

TSHAD MA'I SKYES BU.
MEANING AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM

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Man unterschätze den Terminus nicht!
Quod non est in verbo, non est in cogitatione.

(Friedrich Kainz, *Philosophische Etymologie und historische Semantik*, 22)

The term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* occurs in numerous passages¹ of the works of rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and mKhas grub rje (1385-1438) that belong to the epistemological and logical literature, the "*tshad ma*"-literature, and is well-used in the later kindred literature of the dGe lugs pas. The "earliest" text it can be found in, is rGyal tshab's *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ chen mo*;² and this text is a compilation of notes taken down by rGyal tshab at the occasion of Tsoñ kha pa's lectures on *tshad ma*.³

The term is easy enough to understand and to interpret within its context. The genitive characterizing the compound is simply attributive; the word literally means, therefore, that the person (*skyes bu*) is a means of valid cognition (*tshad ma*), and I translate the term as "a person of authority". The word designates the Buddha, of course, the authority par

¹ E.g. in the *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* of rGyal tshab (Ca/VIII, 1b5, 3a1 and passim) and of mKhas grub (Ta/VI, 1b3, 4a4 and passim). For rGyal tshab's and mKhas grub's works I am using the microfiches of the Lhasa-edition of the *Yab sras gsuñs 'bum* prepared by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York.

² E.g. 3b5.

³ It is therefore often included in Tsoñ kha pa's collected works too (cf. Tohoku 5400 = 5438, Lhasa Pha/VII = Rgyal Tshab NA/III). Although written by rGyal tshab these notes could be considered as representing a truthful mirror of the contents of Tsoñ kha pa's lectures. Since our term does not occur in Tsoñ kha pa's only *tshad ma*-work, the *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo*, its appearance in the *Tshad ma' brjed byañ* can indeed be considered as the "earliest".

excellence and thus the final source and judge of any validity and usefulness in any kind of cognition.

It is also easy to show the original source of the concept meant by this term. This concept has been introduced by Dignāga in the first words of the benedictory verse of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the verse which contains the key to the religious meaning of the whole Buddhist epistemological and logical tradition. The word used by Dignāga is the attribute *pramāṇabhūta*,⁴ the technical meaning of which is somebody "who has become a means of valid cognition".⁵

Both Tibetan translation of the verse and its commentary show *tshad mar gyur pa* - a correct translation of *pramāṇabhūta*. And that the term was only understood as an attributive adjective is also clear from various commentarial notes on *-bhūta-*. Jinendrabuddhi, e.g., gives the synonyms *utpanna (skyes pa)*⁶ and *prādurbhūta* or *prajāta*⁷ (for *byuñ ba*), while Devendrabuddhi-Śākyamati also give *-jāta* with a corresponding Tibetan *'khrūns pa*.⁸

Important as it is for fundamental Buddhist reasons, that the attribute includes the notion that the Buddha "has become" or "developed to be" a *pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*, the essential meaning of the term definitely is, that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition.⁹ Nowhere, however, is the Buddha called a *tshad ma'i skyes bu* (Skt. **pramāṇapuruṣa*) in the relevant Indian texts.¹⁰ Neither do the Tibetans use that term when explaining Dignāga's benedictory verse, but they keep to the correct form of the attribute *tshad mar gyur pa*.

⁴ For an explanation of the verse, its meaning and the interpretation of the terms involved cf. Hattori M.: Dignāga, *On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 23f. and 74ff.

⁵ Hattori, *loc.cit.* 74, explains: "'to have come into existence' (*bhūta*) as a 'means of valid cognition' (*pramāṇa*)" and translates p.23: "who is the personification of the means of cognition." The explanation of the compound as a kind of *dvandva* (*pramāṇañ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇabhūtaḥ*, E.Steinkellner, *Some Sanskrit-Fragments of Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī. A Corpus of Indian Studies - Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri*, Calcutta 1980, 100: fragment 1) has exegetical purpose mainly.

⁶ Fragment 1, E.Steinkellner, *loc.cit.*, 100.

⁷ Cf. E.Steinkellner, *loc.cit.*, n.16.

⁸ Devendrabuddhi's *pratīka* in Śākyamati's *PTV II*, fragment 4 (Cf. Steinkellner, *Philological Remarks on Śākyamati's Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. In *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus - Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, Wiesbaden 1980, 290) and *PVT*_t 86b4.

⁹ Cf. Dharmakīrti's *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān* (*PV II*, 9a).

¹⁰ D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought. Some Problems and Perspectives*, 1967, 17 referring to Vetter's contribution mentioned below, gives the term *pramāṇapuruṣa* in explanatory brackets, but only retranslates it from the Tibetan (personal communication of Sept.14th, 1981).

Should we then consider the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* just to be a sloppy and more or less unintentional substantivation of the original adjective? Or is there more behind this seemingly clear and harmless term? I think that its immediate context and a survey of the history of the Buddhist attitude towards its own epistemological tradition clearly indicate that this term has been created by somebody who was fully aware of what he wanted to express by it.

At another occasion I dealt with the various modern misconceptions regarding the problem of the development of a seemingly irreligious tradition of epistemology and logic within the context of Buddhism.^{10a} The spiritual place of this tradition in Indian Buddhism has been clearly identified by Vetter in his study of 1964, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti* (31ff.), and we need not deal with his results here in detail. Suffice it to state, that the Buddhist philosophers and scholars whose work represent about 700 years of the tradition in India, did certainly not consider their work as a secular, non-religious occupation, but as a necessary part of their kind of Buddhist belief, or - in traditional words - as a part of the path.

This self-interpretation of the school centers around Dignāga's benedictory verse mentioned above, and then particularly on the second chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* which is a lengthy commentary on just this verse and carries the title *pramāṇasiddhi* ("Establishment of the means of valid cognition"). But although there has been a great emphasis on this chapter within the school itself until its final stage in India, and when most of its works had already been translated into Tibetan, it seems that the Tibetans understood the import of that tradition at its surface value only when in the 12th and 13th century they began to incorporate the school's tenets and problems into their own spiritual and cultural life. According to all that we know of this first strictly speaking Tibetan period of the school's history - and we do not know very much due to insufficient materials available and only a few studies having been done so far¹¹ - the Tibetans seemed to consider the tradition of epistemology and logic as a branch of the secular sciences, together with grammar, poetics and others.

^{10a} The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism. *Nanto Bukkyō* 49, 1982, 1-18.

¹¹ For some recent remarks of relevance cf. L.W.J. van der Kuijp, Introductory Notes to the *Pramānavārttika* Based on Tibetan Sources. *The Tibet Journal* 4:2, 1979, 6-10. Cf. also D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The Life of Buston rinpoche*, Roma 1966, 37f. (n.1).

This attitude towards the *pramāṇa*-tradition is reflected in the fact that the early Tibetan scholars who started to give their own interpretations and explanations of Dharmakīrti's works, evidently concentrated on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* - it may of course also be considered as the result of this fact. Before the Sa skya Paṇḍita's revision of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s translation in the beginning of the 13th century it is indeed difficult to imagine that the study of the then available Tibetan translation would make much decent sense, and van der Kuijp even thinks with good reasons, that Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) did not know the *Pramāṇavārttika* at all.¹² But the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* does not deal with the religious aspects of the *pramāṇa*-theory, and it is quite uncertain whether on the basis of the study of such material, these early Tibetan scholars were in a position to be aware of the problem.¹³

According to a note in g'zön nu dpal's (1392-1481) *Deb ther shon po* (BA 335), the spread of the *Pramāṇavārttika* was due to the Pañchen and his pupil U yug pa Rigs pa'i seṅ ge (middle of the 13th cent.). And that the shift of interest from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* to the *Pramāṇavārttika* took place gradually, and was generally accepted only towards the beginning of the 15th century, can be taken from g'zön nu dpal's words: "In my younger days the inmates of gSañ-phu used to study the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, but now-a-days they have changed over to the *Pramāṇavārttika*." (BA 335). Since the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is a perfectly clear and well-organized text, in fact a much maturer work of Dharmakīrti's than the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and as such quite sufficient to represent Dharmakīrti's teachings on epistemology and logic, the reason for the shift of interest to the *Pramāṇavārttika* can only lie in the latter text's, especially its second chapter's, substantial and essential discussion of the foundation of valid cognition, and thus of the Buddhist meaning of epistemology in general.

¹² L.W.J. van der Kuijp, Phya-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory. *JIPh* 5, 1978, 357.

¹³ L.W.J. van der Kuijp, who dealt with this question in his Introductory Notes ... (cf. n. 11), 6ff., mentions a number of scholars with a positive approach towards a possible religious significance of the *pramāṇa*-tradition: Sa skya mchog ldan (1428-1507), Bo doñ pa chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451), bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554) and finally 'Jam dbyaṅs b'zad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1721/22). There are differences among these scholars as to how the relation between the *tshad ma*-theory and the Buddhist path is accounted for, but for the very idea itself that there is such a relation, all these scholars are certainly indebted to the early dGe lugs pas and their possible predecessor(s).

It is Tsoñ kha pa who still states in his *mDun legs ma*,¹⁴ a kind of autobiography, that "there are many in Tibet, learned and unlearned in the *tshad ma*-texts, who unanimously say that in the Sūtra (i.e. the *PS*) and in all the Seven Treatises (of Dharmakīrti) there is no (spiritual) stage to internalize (*ñams len*) for proceeding towards enlightenment."¹⁵ But he continues, claiming that there exists a decisive clue to the function of the *tshad ma*-tradition with regard to the Buddhist path.¹⁶ For he says that "the meaning of the benedictory verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as an establishment of the means of valid cognition (*tshad ma grub par = pramāṇasiddhi*) is the establishment forwards and backwards (*lugs 'byuñ lugs ldog*)¹⁷ of the Venerable one as the means of valid cognition for those who strive for liberation!"¹⁸

Both Obermiller and Wayman, who previously referred to these lines, misunderstood the exact connotation particularly of the words "forwards and backwards" (*lugs 'byuñ = anuloma, lugs ldog = pratiloma*). Tsoñ kha pa's disciple rGyal tshab, however, gives in his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* (f.4b4-5a1 = p.14,15-16,5) a short sequence of four proofs that establish forwards (*lugs 'byuñ*) that the Venerable is a means of valid cognition. And then, f.5a1-4 (=p.16,5-17,3) he gives a sequence of three proofs that establish backwards (*lugs ldog*) how we can know that he is of such kind.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ed. and transl. by A.Wayman, Observations on Translations from the Classical Tibetan Language into European Languages. *IIJ* 14, 1972, 175-185.

¹⁵ | *byañ phyogs 'di na tshad ma'i gzuñ lugs la || sbyañs dañ ma sbyañs du ma mgrin gcig tu || mdo dañ sde bdun kun la byañ chub tu | bgrod pa'i ñams len rim pa yod min zer ||* (Wayman, *loc.cit.* 180; also translated in Matsumoto Shirō, sTag tshañ pa no Tsoñ kha pa hihan ni tsuite. *Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies* 28, 1982, 12).

¹⁶ Wayman, *loc.cit.* 180f.: the same passage referring to the *pramāṇa*-tradition has already been interpreted by E.Obermiller, Tsoñ-kha-pa le Pandit. *MCB* 3, 1934-35, 334f.

¹⁷ This has been misunderstood by both, Obermiller and Wayman. The former thought that *lugs 'byuñ lugs ldog gis* meant "par la méthode positive et négative (*anvayavyatireka*)", the latter translates "by the forward and the reverse order (of Dependent Origination), proving logically" and adds in a footnote that "Tsoñ-kha-pa refers here to the contemplation of dependent origination as *idaṃpratyayatā*, 'state of having this as its condition (for arising)'."

¹⁸ | *tshad ma kun las btus pa'i mchod brjod don || tshad ma grub par lugs 'byuñ lugs ldog gis || rnam grol don du gñer ba bcom ldan 'das || tshad mar bsgrub śiñ ... ||* (Wayman, *loc.cit.* 181)

¹⁹ Page-references are to the new Indian edition, Vāraṇāsi 1969. Also in Tsoñ kha pa - rGyal tshab's *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ* 5b5ff. the two ways of explaining "forwards and backwards" are directly applied to the first half of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s benedictory verse, always of course with reference to Dharmakīrti's elaboration in the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Cf. also mKhas grub rje's *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* 3a3-5 and 3b6ff.

It is not necessary to show these two chains of proofs in detail. Suffice it to realize that these proofs are closely connected with the structure of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s second chapter - they are in fact a logical formulation of the essential ideas of this chapter. That such a concise formulation is possible only after a careful analysis and a scrupulous knowledge of the details of the basic text need hardly be pointed out. In other words, if Tsoṅ kha pa in his autobiography uses these methodological terms, he refers to a very complex summary of the essential arguments of the second chapter based on a careful analysis of this text. This, however, is not the result of his own work, it can only be attributed to scholars who worked on the *Pramāṇavārttika* before Tsoṅ kha pa and evidently found the latter's approval. The two methodological terms and the corresponding steps of the proofs are mentioned, in fact, already by an Indian exegetical school, since they appear in Vibhūticandra's "notes".²⁰

Once the religious significance of the theory of valid cognition has been accepted - with all its corollaries, "down" to the art of disputation -, the question remains still why the dGe lugs pas talk of the Buddha as a *tshad ma'i skyes bu*.

The term itself suggests that it is related to the terminology of the "three (kinds of) persons" (*skyes bu gsum*) as it is known from the beginning of Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* (vv.3-5), and then in the whole *lam rim*-literature which later follows this text.

These three kinds of persons are: "the inferior or lesser" (*chuñ nu, tha ma*), who pursues his own objectives in the pleasures of this world; "the mediocre or middling" (*'briñ ba*), who turns away from worldly pleasures and sinful actions, pursuing his own quiescence; and finally "the superior" (*mchog pa*) who pursues the cessation of suffering for the other beings because of his own experience of suffering.²¹

Indeed in his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* rGyal tshab devotes a whole introductory division, the second (2b5-4a5), to - and these are the words of this heading (*sa bcad*) - "the way how the stages of the path of the three (kinds of) persons are indicated directly and indirectly"²² in the *Pramāṇa-Śāstra*, particularly the *Pramāṇavārttika*. rGyal tshab takes pains in showing especially how the lowest kind of person has been referred to,

²⁰ PVV, Appendix, 521, 5-13. Cf. Kimura Toshihiko, *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi-sho ni tsuite. Tōhoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshū 2*, 1970, 54-68 (64ff.)

²¹ Cf. *Bodhipathapradīpa. Ein Lehrgedicht des Atiśa in der tibetischen Überlieferung.* Hrsg. v.H.Eimer, Wiesbaden 1978, 104ff.

²² *skyes bu gsum gyi lam gyi rim pa dños śugs la ji.ltar 'phañs pa'i tshul (Tshad ma'i lam khrid 1b4 and 2b5).*

since according to him it is the "middling" who is specially meant in the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and "when reference is to the person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*), who promotes this (middling person), the stages of the path of the superior (person) are being taught."²³

In this chapter rGyal tshab, therefore, not only identifies the *tshad ma'i skyes bu* with the *skyes bu 'chen po*, but clearly displays a keen interest in showing that and how the teachings of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are in accord with the religious "anthropology" of the *lam rim*-theory. He even refers in the beginning²⁴ of this chapter to a discussion on whether the inferior person was only implied by meaning (*don gyis 'phañs pa*) or was actually taught (*dños su bstan par*) in the course of argumentation.

There are also other indications that the purpose of this whole division is to reconcile the *tshad ma*-tradition with the *lam rim*-tradition. E.g. when rGyal tshab feels that he has to deal with the question, where in the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti teaches the "selflessness of the phenomena" (*chos kyi bdag med*), and why he does not teach it in the second chapter.²⁵ The general character of this whole division is not explanatory - as is the rest of the text -, but clearly apologetic. But why? There is only one reason for such an attitude, and that is that the idea brought forward is still a rather new one, and a not generally accepted one.

The apparent sign of the new system to combine the *tshad-ma*-tradition with the path-theory seems to be the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu*. In its unspectacular and seemingly traditional form it is the result of a flash of genius. The simple compound word, indeed, symbolically combines two cultural traditions inherited from India and separately dealt with for a considerable period. Not only does it indicate thereby that the level of understanding has been reached in Tibet too, on which the Indian *pramāṇa*-tradition interpreted itself originally, it also shows that finally the theoretical frame was found to give the strong rational tendencies in Tibetan Buddhism a natural place within the practice of the path.

As a final question we may ask whether it is possible to determine, who first propounded this new theory of the *tshad ma*-teachings as being a part of the path or - as we could call it in agreement with a title to be found with rGyal tshab as well as with mKhas grub - this theory of a "*tshad ma'i lam*"?

²³ *de rjes su 'dzin pa'i tshad ma'i skyes bu'i dbañ du byas nas chen po'i lam rim bstan ciñ ... (loc.cit. 2b6f.)*

²⁴ *loc.cit. 2b5f.*

²⁵ *loc.cit. 4a2-4.*

rGyal tshab in the postscript to his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* mentions Red mda' ba, Blo bzañ grags pa and Kun dga' dpal - in this sequence - as the ones he feels obliged to with regard to the tenets presented. Kun dga' dpal is known as one of rGyal tshab's teachers.²⁶ Whether he is the same as Ña dpon Kun dga' dpal,²⁷ who is mentioned as the author of a *Prajñā-pāramitā*-commentary and Red mda' ba's and Tsoñ kha pa's teacher in this subject, I cannot say. I found no hint in the biographical literature that would relate this Kun dga' dpal to *tshad ma*-studies. Quite clear, however, seems to be that Red mda' ba g'zön nu blo gros' (1349-1412) played an important role in shaping the major theoretical ideas of Tsoñ kha pa and his pupil rGyal tshab. Only eight years senior to Tsoñ kha pa he is not only in high esteem as Tsoñ kha pa's teacher in two subjects, *dBu ma* and *Tshad ma*,²⁸ he is also considered as one of his two most important (*gtso bo*) teachers.²⁹

G.Tucci has already inferred from biographical statements and the allusions of Tsoñ kha pa's disciples that "it appears that he developed and gave greater depth to ideas already elaborated by a great master, at whose school he had his training: g'zön nu blo gros of Red mda'".³⁰ This assumption can only be corroborated by the possible conclusions from the context of the *tshad ma*-tradition. Tucci notes (*loc.cit.* 120) that the exegetical tradition which "acknowledges Logic as a fundamental part of Religion" begins with Kumāramati, i.e. g'zön nu blo gros, but in his note he only refers to Stcherbatsky's meagre remarks on p.46 of his *Buddhist Logic I*. As far as I can see, no further sources of such knowledge are indicated - evidently the circle of scholars around Stcherbatsky, particularly Vostrikov and Baradijn, had access to oral or other information.

I have no reasons to doubt that this information is correct. My reasons are: It is evident that Tsoñ kha pa is not the creator of the "*tshad ma'i lam*"-system. If Red mda' ba had no part in its development, Tsoñ kha pa's disciples would not have acknowledged such a part. The shift from studying the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* to studying the *Pramāṇavārttika* is attested by the *Deb ther shon po* for the first half of the 15th century. Red mda' ba wrote at least three works of relevance.³¹ And finally - Tsoñ kha pa

²⁶ R.Kaschewsky, *Das Leben des lamaistischen Heiligen Tsongkhapa Blo-bzañ-grags-pa (1357-1419), dargestellt und erläutert anhand seiner Vita "Quellort allen Glücks"*. 1.Teil, Wiesbaden 1971, 216.

²⁷ R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24, 83.; G.Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, Roma 1949, 119.

²⁸ R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24, 83f., 86, 88f.

²⁹ R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24.

³⁰ Tucci, *loc.cit.* 118f.

also studied U yug pa's commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, with special emphasis on the second chapter, as noted by one biography.³² U yug pa Rigs pa'i señ ge, the pupil of the Sa skya Paṇḍita, seems to have written the first Tibetan commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the middle of the 13th century, but there is nowhere a hint to be found, that Tsoñ kha pa, besides studying it, has been particularly influenced by this explanation, which almost certainly must have been written in the secularistic mode generally attributed to the earlier Sa skya pas.

Of course, such cumulative evidence would be superfluous if only we had access to one of Red mda' ba's *tshad ma*-works. It is one of the odd features of the Tibetan literary history that most of the works of one of their supposedly important and perhaps original minds are lost or forgotten, although he has been truly esteemed by the founder of the dGe lugs pa-tradition and his immediate disciples, and although as Tsoñ kha pa's teacher and friend he has been always highly venerated - at least verbally - by this tradition until today.

The following three *tshad ma*-works of Red mda' ba are known from A khu Rinpoche's *Tho-yig*. Nr.11820: *rNam 'grel gyi spyi don* ("The general meaning of the *Pramāṇavārttika*"), Nr.11822: *rNam 'grel tikk, Rigs pa'i 'dod 'jo* ("*Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā, Wishing Cow of arguments*"), and Nr.11821: *rNam 'grel rgyan gyi 'grel bśad chen mo* ("*Great subcommentary on the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*"), i.e. Prajñākaragupta's commentary which is famous for its elaborate development of the theme of the second chapter.

None of these works seems to be extant nowadays, although not everything Red mda' ba wrote is lost. His commentaries on the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, on the *Catuḥśataka*, and on the *Suhṛllekha* were recently published in India.³³ Could it be that other texts of this important Tibetan master and evidently original thinker have been kept in Sa skya pa circles? Let us hope that these works of Red mda' ba are not irretrievably lost, and will eventually be recovered and published.

Non est in verbo, quod non est in cogitatione!

³¹ The three are mentioned as rare works in the *Tho yig* of the A khu Rinpoche (Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature*, New Delhi 1963, Vol.3) as Nrs. 11820-22; Cf. below.

³² R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.*, 86f.; the text mentioned there is a *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bśad rigs mdzod* which is probably no mistake as Kaschewsky thinks (note 102), but rather the same as A khu rin po che's Nr. 11814, *rNam 'grel rigs mdzod chen mo*.

³³ *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad de kho na ñid gsal ba'i sgron ma* reproduced from an example of the sDe-dge xylographic print by Ngawang Topgay, Delhi 1974. *dBu ma bži brgya pa'i 'grel pa*. Sakya Student's Union, Sarnath 1974. *bśes pa'i spris yig gi 'grel pa don gsal*. Tibetan Foundation Press, Darjeeling 1960.

Abbreviations

- PV* *Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971-72, 1-206
- PVT* *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śakyamati)
- PVT_t* *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, Tibetan translation: Peking Edition Nr.5718
- PVV* *Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ*. Ed. R.Sāṅkrtyāyana, Patna 1938-1940
- BA* George N.Roerich, *The Blue Annals*. Calcutta 1949, 1953

Postscript: János Szerb reminds me of the fact that Bu ston's teacher bSod nams mgon was also called Tshad ma'i skyes bu according to sGra tshad pa's biography which was completed in 1366 (cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The Life of Bu ston Rin po che*. Roma 1966, 70, 74, 146). This would qualify my attempt to pin down a first propounding of the new theory to Red mda' ba who was born only in 1349.

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