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MĪMĀMSĀ VERSUS VAIŚEŚIKA

Pārthasārathi and Kumārila on the Creation and Dissolution of the World*

In a recent publication Peri Sarveswara Sharma (1994: 60) draws attention to a passage in Pārthasārathi Miśra's commentary *Nyāyaratnā-kara* on Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*, where the former, so he claims, summarises the views of Praśastapāda, author of the *Padārthadharma-saṅgraha*, better known as *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Pārthasārathi's passage occurs under verse 66 of the chapter called "Sambandhākṣepaparihāra", and reads as follows¹:

vaiśeṣikās tv āhuḥ: anādir ayaṃ sṛṣṭipralayapravāhaḥ, brāhmanānena varṣasatānte bhagavato maheśvarasya samastajagatsaṃhārecchā bhavati, tadicchāvadīśvarātmasaṃyogāt paramāṇuṣu vibhāgakarmāṇy utpadyante, taiś ca sarveṣu mitho vibhakteṣu yāvad dvyāṇukaṃ sarvāvayavināśād paramāṇava eva kevalāḥ pāṛthivāpyataijasavāyavīyā vyomakāladigātmamanāṃsi cāvatiṣṭhante, dharmādharmāś ca tāvan-taṃ kālam īśvarecchāpratibaddhāḥ phalam aprayacchantas teṣu teṣv ātmasv avatiṣṭhante, punas tāvati kāle gate tasyaiva bhagavataḥ karmopabhogaśūnyān ātmano dṛṣṭvā anukampāparavaśasya sisṛkṣā bhavati, tataḥ sisṛkṣāvadīśvarātmasaṃyogāt paramāṇuṣu karmotpattes tadvaśān mithaḥ saṃyuktais tair dvyāṇukādikrameṇa pṛthivyādaya ārabhyante, tatas tadicchāvaśād evāpagatapratibandhair abhivvyaktasāmarthyair vividhaiḥ karmabhir vividhānekanarapaśvādibhedabhinnaṃ bhūtajātam ārabhyate, tataḥ sa eva maheśvaro dharmādharmapratipādanāya vedān sṛjati | tad evaṃ pratisargam anye 'nye ca vedāḥ, pravāhataḥ tu vedāḥ sṛṣṭipralayāś cānādayaḥ, kartā ca maheśvaro 'nādir eva, iha ca paramāṇūnām upādānatvān nānupādānatvaṃ sṛṣṭer iti |

* I thank Gerdi Gerschheimer for help and advice.

¹ NyR 5.15.66, pp. 465-466.

Pārthasārathi does not say that he here summarises the views of Praśastapāda. It is however true that the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* contains a passage which in its contents is close to the above one. The relevant parts of it read²:

iheḍānīm caturṇām mahābhūtānām sṛṣṭisamhāravividhir ucyate | brāhmaṇa mānena varṣaśatānte [...] maheśvarasya samjīhīrṣāsamakālaṃ śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānām sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛttinirodhe sati maheśvarecchātmānusamyogajakarmabhyah śarīrendriyakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyaḥ tatsamyoganivṛtau teṣām āparamāṇvanto vināśah | tathā pṛthivyudakajvalanapavanānām api mahābhūtānām anenaiva krameṇottarasminn uttarasmin sati pūrvasya pūrvasya vināśah | tataḥ pravibhaktāḥ paramāṇavo 'vatiṣṭhante dharmādharmasamskāraṇuviddhāś cātmānas tāvantam eva kālam | tataḥ punaḥ prāṇinām bhogabhūṭaye maheśvarasirṣṣānantaram sarvātmagatavṛttilabdha-dṛṣṭāpekṣebhyaḥ tatsamyogebhyaḥ pavanaparamāṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣām parasparasamyogebhyo dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇa mahān vāyuh samutpann[ah] etc.

There can be no doubt that Pārthasārathi's account contains much that is also found in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. It even looks as if Pārthasārathi misinterpreted a compound used by Praśastapāda. The latter's passage contains the ambiguous expression *maheśvarecchātmānusamyogajakarmabhyah*. The part *maheśvarecchātmānusamyoga* means, according to the commentators: "the desire of God and contact (or: the contacts) between the souls and the atoms"³. The whole expression *maheśvarecchātmānusamyogajakarma* must therefore mean: "movements arisen from the desire of God and contact between the souls and the atoms". Pārthasārathi's passage, on the other hand, has the phrase *tadicchāvadīśvarātmāsamyogāt paramāṇuṣu vibhāgakarmāṇy utpadyante*: "movements of separation arise in the atoms as a result of contact between God characterised by that desire on the one hand and the souls on the other". It is hard to imagine that such a position was ever held by a Vaiśeṣika. But it is conceivable that this position was ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas as a result of a careless reading of the ambiguous expression *maheśvarecchātmānusamyoga*. Grammatically this could mean "contact between the desire of

² WI pp. 9-10, §§ 57-58.

³ Vy I p. 98, l. 3-4: *maheśvarecchā nimittakāraṇam, ātmanām aṇubhiḥ samyogaś ca asaṃavāyikāraṇam*; Ki p. 62, l. 8: *maheśvarecchayā sahitā ye ātmānusamyogāḥ*; Ny p. 136, l. 9: *maheśvarasyecchā cātmānusamyogāś ceti vighrahaḥ*.

God, the souls, and the atoms". As stated above, such an interpretation does not easily fit into Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

Do we have to conclude from all this that Pārthasārathi here summarises, i.e. reformulates in his own words, the passage from the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*? Or did he have another source, which he perhaps quotes verbatim? It is to be observed that, in spite of the similarities, there are also some important differences between Pārthasārathi's passage and the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. It is known that the Vedāntin Śaṅkara was acquainted with a Vaiśeṣika account of the creation of the world different from that in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, and which most probably belonged to the earlier, but now lost, *Kaṭandī* of Rāvaṇa⁴. Is it possible that Pārthasārathi, too, used that text?

This possibility can be discarded. Rāvaṇa's *Kaṭandī* did, to be sure, contain an account of the creation of the world (and probably one of its destruction), but one in which there was no place for a creator God. Indeed, Śaṅkara criticises it for this very reason. Praśastapāda may have been the first Vaiśeṣika author to introduce the notion of a creator (and destroyer) God.

What about Praśastapāda's *Ṭikā* on the *Kaṭandī*, which has not been preserved either? Is it possible that Pārthasārathi used a Vaiśeṣika account of the creation and destruction of the world which he found in that text? Are the elements recorded by Pārthasārathi that have no parallels in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* to be explained as borrowings from Praśastapāda's *Ṭikā*?

We will see that this too is highly improbable. Pārthasārathi attributes to the Vaiśeṣikas an idea which they are unlikely to have held. It is the idea that God interrupts the workings of karmic retribution at the time of cosmic dissolution, and ends this interruption at the time of renewed creation. We will discuss this point below.

First we consider the following. Pārthasārathi's presentation of the alleged Vaiśeṣika position introduces a passage in the *Ślokaṇvṛttika* in which the notion of a creator God is criticised. It is therefore conceivable that it – or at least the parts that talk about God interrupting karmic retribution – has been composed to fit the verses of Kumārila's text. Soon after this account Pārthasārathi introduces a verse of the *Ślokaṇvṛttika* with the words: "Concerning what has been said to the extent that deeds do not bear fruit because they are interrupted by the desire of God, [Kumārila] says"⁵. And

⁴ Bronkhorst 1996. For information about the *Kaṭandī*, see Bronkhorst 1993.

⁵ NyR p. 466, l. 21: *yat tūktam īśvarecchāpratibaddhatvāt karmāṇi na phalanīti, tatrāha*.

after that same verse he resumes: "But there is no proof that all deeds, without giving result, have been interrupted by the mere desire of God"⁶. May we conclude that already Kumārila ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas the idea that God's mere desire interrupts the working of karma?

This is far from obvious. Kumārila does not mention God's desire, nor indeed anyone else's, in the context of the destruction of the world (which he does not accept). Quite on the contrary, he speaks of a deed (*karman*) of Prajāpati. The verses concerned read as follows⁷:

*pralaye 'pi pramāṇam naḥ sarvocchedātmake na hi |
na ca prayojanam tena syāt prajāpatikarmaṇā || 68 ||
na ca karmavatām yuktā sthitis tadbhogavarjitā |
karmāntaraniruddham hi phalam na syāt kriyāntarāt || 69 ||
sarveṣām tu phalāpetam na sthānam upapadyate |
na cāpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmaṇaḥ phalam || 70 ||
aśeṣakarmanāśe vā punaḥ sṛṣṭir na yujyate |*

This means:

68. For we have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal destruction. And that activity (*karman*) on the part of Prajāpati would serve no purpose.

69. Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity (*karmavat*) would stop without experiencing [the results of] those [activities]; for the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by another activity (*karman*).

70. The coming to a stop of all [beings] without [experiencing] the fruits [of their activities] is not possible. And nor is that absence of experience itself the fruit of any activity (*karman*).

71ab. Alternatively, in case all activities (*karman*) have been destroyed, no new creation is possible.

This passage repeatedly uses the word *karman*, a notoriously difficult term to translate. It means primarily activity, but can also refer to the mechanism that brings about karmic retribution. In the case of Vaiśeṣika this means that *dharma* and *adharma*, or *adr̥ṣṭa*, might conceivably be referred to by this term. It certainly never refers to the desire of God, especially not if, as Pārthasārathi maintains, God's desire interferes with

the process of karmic retribution. Kumārila's text speaks about cosmic dissolution as an activity, most probably an activity of Prajāpati, and there is no reason whatsoever to assume that God's desire played a special role in this event.

This impression is confirmed by the fact that God's desire does enter the picture in Kumārila's then following account of renewed creation. God's desire is here presented, hypothetically, as the cause of karmic retribution, and is indeed contrasted with activity. The verses concerned read⁸:

*karmanām vāpy abhivyaktaḥ kiṃ nimittam tadā bhavet || 71 ||
īśvarecchā yadīyate saiva syāt lokakāraṇam |
īśvarecchāvaśīte hi niṣphalā karmakalpanā || 72 ||
na cānimittayā yuktam utpattum hīśvarecchayā |
yad vā tasyā nimittam yat tad bhūtānām bhaviṣyati || 73 ||*

71cd. Or if [you maintain that] activities manifest themselves [anew at the occasion of a new creation], what would cause this?

72. If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. For it would be pointless to imagine [the efficacy of] actions (*karman*) if [the creation of the world] is controlled by God's desire.

73. Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having itself a cause; or rather, the cause of that [desire] will be the cause [of the creation of] living beings.

God's desire, then, is introduced in the discussion of the creation of the world, but plays no role in its dissolution. Kumārila's opponents rather looked upon the destruction of the world as due to the activity of Prajāpati. There is nothing typically Vaiśeṣika in this part of the discussion.

Pārthasārathi, on the other hand, uses this passage as a pretext to ascribe a certain position to the Vaiśeṣikas. To understand what is at stake, some general reflections are called for.

The notion of a creator God had been introduced into Vaiśeṣika (perhaps by Praśastapāda) for a special reason. It solved a problem which had occupied the thinkers of that school. It answered the question how deeds of living beings can bring about situations that punish or reward them. In other words, it helped to understand the mechanism of karmic retribution. Earlier Vaiśeṣikas had tried to solve this problem differently. They had claimed that deeds and their retributions are linked through the

⁶ NyR p. 466, l. 24-25: *sarvakarmaṇām tu phalam adadatām īśvarecchāmātrena pratibaddhānām avasthānam apramāṇakam iti.*

⁷ ŚIV 5.15.68-71ab.

⁸ ŚIV 5.15.71cd-73.

intermediary of two qualities of the soul, *dharma* and *adharma*. The soul of each living creature being omnipresent and eternal, these qualities could be thought of as acting at a distance, and at a moment of time far removed from the deed that had caused them. However, foresight and conscious design could not be attributed to these qualities. These were rather linked to other qualities of the soul – such as *buddhi* ‘knowledge’ – that are not involved in the mechanism of karmic retribution. How then can these unconscious qualities act as if guided by foresight and conscious design?

The answer proposed by *Prāśastapāda* is simple. They are guided by foresight and conscious design. There is an all-powerful creator God who arranges things in such a way that *dharma* and *adharma* bring about the desired results. The following passage from the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* shows this⁹:

When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg (*mahad aṇḍam*) is formed, caused solely by God’s (*maheśvara*) meditation / volition (*abhidhyāna*), out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth¹⁰. In it [God] creates *Brahmā*, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all worlds (*sarvalokapitāmahaṃ brahmānam*), and all worlds; he then enjoins him with the duty of creating living things. That *Brahmā*, thus enjoined by God, and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and absolute power, **knows the effects of the deeds of living beings**; he creates the *Prajāpatis*, his mind-created (*mānasa*) sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life **in accordance with their [past] deeds**; [he also creates] the *Manus*, *Devas*, *Ṛṣis* and groups of *Pitṛs* (*pitṛgaṇa*), the four *varṇas* out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet (*mukhabāhūrupādātāḥ*) [respectively], and the other living beings, high and low (*uccāvacāni bhūtāni*); he then connects them with *Dharma*,

⁹ WI p. 11, § 59: *evaṃ samutpanneṣu caturṣu mahābhūteṣu maheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt tāijasebhyo ’nubhyaḥ pāṛthivaparamāṇusahitebhyo* (variants: *pāṛthivādiparamāṇusahitebhyo*, *pāṛthivāṇusahitebhyo*) *mahad aṇḍam ārabhyate* (some editions read *utpadyate*) | *tasmīṃś caturvadanakamalaṃ sarvalokapitāmahaṃ* (variant: *caturvadanakamalasakalokapitāmahaṃ*) *brahmānam sakalabhuvanasahitam utpādya prajāśarge viniyunkte* (variant: *niyunkte*) | *sa ca maheśvareṇa viniyukto* (variant: *niyukto*) *brahmā ’tīśayajñānavairāgyaiśvaryaśampannaḥ prāṇinām* (variant: *sarvapraṇinām*) *karmavipākam vīditvā karmānūrūpajñānabhogāyusaḥ sūtān prajāpatīn mānasān manudevapitṛgāṇān* (variant: *manūn deva*) *mukhabāhūrupādātāḥ caturo varṇān anyāni coccāvacāni bhūtāni* (variants: *bhūtāni ca*; *anyāni coccāvacāni ca śṛṣṭvā*) *śṛṣṭvā, āśānūrūpair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryaiḥ saṃyojayati* II.

¹⁰ Atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth constitute, in *Vaiśeṣika*, gold.

knowledge, absence of passion and power **in accordance with their residue of past deeds**.

Other authors of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools confirm the importance of this side of God’s activity. They came to admit that they could not make sense of karmic retribution without assuming an omnipotent God supervising the process¹¹.

Unfortunately for the *Mīmāṃsakas* this solution was not open to them. They were indissolubly linked to the idea that the *Veda* is without beginning (not uttered by God, as the *Vaiśeṣikas* had it), having been continuously handed down in a world which, too, is without beginning, and without periodic destructions and recreations. They did however accept the principle of karmic retribution. But unlike the *Vaiśeṣikas* they had to maintain that karmic retribution can work, and can be understood, without assuming that it is guided by foresight and conscious design.

We now understand why *Pārthasārathi*, instead of presenting the notion of God as a means to explain karmic retribution, depicts it as interfering with it. The period of dissolution of the world, in particular, is described as one in which “*dharma* and *adharma*, not producing an effect because interrupted by the desire of God, remain in their respective souls” (*dharmādharmāś ca ... tīśvareccāpratibaddhāḥ phalam aprayacchantas teṣu teṣv ātmasv avatiṣṭhante*). And the subsequent renewed creation of living beings is made possible by the removal of those restraints: “Then many different living beings, such as humans, animals, etc., are produced by the various deeds (*karman*) whose potencies have become manifest once the interruptions have disappeared due to the power of [God’s] desire [to create]” (*tatas tadicchāvaśād evāpagatapatibandhair abhivyaktasāmarthyair vividhaiḥ karmabhir vividhānekanarapaśvādibhedabhinnaṃ bhūtajātam ārabhyate*). In other words, if only God did not interfere, karmic retribution would pursue its normal course, and there would be no destruction and new creation of the world. This position is attributed to the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The *Mīmāṃsā* position is closely related to this: There is no creator God who interferes, and karmic retribution does pursue its course, not interrupted by destructions and renewed creations of the world.

Do we have to conclude that *Pārthasārathi* made up the position he ascribes to the *Vaiśeṣikas*? The answer must be negative. *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*’s *Nyāyamajjarī* (ca. 900 C.E.)¹² contains some passages that are of interest.

¹¹ See Bronkhorst 2000.

¹² On the date of *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, see Hacker 1951: 162 (112).

First there is a passage that presents a view that is rejected by the critic of the idea of a creator God, and which may therefore represent Jayanta's own position¹³:

atha brāhmaṇa mānena samvatsaraśataniṣṭhām adhiṣṭhati parameṣṭhīni maheśvarasya samjīhīrṣā jāyate | tayā tirohitasvapthalāram-bhaśaktīni karmāṇi sambhavantīti sampadyate sakalabhuvanapralayaḥ | punaś ca tāvaty eva rātriṣṭhāye kālē vyatīte sisṭkṣā bhavati bhagavataḥ | tayā 'bhivyaktaśaktīni karmāṇi kāryam ārabhante iti |

Then, when Brahman supervises the conclusion of hundred Brahman-years, a desire to destroy arises in the Supreme Lord. On account of that [desire] the activities (*karman*) lose the power to bring about their results, and so the dissolution of all worlds comes about. And again, when the same amount of time, which is like the night, has passed, a desire to create arises in the Lord. On account of that [desire to create] the power of the activities manifests itself, and the activities bring about their effect.

Later in the same discussion about God, the *Nyāyamañjarī* refers back to this passage and states¹⁴:

nanu ca yugapad eva sakalajagatpralayakaraṇam anupapannam, avināśinām karmaṇām phalopabhogapratibandhāsambhavād iti coditam | na yuktam etat | īśvarecchāpratibaddhānām karmaṇām stimitaśaktīnām avasthānāt | tadicchāpreritāni karmāṇi phalam ādadhati | tadicchāpratibaddhāni ca tatrodāsate | kasmād evam iti cet | acetanānām cetanānadhiṣṭhītānām svakāryakaraṇānupalabdheḥ |

It has been objected that the simultaneous dissolution of the entire universe is not possible, because it is not possible to obstruct the experiences of their results of the activities (*karman*) which are undestructable. This is not correct. Because the activities are obstructed by God's desire, and their power [to bring about results] is paralysed. Activities that are impelled by His desire bring about results, and those that are obstructed by His desire remain inactive. If [you ask] why it is like this, [the answer is:] because it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their effects.

¹³ NM p. 490/177.

¹⁴ NM p. 510/186.

The final argument – unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, cannot bring about their effects – is not new, as we have seen. To bring about their effects, activities have to be guided by a conscious being; in other words, they have to be impelled by His desire. This idea may be behind the very introduction of God in the Vaiśeṣika system. The present passage expands the idea by adding that God's desire can also obstruct activities; this explains the simultaneous destruction of the entire universe. But this passage does not say that God only obstructs activities, and that without God's interference they would bring about their results just as well. The final remark "it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their effects" proves the opposite. It had to be a *Mīmāṃsaka*; viz. Pārthasārathi, who turned the argument on its head. For him God interferes with the working of karma, and nothing else.

Not all Vaiśeṣikas looked upon God's role as that of interrupting the process of karmic retribution. *Prāśastapāda*, as we have seen, states the opposite. And *Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī*, while commenting *Prāśastapāda's* phrase "when the *adrṣṭas* have stopped their activity" (*adrṣṭānām vṛttinirodhe sati*), explains¹⁵: *pralayahetunādrṣṭena pratibandhe sati* "when there is interruption [of the *adrṣṭas*] on account of the *adrṣṭa* which is the cause of the destruction [of the world]". *Adrṣṭa*, singular or plural, is synonymous with *dharma* and *adharma*, the two qualities that are responsible for karmic retribution. The destruction of the world itself, according to *Udayana*, is due to *dharma* and *adharma*, and not to the interruption of their activity caused by the desire of God.

But even Pārthasārathi himself describes, in his *Śāstradīpikā*, the Vaiśeṣika position in a way which does not differ so blatantly from the texts of that school. (It may here be recalled that the *Śāstradīpikā* was composed before the *Nyāyaratnākara*)¹⁶. We read here (p. 115):

na hi pralaye paramāṇūnām pralayo 'smākam (i.e., vaiśeṣikānām) asti sāmukhyādivat | kāryadravyāni tu dvyaṇukādīni sarvāny eveśvarecchayā viśliṣṭāvayavāni pralīyante, paramāṇavas tu mitho 'samyuktās tiṣṭhanti vyomādayaś ca kṣetrajñāś cātmīyadharmādharmayuktā evāvatiṣṭhante | sargakālē punar īśvarecchām kṣetrajñādrṣṭam ca nimittam āsādyā paramāṇuṣu karmāṇy utpadyante tadvaśāc ca mithaḥ samyuktās catuṣṭaye 'pi paramāṇavo dvyaṇukādikrameṇa yathāśvaṃ prthivyādikam bhūtacatuṣṭayam ārabhante | nimittabhūtakṣetrajñādrṣṭavaici-

¹⁵ Ki p. 62, l. 6-7.

¹⁶ See Ramaswami Sastri 1937.

tryāc ca jarāyujāṇḍajodbhijjasvedajabhinnam. sarīrabhedam īsvarec-
chākāritasamyogaviśeṣāt paramāṇava ārabhante |

For according to us Vaiśeṣikas, unlike the Sāṃkhyas, atoms do not dissolve in the dissolution [of the world]. Composite substances (kāryadravya), on the other hand, that is to say all dyads and [larger objects], dissolve, their parts having been separated by God's desire; but the atoms, without mutual connection, remain, and so do [the omnipresent substances] such as ether, and the souls, the latter accompanied each by their own *dharma* and *adharma*. At the time of a new creation movements arise in the atoms, the cause of which is God's desire as well as the *dharma* and *adharma* (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of the souls; the four kinds of atoms, which by virtue of these [movements] are [now] joined together, form the four elements earth etc., each their own, in the sequence which begins with the dyad. And on account of the variety of *dharma* and *adharma* in the souls, which cause [the process], the atoms, because of the special connections brought about by God's desire, form a variety of bodies, viz. born from the womb, born from an egg, sprouting, and born from perspiration.

* * *

We can conclude that Pārthasārathi in his *Nyāyaratnākara* (but not yet in his *Śāstradīpikā*) brings to light a fundamental difference in attitude between Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika with regard to the mechanism of karmic retribution. The Vaiśeṣikas had come to admit that this mechanism is hard to explain in non-teleological terms, and without assuming a conscious agent in the process. They introduced the notion of a creator God in order to avoid this difficulty. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers were basically confronted with the same problem, but could not accept the Vaiśeṣika solution without fundamentally changing their system. All they could do was ignore the problem, and criticise the notion of a creator God on other grounds. This is what Kumārila does. His commentator Pārthasārathi goes one step further. He depicts the Vaiśeṣika system as not really needing the idea of a creator God. We have seen that in so doing he painted an incorrect picture of that system.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ki	<i>Prasastapādabhāṣya</i> with the commentary <i>Kiraṇāvalī</i> of Udayana.
KISchr	Kleine Schriften (in the series of the Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart.

NM	<i>Nyāyamañjarī</i> of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.
Ny	<i>Nyāyakandalī</i> of Śrīdhara.
NyR	<i>Nyāyaratnākara</i> of Pārthasārathi Miśra (for the edition see ŚIV).
ŚIV	<i>Ślokovārttika</i> of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary <i>Nyāyaratnākara</i> of Pārthasārathi Miśra.
Vy	<i>Vyomavali</i> of Vyomaśiva.
WI	<i>Word Index to the Prasastapādabhāṣya</i> , see Bronkhorst and Ramseier 1994.

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