THE LOGIC OF THE SVABHĀVAHETU
IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S VĀDANYĀYA

by

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One of the signs of an extraordinarily creative person is continuous work and, what is more important, continuity in this work. Philosophy is – among other things – work. And work results in change: changing problems and changing answers. History and scholarly culture have a tendency to petrify, to create solid forms, structures and systems that can be taken home, stored, studied and transmitted. Difficulties, imbalances, unsolved problems, developments and differences – in short: the qualities of real life in an author’s work are usually neglected and, unnoticed, soon disappear from the transmitting consciousness of the heirs to any given tradition.

Dharmakīrti’s fascinating mind has suffered this fate. His elaborate efforts established Dignāga’s tradition of epistemology and logic in a form that has lasted – within the Tibetan Buddhist culture – up to our times. However, its intrinsic fascination was soon lost in the reception of a highly interesting philosophical system which leaves a great deal of room for later debate.

To understand Dharmakīrti’s significance for the subsequent tradition he must be seen independently of it, must be read in his own words, and must be studied within his own context of questions, efforts and solutions. What Dharmakīrti himself achieved is one thing that must be investigated; what his pupils and the even later branches of his tradition contributed is another; what they thought he had achieved is yet another field for investigation.

As soon as we start reading Dharmakīrti on his own terms we find ourselves participating in his philosophical workshop. And the philological situation in his case is luckily such that we can literally observe him at work, taking up a theme again and again, adapting it, fitting it together with other themes he has taken up again, and welding them together so that they seem never to have been separate.

Professor Frauwallner concluded his paper of 1954 on the origin and sequence of Dharmakīrti’s works with a statement that points the way to one of the lines of future research on Dharmakīrti: “It will be a fascinating task to trace the origin and gradual development of his thought in detail.”1 Nothing much has happened until now, more than 30 years later, but there is an increasing number of scholars today who have demonstrated in their research2 that these words were not written in vain.

At the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 I offered a paper with a rough working hypothesis concerning a development in Dharmakīrti’s works with regard to a theorem that I consider as central to his logical thought: the theorem of the ascertainment (niścaya) of the logical nexus (vyāpti) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (svabhāvaheṣu). I presented an idea of this theorem’s development in Dharmakīrti’s major works, starting from the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttikā together with its so called “autocommentary” through the Pramāṇaviniścaya and Nyāyabindu to its final form in the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya. I also said that this development and the reasons for it can be discerned in connection with the development of corollary theorems, and

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2 Cf. e.g. the papers of T. Tani on the development of Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga-concept, of T. Iwata on his work on the svabhāva- and kāryaheṣu-concepts, and of M. Inami on the treatment of paksābhāsa in this volume.
that there is a veritable "causal complex" of theories and theorems which finally merge into a complete and consistent logical theory. This I would like to refer to as the "final form of Dharmakirti's logic".

I regret to have to admit today that I have not yet been able after all these years to fulfill my promise and present a study of this development. Under these circumstances I would like to offer you today not another working hypothesis, but what I would like to refer to as an experiment in interpretation.

Irrespective of my working hypothesis that the "final form of Dharmakirti's logic" took shape in the formulation of his late works, the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya, an investigation of the logic in these works as such, without reference to its connections with earlier forms of the same theory is a necessary task in itself. If I call it an experiment I mean that in dealing with Dharmakirti's final formulations it remains to be seen whether they contain a logical theorem which obviates the need for information from his earlier works and allows us actually to consider it as the nucleus of a coherent logical theory. For, if this hypothetical presumption of conceptual coherency is not accepted with regard to the limited corpus of his late work, the specific works under consideration will have to be seen as being in danger of losing their literary and systematical consistency.

Accordingly I shall base my explanations entirely on the formulations of the Hetubindu, where important terms are used for the first time, and above all of the Vādanyāya, where their meaning and methodical application is explained to some extent. I shall refer to his other works only in order to clarify his conceptual usage where there is no reasonable doubt of any change in this.

In order to demonstrate the generally binding force of the main statements in the Vādanyāya regarding the proof of the logical nexus (vyāpatīsādhana) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (svabhāvahetu) that I would like to investigate, a glance at the context of these statements will be sufficiently revealing.

The subject of Dharmakirti's last major work, the Vādanyāya, is the definition of the so-called "points of defeat" (nigrasthānāmi) in disputations (vāda) and the refutation of other definitions (in fact those proposed by the early Nyāya school). Within the frame of definition of the "points of defeat" we find in the Vādanyāya a complete formulation of Dharmakirti's logic, i.e. his theory of the logical reasons (hetu), when for the major part of the explanation of the term defining the points of defeat for the propounder, Dharmakirti considers a "point of defeat" to be any deficient usage of the definitions of theories.

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3 Textual references are given to the editio princeps of Rāhula Sāṅkṣerīyana (Patna 1935-36). Swami Dwarkidas Shastri's edition (Varanasi 1972) is no improvement on the first edition mainly for methodological reasons. A new and critical edition of the first part of the Vādanyāya together with a German translation was submitted by Michael Torsten Much as a PhD dissertation at the University of Vienna in 1983. Meanwhile the second part of the text has been prepared and the complete work will be published by 1991.

4 For a survey of the system of the kinds of "points of defeat" and their definition as implied in the śāstraśatrakā verse of the Vādanyāya cf. Michael T. Much, "Dharmakirti's Definition of 'Points of Defeat' (nigrasthānāmi)", in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, ed. Bimal K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Dordrecht etc. 1986, 133-142 (with a synopsis of the definitions on p. 138).

5 VN 3,1-60,3.

6 Dharmakirti expounds the definitorily term astādhānāyogavacanam ("non-means-of-proof-formulation") which entails the definitions of the possible "points of defeat" on the side of the propounder (vādin). When the negation is constructed with the second member of the compound (astādhānāyogsya avacanam VN 3,1f.), i.e. "the non-formulation of a means of proof"), it is further taken to mean "the non-formulation of such means (āgga) of inferential cognition (ādāna = siddhi) as are available in form of the only threefold indicator (trīvidhām eva liṅgam)" (VN 3,3f.). He finally says that "non-formulation" (avacanam), i.e. "non-presentation" (anuccraṭa) of this indicator, can have two reasons: "silence" (ādiṣṭhānā) or "non-justification" (asamanthana) of this means (VN 3,2f.).
of logical reasons or indicators, and that such deficient usage consists in non-justified usage. Here "non-justification" (asamarthana) is nothing but the fact that the propounder does not indicate a definite, ascertaining cognition (*niscaya) with regard to all the three forms or aspects (rupa) of the logical reason. This is the context which requires a description of what a proper, i.e. justified (samarthita) logical reason is like. And what follows is - apart from various digressions - a succinct formulation of Dharmakirti's logic.

He first states the three well-known kinds of possible logical reasons as a means for proving something not perceived: essential property (svabhava), effect (karya) and non-perception (anupalambha). Such a reason has to be justified, else its propounder is defeated. Justification (samarthana) of the reason means proving the reason's presence in the problematic locus and proving the reason's pervasion by the argued property.

There follow detailed descriptions of what exactly constitutes a proof (sadhana) of the pervasion (vyapti) by the argued property (sadhya) for each of the three kinds of logical reasons, in other words a theory of the ascertainment of a logical nexus.

In this paper I would like to limit the discussion to the prescriptions concerning the mode of establishing a pervasion in the case of an essential property as reason (svabhavahetu), because it is in this area that we find a manifest shape of Dharmakirti's final logical thought.

Before we go into the details of this theory it is of considerable relevance for our further remarks to acknowledge again the fact that the context that I described briefly above which demands a justification of the logical reason is of a purely general kind. Thus this context will not content itself with an answer provided within the limited frame of the logical operations of a particular inference only, e.g. the sattvavastumana. The justification of a svabhavahetu as proposed below must be the result of a method applicable in all cases of essential properties used as logical reasons.

The definition of the proof of pervasion (vyaptisadhana) for a logical reason of this kind in the Vatanyasa is this: "In the case of this (essential property as logical reason) a proof of pervasion is the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (the logical reason) in the contradictory opposite (of the argued property)."

This definition is already extant in a fuller linguistic form in the Hetubindu, where the ascertainment of positive concomitance (anvayaniścacya) is defined, but the complementation of the two terms - namely <sadhya> viparyaye and <hetoh> bādhaka - is also supported by a later repetition in negative form from the Vatanyasa.

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7 VN 5.1f.: tasya samarthanam sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhyā dharmini bhvāsādhanaṃ, and VNṬ 3.26: sādhanāṅgasāmarthanam trīpi api rūpena niścayāpdarśanam.
8 VN 3.3f.: tṛividham eva hi liḥgam aprayaṃkṣayā siddher aṅgaṃ svabhavāḥ kāryam anupalambhaḥ ca.
9 VN 5.1f.: tasya samarthanam sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhyā dharmini bhvāsādhanaṃ.
10 In the case of a svabhavahetu: VN 6.5-13.2, of a kāryahetu: VN 13.3-18.2, and of an anupalambhaḥetu: VN 18.3-60.3.
11 The extent to which the results gained here are also meaningful for an interpretation of the kāryahetu remains to be investigated.
12 VN 6.5f.: aha vyāptisādhanam viparyaye bādhakāpamāarpadoṣadānaṃ.
13 HB 4.5: sā śādhyāviparyaye hetoh bādhakāpamāarpadṛṣṭam. The proposition that Arcaja relates sā to vastuśas tadbhvātā (HBṬ 44.3) is a mistake, for only ... anubandhasiddhiḥ of the previous sentence can be referred to meaningfully and grammatically.
14 VN 8.2: <evam> sādhanasya sādhyāviparyaye bādhakāpamāarpadṛṣṭane...
Dharmakirti follows this definition with a more detailed explanation than that given in the Hettubindu. And with the help of these explanations we can now answer several vital questions: What is the sādhyaviparyaya, tentatively translated as "the contradictory opposite of the argued property"? What is the meaning of bādiaka? And what is the cognition called bādhakapramāṇa? And in general, aside from his having to explain how a logical reason is justified, is there an additional reason for explaining the method of ascertainment in yet more detail?

To answer the last question first, an additional reason can be found in Dharmakirti's life-long concern with the ideas of his teacher Iśvarasena.

The basic motif for defining the pervasion's proof in this way goes back to the lack of certainty with regard to the logical relation between reason and argued property that seems to have been discovered by Iśvarasena. When Dignāga formulated the third characteristic of a logical reason, i.e. its absence in cases where the argued property is absent (vipakṣe sattvam), he did not provide any means of control for this "induction domain" thereby opening a door to "the demons of doubt" with regard to the realm beyond a non-omniscient ordinary being's powers of cognition. The impossibility of ascertaining the absence of the reason in the absence of the argued property thus became one of the causes for the fact that Dignāga's formulation of these three characteristics of the logical reason can be considered as a statement of "the necessary conditions of certainty", but not as a statement of "the sufficient conditions of certainty".

Iśvarasena, as I have previously shown, not only discovered this problem but also tried to solve it in two ways: by evolving a theory of non-perception (anupalambha) in order to provide a means of control with regard to the absence of something (abhāva), and by introducing a fourth characteristic

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15 VN
6,5-11,1 The proof of a logical nexus (vyaptisādhanā) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (svabhāvahetu)
6,5-8,2 1) Definition:
6,5-6 a) Definition: demonstration of a valid cognition which negates the reason in the contradictory of the argued property (viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana)
6,6-8,2 b) Example in form of a prasakta in the case of the samvānumāna
8,2-11,1 2) Explanation:
8,2-9,2 a) The necessity of a sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa: without it the contradiction between the reason and the contradictory of the argued property cannot be established, the negative concomitance (vyav티reka) would therefore be doubtful and the reason indeterminate (anākāntika).
9,1-2 a) The absence of the reason cannot be established merely by the non-perception (adarśanamātra) of a non-omniscient person.
9,3-6 b) The function of a bādhakapramāṇa (in case of the samvānumāna): hypothetical establishment of the contradictory of the reason through negation of the reason's pervading property in a hypothetical locus.
9,7-11,1 c) Refutation of the objection: infinite progress (anavaṣṭhā) is unavoidable if non-perception is not considered as valid.

* = 9,7-12 + 8,5-6 + 10,1-11,1

16 Earlier interpretations of these terms deviating in part from mine can be found in Yuichi Kajiayama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, Kyoto 1966: 97 and Katsumi Mimaki, La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (shiharsiddhiśīpaṇa) et le preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhāvakṣiddhi), Paris 1976: 55 and 59ff.
17 Cf. Steinkeilner 1966: 82.
18 The term was proposed by Richard P. Hayes, "An Interpretation of anyāpoha in Dignāga's General Theory of Inference", in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (cf. above note 4) [31-57]: 32.
19 Cf. Richard P. Hayes, "Dignāga's Views on Reasoning (mārtīdnumāna)", Journal of Indian Philosophy 8/3, 1980 [219-277]: note 33. As the second cause can be considered as the fact that in Dignāga's theorem of the three characteristics of a logical reason (mārtīṣya) the problematic case (pakṣa) is not part of the "induction domain".
20 Cf. note 18.
of the reason (abādhiavāsīyatva) especially related to this problem.  

For both of these attempts he was continuously criticized by his pupil Dharmakīrti.  

Dharmakīrti made Īśvarasena’s problems his own from the very beginning of his logical work, but rejected his solutions, trying rather to find an answer of his own. On another occasion I have tried to show how Dharmakīrti was motivated by this task and how he elaborated his own solutions.  

Here, all I want to point out is the fact that it is still this same problem he himself declares to be the motif for the last of his formulations concerning the certainty of a logical relation.  

With reference to the example of the satīvānumāna, he states that this proof of pervasion is the necessary condition for dispensing any insecurity with regard to the logical relation of reason and argued property: “Since there is no incompatibility (vīrodha) [between the proving property and the contradictory of the argued property] if a valid cognition is not demonstrated in this way, such that it negates the proving (property) in the contradictory of the argued property, the suspicion (ṣaṅkā) that it might be existent or produced and still eternal will never wane, even if an occurrence [of the proving property] in [a locus of the occurrence of] the contradictory of the [argued property] is not perceived.”  

And he continues to express himself on this most important basic and original motif of post-Dignāgean logical research by stating: “Since the negative concomitance (vyatireka) would then be doubtful, this would be a case of the indeterminate apparent reason (anāikāntikāḥ heṭvābhāsah).”  

Finally he repeats for the last time his central objection to Īśvarasena’s attempt to avoid this consequence by providing non-perception (anupalambha) as an adequate means of control: “For absence (vyūrtti) [of the reason in the absence of the argued property] is not (established) by mere non-perception (adarśanaṃmāna), since the non-perception of someone who does not see everything does not prove absence — in the case of matters distant [in terms of place, time and condition] for somebody with a vision of our (ordinary) kind (simply) does not see certain things even though they exist.”  

So much for the problem that here is expressly stated to be the motif for formulating the definition of the proof of the pervasion in the manner proposed and not in any other. To repeat: the logical relation between reason and argued property is uncertain and the reason therefore is unjustified as long as the negative concomitance remains doubtful.  

Now we can return to the terms of the new method proposed and to our previous questions in order to see whether these terms create the necessary conditions for avoiding this problem, thereby offering a means of providing logical certainty.

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24 VN 8,2-4: <evam > sādhanaśāyāviparyayē bādhahkapramāṇasāyupadarśane vīrodhābhāvāy asya viparyayē vṛttter adarśane <‘pi> santākā vā syān niyāṣ cety anvītītī eva sākhyāḥ.

25 VN 8,4-9,1*: tato vyatirekasya sandeḥād anāikāntikāḥ syād heṭvābhāsāḥ.

* The lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and belong to the end of the next page, after 26.

26 First formulated in PVSV 12,4ff.; cf. Steinkellner 1966: 75f.

27 Following Santarāksita’s explanation (VNT 12,7): apisabdo yasmādhante.

28 VN 9,1-2: nāpy adarśanamāntād vyūrttīḥ, vipraśīttetvā asanvadarśino ’darsanasyābhāvādadhanaḥ, avadānśānena sādām api keśātṛd ardhanām adarśanāt.
What is the śādhyaviparyaya and – as a corollary to this question – why does Dharmakīrti use the new term viparyaya?

The synonyms available, vipakṣa\(^{29}\) and śādhyābhāva\(^{30}\) explain only the logical function of śādhyaviparyaya but not the concept of the term itself, i.e. the particular kind of "absence of the argued property" needed.

First of all we may ignore for the time being and for our purposes the ambiguity of the term śādhyābhāva and its use which consists in the fact that it either refers to a locus of such nature that it is a case of the occurrence of the discussed property, or to the property itself.

When Dharmakīrti in the above mentioned sentence says that a suspicion regarding the "induction domain" cannot be ruled out, when a bādhakapramāṇa is not demonstrated,\(^{31}\) the reason is given to consist in the absence of the relation of incomparability (virodhaḥ), i.e. an incomparability between the proving property (sādhana) and the śādhyaviparyaya. The result of the function of the bādhaka is therefore indicated to consist in the cognition of an incomparability (virodha) which makes all doubt impossible.\(^{32}\) And the śādhyaviparyaya in this case is clearly understood as a property, since only as such can it be incomparable with the proving property. Such an incomparability\(^{33}\) then necessarily has to cover the whole logical field and cannot be understood as an "incomparability of contrariety" (sahānavasthāna), but only as an "incomparability of contradiction" (parasparaparipariṣṭha) between two contradictories, where a third term is impossible.

The requirement of stringency applied to the incomparability between the proving property and the śādhyaviparyaya in order to remove all suspicion entails a like requirement for the definition of the terms that exclude each other, or else the incomparability would be meaningless for a statement of negative concomitance (vyatireka).

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29 Cf. HBṬ 44.4; śādhyasaṃ viparyayo vipakṣaḥ tatra.
30 Cf. VN 9.11: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent in the absence of the argued property (śādhyābhāve 'sau'), ... (evam <chi> sa heṇā śādhyābhāve 'sau sidhyet', ...). And VN 9.96: yad adarśanam viparyayo śādhyayai hetuḥ śādhyaviparyayo ... where Śāntarakṣita glosses viparyayam abhāvām (VNṬ 11.12), although this refers only to the absence 'of the reason.'
31 Cf. VN 8.2-4 (note 23).
32 Dharmakīrti works with two kinds of incomparability (virodha) (cf. PVŚV 5.13-16; 104,15-17; PVIn II 13.2-6; NB 72-75 and F. Th. Scherbatsky, Buddhist Logic II, Leningrad 1930: 187ff.). The first is defined as sahānavasthāna (NBṬ 199.3; cf. also PVŚV 36.16 = Karṇapakarṇa's Pramāṇavārttikā-anvṛtti, ed. Rāhula Śāṅkṛtyāna, repr. Kyoto 1982)), exemplified by the case of "cold and warm" (cf. PVŚV 6.1f.; NB 73), to be taken as an incomparability between two opposed facts, and is translated best when used in the logical context as "contrariety". This kind of incomparability, when talking of terms, is an incomparability of contraries, where a third term is always possible.

The other kind of incomparability is defined as parasparaparipariṣṭha (NB 73, or anyonyopalabdhipariṣṭha PVŚV 5.14f.), i.e. as "the mutual exclusion" of two terms, and exemplified by the cases of "being and non-being" or "eternal and non-eternal" (NB 73; PVŚV 5.15). This is an incomparability between contradictories, a third term being impossible. I therefore translate it as "contradiction".

Clear and most useful observations on possible translations of the term virodha and the types of opposition it may refer to can be found in a recent paper by Nandita Bandopadhyay ("The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology", Journal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988 [225-246]: note 1). Following her considerations we should not translate virodha by "opposition" but use the term "incompatibility". She also proposes the term "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction" for the relation of contradiction in the strict sense and for the relation of contrariety respectively, and suggests that "contradiction as a term in the wider sense of incomparability" may be used as an equivalent of virodha.

In the case of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term virodha it will not be necessary to adopt these latter generalizations because it is clear in most cases which type of virodha is intended. I therefore translate virodha by "incompatibility", and interpret it as the relation of contrariety on the logical planes when defined as sahānavasthāna (meaning "factual or physical contradiction", cf. ibid., 230-232), and as the relation of contradiction when defined as parasparaparipariṣṭha ("mutual exclusion").
33 Cf. Śāntarakṣita's explanation: yadi sādhanasya śādhyavipar <ya>yasya ca p ar a s p a a ni virodhaḥ sūtri bhaved adarśanamātreṣa(ī)-sarṇāyaḥ vṛdhīṣṭā (VNṬ 8.26f. + 11.28f.)
Now, if the *sādhyaviparyyāya* were considered to be nothing but *sādhyabhāva*, i.e. the argued property's absence, the insufficiency of induction cannot be accounted for and a contradiction of the reason to it would not yield the required stringency. This is only the case when *sādhyaviparyyāya* is understood as "the property which is in contradiction to the argued property", for only the property contradictory to the argued property is not only a certain case of the absence of the argued property but also excludes a third possibility that could be taken as a further area for the occurrence of the reason, thereby causing the latter to be indeterminate.

Accordingly the *vipaka* would then have to be taken as "that locus where the contradictory of the argued property occurs." And this amounts to no less than a new way of expressing the *vipaka* or *sādhyabhāva*. I would consider the new element as being that the locus of reference for a formulation of the negative comcomitance (vyātireka) is determined by its contradictory character.

If the *sādhyabhāva* is thus contextually defined as that which is a property in contradiction to the argued property or a locus of its occurrence, this new concept itself may have been sufficient reason for Dharmakīrti to use a new term, *viparyyāya*, "the reverse" or "contradictory", instead of the traditional *abhāva*.34 The term *viparyyāya* would then be understood as actually defining the absence (*abhāva*) of either the proving or the argued property as their respective contradictories.35

In giving such a concrete meaning to the term *viparyyāya* instead of merely taking it as a synonym of *abhāva* we are supported by another passage, where Dharmakīrti explains why he does not deny in general that non-perception can prove an absence:36 "The non-perception (adarsana) which proves the *viparyyāya* of the logical reason in the *viparyyāya* of the argued property is called a valid cognition which negates this (logical reason) because it conceptually establishes (pratipātātanā) [in the *viparyyāya* of the argued property]37 a (property which is) *contradictory* (viruddha) (to this reason).38,39

And we are further supported by the subsequent argument which points to the establishment of the negative comcomitance for the sake of certainty as the task of the cognition under discussion: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent (āsan) in the absence of the argued property

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34 An additional reason might be found in an attempt finally to clarify (also terminologically) the meaning of *vipaka* when we think of the three possible interpretations Dignāga had already dealt with in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (cf. note II. 53 in my translation of the *Hetubindu* and the sub-note for these interpretations; cf. also Kajiyama (cited in note 16) note 181 and Steinkellner 1979: note 81).

35 Dharmakīrti's usage of the term *viparyyāya* is, of course, not limited to the meaning "contradictory opposite". He does, however, use the term when he refers to the incompatibility of "mutual exclusion" (parāparaparipāṭa), which Stcherbatsky (cited in note 32, p. 187 note 3) refers to as the "logical opposition" or Contradiction. This is the case not only in the *Nyāyabindu* (cf. NB III 85: *sādhyaviparyyāya*, cf. also III 81, 84, 88) but can already be found in his earlier works (cf. PVSV 5.2; 121.25; 174.22).

Besides this strict logical usage as "contradictory opposite", a meaning of merely "the opposite" is also attested, e.g. in PVSV 5.4: 78.23 (v. 156c [ = 158e]): 79.5; 112.19; PV II 226d; PV III 85d; PV IV 195b.

The term also functions in a spiritual context where it serves as a synonym of *pratipaka* (cf. PV I 221b [ = 223b] and PVSV 111.7; 163.8) and can also connote "change" (cf. PV I 232b [ = 234b] and PVSV 116.13; 135.13).

The only evident usage as a synonym of *abhāva* is PVSV 117.22 (cf. PVVT [cited in note 32] 425.12) and possibly also PV III 85d (cf. PVV 143.3).

Under these circumstances it seems evident that in Dharmakīrti's language *viparyyāya* cannot be taken simply as a synonym for *abhāva*.

36 VN 9.9: na, <a>bhāvasādhanasyādārśanasyapraśenedhāti.

37 Cf. VNṬ 11.17f.

38 Cf. VNṬ 11.14: asyei varaṇa.

(sādhyābhāve), if there it were opposed (bādhyeta) by a (property) contradictory to itself (svaviruddha) for which a valid cognition is available (pramāṇavat). From the second statement we can understand clearly, that the absence (abhāva) of the reason is proven, if its contradictary has been established in the absence of the argued property (sādhyābhāve). That means that the negative concomitance (vyatireka) is proven by a cognition that positively establishes the contradictary of the reason. And it as a statement of this positive establishment of the contradictory of the reason in (the occurrence of) the contradictory of the argued property that we have to understand the beginning of the first statement therefore, and not as a statement of the negative concomitance (vyatireka).

I would therefore propose to translate this beginning as "that non-perception which proves the contradictory (viparyaya) of the logical reason in the contradictory of the argued property (sādhyāviparyaya)." For Dharmakīrti says that this cognition is called negating the reason because it establishes its contradictory. And he continues to say that this is the only way to prove the negative concomitance.

The absence (abhāva) of the reason is then a certain consequence of the presence of its contradictory (viparyaya), but not the viparyaya itself. If the phrase viparyayaṃ sādhyātāt hetoh referred not to the contradictory of the reason, but to its absence (abhāva) we would have no meaningful area left in this sentence for the contradictory of the reason (asya vinuddha-) which is said to be conceptually established.

What is the cognition called bādhaṇkapramāṇa and what is the meaning of bādhaka? Dharmakīrti explains this cognition in two ways. These can be distinguished as referring to its conceptual and its logical function respectively.

Its conceptual function is explained when he says that "it conceptually establishes a (property which is) contradictory" (vinirdhānapratyupasthāpanāt VN 9,10). By the act of pratyupasthāpana this cognition "provides" (ākarṣat VN 9,4f.) the desired property. This conceptual function has been explained by Dharmakīrti in PV IV 228-236 and can be connected with the verb prakalpayati (PV IV 233d =, PVin II 25d) which refers to the conceptual cognition of establishment of a "usage" (vyavahāra) without a real objective basis (asanyānā) when it affirms (vidhi) or negates (nīsedha). Here in the Vādanavya this function is conveyed by the term pratyupasthāpana, which can therefore be translated as "conceptual establishment".

The logical function of the bādhaṇkapramāṇa is explained when Dharmakīrti identifies it as vyāpaka-dharmāṇupalabdhī (VN 8,6), which already occurs in HB 4,18f. as vyāpakānupalabdhī in the

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40 VN 9,11f.: evaṃ <hi> sa henuh sādhyābhāve 'san sīdhet, yadi iara pramāṇavatā svaviruddhena bādhyeta.
41 VN 9,9f.: yad adarśanam viparyayam sādhyātīt hetoh sādhyāviparyayet, ...
42 Here I do not follow Sāntarakṣita who glosses yad adarśanam viparyayam abhāvaḥ (1) sādhyātāt (VNṬ 11,12f.)
43 In addition it may be noted that the two formulations viparyayaṃ sādhyātīt hetoh sādhyāviparyayet (VN 9,9f.) and sa henuh sādhyābhāve 'san sīdhet (VN 9,11) are too close not to be questioned with regard to the reason for their linguistic difference if viparyaya and abhāva/asat are taken as synonyms.
44 Arcaṇa paraphrases tadi viparyayatdhamprayavasthāpepakam (HBT 44,5), where the adjective pratyavasthāpaka evidently bears the same meaning as our substantive pratyupasthāpana.
45 Cf. also HBT 44,23f.: tad viparyayatprasthāpanadakarṣitāt.
46 These verses were incorporated into PVin II as vv. 20-28 (for the new counting of the verses in PVin II cf. Steinkelner 1988: 1434) and are translated in Steinkelner 1979: 42ff.
47 The two lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and should follow 9,12.
48 This kind of non-perception (anupalabdhi) is explained in PV I, 29a-c' [=31a-c'] = PVin II 74a-c' (cf. Steinkelner 1979:...
function. This "non-perception of the pervading property" serves as the reason for a negation of its pervaded property, in our case the original logical reason. Its resultant inferential cognition is the non-existence of the pervaded property, its negation. This cognition therefore results in a "conceptual establishment" (pratypasthāpana) "canceling" or "negating" (bādhaka) this property. bādhaka thus means strictly "negating" here, and a "bādhakapramāṇa" is a "negating valid cognition" which in the case of the svabhāvahetu has the form of an inference from the non-perception of the pervading property (vāpakānapalabdhī).

After these clarifications we can summarize in the words of Dharmakīrti that the proof of pervasion (vyāptisādhana) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (svabhāvahetu) consists in the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (bādhaka) the logical reason in the contradictory opposite of the argued property, and that this negation is inferred from the non-perception of the reason's pervading property (vāpakānapalabdhī).

A final question remains to be asked, however: whether this method of proving the pervasion is to be applied in all cases of essential properties as reason, or whether different methods are still conceivable for different kinds of such reasons as proposed, e.g., in Dharmakīrti's earliest work?49 I said in the beginning that the context of the Vādanyāya, but also of the Hetuśīna, is of general kind and requires a proposition for the justification (samarthana) of a svabhāvahetu valid in all cases. Since Dharmakīrti does not in fact offer alternative methods we have to see how the method proposed is put to work not only in case of the sattvānumāna, where we can rely on the example provided by the Vādanyāya, but also in case of the sāntānaprābhavānumāna which is not mentioned at all in the Vādanyāya or the Hetuśīna.

Dharmakīrti uses the sattvānumāna to exemplify the various points of the logical structure proposed. He begins with the proof as such as an example for the justification (samarthana) of a reason which consists in proving its occurrence in the problematic locus (dharmin) and proving the pervasion by the argued property:50 "E.g.: 'What is existent or produced, all that is impermanent; like a pot etc.; (and) sound is existent or produced.'"51

He then exemplifies the demonstration of the valid cognition which negates (bādhakapramāṇopadārtha) the reason in the contradictory (viparyaya) of the argued property as proof for the pervasion.

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136f. for a translation). On Dharmakīrti's theory of anupalabdhī as a logical reason for a cognition of non-existence cf. Pāni II 11,12ff. as well as HB § 4.3 with its extensive digression on the nature of negative cognition and my translation and notes (cited in note 22: 60ff., 154ff.)

49 In my paper delivered at the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyoto 1982 I said in conclusion with regard to Dharmakīrti's first work: "While a method to ascertain the causal relation has been already developed here, a likewise generally applicable method of ascertaining the relation of identity is not given. The required valid cognition is said to be demonstrated by the example, but only in the case of the kṣetayankānumāna is an additional inference developed for proving the pervasion (vyāpti)."

At that time I was under the impression that Dharmakīrti wanted to say that the demonstration by means of an example is in fact a way of ascertaining the pervasion wherever an example can be provided for essential properties. But I now think that this is not the case at all. The task of the presentation of an example is only to indicate an already established valid cognition regarding the real identity and the logical relation of two essential properties based upon it. And this necessary relation between words, concepts, properties as based upon the undivided identity of the instance of reality referred to does not have to be established or ascertained in a particular way for the simple reason that within the culturally given system of linguistic conventions it is already known (prasadādhī cf. PVSV 16,30ff. and below 321).

50 VN 5.1: tāya samarthanaṁ sādhyaṁ vyāpīṁ prasādyaṁ dharmiṁ bhāvaśādhanam. The sequence implied in this formulation is said to be logically irrelevant. (VN 6.2-5).

51 VN 6.1f.: yathā yat sat kṛtakam voc tat sarvam anityam; yathā ghatādi; san kṛtakā vedaśādha iti.
(vyāptisādhana): "If everything existent or produced were not perishing at every moment, it would be only non-existent because it would be excluded from what is defined by capability for causal efficiency, since for a non-momentary (thing) causal efficiency is neither possible successively nor simultaneously. For that which is defined such that no capability can be stated (of it), is a non-existent."\(^{52}\)

The cognitive function of the bādhakapramāṇa which negates the reason thereby "conceptually establishing" its contradictory is exemplified with regard to the reason "existence" (sattva) as establishing its contradictory "inability as the defining characteristic of a non-existent":\(^{53}\) "Where (causal efficiency) is not possible successively or simultaneously, that is incapable for every (effect); and this (impossibility) is extant in a non-momentary (thing)."\(^{54}\)

And finally Dharmakīrti exemplifies the argument for the particular pervading property (vyāpaka-dhi̊roma): "In this case the capability (for causal efficiency), is proven as pervaded by the possibility (to produce an effort) successively or simultaneously, because there is no other way (of producing)."\(^{55}\)

From these exemplifications the following structure results in case of the sattvānumāṇa: the logical pervasion (vyāpi) between the essential properties (svabhāva) "existence" (sattva) as logical reason (hetu) and "momentariness" (ksanikata) as argued property (śādya) is proven by a non-perception of the reason's pervading property 'possibility of successive or simultaneous (efficiency) (kramayugapadyayoga) in the case of "non-momentariness" (aksanikata) as the contradictory of the argued property, because this non-perception negates (bādha) the reason thereby conceptually establishing "non-existence" (asaṭṭava) as its contradictory property (svaṭṭiṇuddha).

In this way the non-perception of the pervading property (vyāpakānupalabdhī) proves the contradictory of the reason (~h) in the contradictory of the argued property (~s) and thereby establishes the pervasion between reason (h) and argued property (s):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
&s & ~s \\hline
&~h
\end{array}
\]

This is the schematic model that can be drawn for the sattvānumāṇa on the basis of the information available in the Vādanīya. For the sūnissapānānumāṇa or comparable inferences we are not given any specific indications as to what the schematic model should look like: there are no trees or sūnissapās in either the Vādanīya or the Hetūbīndu. So we are forced to construct a schematic model on the basis of whatever information is available in Dharmakīrti's work as a whole, in order to find out whether the newly developed method for the ascertainment of the logical nexus (vyāpi) can be applied at all in this case. This is, of course, an experiment whose result will either prove or disprove the assumption that the proposed method is valid for every essential property used as logical reason (svabhāvahetū).

\(^{52}\) VN 6.6-8.2: yadi na sarvāṃ sa tatām kāṃ va prayakṣāṇāvāniśi syāti, aṣṭankaśaya kramayugapadyabhāyiṣit kramayugavād arthakriyādāmarthyalakṣaṇāyogāntihitam āty asād āva syāti. sarvāsāmāṇyopāyakāhyāśāmāḥkāhyāśāmāḥ kṣatā kāhyām iī.

\(^{53}\) VN 9.3-5: bādhaḥ svayam punah pramāṇam . . . . . . . . . iī pravartanā nam astamāriṣyam astaśūkṣaṃ bhāsātī.

\(^{54}\) VN 9.3-4: yatāḥ kramayugapadyayogāḥ na tasya kacyāḥ sāmāriṣyam, asti cākṣaṇike sa iī.

\(^{55}\) VN 8.5.1: tatra sāmāriṣyam kramakramayogena vyāpiṣyāḥ siddham, prakāśāntarābhāvāti.
That we are allowed or rather forced to construct a model for the case of the śiṃśapātvānumāna in accordance with a schema given for the special case of the sattvānumāna by Dharmakīrti himself, can be justified by two interrelated arguments. Firstly, the assumption that the method prescribed by Dharmakīrti in the Vādanāya was meant to be valid only for the sattvānumāna but not for all other cases of possible inferences using an essential property as reason (svabhāvahetu) would imply that Dharmakīrti had presented an incomplete theory of logic in both of his last works, an assumption that one can hardly defend in the face of the general meaning of these works, particularly the Hetu vivid.bh., as formulations of a theory of logical reason (hetu). Secondly, we would have to assume that instead of demonstrating the sattvānumāna as a crucial inference of special Buddhist concern by means of, and on the basis of a logical method developed for undisputable ordinary cases of logical reasons, Dharmakīrti had expounded a logical theory developed only for the sattvānumāna. An assumption of this kind would be against all historical and systematic reason. Nevertheless, I must again emphasize that what follows is an experiment of interpretation.

If we take the famous example from Dharmakīrti’s first work: vṛkṣa, yam śiṃśapātvā,56 our sādhyavāryadya bādhalapramānam could be taken to work in the following way:

Since the pramāna which negates the logical reason in the field of this property is a non-perception of its pervading property (vyāpakānupalabdhī), we have to answer the question as to what could serve as this pervading property in the case of the property śiṃśapātva.

Here a brief line of Dharmakīrti’s is of assistance: “Since only a certain particular possessor of branches etc. is known in this way (i.e. as ‘śiṃśapā’).”57 What can we deduce from this sentence that is of relevance for our question?

“Tree” and “śiṃśapā” are both designations (vyavahāra) which refer to general properties that can be understood as “the capability for the designation ‘tree’” (“vṛksavyabhāvahetugatavyayatvā”) and “the capability for the designation ‘śiṃśapā’” (“śiṃśapāvyabhāvahetugatavyayatvā”) respectively according to Dharmottara’s explanation.58 In the sentence quoted above Dharmakīrti means that the property “possessing branches etc.” (sahādhatvamātva) as extant in the particular thing which is designated as “śiṃśapā” is the reason (nimitta) for its designation as “tree”. If this essential property, when absent, may force the property of a “capability for the designation as ‘śiṃśapā’” to be absent, as stated in the main clause preceding,59 it is evident that it is conceived as a pervading property (vyāpkadamātra) of the latter.

56 PVSV 2.16; NB II 16.
57 PVSV 16.30ff.: sahādhatvadiṣṭaḥavyāditya karṣicita tathāpradesādhe.
58 According to Dharmottara the above inference has the following meaning: “This (thing) can be called ‘tree’, because it can be called ‘śiṃśapā’” (“vṛksavyabhāvahetugatavyayatvā śiṃśapāvyabhāvahetugatavyayatvā”). NBṬ 106.11: Cf. also the formulation of this proof in DhPr 107.8ff.). And Dharmottara goes on to explain: “In this case a stupid person in an area rich in śiṃśapās reversed in the usage of (the word) śiṃśapā and says ‘this is a tree’ then out of stupidity determines the śiṃśapā’s tallness too as a reason (nimita) for the usage of (the word) ‘tree’, (and) then (further) determines the small śiṃśapā which he sees as a non-tree. This block is introduced into the usage of (the word) ‘tree’ as having no other reason than śiṃśapā’s tallness etc. [in this śiṃśapā, or in this area?] do not constitute further reasons for the usage of (the word) ‘tree’, only śiṃśapā is the reason. (sahādhatavatvamātva) as extant in a śiṃśapā is the reason (nimita).” (sahādhatavatvamātva āditya prakūrāntaśiṃśapāvadādyavahāro jāto yad kālec ācārayām śiṃśapām upādāhārayati yam vṛkṣa iti tadd asau jāhāc chintāśaṃśapārthāc ca evaṁ apī vṛkṣavyabhāvasya nimitām avayavān iadda yān evavaccām pāryat śiṃśapāṁ ati evavacām avayavān. sa mābhāī śiṃśapāvamātānimīnam vṛksavyabhāva pravayatvāc. noccavādī nimitātānam ātma vṛkṣavyabhāva, api tu śiṃśapāvamātānimīnam – śiṃśapāvadāsahādhatavatvām nimitām iti arthāh. NBṬ 106,11-107.2). Cf. also DhPr 107.22-28.
59 Therefore either an essential property (vyavahāra) which is connected with that [real existence of the reason] as such may cause the very essence (buddha) which is postulated as a reason] to be absent (nivarttayet). [PV Ṛ 12a-3’ (= 25a-c’)] – e.g. the tree a śiṃśapā.” (samāmasamātānāmśiṃśapānām vābhāvam eva va / nivarttayet – yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapāḥ. PVSV 16.27-30). Cf. the prayoga formulated by Kamaladīla: yāyadhyādākharmanakāraḥ sa tadāyadhyādharmanakālaḥ, yathā vṛkṣaḥvādbhāva-
Therefore we can assume that this property would have been Dharmakirti’s candidate for the position of the *vyāpakadharma* of the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* had he cared to explain the *śimśapātvānumāna* as well.

We can therefore consider as a property contradictory to the argued property (*sādhyāviparyaya*) in the case of the *śimśapātvānumāna* the property "non-capability for the designation ‘tree’" (*vykaśavyavahārayogatva*) and the property "possessing branches etc." (*śākhādīmatva*) as the pervading property (*vyāpakadharma*) of the logical reason "capability for the designation ‘śimśapa’" (*śimśapa-vyavahārayogatva*).

The logical nexus between the properties "treeness" and "śimśapā jclassness" is then clearly ascertainable by means of the *viparītē bhādha kapramānam*; in the case of non-capability for the designation ‘tree’ a capability for the designation ‘śimśapa’ is denied because of the non-perception of its pervading property "possessing branches etc."

Thus we would arrive at the same schematic model as in the case of the *sattvānumāna* with the only difference being that the argued property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*śādhana*) are not coextensive.*

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In this way the difference between these inferences from two kinds of essential properties as reasons would not be constituted by different methods in ascertaining their logical nexus with the respective argued properties. In both cases the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) of the reason and the argued property would be ascertained by an additional inference, the *vyāpakānupalabdhi*-argument, which proves the absence of the first logical reason (*sattvā or śimśapā*) in the contradictory of the argued property (*akṣani katvā or *vykaśavyavahārayogatva*) by a non-perception of the first reason’s pervading property (*krama vyaya padya yogā* or *śākhādīmatva*) as a second logical reason.

This ends our experiment, I feel successfully, and we are now able to draw the following conclusion: the method proposed in the *Hetubindu* and explained in more detail in the *Vādanyāya* for an ascertainment of the logical nexus (*vyāptiniścaya*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāwahetu*) is in fact, as should be expected, prōscriptive for every logical reason. Towards

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*60* It is not of logical relevance here that a part of the argued property’s loci, i.e. trees other than śimśapaś would also be loci of the absence of the reason, because the logical nexus is established only with regard to the absence of the argued property proper.

Moreover, Dharmakirti defined the pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the *Hetubindu* as an asymmetric relation: "Pervasion is the necessary existence of the pervading (property) where (the pervaded property exists) or the existence of the pervaded (property) only when (the pervading property exists)." (*HB 2.7f.: vyāpti vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya va tatrāvā bhāvah.) These two definitions can be written as (x) (hx → sx) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) h, then x (is) s." and as (x) (¬sx → ¬hx) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) not s, then x (is) not h."
the end of his work Dharmakīrti proposed a new and generally valid method, one that was no longer flawed by a different treatment of the same kind of reason.

What is still to be investigated is the question of whether the different treatments of the svabhāvaḥetu and the kāryahetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are not indications to be found in Dharmakīrti's work that he was aiming in this direction.

At the beginning of this paper I referred to Frauwallner, who paved the path towards a historical interpretation of Dharmakīrti's work. Let me now end this investigation by referring to another great scholar who has, in many important ways, promoted our knowledge of Dharmakīrti's thought and tradition with his critical analysis of the theories and later polemics: Satkari Mookerjee.

Satkari Mookerjee long ago recognized with reference to the sattvānumāna that its treatment amounts to an acceptance of a theory of "internal concomitance" (antarvyāpti), although he knew that it was not accepted in the Buddhist epistemological school except for the late Ratnakaraśānti.61 Later62 Mookerjee saw that this theory was a consequence of Dharmakīrti's concept of the svabhāva-pratibandha as the real fundament of a logical relation: "The relation of antarvyāpti is then a deduction from Dharmakīrti's conception of natural concomitance (svabhāvapratibandha)."63

Mookerjee also felt Dharmakīrti's importance for the beginnings of the Jaina tradition of the antarvyāpti-theory with Siddhasena Divākara.64 In the Nyāyāvatāra this theory and the term for it is to be found – according to our present knowledge – in total isolation and without any Jaina background, but in Dharmakīrti we can now say that this theory seems to be the final product of a life-long occupation with the problem of an ascertainment of the logical nexus at least in the case of the svabhāvaḥetu. And although Dharmakīrti did not himself refer to his new theory by the term antarvyāpti, he can definitely be considered its creator.65

That his own tradition did not choose to follow these new lines of thought in a straightforward way but chose rather to interpret Dharmakīrti with an emphasis on the Dignāgean heritage, is another matter. But we can fully support the late Buddhist antarvyāptivādin Ratnakaraśānti, who insists on Dharmakīrti as the propounder of this theory, when he says that the sārta – whom I consider to be Dharmakīrti – regards the example in the formulation of the sattvānumāna merely as a concession to slowminded people, but not as logically necessary.66

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62 Cf. "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara", Vaisāhī Institute Research Bulletin 1, 1971 [1-143]: 4-9. I would like to thank Prof. E. Mikogami of Rytōkoku University, Kyoto, who called my attention to this work and sent me a copy.
63 ibid., 7.
64 ibid., 8ff.
65 On Dharmakīrti’s authorship of this theory and on the somewhat enigmatic treatment of the sattvānumāna in its logical structure by the later Buddhist logicians cf. the valuable observations and materials collected in Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on Antarvyāpti, Bāhyvyāpti, and Trairūpya" (in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology [cf. above note 4] 89-105), which is in part a reworking of his paper "Ratnakaraśānti and Ratnakīrti" (in Surabhi, Sreekrishna Sarma Felicitation Volume, Tirupati 1983, 131-140).