1. In the first paragraph of his Manubhāṣya (henceforth = Bhāṣya)1 on Manu (= M.) 1.5,2 Medhātithi (= Me.) deals with a fundamental objection raised, or which at least could be raised, against not just this verse, but rather against almost the whole of the first adhyāya:

"Where3 were [the arrows]4 shot off and where5 did they fall down? That [Manu], who after having been asked [to expound] the dharmas as taught in the śāstra6 promised that he would expound them and nothing else [viz. in the preceding verse], [now gives] a description of the world in its undifferentiated7 state does not fit into the context and does not serve the purpose of attaining the goal(s) of man.8 The well-known proverb9 'Being questioned about mangoes he acquaints [one] with the kovidāra10 (trees)’ is [evidently] true (i.e. its truth is shown by Manu’s procedure). And with regard to this subject (i.e. the description of the world in its undifferentiated state) [this śāstra/this text/there] is no authority/valid means of cognition, nor is any purpose [served by it]. Therefore the whole of this [first] adhyāya need not be studied [at all]."11

The first two arguments (irrelevancy to the subject under discussion and lack of significance for the puruṣārthas) of the opponent are refuted by Me. in the immediately following, i.e. second, paragraph; Me. states that this adhyāya as a whole is meant to make one realize that this śāstra serves on the contrary a highly important purpose, viz. the complete knowledge of the nature of dharma, the cause of unsurpassable superiority, as also of adharma, its opposite, and he refers to M. 1.4912 and 12.23 (the latter verse he even quotes in full), in order to substantiate his contention that "the [various] conditions [of living beings in the course of their migration] in the cycle of rebirths beginning with Brahmān down to the vegetable kingdom13 are caused/brought about by dharma and adharma".14 Finally he makes, with palpable emphasis, the counterstatement which the reader already expects, viz. that it is the purport of the first adhyāya to show that this śāstra has, quite the contrary, by all means to be studied.15

Since Me., as a rule, observes the yathāsamlkhyā-principle in his stylized discussion, his readers expect him now to turn to the third
argument, the alleged lack of a pramāṇa/pramāṇa(s). And in fact the third paragraph starts with the laconic statement: ...mūlam tv atra mantraṁ rthavādāḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca, “the (epistemological) basis for this, however, are mantras and arthavāda(s) [in the śrutis] as well as the sāmānyato dṛṣṭam [type of inference]”. The meaning in which the expression pramāṇa was used by the opponent is thus conveniently explained, and at the same time the relevant means of cognition are determined as classifiable as śabda and anumāna. As for the first of them, Me. illustrates only the category mantra, viz. by quoting RV 10.129.317 – which, however, closely resembles an arthavāda –, yet not without adding a detailed paraphrase and interpretation of this rc.18

This is followed by a paragraph introduced by the statement “by an [inference of the type called] sāmānyato dṛṣṭa the possibility of the universal dissolution is also proved” (sāmānyato dṛṣṭena mahāpralayo 'pi19 sambhāvyate). This is clearly meant to resume what was already said at the very beginning of this paragraph, viz. mūlam tv atra mantraṁ rthavādāḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca;20 a bit disturbing, however, is the position of the api – one would rather expect to find it after dṛṣṭena – as is the predicate sambhāvyate, with regard to which one wonders whether Jha’s translation really captures its meaning.

Me. goes on to explain:21 “(1) For, that which is found to be destroyed in one part is also found to be destroyed in its entirety, e.g. at one time a [single] house is found to be burning, at another time the entire village is burning. (2) And all such things as are produced by an agent/creator – such e.g. as houses, palaces and the like – are liable to destruction. (3) And this world, consisting of rivers, oceans, mountains, etc. is the work of an agent/creator. (4) Hence it follows (sambhāvyate) that, like a house, etc., it will come to destruction. If it is argued that the fact [of the world] being the work of an agent/creator is itself not [yet] established (siddhā) [then this is not right] because this [fact] also is established (sādhyate) by the fact that [the world] has, like a house and such things, a particular shape. This and similar [logical operations constitute] the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa [inference upon which the statements in the present verse are based].”22

It may appear tempting to regard the expressions siddhā and sādhyate as contextual explanations of sambhāvyate (used twice in the part of this passage preceding them). But the causative of sam-vbhū cannot simply, i.e. without any evidence, be taken to have among others also the meaning “to bring about [in terms of right cognition]”; on the contrary, it must be used, by Me. too, in the well-known meaning “to make [something] possible, to let [something] appear as possible/[a
cognition] as correct”. That is to say Jha’s translation (“the possibility of... is proved”) is indeed unobjectionable, although it remains to be seen whether it is the possibility of the existence of an external object that is denoted or else the possibility of the validity of an epistemological operation. Conversely, siddhā and sādhya have, in their turn, to be interpreted in the light of the initial, and governing, sambhāvyate; or, to be more precise, one has to take into consideration that both expressions are used in the opponent’s objection and its refutation.

It is equally clear that the use of the future tense naksyati has nothing to do with the particular class of inference explained here by Me., but is employed only due to the temporal relation between the event of universal dissolution and the present time. An attempt has been made by Jha to bring the logical structure into relief by adding after sentence (1) within parenthesis the remark “this is the Major Premise”, after the second (i.e. (2)) “this is the second step in the inferential process”, after the third (i.e. (3)) “this is the third step” and, finally, after the last (i.e. (4)) “this is the final conclusion”.

2. Yet, Me. does not rest content with making clear the epistemological foundation of the cosmogony as expounded in the first adhyāya of M., or with illustrating the corresponding two means of valid cognition, but also explicitly justifies the casualness of this his explanation. For he goes on to say:

“And we do not [here] make an endeavour either to [show] that the [said] means of cognition are free from defects, or to criticize them, because the [present] śāstra (i.e. the Manusmṛti and my work) does not aim at this [subject] (i.e. the discussion of pramāṇas) in general; for this (i.e. the validity of the pramāṇas) is not properly determined until it has been reflected upon and examined; and if all this were done, [my work] would be a tarkaśāstra and not [any longer] a dharmaśāstra, and it would [also] by force become too prolix.”

Even though Me. expresses himself in such a manner that one wonders whether he refers to the particular proofs he himself has adduced, or to sabda and sāmānyato drṣṭam (anumānam) in general, or to both, his additional clarification cannot be denied a high degree of persuasiveness: The implicit claim that he would be capable of himself carrying out the necessary philosophical examination is credible. On the other hand, the reader will share with me the feeling of regret that Me. refused to compromise and did not at least outline his own ideas about the two means of valid cognition at issue here. For, is it not very likely indeed that he himself has carried out this critical examination?
In compensation, as it were, of this decision, the second part of his commentary on M. 1.5, i.e. that in which the words of the mūla themselves are finally explained, contains additional information on anumāna which has to be noted by all means. The predicate avijñeyam of the verse is commented upon thus: sarvaprakāram anumānam niṣedhati / na sāmānyato drṣṭam anumānam asti tadrūpakāvedakam31 na viśeṣato drṣṭam, ataś cāvijñeyam / (I 9.16f), “[by the next attribute, avijñeya] he (i.e. M.) denies [the use] of any kind of inference [with regard to the form/shape/appearance of the world at this cosmogonical moment]: [what he has in mind is that] there is no sāmānyato drṣṭa inference that would inform [us] about its form/shape/appearance nor any viśeṣato drṣṭa inference, and therefore it is [characterized by M.] as being ‘incognizable’.”32 Me. almost immediately afterwards adds that this attribute means that it “cannot be cognized by [those] means of valid cognition which have limited, i.e. differentiated, [entities] as their objects “(ataś cāvijñeyam avacchedaviṣayaih pramānaiḥ)” (I.9.19f.).33 The question as to the appropriate means of cognition was forseen by Me., for he continues (I 9.20): āgamāt tadrśād eva gamyate, a clause rendered by Jha as follows: “That this is its condition is known from the scriptures which also are as transcendental in their character as the ante-natal condition of the World”. Indeed, gamyate cannot here have the meaning “is inferred”,34 but quite clearly refers to a different method of cognition. The subject can indeed only be the same as that of avijñeyam itself, viz. idam of M. 1.5; therefore, Jha’s explanatory paraphrase is acceptable. But what about the qualification tadrśād (eva) (the function of the particle being patent)? Does it really, as assumed by Jha, refer to the epistemological, and ontological, status of the āgama, and not rather to its contents (“only because of such ‘scriptures’ (i.e. passages like that quoted by Me. in the preceding sentences, viz. ChU 6.2.1 f.) this (i.e. the world in this particular condition, i.e. before the creation of differentiated things) is known”)? Jha does not adduce any reason for his decision or point out a parallel. In my opinion, the term āgama itself is clear by itself and does not call for any qualification; in view of the extraordinary manifoldness of the information found in Vedic texts it is, however, useful, if not necessary, to determine the type of statements in the āgama which serve as valid means of cognition in this particular case. The āgama is the only pramāṇa from which knowledge about things beyond the scope of the other means of valid cognition can be acquired (the operation of which latter is distinguished from that of āgama and denoted by vi-jñā).35
My interpretation is, I think, confirmed by the subsequent part of Me.'s commentary on M. 1.5, viz. his explanation of the drśṭānta “as if merged in deep sleep” (prasuptam iva):36 “just as the ātman, in the condition of deep sleep, remains free from [all] conscious thoughts and all defilements, while all conceptualizations have vanished —, and yet it cannot be said to be non-existent because it is in fact recognized by [the sleeping person] on waking [in that he says to himself] 'I slept soundly', in the same manner the world [in this particular cosmological state] is determined [as similar to the ātman in the condition of deep sleep, i.e. as not non-existent, etc.] with the help of (the) āgama (i.e. corresponding passages in authoritative texts) which consists of something [epistemologically already] established37 and [in addition], by (the) logicians, with the help of [various] inferences [all of] which [in reality, however] are [but] fallacies.”38

Me. cannot be denied absolute consistency when he denounces as “fallacies” (ābhāsānumāna) the inferences of certain logicians who want to prove by way of them the “world [in this particular cosmological state]”: with regard to an object which is not only beyond perception “because all products-of-transformation which are by their nature differentiated [things]/particulars39 have been dissolved in prakṛti” but which can also not be cognized by an inference because “there is not a characteristic mark, as this [latter] too is dissolved because all products-of-transformation which consist of particulars have been destroyed”,40 the only potential source of reliable information, the only pramāṇa left, is indeed śabda!

Now, there cannot be any doubt that the particular state of the world referred to is that of the mahāpralaya.41 And this finally makes fully understandable why Me. used, in the preceding passage(s), the causative sambhāvayati. In his view an inference such as that mentioned by him by way of illustration is in fact not possible. That is to say, sambhāvayati, although it literally means “to make possible”, here almost amounts to “to try in vain to make something appear as plausible”.42 It thus clearly expresses a criticism; the question, however, is whether the criticism is directed against this particular inference, and similar ones, because of the lack of a liṅga — or against the class of inferences called by Me. sāmānyato drṣṭa as such. In the sentence quoted just now (na sāmānyato drṣṭam anumāṇam asti tadrūpakāvedakam na viśeṣato drṣṭam), Me. expresses himself in such a manner that the possibility of a principal refusal can safely be precluded. And in view of the fact that this sentence is evidently meant to explain that immediately preceding it (sarvaprakāram anumāṇam niṣedhati), it is similarly more
than probable that Me. refers to a theory of anumāna characterized, at least among other things, by the dichotomy of višeṣato drṣṭa and sāmānyato drṣṭa.

3. Before following this trail further and attempting to identify this theory of inference, it is necessary to look for more examples in the Bhāṣya. Fortunately there is a tool, viz. the indices compiled by Jha; however even though they cover the complete Bhāṣya they can hardly be regarded as absolutely reliable. Nevertheless, that is practically all I can lean on as I have not yet been able to go through the whole of Me.’s commentary in order exhaustively to collect all the passages where he refers to anumāna.

Apart from the references to the Bhāṣya on M. 1.5, Jha’s indices do not, however, provide information which one could not also find by just looking up all verses of the Smṛti itself in which the word anumāna occurs.

3.1. The first of these verses is, if one keeps to the sequence of the Smṛti, M. 8.44. What is noteworthy in Me.’s Bhāṣya is, firstly, his explanation that “by an inference the king should determine the [real] cause of the law-suit with regard to something that is [by its nature] beyond perception or something that is not perceived [although by its nature perceptible]” (... rājānumānena parokṣe pratyakṣe vārthakāraniṁ niścīnuyāt) and, secondly, his remark that “inference is repeated [here]”, although it has already been taught, “in order to emphasize the point (lit. for the purpose of the firmness of remembrance)” (uktasyāpy anumānāsyā punarvacanam smṛtidaṁdrśhyārthaṁ).

According to Jha this is a – veiled – reference to Me. 8.3. I don’t find this acceptable, even though in the Bhāṣya on this verse the first half of M. 8.44 is quoted. What Me. refers to is rather M. 8.25:

bāhyair vibhāvayed liṅgair
bhāvam antargatam nrṇām /
svaравāneṅgitākāraīś
cakṣuṣā ceṣṭītena ca ll.

It is true that the term anumāna is not used by Manu in this verse. But in its place we have the almost equally unequivocal notion of liṅga; in addition there cannot be any doubt and there is in fact unanimity among the commentators and translators that what the verse is about is the truthfulness or otherwise of the litigants and of the witnesses. And this is precisely what Me. states at the very beginning of his Bhāṣya
on 8.25: “What the verse means is that the veracity or untruthfulness of the two litigants and of the witnesses should be found out by means of inference also (i.e. not only by other means of cognition such as perception)”⁵² (anumāṇenāpi satyāṇṛtavāditā vyavahārataḥ⁵³ sākṣīnāṁ ca niścetavā yitī⁵⁴ slokārthāḥ). After clarifying that the expressions “voice” (svara) etc., in M. 8.25, are therefore only used by way of illustration (ataḥ ca svarādigrahaṇāṁ pradarśanārtham), he draws the conclusion: “What results [from this verse] is therefore that he (i.e. the king) should ascertain [the veracity or otherwise] by all that which is a sure liṅga, but not only by the voice etc., because these latter are [sometimes] fallacious” (tenā yan niścitaliṅgāṁ tenaiva paricchidyād ity uktam bhavati na punah svarādibhir eva savyabhicāritvāt teṣām).

The reasons Me. adduces for the possibility of vyabhicāra are quite remarkable, because they throw further light on his acquaintance with and views on logic: They testify to the experienced and prudent jurist he quite clearly is, a scholar who cannot by any means be accused of naive unworldliness: anucitasabhāpravesā hi mahāprakṛtikarṣanena satyakāriṇo 'pi svabhāvato vikriyante / pragalbhās tu sāmyvṛtākāra bhavanti, “for persons who are not used to appear in an assembly in court naturally get flurried when they see great men such as a king, minister, etc.,⁵⁵ even though they speak the truth⁵⁶ (i.e. they exhibit external signs that a judge would in the case of other persons interpret as pointing to the fact that they don’t speak the truth); but those that are sharp⁵⁷ manage to hide their real feelings (i.e. even though not speaking the truth don’t show any of the external signs).”

In Me.’s view only such liṅgas, logical reasons, are conclusive which are anavyabhicārin. Not only a truism, but also trite an observation, in terms of the history of Indian logic.

3.2. The second, and last, of the verses in which the term anumāna occurs, viz. M. 12.105⁵⁸ is comparatively clear by itself. That part of Me.’s Bhāṣya, however, which contains his explanation of the term anumāna, is unfortunately quite corrupt. It reads as follows:

evam anumānam api suvivecitam na bhāratādigrantraprāmāṇopalakaṃṣaṇavāc ca / tena sauryādīśāstrāṅe keśavyātāsiddhiḥ / yena na vivecitam hy anumānam sa paksāvipaṣaṇyor darsanādarsanāmaḥānānumānapravṛtti manvāno vede 'pi kartāraṃ kalpayet / yadā tu nipunamātir bhavati tattatprajyakasya snātavyalakṣaṇaṃ tasya karttvasyavakaṇṭasyābhāvād apauruṣeyatvatam adhyavasyati ।

Jha avoided the difficulties by simply not addressing them, i.e. by not translating those phrases or sentences which he did not understand – albeit without indicating the gaps in his translations by a series
of dots or another mark. I, too, have no idea how to emend this passage, except for *sa pakṣavipaksayor*, in the place of which I propose to read *sa sapakṣavipaksayor*, and the last sentence which I should like to restore tentatively – I know that I am daring – as follows: *yadā tu nipunamatir bhavati tattatprayojakasya parvālocanayā (?) or anumānasya vilakṣaṇatayā (?) tasya kārtrīvakāraṇasyābhāvād apauruṣeyatvam adhyavasyati.*

Those parts which I think I understand could be translated thus: “Similarly inference should also be [carefully], examined . . . For [a man] by whom inference has not been examined might construct an author for the Veda also in that he could be of the opinion that an inference can be made just because [the logical nexus] is there in a *sapakṣa* or a *vipaksā*. But when he develops the [necessary] knowledge by properly reflecting on [the logical reason] which cogently proves this or that [*probandum*], [then] he correctly concludes that [the Veda] is not the work of an author because there is no reason [that would cogently prove] that [a person] is its author.”

The passage deserves attention of course insofar as it, too, is evidence of Me.’s – to all appearances general – attitude towards *anumāna*: He almost emphatically cautions his readers against falling prey to various fallacies, false inferences which do not lead to valid cognition in that they do not meet all the logical exigencies. This attitude is similar to that of Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and Śāṅkara, but Me. seems to base his criticism on the theory of *anumāna* rather than on axiomatic ideas about the hierarchical relation between the Veda (as highest authority) and (human) inferential reasoning, – although he, too, is aware of the possibility of a contradiction between *tarka* and *veda*, and surely does not regard the former as valid in such cases.

3.3. One might add that *tarka* is, of course, one of the other keywords that have to be taken into account in the context of the present essay. In fact what Me. has to say on *tarkena* in M. 12.106 is important for his conception of and attitude towards *anumāna*, although it is certainly also noteworthy with regard to the notion *tarka* itself. For he paraphrases it with *anumānāntareṇa yuktaḥ* and then adds the explanation *tarka uḥāpoḥāntaryasyasiddhiḥ / idam atra yuktam uḥitum idam aposhitum / – which is followed by an example, viz. the mantra TS 1.4.12 (devasya tvā savituh prasave ’śvinor bāhubhyām pūśno hastābhyyām agnaye tvā juśtam nirvapāmi), from which “the word agni has to be removed because its meaning is not fitting” (agnipadasyārthāsamavāyād aposah)
in order to be replaced “by the word sūrya” (sūryapadasya ca kṣepah), if the mantra is to be used in an ritual offering to God Sūrya.

This looks as if Me. thought of the ritualistic-technical meaning of āha and apoha only; but the paraphrase of tarkeṇa by anumānāntaraṇa yuktā quite clearly shows that this is not the case – i.e. that Me. did not entirely misunderstand M. 12.106, and that he rather took the term tarka as being used by Manu in its, in fact well-known, meaning of “(methodical) reasoning, process of reflection” (literally: “turning something to and fro in one’s mind”). Yet one cannot but wonder why at all he gives this ritualistic-technical explanation of āha and apoha; for, this is evidently not what Manu had in mind, it is – so it seems – inappropriate because the change, or rather adaption, of mantras has no connection with determining or applying the dharma; a further piece of evidence is the fact that apoha is not a term used elsewhere with reference to the process of changing a mantra so as to be suitable for another sacrifice.

Another problem is created by the second member of the compound anumānāntaraṇa; Jha’s translation (“by ratiocination – by means of inference”) is – again – such that it does not reveal how he understood the words of the text; and Jha also does not take into account the expression āntaryā of the compound ūhāpohāntaryasiddhiḥ (of the next sentence), even though one hesitates to separate it from āntara. This latter compound, however, cannot be correct, since tarka itself never leads (directly) to siddhi.66 That is to say, I fully agree with Preisendanz67 who regards this compound as corrupt and proposes the emendation ūhāpohasamarthabuddhiḥ referring to Govindarāja’s and Nandana’s explanations of tarkin in M. 12.111. I find this emendation very plausible indeed because āha and apoha as used here by Me. are among the prajñāgunas “intellectual capacity” enumerated in the Kauṭiliya Arthaśāstra (6.1.5),68 viz. śuṣrūṣā, śravaṇa, grahaṇa, dhāraṇa, vijñāna, ūha, apoha, tattvābhiniveṣa.

That tarka can be used as a generic term for āha and apoha as denotations of particular prajñāgunas is indeed pausable, even though I am not able to point out other examples except for Me. on M. 12.111 (anumānādi kuśalāḥ tarky ayam ūhāpohabuddhiyuktah). The close phraseological connection between ūha and apoha, in its turn, is clearly attested in Mbh. 13.133.43b and 134.27b; and this connection together with the context in which ūhāpohaviśārada69 is used at the two places in the Epic is by itself already sufficient evidence that ūha cannot in this case mean “modification of a mantra”. It has rather the meaning saṃdasyānuktasya liṅgenāvagatiḥ, or jñātasyārthasyopapattiparicintanam and apoha that
of \textit{yuktyapetasya hānam} or \textit{duṣṭapaksaparityāgah}, as explained by Ganapati Śāstrī in his own commentary on \textit{AŚ} 1.5.5 and 6.1.5, respectively.

Śāstrī's explanations are not based on the – only – old commentary available on this part of the \textit{AŚ}, viz. that written in Malayalam, which does not give any information worth noting;\textsuperscript{70} Śāstrī apparently got his inspiration from \textit{AŚ} 15.1.69(f.), i.e. the definition of the \textit{tantrayuktī uḥya},\textsuperscript{71} and from NS 1.1.40, as regards \textit{uḥa}; the source of his paraphrase of \textit{apoha} could be Hemacandra's \textit{Abhidhānacintāmaṇī} (2.225)\textsuperscript{72} where it is explained by \textit{asatpaksānirākaraṇam}. That \textit{apoha} = “negative reasoning”,\textsuperscript{73} i.e. “the removal, i.e. rejection of an idea by reasoning”, is attested only very rarely in older sources, may have to do with the fact that \textit{uḥa} developed a broader meaning which practically includes that of \textit{apoha}, and became thus a synonym/one of the synonyms of \textit{tarka}, as is shown e.g. by NS 1.1.40 as well as GautDhS 19. (= 2.2.)23: \textit{nyāyādhigame tarko 'bhyupāyah}.\textsuperscript{74}

Now, Śāstrī's first paraphrase of \textit{uḥa}, viz. \textit{śabdasyānuktasya liṅgenāvagatih}, in which \textit{liṅga} should be taken to mean “(characteristic) mark, indicative (factor)”, is not at all far removed from what I call the ritualistic-technical meaning of this expression, viz. “modification of a \textit{mantra}”; for this in fact consists basically in the replacement of an undesirable element of a \textit{mantra} by another element which is not itself used in the \textit{mantra}, i.e. is \textit{anukta}. Seen against this background one wonders whether Me.’s, at first sight strange, illustration of the process called \textit{uḥa} and \textit{apoha}, referred to above (p. 11 f.), could perhaps eventually be aimed at intimating that their two terminological meanings, i.e. the ritualistic one and the philosophical one, are closely related to each other: In both cases something is removed or rejected and something else moved in or accepted.

Returning to Me.’s Bhāṣya on M. 12.106 I propose for \textit{anumāṇāntareṇa yuktyā} the translation “by a kind\textsuperscript{75} of \textit{anumāṇa} (i.e. something similar to, but not admissible as a member of the category ‘\textit{anumāṇa}’), i.e. by a process of reasoning/arguing [which paves the way for an \textit{anumāṇa} proper]”. And, following Preisendanz, I suppose that Me. defines \textit{tarka} as “a mental activity/intellectual process capable of positive and negative reasoning (i.e. of finding out something new, not expressly stated in a textual authority, and of rejecting something else as not tenable).”

\textbf{3.4.}\ The predicate \textit{apratarkyam} of M. 12.29,\textsuperscript{76} however, is explained by Me. by simply stating: \textit{tad anumāṇāṅgocaram} (II 463.26).\textsuperscript{77} This is
indeed not a case with regard to which one will consider a meaning related to that of the technical term *tarka* (i.e. generic term of the *prajñāguṇas uha* and *апoha*).

**3.5.** The verse M. 2.11\textsuperscript{78} by itself clearly shows that the expression *hetuśāstra*\textsuperscript{8} cannot but have been used pejoratively. And as is to be expected, Me. indeed explains it as *nāstikaśāstraṃ bauddhacārvākādiśāstraṃ yatra vedo 'dharmāyeti punaḥ punar udghuṣyate,\textsuperscript{79} tādṛśaṃ tarkam āśritya yo 'vajñāṃ kuryāt śrutaṃ śrutau smṛtau ca / (I 72.12–14).

It is not only that he subsequently uses also the synonym *tarkaśāstra* that one is reminded of his Bhāṣya on M.12.106; for in the second part of it Me. reports the interpretation of “others” (*anye tu vyācakṣate I 484.17*) according to whom “what is denoted by ‘tarkena’ [of M. 2.106] are texts/works of which reasoning forms the main subject and which aim at setting forth the ordinary worldly means of cognition [such as] works on Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Lokāyata” (*tarkeneti tarkapradhānā granthā laukikapramāṇaniruṣpanaparā nyāyavaiśeṣikalokāyatikā ucyante*) (II 484.17). But he immediately afterwards adds the clarification that “among these, those which are inconsistent with the Veda, [i.e.] the texts/works of the Baudhas, Lokāyatikas, Nirgranthas, etc. are rejected; they are inconsistent with the Veda\textsuperscript{80} [since] in them the Veda is not recognized as a valid means of cognition and authority, while it is recognized by Kapila, Kaṇāda [and Akṣapāda]” (*tatra vedaviruddhāni bauddhalokāyatikanaigranthadhādini paryudasyante / tāni vedaviruddhāni / na tatra pramāṇam vedah / kapilakaṇādakriyā\textsuperscript{81} mavirathātāṅgahāntadīśu hi śabdaḥ pramāṇam*) (II 484.18–20) and that “these [latter] śāstras should be carefully listened to [and studied]” (*... atas tāni śastrāni śrotavyāṇīti ca*)\textsuperscript{82} (II 484.22). Not surprisingly, for Me., too, the ultimate criterion for deciding whether a philosophical tradition at all deserves a Brahmin’s attention is its acceptance or otherwise of the *prāmāṇya* of the Veda, or of *śabda* as a valid means of cognition. The expression *tarka*, however, applied to *śāstras* of either class, is in itself no guarantee for their ‘orthodoxy’ or else ‘heterodoxy’.

**3.6.** In a passage of the Bhāṣya (on M. 2.6) touched upon by me elsewhere\textsuperscript{83} Me. explains, and in some detail at that, why it cannot be maintained that Manu and the other Śrāvikāras perceived the *dharmas*:\textsuperscript{84} *indriyair arthānāṃ sannikarṣe yaj jñāṇaṃ tat pratyakṣam / na ca dharmasyendriyaiḥ sannikarṣaḥ sambhavati tasya (i.e. dharmasya)*
kartavyatārsvabhāvāt / asiddham ca kartavyam / siddhavastuvīśayaś ca sannikarṣah / anumānādīni\(^{85}\) tadātve yady apy asantam artham avagamayanti ("... even though they make one cognize an object which does not exist at that particular point in time") pipīlikāndasaṅcāreṇa hi bhaviṣyatīṃ vr̥tim anumāte tathāpi na tehhyāḥ kartavyatāvagatiḥ / (I 63.5–9). Does Me. refer here to the Nyāyabhaṣya on NS 2.1.35 and 36, or what is his source? And what is even more important: Does the fact that Me. uses the 3. prs. plural (anumāte) indicate that he himself regards such an inference as problematic?

3.7. Almost in passing only it may be noted that at one place, viz. in the Bhāṣya on M. 2.16, Me. uses the expression sāmānyāto 'numānam.\(^{86}\) Yet this has nothing to do with the term sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam (anumānam), and is meant to characterize a particular (Vedic) injunction which can be inferred as a general one.

4. Of the many and different problems involved by the Bhāṣya passages presented in the foregoing there is one only that I am able to pursue a little further, viz. that of the origin of Me.'s distinction between viśeṣato dr̥ṣṭam and sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam anumānam. These terms are met with for the first time in the history of Indian logic\(^{87}\) in Vārṣaganyā's Śaṣṭitāntra\(^{88}\) and may very well also have been coined by this famous Śaṃkhya philosopher. But apart from their designations the difference between these two classes of inferences as viewed by Vārṣaganyā has nothing to do with the dichotomy referred to by Me. It is true that Me. does not define the former, or give an illustration of it; but quite the reverse holds good for sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam (anumānam), and it is hence highly probable, to put it not too strongly, that viśeṣato dr̥ṣṭam refers to a form of inductive conclusion,\(^{89}\) and not, so it seems, to the inference of an object previously already cognized by perception.\(^{90}\) Is Me.'s dichotomy therefore identical with that drawn by Praśastapāda between dr̥ṣṭam and sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam [anumānam]? Perhaps, that is to say, this possibility has certainly to be carefully examined, but the lack of a full terminological correspondence does not speak in favour of it. Besides there is another alternative, which suggests itself even earlier in view of the fact that, Me.'s knowledge and recognition of the Vaiśeṣika\(^{91}\) apart, it is the Pūrvamīmāṃsā to which he mainly shows allegiance, philosophically, conceptually and methodologically.\(^{92}\)
NOTES

* My thanks are due to Anne MacDonald, a Ph.D. student in Indian philosophy at our Institute, for correcting my English with great competence and remarkable sensitivity.

1 The edition used is that published by Jha 1932; that of Dave 1972–1985 has been compared.

2 In numbering verses of the Manusmṛti I follow the NSP-edition (Bombay 1946). As for the interpretation of the first sentence, I disagree with Jha 1920–1926: "Where we began and whereto we are carried!"; even if all Jha wished to do was to give a free paraphrase, I do not find his rendering acceptable.

3 The predicates, in my view, most smoothly fit to something which is discharged or hurled, most probably a weapon.

4 The well-known construction (cf. Speijer 1886: 322) of the repeated interrogative kva (which lives on in NIA languages) is, here, too, clearly meant to express an extraordinarily big difference, an utter discrepancy, – between what is announced by Manu and what he now does – which is similar to the large distance between the place of the archer, and the target hit by his arrow.

5 I think the text has to be emended here: sāstroktadharman instead of sāstroktanipatitadharman, "nipatita" by mistake being carried over from the preceding clause.

6 On vyā-vṛk see Thieme 1981.

7 I take apuruṣārtham ca to stand for apuruṣārthārtham ca; cf. Me. on M. 1.1 and Wezler 1998a.

8 Note that this proverb does not belong to those dealt with by Hopkins 1887 and Pischel 1893.


10 kva astāḥ kva nipatītaḥ / sāstroktanipatitadharman prṣṭās tān eva vaktavyataya pratiśnāya jāgato 'vyākṛtavasthāvarnam aprakṛtam apuruṣārtham ca / so 'yam satyō janapravādah 'āmrān prṣṭaḥ kovidārān acāśta' itī / na cāsmin vāstuni pramāṇam nā ca prayojanam ity atāḥ sarva evāyam adhyāyo nādhyetavyah / (I 8.5–8). – Note that I quote the text of the Bhāṣya as printed in Jha 1932.


12 Jha's (1920–1926) "inanimate objects" for sthāvara is hardly just a misprint for "immovable living beings"! Note, however, that Me. explains sthāvaram of M. 1.40 with vrksaparvatādi.

13 Jha's translation of the compound dharmādharmanimitthā(ḥ) with "as forming the basis of Dharma and Adharma" is clearly wrong; it cannot but be a bahuvrhi qualifying "gatayo".

14 ucyate / sāstrasya mahāpryājnatvam anena sarvena pratipādyate / brahmādyāḥ sthāvaraparyantāḥ samsāragatayo dharmādharmanimitthā atra pratipādyante / 'tamasā bahurūpeṇa veṣṭītaḥ karmahetuṇeti' (slo. 49) / vakṣyati ca – 'etā dṛṣṭvā tu jīvasya gatiḥ svetavi cetasā / dharmatā 'dharmataś caiva dharme dadhyāt sadā manaḥ iti' (a's 12 slo. 23) / tatas ca nirātisayaisvaryaḥhet dharmas tadviparītaṁ cādharmas tādṛśaparijñānārtham idam sāstraṁ mahāpryājanaṁ adhyetavyam ity adhyāyatāparyam / (I 8.9–14). – In terms of the history of ideas it is quite remarkable that Me. does not think of any other explanation for the fact that most of the first adhyāya is devoted to cosmogony.

15 On māla cf. also Wezler 1998b.

16 Note that Sāyaṇa (who, by the way, reads tucchena instead of tucchyena) in his commentary on this Rgvedic verse quotes M. 1.5.

17 Indology does not seem to have properly appreciated that there exist a long
series of explanations and interpretations of individual Vedic passages beyond the commentaries, i.e. seems to have neglected the tradition of vedārtha, the claim of Hindu recipients of the Veda to understand its meaning.

19 Cf. also the very last sentence of the Bhāṣya on M. 1.5, viz. sarvato naikadesāpralaya ity arthaḥ (I 9.25).

20 Cf. above p. 2.

21 I by and large follow Jha 1920–1926 here.

22 This is to say, I agree with Jha 1920–1926 that kvacid must have a temporal meaning at this point; cf. the subsequent kadācit.

23 sāmānyato drṣṭena mahāpralayo ’pi saṃbhāvyate / yaśya hy ekadeśe nāśo drṣṭas tasya sarvasvāpi nāśo drṣyate / yathā sālāpi kvacid dahiyaṁanā drṣṭa kadācit sarvo grāmo dahiye / ye ca kartṛpūrvaḥ bhāvās te sarve vinaśvarā grhaprāśadādayaḥ / kartṛpūrvam cedam jagatsaritsamudrasaśālādyātyātmakam / ato ghṛādivan nakṣyatīti saṃbhāvyate / kartṛpūrvaatva na siddhīti cet tannivesavīśeṣavattvādānaṁ ghṛādivat sāpi sādhyata ityādi sāmānyato drṣṭam / (I 8.27–9.2).

24 His translation – of the second saṃbhāvyate – “it follows that”, however, has to be replaced by “it is possible that”.

25 There is some likelihood that when an author speaks of a/the (mahā-)pralaya he generally has in mind a future event.

26 On which see Hacker 1959 and 1961.

27 Note that sūddhi – of M. 12.105 – is explained by Me. as vivaranāṃ pūrvapakṣanirākaraṇena niścitāsiddhāntavyavasthāpanam (II 484.16f.).

28 I do not think that Jha’s 1920–1926 rendering of taddūṣane va by “or at refuting (the counter-arguments)” is correct.

29 na ca pramāṇasuddhau taddūsane va prayatāmahe ’nidamparattvāc chāstrasya / etad dhi yāvam na vicārya nirāpitam tāvan na samyag avadhāryate / tathānirūpane ca tarkāsāstratā śayan na dharmaśāstratā granthavistaraś ca prasajyate (read: prasajyeta?) (I 9.3–5).

30 I personally regard this latter alternative as more probable because the examination of e.g. a particular inference almost inevitably leads to addressing questions of principal importance connected with this pramāṇa as such.

31 Read, of course, tadrūpāvedakam ("rūpakā" being due to a kind of dittography).

32 Jha 1920–1926 apparently regards these two sentences as part of the explanation of the preceding attribute apratarkyaṃ. This – as well as his translation – does not stand a critical examination.

33 The qualification “those” is necessary because one cannot know of something if no means of cognition can ever operate with regard to it.

34 Birvé’s (1964: 371 n. 14) criticism of Scharfe (1961: 78) is convincing, but I don’t agree with him that the meaning of ganyate everywhere in the Mahābhāṣya, not to speak of other Śāstric texts, is “is inferred, cognized by conclusion”.

35 Cf. Bhāṣya I 9.24: āsid iti / vartamāṇa ("as something presently occurring") tu sāvasthā na kasyacat vijñeyaty ata uktam avijñeyam /.

36 In Dave 1972: 16 this pratikā – as also sarvato at the end of the Bhāṣya on 1.5 – is not marked off in bold type from the rest of the text.

37 Jha 1920–1926 renders āgamat siddhāṭhatarūpād abhāśānumānebhyās ca tarkīkānām avasīyate with “as is shown by the scriptures that describe things as they have actually existed, and also proved, for those who depend upon reasonings, by what appear to be sound inferences”! I wish only to refer to parallels, viz. na ca sābdaṛśer (what is meant is the Manusmṛti, not the Veda) siddhāsabuddhāsāṣeṇāyāṃ vṛttavagatiḥ saṃbhavati and, from the Bhāṣya on 8.3. (na ca smṛt eva pramāṇaḥkālāṇī yuktā l) na hi vyavadārasmrīd vedamūḥ Śākyate vaktum siddhāṭhāpuṭvāt pratyakṣaḥdṛṣṭyavagamyavatvāj jayaparājayaprakārāṇām (II 76.26–28). Cf. also I 6.27
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f.: tad uktam 'sādhye 'rthe vedaḥ pramāṇaḥ, na siddhārūpe' / arthavādānām hi siddhārūpo 'rthāh / na hi tadarthaśa kartavyaśā pratyaye l. — Henceforth I refrain from expressly stating that I disagree with Jha 1920–1926.

38 prasuptam ita jāgratśvapnavattām parityajya samprasādāvasthā susuṣṭār dṛṣṭāntatvenopātta l yathā ayam ātmā suṣuṣṭyavasthāyām niḥsambodhāklesapradhavastāśeṣavikalpa āste, na ca nāstīti śākyate vaktum, prabuddhaśa sukham avāśpam iti pratyabhīṣānādārśaṇāt, evam jagad āgāmāt siddhārtharūpād ābhāsānumānebhīṣa ca tārkikāṇām avasīyate l (I 9.20–24).

39 Read viśeṣasvabhāvānāṃ vikārāṇāṃ.

40 viśeṣaṇām svabhāvānāṃ vikārāṇāṃ prakṛtāv upalayanād atāḥ pratyakṣenajñātām / anumānāt tarhi jñāyate, tad api nālakṣanām (i.e. tad api na: alakṣanām l) lakṣanām lingam cihnam, tad api tasyāṃ avasthāyām pralīnām eva, sarvavikārāṇāṃ viśeṣātmanā viṇaṣṭatvāt l (I 9.12–15).

41 Cf. also the last sentence in the Bhāṣya on M. 1.5 quoted in n. 19 above.

42 Cf. e.g., from the Bhāṣya on 12.105, jvālādiśu ca pratyakṣena kṣayam dṛṣṭvā śabde 'pi tathā sambhāvayet ... (II 484.21 f.).


44 Jha (1920–1926, indices) fails to refer to M. 12.105.

45 yathā nayaty āṣṭρ̥ptaśiḥ
    mṛgyasya mṛgayuḥ padam /
    nayet tathānumāṇena
dharmasya nrpatīḥ padam //.

Regarding the meaning of √ni as used in this verse, see the Large Petrograd Dictionary, 4th part, p. 267 (“12 etwas herausbringen, hinter Etwas kommen, feststellen”).

46 That is to say, I assume that pratyakṣe is to be interpreted as 'pratyakṣe. Kulluā however explains the last line as follows: ...tathānumāṇena dṛṣṭapramāṇena vā dharmasya tatvam niścīnyāt l. Should the text of the Bhāṣya be emended to anumāṇena parokṣe pratyakṣe vā pratyakṣena?


48 Which reads thus:

pratyaham desadṛṣṭaiṣ ca
śāstradṛṣṭaiṣ ca hetubhiḥ l
āṣṭādaśasu mārgese
nibaddhāni prthak prthak //.

49 Cf. e.g. Me.'s explanation of hetubhīr (of 8.3): hetur nīrṇayasyādhanam l sa ca dvividhā / pramāṇarūpo vyavasthārūpaś ca l tatra pramāṇarūpo 'rthaniṛṇayahetuḥ sāksyādiḥ / ... (II 73.20fs).

50 Viz. II 74,5 f.

51 Read vyavaharatoh, and cf. the expression vivādisākṣyādīnām (II 83.22).

52 Or does api mean "and" here?

53 Cf. n. 50.

54 It should be remembered that I follow the orthography of the edition (of Jha 1932).

55 I am not sure that my interpretation of mahāprakṛti is correct; I do not know of any other occurrence of this expression.

56 The expression is, in my opinion, clear evidence of Alsdorf's (oral) interpretation of satyakriyā (P. saccakiriyā) as "speaking the truth/act of speaking the truth".
The expression *pragālīha* is found in the Arthaśāstra in the enumeration of the *amāryasampat* (1.9.11) as well as in that of the *ātmasampat* (6.1.6); it is also one of the qualities of a particular type of secret agents (1.11.2).

It reads thus:

pratyakṣaṁ cānumānaṁ ca
śāstraṁ ca vividhāgamam /
trayaṁ suviditaṁ kāryam
dharmaśuddhīṁ abhīṣatā ///

What is Me. here talking about: the inclusion – by implication – of the other means of valid knowledge recognized by the Mīmāṃśā, i.e. upamāna and arthaṇāppati (cf. Kullāka on M. 12.106), or, rather, the difference between the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda and the *pauruṣeyatva* of “the Mahābhārata and similar texts” (cf. e.g. Nyāyamaṇjarī, ed. by Varadacharya, Vol. I p. 575 ff. and Nyāyakumudacandra ed. Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya p. 726 f.)?

Add kāryam / kartavyam after suvivecitam, in accordance with the verse.


Cf. Bhāṣya on 12.106 where this possibility is however already presupposed by Manu himself; cf. n. 63.

It reads as follows:

ārṣaṁ dharmaṃ padeśaṁ ca
vedaśāstra-virodhīna /
yat tarkanānaṃ sadhetate
sa dharmaṃ veda netaraḥ ///

The rest of this sentence is: nirūgayati sa dharmaṃ vedetī padayojanaṁ /.

Not, as maintained by Jha 1920–1926, VajS 2.11!

Cf. Oberhammer-Prets-Prandstetter 1991–1996 s.v. ūhā. In passing it may be noted that the passage from the Nyāyabhāṣya quoted first at the end of the article is not that translated by the authors, that the translation is demonstrably wrong and that it is the reading found in the (in reality translated) version quoted last which clearly has to be preferred (cf. e.g. Nyāyamaṇjarī (ed. Varadacharya) Vol. II p. 584.19 ff.) – I thank Ms. Preisendanz for this information. – The translation of the definition of ūha as found at Saṅkhāyana Śrāuta Sūtra 6.1.3, which is given in the first paragraph of the article on ūha, is also not acceptable, even though the authors may have been misled by Caland (1953: 141).

Reference is to a lecture which she gave at Hamburg University and which will be published, perhaps still this year in: Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Erkenntnistheorie der Religion. Weiterbildendes Studium Universitāt Hamburg, ed. by Klaus Glashoff.

Cf. also AŚ 1.5.5.

The occurrence of ūha in the Suśruta S. referred to in the Large Petrograd Dictionary, viz. 2.44.18 = Cikitsāsth. 5.29, for which Böhlingk gives the meaning “Erschliessung”, actually confirms the semantic explanation of Gaṇapati Śastri: Dalhana also paraphrases it by asrūtasya kalpanā.

My thanks are due to Mr. Narayan Rāmachandran for rendering me assistance in consulting this commentary.

It reads as follows: anuktakaranaṁ ūhyam. The example quoted thereafter (15.1.70) is AŚ 3.16.5 (yathā ca dātā pratīgraḥitā ca nopahatau syātām tathānusayaṁ kuśalāḥ kalpayeyuḥ) (cf. 3.15.99). Cf. also Oberhammer-Prets-Prandstetter 1991/96 s.v. ūhyam.

Or any other work in which the AŚ’s theory of prajñāgūnas was received. Note that the wording is slightly different in the Abhidhānacintāmaṇi.
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73 Quoted from Apte 1978.
74 Cf. also sūtra 24: tenābhyyāya yathāsthānam gamayet. It is tempting to interpret the expression nyāyādhiyamaṇa as nyāyenādhiyamaṇa, “attaining [the truth] methodically”, but the juridical meaning of nyāya has to be given its due (here, too).
75 Cf. the Critical Pali Dictionary s.v. antara.
76 Which reads thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
yat \text{ tu syān mohasamyuktam} \\
avyaktaṃ viṣayātmakam \text{ /} \\
apratarkyaṃ avijñeyam \text{ /} \\
tamas tad upadhārayet \text{ /}
\end{align*}
\]

77 The edition has anumānagocaram, but Jha translates as though he read, or (rightly) silently emended the text to, anumānāgocaram.
78 Which reads thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
yo 'vamanyeta te māle \\
hetūśāstrāśrayāt dvijāḥ \text{ /} \\
sa sādhubbhir bahiśkāryo \\
nāstikō vedanindakah \text{ /}
\end{align*}
\]
as for the dual (māle) see verse 2.10 (śrutī and smṛti).
79 Note that Me. assumes that the blasphemous statement is repeated, and “proclaimed aloud”, so that any error on the part of the listener can safely be excluded.
80 Why does Me. repeat the statement vedaviruddhāni? For the sake of emphasis? Or is the text corrupt here?
81 One expects ākṣapāda to be mentioned, too, because Me. subsequently quotes Nyāyasūtra (i.e. “Ākṣapādasūtra”) 1.1.3 (II 484.20 f.) – whereas, in the Bhāṣya on 1.7, he introduces the quotation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.16 with tathā ca vaisēśikāh (I 10.17). Should we read ākṣapādaviracitagrānthādīṣu? The hi is also problematic.
82 I do not know how to explain the ca here.
83 Wezler 1998a.
84 As for the use of the plural, see Wezler 1998b.
85 This is added as a parenthesis by Me.
86 The passage reads as follows: ucyate / yāni kānicāna śastra-pratipādikāni vākyāni na tāni śūdṛṇādhyyayāni śakyaṃ sāmānyato 'numānām / yāni vedavākyāni yāni tadarthavyākhyānavākyāni vyākhyaśīlin tātpratrāpakaṇi tāny api pravāhanītyatayā nityāny eva /
87 For the justification of the application of this term see Nenninger 1992: 7–11.
91 See p. 15 above (Me. subsequently, i.e. II 484.21, quotes Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.3), as also the Bhāṣya on 1.78 (tathā cāh vaiśeṣika 'kṣitāv eva gandhā' iti) regarding which see Praśastapādabhāṣya on gandha.
92 To be continued.

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