forth’ (TSP 483,24f.).

91 *pitasāṅkhādbuddhiḥ* *nimah vibhrāme* ‘*pi* *pramāṇatām* [K: *pramāṇatā* MS] *arthākriyāvasamvādād* *aṣṭopare sanpracāṣante* //1323// *tah nādhyavastākāraṇapratipāda* *na vidyate* // *tāṭāpy* *arthākriyāvāpytīr anyathātiprasadjaye* //1324// *keśādiḥpratibhadē ca jñāne sanvādābhavatāḥ* [S: *samvādī*–*K*] *ālokaḥ* *ataś* *tasya* *urnavirā* *pramāṇatā* //1325// *na* *varṇavatāraśtanam* *ca* *samsthānam* *upapadyate* // *bhāsanāhan* *varṇasya* *na* *ca* *samvāda* *īkṣyate* [S: *iṣyate* K (M is not clear)] //1326// *yady akāram anādṛtya* *pramāṇyam* *ca* *prakalpyate* // *arthākriyāvasamvādāt* *tāṭāpya* *ḥy arthānīśayacah* //1327// *iṣyādi* *gaditaṁ* *sarvaṁ* *kathāṁ* *na* *vadhataṁ* *bhavet* // *vasanāpākāhetūthas* *iṣmāt* *saṃvāduceṣṭhaḥ* //1328//.
I don’t think that Jinendrabuddhi flourished far before Śántarakṣita (ca. 725–788 A.D.), because both authors were possibly influenced by Arcaṭa’s theory on the aim of a treatise (prav-oyana) in his Hetubinduṭikā. As for the date of the composition of this text, I would like to assume it to be approximately 740–750 A.D.; Arcaṭa is considered to be a master of Dharmottara (ca. 740–800) so that his life would be about 710–770 A.D. On the other hand, Śántarakṣita’s Tattvasamgraha is considered to have been written about 760 A.D. Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramānasamuccayāṭikā would have been composed slightly before the Tattvasamgraha.

This is related with another problem as to whether our Jinendrabuddhi is identical with the grammarian Jinendrabuddhi who was also a Buddhist and who was the author of the Nyāsa, a commentary on the Kāśikāvṛtti. Prof. Richard P. Hayes pointed out the possibility of such identity. Prof. Nobuhiko Kobayashi pointed out that the Nyāsa-kāra who is mentioned in Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṃkāra is the grammarian Jinendrabuddhi, and that three stanzas of Bhāmaha’s same work are cited (TS 911–13 on apoha theory) and criticized in the Tattvasamgraha. These convincingly demonstrate that Jinendrabuddhi the grammarian flourished first, then Bhāmaha quoted his passages, and the latter was in another context attacked by Śántarakṣita. If I am allowed to conjecture that the Nyāsa-kāra is identical with the Ṭikā-kāra and that the composition of the Nyāsa was done before the Pramānasamuccayāṭikā, Jinendrabuddhi’s life would possibly be about 710–770 A.D. with some margin of error. However, this consequence is not compatible with the previous studies which place Bhāmaha before Dharmakūti. At any rate, this important issue will have to be examined further from every possible viewpoint in order to reach a final settlement.

VI. Concluding Remarks

Dharmakūti added ‘non-erroneous’ (abhrānta) to Dignāga’s definition of direct perception. He intended to rule out sensory illusion (indriyabhānta, indriyāja bhrāntiḥ) from direct perception and enumerated it as a kind of pseudo-perception. Dignāga’s inconsistent dealings with a cognition of a double moon guided this interpretation of Dharmakūti.

In the context of direct perception, ‘non-erroneous’ was construed in the sense of ‘non-deceptive’ by Viśāladeva and Kamalaśīla, and possibly by Jinendrabuddhi, too. I suppose it was a general tendency of interpretation among the people who belonged to ‘Philological School’. It was Dharmottara who first criticized such an interpretation and opened a new phase of epistemology.

92 This is one of the conclusions of Funayama [1995a].
94 He is called bodhisattvadesīyāryaṣṭrijinendrabuddhipāda in the colophone of the Nyāsa.
95 Hayes [1983: 716].
96 Kobayashi [1978].
97 Kobayashi [1965].
98 E.g., Tucci [1930]. Cf. According to Kobayashi [1978: 470], Jayādiya, one of the two authors of the Kāśikāvṛtti which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon, is stated to have died in ca. 660 A.D. by Yijing in his Nan hui ji gui nei fa zhuoan, so that Bhāmaha flourished possibly after Dharmakūti, though the latter’s idea is not mentioned in the Kāvyālaṃkāra. On the other hand, the reliability of Yijing’s statements is doubted by Brough [1973: 255f.].
Jinendrabuddhi interpreted the word *sataimira* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 8b in the following two ways: His first interpretation is based on that of Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, and his second interpretation was motivated by the idea of some of his predecessors’ idea that a cognition of a yellow conch is direct perception. In this article, I also examined the possibility that Jinendrabuddhi flourished shortly before Śāntarakṣita.

Kamalaśīla constructed his own interpretations of ‘non-erroneous’ by using preceding texts: Vīṇātadeva’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* as being agreeable with Kamalaśīla’s main standpoint, Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* as being his pārāsakṣa, and probably the works of Dīrmottara, to say nothing of the master Śāntarakṣita’s teachings. In this respect, Kamalaśīla’s statement is weak in originality. Its importance would lie in the point that it is a well-systematized theory which reflects several different phases and actual debates in the eighth century.

Appendix I: Kamalaśīla’s Interpretation of abhṛānta in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

> evam kalpanāpodhatvam pratyakṣasya prasādhyābhṛāntagrahaṇe prayojanam āha keśoṇḍuke ⁹⁹ tātyā /

> keśoṇḍuke⁹⁹ divijānanivṛttyartham idam kṛtam /

> abhṛāntagrahaṇam tad dhi bhṛāntavyān nesvate pramā //1311//

> abhṛāntam¹⁰¹ atrāvisamvādītvena draṣṭavyam / na tu yathāvasthitālambanākārataya¹⁰² / anyathā hi yogācaramanetālambanāśiddhaḥ ubhayanayasaṃsārayenaṃśtasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvagyāpiṣaḥ /

> avisamvādītvam cābhimatarthakriyāśaṃmarthāhprāparāpanasaktiḥ¹⁰³ / na tu prāpaṇe eva / pratibhādhi-sambhavat / yady evam abhṛāntagrahaṇam evāsti / kiṃ kalpanāpodhagrahaṇeṇeti cet¹⁰⁴ / na / anumānāvikalpaśāpi pratyakṣatvaprasągāt / (TSP 479,20–480,9)

Appendix II: Vīṇātadeva’s Interpretation of abhṛānta in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*

> ‘khrul ba med pa ni ma khrul ba ste / thob par byed pa’i yul la phyin ci ma log ces bya ba’i tha tshig go //< ci’i phyir bye brag gnyis smos she na’> /< śmras pa’> [ ] < ma khrul ba smos pa ni re zhig rab rib can gyi shes pa ’khrul ba rnam par bcad par bya ba’i phyir> /< rig pa dang bral ba smos pa ni rjes su dpag pa bsal bar bya ba’i phyir> /< ’di ltar ma ’khrul ba nyid ni thob par byed pa’i yul la khas blang bar bya’i /< dmigs pa’i yul la ni ma yin no> / gal te dmigs pa’i yul la ma ’khrul pa nyid khas len na / des na ’dir <rnal byor spyod pa’i lugs bsal bar byas par ’gyur te> / ’di ltar <rnal byor spyod pa’i ni dmigs pa’i

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⁹⁹ keśoṇḍuke - M : keśoṇḍrake - KS. I follow M; both mean the same.

¹⁰¹ keśoṇḍukā - M : keśoṇḍrakā - KS.

¹⁰² Cf. Tib. tr. ma ‘khrul ba nyid ni (*abhṛāntatvam*).

¹⁰³ Cf. Tib. tr. dngos po ji ltar gnas pa’i rnam pa dmigs pa nyid kyis ni ma yin te (*vatstutno yathāvasthitākārālambanātaya / *yathāvasthitākārālambanātaya*). Compare also a similar expression in TSP 492,20:... api tu yathāvasthitām eva vastusvarṇam anūdya... (Tib. ’on kyang ji lla ba bzhi du gzhaṅ pa nyid kyi dngos po’i rang bzhi rjes su brjod nas).

¹⁰⁴ cet MK : om. S.
shes pa thams cad ni 'khrul ba yin par 'dod de' / de bas na de'i lugs bsal bar rab tu byed pa rtsom par 'gyur te / <8>rab tu byed pa ni mdo sde pa dang / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i rjes su sneggs par rtsom par 'dod la' / <10>gnyi ga yang thob par byed pa'i yul la mi bslu ba'i mthsan nyid ni ma 'khrul ba yin par khas len toa / <10>de lta yin na go / rjes su dpag pa yang mgon sum nyid du thal bar 'gyur te / <11>de yang mi bslu ba nyid du ma 'khrul bar 'dod do / <11>de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa bsal bar bya ba'i phyir rtogs pa dang brai ba zhes bya ba smos te / . . . (NBTV(V) 40,1–19)

In the following passages, words in bold letters are the original Skt. of the Tibetan words of NBTV(V) with the same index number <1>–<12>.

DhP 42,18f: <i>ihāvisāṃvādakavam abhūrṇatvatvam abhipretām, tena dviccandrādijñānāṃ vyavacchinnāṃ yogācāramataḥ api ghṛtiṃ bhavaḥtyā pūrvavyākhyānām . . . ; ibid. 44,23f.: <i>ihābhūrṇapadaṃ taimirikādijñānasyavacchedadārtham</i> <8>kalpanāpoḍhagrahanam tv anumāṇanirārthām</i> <10>iti yat pūrvakā yvākhyātaṃ . . .

NBTV(T) 18,14–19, 1: tena (= Viśṇudeva) tv evam vyākhyātam / abhūrṇam iti yat visāṃvādi na bhavaḥ / <10>evam saty anumāṇasyāpi pratyakṣalaṣaṇam prāṇoṇīti</i> <10>kalpanāpoḍhagrahanam tanniṛṛtyārtham</i> <12>it yad evam vyākhyāyate . . .

Tātparya (in Malvania’s gloss, DhP p. 263): <i>kimartham viśeṣāṇavadyopādānām</i> <11>ucyate</i> / <i>taimirikādijñānasyavacchedadārtham abhūrṇapadaṃ</i> <8>anumāṇanirārthām itarat</i> / <i>nā tv ālambanaviṣaye</i> <5>nyathā</i> <i>yogācāramataḥ amatam syāt</i> / <i>tanmatena sārvesāṃ svālambane bhṛntatvāt</i> / <i>isyat e ca sātraṇādikāyaogācāramatānātansuṣeṣaṃ prakaraṇārmbho</i> <5>yataḥ <i>prāṃṇya[ṣe][c]</i> viṣaye ‘visāṃvādakatvalaṣaṇam abhūrṇatvaṃ dvābyāṃ abhyapagamyate</i> / <i>tati evam anumāṇasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāḥ</i> <10>it tād api hi visāṃvādakatvād abhūrṇam itisya</i> <11>bagai</i> <8>anumāṇanirārthām kalpanāpoḍhagrahanam</i> <10>iti anyāvyākhyām nirācikīrsur āhā—abhūrṇam ity ādī / .

Appendix III: Devendra buddhi and Jinendrabuddhi

Some of the passage of the pratyakṣabhāṣa-section of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayātikā are identical with those of Devendra buddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikaparājikā. The following two cases are such examples, where the Tibetan words in bold letters were possibly identical in Sanskrit.

1. PST I P 32a7–b5, D 28b2–7: <i>rab rib bsus</i> <10>shes pa 'dis dbang po la nye bar gnod pa las skyes pa rab rib la sogs pa'i shes pa mgon sum litr snang ba bzhí pa gsungs so zhes pa'o / . . . de <i>lit</i> ni smig rgyu la sogs pa la chu la sogs pa'i shes pa de kho na ruam par gcad</i> <10>pa'i ched du ma 'khrul ba zhes mgon sum gyz mthshen nyid la khyad par nye bar byas pas so / de ni dbang po la nye bar gnod pa las skyes pa'i shes pa bzog pa'i don du'o zhe na / ma yin te / don dang phrad pa 'dzin pa kho na las don med pa las byung ba la' ba gnyis la sogs pa'i shes pa bzog pa'i phyir ro / gzhan du na dbang po las skyes pa shes pa ni yid brjod par bya bar 'gyur ro / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i shes pa ni / ji lit snag na la This pa'i brda dran pa'i stobs las 'jug pa dang mgon sum ma yin pa'ang yin par grub pa kho na'o zhes pa'o / . . .

PVP I P 249b1–5, D 212b6–213a2: <i>dbang skyes min pa bsgrub don du</i> <10>shes bya ba smos she
na `/ khrul pa bstan phyir ro`\(^{108}\) // phyir rol pa `di la `khrul pa snang st`e / smig rgyu la sogs pa dang kun rdzob tu yod pa dag la shes pa dbang po las skyes pa nyid yin par `dod pa lta bu`o // de lta na de nyid rnam par gcad pa`i phyir mgon sum gyi mtshan nyid kyi khyad par `khrul pa med pa can zhes brjod do // dbang po la\(^{109}\) gnod pa byas pa`i shes pa bzog pa`i don du zhes bya ba yang brdzun yin te / don dang phrad nas `dzin pa nyid kyi don ma yin pa las `byung ba zla ba gnyis pa la sogs pa`i shes pa zlog\(^{109}\) pa`i phyir ro // de lt`a ma yin na dbang po las skyes pa zhes bya ba nyid brjod par bya bar `gyur ro // rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa yang de yin la / grub pa yin pas zhes bya bar tshig rnam pa sbyar ro // `di lta ste / rjes dpag rjes su dpag las byung // dran byung brjod las byung ba yi`\(^{111}\) // shes pa sngon nyams su myong ba brda dran pa`i stobs kyi `grub par `gyur ba nyid yin pa lta bu`o //

2. PST I P 32b7–33a2, D 29a2–4: mgon sum ltar snang ba b`ahi pa `gang de ni `dir dmigs kyi bsal bar blta bar bya`i` // mtshan nyid kyi tshig gis\(^{112}\) don gis go bas gsal\(^{113}\) ba`i dper brjod pa ni ma yin no // gzhan du na mtshan nyid `khrul `par `gyur ro // de`i phyir dmigs kyi bsal ba`i tshig des phyi dang nang gi nye bar gnod pa`i rkyen gis bcom pa`i dbang pa`i shes pa rtog pa dang bral pa nyid na`ang mgon sum ltar snang bar brjod do // rab rib bcas zhes pa`i dir / rab rib ni dbang po nye bar bcom pa`i rkyen thams cad nye bar mtshan po tsam du blta bar bya`o lo // gang zhig zla ba gnyis la sogs pa`i shes pa dbang po las skyes pa ma yin pa kho na ste // `on kyang yid kyi kho na`o zhes smra`o //

PVP I P 250b5f., D 213b6f.: `dir b`ahi pa ni / mgon sum ltar snang ba rnam pa b`ahi po `di la mgon sum ltar snang ba b`ahi pa / mgon sum ltar snang rab rib bcas\(^{114}\) // zhes\(^{115}\) bya ba gsungs pa gang yin pa de dmigs kyi dagar ba yin par\(^{116}\) rig par bya ba`am mtshan nyid thag ma yin par rig par bya`i / mtshan nyid kyi tshig las don gis gsal ba`i dpe ni ma yin no //

PVP I P 250b7–251a3, D 214a1–4: `di ltar rtog pa yongs su rdzogs par byas nas `di`i rtog pa nyid kyi rgyu ma bs`had par / rab rib bcas\(^{117}\) zhes\(^{118}\) gsungs so // de nyid kyi phyir de ni rtog pa dang bral ba`i mgon sum ltar snang ba bstan pa yin no zhes par bya`o // `di lta ma yin na / mtshan nyid `khrul pa can du `gyur ro // de bas na dmigs kyi dagar ba`i tshig / des bs`had nyer gnod pa las skyes`\(^{119}\) // phyi dang nang gi`\(^{20}\) gnod pa byed pa`i rkyen gis`\(^{21}\) dbang po la`\(^{22}\) gnod pa byed pa las skyes pa`i shes pa thams cad rtog pa dang bral pa nyid yin na yang / mgon sum ltar snang ba zhes brjod do // de la rab rib `ba`zhig ni // nyer gnod mtshan par byed pa yin //\(^{23}\) de la rab rib dang

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\(^{108}\) PV III 289b: (ute dve) bhrāntidārānāti.

\(^{109}\) la D : om. P.

\(^{110}\) zlog P : ldog D.

\(^{111}\) ba yi D : ba`i P. The citation is PS I 7d–8a: anumānānumānikam // smārtābhilāśikāṃ ceti /.

\(^{112}\) gis P : gi D.

\(^{113}\) gsal P : bsal D.

\(^{114}\) PS I 8b: pratyakṣābham sataimaram.

\(^{115}\) // zhes D : shes P.

\(^{116}\) yin par D : om. P.

\(^{117}\) PS I 8b: sataimaram.

\(^{118}\) zhes D : ces P.

\(^{119}\) PV III 293b: tenoktam upaghātiajām.

\(^{120}\) gi P : gis D.

\(^{121}\) gis P : gyi D.

\(^{122}\) la D : om. P.

\(^{123}\) The passage is PV III 293cd: kevalan tatra timiram upaghātopalākṣāyam //.
bcas pa’i tshig gi rab rīb ni dbang po la gnod pa byed pa’i rkyen thams cad kyis₁²⁴ nge bar mthson pa yin par bta bar bya’o // de yang yid kyi₁²⁵ shes kha cig // zla ba gnis la sogs pa’i shes pa yang dbang po las₁²¹ skyes pa ma yin gyi /’on kyang yid kho na yin zhes kha cig smra’o //

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AS
Abhidharmasamuccaya (Asaṅga): See ASBh.

AS Bh

ĀP
Ālambanaparīkṣā (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Frauwallner [1930].

ĀPV
Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Frauwallner [1930].

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1²⁴ kyis D : kiy P.
1²⁵ kyi P : kyis D.
1²⁶ PV III 294a: mānasam tad apiṭy eke.
1²⁷ las D : la P.

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NB *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): See DhP.

NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): See NS.

NBT(Dh) *Nyāyabinduṭikā* (Dharmottara): See DhP.


NMu *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): In *ming zheng li men lun ben* 〔明正理門論本〕, tr. Xuanzang (玄奘): T 1628 (vol. 32).


P Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.


PS I Praṇānasamuccaya (Dignāga), chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa) (Tib.): See Hattori [1968].

PSṬ Viśālāmalavatī-nāma-praṇānasamuccayaṭṭhā (Jinendrabuddhi) (Tib.): P 5766 (vol. 139), D 4268 (vol. 20).

PSV Praṇānasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa) (Tib.): See Hattori [1968].

PV Praṇānavārttika (Dharmakīrti).

PV I Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.

PV III Chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa): See Tosaki [1979; 1985].

PVIn Praṇānavinīścaya (Dharmakīrti).


PVInṬ Praṇānavinīścayaṭṭhā (Dharmottara) (Tib.): P 5727 (vol. 136), D 4227 (vols. 14–15).

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YBh Yogācārabhūmi, the hetuvidyā-section: See Yaita [1992].