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## Modernization and Philosophical Tradition : India and the Third World

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### Sociology of Modernization

‘Modern Challenges’ as a significant phrase can only be construed as a situation of clash, conflict or tension born out of considerable dynamic changes in a society. In fact, any contemporary changes need not be called ‘modern’. Modernization is a tangible historical process and since tradition represents the most conservative, static elements in the society, a conflict or a tension is intelligible only in such a context. In short, the process of modernization faced with the traditional factors create a genuine and historically necessary dialectic. But thanks to many contemporary sociologists (especially the *parsonians* or *structural functionalists*) the term ‘modernization’ is at least as ambiguous (if not more) as the term ‘development’. Unless, therefore, we clarify some of the current confusions (or are they deliberate mystification ?) created around the term ‘modernization’ it is likely that not only unwary travellers but even some smart thinkers in the field of social sciences may fall into the Imperialist trap of acquiescing in the most dangerous hoax that ‘Green Revolution’ can be a substitute for ‘Industrialization’.

Modernization is not a term which merely refers to an inevitable historical process of “earlier” and “later” so that we are beguiled to believe that the so-called non-modernized countries (also the same as ‘underdeveloped’) of Asia and Africa have only got a late start and that it is only *a matter of time* for the latter to be like the former. The terms ‘traditional/relatively modernized’ and ‘developing’ are surreptitiously introduced to substitute the terms ‘non-modernized’ and ‘underdeveloped’ by certain kinds of sociologists whose motives in doing this are fairly obvious. There is a certain historical import of the term ‘modernization’ which is revealed only when we try to assess the actual factors of modernization in the

context of a world-wide system of Imperialism or Economic, Political and Cultural exploitation. By 'Imperialism' is meant the working of multinational capital throughout the underdeveloped countries under the protection of the Industrial-military-complex of the capitalist countries, (or the Capitalist Country) of the world. Andre Gunder Frank, the Latin American Economist was truthful when he reformulated the term "development" as "development of underdevelopment". Similarly, it is contrary to history to assume that modernization is an inevitable process occurring in every country 'sooner' or 'later'. On the contrary, the process of modernization is enhanced in the already modernized countries at the further expense of the relatively non-modernized countries of the Third World. More often than not the relationship is inversely proportional between modernized and non-modernized countries. They are unfortunately, but of necessity, linked as the metropolis and suburb, or pool and drain respectively. This very fact was elaborately mystified by sociologist Marion Levy, Jr. as a "*Continuum* (underline mine) between relatively modernized and relatively non-modernized country." To take a very simple statistics, for 6% of the world population (U.S.A.) 60% of the world's resources are pulled, I mean, drained from relatively non-modernized nations. Since these resources are solely material the countries which are supplying U.S.A. with these resources are, measurably to that extent, being deprived of modernization themselves. In concrete terms the U.S.A. is a modern country because Latin America, South East Asia and Africa are non-modernizing themselves (giving up Industry for Green Revolution) or stagnating and starving. In other words, modernization is not an independent process of increasing utilization of a country's potential but very much in fact a residual realization of a country's resources after being preyed upon by the more powerful nations. Modernization for us or any erstwhile colonies, therefore, often turns out to be a constant struggle for mere survival to be able to serve the interests of the whole chain of imperialist countries. This exploitation is economic, political and cultural.

Modernization is also used as a value-loaded term and therefore refers both to the ideal type as well as to the actual instances which often falsify the ideal. For example, political modernization undoubtedly means greater participation on the part of the people in country's affairs. In actually, in the most modern countries is flagrantly contradicted.

The term modernization is often confused with many specific symptoms, like industrialization, urbanization, increase in bureaucratic efficiency, an increasing number of executive class or centralisation in technocracy as Galbraith's *The Industrial State* describes it. But there can be industrialization without political modernization just as there is possible urbanization without industrialization. The contract between an urbanized Punjab and an industrialized West Bengal is a clear case in point. These piecemeal definitions can be very untrue and inadequate indications of a country's modernization. If someone defines modernization as a fast improvement in distribution of wealth with constant break-through in production, than

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Such is also believed that affluence is a sign of modernization and thus the richest country is the most modern country. It is in this context that we should draw a distinction between 'scarcity' and 'poverty'. Unless we grasp their difference we may start believing that America is more modern than Russia and Russia is more modern than China. Scarcity is a natural situation of non-availability of necessary resources ; in such cases the problem can be *merely economic* and the solution or at least effective intervention be brought about by building up proper resources which again presupposes an *independent economy*. Poverty, on the other hand, is often an artificial institution generated and reinforced for *economic and political* interests of the power structure of the society. Removal of poverty, therefore, calls for a total transformation of the economic and political structures. In the case of India the people are being doubly exploited by indigenous as well as foreign capitalists. It is no wonder, therefore, that the slogan of 'Foreign aid' is so powerfully preached by the interested groups, as if that is the key to all solutions. But this kind of aid makes an economy politically dependent on other countries. This is the simple logic of Neo-Colonialism. That this kind of aid is anything but a giveaway or helping programme on the part of the richer countries motivated by human considerations will be clear from a speech by the late American President Eisenhower as early as in 1953 :

"If we lost Indochina and the Malaya peninsula, the tin and tungsten we so greatly value from that would cease coming...

Finally, if we lost all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia ? The prodigious supplies of rubber and rice—the areas of Thailand and East Pakistan ?

So when the United States votes \$ 400,000,000 to help (the French in) the war, we are not voting a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way we can to prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most terrible significance to the U.S.A.. our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the riches of the Indonesian territory and from Southeast Asia."

The U.S. Military-industrial complex was thus preparing for a 'Gulf of Tonkin' when Vietnamese people, were trying to solve their poverty. India, naturally, is no exception. Strangely enough, what Eisenhower said to his sceptic governors in 1953 could be very well said in the British Par-

liament fifty years ago with regard to the maintenance of the British Empire.

### Modernization and Modernity

By modernity we mean the superstructural incorporation of a *partial life-style* of the modern metropolis and then percolating such culture or *commodity orientation* to the less fortunate sector. But all this happens without any significant structural change or changes in production factors or production relations. The same is true about urbanization and urbanity. Today in most villages there has spread a transistor and nylon culture (urbanity), say, in West Bengal ; though, by the latest census there has been absolutely no change in urbanization. In the erstwhile colonies (i.e., Asian, African and Latin American countries), there is thus a great difference between *modernization* and *modernity*. In the case of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, South Vietnam and Sri Lanka the modernity has been a certain amount of westernization—that also not an Industrial West but a Feudal West—a cross brand of neon signs and Coco-Cola culture, drinking alcohol, visiting night-clubs and cabre or a more polished English diction.

We have however delineated all these cautions about 'modernization' to emphasize the obvious that the constraints to modernization are not all *internal* or modernization is not an uninterfered indigenous process but is very much affected and manipulated by the overpowering system of Neo-colonialism. Moreover, unless we distinguish between modernization and modernity we shall run the danger of perpetuating the existing alienation between the elites and the people, between the structural and super-structural, and even in our own selves.

### Meaning of Modernization for the Third World

The distinction between *ideal* meaning and *actual* meaning tends to confuse the real issues by bringing in unnecessary subjectivity into the concept. And yet it is highly fashionable in some sectors to try to understand the social workings of the so-called underdeveloped societies in terms of this very process. As a matter of fact the term 'modernization' is so misleading that it can be and has been construed by the Imperialist Countries as 'joining hands with capitalism' knowing all the time that they themselves are putting formidable obstacles in the path of modernization of the aspirant countries. *It is a sad irony of history that the cause of non-modernization is often upheld as the goal of modernization.* On account of all these twists and ambiguities it is advisable to understand modernization not as being like U.S.A. or W. Germany or Japan or this country or that country but to limit the scope relative to the specific country one is talking about. It is much more important therefore, that modernization should mean the transformation of the entire social struc-

ture. In a country with Asiatic mode of production, feudalism may be a step towards modernization, or with feudal conditions a change towards capitalism or in a capitalistic country a change towards socialism ; all these stages relating very concretely to the production structure of the country concerned. Karl Max wrote in his *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* :

“In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will ; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of consciousness correspond. (1859)

In these lines we get a clear idea as to what a structural change refers. The other implication which becomes obvious is that tradition which is a general form of social, cultural and spiritual modes do not really independently hang in the void but should be reasonably regarded as *historically generated superstructures*. Modernization, therefore, need not be mystified as subtle mental or subjective set of attitudes to be reflected in a life-style, to be mystified into Rationalism or Scienticism of outlook as many sociologists want us to believe, but is a matter of unambiguous observations of improvement around production and distribution. [cf. *Tradition and Modernity in India*, Ed. A.B. Shah and C.R.M. Rao, Bombay, 1965, especially, Yogendra Singh's article ]. We do not need a bunch of foreign-trained glamour boys to tell us whether the people in urban slums, or the agriculture labourers in the villages are improving their living. Yet we use a lot of U.N.O. money, futile projects, board of experts to tell us the fairy tale that the attitudes of South East Asian people towards technology or industry reveal a resistance to change.

Whether structure determines the superstructure or vice versa, is not the point of controversy here. But construed in this way it is easier to see that tradition as superstructure certainly loses its reinforcing channels if the very foundation changes. It may be misleading to use the word “challenge” for that may signify as if tradition and modernization are two equally strong, unrelated processes coming to a test of strength. Truly speaking, so long as there is a challenge there is a strong possibility that there has not occurred enough modernization or structural transformation. I have no intention to be dogmatically denying the fact that often these superstructures tend to survive as hang ups or prejudices or even as inhibiting or delaying factors, but then these cannot predominate for too long. In short real modernization is an objective process which makes some of the old structural surrogates (some aspects of the superstructure) impotent or at least demystifies that roles. We deem it necessary to state here all

this with reference to those sociologists who swing to the other extreme and assert that it is the superstructure which transmutes, helps or hinders the structural process of a society. In order to grasp properly and adequately whether Modernization challenges Tradition it is essential that we assess the alternative model which asserts that tradition or superstructure challenges or perhaps thwarts the structural changes. As a matter of fact in social science circles it is very customary to talk of traditional societies and modern societies, often hinting (though not necessarily) as if the relationship is reversible and thereby conveniently denying the historicity of any process.

### Value System and Modernization

Since the 19th century, it has been maintained that *value system* in India has proved as obstacles to her economic growth. Apart from the simple-mindedness of this explanation there is the implicit motive to absolve Imperialism and colonization of the responsibility of retarding world progress for economic interests. In 1821 the distinguished French scholar, Abbe Dubois expressed such views in *Hindu Manners Customs and Ceremonies*. Even the economic historian Vera Anstey wrote that the "religious tenets and practices of Hinduism and Muhammadanism have strictly limited economic development in the past..." [*The Economic Development of India*, 1936, p. 47. Longmans edition, London. Quoted from *Modern India* ed. by Thomas R. Metcalf, MacMillan Company, U.S.A. 1971. Actually, for the subsequent analysis I have mostly depended on Morris D. Morris's article on "Values as an obstacle to economic growth in South Asia : An Historical Survey" included in the above-mentioned Volume and the three stages of economic exploitation of India as described by R.P. Dutta in his *India Today*.] Even the top-notchers of the colonialist historians (or perhaps that is why) Charles Trevelyan of Cambridge wrote in 1838 :

The peculiar wonder of the Hindu system is, not that it contains so much or so little knowledge, but that it has been so cleverly contrived for arresting the growth of the Human mind, as to exhibit it at the end of two thousand years fixed at nearly the precise point at which it was first moulded. (Quoted from T. Metcalf, *op. cit.* p. 188).

Possibly in his unconscious desire to demonstrate the superiority of the culture and social system of East India Company gangsters Trevelyan thoroughly ignored the fact that during the later Moghul period the monetization of economy and the use of hired labour in *Khud-Kashi* subverted the peasant economy of rural India and precipitated a *political crisis* by initiating a series of peasant revolts though often under the leadership of the *Zamindars* and *Jagirdars* finally bringing about the collapse of the

Moghul Empire. It was not the mythical, superhuman cunning of Robert Clive (subsequently Knighted by the Queen of England) or the enterprising character of the English Tradesmen which wiped off the vestiges of Moghul empire, but then History was written by the Colonialist. (cf. Irfan Habib, "Potentialities of Change in the Economy of Moghul India").

The most classical analysis of this model in the Indian context came from Max Weber in his book *The religion of India*. Weber was certain that the effects of Hinduism on South Asian economic progress were "essentially negative". He even believed that with the removal of *Pax Britannica* "the old feudal robber romanticism of the Indian Middle Age would again break forth". The concept of *moksa*, *dharma* and *karma* lowered the levels of human aspiration and placed "a premium on passive acceptance rather than on amelioration of the human situation whether by hard work or social reform". (Weber, *Religion of India*). What Weber said about Indian life-style was in essence the same as what many contemporary sociologists and anthropologists, Indians as well as foreigners, re-asserted, that is, the South Asian society produced a smaller quantum of output than a society with a different system of values. Also the incentives to invest are lower. People are afraid of innovation, shy of technology, etc... This reminds one how during school days we were falsely conditioned to believe that Indian farmers were lazy. As a matter of fact, I only saw through the myth when I saw an Indian farmer working about 15 hours a day often for a frustrating reward. That is how we have been defined by the Imperialists.

There are obviously too many historical and logical fallacies in the Weberian argument and fortunately for us this hypothesis has been definitively and finally repudiated very authentically by Morris D. Morris in his article on Indian economic history during 18th century. However, there are two important points that are relevant for our purpose here. The first is the utter *naivete* with which we believe in a unique and monolithic traditional model in India. It never occurs to us that there is no single "Hindu" ideological position to shape social behaviour. The Brahminical value system is already based on a functionally dual society. There was always side by side a *Lokayata* tradition which we often find expressed in old folk songs or *Sahajiya* sects. If we look at artisans' crafts or folk songs we notice that machines are already included rather than rejected in the people's life style. Moreover, historically we find that the economic behaviour of the people at different regions of India were very diverse which ranged widely from the most passive and other worldly to the most aggressive and profit maximizing. And assuming for arguments' sake that there was a single system of values the same system upheld and justified these antagonistic behaviour. The behaviour of Indian entrepreneurs with regard to cotton textile flatly contradict Weber's thesis. "It was not until 1874, after seventeen locally financed mills had been established in Bombay, that the first British Mill was projected." (Morris D. Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 19). In short Indian civilization or tradition did not pose any special

problem for economic transition ; what really thwarted our growth and still thwarts were and are the bloody hands of Imperialism. This kind of confrontation which not only manipulates the economy but constantly dominates and defines the subjugated through the myth of *racism* (superiority of race) can initiate a degenerate and alienated elite class which becomes the only channel (and useful tool) for the Colonialist to rule the natives of the country. This class may symbolize absolute power and it redefines the tradition to their advantage. Under such circumstances the distorted value system of this powerful class can impede to a considerable extent the necessary structural transformation. This is exactly what happened in India. Besides, the law of *Karma*, and the *Caste System* (though very often functionally it was *jati* or the *dominant group* that operated in determining behaviour of the people rather than the caste or *varna*) were certainly the two most predominant aspects of Indian tradition and the prevalence of them is a clear denial of any structural progress in the country.

### Reality of Modern India

Let us come back to the case in point. Has there been enough modernization in India ? The answer is very clearly and emphatically No. Anybody with a bit of common sense will admit that the proof of modernization is best visible in the context of rural poverty in India ; and whatever the World Bank, the IMF say, we cannot (humanly as well as logically) modernize our country by a super sophisticated means of providing the people with free family planning goods, but only by uplifting very directly the peasant economy. Yet the fact of poverty in terms of getting even the biological essentials are appalling and frustrate all optimistic *talks* unless, of course, one is morally perverse. It is very significant to note that very little real changes have been introduced into the scene towards amelioration since Dadabhai Nauroji submitted his survey on Indian poverty about hundred years ago. The centenary of this stagnation is well brought out in Dandekar and Rath's report on "Poverty in India" in 1971. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VI. No. 1., Jan. 1971) and I quote:

"In 1960-61, 40 per cent of the rural population and 50 per cent of the urban population lived below the poverty line; that is with diets inadequate even in respect of calories...Even a conservative correction of the NSS estimates on this account makes it clear that the small gains of development during the past decade have been very unequally distributed and the *gulf between the rich and the poor has widened*...The processes of economic development as we have witnessed them in the past, require that the rich must become more rich before the poor can secure the minimum...But much before this happens, the gulf between the rich and the poor will widen intolerably and inevitably undermine the democratic foundations of the economy. Indeed, if it is allowed to continue



unchecked there is enough time between now and 1980-81 for the process to be completed. [emphasis mine]

Statistics or no statistics the above lines unambiguously lay bare the trend that there is a far greater perpetuation of economic and political *status quo* in terms of fundamentals rather than any revolutionary structural transformation which is only *the* basic pre-condition of modernization.

A proper structural change or modernization today is sure to call for both a political and economic intervention in their widest possible sphere. Indian poverty is not independent of the word politics. In spite of this modern touch the problem of modernization has to be mainly related with the peasantry of the country. It is indeed on account of this that the problem of 'tradition versus modernity', attains its true significance. In the case of India, therefore, the necessary and sufficient conditions for modernization will be dependent on three following factors :

○ The serious tackling of rural poverty which is related with industrialization;

○ The politically decisive class-alliance of the peasantry, and

○ The dissolving of caste in favour of class. There are no extensive changes in any of the above mentioned aspects; hence no significant modernization has taken place in India.

All the three factors centre around the peasant economy, peasant politics and peasant society. India is flirting with the peasant problems and thereby being only half-hearted towards industrialization. She has preferred the model of so-called 'development' or 'stability model' than a productive breakthrough and distributional reorganization.

In countries like England, France and U. S. A., in their early period of modernization the peasantry was liquidated or absent. The entire foundation of Western democracy was thus found as minimising the role of their peasantry.

In Germany and Japan there was a revolution at the top or facism—the peasants made a political alliance with the ruling class. The German junkers were interested both in Rye and Iron.

The third alternative is the alternative of revolution at the bottom or establishment of a socialist society. But everywhere in the world the real process of modernization started either by a negative or a positive solution of the peasants problem. I shall quote here the opinion of an eminent, but none too radical, historian, Barrington Moore :

The process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail. It culminates during the twentieth century with peasant revolutions that succeed. No longer is it possible to take seriously the view that the peasant is an 'object of history', a form of social life over which historical changes pass but which contributes nothing to the impetus of these changes. (*op. cit.*, p. 453)

By the term peasantry I refer to a certain life-style as well as a certain

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mode of production. Whether there is a developed proletarian class with a different culture of their own and whether they are the vanguards or the poor peasants are the vanguards of revolution is a serious controversy into which we do not intend here to enter. What we suggest is that a thorough-going modernization primarily deals with the peasant phenomena. We shall not deny that indirectly intend to controvert Fanon's idea of the role of the lumpen proletariat in the Third World or Marcuse and Oglesby's new left orientation of a class-less revolution. But, however important, the assessment of the revolutionary class is, We are not dealing here with that problem directly. Our emphasis on this general peasant phenomena springs directly from a belief that unless the proper political and economic as well as life-style dialectics of the peasantry are dealt with strongly, mere industrialization may fail to modernize a Third World country in the true sense of the term. That is why perhaps in spite of Marx's hopes, introduction of Railways in India did not modernize the country in a meaningful sense. In other words, mere technocratic planing without an overall human (peasant class) consideration may never succeed ; and India presents such a case of discontinuous, technological bias in her industrialisation programme without attention to the major human factor—the peasantry. Consequently, the necessary model of an agriculture-industry continuum is clearly absent in our country.

It is *exclusively the peasants* in a colonized country which reflect a set, die-hard, determined life style compared to any other group. Therefore, traditional challenge becomes most intense in terms of the peasants. We are inclined towards the view that in a colonized country the superstructure grows in importance and weight more than that of the so-called developed countries. Hence, any structural change has to be relevant and intense enough to affect our agricultural population primarily.

### Indian Philosophical Doctrines :

We have already pointed out that there is no unique and universally acceptable value system for every Indian irrespective of their class and caste. As a matter of fact caste system is such a sinister method of human oppression that those who enjoy the privileges of the system have to rationalize and mystify human life into an incredible metaphysics of renunciation, *vairagya*, *moksa*, transitoriness of this life and *karma-phala*. Especially because a man's caste is a cage he is born into, once born, unless he renounces this life there is no reasonable way to escape its oppression. Thus tradition in the sense of station in life determined by

birth is merely an exasperating sense of fatalism and *karma-phala* and *adrsta-vada*. These are not merely cherished values, they are still grim actualities. One can hardly say that a peasant cherishes other-worldly sense or *vairagya* in any other sense but as an escape from this iron mould. Therefore, what is conceived as a challenge to the *elites* is a blessing and boon to a vast number (majority) of *people*. Through thousands of years the elite tradition has dehumanised the people in India and the Third World, so much that there is only one thing worse than this and that is death; perhaps not even that. That is why the people who crowd Aurobindo Ashrama or Vendants Missions, or *Maths* are mostly those elites rather than the bulk of peasantry or industrial workers. Now, of course, Europeans and Americans, disgusted with their affluence and bombardment of Viet-Nam or some such colonies, define the "Spiritual India" to which we gladly give in. In lieu of the white races' recognition of our culture we become buffoons to give them the 'exotic' and 'grass brand of mysticism'. We are also creating some gurus for export purpose.

### Modernity and the Indian Renaissance

It is often maintained by many including Srinivas that though not structurally, at least a large portion of our infra-structure has been completely modernised by rejecting the traditional pattern. It is precisely to forestall this view that we made a distinction between *modernity* and *modernization*. We shall briefly refer to the effects of this modernity on the elite tradition and show how the elite class of India very quickly adjusted to modernity keeping the caste system more or less intact. As a matter of fact we can substitute the term "Westernization" for the fancy term *modernity* as Srinivas openly does in his book *Social Change in Modern India*. Srinivas is so lyrical in praise about this process of Westernization that we feel tempted to quote his own words :

Implicit in Westernization are certain value preferences. A most important value, which in turn subsumes several other values, is what may be broadly characterized as humanitarianism, by which it meant an active concern for the welfare of all human beings irrespective of caste, economic position, religion, age, and sex. (*loc cit.*, Univ. of California Press, 1971, p. 48, paper back).

*Could anyone believe that any seeing person with minimum knowledge of the history and practice of Capitalism and the West would ever say that 'economic position' and 'sex' makes no difference in the Western World? He should be lucky to have omitted to mention 'Race' along with "Caste, age...etc."*

However, this brand of modernity or Westernization started in 19th century Bengal very ceremoniously. We have been brain washed since school days to hold in highest esteem the Renaissance leaders as the first group of 'Modern men' in India. Undoubtedly this process posed some problems

or even challenges to the existing *elite tradition* but the elites who naturally came from the relatively higher castes showed amazing adjustments towards the impact of this new trend. I shall submit that these elites developed two distinct models of adjustment apparently antagonistic, but perpetuating the same goal of retaining the new privileges within the fortunate or privileged castes. The wiser and more effective model was a (1) *Rationalistic or liberal model*: Since the nineteenth century Bengal reformism, this was the most practised model. It suited the new middle class which was emerging and taking shape under the influence of Western education and orientation. Outwardly, these pioneers talked a lot against the Hindu tradition and Rammohon Roy in a talk with the Frenchman Jacquemont expressed his hope that this new elite class will lead a *popular movement of emancipation*. (See Amit Sen, *Notes on Bengal Renaissance*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 10.)

Yet it is amazing how these crusaders of emancipation left the caste system untouched and unaffected. In essence this was only an extension of the old, elitistic, caste-determined model subsequently generating a *high-caste nationalism*.

The second model developed as a competitive reaction to the above one is (2) *The Orthodoxy or Revivalistic model*. Radhakanto Deb was a leader of this group. This revivalism started under the garb of religious synthesis and preached and practised by Ramakrishna. We need not mention that this model could present nothing but a song of glory for ancient India though active enough to enjoy the educational privileges and finally ended up in laying the foundation for the Sanskrit College and an organized Revivalistic approach. In other words the two neighbouring Colleges, Sanskrit College and Presidency College divided among themselves the same new privileges within the elite castes under different names. (See the author's paper, *Models for Change and Tradition in India*", in *Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, 1971).

The two adjustment models clearly account for why in India till the other day we clung to that trend of Westernization which represented basically the feudal West (England) rather than the Industrial West. This same fact was referred to by Nehru as "Double faces of England" in his *Discovery of India*. It is not insignificant that Nehru, a Kashmiri Brahman, a blend of Indian and Etonian himself, often slipped into the washed out old face of England. We have differentiated between modernity and modernization not merely to explain historically the scope of traditional challenge or for academic analysis but mainly to draw attention to the absurd happening in India (and in South Asia) specially in the field of education that can best be called a 'cultural confusion' which, paradoxically enough, allows an unbalanced power and wealth in the unproductive sector of the nation. The educational institutions of India are clearly the citadels of perpetuating modernity often at the cost of modernization. Normally, in developed countries, the institutions play more or less the role of an infrastructure serving the interests of the big bourgeoisie. The institutions, in

this sense, play a reasonable role towards enhancing, though indirectly, the productive level of a country. In India and the Third World nations, on the contrary, it will be wrong to say that the educational infra-structure is being maximally dominated or used by the capitalist sector. As a matter of fact, the intellectuals, as a class, have accumulated an undesirable amount of power of their own and an unreasonably large part of our economy is spent for this class—a class which is alienated and farthest from the production platform of the country. In short, this class is systematically substituting the process of modernization by that of modernity. This explains why we have English in top level education, why we have a vertical rather than horizontal distribution of education and also why, (especially in West Bengal) an unbelievably large amount of money is used by this tertiary sector. The result is, our education has completely sacrificed the two most vital factors—'Need' and 'Relevance'. Our present education is neither needed nor relevant whether for the people of the country or even for the capitalists of the country. It is, therefore, a dispensable cultural appendix (highly inflated) on the people and national economy. A challenge of *modernization* thus has to be not merely a challenge to Indian *tradition* but also to this dangerous phenomenon of *modernity*. This is why we have said that in erstwhile colonies, superstructure has an enhanced role and importance, the superstructure not merely negatively contributes in maintaining a status quo, but positively substitutes an unproductive model and/or image for that of a productive one.

### CONCLUSIONS :

○ Modernization has not been intensive and extensive enough in India in the sense of a structural transformation.

○ The prevalence of caste system and subsequent Westernization have created and maintained an alienation between the people and the elites and have thereby kept up the conditions for a dual society.

○ The hope lies in further industrialisation through which only there can be a class polarisation which will help dissolve the old caste system and consequently bring the real challenge to our tradition. But such industrialization has to be rurally oriented keeping in mind the fact of colonization and consequent drain on the peasantry of the country. At times, therefore, we may even have to incorporate aspects of tradition and fight the queer phenomenon called "modernity". □

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## OUR MEANING

Documentation of the *invisible wars* can be extended to the lynching and burning and destruction of blacks, Amerindians, harijans, and other under-privileged minority citizens in the civilized socio-economic democratic systems. Should we still pursue in vain the age old metaphysical search for *nirvana*? Or should we bring forth all knowledge, wisdom and science and technological know-how at creating such a reasoning and philosophical enlightenment among the people that instead of succumbing to the myth of *karma*, the hunjuri woman can find strength and determination to raise the cries of *dharmayudha*; that instead of jumping into the well of death hanjuri could muster strength to obtain all necessary elements from rich hoarders' godowns; that instead of keeping her alive in prison, the society and magistrates could provide her with food, shelter, education and institution for rehabilitation? And most urgently of all we would like, through PSA, to provide the hanjurian people with socio-economic and scientific analysis of realities rather than permitting them to be the victim of metaphysical myths. Through PSA we would like to revive the Socratic philosophical tradition of dialogue on an equal basis with students, workers, farmers and the common men.

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