

The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*

—Text and Translation—

(1) Pūrva-pakṣa

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For a study of the theories and practices of the Brahmanical, as well as the non-Brahmanical, religious schools in India around the fifth century, the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (hereinafter referred to as *MHK*) of Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka (490–570 ca.) and his auto-commentary *Tarkajvālā* (abridged as *TJ*) provide much valuable information. In the following, the Mīmāṃsaka ideas quoted and refuted in Chapter IX: Mīmāṃsā-tattva-nirṇaya-avatāra of *MHK* will be discussed on the basis of the Sanskrit text in collation with the Tibetan version and with reference to the Tibetan *Tarkajvālā*.

The Sanskrit text of the chapter in question was offered to me by Prof. V. V. Gokhale of Poona¹⁾. It is a copy by Prof. Gokhale's own hand-writing from what Rev. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana copied at Śha-lu monastery in Tibet. As to the state of matters when Rāhula made the copy, he described as follows: "From the 5th August to 15th August (1936) we were busy with taking photographs of the important Sanskrit Mss. in Śha-lu-ri-phug. . . . In the meantime, I and Mr. Abhaya Singh were engaged in copying Manorathanandin's commentary (of Pramāṇa-vārttika). I also wanted to copy the *Tarkajvālā*,²⁾ Vighraha-vyāvartanī and Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgādhyāya. I needed more photographic materials for which I sent many letters and telegrams, but I was not sure about their arrival. It was already the middle of August and after one month winter was to begin, so I could not calmly wait. I was very thankful to the custodians of Śha-lu and specially to my friend Ri-sur-lama, who permitted me to take all the four manuscripts with me to Gyan-tse.

Śha-lu monastery is a little more than one mile away from the road Shi-gar-

1) This study is based on the Sanskrit text of the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* offered by Prof. V. V. Gokhale. The present writer remains thankful to Prof. Gokhale's kind guidance at Poona, Oct. 1969—May 1970, at Tokyo, Nov. 1971—Mar. 1972, and to his generous permission for the use and publication of this material.

2) The Sanskrit text that Rāhula mentioned here under the title "Tarkajvālā" is apparently the basic verses of the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*, and not the commentary generally known as *Tarkajvālā*. So far as is known, there is no extant Sanskrit text of the commentary *Tarkajvālā*. From the Tibetan translation, it is known to be in prose and quite big in amount (about 340 leaves in Tibetan).

tse-to-Gyan-tse. On the 16th August we started for Gyan-tse where we arrived by the evening of the 17th. . . .

After receiving the required materials we left Gyan-tse on the 8th September on our way to Shi-gar-tse. The copying of the three Mss. was finished, so we returned them to the custodians on our way back to Shi-gar-tse. The Ms. of the Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya was yet to be finished, so I kept it with me and after copying it, returned it through a Nepalese friend.”¹⁾

The Sanskrit text of the *Tarkajvālā* (*Madhyamaka-hṛdaya*) thus copied by Rev. Sāṃkrtyāyana was ascribed to “Bhagavadviveka”, written in Raṃjana script, with 5 or 6 lines on each leaf, consisting of 24 leaves of the size $22\frac{1}{2} \times 2$ inches, and considered “complete(?)”.²⁾ He also mentioned that it is a “worn out Ms., the page numbers are gone.”³⁾

Its Ninth Chapter begins from p. 21b, and ends on p. 25a of Rev. Sāṃkrtyāyana’s copy. Rev. Sāṃkrtyāyana copied the text (so Prof. Gokhale followed his style faithfully), one Śloka on one line with verse numbers No. 1–No. 148.

When compared with the Tibetan editions of *MHK* (sDe dge bstan ḥgyur *Dsa* 31a–40a, hereinafter referred to as D31a; sNar than bstan ḥgyur *Dsa* 31a–39b; Peking bstan ḥgyur *Dsa* 34a–43a), the Sanskrit text of the Ninth Chapter of *MHK* differs in the following points:

i) The Tibetan verses not found in the Sanskrit text:

Between Verses No. 7 and No. 8, the Tibetan text of *MHK* has one extra verse which cannot be found in the Sanskrit text. What is more, Chapter IX, of the Sanskrit text of *MHK* brought by Rev. Sāṃkrtyāyana counts 148 verses as a whole, whereas the Tibetan text has more than 160(?) verses for this chapter, and there are some parts in the Tibetan text where the usual set-form of a verse with four *padas* is not strictly observed (e.g. D305a1–5). All the verses thus augmented in the Tibetan text of *MHK* are explained in *TJ* as quotations from some other works.

ii) The Sanskrit verses not found in the Tibetan text:

Verses Nos. 2 and 5 of the Sanskrit *MHK* are not found in the Tibetan *MHK*. In the Tibetan *TJ*, however, both of these two verses are translated, not in a verse style, but in prose, and some of their words as *parokṣa*, *adrṣṭa-liṅga-saṃbandha*, *svarga*, *apūrva*, and so on, are elucidated by paraphrases. It is very probable, therefore, that those two verses not found in the Tibetan translation of

1) Rāhula Sāṃkrtyāyana: “Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Mss. in Tibet (with plates)”, in *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 1 (1937, Patna), pp. 1–57.

2) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

3) *Ibid.*, p. 48, note.

MHK are in the original Sanskrit *MHK*.

From the above-mentioned facts i) and ii), we can assume that originally there was the Tibetan translation of *TJ* only and not of *MHK*, and that the Tibetans of some later period extracted only verses from the Tibetan *TJ* and made an independent text of the Tibetan *MHK* out of it. For this reason, the verses quoted in the Tibetan *TJ* are mixed in the Tibetan *MHK* only because they are in verse style and the original verses in the Sanskrit *MHK* are not collected in the Tibetan *MHK* as they are translated in prose style in the Tibetan *TJ*.

Almost all the points that Bhavya quotes in this work as the assertion of the Mīmāṃsakas are reiterated in a similar form and manner, in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (8th century) as the points of controversy between the Buddhist logicians and Kumārila of the Mīmāṃsā School. None of the 17 verses in the Pūrvapakṣa of *MHK*, however, can be actually found either in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* or Kumārila's *Ślokovārtika*.

In Śabarāsvāmin's *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, "śabda-nityatva (ad MS. I, 1, 6-23)", "vākya-artha-prāmāṇya (ad MS. I, 1, 24-26)", and "veda-apauruṣeyatva (ad MS. I, 1, 27-32)" are discussed, but few of its words or of its contexts are shared by Bhavya's 17 verses.

As it has been pointed by Prof. Hajime Nakamura, Verse No. 14 of *MHK* agrees with a few small changes with Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* I, 42. The *Vākyapadīya* (I, 30-42) where this verse is found is noteworthy as it is here that Bhartṛhari sets forth against the so-called logicians (hetu-vādin=tārṅika) who put primary importance on reasoning, his traditionalist standpoint asserting the exclusive authority of the Vedas as the source of knowledge. This part of the *Vākyapadīya* shares in common many words and phrases with the Ninth Chapter of *MHK*, but except for Verse No. 14 no other verses actually agree in these two works.

Abbreviations and marks

RS	Rev. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana
VG	Prof. V. V. Gokhale
<i>MHK</i>	<i>Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā</i>
<i>TJ</i>	<i>Tarkajvālā</i>
D	sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
N	sNar than edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
P	Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
()	Readings or additions by RS
[]	Suggested readings or additions by the present writer

1) Hajime Nakamura: *Kotoba-no Keijijō-gaku* (Metaphysics of Language), in Japanese (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 159-162.

Chapter IX: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts

navamaḥ paricchedaḥ| mīmāṃsā-tattva-nirṇayāvatāraḥ||

[||dbu maḥi sñin po las dpyod paḥi de kho na ñid gtan la dbab pa la ḥjug pa ste
leḥu dgu paḥo||]¹⁾

(D31a7)

(N31a5)

(P34a7)

Verse No. 1:

eke 'pavarga-sanmārga-dhyāna-jñānāpavādinah(|)

|ño tsha med pa kha cig ni| (D31b)byañ grol legs lam bsam gtan dan|

kriyā-mātreṇa tat-prāpti[m] pratipadyānapatrapā[h]||

|śes la skur ḥdebs bya ba tsam| |bdag²⁾ gis de ni ḥthob par sems|

Verse No. 2:

śāstrōkta-vrīhi-paśv-ājya-patnisambandha-karmaṇaḥ|

nānyo mārgo 'pavargāya yukta ity āhur āgamāt||

Verse No. 3:

rāgādi-doṣa-duṣṭatvāt puruṣasya vaco mṛṣā(|)

|chags sogs skyon gyis ñams paḥi phyir| |skyes buḥi (P34b)tshig ni brdsun³⁾ ñid yin|

vedo 'puruṣa-kartṛtvā(t) pramāṇa[m ity gr]hyate||

|rig byed skyes bus ma byas phyir| |des na tshad mar gzuñ bar bya|

1) Supplied from D40a3.

2) N. P. dag

3) N. P. rdun

4) "The Mīmāṃsakas, different from the Vedāntins, are those who hold that what is revealed in the Vedas is self-existent and exclusively true, and who denounce all the right means of deliverance, that is, meditation and learning. By contradicting all the doctrinal expositions, they maintain that deliverance can be attained only by means of sacrificial rites; just like jugglers, they let their students dead to all sense of shame; by forty-eight Saṃskāras they qualify their followers for a Brāhmaṇa. (TJ. D271a)" Then, TJ goes in details to an explanation of the forty-eight Saṃskāras: garbhādhāna (or ceremony to cause conception), pūṃsavana (or ceremony to cause the birth of a male child), simantonnayana (or arranging the parting of the pregnant wife's hair), jātakarman (or ceremony on the birth of the child), nāmakaraṇa (or ceremony of naming the child), annaprāśana (or the first feeding), caula (or tonsure of the head of the child), and so forth. Among the extant *Dharma-śāstras*, only the *Gautama-*

English Translation

Chapter IX: Introduction to the Examination of Truth of the Mīmāṃsā School

Verse No. 1:

Some people are shameless, thinking little of the right means of deliverance, that is, meditation and learning, and asserting to attain it [=deliverance] only by means of sacrificial rites.⁴⁾

Verse No. 2:

On the basis of the scriptural authority, they claim that except for the acts [of oblation] of grain, cattle and clarified butter, or the sexual union at the site of sacrifice as prescribed in the sacred literature, no other means is proper to lead people to deliverance.⁵⁾

Verse No. 3:

As it is contaminated by the defilements of passions and so forth, the human speech is bound to be false. The Veda, which is not produced by the human hands, should be accepted as the authority [of knowledge].⁶⁾

dharma-sūtra has the forty-eight Saṃskāras. (See Kane, P. V.: *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Pt. 1, p. 193) But, when examined carefully, the explanation in *TJ* does not agree with what is in the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* VIII, 14-24 (*ĀnSS*. Edition p. 54; *SBE* Vol. II, p. 213f).

5) This verse cannot be found in the Tibetan *MHK*. *TJ* (D271b5f), however, describes minutely the acts of oblation and sexual union, quoting scriptural authorities: e.g. oblation of grain (*TJ*. D271b6); oblation of cattle (paśu-bandhana, aśva-medha, *TJ*. D271b7; puruṣa-medha, *TJ*. D272a1-2, cf. *Tait. Br.* II, 4, 1); oblation of clarified butter (ājya *TJ*. D272a2); sexual union at the site of sacrifice (patnisambandha, *TJ*. D272a3f, cf. *Chānd. Up.* V, 8, 1; *Śat. Br.* 14, 9, 1; *Bṛh. Up.* VI, 2).

6) "Because men are subjected to passion, (anger), and nescience. This statement tries to prove one thing on the basis of another unconnected thing. For instance, as for the statement: 'On the bank of this river, there grows fruit', in hundred cases this statement is valid, whereas in other hundred cases, this statement is invalid." (*TJ*. D274b5) Translated on the basis of Peking edition (P310b2)

Verse No. 4:

karttur asmarāṇāc cêṣṭo vedo 'puruṣa-kartṛkaḥ(|)

|byed po mi dran par ḥdod phyir| |rig byed skyes bus ma byas la|¹⁾

sampradāyānupacchedād āgamo 'sau tad-atyaye||

|brgyud nas ḥoṅs pa ma chad phyir| |des na luṅ yin de med na|

Verse No. 5:

atyantākṣa-parokṣe hi pratipattiḥ katham bhavet|

adrṣṭa-liṅga-sambandhe svargāpūrvādi-vastuni||

Verse No. 6:

nitya[ḥ] śabdo dhvani-vyaṅgyaḥ sambandho 'rthena nityataḥ|

|sgra rtag²⁾ dbyaṅs kyis gsal bar byed| |don daṅ ḥbrel pa rtag pa ṅid|

pratipattur yato 'rtheṣu(?) pratipattiḥ prajāyate||

|don la rtogs pa daṅ ldan la| |rtogs pa rab tu skye bar ḥgyur|

1) P. lo

2) N. P. brtag

3) "By Manu, Yājñavalkya, Vyāsa, Vasiṣṭha and so on, by those sages, the Veda has been taught, but not composed by them. The words and styles of the Veda have been reproduced again and again by a series of ancient sages, and this lineage of transmission has never been interrupted; for this reason it is called Āgama or traditional teaching." (TJ. D275a1)

4) Again the verse cannot be found in the Tibetan *MHK*, and it is paraphrased and commented in *TJ*. "Even though they are beyond the ken of human perception (lkog tu gyur pa yin na yaṅ), on the authority of the Āgama it is understood that there is the Svarga (mtho ris ni yod do) and that there is the Apavarga (thar pa ni yod do). As the matters like Apūrva have no connection with the marks and as they are beyond the ken of perception by human senses, they are not seen; but by the verbal testimony of the Veda, it is known that they exist. Except for the authority of the Veda, there is no understanding of their existence. For this reason, the Veda is the sole source of knowledge." (TJ. D275a1-4). The compound "adrṣṭa-liṅga-sambandha" should be taken to mean "even if its connection with marks is not perceived." Cf. "anena liṅga-liṅgiṇoḥ sambandha-darśanam, liṅga-darśanam

Verse No. 4:

As there is no recollection of its author, the Veda is claimed to be not a human product. And as there is no interruption in its transmission, this Veda is the sacred word. In its absence, . . .³⁾

Verse No. 5:

. . . how can there be any understanding about the matters like Svarga (or heavenly bliss) and Apūrva (or the consequence of the unforeseen cause) and so on, which are beyond the ken of perception by the human senses and of which the connection with the marks is unrecognizable?⁴⁾

Verse No. 6:

The sound, which is eternal, is manifested by syllables. Its connection with object stands eternal. From that (connection of word and object), understanding with regard to the object arises for one who understands.⁵⁾

cābhisambadhyate, liṅga-liṅgiṇoḥ sambaddhayor darśanena liṅga-smṛtir abhisambadhyate, smṛtyā liṅga-darśanena cāpratyakṣo'rtho'numīyate", *NBh* ad *NS* I, 1, 5, (p. 291). also *TJ* ad *MHK* Verse No. 9 (*TJ*. D276a3); Vṛttikāra: pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandha, sāmānyato'dṛṣṭasambandha, Keith: *The Karma-Mimāṃsā*, p. 29.

5) "The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas claim that the sound is not eternal. But this assertion betrays their thorough ignorance". (*TJ*. D275a4) "The word (śabda) stands eternal, and it is distinguished by the sounds (dhvani) which are produced by the positions (sthāna), the articulatory organs (karaṇa) and the efforts (prayatna), and it is wrong to say that the sound is produced anew. Although the sound disappears immediately after its pronunciation, yet it is connected with the object indissolubly. In that sense, the sound is eternal. Just as the sound 'bull' is always connected with the object with a hump (kakuda) and a dewlap (śāsnā) and so on, from the sound itself which is indissolubly connected with an object the definite grasp of the object is produced. So it is wrong to say that the sound disappears. The sound is eternal and, for this reason, the sound is knowledge itself and it is the authority". (*TJ*. D275a5-7) Cf. sthāna-karaṇa (*Vṛtti* ad *Vākyap.* I, 46); karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so'nugrhyate (*Vākyap.* I, 47); kakuda-śāsnā-ādi, *Mahābhāṣya* I, 1; *Vākyap.* II, 329.

Verse No. 7:

advi[h]pravṛtter abhyāsāt pratyabhijñāna(ta)s tathā(|)
|lan cig hjug phyir goms paḥi phyir| |phyis kyañ śes phyir de bshin du|

śabdavac¹⁾ chrāvaṇatvād dhi nityaḥ śabdo 'vasīyate||
|mñan bya yin phyir sgra ñid bshin| |sgra ni rtag par śes par bya|

Verse No. 7':

|mñon sum rjes su dpag pa dañ| |sgra las byuñ dañ ñer hjal bcas|

|don gyis go dañ dños (N^{31b})med paḥi| |gtan tshigs bsgrub bya sgrub par byed|²⁾

Verse No. 8:

anumānāt prthak cāsau pramāṇatvāt [t]ad-anyavat|
|ḥdi ni rjes dpag las tha dad| |tshad ma yin phyir gshan de bshin|

ekānekārtha-viśaya-pratipattir athāpi vā||
|yañ na gcig dañ du maḥi yul| |rtogs par gyur pa ji bshin no|

1) RS. śabdavic, corrected on the basis of Tib.

2) N. P. |sgra dañ byuñ dañ ñer hjal dañ| |don gyi go dañ dños med paḥi| |gtan tshigs sgrub bya sgrub par byed|

3) "(1) When the word 'bull' is articulated, immediately a conviction about an object with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns is produced, and there is no need for its articulation for a second time. (2) By constant repetition, the Vedas are so well known that, even if not articulated, by association [the word] stays in mind in indissoluble connection with the object. (3) When in the past one is well known in association with a name [like Devadatta], and when that one appears in sight on a later occasion, then there is produced a recognition: 'That Devadatta is this'. (4) As it [=the word] is always grasped by the auditory organ and never by other organs.

Here, 'śabda' is the subject (dharmin), 'nityatva' is the predicate (dharma), and the combination of the subject and the predicate is the proposition (pakṣa). 'Advīḥpravṛtter', 'abhyāsāt', 'pratyabhijñānatāh', and 'śrāvaṇatvāt' are four reasons. 'Śabdatvavat' is an example. Although bulls born and living in various places have a variety of color like 'dark-colored ox' or 'yellow ox', bull-ness [gotva] is observed in common in all those objects which are different one from another. Śabdatva or the common nature found in all words is the nature of eternality (nityatva). As it [=eternality] stands always in combination with the words, in this sense the word is called eternal. This can be known from the verbal testimony of the Vedas." (TJ. D275b1-6)

As to śabda and śabdatva, cf. "By word is meant the universal (ākṛti) of the word." Vṛtti ad VākyaP. I, 23; Mahābhāṣya I, p. 13. As to gauḥ: gotva, Cf. Śabara-bhāṣya ad MS. I, 1, 5 (tr. pp.

Verse No. 7:

The word is ascertained to be eternal. Because of the reasons that it [=the word] should work only once, that it is repeated again and again, that it is recognized as such, and that it is in the realm of the auditory organ. Like wordness (śabda-tvavat).³⁾

Verse No. 7':

Direct perception, inference, verbal testimony, together with resemblance, presumption, and non-existence—these [six] means of knowledge demonstrate what should be demonstrated.⁴⁾

Verse No. 8:

This [Āgama] is different from inference. As it is another source of knowledge. Like other [Pramāṇas] different from this [Āgama]. Further, it produces an understanding about one [specific] object as well as many objects [in aggregation].⁵⁾

18-22); ad MS. I, 3, 30-35 (tr. pp. 118-124); *Vākyap.* II, 365 (Abhyankar-Limaye ed); *SDS* pp. 307-308.

4) This verse is found in the Tibetan *MHK* only, and not in the Sanskrit *MHK*. *TJ* has this verse after the following sentence: "Again by Buddhists, it is claimed that Āgama or the traditional teaching should be included in the category of inference, but this assertion is not right. Why?" (*TJ*. D275b5)

The *Yukti-dīpikā* has this verse as an assertion of some who hold six Pramāṇas: "tathā śaḍ ity anye—

pratyakṣam anumānam ca śabdaṃ cōpamayā saha|
arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavaḥ sādhyasādhakāḥ|" (Pandeya ed., p. 31)

5) "Āgama or verbal testimony is different from inference. As it is an independent source of knowledge. Like direct perception. Further, direct perception which is concerned in a particular (śvalakṣaṇa) produces an understanding about one specific object while inference which is concerned in the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) produces an understanding about many objects in aggregation. In the same manner, Āgama produces an understanding about one specific object like Apavarga as well as many objects like Svarga and others. For this reason, Āgama has its sphere of activity different from that of inference. Like direct perception, it produces an understanding about one specific object, and at the same time, like inference it produces an understanding about many objects in aggregation." (*TJ*. D275b7-276a3) Here, *TJ*'s allocation of *eka* for *apavarga*, and *aneka* for *svarga* and others is not clear. We cannot find any similar idea in other works so far. About what is denoted by Āgama, universals and individuals, cf. *Tantravārtika* ad MS. I, 1, 33 (tr. pp. 363-365).

Verse No. 9:

adṛṣṭa-liṅga-saṃbandha-padārtha-mati-hetutaḥ(|)¹⁾

|rtags²⁾ dañ ḥbrel pa ma mthoñ baḥi| |dños don blo yi rgyu phyir ram|

bhinna-gocara-dhī-janma-kāraṇatvād athāpi vā||

|yañ na tha dad blo skye baḥi| |rgyur gyur pa ñid yin phyir ro|

Verse No. 10:

apūrvō 'pi kriyā-vyaṃg(?ya)ḥ³⁾ kriyā-mokṣe 'pi sādhanam|

|sñon med pa yañ bya bas gsal|| thar paḥaṇ bya bas sgrub par byed|

soma-pānādikā vidvā[n] nirj[ayed a]⁴⁾ntakaṃ yayā||

|mkhas gañ zla baḥi btuñ sogs kyis| |mthar byed pa las ñes par rgyal|

Verse No. 11:

deva-rṣi-juṣṭa[m] śiṣṭeṣṭam⁵⁾ purāṇam vartma śobhanam|

|drañ sroñ lhas bsten dam pas ḥdod| |lam rñiñ bzañ po rig don ḥdi|

vedārtha-bāhyaiḥ⁶⁾ strī-śūdrai[r] yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī||

|phyi rol dmañs rigs bud med gzugs| |ḥdsin pas rigs ldan gsum ḥdi spañs|

1) Tib. “deḥi rgyuḥi ño bor gyur pa yin paḥi phyir” (TJ. D276a5) suggests “-hetutvāt” instead of “-hetutaḥ”.

2) N. P. rtag

3) RS. -vyamga-

4) RS. nirjāya...ntakaṃ yayā

5) RS. śiṣṭeṣṭām

6) Tib. *MHK* and *TJ* suggests a reading: “vedārthaḥ bāhyaiḥ...”.

7) Added on the basis of “mtho ris la sogs paḥi dños poḥi don gyiḥo (TJ. D276a4)”

8) Although *TJ* gives no explanation about “bhinna-gocara-dhī”, it is presumable that it refers, just as Verse No. 8, to both of the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Cf. “tha dad paḥi spyod yul can gyi blo dag skye baḥi rgyur gyur pa yin”. (TJ. D276a6)

9) “Apūrva bears a meaning of Dharma. It is manifested through the acts of sacrifice and others.

Verse No. 9:

As it is the cause of cognition about the matter [like Svarga]⁷⁾, of which the connection with the marks is not perceived, and as it is the cause of emergence of the cognitions which have different spheres of activity, [Āgama is another source of knowledge different from inference.⁸⁾

Verse No. 10:

Even Apūrva is materialized by the acts of sacrifice. Even for deliverance, the means of achievement is the sacrificial rites like Soma-taking and so on, by which a wise man wins a victory over death.⁹⁾

Verse No. 11:

This good, old, and reasonable way, which is favored by gods and sages and pursued by the wise—this three-folded way—is discarded by those outsiders of the Veda-content, by those in shape of women, slaves, and Buddhists.¹⁰⁾

Through this act materializing Apūrva, even deliverance (Mokṣa) is achieved. What is the reason? By means of the sacrificial rites which are marked by the act of Soma-taking and others, the Yogin wins a victory over death and becomes immortal. It is just as said [in the Veda]: 'Having taken Soma, [we] become immortal. [We] are embodied in the unborn wisdom. Thus [we] become the knower of the Veda'." (TJ. D276a7-276b2) Cf. "apāma somam amṛtā abhūma," RV. VIII, 48, 3.

10) "This [way] was favored by Brahmā and other gods and by sages like Gārgya, Vasiṣṭha and others, and pursued by the wise, intelligent people as it is authentic. It is old as it has been in existence for a long span of time. It is a way as it leads people. It is good as it gives pleasure. It is reasonable as it agrees with logical reasoning. The content of the Veda—this three-folded way—is discarded by those outsiders in shape of women, slaves, and Buddhists. The Sāma-, Yajur-, and Atharva-Vedas form the three-folded way (trayī), in which the benefits of all living beings are accumulated and which is the basis of all the philosophical doctrines." (TJ. D276b3)

Verse No. 11:

yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nēhāsti na tat kvacit(|)
 |ḥdi la gañ yod gshan la yod| |ḥdi la gañ med ḥgaḥ laḥaṇ min|
 catuṣṭaye'pi dharmāḍau ta[n naī]¹⁾vānyatra dṛśyate|
 |chos la sogs pa bshi po yañ| |de ñid gshan naḥaṇ mthoñ ba min|

Verse No. 13:

dūṣayitvā trayī[-]mārgaṃ hetubhir hetuvādinaḥ(|)
 |gtan tshigs smra bas gtan tshigs kyis| |lam gsum po ni sun ḥbyin te|
 anumāna-pradhānatvāt [sva]-nayaṃ²⁾ dyotayanti ye||
 |rjes su dpag pa gtsor gyur phyir| |rañ gi lugs ni gsal byed gañ|

Verse No. 14:

pāda-sparśād iv[āndhānām viṣame]³⁾ pathi dhāvatām(|)
 |loñ ba rkañ⁴⁾ paḥi tshod dpags kyis| |ñam ṇaḥi lam du rgyug pa ltar|
 anumāna-pradhānānām pātaḥ teṣāṃ na durlabhaḥ||
 |rjes su dpag(D32a) pa gtsor ḥdsin rnam| |ltuñ bar dkaḥ ba ma yin no|

1) RS. tad evānyatra, corrected on the basis of Tib.

2) RS. praghātātāt sa(? sva)nayaṃ

3) RS. pāda-sparśād ivaddhā...viṣaye

4) P. loñ ba rgad paḥi

5) "Whatever is here, in the Veda, for instance, the group of four, Dharma-kāma-aṛtha-mokṣa is in all other philosophical doctrines, too. What is not found in Veda, on the other hand, is not in any other heretical teachings, either. So, the foundation for the group of four, Dharma-kāma-artha-mokṣa, is supplied only by the Veda." (TJ. D276b6)

A set formula similar to this verse can be found in the opening part of the *Mahābhārata*: "What we find in this book relating to morals, relating to practical life, relating to sensual pleasure and relating to salvation, can be found elsewhere; but what is not written therein, can be found nowhere else in the world.

dharme cārthe ca kāme ca mokṣe ca bharatarṣabha|

yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nēhāsti na tat kvacit| (MBh. I, 56, 33)

W. S. Sukthankar ed., Vol. 1, Ādiparvan Pt. I (Poona, 1933), p. 244; Cf. M. Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 1 (2nd ed. Delhi, 1972), p. 326.

6) "What is known as the Three-folded Way cannot be set aside through logical reasoning. As it is said as follows:

'As the Dharma of those endowed with love and learning,
 with its auxiliaries, gives nourishments to reasoning,
 The completion of the Four (dharma-kāma-artha-mokṣa)
 could not be pursued by logical reasoning.'

Some people, logicians, go too far in this direction. Those people, who try to establish their own theories by means of refutation of the Three-folded Way, do not believe what they have before their

Verse No. 12:

What is here is in others and what is not here cannot be found in any other, either.
The group of four, beginning with the Dharma, could not be found in any other.⁶⁾

Verse No. 13:

Logicians, who put primary importance on inference, explain their standpoint, by setting aside the Three-folded Way through logical reasoning.⁶⁾

Verse No. 14:

Falling is not unlikely in the case of those who put primary importance on reasoning, as in the case of blind men who walk along a precipice by groping the way with their feet.⁷⁾

eye." (*TJ*. D277a1-3)

We cannot trace the source of the verse quoted here in *TJ*. However, a severe criticism on the logicians (tārkika) who put primary importance on inference (anumāna-pradhāna) or logical reasoning (hetuvāda) and who think little of the tradition (āgama) can be found in *VākyaP.* I, 32; 34; 35; 38; 41; 42. E.g. "Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones."

yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ|

abhiyuktataraj anyair anyathaivōpapadyate| (*VākyaP.* I, 34); Iyer tr. p. 45.

"One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the I-consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning."

caitanyaṃ iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate|

āgamas tam upāsino hetuvādair na bādhyate| (*VākyaP.* I, 41); Iyer tr. p. 50.

7) "Just as blind men who with the touch of their feet grope the way out of a precipice, logicians (hetu-vādin) who rely on inferential reasoning only are difficult to defend themselves from falling down. For this reason we do not accept the logicians as the authority of knowledge." (*TJ*. D277a3-4).

This verse, with a slightest change, can be found in *VākyaP.* I, 42, where the logicians are severely criticized. See Note (5) for Verse No. 13.

hasta-sparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā|

anumāna-pradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ| *VākyaP.* I, 42.

This verse in the form "pāda-sparśād..." can be found in Bhavya's *Prajñā-pradīpa* (*tsha*, P153b1). See Y. Ejima: "Idea of Āgama by Bhāvaviveka" (in Japanese), *IBK* Vol. XVII, No. 2, (March 1969), p. 893.

Verse No. 15:

na câsti kaścit sarvajño nêdānīm dṛśyate yataḥ(|)
|ḥdi na¹⁾ ḥgaḥ yañ kun mkhyen med| |gañ phyir ḥdi ni ma mthoñ phyir|

sarvajñatā hi buddhasya kalpitā loka-paktaye²⁾||
|thams cad mkhyen par sañs rgyas la| |brtags pa ḥjig rten gus byaḥi phyir|

Verse No. 16:

apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ kṛtakatvāt tad-anyavat(|)
|sañs rgyas gsuñ yañ tshad ma min| |byas paḥi phyir na gshan bshin no|

asarvajñas ca sambuddhaḥ puruṣatvāt tad-anyavat||
|rdsogs paḥi(P35a) sañs rgyas kun mkhyen min| |skyes bu yin phyir gshan bshin no|

Verse No. 17:

apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ trayī-dūṣaṇa-darśanāt|
|sañs rgyas gsuñ ni tshad ma min³⁾| |lta ba gsum po sun ḥbyin phyir|

yad yathōktaṃ [t]athōktaṃ [tad ya]thā nagnâd[i-]darśanam⁴⁾||
|ji ltar gañ smra de de ltar| |gcer bur rgyu baḥi lta ba bshin|

1) N. P. ḥdi ni

2) bhaktaye?

3) D. yin, changed on the basis of N. P.

4) RS. yad yathoktaṃ yathoktaṃ...thā nagnâdadarśanam

5) "If the logicians are claimed as the source of knowledge by introducing the idea of an omniscient being (sarvajñatva), (such an assertion should be refuted by Verse No. 15.)... At present, there is no omniscient being. As it is not empirically perceived. Like a son of a barren woman. And a theory which advocates the omniscience of the Buddha is not right. As such a theory is taught for a purpose of winning public confidence. As it is taught with an intention: 'When people hear that the Buddha is an omniscient being, they will place their trust in us—Buddhists.'" (TJ. D277a4-7).

Refutation of the Buddhist-Jain idea of Sarvajña was made in a thorough-going way by Kumārila of the Mīmāṃsā School. Controversial discussion between him and the Buddhist logicians are recorded in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and much later in Ratnakīrti's *Sarvajñasiddhi*. See K. B. Pathak: "Kumārila's Verses Attacking the Jain Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient Being", *ABORI*, Vol. XII, Pt. II (1931, Poona), pp. 123-131; B. Frauwallner: "Kumārila's Brhātṭikā," *WZKSÖ*, Vol. VI, (Wien, 1963), pp. 78-90; E. A. Solomon: "The Problem of Omniscience (Sarvajñatva)." *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXVI, Pts. 1-2, (May 1962, Madras), pp. 36-77; N. J. Shah: *Akalāṅka's Criticism*

Verse No. 15:

And there is no omniscient being. As such a person is not perceived at present. The omniscience of the Buddha is advocated with an intention of winning public confidence.⁶⁾

Verse No. 16:

The words of the Buddha is not a right source of cognition. As they are what is produced. Like those other than [the words of the Buddha]. The Enlightened One is not an omniscient being. As he is a human being. Like those other than [the Enlightened One].

Verse No. 17:

The words of the Buddha are not a right source of cognition. As they hold a view of setting aside the Three-folded [Veda]. Anything which is like the above-mentioned [view setting aside the Three-folded] is like the above-mentioned [=not a right source of cognition]. Like the view of the Naked [Jains].⁷⁾

End of the Pūrva-pakṣa or the Opponent's View in
the Ninth Chapter of the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*

of *Dharmakīrti's Philosophy: A Study*, (Ahmedabad, 1967); S. Kawasaki: "Is There a Man Who Can Know the Dharma?", (in Japanese), *Essays on Buddhist Dharma Dedicated to Dr. Akira Hirakawa*, (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 267-289.

6) "As both are common in being what is produced, like the words of the nihilists (Uccheda-vādin), the words of the Buddha cannot be accepted as a right source of cognition. As they are common in being a human being, like any other princes, the Buddha cannot be accepted as an omniscient being. This is what is meant by the verse." (*TJ*. D277b1-2)

7) "'The words of the Buddha' is the subject (dharmin). 'Being not a right source of cognition' is the predicate (dharma). The combination of the subject and the predicate is the proposition (pakṣa). 'As they set aside the Three-folded' is the reason. 'The view about the Three-folded' is the meaning of 'trayī-darśana' or the 'Three Theories (siddhānta)'. As they set aside these three theories, they are called 'trayī-darśana-dūṣaṇāt'. Any one in which the three-folded view is set aside is not a right source of cognition. 'Like the view of the Jains' is an example. . . ." (*TJ*. D277b2-4). Here in *TJ*. the compound "trayī-dūṣaṇa-darśanāt" is explained to mean "trayī-darśana-dūṣaṇāt", and "trayī-darśana" to mean "Three Siddhāntas". But, this explanation is not acceptable. "Trayī" here should mean the "Three Vedas" as in Verse No. 13.

P. S.: The present writer would like to express his gratitude to Prof. J. W. de Jong and Prof. Masaaki Hattori for their valuable suggestions and comments on his readings and decipherment of the *MHK*. in his article “Bhavya no tsutaeru Mīmāṃsā Shisō (Some Mīmāṃsā Ideas Known to Bhavya)”, (in Japanese), *Essays on Indian Thoughts and Buddhism Dedicated to Dr. Hajime Nakamura*, (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 71-86.

There is a project to make a joint study of the *Tarkajvālā* on the basis of its Tibetan versions and the Sanskrit *MHK*. under the supervision of Prof. V. V. Gokhale and Prof. Hajime Nakamura. The present writer, informed of this project from Prof. Nakamura this spring, is most willing to take a part.

Some Problems of John Dewey's Theory of History

Hideyo YAMADA

The writer tries to analyse Dewey's theory of history under the following four aspects:

1. temporal and spacial phases of existence (text: "Logic—The Theory of Inquiry", Chap. XII.),
2. self-objectification of human existence (text: "Experience and Nature", Chap. III.),
3. nature and history (text: same as above),
4. history and individuality (text: Dewey's article, "Time and Individuality").

And the writer's main aim is to show that Dewey's theory of history is to be understood to have the following four features:

1. he employs a pluralistic and indeterminate theory of history instead of the monistic historical theory of developmental stages,
2. the agent of historical development is not nations as in Hegel, but the individual who is existentially free and the story of whose development means history in itself,
3. his theory may be called an evolution-theory of history, and furthermore it might be, probably, said to have the nuances of an Existentialist theory, and finally,
4. some criticisms of Dewey that have been presented to assume that he has a pragmatic view of history seem not to be entirely correct, because his problem is not confined to why we learn history but is chiefly concerned with the ontological structure of history itself.

Plato's Magnesian State: an interpretation of the *Laws*

Mie IKEDA

The *Laws* is not an appendix to Plato's thinking, but the culmination of his entire philosophy, especially his philosophy of state, of education, of morals and of religion. It is not an imaginative theory of a failed politician, but a practical program of social reform by a philosopher whose eyes penetrated deeply the morbidity of his time. Historical Greek city-states have disappeared, but his criticism of Athenian democracy and his principles of the reconstruction of the state are still of much importance even to us Japanese. His problems are our problems. Was Plato, as a true disciple of Socrates, a defender of political freedom, and was his perennial attack on democracy his desperate endeavour to save freedom from utter ruin, or was he, as some critics say, an enemy of democracy, and did he sacrifice freedom to the altar of morals and state? Concerning his political philosophy very few of his interpreters are impartial. They are either passionately favourable to him or passionately hostile to him. In this article I tried as much as I can to let Plato speak for himself. I examined in detail his proposals of administrative and judicial reforms, what elaborate devices he made to protect his state against the unbridled sovereignty of the people on the one hand, and against the abuse by the magistrates of their executive and judicial powers on the other: the procedures of election, the scrutiny and the audit, the reciprocal check of the magistrates, the functions of the guardians of the laws and the nocturnal council.

Depuis sa première conversion en 1646, Pascal s'était mis en rapport avec le milieu de Port-Royal. C'est pourquoi ceux qui s'intéressent à sa pensée, surtout religieuse, sont invités à tenir le plus grand compte de l'histoire de Port-Royal et du jansénisme. Ayant déjà fait une brève étude sur la situation historique du jansénisme (Voir: Le jansénisme et l'Abbaye de Port-Royal— Leur rôle dans la pensée moderne—, *La Pensée*, janvier 1976), nous traitons dans le présent article des solitaires de Port-Royal et de leur attitude à l'égard du cartésianisme.

En premier lieu, nous considérons la présence des solitaires à Port-Royal comme très importante non seulement dans l'histoire de cette fameuse Abbaye, mais aussi dans celle de la pensée moderne. La plupart d'entre eux étaient, avant de quitter le monde, des personnes relativement haut placées, c'est-à-dire des ecclésiastiques, des théologiens, des avocats, des médecins ou des gentilshommes etc. Ils abandonnèrent leur fonction sociale sous l'influence de l'abbé de Saint-Cyran, directeur des religieuses de Port-Royal, et là se consacrèrent à la lecture ou à la traduction de la Sainte Bible, à la méditation, à la prière, au travail manuel et aussi à l'enseignement dans les petites écoles de Port-Royal. Selon Augustin Gazier, auteur de *l'Histoire générale du mouvement janséniste*, «c'était une association de personnes de piété, groupées en petit nombre pour travailler simultanément, chacun dans sa sphère, à la grande affaire de leur salut. Point de chef auquel on dût obéir, point de vœux, pas même de résidence obligatoire.»

Il nous semble que cette tendance, pour ainsi dire individualiste, dans leur attitude devant Dieu et le monde, leur a permis de se rapprocher du cartésianisme. C'est le deuxième point dont nous voulons traiter dans le présent article. Bien que la prospérité du cartésianisme à Port-Royal pendant la dernière moitié du 17^e siècle, dont parlent Antoine Adam et d'autres auteurs, puisse signifier «le changement de qualité de Port-Royal», nous croyons qu'il ne faut pas nécessairement considérer ce phénomène sous l'aspect négatif. Dans le cas contraire, est-il possible d'expliquer suffisamment comment le cartésianisme a gagné une si rapide victoire sur Port-Royal qui se montrait pourtant résolu dans la lutte contre les jésuites?

Enfin, ce que nous venons de dire nous conduira à une autre question: comment doit-on considérer le rapport entre la pensée de Pascal et le cartésianisme? D'une part, on pourrait répondre tout de suite que leur opposition est radicale, en se souvenant des controverses avec le Père Noël en 1647, du «*Mémorial*» au temps de sa soi-disant conversion définitive ou de quelques fragments hostiles à Descartes dans les *Pensées*. D'autre part, on sait que la tentative de les rapprocher jusqu'à un certain point n'est pas impossible, comme l'a fait Michel Le Guern dans son livre si intéressant *Pascal et Descartes*. Quant aux *Pensées* par exemple, on constatera assez facilement que les fragments critiquant Descartes (frs. 84, 553, 887, 1001 etc.) sont dans les papiers non classés excepté le fragment 84. De plus, ce qui importe le plus dans ce cas, c'est que le fragment 84 ait été rayé par Pascal. Au contraire, dans les papiers classés se retrouvent presque tous les fragments qui font de la pensée l'attribut essentiel de l'homme, qui insistent sur la dignité de la pensée humaine, ou qui suggèrent que les animaux sont de pures machines (frs. 105, 111, 113, 200, 759 etc.). Ces remarques ne sont évidemment qu'une simple allusion au problème, mais celle-ci nous obligerait à examiner le rapport entre Descartes et Pascal sous divers aspects.

En nous fondant sur ce que nous avons résumé ci-dessus, nous voudrions examiner plus en détail la pensée de Pascal par rapport à Port-Royal.

A Study on the Historical Character of the Ippen (一遍) Teachings (1)

Kiyoshi HIROKAMI

At the end of the Kamakura period, the Ippen Teachings were formed under the influence of Zen-Buddhism, Esoteric Buddhism, Shintoism, especially of the Honji-Suijaku (本地垂迹) Theory.

In the Honji-Suijaku Theory, the native Japanese gods (Jingi, 神祇) are considered to be manifestations (Suijaku) of the true nature (Honji) of various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

The purpose of this study is to trace historically the formation of the Ippen Teachings, in particular the Honji-Suijaku Theory.