

## Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript<sup>1</sup>

ELI FRANCO, Vienna

In summarizing previous scholarship on the so-called Spitzer Manuscript (= SHT 810) more than 30 years ago, Dieter SCHLINGLOFF rightly observed that part of the manuscript seems to have been lost during World War II.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, two previous publications concerned with this manuscript by Heinrich LÜDERS<sup>3</sup> and Yūshō MIYASAKA<sup>4</sup> reproduce and transcribe fragments that cannot be found among the original fragments as previously preserved in the German Academy of Sciences at Berlin and recently transferred to the State Library, Berlin. However, in a "Korrekturnachtrag" to his paper SCHLINGLOFF adds: "After extensive investigations, the whereabouts of Dr. Moritz SPITZER could be ascertained. Dr. SPITZER, who lives at present in Jerusalem, informed me to my great delight that he was able to save his transcriptions of the fragments so that the loss of part of the original caused by the war is alleviated."<sup>5</sup>

SPITZER's transcriptions, prepared in late 1927 and early 1928, have been graciously put at my disposal by SPITZER's son, Amitai. They are found on some 65 unnumbered pages of various size and were kept in an old paper folder. There is no evidence to suggest that the order of all the pages in the folder as a whole is meaningful, but certain pages can be recognized as belonging together. Recently I was able to compare SPITZER's transcriptions with the original fragments and found transcriptions of some forty(!) fragments of various size that are no longer extant. Furthermore, I could deter-

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to express my deep gratitude to Karin Preisendanz and Lambert Schmithausen for most valuable suggestions and to Anne MacDonald for correcting my English.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. D. SCHLINGLOFF, "Fragmente einer Palmblatthandschrift philosophischen Inhalts aus Ostturkistan (Ms. Spitzer)." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 12-13, 1967-68 [= Frauwallner Festschrift], 323-328, on p. 324, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. LÜDERS, "Das Zeichen für 70 in den Inschriften von Mathurā aus der Śaka- und Kuṣāṇa-Zeit." *Acta Orientalia* 10, 1932, 118-135.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Y. MIYASAKA, "Kyōryōbu no danpen" [Fragments of Sautrāntika]. *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 10, 1962, 673-679.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. SCHLINGLOFF, *ibid.* p. 328: "Korrekturnachtrag: Der Verbleib von Dr. Moritz SPITZER konnte nach längeren Nachforschungen ermittelt werden. Herr Dr. SPITZER, der heute in Jerusalem lebt, teilte mir zu meiner grossen Freude mit, dass er seine Transkriptionen der Fragmente retten konnte, so dass der kriegsbedingte Verlust eines Teiles des Originals verschmerzt werden kann."

mine with the help of the transcriptions that some of the remaining fragments were broken into two or three pieces after SPITZER had transcribed them, presumably during or after WW II. Relying on SPITZER's transcriptions I was able to paste together<sup>6</sup> the following fragments: 8 + 623; 30 + 74 + 140; 73 + 64 + 76; 139b1[7] + 139a1[1]; 767 + 780; 842 + 847.<sup>7</sup>

Since SPITZER did not transcribe the entire manuscript, it is impossible to ascertain what portion of the fragments has been saved by his transcriptions. One can only hope that he transcribed the larger fragments and that those fragments that he did not transcribe were smaller and less significant. In this connection one has to mention that the great Japanese scholar Shōkō WATANABE, who worked with Ernst LEUMANN in Berlin during the thirties,<sup>8</sup> transcribed about 100 fragments.<sup>9</sup> WATANABE handed over his transcriptions to Yūshō MIYASAKA, and the latter passed them on to Junkichi IMANISHI, currently a professor at the IABS, Tokyo. A careful comparison between SPITZER's and WATANABE's transcriptions is an urgent desideratum. On the one hand, such a comparison will allow us to better determine how many of the fragments were lost during the war. On the other hand, as will be seen below, a comparison between two independent transcriptions is bound to eliminate some mistakes that occur in the one or the other.<sup>10</sup>

In what follows I reproduce and discuss the transcriptions of the first three pages of SPITZER's Nachlass as a token of my respect for and friendship with Professor Minoru

<sup>6</sup> The pasting is done only virtually on the images of the digitalized fragments, of course; I did not actually remove the fragments from their glass frames.

<sup>7</sup> The numbers of the fragments refer to the numbering of glass frames preserved in the State Library in Berlin. Fragment No. 10, which has also been transcribed by SPITZER, was broken probably during the sixties because it appears unbroken on the black and white photos used by SCHLINGLOFF when he worked on the manuscript during the early sixties, which he has kindly put at my disposal.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. MIYASAKA, *ibid.*, p. 673. Incidentally, some unpublished pages by WATANABE remain in LEUMANN's Nachlass, cf. *Catalogue of the Papers of Ernst Leumann in the Institute for the Culture and History of Indian and Tibet, University of Hamburg*. Compiled by Birte Plutat. Stuttgart 1998, entries 381, 387, 503.

<sup>9</sup> MIYASAKA states (*ibid.* p. 673) that the fragments amount to 110½ leaves, but given that 854 glass frames containing fragments still remain, that some of the frames contain more than one fragment (27, I believe, is the highest number of fragments in a single frame), and that some fragments (certainly more than 40) were lost, the statement cannot be correct. If it were true, it would mean that on average each fragment would have been broken to nine or ten pieces, which seems highly improbable. My assumption is that WATANABE transcribed some 110 fragments and that MIYASAKA's statement refers to WATANABE's transcriptions, not to the original fragments. It is probable that MIYASAKA did not see the actual manuscript, at least not before writing his paper, because he also says that the fragments are made of birch-bark, while in fact they are made of Talipot palm-leaves. I would like to thank Professor KYŪMA for a translation of MIYASAKA's paper.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. e.g., a case of aberratio oculi pointed out in 372a2 below.

Hara. Two of the fragments are transcribed also on p. 28<sup>11</sup>, two also on p. 35,<sup>12</sup> and one also on p. 64 of the Nachlass<sup>13</sup>; I point out the variants in the notes. Further, whenever available I note the variants in WATANABE's transcriptions as published by MIYASAKA. Note that I did not change SPITZER's transcriptions and that sometimes better readings appear in the notes rather than in the main text. In the discussion below I also suggest some conjectures in pointed brackets and add punctuation to facilitate the reading. Finally, I have prepared a concordance for MIYASAKA's transcriptions which I append to this paper.

[Page 1]

Blatt 369

a.

[1] khalv api<sup>14</sup> kin vijānī[.]. . . (duḥ)kha[m] tathāt<sup>15</sup> pariśiṣṭān(i) duḥkham ca duḥkh[a]tatprāptam<sup>16</sup> pariśiṣṭāny api duḥkhan tasmād<sup>17</sup> duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśa-

<sup>11</sup> P. 28 contains the transcription of another small fragment which contains the word *pariśiṣṭāni* and thus seems to belong to folio 369, but SPITZER did not include it there.

<sup>12</sup> Next to the transcription of these two fragments SPITZER refers to some unspecified location "6 unten".

<sup>13</sup> The pages are numbered by me in the order in which they were placed in the folder.

<sup>14</sup> One of the most conspicuous phraseological characteristics of the SPITZER Manuscript is the frequent use of *khalv api*. It is interesting to note that G. VON SIMSON, who investigated the language of the *sūtras* of the Sarvāstivāda school, pointed out that the use of *khalu* is usually avoided in the Sarvāstivāda texts. Cf. G. VON SIMSON, "Stil und Schulzugehörigkeit buddhistischer Texte." in H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur*. Part 1 (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, III, 1). Göttingen 1985, pp. 76-93, in p. 83: "Auf der anderen Seite scheint bei den Sa. der Wille zur Abkehr und Entfernung von der mittelindischen Vorlage stärker ausgeprägt zu sein als bei den Mū. Charakteristisch hierfür ist die weitgehende Vermeidung der Partikel *khalu* im PrMoSū (s. Anh. II.1, Nr. 33-37), die eben so wie die Partikel *kho* im Pāli sonst in buddhistischen Sanskrittexten überaus gewöhnlich ist." It seems, therefore, that either the avoidance of *khalu* was not yet common in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, or that was limited to the *sūtra* literature and was not applied to Abhidharma commentaries. Further, there is no absolute certainty that the Spitzer manuscript belongs to the Sarvāstivāda school. The use of *khalv api* rather than *khalu* alone seems to presuppose a different language of reference than Pāli.

<sup>15</sup> MIYASAKA, p. 676, 27b1, corrects: *tathā (ta)pariśiṣṭāni*. Note that MIYASAKA's transcription of this line begins with . . . . . *kham*, i.e. without *khalv api kin vijānī[.]*

<sup>16</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription, p. 676, differs considerably; it omits *duḥkham ca* and reads *duḥkhat (sic.) prāptam*. Read: . . . *duḥkham. tat prāptam*.

<sup>17</sup> MIYASAKA, p. 676, reads *tasmān na*.

naṃ<sup>18</sup> duḥkhaḍarś . . . . .

[2] nāt pariśiṣṭa(ṭa)<sup>19</sup> . . . // pi kin vijānī . . . . . h̥ (3)<sup>21</sup> yathā khalv api duḥkham  
tathāt<sup>22</sup> pariśiṣṭāni tat prā(ṭam) [yathā pari]śiṣṭāni ttathā duḥkham pariśiṣṭāni ca na  
du(h̥kha.) . . . . . /// tatra yad ukta ///

[3] duḥkham . . . . . (duḥ)[khaḍarśanāt pa]riśiṣṭadarśanam it[i] . . . . . (da)rśa-  
natatprāṭam du(h̥kha) /// . . . duḥkhaḍarśanam a . . . . . [th . . . . . i]///

b.

[1] darśanā(t pariśiṣṭa . . .) ///<sup>23</sup> . . . [duḥkhada]rśanam tasmān na duḥkhaḍarś(an) . . . .  
. (du)ḥkhaḍarśanāt pari(śiṣṭa) . . . /// (i)ti tan naḥ<sup>24</sup> (!) (1) . . . . . khalv apy ekas.m.y.<sup>25</sup>  
. . . . .

[2] katvaṃ<sup>26</sup> tasmān na . . . /// (par)iśiṣṭānān darśanam /// . . . . . kā<sup>27</sup>bhisamayāḥ<sup>28</sup>yadi

<sup>18</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription of this line ends here.

<sup>19</sup> *pariśiṣṭ(tāni)* corrected to *pariśiṣṭ(ṭa)*.

<sup>20</sup> The sign /// in the middle of the line is used by SPITZER, I assume, to point out gaps in the reconstructed leaf where the remaining fragments did not fit together. I also suspect that double *daṇḍas*, as used here before *pi kin*, have exactly the same function, but I respected the number of *daṇḍas* as it appears in SPITZER's transcriptions. I have also reproduced faithfully the number of dots in the transcription, but did not go so far as to distinguish between dots and what appear more like short hyphens. It should be noted that in all probability SPITZER did not use dots to refer to a number of missing or illegible *aḥṣaras*, but in a rough way to cover a certain space. It should also be noted that the separation into words is mine and that I do not reproduce SPITZER's hyphens between words.

<sup>21</sup> Although SPITZER has bracketed the number, this does not mean that it is his addition. The numbering of sections is typical of the Spitzer Manuscript.

<sup>22</sup> Sic.

<sup>23</sup> This part is missing in MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 27a1) which runs as follows: *du(h̥khada)rśanan tasmān na duḥkhaḍarś(an) . . . . . (du)ḥkhaḍarśanāt . . . . . pari . . . . . ti . . . . . tan na . . . . .* Relying on the transcription of this line by MIYASAKA, I concluded that the sign /// in SPITZER's transcription does not always represent the final break-off point of a fragment; by today's conventions such a case would be represented by a number of "+" corresponding to the estimated number of missing *aḥṣaras*.

<sup>24</sup> The scribe often adds a *visarga* to the negation at the end of the phrase *iti tan na*, probably for emphasis.

<sup>25</sup> Above the line SPITZER suggests: *samaye*.

<sup>26</sup> The nasalisation of a vowel before a nasal is typical for the manuscript.

<sup>27</sup> *a* corrected to *ā*?

<sup>28</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 27a2) begins here.

khalv api (du)ḥkham<sup>29</sup> duḥkhat[o] ('bhi)[samā<sup>30</sup>gacchat](i) na ca bhavati duḥkhaḍarśanāt  
pariśiṣṭa . . . . . pariśiṣṭāni<sup>31</sup> . . . ///

[3] ath(ā)n(u)t[pa]t(te)ḥ ev(a) /// (bha)<sup>32</sup>vati duḥkhaḍarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam<sup>33</sup> na hi  
nirodhamārggālakṣaṇ<sup>34</sup>ā<sup>35</sup> satkāyadr̥ṣṭis tasmād anupūrvvābhis(amaya . . .)<sup>36</sup>

Blatt 37? [= 370]

a.

[1] s x x āryya(ś)r(ā)vakaḥ idaṃ duḥkham iti /// . . [duḥkha<sup>37</sup>sa]mudayaḥ ayaṃ  
duḥkhanirodhaḥ iya(!)<sup>38</sup> duḥkha[ni]rodha[gaṃana](m?)<sup>39</sup> prat(i) x x d x ti(e?)<sup>40</sup> na ca  
duḥkhaḍarśanam pariśiṣṭe<sup>41</sup> ayathābhūtaṃ;<sup>42</sup> na hi pariśi

[2] ṣṭāni duḥkham tasmād anyatha<sup>43</sup>nnyathābhi(samayaḥ?) /// . . . . . (anupū)rvvābhi-

<sup>29</sup> MIYASAKA: *duḥkh(ābh)(isamayam) s(a)m(ā)g(ac)chati*.

<sup>30</sup> *a* corrected to *ā*?

<sup>31</sup> Not transcribed by MIYASAKA.

<sup>32</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 27a3) begins here. Note that he inserts his transcriptions of 28a3, 27b1 and 28b1-2 between that of 27a1-2 and 27a3.

<sup>33</sup> A negation should probably be conjectured for this sentence, perhaps *na* before *bhavati*.

<sup>34</sup> *ṇ* corrected to *n*.

<sup>35</sup> MIYASAKA reads: *-ālamānā* instead of *-ālākṣanā*. The correction of *ṇ* to *n* by SPITZER tends to support MIYASAKA's reading.

<sup>36</sup> A small fragment (1x3 cm) which probably belongs to this folio or to the next is preserved in frame 518:



/// (duḥkha?) [da]rśanād abhisamay. ///

<sup>37</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 676, 28b1-2) begins here.

<sup>38</sup> MIYASAKA: *iya(m̐)*.

<sup>39</sup> MIYASAKA: *-g(ā)m(i)nī*.

<sup>40</sup> MIYASAKA: *prati(pa)d (i)ti*. SPITZER on p. 28: */// [da]te*.

<sup>41</sup> MIYASAKA: *pariśiṣṭa . . .* His transcription of this line ends here.

<sup>42</sup> Note that on p. 28 SPITZER transcribes: *pariśiṣṭeṣu yathābhūtaṃ*.

<sup>43</sup> *ā* corrected to *a*.

samayaḥ (4) <sup>44</sup>pīḍā<sup>45</sup>lakṣaṇam khalv api duḥkhaṁ naiva<sup>46</sup> pariśiṣṭāni<sup>47</sup> yathā ca duḥkhaṁ tathā te jñeyam na hi yathānātmā tathā duḥkhaṁ mā bhūt<sup>48</sup> pariśi

[3] [ṣṭānām anā]tmatvā duḥkhat(v)an na pi yathā duḥkh . . . /// (a)nātmā vinivarttate /// bhavati duḥkhe<sup>49</sup> nā[tmadarśanāt<sup>50</sup> pa]riśiṣṭānā(!) darśanam iti (5)

b.

[1] x x x x x (kha)lv api [du](hka)jñāne duḥkham adṛṣṭa . . . /// . . . [na] ca duḥkhe jñānotpattau . . . /// . . . yāḥ pariśiṣṭāni [na h]y (e)k(a)[m] (a)nekeṣv anekadhā bhavati [2] tasmāt teṣāṁ darśanam na bhavati na . . . /// . . . <sup>51</sup>y(a?)ḥ <sup>52</sup>na hy anutpanne duḥkhajñāne duḥkhābhisamayā tasmād anupūrvvābhisamayāḥ duḥkhe khalv api darśanam duḥkhadarśanam duḥkhadarśanāc ca ni

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[3] rodhadarśanam iti bhāvan(!) āha ay . . . /// . . . [nam] tasmān na bhavati duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam iti (2) anyathā khalv api duḥkhādhiṣṭhānakleśāḥ pravarttante anyathā pariśiṣṭe[u]

Blatt (371?) [= 371]

a.

[1] . . . . . /// (pariśiṣṭā)nām darśanam iti (3) duḥ(kh . . .) . . . /// . . . khalv apy anātmā tvān na tv anātmā x x x x duḥkhatvaṁ tad yadi sarvvatra pīḍā x x x x y x x x y [2] . . . . . // t prahī[na] /// . . . . . // . . . tt x ko mārggas tasmān na duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam (4) pratyutpannamātram khalv api duḥkha . . . . .

<sup>44</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 28b2) begins here.

<sup>45</sup> *ḍ* is transcribed on p. 28 as *ḷ*; *ḷ* is most probably the correct transcription because *ḍ* between vowels is hardly ever used in the SPITZER Manuscript.

<sup>46</sup> MIYASAKA: *naivam*; on p. 28 SPITZER also transcribes *naivam*.

<sup>47</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription of this line ends here.

<sup>48</sup> On p. 28: *duḥkham ābhūt*.

<sup>49</sup> On p. 28 SPITZER seems to have understood *duḥkhena - ātma-*.

<sup>50</sup> Read *nātmā-*.

<sup>51</sup> Above the line and with a different pen SPITZER suggests tentatively: *anupūrvvābhisama*.

<sup>52</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 676, 28a3) begins here and ends in line 3 with *āha aya*.

[3] . . . . . m utpannam tan nābhisamāgatam abhisamāgatam ca vigatatvā nasti(!)<sup>53</sup> tasmā duḥkhābhisam(ayas) . . . . .

b.

[1] . . . . . atrāha jātigrahaṇā tad apy abhisamāgatam bhavati (6) atra brūmaḥ sad asat khalv api s . . .

[2] . . . . . /// . . . kleśābhā[vā] /// . . . . . <sup>54</sup>yaprakaraṇe Anupūrvvābhisamayaparīkṣā // • // yad ucyate prakṛtiprabhasvaram<sup>55</sup>

[3] . . . . . /// <sup>56</sup>k x n x nyatropalabhyate t . . . . . opakleśāḥ tadubhayaprat(yu)t-(pan)n(a)tve<sup>57</sup> āgantukatvaṁ na bhavati . . . . . o . . . . .

Blatt (372?) [= 372]

a.

[1] . . . . . <sup>58</sup>y x dh x yu . . . dhva <sup>59</sup>prabhasvaratvam upalabdham yad ucyate prabhasvaram upakliśyate iti yady x x y x tr x nn<sup>60</sup> x [p]ra[t]yu[tpann] . . . . . bhava

[2] . . . . . kliṣṭam prabha[svara]<sup>61</sup> . . . . . khalv api nopapadyate prabhasvaram<sup>62</sup> upakliśyate iti kiṁ kāraṇam yadā hi<sup>63</sup> buddhyā prabhasvaram upalabhyate<sup>64</sup> na

<sup>53</sup> The transcription is certainly correct; the fluctuation of *ā* and *a* (and to lesser extent of *i*, *ī* and *u*, *ū*) is another typical characteristic of the manuscript.

<sup>54</sup> With a different pen SPITZER suggests here *Dharmanandī*, which he considered as a possible title of the work; cf. frg 70a. MIYASAKA's transcription of 29b (p. 673) begins here.

<sup>55</sup> Both SPITZER and WATANABE/MIYASAKA consistently transcribe *prabhasvara* rather than *prabhāsvara*.

<sup>56</sup> This part does not appear in MIYASAKA's transcription which reads *-prabhasvaram . . . (u)pakleśāḥ*.

<sup>57</sup> MIYASAKA: *tad ubhayapratipatti?*.

<sup>58</sup> This fragment is transcribed also on p. 35 of the Nachlass.

<sup>59</sup> MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 677, 18a1) begins here and stops after *yadi* in this line.

<sup>60</sup> Or: *nu*.

<sup>61</sup> On p. 35: *prabha O [svar. ]*.

<sup>62</sup> MIYASAKA transcribes (p. 677, 18a2): *khalv api nopapadyate prabhasvaram upalabhyate na tado*. This is obviously due to an aberratio oculi from *prabhasvaram* to *prabhasvaram* in this line.

<sup>63</sup> On p. 35: *yad api*.

<sup>64</sup> On p. 35: *upakliśyate*.

tado[pa](k)[l](iśy...) // cetasi<sup>65</sup> ... // ... dā prabhasvaram  
 [3] ... upalabhye<sup>66</sup>ta vitam<sup>67</sup> (l)<sup>67</sup> dvisvabhav[ā!]<sup>68</sup>m<sup>68</sup> syād buddhiś ca dvivyaśyād<sup>69</sup>  
 aniṣṭam caita tasmāt prarūpan<sup>70</sup>[ā?]<sup>71</sup>bhāvaḥ<sup>71</sup> (3)<sup>72</sup> na khalv apy upakliṣṭam upakliṣṭam  
 grhṇāti prārū[panabhāv]<sup>73</sup> ... // ... upakliṣṭan na tadā<sup>74</sup>

b.

[1] ... (ap)y upakliṣṭānupakliṣṭe yugapad upalabhyate<sup>75</sup> tat katham etac chakyate  
 jñātum prabhasvaram upakliṣṭa itī (4)<sup>76</sup> yadi ca prakṛtiḥ upakleśair upamṛdyate prabha-  
 (svar)<sup>77</sup> ... // ... (upa)m(r)dyate prabhasva

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[2] ... ity ay<sup>78</sup> ... [yā]<sup>79</sup> khalv api yasya prakṛtiḥ sa tasya svabhāvaḥ sā yady

<sup>65</sup> Strangely enough, fragment 395 (SHT-810) reads as follows. Side a: a ///svaratvam api na .y./// ; side b: a ///. cittacetasi///. This cannot be a mere coincidence as the text on both sides of this fragment coincides with the transcriptions of this fragmentary portion of leaf 372, but it is strange that SPITZER did not transcribe *api* na on one side and *citta* on the other.

<sup>66</sup> a corrected to e.

<sup>67</sup> The text seems corrupt. The exclamation mark added by SPITZER must mean that he rechecked his transcription, but I cannot make sense of it. MIYASAKA reads (p. 677, 18a3): *palabhyetāpi tam dvisvabhāvaṃ*. However, I think that *dvisvabhāvaṃ* is a *bahuvrīhi* referring to *citta*. *tam* could be explained as a prakritism cf. EDGERTON, *BHSG* 21.11. Perhaps *vitam* should be emended to *cittam*.

<sup>68</sup> However, on p. 35: -svabh[ā]vaṃ.

<sup>69</sup> However, on p. 35: *dvivyaśyād*. MIYASAKA reads: *dvivyaśyāna niṣṭam*; perhaps one should read *dvitvavyaśyāt*.

<sup>70</sup> The use of *n* for *ṇ* is not typical for the manuscript, but *prarūpanam* appears also in 393b.

<sup>71</sup> On p. 35: *caitā asmātpararūpanābhāvaḥ*, but the reading above is certainly better. The reduction of double consonants to single ones (here *t* instead of *tt*) occurs repeatedly in the manuscript, and one should understand here *caitā tasmāt*.

<sup>72</sup> The number does not appear in MIYASAKA's transcription p. 677, 18a3.

<sup>73</sup> MIYASAKA: *prārū(panā...)*. Relying on the two transcriptions I conjecture *prarūpanābhāva*.

<sup>74</sup> MIYASAKA was able to decipher slightly more in the damaged portion towards the end of line 3: x ..... dāprabhasvaram ..... x ..... pakl(i)ṣṭan na tadā ..... (x) ..... x bh ..... t ..... si ..... .

<sup>75</sup> A negation should be added for this sentence, perhaps *nāpy*; cf. below.

<sup>76</sup> SPITZER on p. 35 reads 5 here whereas MIYASAKA (p. 677, 18b1) reads 6.

<sup>77</sup> On p. 35 SPITZER completes: *prabhasvaram*. The rest of this line is not reproduced by MIYASAKA.

<sup>78</sup> On p. 35 SPITZER completes: *ity a O y(u)[k]t(a)m*. MIYASAKA (p. 677, 18b2): *ity ay(u)k(ta)m*.

<sup>79</sup> On p. 35: [sa?].

upamṛdyate cittam itī tan na bhavati (1)<sup>80</sup> yadi khalv ap(i)<sup>81</sup> ... // (pra-  
 bha)svaratvam ... // ... ekībhavanti

[3] ... o x r x i ..... (pra)[kr]tisthāḥ katham upakleśayanti (2) yadi khalv  
 apy x x x pakleśāḥ prā<sup>82</sup> x x ā ..... .

Blatt 373

a.

[1] ..... // <sup>83</sup> ... syād atha prabhas(var) ... // ... yasyānyacittatvam<sup>84</sup> anyam  
 prabha(sv. .)

[2] cittan n ..... // ... (kha)lv apy upakleśāḥ ..... // (pra)bhasvaram apy upakleśam  
 anuprāptam kli ....

[3] ṣ(i)am . a ..... // ... (pra)bhasvaram tasmād . x // (pra)bhasvaram āsīd idam āsīd itī  
 na bh ..... .

b.

[1] (a)ny(e)n(ā)ny(a)[sy](a) ... // ... [m] upakleśasya py any ... // ... (a)vasthā  
 bhavati athāvatīṣṭhate [ny] ....

[2] (ā)di cānye(na) ... // (upakli)śyate tasmā d[u](hkh . .) ... // ... syānyenopakliṣṭa-  
 syopakleśatvam ..... .

[3] ..... // ... samyoga ..... // ... (u)pakliṣṭam syād itī (5) ..... .

Blatt ?<sup>85</sup> [= 374]

a.

<sup>80</sup> MIYASAKA seems to have read a *daṇḍa* here; graphically, it is impossible to distinguish between the number 1 and a *daṇḍa*.

<sup>81</sup> The rest of this line is not reproduced by MIYASAKA.

<sup>82</sup> On p. 35: *prāp[?]ā[s...ni...]*. MIYASAKA (p. 677, 18b3) reads here: *prāśās*.

<sup>83</sup> Considering the large number of double *daṇḍas* on this leaf, one may assume that this section was versified, but I could not discern any metrical pattern. It is not impossible that SPITZER uses “//” here in the same function as “///” above, i.e., for juxtaposing different fragments that apparently belong to the same leaf.

<sup>84</sup> Read *yasyānyac cittatvam* or perhaps, in view of the subsequent *anyam prabha(svaratvam)?*, assuming a prakritic influence on the pronominally declined adjective one may also read *yasyānyam*.

<sup>85</sup> The same fragment is transcribed (a. and b. in reversed order) also on p. 64 and by MIYASAKA as frg. 20a (p. 677) and 20b (p. 673).

- [1] . . . . . [y] x [t] x [c] x (p[r]abha)svaran tad upakliṣṭam ity etad ayuktam vaktum<sup>86</sup>  
 (1)<sup>87</sup> yadi khalv<sup>88</sup> asya prakṛtiṣ upakl . . . .  
 [2] . . . . . na hy asyāvayavopakliṣṭo<sup>89</sup> ‘vayavo nopakliṣṭa’<sup>90</sup> iti (3) anyam khalv apy  
 upakliṣṭād anupakliṣṭa . . . .  
 [3] . . . . . pi prabhasvaram evam syā(t) (4) yadi khalv api grhyate prabhasvaram ity  
 anupakliṣṭa<sup>91</sup> bhavaty a<sup>92</sup> . . . . .

b.

- [1] . . . . .<sup>93</sup>(Pra)bhasvarapratijñopāmbhika(m)<sup>94</sup> samāptam -// ● // ye ācāryyaguna-  
 sāmānyaviśeṣayuktāḥ saṃghe<sup>95</sup> . . . .  
 [2] . . . . .ṣayuktaḥ atah<sup>96</sup> paśyāmaḥ bhagavān api saṃghe<sup>97</sup> iti //<sup>98</sup> atra brūmaḥ sati khalv  
 apy āryya[śrāv] . . . . .  
 [3] . . . . . x x x . x i . . . . . (ā)diṣv api saṃdehaḥ (1) yat khalv api saṃghopalabdha  
 kāraṇa . . . . .

The transcriptions reproduced above cover fragments belonging to six consecutive folios (369-374). Although not all fragments bear folio numbers,<sup>99</sup> or complete folio

<sup>86</sup> *vaktam* corrected to *vaktum*; MIYASAKA: *vāktum*.

<sup>87</sup> MIYASAKA seems to have read a *danḍa* here.

<sup>88</sup> On p. 64: *khalv apy*, but *api* is omitted on p. 3 and by MIYASAKA.

<sup>89</sup> Read *asyāvayava upakliṣṭo*. According to MIYASAKA a number of *akṣaras* are missing between *asyāvayavo* and *pakliṣṭo*. I assume that a hyper-sandhi has occurred between *-avayava* and *upakliṣṭo*. On p. 64 the transcription begins with (*ava*)*yavo*.

<sup>90</sup> On p. 64: *nupakliṣṭa*; read ‘vayavo’ *nupakliṣṭa*.

<sup>91</sup> On p. 64: *anupakliṣṭa*. MIYASAKA reads: *anupakliṣṭa(m)*.

<sup>92</sup> MIYASAKA: *a(th)*.

<sup>93</sup> MIYASAKA suggests (p. 373, 20b1): (*cittaprakṛtipra*?)*bhasvara* . . . .

<sup>94</sup> On p. 64: *-pāmbhaka(m)*; MIYASAKA: *-palambhakaṃ*. Apparently neither *upāmbhaka* nor *upāmbhika* are recorded by the dictionaries; MIYASAKA’s *upalambhaka* is recorded, but this reading seems less probable here. Cf. also fragment 139b/1/3 (representing the end of the section criticizing the Kāśyapiya theory of karma): *kāśyapiyopāmbhi* . . . .

<sup>95</sup> On p. 64 *saṃgha* corrected to *saṃghe*; MIYASAKA (p. 373, 20b1) reads *saṃgha*.

<sup>96</sup> *atah* om. by MIYASAKA.

<sup>97</sup> MIYASAKA: *saṃgha*.

<sup>98</sup> On p. 64: 1 //.

<sup>99</sup> For instance, the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> folio that I consider to be folios 371 and 372.

numbers,<sup>100</sup> SPITZER must have considered the fragments to be parts of consecutive folios, and his assumption can now be confirmed with greater certainty.<sup>101</sup>

The discussion preserved in the fragments ranges over three topics: The first, titled *anupūrvābhisamayaparikṣā*, ends in 371b2; the second, titled (*prakṛti*)*prabhasvara-pratijñopāmbhika* continues up to 374b1; of the third only two and a half lines remain (374b1-3), but at the end of the paper I will reproduce some more fragments which deal with the same subject and which must have belonged to folio 375. All three topics constitute points of debate among various schools of Conservative Buddhism.

1) The first topic concerns the question whether the four noble truths are fully comprehended successively or at once. The debate centers on the so-called *abhisamaya-vāda*.<sup>102</sup> In his classification of the points of controversy, Bareau has pointed out that according to the Andhakas, the late Mahāsāṅghikas, the Sarvāstivādins, the Sammatīyas and the Bhadrāyānīyas the full comprehension of the four noble truths is gradual, whereas according to the Theravādins, the Vibhajyavādins, the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahā-sāṅghikas it occurs at once, that is, in a single cognitive act.<sup>103</sup>

This discussion is of particular importance for us because it clearly presupposes Dharmaśrī’s or Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s *\*Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra* and thus determines a *terminus a quo* for the work. B. WATANABE, K. MIZUNO and S. WATANABE, who translated the *\*Abhidharmahrdaya* into Japanese, argued that “Dharmaśrī composed the *Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra* in about 200 A.D.”<sup>104</sup> This could allow us to determine both the manuscript and the work contained in it as belonging to the third century, because

<sup>100</sup> For instance, the second folio reads “377”, but its placement after fol. 369 makes clear that SPITZER considered it to be fol. 370.

<sup>101</sup> We can confirm that “Blatt 7” = 374 by going backwards from folio 376 which is preserved as fragment 137; parts of folio 375 are reproduced below. The rest follows easily.

<sup>102</sup> The term *abhisamayavāda* was coined by FRAUWALLNER in his remarkable study of this doctrine in Dharmaśrī’s *\*Abhidharmahrdaya* or *\*Abhidharmasāra*; cf. E. FRAUWALLNER, “Abhidharma-Studien. III. Der Abhisamayavāda”. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15, 1971, 69-102, esp. p. 102. With all respect due to FRAUWALLNER, the name he chose has at least one considerable disadvantage, namely, it is too general and can be applied to Dharmaśrī’s theory as well as to its contrary (*ekābhisamaya(vāda)* or *yugapadabhisamaya(vāda)*). In what follows I retain the longer, but emic terms *anupūrvābhisamaya(vāda/in)* and *ekābhisamaya(vāda/in)*.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. A. BAREAU, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*. Saigon 1955, p. 270; cf. also p. 90 (thesis 4), p. 72 (th. 1), p. 138 (th. 9), p. 124 (th. 6), p. 129 (th. 2), p. 216 (th. 19), p. 174 (th. 17), p. 183 (th. 2), and p. 62 (th. 23) respectively.

<sup>104</sup> Reported in H. NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*. Delhi 1987, p. 108.

the palaeographical evidence presumably does not allow us to date the manuscript later than that period<sup>105</sup>. Unfortunately, however, the above dating of the \**Abhidharmahṛdaya* did not find acceptance among Abhidharma scholars. While everybody seems to agree that it was written before 220 A.D., there seems to be no decisive evidence that could help us to determine even approximately how much earlier.<sup>106</sup>

To come back to our fragments, folio 369 begins somewhere in the middle of the third section of the chapter *Anupūrvābhisamayaparīkṣā*. The *pūrvapakṣin* (369a1) seems to argue that the last three noble truths are similar to the first noble truth of suffering.<sup>107</sup> And (the apprehension or the object of the noble truth of) suffering is suffering. Thus, the following obtains: The rest, i.e., the other three noble truths, are also suffering. Therefore, by seeing (the noble truth of) suffering one sees the rest. (I read: <yathā> (duḥ)kha[m] tathā t<at>pariśiṣṭān(i) duḥkham ca duḥkha[a]<m>. tat prāptam: pariśiṣṭāny api duḥkhan. tasmād duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam).<sup>108</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Another reference that may prove useful for the dating of the work is found in fragment 157b:

1 ||| punar vṛkṣānūti\* vibhāṣāyām api ca na hetu . i . t. gomayāni|||  
2 |||...| patatām varam garuḍam āhur udadhiṣu samudram uttamam śaṣṭhi|||

However, I was not able to identify the quotation or to determine to which *Vibhāṣā* (presumably one of the commentaries on the *Jñānaprasthāna*) the author refers. The second line seems to contain a *subhāṣita* ("Garuḍa is the best of birds, the ocean is the best of seas, sixty ..."), but I could not identify its source either.

\* Note that *vṛkṣa* is usually a masculine noun.

<sup>106</sup> According to ARMELIN the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* is contemporary with the *Jñānaprasthāna*; cf. I. ARMELIN, *Le Coeur de la Loi Suprême. Traité de Fa-Cheng. Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra de Dharmasiri*. Paris 1978, p. 12 (expressing disagreement with R. YAMADA who situated the *Jñānaprasthāna* before the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*). FRAUWALLNER considered the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* to be earlier than the *Jñānaprasthāna* (cf. "Der Abhisamayavāda", p. 72), and WILLEMEN seems to endorse this opinion in *The Essence of Metaphysics. Abhidharmahṛdaya*. Bruxelles 1975, p. VIII, or at least to rely on it while claiming that "200 A.D. does not seem acceptable." Cf. also WILLEMEN's introduction in K.H. Potter (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.* Delhi 1996, p. 451. The title of this volume, and the place of the summary of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* in it, would imply that the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* must be considerably earlier than 150 A.D., but I suppose that in this case the title should not be taken too literally. For the most recent discussion cf. B. DESSEIN, *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions*. Delhi 1999, vol. I, p. xxxiii, and further references in vol. II p. 13, nn. 150-151. DESSEIN also considers the work to be probably earlier than the *Jñānaprasthāna*. As far as I can see there is no cogent argument allowing for a decision one way or the other.

<sup>107</sup> The reason for the statement is missing. Note also that the discrepancy between the transcriptions of SPITZER and of WATANABE/MIYASAKA is considerable.

<sup>108</sup> I follow here SPITZER's transcription. Note that WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcribe *tasmān* na instead of *tasmād*. If the WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcription is correct, then we obviously deal with a *siddhānta* statement. Indeed, in the discussion that follows, the words *tasmān na duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam* occur repeatedly, and this in itself would make the WATANABE/MIYASAKA tran-

The next line (369a2) appears to contain the reply of the *siddhāntin*, who derives the opposite conclusion from the alleged similarity among the truths: (If it is said that) the second, third and fourth truths are like the first truth, (then) the following obtains: the first truth is like the other three. But (the other three truths are) not suffering. (Thus, the first truth would also not be suffering) (*yathā khalv api duḥkham tathā t<at>pariśiṣṭāni. tat prāptam: yathā pariśiṣṭāni tathā duḥkham, na ca duḥkha ...*). The reason why the *siddhāntin* rejects the identity between the first and the other truths is not clear here. I assume that it is because the first truth is itself suffering whereas the others, or at least the third and fourth truths, are not considered to be suffering, but this is not stated explicitly in the fragment and I was also unable to identify the exact Sarvāstivāda position on this point. According to the Sarvāstivādin the third truth is *asaṃskṛta*, but the other three are not.<sup>109</sup> If one considers that everything which is produced (*saṃskṛta*) is *duḥkha*, one could say that the third truth is not suffering, but the other three are. If this is the Sarvāstivāda position, then our text would seem to be incompatible with it.<sup>110</sup>

The discussion continues on the verso side of the leaf (369b). In the first line there could be a statement to the effect that the apprehension of the four truths does not occur at once, "on one occasion" (*ekasamaye*). In the second line it is argued that it can be admitted<sup>111</sup> that one fully understands suffering as suffering, but that this does not imply that by seeing suffering one sees the other truths too (*yadi khalv api (du)ḥkham duḥkha[o] ( 'bhi)[samāgacchat](i) na ca bhavati duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭa ...*). In the third line the *siddhāntin* continues to argue that by seeing suffering one does not see the other truths because the false view of the *skandhas* as the Self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) does not have as its object the suppression of suffering and the way that leads to the suppression of suffering (<na> *bhavati duḥkhadarśanāt pariśiṣṭadarśanam. na hi nirodhamārgā-*

scription more probable. However, the immediately preceding statement that "the rest are also suffering" (*pariśiṣṭāny api duḥkham*) is clearly the *pūrvapakṣa* in the discussion.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. BAREAU, *op. cit.*, p. 138 (th. 8); cf. also p. 197 (th. 32) for the *Sāriputrābhidharma*, p. 100 (th. 10) for the *Pūrvāśāla*, and p. 221 (th. 56) for the *Theravāda*.

<sup>110</sup> According to BAREAU, *op. cit.*, the *Hetuvādins* (p. 246, th. 3) considered all *asaṃskṛtas* except *mārga* to be suffering, whereas the *Theravādins* (p. 233, th. 166) seem to argue that all noble truths are not suffering. The position of the Sarvāstivāda is unknown to me.

<sup>111</sup> I interpret *yadi khalv api* as *yadi nāma* ("let it be admitted") and the enclitic *ca* of the next sentence in an adversative sense. Otherwise the next phrase would be part of a conditional clause introduced with *yadi khalv api* and be connected with *ca* in its conjunctive sense. It is also possible that the apodosis (i.e., the phrase that ends with *-kābhisamayāh*) preceded the protasis introduced with *yadi khalv api*.

*lambanā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ*). In other words, seeing the third and fourth truth does not involve the false view about the Self. This clearly implies that seeing suffering (i.e., the first truth) does involve the false view about the Self. Thus, these two (which involve and do not involve the false view about the Self) cannot occur at the same time. Therefore, the full comprehension of the four noble truths occurs gradually (*tasmād anupūrvābhisamaya*<ḥ>). If this is a correct interpretation of the fragment, then the Spitzer manuscript expresses a point of view that seems to be incompatible with the established doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda. For it is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa* that the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is abandoned or eliminated by seeing the first truth.<sup>112</sup> I do not know how to resolve this contradiction. Perhaps the author of the Spitzer manuscript means that the elimination of the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* by seeing the first truth involves its apprehension as something false; however, it no longer finds support in the seeing of the third and fourth truth. Thus, it cannot appear again, not even as something that has to be discarded. Perhaps this suggestion slightly stretches the common usage of the word *ālambana* (objective support of the cognition), but the only other alternative I could think of, namely, that our manuscript provides an unknown variant to the *anupūrvābhisamaya-vāda* seems even less probable. Of course, as long as the text is fragmentary, there is no certainty as to how the argument has to be interpreted.

The next folio (370) begins with a formulation, or perhaps a quotation,<sup>113</sup> of the four noble truths (*duḥkha, duḥkhasamudaya, duḥkhanirodha* and *duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipat*). The *siddhāntin* probably uses this formulation to emphasize the differences among the truths and to argue thereby that they cannot be apprehended at the same time.<sup>114</sup> The first argument after this formulation has been transcribed by SPITZER in two different manners. If we accept the reading *pariśiṣṭeṣu yathābhūtam*, the argument says that the seeing of suffering is not a correct apprehension in respect to the rest, because the rest are not suffering (*na ca duḥkhadarśanam pariśiṣṭeṣu yathābhūtam. na hi pariśiṣṭāni duḥkham.*). In other words, an apprehension in which suffering appears is correct in respect to the object “suffering,” but not correct in respect to the object

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* of Vasubandhu (ed. A. Thakur, Patna 1975), p. 280.10 on 5.5a: *tad evaṃ satkāyadr̥ṣṭir ekaparakāra bhavati duḥkhadarśanaheyā.*

<sup>113</sup> Both the *anupūrvābhisamayavādin* and the *ekābhisamayavādin* use canonical passages in support of their views; examples are translated by BARBAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 and 138 for the *anupūrvābhisamayavādin*, and pp. 62 and 216 for the *ekābhisamayavādin*; cf. also p. 183.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (Sanskrit translation by AIYASWAMI SASTRI, Baroda 1975), p. 79.6: *yogī ca cittaṃ samādhiyā idam duḥkham ayaṃ duḥkhanirodha iyaṃ duḥkhanī(rodha)gāminī pratipad iti vikalpayet. yady ekasmiṃs citte syāt katham evaṃ anupūrvāna samādhivikalpo bhavet.*

“cessation of suffering,” etc., because the other truths are not (or are different from) suffering.<sup>115</sup>

Section 4 of the discussion concludes that the full comprehension of the different truths occurs in respectively different modes or manners (*anyathānyathābhi(samayāḥ)*); thus the four truths are fully apprehended in succession. The expression *anyathānyathā* probably refers to the sixteen aspects or forms (*ākāra*)<sup>116</sup> through which the truths are apprehended, e.g., those of the first truth are *anityatā, duḥkhatā, anātmatā* and *śūnyatā*.<sup>117</sup> Thus, the four truths are fully comprehended in succession.

In section 5 (370a2-3) the *siddhāntin* points out that suffering (*duḥkha*) is characterized by pain (*pīḍā*),<sup>118</sup> but that the other truths are not so characterized (*pīḍālakṣaṇam khalv api duḥkham naivaṃ pariśiṣṭāni*). Next the *siddhāntin* admonishes the opponent: You have to understand suffering the way it is (i.e., you have to grasp suffering in its specific nature of being painful and not as *anātman*). For it is not the case that suffering is painful because it is not the Self,<sup>119</sup> lest the other truths too would be suffering because they are not the Self. Nor is it the case that (the apprehension of?) Selflessness ceases in the same manner as (the apprehension of?) suffering (ceases?)<sup>120</sup> (*yathā ca duḥkham tathā te jñeyam na hi yathānātmā tathā duḥkham mā bhūt pariśiṣṭānām anātmātvā<d> duḥkhat(v)an na pi yathā duḥkha ... (anātmatā vinivartate)*). Section 5 concludes with a statement that one does not see the other three truths just because one sees the non-Self in respect to suffering (<na> *bhavati duḥkhe* <sup>121</sup> <’> *nātmadarśanāt pariśiṣṭānā<m> darśanam iti*).

<sup>115</sup> If, on the other hand, the reading *ayathābhūtam* is correct, one would have to assume that this argument is stated by the *pūrvapakṣin*. According to my understanding of the Nachlass the transcription *pariśiṣṭeṣu yathābhūtam* is earlier than *pariśiṣṭe ayathābhūtam*. This could mean that SPITZER has corrected his first reading (<su yathābhūtam>) to *ayathābhūtam*.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. *AKBh* 400.2f. on VII.13a.

<sup>117</sup> For a different formulation of the same argument cf. *AKBh* 351.16-17 (on VI.27bc): *tad yadi satyānām darśanābhisamayam praty ekābhisamayam brūyāt, ayuktam brūyād ākārabhedāt.*

<sup>118</sup> Cf. also *AKBh* 400.2: *pīḍāmakativād duḥkham.*

<sup>119</sup> The argument probably responds to a *pūrvapakṣin* who argues that one can see all the truths together in the form of *anātman*; cf. *AKBh* 351.17: *athāpy anātmākāreṇa sarveṣāṃ [satyānām] darśanam iti brūyāt.*

<sup>120</sup> This last statement is suggested very tentatively for it is not clear how many *aḥṣaras* are missing between *duḥkha* and *anātmatā*. It is also not quite clear in what sense *vinivartate* is used here. Perhaps one should understand: Nor is it the case that *anātmatā* does not apply to the other truths just as suffering does not apply to them.

<sup>121</sup> Note also that one could read *duḥkhena ātma-*, but this reading seems improbable to me.



In section 6 (370b) the *siddhāntin* points out further differences among the truths. One such difference adduced may have been that the cognitions of the truths differ in content, e.g., suffering appears in the cognition of suffering and it is not seen (in the cognition of the other truths) and when the cognition in respect to suffering occurs, the remaining truths are not (apprehended). This is at least a possible interpretation of ... (kha)lv api [du](hka)jñāne duḥkham adrṣṭa ... [na] ca duḥkhe jñānotpattau ... -yāḥ pariśiṣṭāni. Such an interpretation seems to be corroborated by the following statement that one and the same thing (i.e., cognition) does not arise with regard to many (objects) in many different forms ([na h]y) (e)k(a)[m] (a)nekeṣv anekadhā bhavati. Further, when the cognition of suffering does not arise there is no full comprehension of suffering (and the same holds good for the apprehension of the other truths). Therefore, the full comprehension of the four truths happens gradually (na hy anutpanne duḥkha jñāne duḥkhābhisamayāḥ. tasmād anupūrvābhisamayāḥ). According to the *siddhāntin* (the Buddha?) formulated (the four truths?) considering that seeing the truth of suffering leads or gives rise to (or enables<sup>122</sup>) the seeing of the cessation of suffering (duḥkhe khalv api darśanam duḥkhadarśanam duḥkhadarśanāc ca nirodhadarśanam iti bhāvan āha ...).<sup>123</sup> This does not imply that by seeing suffering one sees all noble truths in one cognition.

Yet another argument brought up by the *siddhāntin* is that the defilements that rest on suffering “operate” differently than those in relation to the other truths (*anyathā khalv api duḥkhādhiṣṭhānakleśāḥ pravartante anyathā pariśiṣṭe[u]*). I assume that this refers to the Sarvāstivāda doctrine according to which different types of *kleśas* are destroyed gradually as one apprehends the different truths in their different forms.

Folio 371a1 seems to continue the discussion by pointing out differences between *duḥkha* and *anātman* (na tv anātma x x x x duḥkhatvaṃ) and arguing that if the characteristic of *duḥkha*, namely, pain (*pīḍā*), were found everywhere, i.e., in all truths (*tad*

<sup>122</sup> Cf. *AKBh* 352.1: *athāpy ekasya darśanāc cheṣeṣu vaśitvalābhād ekābhisamayam brūyāt, na doṣaḥ syāt*.

<sup>123</sup> This interpretation and conjecture are very tentative. Both SPITZER and WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcribe *bhāvan āha* which does not seem to make sense unless one assumes that this could be an irregular (and untypical for the scribe of the Spitzer manuscript) sandhi form for *bhāvam*; in this case one could speculate that a participant in the discussion formulates (*āha*) what is said in the preceding *iti* clause as the intention (*bhāva*) of a specific statement of the Buddha. Alternatively, under both conjectures, one could assume that the implied subject of *āha* is the author of a text upon which our present text comments. It is also not impossible that the scribe has once again mixed up his short and long vowels and that one should read *bhāvān*. In this case one would have to interpret the statement ending with *iti* as reflecting the *ekābhisamaya* point of view: The opponent addressed as *bhāvān* is quoted in this way because by fully comprehending (“seeing”) suffering one has in fact also fully comprehended the cessation of suffering.

*yadi sarvatra pīḍā ...*), this would lead to an unacceptable consequence (any reference to this is, however, missing in the fragment). The past participle *prahīṇa* in the next line could perhaps refer to the same process as the one referred to by Vasubandhu in the concise formulation in *AKBh* 351.15-16: *prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇabhāvanāt*, namely, when *duḥkha* is seen, three kinds of *kāryābhisamaya*<sup>124</sup> arise in respect to the other three truths: the cause of the arising is abandoned, the suppression is experienced directly and the path is being practiced.

A further characteristic that could distinguish suffering from other factors involved in the other truths is that suffering is (fully comprehended) as soon as it has arisen, whereas the other factors are not understood at the moment they arise and when they are fully comprehended they have already departed (*pratyutpannamātram khalv api duḥkha ...*). Perhaps the proponent argues that suffering is only experienced as it arises in the present, and that the object of full comprehension cannot be something which has just arisen. By the time it is fully comprehended it is no longer present because it has already departed (i.e., is already destroyed) (*... utpannam tan nābhisamāgatam abhisamāgatam ca vigatātvā <n> nāsti*.)

The numbering in this section is confusing. It is possible that a new sequence of enumeration started somewhere after (5) in 370a2 and that (6) in 371b2 is part of this new enumeration rather than being subsequent to this (5). I cannot discern any change in topic though, or a change in the identity of the speakers. The possibility that we have here a numbered sub-division of (5) cannot be excluded either. Note that (6) seems to appear at the end of a *pūrvapakṣa* statement, whereas (4) and (5) conclude *siddhānta* statements (the identity of the speaker in the two statements marked by (3) is not clear to me).

The last argument of the opponent appears on 371b1: “As regards this [statement of ours the opponent] says: Because one apprehends *jāti*, that too becomes fully comprehended” (*atrāha jātigrahaṇā <t> tad apy abhisamāgatam bhavati* (6)). I assume that *jāti* here refers to a universal, i.e., is equivalent to a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* that is common to all truths. One may recall Vasubandhu’s statement that the *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* are impermanence (*anīyatā*) for conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), *duḥkhatā* for all defiled (*sāsrava*) *dharma*s, *śūnyatā* and *anātmatā* for all *dharma*s.<sup>125</sup> Vasubandhu, as we saw above,

<sup>124</sup> On the difference between *darśanābhisamaya*, *ālambanābhisamaya* and *kāryābhisamaya* cf. *AKBh* 351.13f.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. *AKBh* 341.12-13 on VI.14cd.

raises the possibility of someone claiming that one can see all truths with the form of *anātman*, and Yaśomitra explains that someone belonging to a different Buddhist school (*nikāyāntarīya*) could argue for *ekābhisamaya* on the basis of the two general characteristics *śūnyatā* and *anātmata*.<sup>126</sup> Of the proponent's reply to this objection, unfortunately, nothing is preserved in our manuscript except the disconnected words *sat*, *asat* and *kleśābhāva*.

The section concludes with ...*yaparakarane anupūrvābhisamayaparīkṣā* which can be understood in two ways. One could assume that *prakaraṇa* refers to the name of the work, e.g., the *Abhidharmaparakaraṇa* of Vasumitra. Or one may assume that *prakaraṇa* refers to a chapter in the work and that this chapter was subdivided into *parīkṣās*.

2) The second topic (371b2f.) begins with a reference to a *pūrvapakṣa* statement that consciousness (*citta*)<sup>127</sup> is luminous by nature (*yad ucyate prakṛtiprabhasvaram* ...). This is a clear reference to a doctrine propagated by some schools of Conservative Buddhism, notably, the Mahāsāṅghikas, the Vibhājyavādins and the *Śāriputrābhidharma*,<sup>128</sup> that consciousness is luminous by nature (*cittaṃ prakṛtiprabhāsavaram*), but can be defiled (*kliṣṭa*, *upakliṣṭa*) by the defilements (*kleśa*, *upakleśa*) or liberated (*vipramukta*) from them. In this sense it is said that "consciousness accompanied by desire is liberated" (*sarāgaṃ cittaṃ vimuccati*).<sup>129</sup>

This doctrine is based on a passage in *Āṅguttara Nikāya* I.6<sup>130</sup>: *pabbassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhan*. "This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is defiled by adventitious defilements."

<sup>126</sup> Cf. AKV 926.11-12: "athāpy anātmākāreṇa sarveṣāṃ satyānāṃ darśanam iti brūyāt" *nikāyāntarīyaḥ śūnyatānātmate sarvasatyānāṃ sāmānyam lakṣaṇam kṛtvā*.

<sup>127</sup> In the following discussion I use "consciousness" for *citta* and "cognition" for *buddhi*. It seems that the two terms are not used synonymously here; in 372a it is said that the luminous (consciousness – I assume that *prabhasvara* qualifies *citta*) is apprehended by *buddhi*: *buddhyā prabhasvaram upalabhyate*.

<sup>128</sup> Cf. BAREAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68 (th. 44), 175 (th. 28), 194 (th. 6); cf. also pp. 90 (th. 9), 147 (th. 80), 161 (th. 14), 217 (th. 24) and further references there to the *Vibhāṣā*, *Śāriputrābhidharma*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Nyāyānusāra*, etc.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. the informative presentation in E. LAMOTTE, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti*. Louvain-Leuven 1962, pp. 51-54. For *prabhāsvara citta* in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka cf. also D. SEYFORTH RUEGG, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*. Paris 1969, esp. pp. 425-428.

<sup>130</sup> PTS ed. vol. I, p. 10.

In spite of this and similar passages the major schools of Conservative Buddhism, especially the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda, reject this doctrine.<sup>131</sup> Consciousness is not luminous or pure by nature; it is defiled by passions and actions, and the connection with them has to be severed. If consciousness were luminous by nature, it could not become defiled by the defilements. Further, the *dharma*s perish at every moment. Therefore, it is not the defiled luminous consciousness which is liberated. Rather, when the connection with the defilements is severed, a *future*<sup>132</sup> consciousness is liberated, i.e., the cognition in the next moment which is a cognition of the Arhat (*asaikṣya-citta*) arises free from defilements.

In accordance with this opinion the *siddhāntin* (371b3) states that the *upakleśas*<sup>133</sup> are not adventitious to consciousness as long as both (consciousness and defilements) exist at present (... *upakleśaḥ tadubhayaprat(yu)t(pan)n(a)tve āgantukatvaṃ na bhavati* ...).

In 372a1 the *siddhāntin* could perhaps argue that the luminosity of consciousness is not perceived (...<sup>134</sup> *prabhasvaratvaṃ upalabdham*). If the *pūrvapakṣin* replies that the luminous consciousness is defiled (*yad ucyate prabhasvaram upakliṣyata iti yadi* ...) (and this is the reason why its natural luminosity is not perceived in its present state; cf. *pratyutpanna*), the *siddhāntin* answers that what is luminous cannot be defiled (... *<upa>kliṣṭam prabha[svara] . . . . . khalv api nopapadyate*). Further, he asks for the cause or reason for the opponent's statement that a luminous consciousness is defiled, implying that no such cause or reason can be given, because at the time when the luminous consciousness is apprehended by a cognition consciousness is not defiled (*prabhasvaram upakliṣyata iti kiṃ kāraṇam? yadā hi buddhyā prabhasvaram upalabhyate na tado[pa](k)[l](iṣy)<ate>*).

If the *pūrvapakṣin* would retort that the luminous consciousness could be perceived at another time (... *dā*<sup>135</sup> *prabhasvaram . . . . . upalabhyeta*), then he would have to

<sup>131</sup> One of the reasons for this rejection probably lays in the fact that the implied canonical notion of *citta* as a lasting subtle element was incompatible with the doctrine of momentariness and the denial of the substance.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. LAMOTTE, *op. cit.*, p. 54 and n. 37.

<sup>133</sup> In the entire discussion, with a single exception, *upakleśa* rather than *kleśa* is used; this is probably due to the canonical formulation in *Āṅguttaranikāya* I.6 (PTS ed. vol. I, p. 10) quoted above. However, I do not think that the distinction between *kleśa* and *upakleśa* is relevant to the present context, and there is nothing to indicate that the author has only the minor defilements in mind.

<sup>134</sup> I assume that there was a negation in the first part of the statement.

<sup>135</sup> I would like to conjecture *anyadā* here.

accept that (consciousness has) two own-beings (i.e., luminousness and non-luminousness) and the cognition too (would have two own beings) because of the double determination (of consciousness as luminous and as non-luminous). But this is not acceptable to the opponent. Therefore, there is no determination (that luminous consciousness is defiled) (*taṃ(?) dviṣvabhāvaṃ syād buddhiś ca dvi<tva?>vyavasāyāt. anīṣṭaṃ caita<t>). tasmāt prarūpan[ā]bhāvaḥ.*) This concludes section 3.

Section 4 considers further alternatives. First, a defiled consciousness does not apprehend a defiled consciousness;<sup>136</sup> there is no determination i.e., it could not be determined that luminous consciousness is defiled (*na khalv apy upakliṣṭam upakliṣṭam grhṇāti prarūpan<ā>bhāva ...*). (If the opponent suggests that the defiled consciousness apprehends the luminous consciousness, this is also impossible.) At the time when it is defiled it is not luminous (*... upakliṣṭaṃ na tadā ...*). Nor are the defiled and the non-defiled apprehended at the same time (*((ap)y<sup>137</sup> upakliṣṭānupakliṣṭe yugapad upalabhyate<sup>138</sup>*). Therefore, how could it be known that a luminous consciousness is defiled (*tat katham etac chakyate jñātum prabhasvaram upakliṣyata iti*)?

Section 5 seems to begin with a presentation of the opponent's position in the form of a hypothesis: If the luminous nature of consciousness is destroyed by the defilements (*... (yadi ca prakṛtir upakleśair upamṛdyate, prabha(svar)...*). A possible reply or consequence could be that in this case consciousness too would be destroyed together with its luminous nature (*... (upa)m(r)dyate prabhasva ...*). The opponent must have attempted to justify his position by claiming that consciousness and luminosity are two different things and that only luminosity is destroyed. This argument is rejected as incorrect (*ity ay(u)[k]t(a)m*). The proponent gives the reason for the fault in the opponent's view: The nature (*prakṛti*) of a thing is its own-being (*svabhāva*). If that own-being is destroyed, the thing called "consciousness" would not be any longer (*[yā] khalv api yasya prakṛtiḥ sa tasya svabhāvaḥ. sā yady upamṛdyate cittam iti tan na bhavati*). Luminosity (and consciousness itself) become one (*... prabhasvaratvam ... ekībhavanti*). Further, how could (properties?) that rest on the nature of consciousness defile (consciousness itself) (*((pra)[kṛ]tisthāḥ katham upakleśayanti*)?

373a1 refers again to the opponent for whom being consciousness and being luminous are different things (*yasyānya<c/m> cittatvam anyam prabha(sv)<aratvam> ...*).

<sup>136</sup> I am tempted to conjecture *upakliṣṭam anupakliṣṭam*, but that would be a *lectio faciliior*.

<sup>137</sup> As pointed above a negation should be added for this sentence, probably *nāpy*.

<sup>138</sup> For the phenomenon of a singular verb with a dual subject cf. EDGERTON, *BHSG* 25.3.

The proponent must have rejected the construed difference between consciousness and luminosity. Further, he could have argued that under the assumption of such a difference a defilement, if it comes into contact with a luminous consciousness, would become luminous itself, clearly an inadmissible consequence, just as that the luminous consciousness too, inasmuch as it comes into contact with a defilement, is supposedly defiled (*((pra) bhasvaram apy upakleśam anuprāptam kli...*). This interpretation is based on a parallel passage in the *Vibhāṣā*, as summarized by Lamotte.<sup>139</sup>

In 373a3 the opponent possibly attempts to establish the difference between luminosity and consciousness by taking recourse to the factor of time. Consciousness could have been luminous in the past (*((pra) bhasvaram āsīt<sup>140</sup>*) and have become defiled later on. The opponent may have understood this difference as a difference in state (cf. *avasthā* in 373b1). I assume that the proponent now repeats his previous argument in his reply, namely, that if a state of consciousness is not something different from consciousness itself, then when the state is that of being defiled, consciousness is defiled. If, on the other hand, the state would be different from consciousness itself, defiling is due to an interaction between two different entities (cf. *... anyenānyasya ...*). Thus, the relationship between consciousness and the defiled state is the same as that between consciousness and the defilement, for the defilement is also different from consciousness (*upakleśasya py any...*), and thus consciousness itself would not be affected by the defiled state. The argument must have been more complicated and must have also taken into account whether a state lasts for some time (*... (a) vāsthā<sup>141</sup> bhavati. athāvatīṣṭhate ...*).

The opponent may have argued that the proponent does not understand what it means to be defiled. Because consciousness is defiled by the defilements, it is suffering, and being defiled by something else it becomes itself a defilement (*((upakli)śyate tasmā<d> d[u](hkh) ... syānyenopakliṣṭasyopakleśatvam ...*). The defilement occurs by way of a contact or conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between the two. Section 5 ends with a *pra-saṅga* in which the consequence must have been that consciousness itself would be de-

<sup>139</sup> Cf. LAMOTTE, *op. cit.*, p. 54 (paraphrasing *Vibhāṣā* T. 1545, k. 27, p. 140 b-c): "Polemiquant avec les Vibhajyavādin, les Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika remarquent qu'une pensée originellement lumineuse ne peut pas être souillée par les ordures des passions adventices. Dans cette hypothèse, les passions adventices, naturellement souillées, une fois associées avec la pensée originellement et naturellement lumineuse deviendraient pures. Ou, si elles restaient impures, la pensée lumineuse ne serait pas souillée par leur fait."

<sup>140</sup> I do not understand the relationship between *prabhasvaram āsīt* and *idam āsīt iti na bh.*; perhaps *idam āsīt* begins a new sentence.

<sup>141</sup> It is possible, of course, that one has to read *anavasthā*. In this case *athāvatīṣṭhate* means: if there is no infinite regress.

filed ((u)pakliṣṭaṃ syād iti). Our text, however, is too fragmentary to serve as a basis for reconstructing an argument.

In 374a1 the *siddhānta* position is being reiterated, namely, it is not correct to say that luminous consciousness is defiled (... [y] x [t] x [c] x<sup>142</sup> (p[r]abha)svaraṃ tad upakliṣṭaṃ ity etad ayuktaṃ vaktum). It can also not be said that luminous consciousness is only partly defiled, namely, in its non-essential part because it does not have a defiled part and a non-defiled part (na hy asyāvayava upakliṣṭo 'vayavo 'nupakliṣṭa iti) because consciousness does not have parts.

This ends section 3. Even if we take 374a1 as the end of section 1 (which is not at all certain since the figure for 1 is indistinguishable from a simple *danḍa*), it is hard to see where section 2 may have ended and section 3 began in such a small space.

Of section 4 only the beginning and the end remain. It begins with the assertion that the non-defiled is different from the defiled (*anyam*<sup>143</sup> *khalv apy upakliṣṭād anupakliṣṭa...*) and ends with a *reductio ad absurdum* that in this manner (the defiled) too would be luminous (*pi prabhasvaram evaṃ syā(t)*). In-between the proponent may have argued again for a symmetry between defiling and purifying or becoming luminous.

Finally, section 5 refers to the opponent's position that consciousness itself is not defiled because it is perceived to be luminous (*yadi khalv api grhyate prabhasvaram ity anupakliṣṭa<m> bhavati*). The proponent's reply is unfortunately not preserved. As mentioned above, 374b1 preserves the name of the chapter: *prabhasvarapratiñjñopālam-bhika* "[the chapter that] criticizes the thesis [that consciousness is] luminous [by nature]."

3) The final topic in our fragments deals with the question whether the Buddha too is included in the *saṅgha*. Unfortunately, SPITZER was unable to continue his work. I was able to identify at least six, probably seven, more fragments which clearly deal with the same topic: 51, 59, 80, part of 130, 242(uncertain), 548 and 854. At least four of these fragments probably belong to folio 375; the others could either belong to 375 or to 376 where the discussion continues.

<sup>142</sup> Possible conjectures on the basis of these remnants would be *yac cittam* (or perhaps *yat kim-cit?*).

<sup>143</sup> Cf. n. 65 above on the possible prakritic pronominal adjective.

51a (2.1x2.8)



a ///(ā?)ryyaguṇasāmanya///  
b ///... [p](y?) āryyaguṇa(sāmanyaviśeṣa?)///

51b



a ///((sāman)y(a)[v](i)[ṣ](e)ṣānupra///  
b ///saṃghe tasmān (n).///

59a (3.4x4.9)



2 ///[ya]thāryyaḥ evaṃ [bu](d)dh(as) t. .///  
3 ///ry[y]a e[v]aṃ [buddha ā]panna .///

59b




1 ///... i[ti] tan naḥ 4 || ya[d].///  
2 ///... s tasmān na bhagavāṃ saṃghe .///  
3 ///... [tatra yad uktam] ... + +///

80a; fol. 37\* verso<sup>144</sup> (3.5x7.8)


- 1) [t]y ukta[m] sūtreṣu tatsv{ā}(a)bh(ā)vagrahaṇe viru[ddhya]///
- 2) (prādu?)rbhāvas tasmān na svabhāve O varttate b. i///
- 3) tam iṣṭaṃ kāraṇam asti tasmā(t) tata eva .i///

80b; fol. 37\* recto



- 1) kāryyaṃ tasmād buddhaḥ saṃghe nopalabhya(te)///
- 2) (saṃ)gheti 3 sati kha O lv api vi[śe](śa)///
- 3) (sādha/vaidha?)rmy[āt ta]smāt saṃghe nopalabhyate///

130a part (3.5x3.9)



- 1 ///[v]āt sa(m)ghe iti tan na///
- 2 ///+ + iti tan naḥ 3 y.///
- 3 ///+ + + (sā)manyavi[ś]e(śa)///

130b part



- 1 ///(sāma)nyaviśeṣa...///
- 2 ///(ācāry?)y(ag)[u]ṇasāmanyaviśe(śa)///
- 3 ///[ca] saṃghaḥ sa ca ..m///

242a (1.8x2.2)



- a ///ḥ sa(m?)gha//
- b ///.. yathā ..///

242b



- a ///((ācāry?)y(a)[g]uṇas[ā](manyaviśeṣa?)/ //
- b ///na ca saṃ(gha?)///

548a (0.9x3.8)



- a ///.. [pa]deśasy[u]pa ..///

548b



- a ///((ār?)[y]ya)guṇasām(an)ya(viśeṣa)///

<sup>144</sup> In the early Turfan manuscripts, roughly up to the 7<sup>th</sup> century, the numbers were written on the recto side.

854a (3.7x3.4)



- 1 ///m āryyaḥ .. + +///  
 2 ///.. ti yathā [b]u(ddha)///  
 3 ///+ [s] tasmād bhavaty ā..///


854b




- 1 ///+ yathāryya eva ..///  
 2 ///[bu]ddhānām śrāvakā +///  
 3 ///āryyasā(man)y(viśeṣa?)+///

As for a possible arrangement of these fragments I suggest the following. Since number 4 is likely to come after 3, and 4 (in 59b) appears in line 1 while the two figures for 3 (in 80b and 130a) appear in line 2, 59b must belong to the verso, and 80b and 130a to the recto of folio 375. I suggest also that 130 be placed to the right of 59 because 3 in 130a concludes the *siddhānta* reply to the *pūrvapakṣa* numbered 3 and concluded in 80b, and thus enough space should separate the two fragments to allow for the *siddhānta* statement or argument. 854 seems closely related to 59 and I tentatively place it to its left (*yathā buddha (evam āryyaḥ?) ... yathāryyaḥ evam buddhaḥ*). There is no way to determine where 51, 242 and 548 may belong and, therefore, I do not include them. The probable arrangement of 80, 59, 130 and 854 can be represented as follows. Note, however, that the spaces between the fragments are misleading; the original leaf was some 40 cm wide.

375 verso




375 recto





- 1) tiir api n(ā)s(i)titi [ʃ] [p]r[ɛ]a[tʃ]i[n̄]āvruddha[m] khalv [apy u] .. + + + + + + + + +  
 2) sa([m])'ccēryayagun[a]sā O m(ā)nvyaiśeṣayogas tasmāt s(ā)dhyasādha[kā]bhāṇ . i!!!  
 3) (jā)nīmah [n]ās(t)i miškāra(na) i . i +

<sup>1</sup> What looks like an *anuvāṇa* is perhaps just a small indentation in the leaf (almost a hole as can be seen on the other side of the leaf between *yv* in line 2 and *r* in line 3). In any case, *saṃśedhya* (to be walked upon, brought about or produced) does not seem to make sense here; further there would be no reason for the doubling of *c*. I understand *saccarya* as true or good conduct, i.e., as equivalent to *saccarya*. It may be reminded that the distinction between *a* and *ā* is often ignored in the manuscript.



- 1) smā[ti] s(ar)[v](a)[bh/s]... h ta(t)r(a) + + ... t. + + y. + + + + y. + + + + t///  
 2) yuktavād vyatikrīta(m) O sarvasya c ā(a)sarveṇa sādharṇyavaidha(r)myam ast(i)///  
 3) rīktaṃ ◇ nanv al[vy]atikrīti[ti]ai api sāmānya[v]i[śi]te(sa) + + + + + + + + + + t///

Now let us have a look at the content of these fragments. The discussion begins on the fragment preserved in SPITZER's transcription with the statement of the opponent's position, namely, that the disciples are endowed with the general and specific qualities of the teacher, and thus the general and specific qualities of the Buddha are present in his disciples, the *śrāvakas*, and therefore "we" see that he too is in the *saṅgha* (*ye ācāryya-guṇasāmanyaviśeṣayuktāḥ saṅghe ... śayuktāḥ. ataḥ paśyāmaḥ bhagavān api saṅghe iti*). The *siddhāntin*'s rejection of this position, which was divided into at least five sections, cannot be reconstructed in detail. In folio 375 only one argument seems relatively clear. The *siddhāntin* denies that an enlightened disciple (Arhat, which I assume is referred to with the word *ārya*) is similar to the Buddha (*yathāryyaḥ evaṃ buddhaḥ ...*).<sup>145</sup> His reason, or one of his reasons, for the rejection of the similarity is that if this were the case the Arhat too would be a Buddha ((*ā*)*ry*[*y*]a *e*[*v*]aṃ [*buddha ā*]panna...).

In folio 376 the *siddhāntin* must have argued that the mere fact that the Buddha and the Arhats share some general and specific qualities or properties does not prove that the Buddha can be seen in the *saṅgha*. Everything has similarities and dissimilarities with everything (*sarvvasya c<a> sarvveṇa sādharṃmyavaidha(r)myam ast(i)*). The opponent may have replied that the similarities adduced are not mere accidental properties, and that there is an essential similarity between the Buddha and the Arhats which consists in their connection with the same general and specific qualities of moral conduct (cf. 376v2: *saccāryyaṇ[a]śām<ā>nyaviśeṣayogaḥ*).<sup>146</sup> The *siddhāntin*'s reply is largely lost, but one can see that he used two types of argument in this connection. The one (376v1) charges the opponent with committing the fallacy of *pratijñāviruddha*. This word is certainly used here as a technical term, but the context does not allow us to determine which of the various meanings that appear in the early manuals of debate<sup>147</sup> is intended here. Moreover, it has to be noted that *viruddha* can be used in the sense of "contradictory," that is, *pratijñāviruddha* does not necessarily mean "contradicted by the thesis"; it can also mean "contradictory to the thesis," and my guess is that the term is

<sup>145</sup> I assume that the statement as it now stands was negated either by a preceding *na* or by a subsequent *iti tan na*, etc.

<sup>146</sup> The statement here certainly represents the *siddhānta* opinion, but it must refer to a preceding *pūrvapakṣa* statement which uses the same terms. I assume that this statement here was denied either by a preceding *na* or *asiddha*, etc. As mentioned above, I tentatively interpret *saccāryya* as *saccāryā*.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. K. PREISENDANZ, *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III.1*. Stuttgart 1994. Vol. 2, pp. 320-321.

employed here in this sense, but even so it is impossible to determine what is contradictory to the thesis.<sup>148</sup>

The other argument refers to the opponent's proof (or inference? *\*sādhana*) and points out the absence of the property to be proved and the proving property (*s(ā)dhyasādhā[kā]bhāva*). Unfortunately the proof itself does not appear in the fragment, or more precisely, only part of it appears in the initial statement (*ye ācāryyagūṇa*-, etc.).

I am not quite sure yet how to interpret this passage. The same topic is probably mentioned by BAREAU, namely, "[Le] Buddha est inclus dans la Communauté".<sup>149</sup> Among the schools which endorse the thesis that the Buddha is included in the community BAREAU mentions the Sarvāstivāda without, however, specification of thesis number, and I could not find this thesis in his presentation of the Sarvāstivāda. Further, according to the materials presented by BAREAU the question whether the Buddha is included in the *saṅgha* seems to have arisen in the context of donation (i.e., whether a donation made to the *saṅgha* is also *eo ipso* a donation to the Buddha), and in the present fragments there is no trace of such a discussion, although, of course, not enough fragments remain to justify an argument *ex silentio* with any certainty.

If BAREAU's attribution of this thesis to the Sarvāstivāda is correct, this would be a reason to reject the identification of the present discussion as a treatment of this topic because what should accordingly be endorsed by the Sarvāstivāda appears here as a *pūrvapakṣa*. A possible solution to this problem would be to distinguish between the thesis "the Buddha is in (i.e., part of) the *saṅgha*" and the thesis "the Buddha is perceived in (i.e., through?) the *saṅgha*" discussed here. Alternatively, one may assume that the Spitzer Manuscript does not represent a text of the Sarvāstivāda school. However, I would hesitate to take such a step without further substantiation because practically all the Sanskrit manuscripts in the Turfan collection are assumed to belong to the Sarvāstivāda school. In this connection one is reminded of MIYASAKA's suggestion that the work preserved in the Spitzer Manuscript belongs to the Sautrāntika school. MIYASAKA's assumption, however, is problematic. If I understand him correctly, he attributes the text to the Sautrāntika school because he sees certain similarities between it and the *\*Satyasiddhiśāstra* of Harivarman. Yet the attribution of the *\*Satyasiddhiśāstra* to the

<sup>148</sup> According to the Nyāyasūtra definition of the *nigrahasthāna pratijñāviruddha*, the contradiction referred to obtains between the reason (*hetu*) and the thesis. However, *hetu* is a masculine noun and therefore it is probably not referred to by *-viruddham* which is probably a nominative.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. BAREAU, *op. cit.*, p. 260 and further references therein to pp. 83 (thesis 4 of the Baḥurūṭiyas), 185 (th. 21 of the Mahīśāsakas) and 192 (th. 1 of the Dharmaguptakas).



Sautrāntika is itself problematic. DÉMIEVILLE and BAREAU, for instance, consider this text to belong to the Bahuśrutīya school.<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, our understanding of the very term Sautrāntika has radically changed since MIYASAKA wrote his paper. It is now believed that this term does not apply to any specific school, but that it rather stands for various *Ābhidharmikas* who accept only the Buddha's sermons as authoritative. As such the term can be applied to practically any school except the Sarvāstivāda.<sup>151</sup>

Whatever the case may be, the above materials amply demonstrate how important SPITZER's transcriptions of the lost fragments are for our understanding of the text. Next to the fragments of folio 375 and 376 (reproduced above) I was able to identify further fragments belonging to folios 379-387. Thus, combining SPITZER's transcription and the surviving fragments we can gain a relatively good understanding of the structure and content of folios 369-387. I hope to publish these additional fragments soon.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. BAREAU, *Les Sectes*, p. 81 and further references in n. 1.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. FRANCO, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, Wien 1997, p. 85, n. 51 (containing a summary of a personal communication by Professor SCHMITHAUSEN).

Page Nr in Miyasaka 1962	Fragment Nr in Miyasaka 1962	Page Nr in Spitzer's Nachlass <sup>1</sup>	Fragment/Frame Nr of SHT-810
673	untransliterated reproduction	46, a	—
“	29b	2, fol. 371 b2-3	—
“	20b1-3	3, fol. 374 b1-3	—
675	53b3	—	—
“	48a3	22, b3	—
“	23a1-2	—	—
“	23b1-3	—	—
“	17b1-2	52, a1-2	—
“	59a2		112a2
“	59b2		112b2
“	58b3		11a3(?) ( <i>upamānāt</i> instead of <i>abhāvāt</i> )
676	27a1-2	1, fol. 369, b1-2	—
“	28a3	1, fol. 370, b2-3!	—
“	27b1	1, fol. 369, a1	—
“	28b1-2	1, fol. 370, a1-2	—
“	27a3	1, fol. 369, b3	—
“	51a1-51b3	33 (a and b in reversed order)	—
“	9(a or b?)2-3		98b2-3
“	31 <sub>1</sub> a1-3		138a/9.1-3
677	36 <sub>2</sub> a1-3		138b/2.1-3
“	36 <sub>1</sub> b1-3		138b/1.1-3
“	36 <sub>2</sub> b1-3		138a/10.1-3

<sup>1</sup> Only lost fragments are noted here; i.e. if a fragment exists in SHT-810, a reference to the Nachlass is not given even if the fragment has been transcribed by SPITZER.

“	36 <sub>3</sub> b1-2		138b/7.1-2
“	18a1-18b3	2, fol. 372	—
“	20a1-3	3, fol 374, a1-3	—
“	52 <sub>2</sub> b1		662a2-3! ( <i>buddhi-he(nu)</i> is missing there)
678	26 <sub>1</sub> a1-3		80a.1-3
“	26 <sub>2</sub> a <sub>x-x</sub>	—	—
“	26 <sub>3</sub> a <sub>x-x</sub>		130a1-3
“	26 <sub>4</sub> a <sub>x-x</sub>		59a
“	26 <sub>1</sub> b1-3		80b1-3
“	26 <sub>2</sub> b <sub>x-x</sub>		596b and 51b <sup>2</sup>
“	26 <sub>3</sub> b <sub>x-x</sub>		130b (right frg)
“	26 <sub>4</sub> b <sub>x-x</sub>		59b
“	212		137b2 (left frg)
679 (notes)	10b		111a3
“	9b		98b1 <sup>3</sup>
“	9 <sub>2</sub> a		part of 98b1?
“	62a1-2		40b1-2
“	7b1	9, a2	—

<sup>2</sup> MIYASAKA transcribes four lines as if they belonged to the same fragment; however, this seems unlikely to me.

<sup>3</sup> However, *buddhir bodhavyā* instead of *buddhibauddhavya*; om. *prakaraṇam* which seems to appear in 9<sub>2</sub>a.)