

THE LOGIC OF THE *SVABHĀVAHETU* IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S *VĀDANYĀYA*

by

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One of the signs of an extraordinarily creative person is continuous work and, what is more important, continuity in this work. Philosophy is – among other things – work. And work results in change: changing problems and changing answers. History and scholarly culture have a tendency to petrify, to create solid forms, structures and systems that can be taken home, stored, studied and transmitted. Difficulties, imbalances, unsolved problems, developments and differences – in short: the qualities of real life in an author's work are usually neglected and, unnoticed, soon disappear from the transmitting consciousness of the heirs to any given tradition.

Dharmakīrti's fascinating mind has suffered this fate. His elaborate efforts established Dignāga's tradition of epistemology and logic in a form that has lasted – within the Tibetan Buddhist culture – up to our times. However, its intrinsic fascination was soon lost in the reception of a highly interesting philosophical system which leaves a great deal of room for later debate.

To understand Dharmakīrti's significance for the subsequent tradition he must be seen independently of it, must be read in his own words, and must be studied within his own context of questions, efforts and solutions. What Dharmakīrti himself achieved is one thing that must be investigated; what his pupils and the even later branches of his tradition contributed is another; what they thought he had achieved is yet another field for investigation.

As soon as we start reading Dharmakīrti on his own terms we find ourselves participating in his philosophical workshop. And the philological situation in his case is luckily such that we can literally observe him at work, taking up a theme again and again, adapting it, fitting it together with other themes he has taken up again, and welding them together so that they seem never to have been separate.

Professor Frauwallner concluded his paper of 1954 on the origin and sequence of Dharmakīrti's works with a statement that points the way to one of the lines of future research on Dharmakīrti: "It will be a fascinating task to trace the origin and gradual development of his thought in detail."¹ Nothing much has happened until now, more than 30 years later, but there is an increasing number of scholars today who have demonstrated in their research² that these words were not written in vain.

At the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 I offered a paper with a rough working hypothesis concerning a development in Dharmakīrti's works with regard to a theorem that I consider as central to his logical thought: the theorem of the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*). I presented an idea of this theorem's development in Dharmakīrti's major works, starting from the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with its so called "autocommentary" through the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu* to its final form in the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*. I also said that this development and the reasons for it can be discerned in connection with the development of corollary theorems, and

¹ E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrtis", in *Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller*, Leipzig 1954 [142-154]: 154.

² Cf. e.g. the papers of T. Tani on the development of Dharmakīrti's *prasaṅga*-concept, of T. Iwata on his work on the *svabhāva*- and *kāryahetu*-concepts, and of M. Inami on the treatment of *pakṣābhāsa* in this volume.

that there is a veritable "causal complex" of theories and theorems which finally merge into a complete and consistent logical theory. This I would like to refer to as the "final form of Dharmakīrti's logic".

I regret to have to admit today that I have not yet been able after all these years to fulfil my promise and present a study of this development. Under these circumstances I would like to offer you today not another working hypothesis, but what I would like to refer to as an experiment in interpretation.

Irrespective of my working hypothesis that the "final form of Dharmakīrti's logic" took shape in the formulation of his late works, the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*, an investigation of the logic in these works as such, without reference to its connections with earlier forms of the same theory is a necessary task in itself. If I call it an experiment I mean that in dealing with Dharmakīrti's final formulations it remains to be seen whether they contain a logical theorem which obviates the need for information from his earlier works and allows us actually to consider it as the nucleus of a coherent logical theory. For, if this hypothetical presumption of conceptual coherency is not accepted with regard to the limited corpus of his late work, the specific works under consideration will have to be seen as being in danger of losing their literary and systematical consistency.

Accordingly I shall base my explanations entirely on the formulations of the *Hetubindu*, where important terms are used for the first time, and above all of the *Vādanyāya*, where their meaning and methodical application is explained to some extent. I shall refer to his other works only in order to clarify his conceptual usage where there is no reasonable doubt of any change in this.

In order to demonstrate the generally binding force of the main statements in the *Vādanyāya* regarding the proof of the logical nexus (*vyāptisādhana*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) that I would like to investigate, a glance at the context of these statements will be sufficiently revealing.

The subject of Dharmakīrti's last major work, the *Vādanyāya*,³ is the definition of the so-called "points of defeat" (*nigrahassthānāni*) in disputations (*vāda*) and the refutation of other definitions (in fact those proposed by the early Nyāya school). Within the frame of definition of the "points of defeat"⁴ we find in the *Vādanyāya* a complete formulation of Dharmakīrti's logic, i.e. his theory of the logical reasons (*hetu*), when for the major part⁵ of the explanation of the term defining the points of defeat for the propounder⁶, Dharmakīrti considers a "point of defeat" to be any deficient usage

³ Textual references are given to the *editio princeps* of Rāhula Śāṅkṛtyāyana (Patna 1935-36). Swami Dvarikadas Shastri's edition (Varanasi 1972) is no improvement on the first edition mainly for methodological reasons. A new and critical edition of the first part of the *Vādanyāya* together with a German translation was submitted by Michael Torsten Much as a PhD dissertation at the University of Vienna in 1983. Meanwhile the second part of the text has been prepared and the complete work will be published by 1991.

⁴ For a survey of the system of the kinds of "points of defeat" and their definition as implied in the *śāstraśārtraka* verse of the *Vādanyāya* cf. Michael T. Much, "Dharmakīrti's Definition of 'Points of Defeat' (*nigrahassthāna*)", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Bimal K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Dordrecht etc. 1986, 133-142 (with a synopsis of the definitions on p. 138).

⁵ VN 3,1-60,3.

⁶ Dharmakīrti expounds the definitory term *asādhanaṅgavacanam* ("non-means-of-proof-formulation") which entails the definitions of the possible "points of defeat" on the side of the propounder (*vādin*). When the negation is constructed with the second member of the compound (**sādhanaṅgasya avacanam* VN 3,1f.), i.e. "the non-formulation of a means of proof", it is further taken to mean "the non-formulation of such means (*aṅga*) of inferential cognition (*sādhana* = *siddhi*) as are available in form of the only threefold indicator (*trividham eva liṅgam*)" (VN 3,3f.). He finally says that "non-formulation" (*avacanam*), i.e. "non-presentation" (*anuccāraṇa*) of this indicator, can have two reasons: "silence" (*āśṇīmbhāva*) or "non-justification" (*asamarthana*) of this means (VN 3,2f.).

of logical reasons or indicators, and that such deficient usage consists in non-justified usage. Here "non-justification" (*asamarthana*) is nothing but the fact that the propounder does not indicate a definite, ascertaining cognition (**niścaya*) with regard to all the three forms or aspects (*rūpa*) of the logical reason.⁷ This is the context which requires a description of what a proper, i.e. justified (*samarthita*) logical reason is like. And what follows is – apart from various digressions – a succinct formulation of Dharmakīrti's logic.

He first states the three well-known kinds of possible logical reasons as a means for proving something not perceived: essential property (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*) and non-perception (*anupalambha*).⁸ Such a reason has to be justified, else its propounder is defeated. Justification (*samarthana*) of the reason means proving the reason's presence in the problematic locus and proving the reason's pervasion by the argued property.⁹

There follow detailed descriptions of what exactly constitutes a proof (*sādhana*) of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) by the argued property (*sādhya*) for each of the three kinds of logical reasons, in other words a theory of the ascertainment of a logical nexus.¹⁰

In this paper I would like to limit the discussion to the prescriptions concerning the mode of establishing a pervasion in the case of an essential property as reason (*svabhāva*hetu), because it is in this area that we find a manifest shape of Dharmakīrti's final logical thought.¹¹

Before we go into the details of this theory it is of considerable relevance for our further remarks to acknowledge again the fact that the context that I described briefly above which demands a justification of the logical reason is of a purely general kind. Thus this context will not content itself with an answer provided within the limited frame of the logical operations of a particular inference only, e.g. the *sattvānumāna*. The justification of a *svabhāva*hetu as proposed below must be the result of a method applicable in all cases of essential properties used as logical reasons.

The definition of the proof of pervasion (*vyāptisādhana*) for a logical reason of this kind in the *Vādanāyā* is this: "In the case of this (essential property as logical reason) a proof of pervasion is the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (the logical reason) in the contradictory opposite (of the argued property)."¹²

This definition is already extant in a fuller linguistic form in the *Hetubindu*, when the ascertainment of positive concomitance (*anvayaniścaya*) is defined,¹³ but the complementation of the two terms – namely <*sādhya*> *viparyaye* and <*hetohi*> *bādhaka* – is also supported by a later repetition in negative form from the *Vādanāyā*.¹⁴

⁷ VN 5,1f.: *īasya samarthanaṃ sādhyaṇa vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasāadhanam*, and VN 3,26: *sāadhanāṅgasyāsamarthanaṃ triṣv api rūpeṇa niścayāpradarśanam*.

⁸ VN 3,3f.: *trividham eva hi liṅgam apratyakṣasya siddher aṅgaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryam anupalambhaś ca*.

⁹ VN 5,1f.: *īasya samarthanaṃ sādhyaṇa vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasāadhanam*.

¹⁰ In the case of a *svabhāva*hetu: VN 6,5-13,2, of a *kārya*hetu: VN 13,3-18,2, and of an *anupalambha*hetu: VN 18,3-60,3.

¹¹ The extent to which the results gained here are also meaningful for an interpretation of the *kārya*hetu remains to be investigated.

¹² VN 6,5f.: *atra vyāptisādhanaṃ viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśanam*.

¹³ HB 4,5: *sā sādhyaṇviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ*. The proposition that Arcaṭa relates *sā* to *vastutas tadbhāva* (HB 44,3f.) is a mistake, for only . . . *anubandhasiddhiḥ* of the previous sentence can be referred to meaningfully and grammatically.

¹⁴ VN 8,2: <*evaṃ*> *sāadhanasya sādhyaṇviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśane* . . .

Dharmakīrti follows this definition with a more detailed explanation than that given in the *Hetu-bindu*. And with the help of these explanations¹⁵ we can now answer several vital questions: What is the *sādhya* *viparyaya*, tentatively translated as "the contradictory opposite of the argued property"? What is the meaning of *bādhaka*? And what is the cognition called *bādhakapramāṇa*?¹⁶ And in general, aside from his having to explain how a logical reason is justified, is there an additional reason for explaining the method of ascertainment in yet more detail?

To answer the last question first, an additional reason can be found in Dharmakīrti's life-long concern with the ideas of his teacher Īśvarasena.

The basic motif for defining the pervasion's proof in this way goes back to the lack of certainty with regard to the logical relation between reason and argued property that seems to have been discovered by Īśvarasena.¹⁷ When Dignāga formulated the third characteristic of a logical reason, i.e. its absence in cases where the argued property is absent (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*), he did not provide any means of control for this "induction domain"¹⁸ thereby opening a door to "the demons of doubt" with regard to the realm beyond a non-omniscient ordinary being's powers of cognition. The impossibility of ascertaining the absence of the reason in the absence of the argued property thus became one of the causes for the fact that Dignāga's formulation of these three characteristics of the logical reason can be considered as a statement of "the necessary conditions of certainty",¹⁹ but not as a statement of "the sufficient conditions of certainty".²⁰

Īśvarasena, as I have previously shown, not only discovered this problem but also tried to solve it in two ways: by evolving a theory of non-perception (*anupalambha*) in order to provide a means of control with regard to the absence of something (*abhāva*), and by introducing a fourth characteristic

15 VN

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|-----------|---|
| 6,5-11,1 | The proof of a logical nexus (<i>vyaptisādhana</i>) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (<i>svabhāvahetu</i>) |
| 6,5-8,2 | 1) Definition: |
| 6,5-6 | a) Definition: demonstration of a valid cognition which negates the reason in the contradictory of the argued property (<i>viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana</i>) |
| 6,6-8,2 | b) Example in form of a <i>prasaṅga</i> in the case of the <i>sattvānumāna</i> |
| 8,2-11,1 | 2) Explanation: |
| 8,2-9,2 | a) The necessity of a <i>sādhya</i> <i>viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa</i> : without it the contradiction between the reason and the contradictory of the argued property cannot be established, the negative concomitance (<i>vyatireka</i>) would therefore be doubtful and the reason indeterminate (<i>anaikāntika</i>). |
| 9,1-2 | α) The absence of the reason cannot be established merely by the non-perception (<i>adarśanamātra</i>) of a non-omniscient person. |
| 9,3-6 | b) The function of a <i>bādhakapramāṇa</i> (in case of the <i>sattvānumāna</i>): hypothetical establishment of the contradictory of the reason through negation of the reason's pervading property in a hypothetical locus. |
| 9,7-11,1* | c) Refutation of the objection: infinite progress (<i>anavasthā</i>) is unavoidable if non-perception is not considered as valid. |

* = 9,7-12 + 8,5-6 + 10,1-11,1

¹⁶ Earlier interpretations of these terms deviating in part from mine can be found in Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Kyoto 1966: 97 and Katsumi Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthira-siddhidṛṣṭi) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*, Paris 1976: 55 and 59ff.

¹⁷ Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 82.

¹⁸ The term was proposed by Richard P. Hayes, "An Interpretation of *anyāpoha* in Dignāga's General Theory of Inference", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (cf. above note 4) [31-57]: 32.

¹⁹ Cf. Richard P. Hayes, "Dignāga's Views on Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8/3, 1980 [219-277]: note 33. As the second cause can be considered as the fact that in Dignāga's theorem of the three characteristics of a logical reason (*trairūpya*) the problematic case (*pakṣa*) is not part of the "induction domain".

²⁰ Cf. note 18.

of the reason (*abādhitaviśayatva*) especially related to this problem.²¹

For both of these attempts he was continuously criticized by his pupil Dharmakīrti.²² Dharmakīrti made Īśvarasena's problems his own from the very beginning of his logical work, but rejected his solutions, trying rather to find an answer of his own. On another occasion I have tried to show how Dharmakīrti was motivated by this task and how he elaborated his own solutions.²³ Here, all I want to point out is the fact that it is still this same problem he himself declares to be the motif for the last of his formulations concerning the certainty of a logical relation.

With reference to the example of the *sattvānumāna*, he states that this proof of pervasion is the necessary condition for dispelling any insecurity with regard to the logical relation of reason and argued property: "Since there is no incompatibility (*virodha*) [between the proving property and the contradictory of the argued property] if a valid cognition is not demonstrated in this way, such that it negates the proving (property) in the contradictory of the argued property, the suspicion (*śaṅkā*) that it might be existent or produced and still eternal will never wane, even if an occurrence [of the proving property] in [a locus of the occurrence of] the contradictory of the [argued property] is not perceived."²⁴ And he continues to express himself on this most important basic and original motif of post-Dignāgean logical research by stating: "Since the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) would then be doubtful, this would be a case of the indeterminate apparent reason (*anaikāntikaḥ hetvābhāsaḥ*)."²⁵

Finally he repeats for the last time his central objection to Īśvarasena's attempt to avoid this consequence by providing non-perception (*anupalambha*) as an adequate means of control:²⁶ "For²⁷ absence (*vyāvṛtti*) [of the reason in the absence of the argued property] is not (established) by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*), since the non-perception of someone who does not see everything does not prove absence – in the case of matters distant [in terms of place, time and condition] for somebody with a vision of our (ordinary) kind (simply) does not see certain things even though they exist."²⁸

So much for the problem that here is expressly stated to be the motif for formulating the definition of the proof of the pervasion in the manner proposed and not in any other. To repeat: the logical relation between reason and argued property is uncertain and the reason therefore is unjustified as long as the negative concomitance remains doubtful.

Now we can return to the terms of the new method proposed and to our previous questions in order to see whether these terms create the necessary conditions for avoiding this problem, thereby offering a means of providing logical certainty.

²¹ Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 82f.

²² Cf. Steinkellner 1966: 75ff. and the refutation of the *śaḍlakṣaṇo hetu* in the *Hetubindu* (cf. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien 1967: chapter VI). My hypothetical assumption that this *hetu*-theory was Īśvarasena's has meanwhile been corroborated by external evidence as well (cf. Steinkellner 1988: note 47).

²³ Cf. Steinkellner 1988.

²⁴ VN 8,2-4: <evaṃ> sādhanasya sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśane virodhābhāvād asya viparyaye vṛtter adarśane <'pi> san kṛtako vā syān nityaś cety anivṛttir eva śaṅkāyāḥ.

²⁵ VN 8,4-9,1*: tato vyatirekasya sandehād anaikāntikaḥ syād dhervābhāsaḥ.

* The lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and belong to the end of the next page, after 9,12.

²⁶ First formulated in PVSV 12,4ff.; cf. Steinkellner 1966: 75f.

²⁷ Following Śāntarakṣita's explanation (VNT 12,7): *apiśabdo yasmādarthe*.

²⁸ VN 9,1-2: nāpy adarśanamātrād vyāvṛttiḥ, viprakṛṣṭeṣu asarvadarśino 'darśanasābhāvāśādhanāḥ, arvāgdarśanena satām api keśāncid arthānām adarśanāt.

What is the *sādhya viparyaya* and – as a corollary to this question – why does Dharmakīrti use the new term *viparyaya*?

The synonyms available, *vipakṣa*²⁹ and *sādhyaābhāva*³⁰ explain only the logical function of *sādhya viparyaya* but not the concept of the term itself, i.e. the particular kind of "absence of the argued property" needed.

First of all we may ignore for the time being and for our purposes the ambiguity of the term *sādhyaābhāva* and its use which consists in the fact that it either refers to a locus of such nature that it is a case of the occurrence of the discussed property, or to the property itself.

When Dharmakīrti in the above mentioned sentence says that a suspicion regarding the "induction domain" cannot be ruled out, when a *bādhakapramāṇa* is not demonstrated,³¹ the reason is given to consist in the absence of the relation of incompatibility (*virodhābhāva*), i.e. an incompatibility between the proving property (*sādhana*) and the *sādhya viparyaya*. The result of the function of the *bādhaka* is therefore indicated to consist in the cognition of an incompatibility (*virodha*) which makes all doubt impossible.³² And the *sādhya viparyaya* in this case is clearly understood as a property, since only as such can it be incompatible with the proving property. Such an incompatibility³³ then necessarily has to cover the whole logical field and cannot be understood as an "incompatibility of contrariety" (*sahānavasthāna*), but only as an "incompatibility of contradiction" (*parasparaparihāra*) between two contradictories, where a third term is impossible.

The requirement of stringency applied to the incompatibility between the proving property and the *sādhya viparyaya* in order to remove all suspicion entails a like requirement for the definition of the terms that exclude each other, or else the incompatibility would be meaningless for a statement of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

²⁹ Cf. HBT 44,4; *sādhya viparyaya vipakṣaḥ tatra*.

³⁰ Cf. VN 9,11: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent in the absence of the argued property (*sādhyaābhāve 'sau*), . . ." (*evam <hi> sa hetuḥ sādhyaābhāve 'sau sidhyet*, . . .). And VN 9,9f: *yad adarśanam viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhya viparyaye* . . ., where Śāntarakṣita glosses *viparyayaṃ abhāvam* (VNT 11,12), although this refers only to the absence of the reason.

³¹ Cf. VN 8,2-4 (note 23).

³² Dharmakīrti works with two kinds of incompatibility (*virodha*) (cf. PVSV 5,13-16; 104,15-17; PVin II 13,2-6; NB III 72-75 and F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic II*, Leningrad 1930: 187ff.). The first is defined as *sahānavasthāna* (NB 199,3; cf. also PVSV 36,16 [= Karmakagomin's *Pramāṇavārtikasavṛttiṭīkā*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, repr. Kyoto 1982]), exemplified by the case of "cold and warm" (cf. PVSV 6,1f.; NB III 74), to be taken as an incompatibility between two opposed facts, and is translated best when used in the logical context as "contrariety". This kind of incompatibility, when talking of terms, is an incompatibility of contraries, where a third term is always possible.

The other kind of incompatibility is defined as *parasparaparihāra* (NB III 75, or *anyonyopalabdhiparihāra* PVSV 5,14f.), i.e. as "the mutual exclusion" of two terms, and exemplified by the cases of "being and non-being" or "eternal and non-eternal" (NB III 75; PVSV 5,15). This is an incompatibility between contradictories, a third term being impossible. I therefore translate it as "contradiction".

Clear and most useful observations on possible translations of the term *virodha* and the types of opposition it may refer to can be found in a recent paper by Nandita Bandyopadhyay ("The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 16, 1988 [225-246]: note 1). Following her considerations we should not translate *virodha* by "opposition" but use the term "incompatibility". She also proposes the term "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction" for the relation of contradiction in the strict sense and for the relation of contrariety respectively, and suggests that "contradiction as a term in the wider sense of incompatibility" may be used as an equivalent of *virodha*.

In the case of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term *virodha* it will not be necessary to adopt these latter generalizations because it is clear in most cases which type of *virodha* is intended. I therefore translate *virodha* by "incompatibility", and interpret it as the relation of contrariety on the logical plane when defined as *sahānavasthāna* (meaning "factual or physical contradiction", cf. *ibid.*, 230-232), and as the relation of contradiction when defined as *parasparaparihāra* ("mutual exclusion").

³³ Cf. Śāntarakṣita's explanation: *yadi sādhanasya sādhya viparītyasya ca parasparavirodhaḥ syāt, bhaved adarśanamātreṇa (-se) śaṅkāyā vyāvṛttiḥ* (VNT 8,26f. + 11,28f.).

Now, if the *sādhya viparyaya* were considered to be nothing but *sādhya bhāva*, i.e. the argued property's absence, the insufficiency of induction cannot be accounted for and a contradiction of the reason to it would not yield the required stringency. This is only the case when *sādhya viparyaya* is understood as "the property which is in contradiction to the argued property", for only the property contradictory to the argued property is not only a certain case of the absence of the argued property but also excludes a third possibility that could be taken as a further area for the occurrence of the reason, thereby causing the latter to be indeterminate.

Accordingly the *vipakṣa* would then have to be taken as "that locus where the contradictory of the argued property occurs." And this amounts to no less than a new way of expressing the *vipakṣa* or *sādhya bhāva*. I would consider the new element as being that the locus of reference for a formulation of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) is determined by its contradictory character.

If the *sādhya bhāva* is thus contextually defined as that which is a property in contradiction to the argued property or a locus of its occurrence, this new concept itself may have been sufficient reason for Dharmakīrti to use a new term, *viparyaya*, "the reverse" or "contradictory", instead of the traditional *abhāva*.³⁴ The term *viparyaya* would then be understood as actually defining the absence (*abhāva*) of either the proving or the argued property as their respective contradictories.³⁵

In giving such a concrete meaning to the term *viparyaya* instead of merely taking it as a synonym of *abhāva* we are supported by another passage, where Dharmakīrti explains why he does not deny in general that non-perception can prove an absence:³⁶ "The non-perception (*adarśana*) which proves the *viparyaya* of the logical reason in the *viparyaya* of the argued property is called a valid cognition which negates this (logical reason) because it conceptually establishes (*pratyupasthāpanāt*) [in the *viparyaya* of the argued property]³⁷ a (property which is) c o n t r a d i c t o r y (*viruddha*) (to this reason)³⁸."³⁹

And we are further supported by the subsequent argument which points to the establishment of the negative concomitance for the sake of certainty as the task of the cognition under discussion: "For in this way the reason would be proven to be absent (*āsan*) in the absence of the argued property

³⁴ An additional reason might be found in an attempt finally to clarify (also terminologically) the meaning of *vipakṣa* when we think of the three possible interpretations Dignāga had already dealt with in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (cf. note II, 53 in my translation of the *Hetubindu* and the sub-note for these interpretations; cf. also Kajiyama (cited in note 16) note 181 and Steinkellner 1979: note 81).

³⁵ Dharmakīrti's usage of the term *viparyaya* is, of course, not limited to the meaning "contradictory opposite".

He does, however, use the term when he refers to the incompatibility of "mutual exclusion" (*parasparaparihāra*), which Stcherbatsky (cited in note 32, p. 187 note 3) refers to as the "logical opposition" or "Contradiction". This is the case not only in the *Nyāyabindu* (cf. NB III 85: *sādhya viparyaya*, cf. also III 81, 84, 88) but can already be found in his earlier works (cf. PVSV 5,2; 121,25; 174,22).

Besides this strict logical usage as "contradictory opposite", a meaning of merely "the opposite" is also attested, e.g. in PVSV 5,4; 78,23 (v. 156c [= 158c]); 79,5; 112,19; PV II 226d; PV III 85d; PV IV 195b).

The term also functions in a spiritual context where it serves as a synonym of *pratipakṣa* (cf. PV I 221b [= 223b] and PVSV 111,7; 163,8) and can also connote "change" (cf. PV I 232b [= 234b] and PVSV 116,13; 135,13).

The only evident usage as a synonym of *abhāva* is PVSV 117,22 (cf. PVSV† [cited in note 32] 425,12) and possibly also PV III 85d (cf. PVV 143,3).

Under these circumstances it seems evident that in Dharmakīrti's language *viparyaya* cannot be taken simply as a synonym for *abhāva*.

³⁶ VN 9,9: *na, <a>bhāvasādhanaśyādarśanaśyāpratishedhāt*.

³⁷ Cf. VNT 11,17f.

³⁸ Cf. VNT 11,14: *asyeti variate*.

³⁹ VN 9,9-11: *yad adarśanam viparyayaṃ sādhyati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye, tad asya viruddhapratyupasthāpanād bādha-pramāṇam ucyate*.

(*sādhyābhāve*), if there it were opposed (*bādhyeta*) by a (property) contradictory to itself (*svaviruddha*) for which a valid cognition is available (*pramāṇavat*).⁴⁰ From the second statement we can understand clearly, that the absence (*abhāva*) of the reason is proven, if its contradictory has been established in the absence of the argued property (*sādhyābhāve*). That means that the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) is proven by a cognition that positively establishes the contradictory of the reason. And it is as a statement of this positive establishment of the contradictory of the reason in (the occurrence of) the contradictory of the argued property that we have to understand the beginning of the first statement therefore,⁴¹ and not as a statement of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

I would therefore propose to translate this beginning as "that non-perception which proves the contradictory (*viparyaya*) of the logical reason in the contradictory of the argued property (*sādhyaviparyaye*)." For Dharmakīrti says that this cognition is called negating the reason because it establishes its contradictory. And he continues to say that this is the only way to prove the negative concomitance.

The absence (*abhāva*) of the reason is then a certain consequence of the presence of its contradictory (*viparyaya*), but not the *viparyaya* itself.⁴² If the phrase *viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ* referred not to the contradictory of the reason, but to its absence (*abhāva*) we would have no meaningful area left in this sentence for the contradictory of the reason (*asya viruddha*-) which is said to be conceptually established.⁴³

What is the cognition called *bādhakapramāṇa* and what is the meaning of *bādhaka*? Dharmakīrti explains this cognition in two ways. These can be distinguished as referring to its cognitional and its logical function respectively.

Its cognitional function is explained when he says that "it conceptually establishes a (property which is) contradictory" (*viruddhapratyupasthāpanāt* VN 9,10).⁴⁴ By the act of *pratyupasthāpana* this cognition "provides" (*ākarṣati* VN 9,4f.)⁴⁵ the desired property. This cognitional function has been explained by Dharmakīrti in PV IV 228-236⁴⁶ and can be connected with the verb *prakalpayati* (PV IV 233d = PVin II 25d) which refers to the conceptual cognition of establishment of a "usage" (*vyavahāra*) without a real objective basis (*asatyārtha*) when it affirms (*vidhi*) or negates (*niṣedha*). Here in the *Vādanyāya* this function is conveyed by the term *pratyupasthāpana*, which can therefore be translated as "conceptual establishment".

The logical function of the *bādhakapramāṇa* is explained when Dharmakīrti identifies it as *vyāpakadharmānupalabdhi* (VN 8,6),⁴⁷ which already occurs in HB 4,18f. as *vyāpakānupalabdhi*⁴⁸ in the

⁴⁰ VN 9,11f.: *evam <hi> sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'san sidhyet, yadi tatra pramāṇavatā svaviruddhena bādhyeta*.

⁴¹ VN 9,9f.: *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye, ..*

⁴² Here I do not follow Śāntarakṣita who glosses *yad adarśanaṃ viparyayaṃ abhāvaṃ (!) sādhayati* (VN 11,12f.).

⁴³ In addition it may be noted that the two formulations *viparyayaṃ sādhayati hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye* (VN 9,9f.) and *sa hetuḥ sādhyābhāve 'san sidhyet* (VN 9,11) are too close not to be questioned with regard to the reason for their linguistic difference if *viparyaya* and *abhāva/asat* are taken as synonyms.

⁴⁴ Arcaṭa paraphrases *tad viparttadharmapratyavasthāpakam* (HB 44,5), where the adjective *pratyavasthāpaka* evidently bears the same meaning as our substantive *pratyupasthāpana*.

⁴⁵ Cf. also HB 44,23f.: *tad viparyayarūpasyāsativākarṣaṇāt*.

⁴⁶ These verses were incorporated into PVin II as vv. 20-28 (for the new counting of the verses in PVin II cf. Steinkellner 1988: 1434) and are translated in Steinkellner 1979: 42ff.

⁴⁷ The two lines VN 8,5-6 are misplaced and should follow 9,12.

⁴⁸ This kind of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is explained in PV I, 29a-c' [= 31a-c'] = PVin II 74a-c' (cf. Steinkellner 1979:

function. This "non-perception of the pervading property" serves as the reason for a negation of its pervaded property, in our case the original logical reason. Its resultant inferential cognition is the non-existence of the pervaded property, its negation. This cognition therefore results in a "conceptual establishment" (*pratyupasthāpana*) "cancelling" or "negating" (*bādhaka*) this property. *bādhaka* thus means strictly "negating" here, and a "*bādhakapramāṇa*" is a "negating valid cognition" which in the case of the *svabhāvahetu* has the form of an inference from the non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

After these clarifications we can summarize in the words of Dharmakīrti that the proof of pervasion (*vyāptisādhana*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) consists in the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (*bādhaka*) the logical reason in the contradictory opposite of the argued property, and that this negation is inferred from the non-perception of the reason's pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

A final question remains to be asked, however: whether this method of proving the pervasion is to be applied in all cases of essential properties as reason, or whether different methods are still conceivable for different kinds of such reasons as proposed, e.g., in Dharmakīrti's earliest work?⁴⁹ I said in the beginning that the context of the *Vādanīyā*, but also of the *Hetubindu*, is of general kind and requires a proposition for the justification (*samarthana*) of a *svabhāvahetu* valid in all cases. Since Dharmakīrti does not in fact offer alternative methods we have to see how the method proposed is put to work not only in case of the *sattvānumāna*, where we can rely on the example provided by the *Vādanīyā*, but also in case of the *śiṃśapātivānumāna* which is not mentioned at all in the *Vādanīyā* or the *Hetubindu*.

Dharmakīrti uses the *sattvānumāna* to exemplify the various points of the logical structure proposed. He begins with the proof as such as an example for the justification (*samarthana*) of a reason which consists in proving its occurrence in the problematic locus (*dharmin*) and proving the pervasion by the argued property.⁵⁰ "E.g.: 'What is existent or produced, all that is impermanent; like a pot etc.; (and) sound is existent or produced.'"⁵¹

He then exemplifies the demonstration of the valid cognition which negates (*bādhakapramāṇopadarśana*) the reason in the contradictory (*viparyaya*) of the argued property as proof for the pervasion

136f. for a translation). On Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* as a logical reason for a cognition of non-existence cf. PVi II 11,12ff. as well as HB § 4.3 with its extensive digression on the nature of negative cognition and my translation and notes (cited in note 22: 60ff., 154ff.)

⁴⁹ In my paper delivered at the First International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyoto 1982 I said in conclusion with regard to Dharmakīrti's first work: "While a method to ascertain the causal relation has been already developed here, a likewise generally applicable method of ascertaining the relation of identity is not given. The required valid cognition is said to be demonstrated by the example, but only in the case of the *kṣaṇikanvānumāna* is an additional inference developed for proving the pervasion (*vyāpti*)."

At that time I was under the impression that Dharmakīrti wanted to say that the demonstration by means of an example is in fact a way of ascertaining the pervasion wherever an example can be provided for essential properties. But I now think that this is not the case at all. The task of the presentation of an example is only to indicate an already established valid cognition regarding the real identity and the logical relation of two essential properties based upon it. And this necessary relation between words, concepts, properties as based upon the undivided identity of the instance of reality referred to does not have to be established or ascertained in a particular way for the simple reason that within the culturally given system of linguistic conventions it is already known (*prasiddhi* cf. PVS 16,30f. and below 321).

⁵⁰ VN 5,1: *tasya samarthanam sādhyena vyāptim prasādhya dharminī bhāvasāadhanam*. The sequence implied in this formulation is said to be logically irrelevant. (VN 6,2-5).

⁵¹ VN 6,1f.: *yathā yat sat kṛtakam vā tat sarvam anityam; yathā ghaṭādi; san kṛtako vā śabda iti*.

(*vyāptisādhana*): "If everything existent or produced were not perishing at every moment, it would be only non-existent because it would be excluded from what is defined by capability for causal efficiency, since for a non-momentary (thing) causal efficiency is neither possible successively nor simultaneously. For that which is defined such that no capability can be stated (of it), is a non-existent."⁵²

The cognitive function of the *bādhakapramāṇa* which negates the reason thereby "conceptually establishing" its contradictory is exemplified with regard to the reason "existence" (*sattva*) as establishing its contradictory "incapability as the defining characteristic of a non-existent":⁵³ "Where (causal efficiency) is not possible successively or simultaneously, that is incapable for every (effect); and this (impossibility) is extant in a non-momentary (thing)."⁵⁴

And finally Dharmakīrti exemplifies the argument for the particular pervading property (*vyāpakadharmā*): "In this case the capability (for causal efficiency) is proven as pervaded by the possibility (to produce an effort) successively or simultaneously, because there is no other way (of producing)."⁵⁵

From these exemplifications the following structure results in case of the *sattvānumāna*: the logical pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the essential properties (*svabhāva*) "existence" (*sattva*) as logical reason (*hetu*) and "momentariness" (*kṣāṇikatva*) as argued property (*sādhya*) is proven by a non-perception of the reason's pervading property "possibility of successive or simultaneous (efficiency) (*kramayaugapadyayoga*) in the case of "non-momentariness" (*akṣāṇikatva*) as the contradictory of the argued property, because this non-perception negates (*bādhaka*) the reason thereby conceptually establishing "non-existence" (*asattva*) as its contradictory property (*svaviruddha*).

In this way the non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) proves the contradictory of the reason ($\sim h$) in the contradictory of the argued property ($\sim s$) and thereby establishes the pervasion between reason (*h*) and argued property (*s*):

s	$\sim s$
h	$\sim h$

This is the schematic model that can be drawn for the *sattvānumāna* on the basis of the information available in the *Vādanyāya*. For the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* or comparable inferences we are not given any specific indications as to what the schematic model should look like: there are no trees or *śiṃśapās* in either the *Vādanyāya* or the *Hetubindu*. So we are forced to construct a schematic model on the basis of whatever information is available in Dharmakīrti's work as a whole, in order to find out whether the newly developed method for the ascertainment of the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) can be applied at all in this case. This is, of course, an experiment whose result will either prove or disprove the assumption that the proposed method is valid for every essential property used as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*).

⁵² VN 6,6-8.2: *yadi na sarvaṃ sat kṛtakam vā pratikṣaṇavināśi syāt, akṣāṇikasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāyogād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇato nivṛttam ity asad eva syāt. sarvasāmarthyopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇam hi nirupākhyam iti.*

⁵³ VN 9,3-5: *bādhakam punaḥ pramāṇam iti pravartamānam asāmarthyam asallakṣaṇam ākarṣati.*

⁵⁴ VN 9,3-4: *yatra kramayaugapadyāyogaḥ, na tasya kvacit sāmarthyam, asti cākṣāṇike sa iti.*

⁵⁵ VN 8,5f.: *yatra sāmarthyam kramākramayogena vyāptiṃ siddham, prakāraṇītarābhāvāt.*

That we are allowed or rather forced to construct a model for the case of the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* in accordance with that schema given for the special case of the *sattvānumāna* by Dharmakīrti himself, can be justified by two interrelated arguments. Firstly, the assumption that the method prescribed by Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanīyā* was meant to be valid only for the *sattvānumāna* but not for all other cases of possible inferences using an essential property as reason (*svabhāva*) would imply that Dharmakīrti had presented an incomplete theory of logic in both of his last works, an assumption that one can hardly defend in the face of the general meaning of these works, particularly the *Hetubindu*, as formulations of a theory of logical reason (*hetu*). Secondly, we would have to assume that instead of demonstrating the *sattvānumāna* as a crucial inference of especial Buddhist concern by means of, and on the basis of a logical method developed for undisputable ordinary cases of logical reasons, Dharmakīrti had expounded a logical theory developed only for the *sattvānumāna*. An assumption of this kind would be against all historical and systematic reason. Nevertheless, I must again emphasize that what follows is an experiment of interpretation.

If we take the famous example from Dharmakīrti's first work: *vrkṣo 'yaṃ śiṃśapātvāi*,⁵⁶ our *sādhya* *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam* could be taken to work in the following way:

Since the *pramāṇa* which negates the logical reason in the field of this property is a non-perception of its pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), we have to answer the question as to what could serve as this pervading property in the case of the property *śiṃśapā*.

Here a brief line of Dharmakīrti's is of assistance: "Since only a certain particular possessor of branches etc. is known in this way (i.e. as '*śiṃśapā*')."⁵⁷ What can we deduce from this sentence that is of relevance for our question?

"Tree" and "*śiṃśapā*" are both designations (*vyavahāra*) which refer to general properties that can be understood as "the capability for the designation 'tree'" (**vrkṣavyavahārayogya*) and "the capability for the designation '*śiṃśapā*'" (*śiṃśapāvyavahārayogya*) respectively according to Dharmottara's explanation.⁵⁸ In the sentence quoted above Dharmakīrti means that the property "possessing branches etc." (*śākhādimattva*) as extant in the particular thing which is designated as "*śiṃśapā*" is the reason (*nimitta*) for its designation as "tree". If this essential property, when absent, may force the property of a "capability for the designation as '*śiṃśapā*'" to be absent, as stated in the main clause preceding,⁵⁹ it is evident that it is conceived as a pervading property (*vyāpakadharmā*) of the latter.

⁵⁶ PVSV 2,16; NB II 16.

⁵⁷ PVSV 16,30f.: *śākhādimadviśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathāprasiddheḥ*.

⁵⁸ According to Dharmottara the above inference has the following meaning: "This (thing) can be called 'tree', because it can be called '*śiṃśapā*'" (*vrkṣavyavahārayogyo 'yaṃ śiṃśapāvyavahārayogyavāi*, NB I 106,11: Cf. also the formulation of this proof in DhPr 107,9f.). And Dharmottara goes on to explain: "In this case a stupid person in an area rich in *śiṃśapās* unversed in the usage of (the word) *śiṃśapā*, when somebody shows him a tall *śiṃśapā* and says 'this is a tree' then out of stupidity determines the *śiṃśapā*'s tallness too as a reason (*nimitta*) for the usage of (the word) 'tree', (and) then (further) determines the small *śiṃśapā* which he sees as a non-tree. This block is introduced into the usage of (the word) 'tree' as having no other reason than *śiṃśapā*ness. Tallness etc. here [in this *śiṃśapā*, or in this area?] do not constitute further reasons for the usage of (the word) 'tree', only *śiṃśapā*ness is the reason; that is: possessing branches etc. (*śākhādimattva*) as extant in a *śiṃśapā* is the reason (*nimitta*)."
(*yatra pracuraśiṃśape deṣe viditaśiṃśapāvyavahāro jaḍo yadā kenacid uccāṃ śiṃśapām upādarśyocyate 'yaṃ vrkṣa' iti tad asau jḍyāc chīṃśapāyā uccatvam api vrkṣavyavahārasya nimittam avasyati tadā yāṃ evānuccāṃ paśyati śiṃśapām iām evāvrkṣam avasyati. sa mūdhah śiṃśapānamātranimittē vrkṣavyavahāre pravartate. noccatvādi nimittāntaram iha vrkṣavyavahārasya, api tu śiṃśapānamātrāṇi nimittam – śiṃśapāgataśākhādimattvaṇi nimittam ity arthah*. NB I 106,11-107,2). Cf. also DhPr 107,22-28.


⁵⁹ Therefore either an essential property (*svabhāva*) which is connected with that [real existence of the reason] as such may cause the very essence (*bhāva*) [which is propounded as a reason] to be absent (*nivartay*), [PV I 23a-c' (= 25a-c')] – e.g. the tree a *śiṃśapā*. "*īasmāt tanmātrasaṃbandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva vā / nivartayet – yathā vrkṣaḥ śiṃśapām*. PVSV 16,27-30). Cf. the *prayoga* formulated by Kamalaśīla: *yo yadvyāpakadharmarahitah sa tadvyāpiadharmavikalah, yathā vrkṣavadharmā-*

Therefore we can assume that this property would have been Dharmakīrti's candidate for the position of the *vyāpakadharmā* of the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* had he cared to explain the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* as well.

We can therefore consider as a property contradictory to the argued property (*sādhyaviparyaya*) in the case of the *śiṃśapātvānumāna* the property "non-capability for the designation 'tree'" (**vṛkṣavyavahārāyogyatva*) and the property "possessing branches etc." (*śākhādimattva*) as the pervading property (*vyāpakadharmā*) of the logical reason "capability for the designation 'śiṃśapā'" (*śiṃśapāvyavahārāyogyatva*).

The logical nexus between the properties "treeness" and "śiṃśapāness" is then clearly ascertainable by means of the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*: in the case of non-capability for the designation 'tree' a capability for the designation 'śiṃśapā' is denied because of the non-perception of its pervading property "possessing branches etc."

Thus we would arrive at the same schematic model as in the case of the *sattvānumāna* with the only difference being that the argued property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*sādhana*) are not coextensive:⁶⁰



In this way the difference between these inferences from two kinds of essential properties as reasons would not be constituted by different methods in ascertaining their logical nexus with the respective argued properties. In both cases the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) of the reason and the argued property would be ascertained by an additional inference, the *vyāpakānupalabdhi*-argument, which proves the absence of the first logical reason (*sattva* or *śiṃśapātvā*) in the contradictory of the argued property (*akṣaṇikatva* or **vṛkṣavyavahārāyogyatva*) by a non-perception of the first reason's pervading property (*kramayaugapadyayoga* or *śākhādimattva*) as a second logical reason.

This ends our experiment, I feel successfully, and we are now able to draw the following conclusion: the method proposed in the *Hetubindu* and explained in more detail in the *Vādanyāya* for an ascertainment of the logical nexus (*vyāptiniścaya*) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) is in fact, as should be expected, prescriptive for every logical reason. Towards

śūnyo ghaṭḍis tadvyāptiśiṃśapātvadharmavikalāḥ. (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968: 1025, 17-19).

⁶⁰ It is not of logical relevance here that a part of the argued property's loci, i.e. trees other than *śiṃśapās* would also be loci of the absence of the reason, because the logical nexus is established only with regard to the absence of the argued property proper.

Moreover, Dharmakīrti defined the pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the *Hetubindu* as an asymmetric relation: "Pervasion is the necessary existence of the pervading (property) where (the pervaded property exists) or the existence of the pervaded (property) only when (the pervading property exists)." (HB 2.7f.: *vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ*.) These two definitions can be written as (x) ($hx \rightarrow sx$) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) h, then x (is) s." and as (x) ($\sim sx \rightarrow \sim hx$) meaning "For all x is valid: if x (is) not s, then x (is) not h".

the end of his work Dharmakīrti proposed a new and generally valid method, one that was no longer flawed by a different treatment of the same kind of reason.

What is still to be investigated is the question of whether the different treatments of the *svabhāva*hetu and the *kārya*hetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are not indications to be found in Dharmakīrti's work that he was aiming in this direction.

At the beginning of this paper I referred to Frauwallner, who paved the path towards a historical interpretation of Dharmakīrti's work. Let me now end this investigation by referring to another great scholar who has, in many important ways, promoted our knowledge of Dharmakīrti's thought and tradition with his critical analysis of the theories and later polemics: Satkari Mookerjee.

Satkari Mookerjee long ago recognized with reference to the *sattvānumāna* that its treatment amounts to an acceptance of a theory of "internal concomitance" (*antarvyāpti*), although he knew that it was not accepted in the Buddhist epistemological school except for the late Ratnākaraśānti.⁶¹ Later⁶² Mookerjee saw that this theory was a consequence of Dharmakīrti's concept of the *svabhāva-pratibandha* as the real fundament of a logical relation: "The relation of *antarvyāpti* is then a deduction from Dharmakīrti's conception of natural concomitance (*svabhāvaprati-bandha*)."⁶³

Mookerjee also felt Dharmakīrti's importance for the beginnings of the Jaina tradition of the *antarvyāpti*-theory with Siddhasena Divākara.⁶⁴ In the *Nyāyavatāra* this theory and the term for it is to be found – according to our present knowledge – in total isolation and without any Jaina background, but in Dharmakīrti we can now say that this theory seems to be the final product of a life-long occupation with the problem of an ascertainment of the logical nexus at least in the case of the *svabhāva*hetu. And although Dharmakīrti did not himself refer to his new theory by the term *antarvyāpti*, he can definitely be considered its creator.⁶⁵

That his own tradition did not choose to follow these new lines of thought in a straightforward way but chose rather to interpret Dharmakīrti with an emphasis on the Dignāgean heritage, is another matter. But we can fully support the late Buddhist *antarvyāptivādin* Ratnākaraśānti, who insists on Dharmakīrti as the propounder of this theory, when he says that the *ācārya* – whom I consider to be Dharmakīrti – regards the example in the formulation of the *sattvānumāna* merely as a concession to slowminded people, but not as logically necessary.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Cf. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, (repr.) Delhi 1975: 380ff. (the first edition of this PhD-thesis 1932 appeared Calcutta 1935).

⁶² Cf. "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the *Nyāyavatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara", *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1, 1971 [1-143]: 4-9. I would like to thank Prof. E. Mikogami of Ryūkyō University, Kyōto, who called my attention to this work and sent me a copy.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 83f.

⁶⁵ On Dharmakīrti's authorship of this theory and on the somewhat enigmatic treatment of the *sattvānumāna* in its logical structure by the later Buddhist logicians cf. the valuable observations and materials collected in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti*, *Bahirvyāpti*, and *Tairūpya*" (in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* [cf. above note 4] 89-105), which is in parts a reworking of his paper "Ratnākaraśānti and Ratnakīrti" (in *Surabhi, Sreekrishna Sarma Felicitation Volume*, Tirupati 1983, 131-140).

⁶⁶ *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*, ed. Haraprasād Shāstri, Calcutta 1910, 112,4-9. Cf. Mimaki (cited in note 16) p. 52.