

## MISZELLEN ZUR ERKENNTNISTHEORETISCH-LOGISCHEN SCHULE DES BUDDHISMUS

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### VI. A New Approach towards Improving the Textual Basis for an Understanding of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti

The deplorable quality of the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti has been noted by many scholars and commented on in detail by HATTORI<sup>1</sup>. What can be done for a proper understanding of Dignāga's arguments has also been stated concisely by HATTORI: "... to conjecture as far as possible the original Sanskrit form through a comparison of K with V [i.e. the two translations] and with *PST* [i.e. Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā*], when this quotes the text. In this connection, we must utilize fully the related Sanskrit materials"<sup>2</sup>.

The numerous extant Sanskrit fragments are indeed the most important basis for regaining parts of the original and for proper evaluation of the meaning of the Tibetan translations. But one possibility of improving the basic textual material has not been taken into consideration so far: the collection of Tibetan fragments from the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti in other works of the school rendered into Tibetan by other, and better translators.

A collection of this kind would result in improved knowledge of the Sanskrit original as well as a more valid interpretation of the text in cases where no Sanskrit fragment is extant: First of all, in the latter case we would have a better and more reliable Tibetan version of a certain textual unit to interpret and to compare with the *pratīka*-texts quoted by Jinendrabuddhi. Secondly, even if we have a Sanskrit fragment, this Sanskrit text can better be examined by comparing it with a more reliable Tibetan version than with the two fully extant translations which one would hardly ever dare to take as justification for a textual judgement against an extant Sanskrit fragment.

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<sup>1</sup> Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated by MASAOKI HATTORI, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 18f.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., 18.

In my review of HATTORI's book<sup>3</sup> I opposed his attempt to correct the Tibetan of the extant translations because this would result in creating a Tibetan text that never existed<sup>4</sup>, and insisted on presenting these translations as they were transmitted in the Tibetan canon's versions in order not to distort the basis for textual interpretation and reconstitution.

But by collecting Tibetan translations of quotations from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* in other works which were translated far better in most cases, we actually have access – at least for a great number of textual units – to a Tibetan translation which is not only superior in quality but is also historically authentic.

Of course, the fact that they come from different works implying possibly different treatment of the quoted passages by their respective authors, and that various teams of translators have been at work must be taken into serious consideration. But nevertheless, this would be a very promising new channel for philological efforts devoted to this most important and also difficult of Dignāga's works. One would, in fact, gradually be able to work on the basis of much better Tibetan translations for many passages of import than hitherto possible. It will also be found that these texts correspond much more closely to the *pratīkas* in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, itself the product of better translators.

A simple example should be sufficient to illustrate this approach. In Dharmakīrti's commentary on *Pramāṇavārttika* III 294, where he states that for those who think that even a case of erroneous sense-perception belongs to the mind (*mānasam*), there would be a contradiction with Dignāga's statement, that the sense organs are also the cause for the cognition of blue, two moons etc. (*nīladvicandrādidhīyām hetur akṣāṇy apīti*), Devendrabuddhi literally quotes the passages referred to from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*:

*slop dpon gyis rT'sod par sgrub par bśad par mñon sum du dpyad pa la* [1.]  
*“dmigs pa'i don dpyad pa na | 'di ltar 'ji ltar snañ ba las śes pa skye ba*  
*de ltar dmigs pa źes brjod dam | 'on te ji ltar yod pa dag gźan du snañ ba'i*  
*śes pa'i rgyur 'gyur” źes bya ba skabs su mdzas nas* | [2.] *“mig la sogs pa'i*  
*bar yañ dmigs pa ñid du thal na de dag kyañ don dam par rnam pa gźan*  
*du yod pa dag ni zla ba gñis par snañ ba dañ | sñon po la sogs pa'i snañ*  
*ba'i śes pa'i rgyur 'gyur ro” źes bśad pa'i gźuñ yin pa dañ 'gal lo ||*

<sup>3</sup> WZKS 15 (1971) 222–224.

<sup>4</sup> This is in fact the case with HATTORI's edition of Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab's translation where the transmitted text in many cases is to be found only in the footnotes.

The first fragment is from the Vṛtti on PSI 14 (HATTORI K 189, 8–11). The beginning of our fragment: *dmigs pa'i don* shows the correct text which was proposed by HATTORI on the basis of the Tīkā and the Sanskrit fragment from NCV 96,7 (cf. HATTORI's note 2.15) against the reading *dmigs pa la don du* of both the V and K translations. The introductory 'di ltar of our fragment shows that the following alternative interpretations were introduced by an explanatory introduction like *\*tathā hi* and not a word introducing an alternative question<sup>5</sup>.

That Tibetan fragments of this kind are never totally reliable is demonstrated by the formulation of the first alternative. For this we have a Sanskrit fragment from NCV 99,23 (cf. 96, 11f.) which corresponds nicely with K's translation but is not well represented in our Tibetan fragment, where *teṣu* and *te* are not translated, and 'ji ltar snañ ba las can at best be understood as a corruption of *\*ji ltar snañ ba de rnams la*.

The translation of the second alternative again corresponds better to the systematical sequence of the Sanskrit fragment known from NCV 99,29 than the K and V translations, although it does not translate the important *api* which is well represented in K and V.

The original Sanskrit text can be assumed to have had the following form on the basis of the extant fragments, the Tibetan *pratīkas* of the Tīkā, the two Tibetan translations and the Tibetan translation of the quotation in Devendrabuddhi's commentary<sup>6</sup>:

*rūpādiṣv ālambanārtho vaktavyaḥ. <tathā hi> yadābhāsaṃ teṣu jñānam utpadyate, tathā ta ālambanam <ity uktā atha> yathāvidyamānā anyābhāsasyāpi vijñānasya kāraṇaṃ bhavanti.* "With reference to colour and the like, one should state what is meant by 'the object of cognition'. Namely: they are called 'object of cognition' [as some hold] in that appearance with which a cognition of them arises, or [as others hold] they become as they are a cause of the cognition, although [these cognitions] present an appearance different [from them]."

The second fragment is from the Vṛtti on PSI 15 (HATTORI K 191, 1–4). The Sanskrit original is known from a quotation in Manorathanandin's commentary (PVV 206,26–207,2). Our fragment has three major advantages over the translations K and V: They split the second, causal clause into two, ending the first part with a final particle and thus leaving the second part without subject. They both begin with the

<sup>5</sup> As proposed in HATTORI's (33) and JAMBUVIJAYA's translations (cf. his note in NC 96,25).

<sup>6</sup> Sanskrit words not found in the fragments are tentatively supplied within pointed brackets.

incorrect *dmigs* which was emended to *mig* in K by HATTORI which is to be found in our version. And moreover they read only *yañ* as against the *bar yañ* of our fragment. The latter was the reason why HATTORI understood the Sanskrit fragment as beginning with *cakṣurādīnām* when in fact it begins with *yāvaccakṣurādīnām*. But this can only be seen on the basis of the translation of this quotation in Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

Thus it is evident that a collection of the Tibetan versions of quotations from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*vṛtti in the various works of the Dignāgean tradition can improve our textual basis considerably, and until a Sanskrit manuscript of the Vṛtti is found<sup>7</sup>, this valuable additional source of textual information should not be neglected.

### VII. Another Note on *pramāṇabhūta*

In note 6 to the introduction of his edition and translation of the sections on the Buddha and the four noble truths in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter<sup>1</sup>, TILMAN VETTER gives the reason for his translation of the term *pramāṇabhūta* from the *maṅgala* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as "who is a means of valid cognition" ("der Erkenntnismittel ist"): the interpretation that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition (as if the text read *pramāṇ-ībhūta*) which does not figure at all in Dignāga's own explanation of the verse and can, therefore, hardly be based on the term *pramāṇabhūta*, was added by Dharmakīrti; and he refers to PV II 7–8 as the source of this idea.

Since the compound *pramāṇabhūta* does really not have a *cvi*-formation (cf. Pāṇini 5.4.50), VETTER is certainly right in asking for an interpretation of °*bhūta*- as the equivalent of the copula serving the simple adjectivization of the first member. On the other hand Dharmakīrti and the tradition following his interpretation interpret °*bhūta*- as having the function of excluding what has not become, what is eternal<sup>2</sup>. This is also the interpretation presupposed in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation and analysis of the compound<sup>3</sup>. Jinendrabuddhi

<sup>7</sup> A Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* is said to have been found in the People's Republic of China recently.

<sup>1</sup> Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis *Pramāṇavārttika*. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel. Eingeleitet, ediert und übersetzt. [WSTB 12]. Wien 1984, 14 with note 6.

<sup>2</sup> *abhūtavinivṛttaye bhūtoktiḥ* PV II 7bc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. STEINKELLNER, Some Sanskrit Fragments of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*. In: A Corpus of Indian Studies. Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta 1980, 96–105.

explains in fragment 1<sup>4</sup>: *bhūta utpannaḥ* ...<sup>5</sup>. *bhūtavacanam aprajāta-syeśvarādeḥ* ... . *nityasya pratiṣedhārtham*<sup>6</sup>, and ends with an analysis of the compound as a *dvandva*: *pramāṇaṁ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇa-bhūtaḥ*.

While it is quite clear that Jinendrabuddhi explains the meaning of °*bhūta* under the influence of Dharmakīrti's interpretation, his analysis of the compound as a *dvandva* results in a strange meaning of the term: the Buddha is accordingly said "to be a means of valid cognition, an authority, as well as to have become". In other words, the second member of the compound is no longer understood as an equivalent of the copula – now being understood with the first member of the compound, *pramāṇa*, – but as a predicate in its own right. Thus the term combines two predicates of the Buddha: he is an authority (*pramāṇa*) and he has become (*bhūta*). It is evident that Jinendrabuddhi tried in this rather forced way to reconcile Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the word °*bhūta*- with the fact that Dignāga's compound does not show a *cvi*-formation.

This means that, following VETTER, we indeed have to translate the term *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga's *maṅgala* as "who is a *pramāṇa*" but as interpreted by Dharmakīrti and the following tradition the term must be translated as "who has become a *pramāṇa*".

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>5</sup> The Tibetan text continues: ... *byuñ ba ces pa'i don to*, where *byuñ ba* may translate either \**prādurbhūta* or \**prajāta*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, note 18 for this sentence.