If the general task of historical-philological inquiry – as in contradistinction to purely philosophical inquiry – is to acquire a knowledge of what happened and an understanding of what was understood – primarily from autopsy of literary sources – and if it absolves this task roughly through three interrelated phases: 1) linguistic interpretation dealing with textual criticism, lexicography, etc., 2) higher criticism dealing with authenticity, date, etc. of texts, and, 3) hermeneutics, or interpretation, dealing with the background, circumstances, motives, content, form and meaning, etc. of the texts, and if, finally, it is the ultimate task of a historically orientated philologist to present a systematically reconstructive interpretation of his text (and its author)\textsuperscript{1}, then, surely, any philologist or philosopher taking an interest in Indian logic and epistemology is in a debt of gratitude to Ernst Steinkellner, Tilmann Vetter and the late Erich Frauwallner for the pains-taking efforts and results achieved by them concerning the works and the thought of the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (ca. 530–600)\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} In these methodological reflections I am mainly following the Danish classical philologist J. N. Madvig, for an account of whose views on the method and tasks of philology see Povl Johs. Jensen, Johan Nicolai Madvig. Et Mindeskrift, København 1963, pp. 16–43.

\textsuperscript{2} Frauwallner's contributions are collected in Gerhard Oberhammer and Ernst Steinkellner, Erich Frauwallner. Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1982. – The most important monograph on Dharmakīrti we owe to Tilmann Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti, Wien 1964. – Among Ernst Steinkellner's contributions special mention may be made of his Die Entwicklung des Kṣanikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti, WZKS 12–13 (1968) 361–377 and Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti, WZKS 15 (1971) 179–221. – The celebrated pioneer works of F. Th. Stcherbatsky are now largely superseded. For the date ca. 530–600 (against Frauwallner's ca. 600–660) and for further references see my paper Apropos Dharmakīrti – Two new Works and a new Date, AO 41 (1980) 27–37.
While the problem of "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti’s" has already been established in rough outlines by FRAUWALLNER in a paper thus entitled, and while the general historical significance of Dharmakīrti seems to boil down to his penetrating contributions to "scientific methodology" (i.e. to logic and epistemology rather than to ethics and ontology), still numerous textual and historical puzzles as well as problems of interpretation remain to be solved before we are in a position to reconstruct a full picture of Dharmakīrti as an individual author and philosopher with the historical setting as contrasting background.

The following marginal notes to the first two chapters of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin) – Dharmakīrti’s most systematic major work – as edited and translated by VETTER and STEINKELLNER are only intended as a modest contribution towards that end. The approach of its author can be characterized as that of a philologist primarily concerned with philosophical issues.

First, however, it will be useful for our purpose briefly to recall the frame-work of his thought as presented in PVin I–II and subsequently summarized by him in the epitome Nyāyabindu (NB). Though his

3 Reprinted in his Kleine Schriften, pp. 667–689. While his views on the formation and sequence of Dharmakīrti’s works is basically valid he does, however, leave several of the works ascribed to him out of account. Moreover, the Yogācāra background of Dharmakīrti is entirely left out of consideration, though, in my opinion, we here find a basic motive in the formation of his thought.

4 I have adopted this characterization from a paper read in Copenhagen (May 1983) by Ernst Steinkellner whom I here wish to thank for precious advice and support in preparing this contribution.


remaining extant logical and epistemological works – Pramāṇavārttika (PV, earlier then PVin and NB), Hetubindu (later than PV and PVin), Vādanyāya (perhaps his latest work) and the two “essays” Saṁbandhāparīkṣā and Saṁtānāntarasiddhi – as a rule are composed with a more specific purpose and are more rich in details (thus, it may be added, occasionally offering us a fascinating glimpse into his workshop) they all nevertheless presuppose the same over-all structure (and should be interpreted with that context in mind) as presented in PVin and NB – a structure basically inherited from Dignāga’s epoch-making Pramāṇasamuccaya⁷.

Dharmakīrti, who sees himself as a commentator to Dignāga, is primarily concerned with valid knowledge (samyogijnāna) as a means of successful action. Only two means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) are admissible: pratyakṣa and anumāṇa. Once an object of interest (artha) has been determined by either of them we are in a position to get what we want and avoid what we do not want. The artha known to us either occurs directly in perception as “evident” (pratyakṣa) or indirectly, inferred through anumāṇa. Any empirical object of pratyakṣa has the power (sakti) – in contradistinction to that of anumāṇa – to impress itself clearly and directly in cognition (jñāna) in its unique particularity (svalaksana). Nothing could be more obvious – pratyakṣa – than a thing in its svalaksana, just as it presents itself. The other, or “secondhand”, means of valid knowledge deals with exactly the same thing, but only indirectly through concepts, as a perceptual derivative: svalaksanadar-

⁷ For the first chapter see Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga: On Perception. Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, Cambridge Mass. 1968. For chapters II, III, IV and VI see H. Kitagawa, Indo Kuten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū, Tokyo 1965. For chapter V we now have M. Hattori, The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. Chapter five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣā. Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments, Kyoto 1982. An annotated translation of this chapter by Ole Holten-Pind will appear Copenhagen 1985. – Historically speaking it is to be noted that Dignāga seems to be responsible for the following innovations in Buddhist epistemology: i) He is the first to classify yogijnāna as a particular form of pratyakṣa. ii) He is the first to regard the viṣaya of pratyakṣa and anumāṇa as respectively sva- and saṁmāṇyalaksana. iii) He does not distinguish pramāṇa from pramāṇaphala (= sevasamvitti). These are the three main innovations of interest to us here. In my opinion the main source (among other minor ones) of influence in the formation of these innovations is to be found in Dignāga’s Yogācāra background (cf. his Ālambana parīkṣā, Prajñāpāramitāpindārthasamgraha [see esp. vv. 26–29, quoted,
śaṅhitavāsanākrtaśravavārāpaḥ sarva eva vikalpāḥ. Direct knowledge is always free from conceptual construction (vikalpa) but, in order to be valid in practice, it must be abhrānta, i.e. unimpaired by timira, etc. Otherwise we clearly err in whatever we do.

So far a higher degree of naive realism in regard to sensa can hardly be conceived. Apart from indriyajñāna Dharmakīrti (following Dignāga) recognizes three kinds of pratyakṣa: mental knowledge (māṇasa), self-awareness of all thoughts and mental phenomena (svasamvedana) and yogic intuition (yogijñāna). In all cases the viśaya of pratyakṣa is still svalakṣaṇa, said to be ultimately real (paramārtha-sat), arthakriyāsāmārheta being the ultimate criterion of the empirical reality of things and “facts”*. If an object (vastu, bhāva, artha) is incapable of arthakriyā it cannot serve any sensible purpose.

* Quoted (from an untraced source) in H. R. Kāpadī (ed.), Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri, Volume I, Baroda 1940, p. 251. For the idea see e.g. PVin II, 24–28 and the references given in Steinkellner’s translation, p. 43. Also PVin I, p. 58, 16–26. For the meaning of upapāla (or vipāla) in PVin II, 27–28 see PV III, 212–214. The Yogācāra background is unmistakable: upapāla corresponds to the grāhyāgrāhakavikalpa (cf. e.g. note 26), i.e. to the paratantrasvabhāva, whereas the status of parikalpitasvabhāva must be assigned to the field of anumāna (cf. e.g. PV I, 84: yathāpratīti-kathitah sādhārtho ‘sāv asann api ...'). PV III, 215 (q. v.) is also unintelligible without the laksana-nihsvabhāvatā doctrine of Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra VII, 4, etc. A good instance of utpattinihsvabhāvatā occurs PV I (ed. R. Gnoli) p. 51, 1.9: na hi vikalpā yathārtham eva jāyante ... As known, paratantrasvabhāva is pratyayodhāva.

* See PV I, 166; III, 3; NB I, 13–15. Dharmakīrti’s use of the terms samértisat and paramārtha-sat tends to create some confusion. In this regard PV II, 55ab (= PV III, 3ab) is significant: arthakriyāsamartham yat tad atra paramārtha-sat. Steinkellner’s translation (p. 94): “Was fähig ist, einen Zweck zu erfüllen, das ist hier in Wirklichkeit seien (paramārtha-sat)” fails to see the point of atra which here means vyavahārataḥ. Similarly in PVin II, 20 where atra is translated as “in unserem System” whereas Dharmottara and Bu ston quite consistent with the context take it as ‘gro ba ’dir “in the empirical world”. The objection in PV III, 4a asaktam sarvam iti ced ... (cf. AO 41 [1980] 31) compels Dharmakīrti to admit that the śakti experienced in sprouts, etc. is only maintained to be real samérti. Ultimately nirvyāpārāḥ sarvadharmāḥ (Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti ad I, 9d, q. v.). While I would not outrule that Dharmakīrti is here indebted to Bhavya’s distinction between a mithyā- and a tathyasamérti-
After a thorough discussion with spokesmen of other schools – as is to be expected from a good commentator – concerning the number of pramāṇas, their nature, their object and the four types of prayākṣa within this frame-work, Dharmakīrti somewhat abruptly (PVin I, p. 78; NB I, 18, etc.) enters upon a discussion concerning the “result” attained by cognition, the pramāṇaphala. Dharmakīrti introduces this theme as unexpectedly as did his main authority (ācārya), Dignāga (Pramāṇa-samuccaya I, 8cd; Nyāyamukha, T. 1628; 3b 22–23 = T. 1629; 8c 16–17)\textsuperscript{10}. Till now the “object” of the pramāṇas has simply – but, no doubt, with a conscious naiveté — been taken for granted without raising questions about its ontological status. His attention has been directed to vyavahāra “usage”, the everyday world of things, action, language, etc. where arthakriyāsāmarthya, as said, is the ultimate criterion of reality.

Now, however, we suddenly learn that there is really no external object ([bāhyārtha] PVin I, p. 90, l. 17) and that the assumed “objects” are merely acts, or manifestations, of mind ([vijñaptimātra] PVin I, p. 94, l. 14). From this point of view (already familiar to us from PV), obviously, there is no real or substantial difference between the object, instrument and the result of cognition. If everything is “only mind” and if there is nothing “out there” the distinction between these three aspects is only apparent (yathānudarsana)\textsuperscript{11}. The fact that consciousness from another angle appears bifurcated as subject (grāhaka, svabhāsa) versus object (grāhya, viśayābhāsa) is really also an illusion. Consequently all cognition is, in the final analysis, merely cognition of

\textit{satya} (defined as arthakriyāsāmartha!) it does, however, seem more likely that he is once again under the influence of his Yogācāra background. In this milieu numerous speculations concerning the various subdivisions of sāṃvyrti- and paramārthasatya were thriving. See L. de La Vallée Poussin, Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, Paris 1928–1948, pp. 549–551 (paramārthasāṃvyrtisatya, etc.). Abhidharmakośa VI, 4 does not come into consideration.

\textsuperscript{10} Pramāṇasamuccaya, 8cd: savyāpāra-pratilatvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat “The result of cognition is really [not different from] the means of cognition, because [the latter is, in fact, merely] assumed to perform a function [resulting in cognition].” – Cognition, then, does not grasp anything apart from itself, but somehow splits what, consequently, can only be cognition of itself into what seems to be two different parts. Obviously we here again find the underlying Yogācāra doctrine of a real paratantrasvabhāva appearing as an unreal parikalpitasvabhāva.

\textsuperscript{11} PVin I, 48 = PV III, 356. Here the prefix anu hardly has any particular significance; cf. PVin, p. 90, l. 18–20: ’di la rnam pa gzog pa ’di ni ji ltar snaṅ ba bzin yin gyi, de kho na ŋid ji lla ba bzin du ni ma yin no, Siddhiyinisiṣṭaṭkā, p. 468, l. 21: 469, l. 23; 495, l. 11 reads: yathādārśanam eveyam mānameyaphala-sthitiḥ.
cognition itself, or svasamvittti. Needless to add, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti here adhere to the celebrated “idealistic” Yogācāra doctrine of cittaṁātra which we know, from other sources, to have flourished in those days. However, they may seem to have done so at the heavy cost of coming into conflict with the presuppositions of their own “realistic” pramāṇa-system. As we have seen, they seem on the one hand to presuppose the existence of external objects, and, on the other, to assume that there are no external objects.

Did our authors (in this respect I see no dissension between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) – like so many other Indian philosophers – simply accept these two truths as theoretically (not practically) irreconcilable by having recourse to āgama, or did they, as we would expect from “critical philosophers”, seek some way of reconciling these apparent contradictions?¹²

To answer this question we must briefly look at the approach taken to the doctrine of cittaṁātra by the most influential Yogācāra philosopher before Dignāga, viz. Vasubandhu, the author of the Viṃśatikā, the Trīṃśikā, Karmasiddhi, Abhidharmakośa and Vākyāyukti, etc.¹³ The latter text (which, incidentally, has been unduly neglected by modern Western scholarship) deals with sūtra-exegesis and, inter alia, shows him as an adherent of the Mahāyāna doctrine of two truths: saṁvṛti being the viṣaya of laukikajñāna and paramārtha being that of lokottarajñāna.¹⁴ In the Trīṃśikā – which gives his vijnānaparināma-system and is based on āgama – lokottarajñāna is maintained to occur in vijnānapatimātrata where there is neither any grāhyata nor, consequently, any grāhaka.¹⁵ The initial stanza of the Viṃśatikā – the yuktī-pendant


¹³ Cf. my forthcoming paper on Vasubandhu the Vaitulika.

¹⁴ See Vākyāyukti (TD, No. 4061, fol. 109b 7 – 110a 3): las dan rnam par smin pa dag ni kun rdzob tu rdzas su yod / don dam par ni med de / 'jig rten pa'i 'ses pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir ro // dam pa ni ye 'ses 'jig rten las 'das pa yin te / de'i don yin pas don dam pa'o /// de gnis kyi rañ gi mtshan 'nid ni de'i yul ma yin te / de'i yul ni brjod du med pa'i phyi'i mtshan 'nid yin pa'i phyir ro /// 'dir 'jig rten pa'i 'ses pa' am / 'jig rten las 'das pa tshad ma yin ze na /// gcig kho nor ni 'jig rten las 'das pa yin no /// 'jig rten pa ni dbye ba yod de / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rjes las thob pa gañ yin pa de ni tshad ma yin no /// gzan ni tshad ma ma yin no ///

¹⁵ Trīṃśikā, 28–29: yadā tv ālambanam jñānam naivopalambhate tadā / sthitam vijnānamātrate grāhyāhāvye tadagrahā /// acitto 'nupalamho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca lat / āśrayasya parārytir dvidhā dausṭhulyahānītah /// – For vijnānamātrate in 28c (rather than vijnānapatimātrate) cf. Mahāyānasamgrahabhāsyā (TD, No. 4050, fol. 124a 4): ...'ses bya'i mtshan 'nid de no bo 'nid gsum
to the Trimśikā – gives the syllogism expressing Vasubandhu’s basic argument in favour of cittamātra as revealed in āgama: (p) vijnaptimātram evedam, (h) asadarthavabhāsanāt; (d) yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśa-candradīdarśanam.  

In proving asadarthavabhāsa(na) Vasubandhu avails himself of the old and well-known Mādhyaṃkika argument later technically known as the ekānekavīyogahetu. Vasubandhu could easily have added other stock-arguments known from numerous Mahāyāna texts to support his doctrine of cittamātra in refuting the existence of external objects.  

Here, however, the important thing to note is that the approach of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti differs decisively from that of Vasubandhu. The latter stressed the “ontological” approach arguing in favour of the unreality of external objects, whereas the former – without, of course, being unaware of the “ontological” approach – stressed the “epistemological” one: They start, almost like Descartes, with cognition as the indisputable first and show that cognition is impossible to explain if an absolute distinction is made between the means and the result of cognition. The “object” cannot be isolated from cognition: esse est percipi (…abheda nīlataddhiyoh: PVin I, 55b, etc.). To use a later terminology Vasubandhu is a nirākāravādin assigning the status of parikalpitavabhāva to the “object” (artha, grāhya) whereas Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are sākāravādins assigning the status of paratantrasvābhava to the “object”. So, while definitely coming to the same conclusion as Vasubandhu, viz. cittamātra, their approach is certainly more advanced by their being able to account for the “object” as a part (arthavabhāsa = visayābhāsa = grāhyākāra = grāhyāmsa) of an apparently bifurcated but basically univalent “mind” and not just by discarding it as foreign to and disintegrated from mind.  

It is, especially to-day one and a half millennium later, not easy to say what “personal” motives may have lead Dignāga – and Dharmakīrti – to take an interest in logical and epistemological issues, but to some

\[ \text{mo} \parallel \text{ses bya'i mitshan rjid de la ji itar 'jug par 'gyur ba 'am / gan gis 'jug par 'gyur ba st/ / rnam par ses pa tsam mo}. \]

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16 This reading of the second hemistich is supported by the early quotations found in Bhavya’s Ratnapradīpa and Tarkajvalā.  
18 Cf. Mahāyānasamgraha II, 14 with the Bāṣyā (which, in my view, is authentic) and Trisvabhāvanirdesā, 35 (the authenticity of which seems less certain).  
19 Cf. my forthcoming paper on Bhavya’s Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter IV.
extent it must have been an outcome of historical circumstances, more specifically under the pressure of the necessity of having to solve some problems prevalent within the Yogācāra tradition. In case of Dharmakīrti we of course know about his controversy with Kumārila and other non-Buddhist philosophers\textsuperscript{20}, but somehow the problems he takes up are also to be seen in the perspective of the vehement controversy taking place in those years between Bhavya and Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti’s “religious teacher”, if we are to believe tradition on this point\textsuperscript{21}. This, however, is not the place to go deeper into this problem where so much preliminary work still remains to be done\textsuperscript{22}.

On this background, I think, we are enabled to interpret the epistemological works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in a more proper perspective than has hitherto been the case. We know, of course, that Dharmakīrti is mostly concerned with “scientific methodology” but the motive for this concern is not just “scientific curiousity” but, as I hope will be clear from what follows, a certain “religious urge”, a desire for mokṣa. This finally brings us back to the question about Dharmakīrti’s attitude to the problem of two “truths”, i.e. to the problem of reconciling the rational realism of Sautrāntika forming his starting-point with the idealism of vijñaptimātratā which, from the stand-point of sākāravāda, denies the existence of external objects.

On the final page of PVin (p. 100, l. 12 seqq.) an opponent asks how, as an adherent of vijñaptimātra denying that cognition has a real object (visaya), Dharmakīrti can speak of upapālava and the contrary (i.e. how he can distinguish true cognition from false cognition). This puts Dharmakīrti with his back against the wall and his reply is to be found in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhūṣ) in its Sanskrit original: upapālavāsanābhisaṃdhiḥ ko aprabuddhayāpy anāśvāsikam vyavahāram uptasyaṃ ekam apramāṇam ācāraḥ, aparatā saṃsāraḥ ariśṭānubandhaṃ dhvāsanaṃ tathāha vyavahārāviṣṇuvaśāpeksaṃ pramāṇam, saṃvivahaśārikasya ca itat pramāṇasya rūpaṃ uktam; atriṣṭa pare viṃśdhaḥ visamvādayanti lokam iti. – cintāmayīṃ eva prajñām anuṣṭayante vibhramaṇivekaninmalaṃ anapāyi pāramārthikam pramāṇam abhinukhikurvan-
ti\textsuperscript{23}. – In other words: In saṃsāra correct knowledge “works”, wrong

\textsuperscript{20} See the indexes to Steinkellner’s translations of Hetubindu and Pramāṇaviniścaya.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. my remarks in AO 41 (1980) 32 and the linking together of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti in the Anekāntajayapatākā, II, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{22} At present the most important tasks would be editions and translations, etc. of Bhavya’s Yogācāratattvaviniścaya (Tarkavālā V) and Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Catuḥsātaka (T. 1571).

\textsuperscript{23} NBhūṣ, p. 57, l. 14–19 (in l. 17 yuktam has been emended to uktam; in PVin I, p. 100, l. 15 med pa’i should be deleted). Further fragments (apart from
knowledge does not. As long as we live under the law of karman our cognition – whether right or wrong – is empirical or conventional. To realize the ultimate cognition it is necessary to have resort to prajñā in its three phases: the first (not mentioned here) is śrutamayī, the second (and the one of greatest interest to a critical philosopher) is cintāmayī, while the third (based on the former) is bhāvanāmayī. Dharmakīrti thus admits two “levels” of pramāṇa — an empirical and a transcendental — and adds that he has only said a bit about the latter: de ’i (i.e. don dam pa ’i šes pa ’i acc. to Dharmottara) ya l cha tsam bstan pa yin no (PVin, loc. cit., l. 24–25). This remark can only refer to the commentary to PVin I, 28: yoginām api śrutamayena jñānena rthān grhītvā yukticintāmayena vyavasthāpya bhāvyatām tanniśpattau yat spaśṭāvabhāṣī jñānām tat pratyakṣam (loc. cit., p. 72, l.30 – 72, l.1)24. This becomes somewhat clearer in the lighter of the two passages from the first chapter of PV: sarvaśām viplave ’pi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā ā āśrayaparāviy terthākriyāyogyābhāmatisaṃvādanāt; mithyāte ’pi praśamanānukūlatvān mātṛṣamānādivat25. From these passages we see that the pāramārthikam pramāṇam is a spaśṭāvabhāṣī jñānam that presupposes the application of bhāvanāmayī prajñā and only occurs when āśrayaparāvṛtti has taken place. This “revulsion of the basis” must take place before the intuition of a yogin becomes free from the


24 See Ernst Steinkellner, New Sanskrit-Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścayā, First Chapter, WZKS 16 (1972) 203. I have changed praśruta” to śruta”.

dichotomy (vikalpa) of grāhyagrāhaka. See for instance Saṃtānāntarasiddhi (s. 80): gnas ma gyur pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa' gzuin ba dan 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma span 'pa rnam kyis gzan gyi sems 'ses pa yam, tha snañ la mi slu ba 'nid kyis gzugs la sos pa mthos ba 'byin du tshad ma 'nid yin no28, and PV III, 281: prāguktaṃ yoginīṃ jñānaṃ teśaṁ tad bhāvanāmayam / vidhūta-panājālam spāṭam evavahāsate //27.

So far there is no reason to suspect that Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga) differ seriously from the Viśṇaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu apart from in one respect. This divergence is suggested by the terminology employed by Dharmakīrti in the passage quoted above: Where Vasubandhu speaks of two kinds of jñāna – a laukika and a lokottara – Dharmakīrti speaks of two kinds (rūpa) of pramāṇa – a sāmyavahārika and a pāramārthika. The scheme is, of course, the same but the approach is entirely different. We have already seen how Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in their attempt to account for cītāmātra by advocating sākāravāda differed from Vasubandhu’s nirākāraravāda and thus were enabled to render a certain unity to their system quite alien to that of Vasubandhu. The same epistemological approach also accounts for the other important innovation within the development of Yogācāra with which we are here concerned. In this respect PVIn I, 28 is significant: bhāvanābalataḥ spāṭam bhayādāv iva bhāsate / yaj jñānam aśvanyādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakaṃ //

The decisive term is pratyakṣa. By classifying the highest form of cognition on a par with the most simple form of sensation (the term pratyakṣa applies in both cases) Dignāga (followed faithfully by Dharmakīrti) had indeed taken a new and bold step to render the relationship between samवरिसतया and paramārtha-satyat more coherent and


27 See the namaskāra-āloka of PV for vidhūta-panājāla (said of Samantabhadra).

intelligible than ever before in Buddhist tradition. To be sure, Dignāga was not the first to use the epithet pramāṇabhūta of Bhagavat but when he revived the term in the sense of “pratyakṣa in person” the demands of his system gave it an interpretation without precedent\(^\text{29}\). This innovation solved some old problems but also created new ones hardly foreseen by its author and his commentator. Here is an interesting field for future research.

The importance of bhāvanābala within this scheme now emerges clearly. It is generally agreed that bhāvanā possesses the power to transform or “digest” anything – be it real or unreal – so that it is clearly intuited without conceptual constructions\(^\text{30}\). It is the power of habitual meditation that makes things familiar and obvious. It is the task of critical philosophy (yukti — cintā) to secure that only scientific facts are presented to be digested by bhāvanā. It derives its inspiration from āgama. Philosophical critique thus becomes ancillary to religious experience. If we credit Vasubandhu with having created a system of vijnānaparīṇāma we may as well credit Dignāga (followed by Dharmakīrti) with having created one of *pramāṇaparīṇāma*\(^\text{31}\), so to speak.

In view of its cardinal importance in his system it may seem surprising that Dharmakīrti does not devote much space to justify the role

\(^{29}\) See HATTORI, op. cit., p. 23 with n. 3 and ERNST STEINKELLNER, The Spiritual place of the Epistemological tradition in Buddhism (= Nanto Bukkyō 49 [1982]). The meaning of the epithet comes out clearly in a fragment to which STEINKELLNER has drawn attention in his Philological Remarks on Śākyamati’s Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, 1981, p. 290): …bhāvanābalanispannanirnalavikalpābhāntajñātātmakatvād bhagavatā pratyakṣapramāṇavabhavatā sūkyād asty eva … In his interpretation of Dignāga’s verse and Dharmakīrti’s commentary (i.e. the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of PV) STEINKELLNER (following VETTER) fails to clarify the distinction between Bhagavat as a sāṃnyavahārika- and a pāramārthika-pramāṇa.

\(^{30}\) See e.g. PV III, 281–287 and Kambala’s Ālokamālā (known to Dharmakīrti) 57–60; 117–118, etc. – In both authors bhāvanā and abhyāsa are used interchangeably.

\(^{31}\) This point is decisive for an adequate interpretation of almost any technical term in the epistemological system. Correct knowledge (pramāṇa, sāmyagjñāna) changes from having an object to having no object, from being conceptual (indirect) to being non-conceptual (direct), from being simple sensation to being pure intuition. The deliberately oscillating vagueness of terms such as orthakriyāsamartha, avisamvāda, svaluksana, etc. is easily understood once it is recognized that they have to apply to all four kinds of pratyakṣa, etc. and, consequently, shift their meaning accordingly. Without being too general or too specific NB I, 1 summarizes the system of pramāṇaparīṇāma with unmatched brevity and comprehensiveness: sāmyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti…
of bhāvanā in his extant works. There are, however, historical grounds for this apparent omission. As shown elsewhere there are reasons to believe that Dharmakīrti composed a work entitled Tattvanāsikarṣa in which, *inter alia*, he discussed the necessity of bhāvanā for realizing tattvārtha. (I shall revert to this lost work of his below.) Moreover there are reasons to assume that Dharmakīrti was familiar with a text in which the significance of bhāvanā is stressed, viz. Kambala’s Ālokamālā. And, of course, we should not forget that the importance of bhāvanā was a matter of common consent within Mahāyāna. On this background there was no need for Dharmakīrti to delve further into the matter.

II

After this attempt of interpreting a part of the background and some of the basic motives in the formation of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s epistemology we shall now direct our attention to some more specific historical and textual problems posed by the first two chapters of PV in as edited and translated by Vetter and Steinkellner.

In PV I, 19d (!) and 21–27 Dharmakīrti discusses the third form of pratyakṣa, viz. svasaṃvedana. To some extent his discussion is based on the one given in his earlier work PV. This is clear from the fact that some of the verses are taken over from that work, sometimes without change, sometimes with slight or considerable modifications and sometimes they are even rendered into prose. Moreover PV in expressly refers to PV. But apart from this well-known fact there is reason to assume that he is also basing this paragraph on an earlier work of his. This may be shown as follows. – In the Nyāyāvatāra-vārtikāvṛtti (NAVV) of Śāntisūri we come across the following quotation dealing with viśnāna as svasaṃvedana:

(1) tatadadṛṣṭāpi bhāvās tatadadṛṣṭāpahetujāḥ
    tat sukhdāi kim ajñānaṁ viśnānābhinnahetujam ||

(2) aviśeṣe 'pi būhyasya viśeṣāt prūtāpāyoh
    bhāvanāyā viśeṣaṁ nārtharūpāḥ sukhādayah ||

(3) prajñādivad viśiṣyante bhāvanābalaḥbhāvataḥ
    nārthena janitākāro buddhau bhogas tadātmanaḥ ||

(4) niyataviśayatvena jñānākāro nivartitaḥ
    arthānvayātirekeṇa vyāpto nīlādibhāsavat ||

---

32 PV I, p. 74, 1. 5 (read gta la phab); II, p. 62, 1. 8; II, p. 96, 1. 19 (read 'greld du).
Marginalia to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya

(5) bhinnābhāṣṇ sitadukkhādir abhinno buddhivedane / abhinābhe vibhinne ced bhedābheda vimāśrayau //
(6) nāṇātvaikatvalopāṇaḥ syād evaṁ sati jagatratye / tasmād antarbhavaḥ ete cetanāḥ ceti sādhilam //

Now two of these stanzas are already known to us from PV (1 = PV III, 251 and 5 = PV III, 279) and they also occur as PVin I, 22 and I, 27, q. v. But what is the source of the remaining four stanzas? Where does the NAVV quote them from, directly or indirectly? To answer this question we may have a closer look at PVin I, 22–27 (Vetter’s edition, pp. 64–72). The second verse of our quotation proves to be identical with PVin I, 23:

/ phyṛ rol khyad par med na yan // dga’ dan yoṅs su gduṅ ba dag /
/ goms las khyad par gyur ba ‘i phyir // bde sogs don gyi raṅ bzin min //

Stanzas 3, 4, 6 of the quotation do not occur as verses in PVin but there are unmistakable traces of them all in the prose; compare 3 and 4 with Vetter’s edition, p. 66, l. 20–22. . . . sioṅ po la sogs pa ’i snaṅ ba ’i khyad par bzin no // de ’i khyad par la mi ltos par goms pa ’i khyad par daṅ rjes su ’brel pa de dag ni blo ŋid yin te / ṣes rab la sogs pa bzin no //, and 6 with op. cit., p. 75, l. 24: de ’i phyir bde ba la sogs pa naṅ yin ŋiṅ myoṅ ba yan yin no //.

Thus we see that all the verses of our quotation occur in some form or other in the prose of PVin, but also that their source is neither PVin nor PV. On the other hand they are certainly by Dharmakīrti. Hence we seem forced to assume that they hail from another of Dharmakīrti’s works—now lost. The most natural thing to assume is that the NAVV is here quoting Dharmakīrti’s Tatttvaniśkarṣa, a text from which another fragment, four couplets dealing with bhāvanā, are already known from Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa35. This conclusion is important in several respects: First of all it gives us a vague general idea of the nature of his Tatttvaniśkarṣa. It must have discussed svasamvedana and bhāvanā (most probably in connection with yogipratyakṣa). In other words one of its main topics was the various forms of pratyakṣa and, as we may assume from the title of the work, their relationship to tattva. As shown above this is exactly what we would have expected Dharmakīrti to deal with more extensively than he did in any of his

34 Emend PVin I, p. 66, l. 14 to gduṅ ba; l. 19 to gduṅ ba ’i; l. 30 to ’brel pa ’i; p. 68, l. 12 to gduṅ bar; l. 25 to šin tu daṅ ba (D); p. 78, l. 7 to logs šig tu.
35 See AO 41 (1980) 29. – For Dharmakīrti tattva is equivalent to devaya-sūnyatā (cf. especially PV III, 213; 360 and Viṃśatikā, 28–29). It is in this sense we have to understand PV II, 253ed: muktis tu sūnyatādṛṣṭes tadarthāḥ sese-bhāvanāḥ (v.1). So for Dharmakīrti (as for Kambala, etc.) sūnyatā is grāhya-grāhakābhāva, i.e. parinispannasvabhāva.
extant works. So here Tattvanîskarṣa may be held to provide the "missing link". Secondly this new fragment (even if it does not hail from Tattvanîskarṣa, but from some other work of Dharmakīrti’s, the title of which is not known), sheds some light on the formation of at least this part of PVin. Now we know that it was composed as a systematic reshuffle not only of PV but also of one (or more) of the author’s earlier works, among these the Tattvanîskarṣa. This is decisive when we have to assess the position of PVin within the literary output of Dharmakīrti as a whole. Thirdly, we have now found a place for depositing some of the quotations from Dharmakīrti occurring in later philosophical works but not to be traced in any of his extant treatises.

In order to gain a better understanding of the historical position of Dharmakīrti it is obviously incumbent upon us to determine his relationship to predecessors and opponents. Here we need not discuss the profound influence of Vasubandhu and Dignāga but will confine ourselves to point out some reminiscences of another and less known Buddhist philosopher, namely Kambala, the author of Ālokamāla (ca. 500 A.D.) 37. There are at least two stanzas (57, 84) in the Ālokamāla – which itself betrays unmistakable influence from Vasubandhu and Dignāga – that here come into consideration:

57. bhāvyate yad yad evetaḥ pāramprayena bālīśaḥ /
    tat tad eva pūraḥ khyāti bhāvanābalanirmitam //
84. iti buddhaye vibhāgo 'syā pāṇḍitaś parikalpyate /
    abhāgasyāpi cittasya lokasaṃvṛtisatyataḥ //

With these compare PV III, 282cd (= PVin I, 29cd), 284cd and 285 (= PVin I, 31):

abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva //
spaśṭābhāṃ nirvikalpam ca bhāvanābalanirmitam //
tasmād bhūtān abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhībhāvyate /
bhāvanāparinispattau tat sphaṭākulпадhiphalam //

36 For our purpose two stanzas are of special interest: nīlapiḍādi yaj jñānāṃ bahirvad avabhāsate / tan na satyam ato nāsti vijñeyam tatvato bahiḥ // tadapeksā ca samvitte mātā yā kartṛrūpata / sāpy atattvam atah samvid advayeti vibhāvyate // It is quoted Anekāntajayapatākā, Vol. II, p. 82 (with the wrong reading apeksayā for apeksā, and mistakenly ascribed to PV) and in the Śyāvāḍakalpalātā to Śāstravārttāsamuccaya, 393. Cf. also PV III, 220 to which Yaśovijayājī (ad 392) incidentally quotes a clause from Devendrayākhyā: citrājñāne hi yo nīlādhiḥ pratyavabhāsate, jñāno ‘prīdhī jñānāviśesana ’rubhava-
svāmabhūta iti . . . (TD, No. 4217, fol. 196a 3 [v. 1]). For Devendrabuddhi, cf. FRAUWALLNER, Kleine Schriften, pp. 842–846. – For the background: Ālambanaparīṣka, 6; Ālokamāla, 26–27.

and PV III, 353 (= PVin I, 45) and III, 212:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{avibhāgo } \text{'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaṁ} & / \\
\text{grāhyavrāhakasamvitibhedavān īva laksyate} & / \\
\text{paricchedo 'ntar anyo 'yam bhāgo bahir īva sthitaḥ} & / \\
\text{jñānasayāhādino bhedopratibhāso hy upapalavaḥ} & / \\
\end{align*}
\]

From these parallels we not only see one of Dharmakīrti’s sources but also how, in his characteristic manner, he almost rewrites them rendering their meaning more precise and specific so as to suit his own purpose. Kambala, who follows the nirākārarvāda of Vasubandhu, does not classify yogijñāna as pratyakṣa, nor does he take svasaṃvitti as pramāṇaphala, nor does he, consequently, accept the triple division of vijñāna. These features are specific to the sākāravāda of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, etc. – In the same way it is a task for future research to trace instances where Dharmakīrti has critical allusions to various non-Buddhist authors and thus reconstruct the living dialogue in which he was participating\(^{38}\). (A tremendous task in itself, needless to add, is to trace and reconstruct the subsequent influence of Dharmakīrti’s own contributions to the debate inside and outside the Buddhist fold.)

Moreover there are some problems with regard to the numbering and identification of the stanzas of PVin as edited by Vettér and Steinkellner. Some of these may be solved by searching for further fragments than have hitherto been identified in later sources.

First of all, to be sure, there seems to be no problem with regard to PVin I, 19d where abc occur on p. 58 whereas d first occurs on p. 62, an antaraśāloka having been inserted as stanza 20. There are other instances of this awkward procedure, as we shall see, occurring in the second chapter of PVin. The Sanskrit of PVin I, 19 is quoted in Kalpalatāviveka, p. 46, l. 27–28:

\[
\text{mānasam cākṣavijñānānantarapratvayodbhavam} / \text{tadarthāntararāgāhi sukhdāśinaṁ svasaṃvedanam} / \]

With regard to stanzas 41 and 42 we face problems. 41ab corresponds, as Vettér points out, to PV III, 332cd whereas “Der Anfang

\(^{38}\) Thus, for instance, there are several interesting allusions to Vākyapadīya (VP), compare PV II, 2d with VP I, 13ab; PVin I, 47b with VP I, 37; PV I, 21 with VP I, 32, etc. – On the other hand when Sākyamati ad PV II, 5 (TD, No. 4220, fol. 79a 5) quotes Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatāra 2 (q. v.), this celebrated Jaina author surely is under the influence of Dharmakīrti, here as elsewhere. This is a new piece of evidence for the discussion about the date of Siddhasena.

\(^{39}\) I owe this reference to Ernst Steinkellner who, for pāda d also refers to NBhūṣ, p. 101, l. 7. In a I have emended cākṣa\(^{\ast}\) to cākṣa\(^{\ast}\). – For PVin I, 21ab Steinkellner kindly calls my attention to Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivritvimarśinī, I, p. 116, l. 25; II, p. 361, l. 11; Bhāmatī, p. 537, l. 19; Nyāyakaṇṭikā, p. 190, l. 9. See Pāda-Index to PVin.
des Verses 42 ist wohl genauso wie der Rest von Vers 41 in die Prosa aufgegangen" (op. cit., p. 90, note to line 7). This leaves us either with one verse of two pādās and one of three pādās, or with one stanza of five pādās. As there seems to be no precedent to such a metrical irregularity in Dharmakīrti the translators (or clerks) are apparently to be held responsible for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. On p. 88, l. 23, however, we read: 'dod pa dañ mi 'dod par snañ ba ni rtoq pa yin gyi dhañ po 'i blo ni ma yin né ze na /, which is a literal prose version of PV III, 345ab: iṣṭāniṣṭāvābhāsinyāḥ kalpanā nākṣāḍhir yadi /

To support this identification we must also account for the missing pāda of 42a. On p. 90, l. 3 we read: de niñ kyi phyir tshad ma dañ 'bras bu dag yul tha dad pa yañ ma yin no //. Vetter identifies this with a line occurring in the Dharmottarapradīpa (p. 91, l. 16): na pramāṇaphalayor visayabhedaḥ, but here the de niñ kyi phyir (*tasmāt) as well as the kyan (*api) are missing. Vetter also calls attention to PV III, 350ab: tasmād visayabheda 'pi na, svasaṃvedanam phalam //. This reference, I think, solves our difficulty: de niñ kyi phyir (= tasmād) and yul tha dad pa yañ ma yin no (= visayabheda 'pi na) should be printed as stanza 42a (b) whereas tshad ma dañ 'bras bu dag (=pramāṇaphalayor; cf. Dharmottarapradīpa, loc. cit.) originally was composed as prose by Dharmakīrti. There are, as known, numerous similar instances of this miśrakavyā-khyāna style in the first chapter of PV⁴⁰. In this way we may retain Vetter's numbering and read two regular stanzas as we would expect Dharmakīrti to have composed (PVIn I, 41–42):

\[
\begin{align*}
tadanyasamvido bhāvāt svasaṃvīt phalam iṣyate & \\
iṣṭāniṣṭāvābhāsinyāḥ kalpanā nākṣāḍhir yadi & \\
tasmād visayabheda 'pi na, svasaṃvedanam phalam & \\
uktam svabhāvacintyādin tādāmyād arthasaṃvidāh & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Similar problems occur in PVIn II. STEINKELLNER (p. 40) prints verse 28 as follows: /mṣaṁ añi de dañ ldam pa yi //gtan tshigs de ni mi dmīgs dañ / bdaq dañ 'bras bu žes bya gsun // kho na'ó //, and in his translation (p. 44) he notes: "Der Vers ist nicht vollständig, aber die Kommentare enthalten keinen Hinweis auf eine mögliche Ergänzung". However, there is a solution. On p. 30 (!) we read as prose: rjes dpag bya dañ de mtišnus la / (DERGE has // !) yod dañ med la med par ni // ņes pa /. In the Nyāyāvatāravivṛtti of Siddharṣi (p. 51, l. 22–23 and elsewhere⁴¹) we find the following stanza: anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstiśāati / niścitānupalambhātmakāryākhyā hetavas trayah //. So what we read on p. 30 is in fact the beginning of a verse – PVIn II, 9 – the

⁴⁰ Cf. GNOLI, op. cit., p. XXXI.
⁴¹ Cf. STEINKELLNER’s translation of Hetubindu, pp. 207–208.
rest of which occurs as verse “28” on p. 40. No less than nineteen antarāṣlokas have been inserted! Verse 9 should then read:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{rjes dpag bya dañ de mtshuñs la } // \text{yod dañ med la med par mi } / \\
&\text{ñes pa gtan tshigs mi dmigs dañ } // \text{bdag dañ bras bu žes bya gsun } / \\
\end{align*}
\]

We thus see that mtshan ŉid de dañ ldan pa yi (p. 40, 1.2) and kho na’o (p. 40, 1.5) really belong to the prose whereas de ŉi (p. 40, 1.3) belongs nowhere and must have been inserted by the translators (or revisers) not seeing that the ŉes pa (p. 30, 1.2) would have saved them from the difficulties of metre. (The numbering of verses should, of course, be changed accordingly.)

According to Steinkellner verse 32, “völlig zerrissen” (p. 61, n. 182 of his translation, q.v.) as it is, is to be found on p. 42, 1.12–13, p. 44, 1.30–31 and p. 52, 1.10–11 giving us:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{med par ŉes pa’i bras bu can } // \text{mi dmigs, ’jug pa’i bye brag gis } / \\
&\text{rnam bži, bskal ba rnam la ni } // \text{med par ŉes pa yod ma yin } / \\
\end{align*}
\]

Based on various parallels Steinkellner reconstructs this verse as follows (p. 117 of his edition): asajjñānaphalā prayogabhedañ anupalabdhiñ / caturvidhā viprakṛṣtesv abhāvaniscayābhāvāt //. This, however, is impossible metrically and otherwise: in a we would thus have a ja-vipulā (ॐ) and in d the penultimate would be long, etc. A literal reconstruction of pādas a and b must be: abhāvaniscayaphālapalabdhiñ caturvidhā //. Whatever we do there is no place for prayogabhedañ metrically and it can only be explained as belonging to the prose just as it does in the parallel passage in PV noted by Steinkellner (p. 45). The literal reconstruction above is also the only metrically satisfactory one. This brings us to the remaining two pādas of verse 32. As noted by Steinkellner bskal pa (read: ba) rnam la ni // med par ŉes pa yod ma yin // has its parallels in NB II, 27 (later than PVin?): …vipra-kṛṣtesu …abhāvaniscayābhāvāt. But no matter how we turn and twist this prose passage it is impossible to turn it into the two missing pādas so as to get the Sanskrit hemistich we are searching for. We should therefore seek it elsewhere. On p. 56, 1.4–5 we find a verse consisting of two pādas only (!), numbered “35” by the editor. A stanza of two pādas only is without precedent in Dharmakīrti, and this is obviously the missing hemistich of verse 32 which then reads: abhāvaniscayaphālapalabdhiñ caturvidhā / iṣṭo ‘yam arthaḥ śakyeta jñātum so ‘tiṣayo yadi //42. (The numbering of the following verses is to be changed accordingly.)

---

42 In his translation (p. 66, n. 205) Steinkellner says: “Dharmakīrti hat… den letzten Pāda geändert, so daß nun nicht die Besonderheit (atiṣaya), sondern die qualifizierte Person (*viṣeṣavat) Object ist”. But metrically there is no space for *viṣeṣavat (or rather for *viṣiṣṭo which would be the normal
The Tibetan version of PVin II, 33 reads as follows:

/snaṅ ba mthoṅ ba med pa daṅ // dīnos po mi dmigs pa la ni /
/rgyu mi srid par gyur pa na // dīnos po med par rtogs par 'gyur /

This, as SteinKellner notes, has its parallel in PV I, 203 (= 205):
drṣyasya darṣanābhāvakāraṇāsambhave sati / bhāvasyānupalabdhasya bhāvaḥbhāvan pratiyate //. The Tibetan version of this PV verse is:
/snaṅ raṅ dīnos po má dmigs pa'i // dīnos po med pa rtogs par 'gyur /
/snaṅ raṅ dīnos po má dmigs pa'i // dīnos po med pa rtogs par 'gyur /

In a note to his translation SteinKellner (p. 58) remarks: "Dharmakīrti hat den übernommenen Vers offensichtlich nicht nur umge- stellt, sondern auch den Sinn geändert. Im PV hat der Vers die Aufgabe, die Nichtbeobachtung des Wesens (svabhāvānapalabdhi) zu bes- chreiben. Hier, im PVin, hat er aber die Aufgabe, alle eben besprochenen Arten der Erkenntnis des Nichtvorhandenseins zusammen- zufassen. . . Eine Rückübersetzung des problematischen Verses wäre folgend denkbar: *drṣyadarṣanābhāve bhāvasyānupalabdhasya ca / kāraṇāsambhave sati bhāvaḥbhāvaḥ pratiyate //". This reconstruction is scarcely possible: The reading kāraṇāsambhave sati would give the imper- missible ja-vipulā if taken as pāda c. It must be retained as pāda b – which, as it stands, violates the metre – just as pāda d must be retained unaltered. Moreover if drṣyadarṣanābhāve was correct we would have to have mthoṅ ba med na for mthoṅ ba med pa in the first pāda of the PVin version. Consequently we are forced to admit that the Sanskrit form of PVin could not have differed from that of PV (given above). Still it is clear that the Tibetan version of the PVin verse is peculiar and requires an explanation. What has happened, in my opinion, is that the trans- lators here – as elsewhere43 – were under the influence of Dharmottara’s exegesis (cf. SteinKellner, loc. cit.). The result, as we see from their version of PVin 33, was an unsatisfactory compromise which is neither faithful to the Sanskrit nor to Dharmottara’s exegesis (which does, it should be added, not pretend to be verbatim).

Again on p. 100 there seems to be a problem of verse "67" (= 66 according to the revised numbering) consisting of five pādas. Here ldog pa sgrub pa ma mthoṅ tsam (l.5) obviously – as SteinKellner notes – corresponds to vyatirekasādhanaśādarsanāmātrasya. It is, however, quite impossible to reduce this passage to a pāda of eight syllables. So again the translators (or scribes) have mislead us by writing mthoṅ for mthoṅ ba, etc. Verse 66 then should read: yasyādarsanāmātrena vyatire-

kaḥ pradarśyate / tasya saṃśayahetuvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam // Incidentally this and the previous verse (i.e. 65 with the wrong reading na yuktādṛśimātreṇa for na cādarśanamātreṇa in a) are quoted NBhūṣ, pp. 142–143.

On p. 106 pāda d of verse “70’ (= 69) is problematic. Steinkelner reconstructs the pāda (p. 118): asiddhiyojanāvācyā. This is an exact rendering of ma grub sbyar ba ... brjod bya min (p. 106, 1.4 and 1.8) but metrically impossible. We should read PVIn II, 69d as na vācyāsid-dhiyojanā / exactly as PV I, 18d, to which there is no alternative, metrically or otherwise.

Further problems face us on pp. 112–113. Certainly the first two pādas of “74” (in fact = 71cd, as we shall see) are correctly identified by Steinkelner as PV I, 26ab: tasmād vaidharmyadṛśānte nṛṣṭo ‘vaṣyam ihāśrayaḥ /. For pādas c and d the Tibetan version has: / yaṅ na rgyu yi dnos por te // me med na yaṅ du ba ste / – the exact equivalents of which are found in the Svavṛttī to PV as pointed out by Steinkelner: ... hetubhāvo vā ... dahanābhāve ca dhūmaḥ. Steinkelner consequently (p. 118) reconstructs pāda d as: dahanābhāve ca dhūmaḥ. Now this again is metrically impossible whatever you do and Steinkelner wisely abstains from reconstructing pāda e. Again the Tibetan version is misleading. This passage in PVIn was not composed as verse by Dharmakīrti but as prose, i.e. exactly as in the parallel passage in PV. But this fact apparently leaves us with the new problem of a verse consisting of one hemistich only. There are, to be sure, no traces of the missing hemistich in the sequel. To solve our puzzle we most turn back to p. 106 (!) where we find (1.31–32) the following prose passage: de bžin du gzan la yaṅ tshad ma gzan gyis gnod pa srid de /. This is an exact rendering of PV I, 20ab where the translators (or revisers) once again failed to recognize the verse: tathānyatrāṇi sambhāvyam pramāṇāntara-bādhanaṃ /. To be sure, the corresponding Tibetan version of PV runs: / de bžin du ni gzan la yaṅ // tshad ma gzan gyis gnod pa srid /. This then

44 Probably the prose of PVIn II, p. 106, 1. 7 is corrupt. See the corresponding passage of the Tib. version of PV (TD, No. 4216 fol. 268 a 3): yaṅ yaṅ ma grub pa’i sbyor ba de bžin du mthun pa’i phyogs la yod pa dan / med pa žes bya ba la sosgs pa la yaṅ ci rigs par brjod par bya’o žes bya ba de lla bu la sosgs pa / ma grub sbyar ba de yaṅ brjod bya min // . Here ma grub sbyar ba brjod bya min renders na vācyāsid-dhiyojanā, whereas de yaṅ (= sāp) belongs to the prose just as the initial ma grub pa’i sbyor ba does. In PVIn, 1.7 we should accordingly for de yaṅ read de lla bu la sosgs pa / ma grub sbyar ba de yaṅ. The lacuna may either be due to the omission of a scribe (haplography) or to an instance of editorial banalization. PVIn, 1.4, then, should be brought back to its original prose form.

48 Like 57a (= 55a) missing in Steinkelner’s “Versindex”.
is the first hemistich of “71” (= 70). The second (= 70cd) is to be found on p. 110, 1.25–26 (where ŠTEINKELLNER takes it as 71ab). The first hemistich of the next verse (71ab) affords no problems and corresponds to ŠTEINKELLNER’s “71cd”. Then follow two antaraślokas (“72” and “73” = 72 and 73) and finally the two missing pādas of 71 that we were looking for: the first two pādas of “74”. This solves our problem and it only remains to be noted that the final verse (“75”) should consequently be numbered as 74.

These observations have mainly been concerned with the identification and numbering of the 133 verses of PVin I and II. No doubt the prose still poses several – mostly minor – problems as far as text, translation and interpretation are concerned. I shall have to postpone remarks on these for another occasion. Considering the difficulty of Dharmakīrti’s thought and style and the problems connected with the transmission of his works, this is only natural. Dharmakīrti is not easy reading and, as we know, prāyaḥ prākṛtatasaktir apratibalaprajñō janaḥ. Experience from Classical philology, the elder sister, as it were, of Indian and Tibetan philology, shows that abstruse philosophical texts have to go through several editions before we get a text edited to the satisfaction of all – if ever. It would therefore be quite absurd if the above observations should leave the impression that the work done by VETTER and ŠTEINKELLNER done so far is not first rate. At present no one could have done a better and more admirable job than they have.

Much work remains to be done and Dharmakīrti surely deserves it. Speaking of one of Proclus’ writings COLERIDGE once remarked that “The most beautiful and orderly development of the philosophy which endeavours to explain all things by an analysis of consciousness, and builds up a world in the mind out of materials furnished by mind itself, is to be found in the Platonic Theology of Proclus”. Had he had the chance to know the works of Dharmakīrti he might well have met hesitations in deciding whom of these congenial almost contemporaries of widely different background to let carry off the palm.

Pāda-Index to PVin I46

akāraṇaḥ api svayam 37d  adarśanāy jagaty asminn 53a
aksadhir yady apecṣeta 5c  anapekṣitasadharmya* 54c
atadatmanā tādātmya* 52c  anirdeśasya vedakam 15d

46 The numbering of verses follows VETTER’s edition from 1966. Subsequent identifications by ŠTEINKELLNER (cf. n. 24) or myself are included and few emendations – all obvious – have tacitly been made. Note that 10, 11ab, 12, 17ab, 24, 30, 33(c)d and 59(c)d are still missing in Sanskrit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Lines</th>
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<tr>
<td>anupaplutacaksusām</td>
<td>47b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anyataḥ pratipattitaḥ</td>
<td>1d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anyathaikasya bhāvasya</td>
<td>49a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anyathaivāvahāsante</td>
<td>46c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anyasyānayatvāhānes ca</td>
<td>50a</td>
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<tr>
<td>apratyakṣasaṃbandhād</td>
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<td>apratyakṣapalambhasya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhinnavedanasyaikyey</td>
<td>26a</td>
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<tr>
<td>abhinābhe vibhīnne ced</td>
<td>27c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhinno buddhivedane</td>
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<td>abhūtān api pasyanti</td>
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<td>abheda niṣataddhiyoh</td>
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<td>abhrāntam abhilāpini</td>
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<td>ayogolakavahinivat</td>
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<td>arthagrahaḥ katham satyam</td>
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<td>arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt</td>
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<td>arthasyeṣṭā prameyata</td>
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<td>arthāḥḥiganamātmanā</td>
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<td>arthāpāye 'pi netradhīḥ</td>
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<td>arthena ghaṭayaty enaṃ</td>
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<td>avibhāgo 'pi buddhātmaḥ</td>
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<td>avedvyavedakākāra</td>
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<td>astiḥyam api yā tv antar</td>
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<td>ātmā meyah phalaṃ svavit</td>
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<td>āsīn me kalpanedṛśi</td>
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<td>iti ced grāhyatāṃ viduḥ</td>
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<td>iti vetti na pūrvoke</td>
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<td>iti sā yogyata mānaṃ</td>
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<td>iyaṃ sarvatra samyojyā</td>
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<td>āṣṭāṅgaśvabhāsinyah</td>
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<td>īkṣate sākṣajā matiḥ</td>
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<td>uktaṃ svabhāvacintāyāṃ</td>
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<td>uccināṃ sarravastuṣu</td>
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<td>keśādijānānabhedavat</td>
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<td>tat pratyaṃkṣam akalpakam</td>
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<td>tatrāṃvisaye māne</td>
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<td>tatrāpy anubhavātmavat</td>
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taddhetute samam dvayam 3d purato 'vasthitān iva 29d
 tadṛṣṭam nāsti tatvataḥ 51b pūrvāparaparāmarśa 8c
 tadṛṣṭarāhita api 46d pratibaddhasvabhāvasya 3c
tadvaśāt tadṛṣṭasyavasthānād 37c pratiesādha ca kasyacit 2d
tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ 34c pratiśīth kalpanārthaḥasya 4c
tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ 35a pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdam 4a
tasmād bhūtaṃ abhūtaṃ vā 31a pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca 1a
tasmād visayabhedo 'pi 42a pratyakṣē 'pi ānāmaṇā 33c
tasmād visesavisayā 17c pratyakṣe 'pi ānāmaṇātā 3b
tasya nānubhavo 'parah 38b ānāmaṇaṃ meyarūpatā 34d
tādātmyād arthasaṃvidaḥ 42d ānāmaṇaṃ svātmavedanā 58d
tādṛṣṭo 'nyādyāśo 'pi vā 43b ānāmaṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ 2c
tenā nārthāntaram phalam 36b ānāmaṇetarasaṃmāṇaṃ 2a
te yogāḥ svātmasaṃvidi 57b ānāmaṃ sadṛṣṭamānaḥ 1b
tevām atah svasaṃvittār 21c buddhāv apratibhāsānāt 15b
dadhānam tacca tām ātmany 36c
 diṛre yathā vā marāṣu 47c bhavaḍāv iva bhāsate (v. 1.) 28b
drāgādhis taimirādhat 54d bhavaṇāparinīstāttau 31c
drśtasāmakaṇāntamakam 8b bhavaṇābalaṃ spāṣṭaṃ 28a
dosodbhavā prakṛtyā sā 54a bhavaṇāyā viśeṣaṇa 23c
dhīr abhedam viyavasyati 50d bhavaḥ yena nirūpyante 51a
 na ca tat tādṛg arthavat 32d bhinnakālaṃ kathāṃ grāhyam 20a
 na jāne 'ham api drśyam 44d bhinnābhaḥ sitadūkhādīr 27a
 na tasmād bhinnam asty anayat 16c "bhedaṃ iva laksyate 45d
 "nantarapraptayodbhavam 19b bhedaḥbhēdavyavasthaivam 25c
 na vikalpānubuddhāsaṣaṇaṃ 32a bhedaḥbhēdau kimārayau 27d
 na siddham bhedasādhanam 26d bhṛntiṃ nāmapājaye 52b
 na svātmavedanaṃ phalam 42b mantrādyupapalatāksaṃ nanopā” 46a
 na hi muktavāharāpātām 34b mahān alpo 'pi ḍṛṣyate 47d
 nānārūpāvahāsinaḥ 49b mānasāṃ cākṣaśviṇānāṃ 19a
 nānyo 'nubhāvya buddhyāṣi 38a meyaṃaṇaphalasthitih 48b
 nābhiṣṭalāpūnaṃgiṃ (v. 1.) 21d meyaṃaṇaphalasthitih 56d
 nābhēdo 'rūpadarśanāt 50b
 nārthadrśṭih prasidhyati 55d yāh prāg ajanako buddher 6a
 nārthāraṃ phalāḥ sukhdādayaḥ 23d yaj jñānam āvaisaṃvādi 28c
 nārthasāmniḥkīṃ ikṣeta 9c yatsannidhāne yo drṣṭas 11c
 nivartatecchayā matiḥ 9b yathākathamcit tasyārthaḥ 44a
 paricchedatmatatātmanī 58b yathā nānudārśanaṃ ceṣām 48a
 punar vikalpayaṃ kīṃcid 14a yathā mṛcchakalādayaḥ 46b
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<th>Romanization</th>
<th>Pali</th>
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<td>yathā rūgādivedane</td>
<td>56b saṃketaśamaranopāyaṁ</td>
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<td>yadā tadā na saṃcodya*</td>
<td>40c saṭyāḥ kathāṁ syur ākārās</td>
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<td>yad yad evābhībhāvyate</td>
<td>31b sa paścād api tena syād</td>
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<td>yan naived tadbhihavedat</td>
<td>26b saṃbandham laukikīṁ sthitīṁ</td>
<td>7b</td>
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<td>yasmād ekam anekam ca</td>
<td>51c *saṃbandho na prasidhyati</td>
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<td>rūpam teṣāṁ na vidyate</td>
<td>51d savyāpāram ivābhāti</td>
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<td>*rūpam muktavabhāśinaḥ</td>
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<td>rūpabhedaṁ hi paśyanti</td>
<td>50c sā ca tasyātmabhihāvita</td>
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<td>*vasthāyāṁ indriyād gatau</td>
<td>14d sādhanā 'nyatra tatākarma*</td>
<td>35c</td>
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<td>vikalpo 'vastunirbāsād</td>
<td>9a sādharmyadarsānāl loke</td>
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<td>vijñānābhināhetuvaṁ</td>
<td>33a sāmarthyaṇa samudbhavat</td>
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<td>vitathapratibhāsini</td>
<td>22d sāmāṇyaḥ buddhyabhedat</td>
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<td>58c</td>
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<td>45b * 'siddhiḥ syād vyatirotekataḥ</td>
<td>59b</td>
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<td>viṣeṣanām viṣeṣyaṁ ca</td>
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<td>visanvādād upaplavaḥ</td>
<td>23b so 'rtho vyavahito bhavet</td>
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<td>*vyavasāyena neha tat</td>
<td>33b stimitendānāraṭāmanā</td>
<td>13b</td>
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<td>vyavahāraḥ pravartate</td>
<td>52d * 'sthīte anyadyāyōm gateḥ</td>
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<td>vyāpāreṇa svakarmanī</td>
<td>18d sthito 'pi caksuṣā rūpam</td>
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<td>37b spaṭārthapratibhāsītā</td>
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<td>*śūnye tac cāksuṣe katham</td>
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<td>visvāvityāvabhāvinaḥ</td>
<td>8d svapne 'pi smaryate smārtam</td>
<td>32c</td>
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<td>18b svayanva saiva prákāṣate</td>
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<td>samkṛtya samvataṁ cintāṁ</td>
<td>25a svasanvit phalam iṣyate</td>
<td>41b</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13a hetutvam eva yuktijñā</td>
<td>20c</td>
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</table>

A revised edition of the stanzas of PVin II

1. anumānaṁ dvīdhā svārthāṁ trirūpāl liṅgato 'ṛthāḍṛk / atasmīṁs tadgraḥo bhṛṅtir api saṃbandhataḥ pramā ||
2. yo hi bhāvo yathābhūtāḥ sa tādgrīṅgacetasāḥ / hetus tajjā tathābhūte tasmād vastuni liṅgidiḥ ||

* The numbering of the verses follows my remarks above. Spaced words or clauses are reconstructed from Tib. and parallel Sanskrit sources. In 55c I prefer the v. 1. teṣāṁ for tasmāt. Steinakter's reconstruction of 52ab (his 53ab) violates the metre. A few emendations, mainly of misprints, have tacitly
3. लिङ्गालिङ्गिद्हियो एवम् पारम्परयेना वस्तुनि
   *प्रतिबन्धहैत तदाभसाशुनयोर् अप्य अवाचनामी
4. तायसो तदरुपाशुनयोसं तदरुपाद्धियवसाशुनयातः
   *तदरुपाविविकाते 'पि क्र्ताहै क्र्तविनयवालिक्षः
5. अनिप्रदिवप्राप्यहयोर् माणिबुद्धिाळ्धियवहळचतोः
   *मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषे 'पि विशेषे 'रथाकिर्यामि प्रति
6. यथान् तादायतःरथत्तवे 'पि अनुमानतदाभायोः
   *रथाकिर्यानुरोधेना प्रमाननत्वमि यवावष्टितमी
7. प्रमानायां वस्तुविरयाः दिवयो अरथाभिदां जगाः
   *प्रतिबहसाया भिन्नतव्यु एकस्मिन्तिदायोगाताः
8. नादरुपाविविर्यक्षवस्तुन्ताद्राप्रसंहनाः
   *सामार्यविरयाः प्रक्तमि लिङ्गमिर्याद्धायोऽपरिष्ठित्वे
9. अनुवेदं 'त्हा तत्तुल्ये सद्धावो नास्तिसाति
   *निश्चितनुपालम्ब्धायस्तमकर्याख्याते वेतवस्सरयाः
10. अयोगमिर्याद्धायो अपराय अत्यां अयोगमिर्यात्वा
    *वयाविचिनातीभवस्या निपतो सरतिरेककाः
11. विश्वंश्वाब्धीव्याधिः क्रियायोऽसहोढिताः
    *विवक्षास्तो 'प्रयोगे 'पि तस्यर्थस्त ययम् प्रतिययाते
12. वयावच्छदाप्राथलमि वाक्यमि यतात् तासत्रा कैतृद प्रानुर्हराहः
    *पर्थो दानुर्हराहो निलां सरोजमि इति यतः
13. प्रतियोगियवारच्छदासहां तत्रात्य अर्थेशु गम्योते
    *तथो प्रसीद्धेऽसमार्थत्यमि विवक्षासुनामाद्ध्वहानेऽ
14. तद्योगवयावच्छदाद्ध सर्ध्मो धर्मवास्याश्चानमां
    *तदविश्वशतायाः धर्मो न प्वरंगवयादोपाहकाः
15. निवर्त्तयावहास्तु विभिन्तर वस्तुवहावो 'सातो 'पि सन
    *वस्त्रवहावीसु नाशी पायां बांध्याविर्यंभितमाः
16. निवर्तत्सदयात्क्षमि नेतर वित्तिः किम्भिः स्याः
    *सापि न प्रतिसेद्धो 'ययम् निवर्त्तिः किम्निष्ठ्याते
17. विद्हानवस्य प्रतिसेद्धांव वक्त्वावास्यो 'सदबो 'सतो 'नः
    *वयावहाराः सा पास्तसि नेति प्राप्तात्रा मुक्ताः
18. निवहानमि प्रतिसेद्धांव मक्त्वावास्यो 'सदबो 'सतो 'सुसः
    *किम् निष्ठ्याते 'सतो 'विक्षिद्याते
19. सताः किम् निष्ठ्याते 'सतो 'समात् किम् निष्ठ्याते
    *जातें बन्धु नायायेन नायार्धमि थ्राल्यामि गताः
20. तस्मिन अश्रिया साबदाधर्मव ह्वाभहावसामासरयामव
    *अबाध्यास्याम अत्रेताः सर्वसि विद्हिनिसेद्धानमि

been made. PVin II, 7 occurs Nyāyāvatārāvārtikavṛtti, p. 70, l. 21 and Nyāyavinisćayavivarana, II, p. 4, l. 2. See also NBhūs, p. 289, l. 24 and Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛt vimārṣiṇī, p. 226, l. 16. PVin II, 53ed occurs in Nyāyakaṇiṇī, p. 138, l. 13 and NBhūs, p. 288, l. 9. These identifications were kindly communicated to me by Ernst Steinkellner (9. 11. 1983).
21. tābhyaṁ sa dharmī sambaddhaṁ khyāty abhāve 'pi tāḍrśaḥ / ṣāḍapraṇavrśter astiśi so 'piśaḥ vyavahārabhāk ||
22. anyathā syāt padārthānāṁ vidhānapratiśedhane / ekadharmasya sarvātmavidhānapratiśedhanam ||
23. anāṇāmatayā bhede nāṇāvidhiśedhavat / ekadharmīṇy asamāhāro vidhānapratiśedhayaḥ ||
24. ekam dharminam uddīṣya nāṇādharmsaṃśrayam / vidhāv ekasya tadbhājām ivāṇyesām upekṣakam ||
25. nīśedhe tadviviktaṁ ca tadanyesām apekṣakam / vyavahāram asatyārtham prakalpayati dhir yathā ||
26. taṁ tathaivaśvikaṇḍyārthabhedāśrayam upāgaṭaḥ / anāṇāśanadbhūtaṁ bādhante 'rtham na laukikam ||
27. tatphalo 'tatphalaś cārtho bhinnā ekas tatas tataḥ / tais tair upaplawair nīśasaṃcayāparacayair iva ||
28. atadvān api sambandhāt kutascid upanāyate / drṣṭiṁ bhedāśrayais te 'pi tasmād ajñātaviplavāḥ ||
29. sarve bhāvaḥ svabhāvena svasaṃbhāvavatvarthē / svabhāvaparabhāvabhāvyāṁ yasmād vyārvrttibhāginaḥ ||
30. tasmād yato yato 'rthānāṁ vyārvrttis tannibhandhanāḥ / jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviveśśaṅgāhinaḥ ||
31. tasmād yo yena dharmena viśeṣaḥ sampratīyate / na sa śakyas tato 'nyena tena bhinnā vyavasthiṭiḥ ||
32. abhāvanīścayaphalāṇupalabḍhiś caturviddhā / īṣṭo 'yam arthaḥ śakyeta jñātum so 'liśayo yadi ||
33. druṣyasya dasanābhaḍvaṃśaṃvāsaṃbhave sati / bhāvasyāṇupalabḍhasya bhāvabhaḍvāḥ pratyayate ||
34. īṣṭaṁ viruddhakārye 'pi desakālaḍyāpekaṇaṁ / anyathā vyabhicāri syād bhasmevaśīṣasthādhan ||
35. svaṇam rāgādīmaṁ nārthaṁ vetti vedaṇa nāṃyataḥ / na vedaṇaṁ vedō 'pi vedaṛthasya kuto gatiḥ ||
36. tenaṁnaḥtīrṇaṁ juhayāt svarṣaṅkāmā iti śrutau / khādeca chvamāṁsam ity esa nārtha ity atra kā pramā ||
37. prasiddho lokavādaś cet tatra ko 'tindriyārthadhṛty / anekārthṛṣu śabdeṣu yenaṛtho 'yam vivecitāḥ ||
38. svargorvaśyādiśabdaś ca druṣto 'rūḍhārthavācaḥ / śabdāntaresu tāḍrśu tāḍrśy evāstu kalpāṇa ||
39. 
40. prasiddhiś ca niṇāṁ vādaḥ pramāṇaṁ sa ca nesyat / tatāś ca bhūjo 'rthagatiḥ kim etad dvistakāmitam ||
41. atha prasiddhiṁ ullaṅghya kalpane na nibandhanam / prasiddher apramāṇatvāt tadgrahe kim nibandhanam ||
42. utpāditā prasiddhyai va śaṅkā śadbārthaniścaye //
yasmān nānārthavaṛtītvam śadbānaṁ tatra drśyate ||
43. 
44. 
45. anyathāsaṁbhavābhāvān nānāsakteḥ svayam dhvaneḥ //
avasyaḥ śaṅkayā bhāvyam niyāmakam apaśyatām ||
46. eṣa sthānur ayaṁ mārga iti vakṣīti kaścana //
ayaḥ svayam braṁhitā tayor bhedaḥ parīkṣyatām ||
47. sarvatra yogyasyaikārthadyotane niyamaṁ kutaḥ //
jiñātā vātiṇdriyāḥ kena vivakṣāvacanad rte //
48. vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ sampetetat taprakāśanāḥ //
apauruseye sā nāsti tasya saikārthatā kutaḥ //
49. svabhāvaniyame 'nyatra na yoṣyeta taṇā punah //
sampetaṁ ca nirarthaḥ syād vyaktau ca niyamaṁ kutaḥ ||
50. yatra svālantyram icchāyā niyamo nāma tatra kah //
dyotayet tena sampetetam nesāṁ evāsya yogyatām ||
51. vṛttibuddhipūrvakatvād iṣṭā sāpṛavrṛtīphalā //
yāyā tu pravrṛtīphalā tasāyā nimittadarsanāt ||
52. tadbhāvamātrā nurodhe svabhāvo hetur ātmāni //
upādhyapecṣah suddho vā nāše kāryatvasattvat ||
53. ahetutvād vināśasya svabhāvād anubandhitā //
sāpekṣāṇāṁ hi dharmānāṁ navaśyambhāvitekyate ||
54. etena vyabhicāritvam uktaṁ kāryāvyavasthitāk //
sarvēṣāṁ nāsahetūnāṁ hetumannaśavādināṁ ||
55. arthakriyāsamarthāṁ yat tad atra paramārthasaṁ //
asanto 'ksanikās tesaṁ kramākramavirodhaḥ ||
56. asāmarthyaṁ ca taddhetor bhavaty eṣa svabhāvataḥ //
yatra nāma bhavaty asmād anyatraṁpi svabhāvataḥ ||
57. kāryam svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe //
hetus tadvyabhicāre sa hetumattāṁ vilāṅghayet ||
58. nityam sattvam asattvam vāhetor anyānapekṣanāt //
apekṣāto hi bhāvānāṁ kādācitkutvasambhavah ||
59. aṅgisvabhāvāḥ sakrasya mūrdhā yady aṅgir eva saḥ //
athānaṅgisvabhavo 'sau dhūmas tatra katham bhavet ||
60. dhūmaḥetusvabhāvo hi vahnis taczakakhibhavān //
adhūmaḥetor dhūmasya bhāve sa syād ahetukaḥ ||
61. anvaṇavyaṅgikād yā yasya drśto 'nuvartakaḥ //
svabhāvas tasya taddhetor ato bhinnāṁ na sambhavah ||
62. kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt //
avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanāṁ na na darśanāt ||
63. avasyambhāvaniyamaṁ kah pariṣyānyathā pariḥ //
arthāntaranimitte vā dharme vāsasi rāgavat ||
64. arthaṇțarānimitto hi dharmāḥ syād anya eva saḥ /
   paścād bhāvān na hetuvam phale 'py ekāntatā kutaḥ //

65. na cādarsanamātreṇa vípakṣe 'vyabhicāritā /
   sambhānyavyabhicāratvat sthālāṇḍulaṇḍapākavat //

66. yasyādarsanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ pradarśyate /
   tasya sāṁśayahetuvāc chēsavat tad udāhṛtam //

67. hetos triśv api rūpesu niścayās tāna varṇitaḥ /
   asiddhāviparīṭārthavyabhicārīrivapakṣataḥ //

68. na ca nāstīi vacanāt tan nāstī eva yathā yadi /
   nāsti sa khyāpyate nyāyas tadā nāstīi ganyate //

69. yady adṛśyā nivṛttiḥ syāc chēsavad vyabhicāri kim /
   vyatireky api hetuḥ syān nāvācyāsiddhiyojanā //

70. tathānyatrāpi sambhāvyam pramāṇāntarabādhanaṃ /
    tasmāt tanmatrasambandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva vā //

71. nivartayet kāraṇam vā kāryam aṇyabhicārataḥ /
    tasmād vaidharmyadṛśtānte nesō vaśyam ihaśrayah //

72. anyathaikanivṛttyāṇyaviniṇvṛttiḥ katham bhavet /
    nāśavān iti martyena na bhāvam gomālāpi kim //

73. sāṃnīdhanāt tathaikasya katham anyasya sāṃnīdhiḥ /
    gomān ity eva martyena bhāvam aśvavatāpi kim //

74. hetusvabhāvābhāvo 'tāḥ pratīṣedhe ca kasyacit /
    hetur yuktopalambhasya tasya cānupalamḥanam //