NEW DIMENSIONS IN JAINA LOGIC

YUVACARYA MAHAPRAJNA
English rendering of "Jaina Nyaya Ka Vikasa"
by Dr. NATHMAL TATIA

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ABOUT THE BOOK

THE NEW DIMENSIONS IN JAINA LOGIC by **Yuvacaryasri Mahparajna** is a critical study of Jaina Logic in its various important aspects. *Yuvacaryasri* delivered a series of nine lecturers under the auspices of the Centre of Jaina Studies, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, on the origin and development of Jaina logic. The present work is substantially based on the subject-matter of those lectures. Besides dealing with the central issues of Jain logic, the learned author has thrown new light on *anekanta; nayavade, sydvada,* and *saptabhangi.* The topics of inference and universal concomitance have been critically dealt with, bringing out the vital contributions of the Jaina logicians in this field.

While dealing with inference and universal concomitance, the author throws new light on the latter with reference to modern science.

We draw the attention of the reader to the critical treatment accorded to the topic in the book. The work has been made more attractive and valuable by appending some vital logical questions along with their critical and intelligible answers at the end of each chapter. The addition of a number of valuable appendices to the book makes it all the more engaging for the readers.

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FOREWORD

The *New Dimensions in Jaina Logic* by Yuvācāryaśrī Mahāprajña is a critical study of Jaina Logic in its various important aspects. Yuvācāryaśrī delivered a series of nine lectures under the auspices of the Centre of Jaina Studies, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, on the origin and development of Jaina Logic. The present work is substantially based on the subject-matter of those lectures. Besides dealing with the central issues of Jaina logic, the learned author has thrown new light on *anekānta, nayavāda, syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī*. The topics of inference and universal concomitance have been critically dealt with, bringing out the vital contributions of the Jaina logicians in this field.

Jainism is essentially a spiritual tradition, as distinguished from the predominantly logical one, viz. the *Nyāya,* and mainly ontological in nature, viz. the Vaiśeṣika system. Jainism may be classed with the *Yoga* and the *Vedānta* systems which were spiritually oriented. The logical thought of the Jainas, while maintaining spiritual character, developed in three stages, viz. the first and the earliest phase embedded in the Prakrit Āgamas, the second one in the philosophical literature that began with Siddhasena Divākara, and the third phase of logic and critical philosophy that started with Akalaṅka. The doctrines of *anekānta, naya* and *saptabhaṅgī* that were present, in their rudiments, in the earliest phase, received their critical treatment in the second phase of Jaina thought. A critical reformulation of the principles of epistemology and logic took place in the third phase of the logical thinking of the Jainas, which took note of the great advances made in the field by the Buddhist logicians headed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and the Brahmanical thinkers with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara in the vanguard. This third period of the development of Jaina logic that started with Akalaṅka and virtually ended with Yaśovijaya of the seventeenth century of the Christian era may be considered as the adolescent stage of Jaina logical thinking.

The *Āgamic* period of Jaina logic kept itself busy with the earlier Jaina epistemology of direct and indirect cognition, according as the cognition was effected directly by the power of the soul or depended upon the instrumentality of the mind and the sense-organs. This was obviously in conformity with the spiritual tradition of the Jainas. The contribution of early Jainism to the subject of epistemology has many a peculiarity which was absent in the systems contemporaneous with it. The doctrine of *Karma* of the Jainas was very intimately bound up with their epistemological speculations. The author of the book has very successfully dealt with the subject, clearly bringing out its distinct features.

In the third stage, that is, the philosophical period, a clear line of demarcation was drawn between logic and dogma. The author in this connection refers to the views of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena on the subject. In the section on the axioms of *anekānta* 'non-absolutism', the book discusses the concomitance of 'the universal and the particular', 'the permanent and the impermanent', 'existence and non-existence', and 'the speakable and the unspeakable' in great detail and brings out the heart of non-absolutism which is a unique contribution in that *anekānta* is here established as a doctrine that rejects no part of our experience dogmatically, nor accepts anything that is not supported by unbiased reasoning and critical estimation.

The section on the doctrine of *naya,* which recognizes the infinity of objective modes and the corresponding infinity of subjective approaches, raises some very pertinent issues connected with causality and ontology as dealt with by Jaina philosophers. The doctrine of *nikṣepa* also is brought in and its relationship to doctrine of *naya* is critically determined.

The section dealing with *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* makes a historical survey of the doctrine right from the days of the *Āgamas.* A very important excerpt from the writings of P.C. Mahalanobis is also quoted in this connection which draws our attention to 'the realist and pluralist views of Jaina philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery'.

Dealing with the third phase of the logical thinking of the Jainas the author asserts that the Buddhists and the Jainas entered the arena of logic rather at a late period, their main interest at the early stages being mainly soteriological. The credit of developing a comprehensive system of instruments and sources of knowledge can be assigned to Ācārya Akalaṅka of the eighth century of the Christian era, according to the author.

While dealing with inference and universal concomitance, the author throws new light on the latter with reference to modern science. We draw the attention of the reader to the critical treatment accorded to the topic in the book.

The work has been made more attractive and valuable by appending some vital logical questions along with their critical and intelligible answers at the end of each chapter. The addition of a number of valuable appendices to the book makes it all the more engaging for the readers.

The book, I am sure, will be a most valuable addition to the field of modern research in Indian logic in general, and the logical literature of the Jainas in particular.

15th January, 1984. —NATHMAL TATIA

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I

Jaina Logic of the Agama Period

Knowledge and the Known

Discussion on valid knowledge occupies a foremost place in Indian philosophy, and it is followed by a treatment of the nature of reality. Knowledge and reality are the fundamental constituents of logic. Reality is determined by knowledge. Īśvarakṛṣṇa opines that reality is proved by knowledge (*prameyasiddhih pramānaddhi*).[1] Ācārya Akalanka also holds the same view. Reality possesses its independent existence, but its proof depends upon knowledge.[2] Until and unless the nature of knowledge is ascertained, reality cannot be established. Hence the science of knowledge (sciences of *tarka, ānvīkṣikī* or *nyaya*) is invariably dealt at length at the outset of philosophy.

In the *Āgama* texts the discussion of knowledge precedes that dealing with the object of knowledge. In the *Pravacanasāra* Ācārya Kundakunda has propounded the chapter of knowledge prior to that dealing with the object of knowledge. Similarly the *Anuyogadvara* and *Nandīsūtra* also begin with aphorisms dealing with knowledge.

The object of knowledge is truth. Knowledge is the means to know it. Truth exists in itself. It neither depends upon the knowledge of the knower nor does it originate from it. Consciousness (*caitanya*) also has its independent existence. It neither depends upon the object of knowledge, nor does it owe its origin to it. When something is known by consciousness, it becomes a case of knowledge, and that which is known becomes the object of knowledge. Consciousness is endowed with the capacity to know, and so it becomes knowledge. By the same logic, the object is competent to be known, so it becomes the object of knowledge. Hence the Jaina philsophers have discussed epistemology prior to ontology.

There are two views about the object of cognition (*prameya*). Some systems acknowledge the reality of the object known, whereas others deny it; but this does not hold good in the case of knowledge. The reality as well as the unreality of the object known are established by knowledge. The discussion on knowledge, therefore, is essential at the outset.

The Types of Knowledge

There is no unanimity among the systems of philosophy regarding the types of knowledge. The Cārvāka system recognizes only one, namely perception. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas approve of only two types of knowledge—perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumana*). Jainism too agrees to two kinds—direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). The Sāṃkhya philosophy admits three—Perception, Inference, and Scripture (*Āgama*). The Naiyāyikas accept four—Perception, Inference, Scripture and Analogy (*upamāna*). Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Prabhākara admits five adding Implication (*arthāpatti*) to the above four, while Kumārila adds one more called Negation (*abhāva*), thus bringing the number to six. Maharṣi Caraka recognises one more, namely Ratiocination (*yukti*) and the Paurāṇikas add Historical Record (*aitihya*), thus bringing the total number to eight. This number may be further augmented. The question, however, is about the absence of consensus among the logicians about the number of the types of knowledge. The problem deserves further investigation.

Variety of Knowledge on account of the Variety of its Sources

There are four sources of knowledge—

1. Sensual Knowledge.
2. Mental Knowledge.
3. Intellectual Knowledge (*prajñā*).
4. Extra-sensory Knowledge.

The philosophers who considered the sensual knowledge alone as the ultimate determinant had no other alternative than to acknowledge only one type of knowledge, namely, perception. Among the Indian thinkers only the Cārvāka regarded the sensual knowledge alone as the source of the search for truth. They believe that what is perceived through senses is alone real; the rest is unreal. The extra-sensory knowledge is nothing but sheer imagination. When the sensual knowledge alone is capable of knowing, there can be no other source of knowledge than perception. The Cārvāka system had to face a number of difficulties on account of its accepting perception alone as the source of knowlege. They had to accept the utility of inference (*anumāna*) to support their theory. That acceptance was merely formal for practical purposes, but not as a matter of logical necessity.

Francis Bacon, the reputed philosopher of the sixteenth

century A.D., laid the greatest emphasis on the theory of sense-experience, and termed the super-sensory transcendental knowledge as untrue and imaginary. According to him, that which is not perceived through senses, is not real; that which is devoid of direct sense-knowledge is utterly false. The empiricist philosophers have also accepted the importance of intellect (*prajñā*). Bacon holds that sense-experiences alone are not sufficient, the inductive argument is also necessary. First of all, we are to collect the data of events and facts on the basis of sense-experience. Then we should analyse them. On the basis of agreement and difference derived from such an analysis, we have to search out the general laws (*vyāpti*) or reason. In this way Bacon has synthesized experience and reason.

Sensory knowledge, mental knowledge and reason—all these come under the locus of the body. The instrument of sensuous knowledge is the brain and the system of physical organs. The tool of mind (*manas*) and intellect (*prajñā*) is the brain. The Indian thinkers have further accepted the possibility of extra-sensory knowledge. The essense of such thinking is that there is knowledge beyond the senses, mind and intellect. This was neither intellectual nor logical. The experience of such knowledge was obtained through the practice of meditation. They practised meditation which was free from conceptual thinking, where the senses, the mind, the intellect, reason and all conceptions cease to function. At that non-conceptual stage they realised the truth and approved of the reality of the transcendental knowledge. Such knowledge transcends the senses, the mind and the intellect. No physical instrument is active, nor the services of any physical instrument is in demand at this stage. The scriptural testimony derived its sanction from such transcendental knowledge of the *yogins*. The scriptural knowledge, in other words, is the endorsement of transcendental knowledge. In the absence of the approval of such transcendental knowledge the validity of scriptural testimony could not have found place in the epistemological system.

According to Ācārya Kundakunda, the person possessing extra-sensory knowledge knows and perceives the entire truth.[4] Indian philosophical systems have accepted transcendental knowledge in some form or the other. The Jaina and the Buddhist thinkers have accepted the power of extra-sensory knowledge in human beings. The theologists have accepted God alone as possessed of transcendental knowledge. The philosophers of Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools hold scriptures

as a source of valid knowledge. In Jaina system there are five kinds of non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) means of valid knowledge. The fifth among them is the *Āgama*.[5] The variety of the sources explain the various limitations of the cognitive power.

Diversity of the Ontological Systems due to the Diversity of the Cognitive Faculties

Due to the diversity of the views of the cognitive powers there is diversity of ontological views. Different systems of philosophy have admitted different kinds of reals. Jaina philosophy believes in six substances (*dravyas*) and nine categories (*tattvas*). Similarly, there are twenty-five categories in Sāṃkhya, four noble truths in Buddhism, sixteen in Nyāya and seven in the Vaiśeṣika system. Had there been any kind of uniformity in the conception of the valid source of knowledge, there would have been uniformity in the ontological conception as well. On account of the absence of the uniformity about the cognitive apparatus, there is a lack of unanimity about the ontological principles. Let us cite some examples in order to clarify the point:

(i) The sensualist systems regard the object as gross and possessed of form. The extra-sensualist systems believe also in the existence of formless and subtle objects. There are three opinions about the soul (*ātman*).

- The soul as non-entity.
- Monistic conception of the soul.
- Pluralistic view of the souls.

The sensualist systems do not believe in the existence of the soul. The soul is not perceptible by the senses and, therefore, the sensualists do not accept its existence. The extra-sensualists accept the reality of the soul. They are also divided into two schools. Among them the Vedāntists and the supporters of the monistic view have given sanction to monistic theories of the soul. Jainism has accepted plurality of the souls. The Nyāya nd Vaiśeṣika systems also have propounded pluralistic views.

(ii) There are many views about the problem of permanence and transitoriness, that is, the doctrines of impermanence, permanence and permanence-cum-impermanence. All the things are impermanent according to Buddhism, while the Sāṃkhya philosophers believe in permanence. Naiyāyikas believe both in permanence and impermanence. The Naiyāyikas regard space and soul as

eternal and the candle light etc. as non-eternal. The Jainas are the upholders of permanence-cum-impermanence not in the sense that some objects are absolutely permanent and others are absolutely impermanent, as the Naiyāyikas think. According to Jainism everything, from space to the light of the candle, is permanent as well as impermanent. Neither the space is absolutely eternal, nor is the light absolutely non-eternal. There is innate transformation taking place in the space, and as such, it is also impermanent. Similarly, the light of the candle, on account of the eternality of the constituent atoms, is permanent as well. There is, therefore, nothing which is absolutely permanent or absolutely impermanent according to the philosophy of non-absolutism.[6]

(iii) All the doctrines of causation, viz. non-existence of the effect in the cause, existence of the effect in the cause and existence-cum-non-existence of the effect in the cause presuppose particular systems of ontology. Sāṃkhya system, being the upholder of the doctrine of existence of the effect in the cause, admits the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. There cannot be the production of an effect which was absolutely non-existent in the past. The effect necessarily pre-exists in its material cause. All kinds of effects cannot originate from all kinds of causes. The causes, howsoever efficient, can produce only those effects which they are intrinsically capable of producing. The existence of the effect in the cause, therefore, is indisputable.[7] The effect resides in the cause as a potentiality.

The Vaiśeṣika system supports the non-existence of the effect in the cause. In other words, it believes in causality as novel creation (*ārambhavāda*). One single indivisible entity is produced, according to this system, from the congregation of atoms, the entity being absolutely non-existent in the past.

The Buddhist philosophers are also the upholders of non-existence of the effect in the cause. The present moment, according to them, has absolutely no nexus with the moments that precede and succeed.

Jainism propounds the existence-cum-non-existence of the effect in the cause. In other words it conceives the real as an eternal entity perpetually undergoing change. From the substantial standpoint the real can never cease to exist, nor can an unreal ever be produced. The doctrine of the existence of effect in the cause is,

therefore, a logically valid concept.[8] From the modal standpoint, however, the existent is vanishing every moment, and the non-existent is emerging without halt. The doctrine of the non-existence of the effect in the cause is also, therefore, not an inconsistent doctrine. The soul is never bereft of the attribute of consciousness, which implies that the real can never vanish, nor can the unreal ever arise.[9] The soul passes through different states constantly which means that the real ceases to exist, giving place to an entity which was non-existent in the past.[10]

Curd, according to the doctrine of the effect in the cause, is a mere modification of milk. Between the two, therefore, there is no difference in substance. A piece of cloth, according to the believers in non-existence of the effect in the cause, is discrete entity produced from the threads, and as such it is absolutely different from the cause. According to the doctrine of existence-cum-non-existence of the effect in the cause the atoms of earth have the potentiality of being transformed into a jar as well as a pot, but a clod of earth has no apparent competence to be transformed into a piece of cloth. It is, however, directly capable of being transformed into a jar.

Different effects have different material for their causes. They all are not produced from a single material cause. The synthetic view of the substantial and the modal potentialities alone can explain the relationship between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent' (patent and latent). There is the potentiality in the atoms of milk of being transformed directly into curd, while the same atoms can be transformed circuitously into those of cotton seeds. Milk itself is a modal form of the atoms, and no mode as such is eternal. Only the atoms are eternal. Milk, curd, earth, cotton seeds,—all these are the modes of atoms and, therefore, the present state of an entity, directly derived from any particular mode of the atoms is called 'existent' while the state circuitously derived is called, 'non-existent' (at a particular time). The doctrine of existence-cum-non-existence of the effect in the cause can also be explained on the basis of such 'existent' and 'non-existent' modes.

(ii) In the domain of philosophy there are two streams of thought—Realism and Nihilism or Idealism. The sensualist thinkers believe that only what is perceptible is real. According to the Jaina, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya systems the sensual objects are not unreal. The Buddhist system falls into two

branches—Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, the latter again being divided into two—idealism and nihilism. According to the Buddhist idealists, the cognitum, as different from the cognition, is not real. It is only imaginary and illusive like the dream or the will-o'-the-wisp. Śāṅkara Vedānta also holds a similar view. Among the Western thinkers, Hume and Berkeley have also denied the existence of anything other than the stream of experience. All the philosophers of the idealistic persuasion have denied the real existence of things of the world.

Definition of *Nyāya* (Logic)

The existence of things is self-evident. The knower may know it or not, but it makes no difference in their existence. They become known when the knower knows them, and if such knowledge is right or is the determinant of the object, it is called the valid organ of knowledge. The definition of the science of logic has been formulated on this basis. According to Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, the term *nyāya* stands for an examination of reality by means of a valid organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).[11] According to Umāsvāti the knowledge of the real is obtained through *pramāṇa* (a comprehensive organ of knowledge) and *naya* (a partial organ of knowledge).[12] In the light of this aphorism in the system of Jaina Logic the term *nyāya* should be defined as *pramāṇanayairarthādhigamo nyāyaḥ* . *Nyāya* is the knowledge of the real by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. In other words the ascertainment or examination of the nature of reality by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya* is *nyaya*. Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārtika*, defines *nyāya* as the knowledge of reality through the action of an instrument of knowledge.[13] In the Jaina tradition the term *yukti* (reasoning) is more prevalent than the term *nyāya*. It is held by Yativṛṣabha that to the person who does not examine objects by means of *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa,* the right appears as wrong and the wrong as right.[14]

The meaning of the term *pramāṇa* is right knowledge. The term *naya* stands for the intention or purpose of the knower who knows a particular aspect of the object. The term *nikṣepa* means the way of knowing the object in respect of the aspect presented. The ascertainment of the meaning of the object, arrived at by reasoning through *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa* is *nyāya*. This *nyāya,* according to Yativṛṣabha, has been handed down from generation to generation.[15] The expression *'syāt'* is the representative of Jaina *nyāya* according to Ācārya Samantabhadra. Absolute

affirmation and absolute negation is not accepted according to this view. Affirmation and negation are relative concepts.[16] In the Jaina tradition the entire epistemological and logical systems do not transgress the limits prescribed by *syādvāda*. On the basis of these facts the definition of *nyāya* in the logical systems of the Jaina should be as follows: *nyāya* means the relative comprehension of the real effected through *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa*.

Three Periods of Jaina Logic

Jaina Logic can be divided in three periods of time—

1. Jaina Logic of the period of *āgamas*.
2. Jaina Logic of the period of philosophy.
3. Jaina Logic of the period of critical study of organs of knowledge.

The period of the advent of Lord Mahāvīra is 599-527 B.C. The *Āgamic* period extends from this period upto the first century A.D. The period of philosophy starts from second century A.D. and that of the critical study of the organs of knowledge from eighth-ninth century A.D.

Jaina Logic of the Period of *Āgamas*

In the logic of the *Āgama* period there is a detailed discussion of the concept of knowledge and intuition (*darśana*). The consciousness, as covered by *kārmic* veil, has two forms—potential (*labdhi*) and manifest (*upayoga*). The development of the power of knowing the object is potentiality and the patent activity of knowing is manifestation (*upayoga*) of knowledge.

The manifestation is again of two kinds—determinate (*sākāra*) and indeterminate (*anākāra*). Determination means concept.[17] The activity of consciousness accompanied with determination is called determinate (conceptual) manifestation of knowledge. This is called knowledge (as distinct from intuition). The activity of consciousness bereft of determination is called indeterminate manifestation. This is called intuition (as distinct from knowledge). In the Jaina *Āgamas* the expressions *'savikalpa'* (conceptual) and *'nirvikalpa'* (non-conceptual) are not employed. The usage of *'sākāra'* (determinate) and *'anākāra'* (indeterminate) is very old. There is no difference of meaning between *'sākāra'* and *'savikalpa'*, and *'anākāra'* and *'nirvikalpa'*. The intuitional consciousness (*darśana cetanā*) is non-conceptual and the knowing consciousness (*jñāna cetanā*) is conceptual.

The instrument of knowing is knowledge. The soul is the knower. It knows the object through knowledge. Knowledge is the attribute of the soul. The relation between the soul and the knowledge is like the one between substance (*guṇī*) and quality (*guṇa*). The quality is neither absolutely different from, nor absolutely dentical with the substance. The soul is the substance while knowledge is the quality. It is from this standpoint that the knowledge is somehow different from the soul. Knowledge certainly belongs to the soul. It is from this standpoint that the former is somehow identical with the latter.

The knowledge is of five kinds—

1. *Mati*—Sensual and intellectual.
2. *Śruta*—Scriptural.
3. *Avadhi*—Clairvoyance.
4. *Manaḥparyava*—Mind reading.
5. *Kevala*—Omniscience.

Of the above five, the two viz. *mati* and *śruta* are sensual and the rest are super-sensual. Of them again the four are for oneself, while the scriptural knowledge is both for oneself and for others.[18] Knowledge is essentially self-cognising. It is the language that communicates knowledge to others. The scriptural knowledge is also, in itself, non-communicative, although it is couched in words. On account of this relationship with language the scriptural knowledge is metaphorically regarded as communicative.[19] In the above classification of knowledge the divisions of perceptual and non-perceptual are not the main types.[20] There is, however, another way of classification of knowledge where sensual knowledge is regarded as non-perceptual (mediate) and super-sensual knowledge is regarded as perceptual (immediate).[21] In this classification the first two types of the above mentioned list fall under the former, and the last three under the latter category.

Ācārya Kundakunda holds that the senses are not intrinsically related to the soul. They are external substances. What is external cannot be the nature of the soul. How can the knowledge attained through what is not the nature of the soul be considered a perception belonging to the soul? The knowledge acquired through an instrument which is other than the soul is, therefore, to be treated as mediate (*parokṣa*).[22] Only that knowledge which originates from the soul and which is not dependent on the sense-organs. the mind and the intellect is direct (*pratyakṣa*).[23] The knowledge which can cognise formless substances and also the super-

sensible material substances, as well as the substances which are hidden, is called direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge.[24] The unmanifest mode cannot be known by sensuous knowledge, but it can be known by the direct perceptual knowledge. The subtle mode, submerged in the gross one, cannot be known by sensuous knowledge. But the direct perceptual knowledge can know it. The knowledge obtained through the sense-organs and the mind is, therefore, non-perceptual (indirect, mediate), while the knowledge obtained exclusively through the soul is direct in the true sense of the term.

Another reason for regarding the sensual knowledge as indirect (non-perceptual) is that there is always a possibility for doubt and error in such knowledge. In support of this view, Jinabhadragaṇī avers that the sensuous and the mental knowledge is indirect (non-perceptual) because of the possibility of doubt and error in them. In the direct knowledge there is the absence of doubt, error and indeterminateness.[25]

The Nature of Knowledge

The consciousness of the soul is unitary and undivided. It is effulgent by nature like the sun. It has two phases—uncovered and covered. The consciousness which is fully uncovered is the unalloyed and innate knowledge. It can also be called knowledge which is free from any condition (imposed property). There is no need of effort for knowledge in the state of uncovered consciousness and hence that knowledge is inborn. Even in the covered state the consciousness is not totally covered, being necessarily uncovered to a certain extent. When the clouds which cover the sun are dense, the light is dimmer. But so much light as can distinguish the day from the night is certainly there. Knowledge is dim when the cover on consciousness is dense. The denser the cover, the dimmer the knowledge. Nevertheless, there is uncovered consciousness enough for the demarcation between soul and non-soul. Such consciousness is mutilated or conditioned (by extraneous factors).[26] Knowledge is not only a conception (*pratyaya*) or a cognition produced by mere sensual experience, but it is the very nature of the soul. It always exists with the soul. It is neither generated at birth nor abandoned at death. The relation between knowledge and soul is not like the one between the soul and the physical body which is acquired at birth and relinquished at death. The soul is not a *tabula rasa* on which our experience scribbles with its fingers of sensations and self-feelings.

The Ultimate Source and Origin of Knowledge

Knowledge is the natural attribute of the soul, which remains uncovered more or less. It can thus be said that the uncovered state of consciousness is the ultimate source of knowledge. There are three more additional sources, viz. sense-organs, mind and the soul. The development of our sense-organs depends on the development of the consciousness. The diversity (degree) of the physical sense-organs is dependent upon the diversity of the development of consciousness. The development of the mind is also dependent upon the development of consciousness. The knowledge arising independently of the sense-organs and the mind is dependent only upon the soul. Thus from the point of view of the development of consciousness the basic sources of knowledge are three, that is, senses, mind and the soul.

The cause of the origin of knowledge is two-fold, viz. internal and external. Whereas knowledge arises on the proper proximity of the external objects, it can arise also on account of internal contemplation.

Limits of Knowledge

There are five sense-organs—touch, tongue, nose, eye and ear— each of which has the capacity to know a particular kind of object.[27]

	Sense-organs	Objects
1.	Tactile sense-organ	Touch
2.	Gustatory sense-organ	Taste
3.	Olfactory sense-organ	Smell
4.	Visual sense-organ	Colour
5.	Auditory sense-organ	Sound.

The above objects do not produce the sensual cognitions, but the cogniser himself, through his own effort, on the occurrence of proper proximity, cognises them through the respective sense-organs. The sense-organs do not cognise the substance directly. They can know it through the attributes or the modes, and, therefore, the sense-organs cognise the modes directly and the substance only indirectly. They know only the present mode, and therefore, they are not capable of knowing the past and the future modes. The sensualist philosophers consider the sensual experience alone as real cognition. But if there is no cognition which synthe-

sizes the discrete strands of sensual cognitions, we shall never be capable of an integrated determination of the object. The mind does not directly know the objects like touch, taste etc., but only through the sense-organs. The mind, therefore, is not cognizant of the substance (*vastu*). But it has the capacity to synthesize the objects cognised by the sense-organs and also to contemplate on them in the context of the threefold temporal divisions. From this standpoint, the mental cognition is considered more advanced than the sensual intuition.[28]

The experience acquired through the sense-organ is called idea (*prātyaya*) or cognition (*vijñāna*). We do not know only the cognitions, we also discover laws and relations which have been hitherto unknown. This power of knowledge is called intellect or reason.[29] Sensual cognition, mental knowledge and reason constitute the jurisdiction of *matijñāna.*

We know the objects also through symbols and words. On seeing the object called fire, we look for the word which stands for it, or conversely, on knowing the meaning of the word 'fire', we look for the object signified by the word. The domain of scriptural knowledge is constituted by the following—(1) the knowledge consequent upon the meaning-word relationship arising from the judgment 'this shining object is the meaning of the word 'fire'; (2) knowledge obtained through language; and (3) the determination of the knowledge acquired through experiments.

The direct knowledge of the material objects (*mūrta*) is clairvoyance.

The direct knowledge of mind (*manas*) is mind reading.

Absolute knowledge is completely uncovered knowledge, which has the power to know all substances in all their modes. This defines its jurisdiction.

Sensory Knowledge and Epistemology

Metempirical knowledge is an uncommon achievement. It is not common, hence it does not find frequent mention in the treatises on logic. The predominant theme of the logical treatises is the empiricial knowledge (*mati* and *śruta jñāna*).

Matijñāna is a successive process, which is as follows:

1. Contact between the cognitum and the cogniser.
2. Intuition (*darśana*)—Indeterminate cognition; cognition of simple existence.
3. Sensual perception (*avagraha*)—Cognition like 'there is something'.
4. Speculation (*īhā*)—Knowledge of the form of 'it must be there'.
5. Perceptual judgment (*avāya*)—Determination of the form 'This is definitely so'.
6. Retention *(dhāraṇā)*—The persistence of the determined object, predisposition (*vāsanā*), traces and impressions (*saṃskāra*)
7. Memory (*smṛti*)—It is a cognition expressed in the form 'that object', which is consequent upon the awakening of the traces (*saṃskāra*).
8. Recognition (*saṃjñā*)—The judgment 'This is that' arising jointly from memory and perception.
9. Reasoning (*cintā*)—The terms *cintā, tarka* and *ūha* are synonymous. It is the ascertainment of necessary concomitance like 'there occurs smoke only on the occurrence of fire.'
10. Inference (*abhinibodha*)—The knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya*) on the basis of the probans (*hetu*).

The probans is of four kinds:

1. Positive probans leading to affirmation.
2. Negative probans leading to affirmation.
3. Positive probans leading to negation.
4. Negative probans leading to negation.

Sensory perception (*avagraha*) is not possible without the contact between the cognitum and the cogniser, and the intuition (*darsána*). There cannot occur speculation (*īhā*) in the absence of sensory perception (*avagraha*), nor perceptual judgment (*avāya*) in the absence of *īhā,* nor retention (*dhāraṇā*) in the absence of perpetual judgment, nor retention without memory, nor memory without recognition, nor recognition without reasoning, nor reasoning without inference.

Scriptural knowledge or verbal judgment manifested itself in two forms—(1) *Syādvāda* or the doctrine of conditional judgment, and (2) *Naya* or the doctrine of standpoints. The Jaina logicians propounded the nature of ontological reality on the basis of verbal symbols through their doctrine of conditional judgment and the doctrine of standpoints. In the world of logicians the verbal symbols were resorted to and the logical systems developed on that basis. In other words there are as many alternatives of conceptual thinking as there are ways of linguistic expressions, that is, the logical conceptions are commensurate with the varieties of propositions. They are innumerable and accordingly the authoritative judgments can also be innumerable. If looked at from a deeper consideration it will follow that there are as many logically valid propositions as there are determinative ways of thinking and speaking. This also holds good in the domain of the dectrine of standpoints, as has been said—*'jāvaiyā vayaṇapahā tāvaiyā hunti ṇayavāyā'*—there are as many varieties of *nayas* as there are ways of verbal expressions. In other words, the number of *nayas* is determined by our ways, intentions and opinions. The upshot is that the enumeration of the sources of valid knowledge, according to Jaina logic, is a matter of determination in a perspective which is relative.

Dialogue

Question 1. Is it possible to have super-sensual knowledge through the scriptures? Does the person possessing super-sensory knowledge take resort to speech? Is he free from conceptual thoughts?

Answer. Yes, it is possible to know super-sensual objects through the scriptures, but the latter is not a means to super-sensory cognition. The instrument of super-sensory knowledge is the intense practice of meditation. Such knowledge is not possible by means of verbal knowledge, but it is possible only through the realization of a non-conceptual state of meditation. In that state the speech, the conceptions and the sense-organs become defunct. Everything extraneous comes to an end.

Super-sensual knowledge does not arise from the scriptures, but the words of the saint who has achieved super-sensory knowledge become *āgama*. The cessation of verbal thinking and the conceptions does not mean that the saint neither speaks nor thinks anything. Absence of speech and absence of conceptual thinking take place at the time of the rise of the super-sensory experience,

and not at the time of its practical application.

Question 2. Does the cognitum depend upon the cognition?

Answer. The statement that the determination of the cognitum depends on the cognition does not mean that the existence of the cognitum is dependent on the cognition. But both the cognitum and cognition are independent. Both have their own individual existence. The function of cognition is not to produce cognitum, but only to explain, analyse and classify it. Such determinations are possible only by means of knowledge. There is, therefore, no difficulty in this sense to regard the determination of the cognitum dependent upon the cognition. There is water and other things which are existent by themselves since time immemorial. But the examination of the nature of water is possible through the instruments of knowledge. What is the nature of water? Is it a fundamental substance or a compound of elements? Such determination is possible only through valid instruments of knowledge. In matters of scientific determination the instruments of knowledge occupy the primary place, while the cognitum has only a secondary importance.

Question 3. It is our commonplace experience that knowledge is constituted by conceptions, in the form of a judgment. How can the non-conceptual condition of the mind, being a state of meditation, have any kind of judgment?

Answer. We are possessed of only two means of conceptual thinking—mind and speech. While we are engaged in conceptual thinking, our consciousness, which is submerged in the fathomless deep, gets little scope for expression. The uncovering of such consciousness needs the control of the restiveness of respiration, body, speech and mind. This is the state of non-conceptual existence. This again is the process of removing the veil accumulated over consciousness. With the removal of the veil, consciousness which is innate manifests itself. Omniscience, like the sun, is a mass of light. The intervention of clouds effects a change in the intensity of light. The clearness or the dimness of the consciousness is dependent upon the intensity or tenuousness of the veil, even as those of light are dependent on the intensity of thinness of the clouds. The veil on the consciousness is made thin by means of the experience of non-conceptual meditation. The manifestation of knowledge becomes more and more vivid as the veil gets thinner and thinner. Śrī Jayācārya has explained the divisions of knowledge consequent upon its luciditv or otherwise by an example of quadrangular

plank buried under the sand. Only a corner of the plank is visible. The corner appears as an independent entity. Similarly, on the subsidence of the sand the second corner appears to the sight. In this way, the third and the fourth may also come up and as a result four independent objects would constitute the cognitum. Ultimately on the subsidence of the entire mass of sand the resultant cognitum will be one individual undivided plank. Similarly, a cognition is called sensory if it occurs through a window of sense-organ. When a piece of thinking takes place through mind, we call it mental cognition. Cognitions are thus designated according to their media. On the removal of the entire veil all these divisions are dissolved. What remains then is unadulterated knowledge or unconditioned knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) or knowledge pure and simple, that is, knowledge which is spontaneous and inborn. The meaning of *kevalajñāna* is pure consciousness, unadulterated with anything else. Feelings are absolutely absent in such state of knowledge. While there is the element of feeling, there cannot arise pure and unalloyed knowledge. With the dawn of pure unadulterated consciousness, knowledge is converted into meditation, and with the perfection of such consciousness the meditation becomes knowledge, pure and perfect.

Question 4. Is knowledge, according to Jaina logic, competent to know only what is other than itself, or is it also capable of knowing itself?

Answer. Knowledge reveals itself as well as others. What does not reveal itself is not capable of revealing others, like a jar. Only the cognitum, which is insentient, is revealed by other than itself. Had the knowledge been capable of revealing only others and incapable of revealing itself, it would need the services of another knowledge to know it (viz. the first cognition). Similarly, the second will need the third, and so on *ad infinitum*—a process which would never come to an end. The sun does not require another sun for its revelation, because it is self-revealing as well. Similarly a knowledge does not require another knowledge for its knowledge, because it is self-revealing.

Question 5. Is super-sensual knowledge acknowledged by all? Is it amenable to a logical proof?

Answer. Super-sensory knowledge is accepted in Jaina philosophy. It has been accepted also in the Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka and similar systems. There is, however, a fundamental point of departure in this consensus. In the

Mīmāṃsaka system a human being cannot be possessed of super-sensory knowledge of the omniscient. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems also consider human knowledge as subject to revelation by Divine Knowledge. According to Jainism, a human being is capable of being possessed of super-sensory knowledge, i.e., omniscience.

Neither the immaterial object nor the super-sensory knowledge falls in the domain of logic. The basis of logic is necessary concomitance and the basis of necessary concomitance is sensual knowledge combined with intellectual thinking.

We believe in the words of the persons who have achieved super-sensory knowledge. Such knowledge is not accessible to anyone of us. Both of us accept its possibility on the basis of the assertion of the saints. The person who has practised meditation arrives at the truth that super-sensory knowledge is capable of being realised. The preliminary form of super-sensory knowledge is the rise of wisdom (*prajñā*). In the terminology of science of meditation, it is called extra-sensory perception (E.S.P.) (*prātibha-jñāna*). Such potentiality exists in each of us. We feel such capacity on many an occasion. Sometimes it suddenly occurs to the mind—My friend will come. We open the door and find the friend. There is an experience like—My brother will come tomorrow, and in fact the brother comes the next day. We very scarcely exercise our potentiality of extra-sensory perception and this is the reason why we are unfamiliar with it. The animal-world exercises this capacity more than we do. According to the zoologists many animals and birds can know in advance about the tornado, earthquake, volcanic eruption and such other natural calamities, and go to place of safety. The human beings depend more on their ordinary sense-organs and as a result their power of super-sensual knowledge is reduced to the minimum.

Knowledge is of two categories—(i) independent of the instruction from others. (ii) dependent on such instructions. The recollection of previous births and extra-sensory perceptions are independent of any instructions. They are, therefore, considered as inborn. There is scope for doubt in the knowledge which is dependent upon instructions, but how can there be a doubt for the person who is himself seeing his previous births or knowing a truth through an extra-sensory perception. Lord Mahāvīra revealed the process leading to the recollection of previous births. An aspirant could attain such knowledge through that process and consequently

his doubt about super-sensory perception was set at rest. In his commentary on the *Yoga Darśana,* Yatibhoja says that the preceptor should induce such extra-sensory experience as is capable of removing all doubts of the aspirant about the path of discipline he is made to practise. The super-sensory knowledge can either be experienced by oneself or can be believed on the authority of others, but it is not possible to produce any universally accepted reason in support of it.

II

Jaina Logic of the Philosophical Period

Philosophical speculations had started as early as the eighth century before the beginning of the Christian era, and till the first century A.D. the super-sensory perception held a prominent place vis-a-vis logic which definitely occupied a secondary position. It was only in the centuries that followed that critical studies in epistemology and logic made their appearance. As epistemology occupies an important place in philosophy, the philosophical period, fortified by epistemology, started from the second century A.D. onward. During this period there was a close alliance between philosophy on the one hand and epistemology or logic on the other.

The sage Gautama composed his *Nyāyasūtra* in 200-450 A.D. according to Professor Jacobi and in the first century B.C. according to Professor Dhruva. The sage Kaṇāda composed his *Vaiśeṣikāsūtra* in the first century B.C., and Bādarāyaṇa wrote his *Brahmasūtra* in the fourth century A.D. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* was composed by Muni Kapila in 6-7 century B.C. Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed his *Sāṃkhyakārikā* between the second and the fourth centuries A.D.

The Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas were pioneers in the field of logic. The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (300 A.D.) criticised *Nyāyasūtra* and Vātsyāyana (400 A.D.) gave the reply in his *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*. The Buddhist Ācārya Dignāga (500 A.D.) criticised the views of Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara (600 A.D.) gave the reply to the former in his *Nyāyavārtika*. The Buddhist Ācārya Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* refuted the views of Uddyotakara. The Buddhist Ācārya Dharmottara, in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* his strongly supported the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Vācaspati Miśra (800 A.D.) in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* re-established the position of Uddyotakara by refuting the Buddhist criticism of the Nyāya doctrines.

The refutation and counter-refutation of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas went on with unabated zeal from the third upto the

eighth century A.D. This battle of arguments ushered in a new era of logic.

When there arise conflicts between philosophies, the philosophers are prone to strengthen their respective position through refutation of others' by means of logic, relegating the scripture to a secondary place of importance. A philosopher does not depend upon the scriptures for the support of his views, but he requisitions logic in defence of his position.

Scripture and Logic Reconciled

The Jaina logic of philosophical period has some distinctive achievements to its credit. The first is the reconciliation between scripture and logic. In the scriptural age the ultimate source of valid knowledge was the scripture itself or the person possessed of super-sensory knowledge. In the Mīmāṃsā system the ultimate authority rested with the *Vedas*. They consider the *Vedas* as impersonal revelation and not as written by man. According to the *Nyāya* school such authority is derived by the *Vedas* from God as their revealer. The Jaina philosophers regard the man who has achieved perfect detachment as the ultimate authority. *Āgama*, in Jaina terminology, stands for the person who has eradicated all the blemishes, who is completely free from all kinds of attachments and who is omniscient. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* there is given an hierarchy of five sources of discipline:

1. *Āgama*—People possessed of super-sensory knowledge or versed in the *pūrvas*.
2. *Śruta*—The scriptures.
3. *Ājñā*—Promulgations.
4. *Dhāraṇā*—Opinions.
5. *Jīta*—Approved practices.

Men with power of omniscience, clairvoyance and mind reading, as well as those who are possessed of the knowledge of the fourteen *purvas*, ten *purvas* or nine *purvas* plus the third *Acaracula* of the tenth *purva*—all these six persons are considered *Agama*, which is the highest authority. In the absence of *Agama* the scripture (i.e. the words of the *Āgama-puruṣa*) is authoritative. In scriptural period the *Āgama-puruṣa* and in his absence the scripture was considered as the authority. In the philosophical period the authority of the *Āgama* was secondary while reason and logic were the primary sources of authority.

Even in the scriptural period the Jaina thinkers did not under-

estimate the value of logic. The Jainas never questioned the solid authority of logic. The reason for this is not far to seek if one clearly understands the subject-matter of the five kinds of knowledge, already discussed. Through *mati* and *śtruta,* one can know all the substances, but it is not possible to know all their modes through them.[1] Substances are of two kinds (1) material (*mūrta*), and (2) immaterial (*amūrta*). The immaterial substances are not cognised by the senses. They can only be known by the mind[2] as well as through instructions of others. In the Jaina *āgamas* six substances have been enumerated—*Dharmāstikāya, Adharmāstikāya, Ākāśāstikāya, Kāla, Pudgalāstikāya* and *Jīvāstikāya.* Among these, *Pudgalāstikāya* is material and the rest are immaterial. The immaterial substances are not amenable to sense-perception, which implies that the knowledge of the necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) is not possible in such cases, and consequently the possibility of inference is out of question. It is, therefore, said that the immaterial substances can be known only through scriptural knowledge, that is, the knowledge acquired from instructions of others (who have direct knowledge of such substances). The sages, possessed of extra-sensory perception, acquired direct knowledge of the immaterial substances and propounded them. On the authority of them we understand that there are immaterial substances. The material substances can be known by the sense-organs. They are known only through a few modes that belong to them, and not through the entire range of their modes. The colour or shape of a thing can be known by the eye, which cannot, however, know the other modes. The verbal knowledge, conveyed by others, is acquired through the medium of words. But the words that we use are limited in number, and, as such, are incompetent to cover the entire range of modes individually, which may be numerable, innumerable or infinite. It is, therefore, not possible to know the modes in their entirety through instructions from others.[3]

Clairvoyance and mind reading can comprehend only the things which are made of matter.[4] In omniscience, however, both the material and immaterial things are directly cognised.[5]

The object is known directly in omniscience which, on this account, does not need any service of logical reasoning. An object is not known directly through the scriptural knowledge and that is the reason why there is scope for logical reasoning in it. Siddhānta-cakravartī Ācārya Nemicandra has recognised two forms of scriptural knowledge— (1) derived from words, and (2) derived from

probans. The scriptural knowledge, in fact, is the comprenension of an object through another object. Thus, for instance, wnen we know fire from smoke, it is a case of the cognition of one object through another. Similarly the service of a probans is also not denied in scriptural knowledge. This implies that reasoning was a recognised instrument of knowledge in the scriptural period also, although it occupied a secondary place in the presence of the dominant *Āgamic* personalities. The logico-epistemological devices could not find scope of development during the age of omniscient teachers and specially learned *ācāryas,* who possessed knowledge of the *pūrvas,* in full or in part. In the first century of the Christian era, Āryarakṣita, in his *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra,* accorded a special treatment to *pramāṇas.* Such treatment is not available in the literature prior to that period. The Jaina thinkers were attracted to the logico-epistemological topics in the philosophical period, when the logical science got the supremacy in the absence of *ācāryas* possessed of special learning in the scriptures. A glimpse of such development can be obtained in the exegetical literature known as *Niryukti,* whose authors unambiguously assert the necessity of examples for the dullards and probanses for the audience having sharp intelligence.[6]

Ācārya Yativṛṣabha has attached great importance to the faculty of reasoning. The theories propounded by the non-omniscient people about the super-sensible objects are not necessarily free from doubt and perverseness, though in some cases they may be beyond suspicion. It was, therefore, necessary to attach adequate importance to logical reasoning in expounding the views of the traditional *ācāryas.* There were two happy results of such orientation—(1) satisfaction of the intellect of the advanced disciples, and (2) rousing of curiosity of the tyros towards the scriptural knowledge.[7] There was a twofold necessity of this logical development—

(1) Logical defence of one's own position against the logical incursions of the opposite camps.

(2) Satisfaction of the demands of the intelligent Jaina monks, for a clear comprehension of the subjects of interest in the logical age.

It was for these reasons, internal and external, that it was necessary to develop a logical apparatus adequate enough for self-

defence as well as the refutation of the opposite theories.

There was a strong scriptural tradition behind the Jaina thinkers, which propounded many a doctrine, concerned with super-sensible objects which were not amenable to rational understanding. Under the circumstance, definition of the scope of logic for the interpretation of scriptural knowledge was a desideratum which was eminently fulfilled by Ācārya Siddhasena. In his *Sanmati*, he drew a sharp line of demarcation between scripture and logic, assigning complete freedom to both in their respective spheres. A person who adduces *Āgamas* for the understanding of the topics of *Āgama* and logic for the topics of logic, makes a right approach to the subject. But absolutely wrong is the attitude of the person who attemps at supporting the scripture by logic and logic by scripture.[8] In the *Āgamic* texts the words of the omniscient are compiled and they are mainly concerned with super-sensory objects. They are beyond the sphere of logic and reasoning and as such the application of probanses are not in demand in them. The sensible objects can be understood through reasoning and, therefore, such objects are to be proved through logic. The employment of scriptural knowledge for the proof of such objects, is not necessary.

Objects unamenable to Logic

The disembodied soul is a super-sensible object. Logic is of no avail for its proof. Intellect cannot comprehend it.[10] The sons of Bhṛgu told their father that the soul, being immaterial, cannot be known through the senses.[11] The plants respire and they are possessed of all the instincts—hunger, fear, sex, possessiveness, anger, pride, deceit, greed etc. They are subject to pleasure and pain. The earth-bodied souls suffer from infatuation. All these are super-sensible objects. They are not amenable to reasoning. The immaterial objects, the subtle material objects and the minute modes are all in need of the testimony of scripture for their proof. The super-sensible objects are established by the authority of the scripture.

Objects amenable to Logic

The embodied soul can be established through logic. That which is capable of being produced by a like cause and also capable of producing a like effect is called the soul. An object bereft of such capability cannot be called a soul. That which has respiratory throbbing is a soul. The soulhood of the embodied self can be proved by logic. Logic, therefore, is needed for the proof of such

objects as are subject to rational thought.

According to Ācārya Samantabhadra, if a speaker lacks established authority, he must expound his views through observation and inference, and such views are said to be proved by logic. If the speaker enjoys unimpeachable authority, the thesis propounded in his words is called a proposition proved by *āgama*.[12]

Verification of Knowledge

The second important achievement of Jaina logic of the philosophical period is the exposition of knowledge as an instrument of valid cognition. The doctrine of valid knowlege as propounded by Āryarakṣita in his *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* could not find a respectable position in Jaina logic on account of its being based on the Nyāya school of thought. Whereas the non-Jaina philosophers were engaged in discussions on epistemological problems, the Jaina philosophers kept themselves engaged in their old theory of knowledge. At the time when all other philosophers were engaged in the development of their respective epistemological theories in an age of philosophical speculations, reinforced by logical thinking, the question of developing an epistemological doctrine of their own, based on their synthetic attitude, presented itself before the Jaina thinkers also. This problem was tackled for the first time by Vācaka Umāsvāti, who took a synthetic view of the old Jaina doctrine of knowledge and the new science of epistemology. This served as a bridge between the *āgamic* theory of knowledge and the logical epistemology. Siddhasena and Akalaṅka established an independent science of epistemology. The synthesis proposed by Umāsvāti has found vent in the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* (1/9-12) which may be rendered as follows:

1. Knowledge is fivefold—sensory, scriptural, clairvoyance, mind reading and omniscience.
2. They fall under two categories of valid knowledge.
3. (Of the above five) the first two are 'non-perceptual' (indirect, mediate).
4. The rest are 'perceptual' (direct, immediate).[13]

In the above epistemological doctrine of Umāsvāti, the *āgamic* tradition of regarding the first two kinds of knowledge as 'non-perceptual', and the remaining three as 'perceptual' has been well preserved. The only difference that has been introduced in this classification consists in substituting the terms *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa pramāṇa* for *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa jñāna*.

The meaning of the word *jñāna* in the old tradition was the same as that of the word *pramāṇa* in the philosophical age. Vācaka Umāsvāti has defined *pramāṇa* as right knowledge. The knowledge which is unambiguous, non-discrepant and self-consistent is right.[14] He included under *mati* and *śruta* all the instruments of valid knowledge accepted by different schools of logic, such as inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), implication (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*) and negation (*abhāva*). All these categories of epistemological tools involve the contact between the sense and the object as an essential condition, and as such they are included under *mati* and *śruta*.[15]

Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first treatise on Jaina logic, composed in 32 *kārikās* (verses). It contains the definition of *pramāṇa,* its varieties and also the constituents of inferential syllogism. Though we do not find a developed discussion of the epistemological problem in the treatise, it occupies a respectable position in Jaina logic on account of its being a pioneer work on the subject.

Ācārya Samantabhadra did not write any independent work on logic, yet his deep interest in logic is unambiguously revealed in his epoch-making works like the *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* and *Svayambhū-stotra*. He has described *pramāṇa* as the revealer of itself as well as the object.[16]

Definition of Perceptual Knowledge *(pratyakṣa pramāṇa)* in Relevant Basic Texts—the Third Achievement

The Buddhist philosophers considered the sensory cognition as perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). The object is directly known by the senses and so the resultant knowledge is called 'perceptual' (*pratyakṣa*). Such knowledge is not conceptual (*kalpanātmakam*) and also not erroneous (*bhrānta*), which are the two specific characteristics of it.

The Naiyāyikas define perceptual knowledge as that which arises when there is contact between the sense and the object.[17] The neo-logicians have recognised two varieties of perceptual knowledge, viz. ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*a-laukika*).* In the former there is contact (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense and

* In the Navya Nyāya three types of extraordinary perceptions are recognised viz. (1) yogic perception, (2) perception of a universal (*sāmānya lakṣana pratyakṣa*) and

the object in the ordinary sense of the term, while in the latter there is an uncommon or extraordinary type of contact.

The sensory knowledge was considered as indirect knowledge in the orthodox Jaina tradition. Ācārya Kundakunda has logically defended the indirect character of a sensory cognition. Umāsvāti also has assigned the status of indirect cognition to sensory perception through his classification of *mati* and *śruta* as indirect cognition.

Thus there were two different traditions among the logicians regarding the nature of sensory perception as (1) direct and (2) indirect. Some Jaina philosophers, in the meantime, made an attempt at reconciling these two attitudes towards sensory perception.

It is in the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra,* an early Jaina text, that sensory perception finds a mention for the first time. In the epistemological discussions of the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra,* perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) is mentioned as twofold, viz. *kevala* (omniscience) and *no-kevala* (clairvoyance and mind reading).[18] In the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* the perceptual cognition is divided as sensory and non-sensory perception, the former being fivefold, viz. auditory perception, visual perception, olfactory perception, gustatory perception and tactile perception; and the latter threefold, viz. clairvoyance, mind reading and omniscience.[19]

The *Nandī-Sūtra* follows in this respect the tradition recorded in the *Anuyogadvāra-Sūtra.* It is only in these two *āgamas* that the sensory cognition is included under the category of perceptual cognition. While the *Anuyogadvāra-Sūtra* can be assigned to the first century A.D., the *Nandī-Sūtra* belongs to the fifth century A.D. Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, who is the principal representative of the *āgamic* tradition, and belongs to the seventh century A.D., has defended the non-perceptual status of *mati* and *śruta,* but at the same time he makes a novel addition. The inference

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(3) perception of the features of a thing which was known previously or elsewhere as here and now presented (*jñāna lakṣana pratyakṣa*). The *sāmānya lakṣana pratyakṣa* is accomplished through the internal organ and illustrated by the knowledge of universal concomitance between smoke and fire, which according to Jaina logicians is effected by *tarka* (reasoning). The second kind of extraordinary perception, viz. *jñāna lakṣana pratyakṣa* is illustrated by the proposition 'this is silver', when there is no such object in front. It is a genuine (though false) perceptual judgment, mediated by our previous judgment about a validly observed piece of silver.

alone, according to him, is absolutely non-perceptual, while the sensory and mental perceptions are instances of empirical perceptions (*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*).[20]

Inference stands for the knowledge of the probandum (*sadhya*) through the probans (*sādhana*). The cognition of fire on the cognition of smoke is not a case of direct perception through the senses. This is the reason why the inference is absolutely a case of non-perceptual cognition. The cognition of the object through clairvoyance, mind reading and omniscience is direct and absolutely perceptual, because no other mediatory knowledge is required for their occurrence. The perception of touch etc. though the sense is direct sensory perception. They are perceptual with reference to the senses, while with reference to the soul they are indeed non-perceptual. The senses in themselves are insentient (*acetana*). They are not capable of cognising the objects. They act only as the media of cognition. It is out of these considerations that it is more appropriate to describe the sensory cognitions as perceptual only in the popular sense of term, while from the ultimate viewpoint the sensory cognition is a case of non-perceptual experience.

The above discussion may be symbolically expressed as follows:

Knower—Knowable = metempirical perception (*paramārthika pratyakṣa*).

Knower—Sense—Knowable = empirical perception (*saṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*).
(In this cognition the knowable is indirect to the knower and direct to the sense-organ).

Knower—Mind—Smoke—Fire = pure non-perceptual cognition. (Here there are two intervening factors between the knower and the knowable. These two factors are the activity of the mind, the knowledge of smoke together with its universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) with fire).

The recognition of the sensory cognition as a kind of empirical perception (*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*) worked as a go-between element, that is, a connecting link between the indigenous and alien traditions about perceptual cognitions. This was a happy solution of the problem. In the period of logical development this distinction between empirical and metempirical perceptual cognition

continued without any reorientation. It was made a permanent feature of Jaina epistemological thinking by Ācārya Akalaṅka who, like the Buddhist Dignāga, can be considered as the founder of Jaina logic.[22]

Anekānta: the Synthesizer of Philosophical Systems

The fourth important achievement of the philosophical period consisted in a synthetic view of the divergent schools of philosophy and the development and extensive employment of the *anekānta* dialectic for such synthesis.

The two important questions of the philosophical debate since the times of the *Upaniṣads* were:

1. Is it possible to know the absolute truth, the truth in its completeness?
2. Is it possible to give it a verbal expression and exposition?

The different philosophies have made out different solutions to these perennial issues of philosophy. The Jaina thinkers also have presented their own solution. The first of these questions was answered by them through their epistemological critique, while the answer to the second they sought to give through their doctrine of *anekānta*.

It is the omniscient *jina* who can know the truth in its completeness. His knowledge is absolutely without any kind of veil over it. This explains why such knowledge has no obstruction or hindrance. The non-omniscient cannot know the truth in its fullness, because the knowledge of such person is imperfect, being a mixture of gnosis and nescience. With the acknowledgement of the gnosis of the non-omniscient, we simultaneously acknowledge his nescience also. In the covered state of consciousness there are truth and untruth entwined in one. It is only the omniscient whom we can designate as having perfect knowledge. The expression '*kevalin*' (omniscient) can also be explained as one who is possessed of knowledge alone and nothing else. He is pure knowledge, absolutely free from nescience. In point of knowledge all persons other than the omniscient are possessed of gnosis as well as nescience. This acceptance of the co-existence of gnosis and nescience implies that the truth in its completeness can be known only by the omniscient and not by anybody else.

The real has two facets—the substance and the mode. The

possessor of scriptural knowledge knows all the substances, material as well as immaterial, but he cannot know all their modes. The omniscient knows all the substances with all their modes, and therefore it is said that he knows the complete truth. The possessor of scriptural knowledge knows the substances through the scriptures. The omniscient knows them directly and so he knows the whole truth. In the words of Ācārya Samantabhadra, both *syādvāda* and omniscience are revealers of all objects. The difference between them, if any, consists in the latter's being a direct cognition and the former's being an indirect cognition.[23] All other objects which are not cognised by either of them are unreal.

In Jaina ontology two kinds of substances are accepted—(1) sentient, and (2) non-sentient. Each substance is divided into infinitely infinite units, and each unit into infinitely infinite modes. All these substances with all their integral units, together with their modes, in their totality, constitute the complete truth. The monist can postulate the Absolute Truth (independent of anything else), but the dualist cannot agree with him. This is the reason why the Jaina philosopher, as an upholder of dualism, explains truth on the basis of his doctrine of non-absolutism. Truth has infinite modes and the capacity of language is limited. A word can express a single mode at a single moment, and as such the speaker can, in his whole life, give expression to only a limited number of modes. It, therefore, follows that the complete truth can never be explained through words; it is only a part of truth that can be the subject-matter of linguistic expression.

Among western philosophers, Spinoza has made a distinct contribution about the nature of the substance.[24] Substance, according to him, is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, it is the conception which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. As distinguished from the substance, an attribute is that which the intellect perceives in the substance as if constituting its essence. By mode, Spinoza understands the affections of substance or that which exists in another thing through which also it is conceived. Substance, according to Spinoza, thus needs nothing else than itself for its existence or for its cognition. It is only the attributes and the modes which are susceptible of being cognised and known. The highest substance, according to Spinoza, is God, that is, Being absolutely infinite and consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

This conception of substance formulated by Spinoza comes very near the Jaina conception of substance as a possessor of infinite modes which, however, do not reveal the substance in its entirety, as the modes and the attributes of Spinoza do not express his highest substance called God. It should be noted in this connection that Spinoza's God is not the creator of the world, not even the fundamental cause of all things, but the logical presupposition of all that exists, that in virtue of which alone everything else can become an object of thought, and which itself does not require for its conception the antecedent conception of anything else. This is the only meaning of Spinoza's *causa sui*.

The Indian philosophers of monistic persuasion have also propounded the highest truth as *causa sui,* i.e. *svayambhū* and inexpressible through words or concepts, and as such unthinkable. The Jaina logicians have not accepted a substance as inexpressible. Their argument is that if a substance is inexpressible in language and unthinkable in mind, then its inexpressibility will not be amenable to proof through any verbal symbol or concept which are the only means through which the inexpressibility could be established. The substance, therefore, is neither absolutely inexpressible nor absolutely otherwise. The infinite number of modes cannot be expressed simultaneously by any linguistic or conceptual device. It is from this standpoint that a substance is inexpressible. But there are modes in a substance which are expressible in language, and as such the substance is expressible through those modes. This exposition of inexpressibility or otherwise of a substance has been made by Jaina logicians on the basis of *syādvāda* (doctrine of conditional predication).

In the proposition 'the jar is red', the jar is explained through a colour. But jar is not only a coloured object. It has also taste, smell, touch and many such qualities. When we characterise an object by a particular attribute, we are not able to distinguish other attributes from that thing, and at the same time we have no such linguistic or conceptual device to express all the attributes simultaneously. The particle '*syāt*' was invented by the Jaina logicians to get out of this predicament. Accordingly, it should be more appropriate to say 'in some respect the jar is red' (*syād asti rakto ghaṭaḥ*), than to assert simply, 'the jar is red' (*asti rakto ghaṭaḥ*). In other words, the jar is red relatively in a particular framework of reference. The use of the particle '*syāt*' is indicative of the fact that you are here describing the jar with reference to a particular colour

viz. red, which is given prominence intentionally by subordinating the other attributes which are, however, not denied. Here the red colour of the jar does not segregate the other attributes from the latter, but while describing the jar as red the particle '*syāt*' is indicative of the other attributes which constitute the complete jar. The function of the particle '*syāt*' is to bring home the existence of all other attributes left out in the proposition under reference which ascribes a particular attribute to the subject. Similarly the proposition 'in some respect the jar exists' (*syād asti ghaṭaḥ*), the attribute of existence is not isolated from the other attributes of the jar, because in that case the jar will lose its jarhood. What is predicated of the jar in the above proposition is not absolute existence, but only an existence which is of a particular kind. The jar is not an eternal thing and as such eternal existence cannot be predicated of it. It is in order to specify the nature of the predicate to obviate misunderstanding of any kind that the particle '*syāt*' is prefixed to the proposition. The only way of describing an object in its wholeness is prominently to predicate a particular attribute, tacitly implying the others, and consequently an object can be regarded as inexpressible and expressible at the same time. The object qua its tacitly-implied attributes is inexpressible while with reference to the attribute expressly ascribed it is expressible. In popular parlance, which is frequently based on relative references, we describe a thing with reference to a particular attribute without any reference to the other attributes. In such modes of description there is nothing which is inexpressible. Such descriptions are called '*nayas*' while the description of a thing in its totality through a single attribute is called '*syādvāda*'.[25] The development of these two methods of describing a thing fully or partially is an important upshot of the philosophy of '*anekānta*'.

Dimenions of Synthesis

The Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas devoted their energies to the act of self-defence and the refutation of others. These debates were full of stringent sarcasms and bitter taunts. Such methods of debate were not liked by the Jaina philosophers as devotees of non-violence. Their attitude was dominated by the *āgamic* dictum that those who praise their own doctrines and disparage the doctrines of others do not solve any problem.[26] The Jaina thinkers did not enter the arena of such debates for a long time. They restricted their intellectual activities in their own limits as silent spectators of the arguments and counter-arguments between the followers of the different schools. But in course of time for the

sake of self-existence and self-preservation, and due to the pressure of the religious, social and political circumstances there arose a vital necessity for the Jainas to defend their own doctrines through argument and logic by participating in assemblies of logicians and philosophers. The Jaina philosophers, at such times, started taking interest in self-defence against the doctrines of the opposite camps. But their method of refutation was free from untoward vituperation. Their refutations were synthesis-oriented in the interest of the cause of non-violence and for strengthening the search for truth. Such thought-activity of the Jainas is reflected in the following statement of Haribhandra Sūrī—"How can the authors of spiritual discourses, who are great souls, be the propounders of incompatible doctrine perfectly detached as they are from worldly things and fully engaged in the welfare of all living beings?" The question inevitably arises 'Why then are there such differences among the philosophies?" Haribhadra's answer to this is—"You should find out the intentions of those philosophers. To point out the contradictions without knowing the implications is not an attempt at knowing the truth." "The poor philosophers quarrel among themselves", says Siddhasena Divākara, "on account of diversities of their terminology and intention, though the instruments of cognition employed by them for the ascertainment of truth enjoy universal validity."[27]

While Siddhasena Divākara made laudable efforts for synthesizing the different philosophies of his times, Samantabhadra commanded an uncommon power of formulating Jaina position in a language which evinces his deep understanding of all systems of Indian philosophy and their refutation from the Jaina standpoint. Samantabhadra was in fact a first-rate Jaina philosopher, who gave a firm footing to Jaina ontology, which remained unsurpassed in centuries that followed. Siddhasena Divākara can be considered as a pioneer philosopher who took a synthetic view of philosophies while formulating the doctrine of *anekānta* as a philosophy of philosophies. His method of treatment of Sāṃkhya, Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika systems exhibits his wonderful ingenuity and critical acumen for their synthesis. He has characterised the Sāṃkhya system as an approach to reality from the standpoint of substance, which has resulted in the postulation of '*puruṣa*' as an unchanging eternal real. The Buddhists, on the other hand, look at the real from the modal standpoint, and as such they, particularly the Hīnayānists, propounded the philosophy of universal flux (*kṣaṇikavāda*). Of these two, viz. the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist, one

must obviously be wrong. Either the doctrine of universal flux is false or the philosophy of unchanging eternality must be so. Both of these cannot be a true estimate of reality. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept the independent existence of the universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) and as such they recognise the validity of the standpoint of substance as well as that of modes. But their postulation of the universal and the particular as absolutely two independent facts makes their philosophy a false doctrine, being only a partial and truncated estimate of reality. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas consider the Sāṃkhya doctrine of pre-existence of the effect in the cause as a false doctrine and the Sāṃkhyas consider the formers' pre-non-existence of the effect in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*) as an absurd hypothesis. All these theories are true in their own perspectives. None of these is an absolutely false doctrine. They are false only so far as they are exclusively postulated. Relatively interpreted none of these is false. A jar is not absolutely different from the earth, and as such it may be viewed as identical with the latter. The jar, of course, does not pre-exist in the earth before it actually takes the form of a jar. The jar, in fact, has come into existence on the assumption of the shape of jar by the earth, and as such it is different from the earth. Thus from the point of view of the identity and difference or the universal and the particular, none of the statements (*vaktavyatā*) are untrue.[28]

There are as many standpoints or ways of approach as there are ways of speech. And there are as many heterodox doctrines, i.e. divergent views, as there are standpoints.[29]. Every philosophy is a standpoint at best, being a view of the real from a particular angle of vision. No particular thought is complete, but it acquires completion when consistently connected with other thoughts. Thus viewed, no exclusive kind of thinking is true nor any relative mode of thought is untrue. The question arises: if the individual exclusive proposition is false, wherefrom would the sum total of such propositions derive their validity? A congregation of false beliefs is necessarily an archangel of untruth. How could that totality be a philosophy, perfect and full. Ācārya Samantabhadra has very astutely formulated the reply by asserting that all the possible alternatives, consistently construed, are bound to give glimpse into the whole truth, capable of discharging all the functions of a real in its completeness. No rational proposition can be absolutely untrue. Shorn of its exclusiveness, it becomes an exponent of truth, which is tolerant of other co-ordinate rational propositions.[30]

Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, the author of the encyclopaedic *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya,* extended the scope of this synthetic attitude to its utmost to find in every wrong philosophy a window which necessarily opened towards the complete truth. His plea is that the sum of all the perverted views is essentially the right view. A heterodox philosophy (*para-siddhānta*) is a true doctrine in so far as it opens up a vista of true philosophy (*sva-siddhānta*).[31] The doctrines propounding universals, particulars, permanence, flux, etc. are parts of a grand philosophy. A rational synthesis of these is the right view as propounded in Jaina philosophy,[32] which does not believe in refutation or support of any particular standpoint, but exhibits the fullness of truth as composed of manifold views in their proper perspectives.

Dialogue

Question 1. Was not any attempt made at synthesis of views in the *Āgamic* period? Was not there any method of comparative study of religions at that time?

Answer. The entire corpus of the *Āgama* literature is not available at present. But from whatever is extent, it can be said that the method of relative and synthetic estimation was recognised at that time. The philosophers of the philosophical period, of course, developed the seed embedded in the scriptures.

In the *Āgamic* literature we find three kinds of doctrines, viz. (1) those which were its own, (2) those which were propounded by others, and (3) those which were upheld jointly by both. This obviously implies that the thinkers of that period studied the alien systems along with their own, and this was but natural for them as they believed in synthesis.

Question 2. Is it possible to synthesise the universal with the particular, unity with plurality?

Answer. Monism banks upon the universal. The monistic philosopher arrives at the summit of synthetic view of things by propounding monism and declaring the unreality of pluralism. It is only identity that is accepted by the monist at the cost of diversity which he considers to be a futility.

The approach of the Buddhists was radical, pluralistic, and analytic. They reached the pinnacle of analytical view and declared that the particulars are the only truth, the universal or the

philosophy of monism being only an irrelevant doctrine. We thus find two antipodal summits—the summit of monism and the summit of pluralism. The Jaina philosophers, however, did not accept any of these extremes. They struck a balance and a wholesome synthesis between the universal and the particular, the one and the many. And they declared that a particular without the universal or one without many and *vice versa* are false. The substance is the universal and the modes are the particulars. Modes without substance or substance without modes are never the objects of experience.

Question 3. Different philosophies have postulated different number of fundamental principles. Is it possible to effect a synthesis among them?

Answer. The fundamental principles are only two—the sentient and the insentient. All other principles are their modes. The number of the fundamental principles is developed on the basis of particular necessities or perspectives. Irrespective of these necessities and perspectives all those principles are reduced to only two. Thus the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are reduced to two, viz. *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*; the five *skandhas* of Buddhism are reduced to two, viz. *nāma* and *rūpa* and so on.

Question 4. Is the *pramāṇa* also relative in its application? If that is so, would not the concept of *pramāṇa* lose its propriety and lapse into an improper concept?

Answer. There is *pramāṇa* because there is *prameya* (object of *pramāṇa*). Had there been no *prameya*, the *pramāṇa* would have been an irrelevant concept. The *pramāṇa* is relative to *prameya* and consequently it is relevant to the *pramātā* (the knower) also. Such relativity does not create a predicament of uncertainty and doubt. On the contrary it successfully explains the real rooted in the firm base of determinative experience. Isolated from the knower (*pramātā*) and the known (*prameya*) and independent of them, the *pramāṇa* is bound to lose its *raison d'être*. A sensory perception is *pramāṇa* (valid source of knowledge) in the perspective of sensory epistemology, but with reference to the extra-sensory perception it is invalid. This position can also be reversed without any impropriety and it is possible to say that the extra-sensory perception is a valid mode of cognition in the epistemology of direct perception. But it has no relevance in the field of *mati* and *śruta* which can cognise only indirectly through appropriate media. The problem of *pramāṇa* can be satisfactorily explained only in the background of relativity. From the verbal standpoint (*śabda-naya*) no line of

demarcation can be drawn between knowledge and its negation. All conceptual experiences, from the verbal angle, are knowledge. In this angle only the scripture and omniscience are the two varieties of knowledge. The dichotomy of *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* is not accepted in this approach. The three *nayas,* viz. *Naigama, Saṃgraha* and *Vyavahāra,* recognise the dichotomy of *jñāna* and *ajñāna,* and, therefore, the division of *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* is proper according to them.[33]

The classification of knowledge into *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* has been done from different view-points and perspectives. The development of the powers of consciousness and thought, at their different stages, is at the root of this sort of classification.

Question 5. Was there any philosophical period, prior to the Āgamic period, if not, was that a period devoid of any philosophical thinking?

Answer. The division of the *Āgamic* period and philosophical period has also been made with a particular intention and from a particular perspective. We can characterise the *Āgamic* period or a period before that as a philosophical period. There is, in fact, no absolute line of demarcation between the *Āgamic* period and the philosophical period. It is the predominance of the presence of enlightened persons, power of extrasensory perception and scientific investigation that is the essential feature of the philosophical as well as the *Āgamic* period. In the third or fourth century before the Christian era logic gained supremacy in the field of philosophy, and it is only this that led us to the distinction of philosophical period from the *Āgamic* period. A conceptless experience or a direct experience is what constitutes *darśana* (philosophy). This concept of *darśana* has undergone change in modern times. Today we do not accept conceptless experience or direct experience as *darśana.* The constituents of *darśana,* in the present age, are limited to conceptual thinking, reasoning or logic. This is the only difference that we can offer for our division of periods. The philosophical period of historical times perhaps begins with the age of Parśva or the age of *Upaniṣads* (eighth century B.C.).

Question 6. Is the principle of relativity applicable everywhere? Or is there any limitation to its application? If it is universally applicable, does violence come under its purview! Do you think that violence is and also is not valid?

Answer. Violence also is not an independent concept. It is to be explained from many standpoints. Ācārya Haribhadra has

considered this problem from a number of standpoints.[34] Violence is dependent on passions and absence of vigilance (*pramāda*) which are the determinants of violence. If there is no *pramāda,* there is no violence.[35]

Question 7. Is truth dependent on a particular standpoint? If so, such truth cannot be universal.

Answer. There is no real contradiction between the natural modes of a substance that appear as mutually opposed. This absence of contradiction needs for its proof the assistance of relativity which is also in requisition for the explanation of the relative modes and manifold relations that make up a substance. The substance as well as the modes are equally true. The substance is fundamentally independent and absolute, but its modes and relations are not so. The determination of the independent and absolute is made from a standpoint which is independent, while the relative truth is understood from the standpoint of relativity. From the view-point of existence truth is universal, but from the view-point of modes it cannot but be determinate and dependent.

Question 8. If the mind, language, speech and such other tools of a person disappear in the state of extra-sensory perception, how can he remember that state when he returns to the normal state of existence through ordinary instruments of experience? Memory is possible only if the normal mind is allowed to function in some way or other in the state of E.S.P.

Answer. The state of E.S.P. is the state of knowing, and not a state of willing or volition. Speech is the volitional aspect of life. The mind bears the responsibility of both—the aspect of knowing and the aspect of willing. While the mind physical is concerned with volition, the mind spiritual is concerned with knowledge. The physical activities of the omniscient (highest E.S.P.) are carried out through both—mind and speech. The omniscient has no mind as medium of knowledge. In the scripture the omniscient has been said to be *no-samanaska* (not possessed of mind) and *no-amanaska* (not possessed of non-possession of mind). In the case of ordinary E.S.P. (i.e. E.S.P. other than omniscience) there exists the mind at the time of knowing though its function is not requisitioned at that time.

It has been said that at the time of E.S.P. mind, speech and

such other tools cease to function. But it would be more precise to say that mind, speech etc. are not actively involved in such perception.

The omniscient never reverts to the state of ordinary perception. Persons in ordinary E.S.P. do not exercise their mental cognition, but their mind is not non-existent. And this is the reason why such percipient can transfer his experience to the mental level. As a result the experiences of the state of E.S.P. are converted into an inheritance of the mental domian.

Question 9. It has been said that it is the omniscient who is *Āgama* and enjoys absolute validity. But the question is, does the omniscient exercise his vocal organ or not? If not, his knowledge will be only a personal experience and, as such, such experience would not be designated as knowledge by others. If, on the other hand, the omniscient gives expression to his knowledge through the services of his vocal organ, then his vocal activity itself should be regarded as *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), which is nothing more than what we call *śtruta jñāna* (scriptural knowledge). Again the words, simply by themselves, cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa.* Some agency over and above the mere words should be accepted as giving authority to the scriptural knowledge.

Answer. As the words of others through syllogistic inference are authoritative for others, so the words of the omniscient are also authoritative for us. The words by themselves have no authority, but as expression of knowledge, they enjoy such authority. An ordinary reliable person who has seen with his own eyes a lion in the forest makes a report to the effect that he has seen a lion in the forest. In this case we know about the lion even without direct perception or inference. The omniscient is an extra-ordinary reliable person, and thus his words are also competent to give us knowledge of objects neither capable of being perceived nor capable of being inferred or known through any other valid source of knowledge.

Whatever is uttered by the omniscient is an exercise of his vocal organ. We know the meaning through his words and such knowledge is called *bhāvaśruta.* The word of the omniscient is instrumental to our *bhāvaśruta* and as such is called *dravyaśruta* (i.e. the physical corpus of the scripture capable of giving us the experience of the omniscient himself).

III

The Axioms of Non-absolutism

1. The Concomitance between the Universal and the Particular

We can know the truth and also express it. It consists in the trio of entity, word and knowledge. Different philosophies have looked at the problem from different angles of vision. The Vedānta has explained the problem from three standpoints—the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The *Brahman* is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will-o' the wisp and dream is pure appearance. In *Hīnayāna* Buddhism the truth is twofold, viz. the ultimate and the conventional while in the idealist Buddhism it is threefold, viz. the ultimate (*parinispanna*), the dependent (*paratantra*) and the imaginary (*parikalpita*). The self-nature (momentariness) of the object is the ultimate truth. The universal nature is only a conventional truth on account of its being a product of the intellectual function of exclusion.[1]

Different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The foundation-stone of such presentation is twofold—intuitive experience and rational knowledge. In intuitive experience the object is known directly and, therefore, there is no difference in such experience. The rational knowledge that occurs at the sensual level does not cognise the object directly and this is the reason why there are varieties in such cognitions. The Vedanta rejected the modes as unreal while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist, on the other hand, rejected the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. According to Jaina logic both the substance and the modes are ultimately true. When the substance hidden under the waves of modes has no appeal, the modes come up prominently at the cost of the substance which lies submerged under them. When the modes, like waves, lose their identity in the calmness of the unfathomed ocean of substance, the latter alone appears to be ultimately real. The Vedantic monism is like the waveless ocean and the Buddhist phenomenalism is the state of the ocean agitated by waves. Non-absolutism appropriates them both, as so finely expressed in the

following beautiful imagery—*Aparyayam vastu samasyamānama dravyametacca vivicyamānam/ Ādeśabhedoditasaptabhanga-madidṛśastvaṃ budhrūpaavedyam//*[2]

From the synthetic viewpoint the object is without modes and from the analytic standpoint it is unsubstantial. "You have realised, Oh Lord, the truth in its sevenfold aspects on account of sevenfold view-points, that reveals itself only to the Wise."

The substance presents itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period of *anekanta* some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch-making achievement of that age.

The first axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the universal and the particular. The one without the other is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without a substance is as impossible as a substance without a mode. There is no such gap between truth and untruth. There is hardly any line of demarcation between the truth of one concept and the falsity of another. The gap between them, if any, can be understood if one realises that the particular bereft of universal is as nonsensical as the universal bereft of the particular. Both the concepts, viz. the universal and the particular, are true if they are mutually dependent. One rejecting the other is false, while both are the true representatives of their own objects of reference.

2. Concomitance between the Permanent and the Impermanent

The second axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of the one is verified by the truth of the other.

The materialist thinks that the sensuous world alone is true. There is nothing like the spiritual. The spiritualist, on the other hand, asserts that it is the self alone that is true, the sensuous world is false. The logicians of the Jaina school investigated the truth behind the rival claims and found that the sensuous world was not false. Whatever is possessed of causal efficiency is true. The senses are causally efficient and hence cannot be untrue. Their objects

also cannot be false. The characteristic features of a real are origination, cessation and persistence.[3] Whatever is causally efficient does necessarily arise, cease to exist and also continue. To say that the sensuous world is true and the self is untrue can be possible only in ordinary parlour, but it can never be a language expressive of the truth that is deep and unfathomable. On the other hand, to say that the self alone is the ultimate truth while the sensuous world is unadulterated falsehood, can be the language of the spiritual world, but it can never be true of the world as it is. The saints and philosophers cannot express themselves in identical linguistic tools. In spiritual idiom the sensuous objects are momentary and evanescent. Such idiom could inspire detachment and renunciation, but would miserably fail as a device of logical investigation of the nature of truth. Logic does not distinguish between the reality of the sensuous object and the reality of the self. The material atoms are as real as the spiritual self in the eyes of the rationalist. All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple criterion of truth is as validly applicable to the material atom as to the spiritual self. When the spiritual values become identical with the world outside, the doctrine of impermanence turns to be a controversia issue. Otherwise that is a very valuable doctrine. All the spiritual thinkers, without any exception, have endorsed it. The Jainas also have assigned adequate importance to it. Among the twelve contemplations, impermanence occupies the first position. The practitioner of such contemplation repeats within himself the formula—everything is impermanent. But that belongs to the sphere of spirituality. As soon as one switches to rational thinking, it is the definite view of the Jaina philosophers that the discrepancy between the impermanence of the material and the permanence of the spiritual becomes untenable. To the reasoning mind the permanence and the impermanence are equally shared by the spiritual and the material world. A clear line of demarcation can never be drawn between permanence and impermanence. By the admission of such distinction the Sāṃkhya system had to assign both bondage and emancipation to *Prakṛti* (the primordial matter) instead of *Puruṣa* of whom the two were only metaphorically admissible. The *Puruṣa* is eternally free and pure. The admission of bondage and emancipation would make the latter amenable to change and impermanence, a position which could not be acceptable to the Sāṃkhya system.

Among the Jainas Ācārya Kundakunda has also asserted, like the Sāṃkhya, that the *Jīva* (the soul) is not the agent of *karma*. The

karma is agent of itself. If the soul were the agent of *karma*, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly because he is not the agent, he is capable of getting rid of *karma*. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific nature which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the agent of the *karma* which is a heterogeneous entity? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious adjunct.[4] One can defend the Sāmkhya's assignment of bondage and emancipation to the *Prakṛti*. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say that it is only the *karmic* body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the semi-absolute substantial standpoint one could assert that the *jīva* (the soul) is the agent of *karma*.[5] The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant.[6] Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists for ever. An entity's continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we concentrate on similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of identity, universality or substance presents itself as the only valid alternative. The flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could one say that the mountain that his ancestors saw still continues to exist? Or the person in front is the same whom he saw yesterday? The old atoms are constantly giving place to new ones. A person's atomic physical conglomerate is being constantly emitted and replaced by a facsimile. In the absence of such emission the method of photography of the absent object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of permanence, exactly as the attention directed to the discrete modes gives rise to the impression of impermanence. Under these two diverse situations how should we distinguish between the truths of permanence and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would lead to the controversy that exists between the rival camps, each believing in one or the other alternative. Non-absolutism, however, does not admit the absolute validity of any one of these alternatives. According to it neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only relatively.[7] There is no creation, according to Kundakunda, without destruction and no destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three—creation, destruction and continuity—is the

truth.[8] The instantaneous modality (*arthaparyāya*) is the mode that is momentary, according to which the mountain or man in front cannot be the same as had been seen ten years before. The prolonged modality (*vyañjanaparyāya*), on the other hand, is one that continues for an appreciably long time, according to which the mountain or the man standing before is the same as had been seen ten years ago. In instantaneous modality the recognition of similarity is absent while in prolonged modality it is predominant. To deduce impermanence and permanence respectively from dissimilarity and similarity is only a truth and not the truth that is ultimate. The dissimilarity in instantaneous modality as well as similarity in prolonged modality are both nothing but modes which would entail impermanence. In the unending chain of causality there comes a moment when a mountain or a man, as an entity, ceases to exist and dissolves in atoms which, however, do continue to exist in the eternity of time and space. The soul that infused life in that body does likewise never cease to exist. The condition of permanence is the basic substance. A mode, whether momentary or continuous, dissimilar or similar, does as a rule establish impermanence.

The approach or the viewpoint (*naya*) of universality and permanence is the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika naya*) while that of particularity and change as origination-cum-cessation is the standpoint of modes (*paryāyārthika naya*). These two are the basic standpoints that are mutually relative. From the relativity of these two are derived the two principles of non-absolutism, viz. identity-cum-difference of the universal and the particular, and the relativity of permanence-cum-impermanence.

3. The concomitance of existence and non-existence

The third axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of existence and non-existence. It is sometimes argued that because the surface of a wooden chair is hard, it bears weight and because it is soft, an axe can cut through it. And because hardness and softness contradict each other, they cannot co-exist. But as they appear to co-exist, both of them are only appearance and not reality. And along with their unreality the wooden chair is also unreal. This is not the way of non-absolutism, which regards an infinite number of mutually opposed attributes as an inalienable part of a real. A real is an integrated whole of infinite number of attributes. It is exactly because those attributes are mutually opposed that a real is a real in the true sense of the term. Opposition in fact is the richness of the real and in the absence of such opposition a real would be

denuded of its reality. It is indeed the intrinsic nature of a real to be possessed of such opposed attributes and if so why should an attempt be made to deny its reality, by getting ourselves entangled in the labyrinth of imaginary contradictions. As Dharmakīrti puts it, who are we to deny what commends itself to the objects themselves? What should exercise our mind is the search for the source of those oppositions and the conditions of their synthesis. The philosophy of non-absolutism made such search and found that existence and non-existence go together. Affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is never possible. Affirmation is as much an attribute of a real as the negation. Existence is affirmation and non-existence is negation. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of non-existence. The substance of earth of which a pot is made is its own substance. Similarly the pot has its own space, time, colour and shape. A pot exists with reference to its own substance, space, time and modes. But it is non-existent as alien substance, space, time and modes. This relative estimation is a principle of synthesis. A pot does not both exist and not-exist with reference to identical factors of reference. Existence and non-existence as mutually opposed attributes do certainly exist simultaneously in the same object, but the basic conditions of the two (viz. existence and non-existence) are not identical. The principle of relativity points to the way of synthesis and testifies the reality of co-existence.

Ācārya Akalaṅka has mentioned a number of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence. A pot exists with reference to its own nature, it does not exist with reference to an alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature' and 'alien nature'. Akalaṅka's reply is—the own nature refers to the thing that is responsible for the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the alien nature establish the reality of a thing. If the alien nature viz. a piece of cloth, is not excluded from the own nature viz. the pot, the word 'pot' would be applicable as designation to all things. And in spite of such exclusion, if the own nature of the pot is not cognised, the latter would be a non-entity like a hare's horn.

The specifically intended pot again passes through a number of phases. Any one among these phases is the own nature while the preceding and succeeding phases are its alien natures.

An intermediate phase of the independent pot again is constantly subject to growth and decay. Therefore the state of the present moment is the own nature while the past and future states are the alien natures. If the existence of the pot is determinable by the past and future moments, exactly in the fashion of the present moment, then all pots—past, present and future—should together be existent at any one moment. The same logic will apply to the nature of non-existence. In other words if a particular non-existence were determinable by all the past and future non-existences in the same fashion as the present non-existence is determined by its own nature, the upshot will be that any particular moment of non-existence is a totality of all non-existences—past, present and future. Existence and non-existence must each have its own nature, in the absence of which they would lose their identity.

Again the momentary pot has a good many qualities and modes like colour, taste, smell, form etc. We know its existence by seeing its colour with our eyes, and in this context the colour is the own nature, while taste etc. of which we are not aware at the moment, are the alien nature. Had taste etc. been the own nature like the colour of the pot, visible at the moment, then the former would be of the nature of colour, on account of its being cognised along with the colour by the eye. And as a result the conception of senses, other than the eye, will be a futile imagination.

Epistemologically viewed, the idea of pot consequent upon the usage of the word 'pot' is the own nature (of pot), while the shape of the pot outside is the alien nature.

Consciousness has two aspects—

(1) The aspect of being a cognition, just like an imageless mirror.
(2) The aspect of being possessed of a cognitum, just like a mirror with an image.

Of these two, the aspect of being possessed of a cognitum is the own nature (of a pot). In other words, in the epistemological situation, the pot qua the cognitum is the own nature while the cognition itself is the alien nature. The criterion is that the point of focus is the own nature while the other auxiliary conditions are the alien nature. The own nature in its essence is the object on which our cognition is fixed. Otherwise all things would be indeterminable. Thus if a pot is considered as nothing other than the cognition itself, then all other things, like a piece of cloth etc., as cognita would be identical with the pot. Exactly similar consequences will

follow if non-existence of a pot is identified with the cognition itself because in that case, non-existence being something indeterminable, the entity called pot would not be amenable to any kind of treatment, ontological or practical.[9]

4. The Concomitance of the Speakable and the Unspeakable

The fourth axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the speakable and the unspeakable. A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes. It is, however, not possible to express in language those infinite number of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this infinitude of the aspects of a thing.[10] Only one attribute can at best be spoken of in one moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus speakable with reference to only a limited number of its attributes.

The Wide Range of Non-absolutism

The above four axioms are the foundations of non-absolutism. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy this tetrad of axioms was fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. The growth and development of the epistemological apparatus also did not detract from the importance of these basic axioms. It was always appreciated that the epistemological apparatus itself needed the service of non-absolutism for its own systematic development. Non-absolutism, in fact, was a most comprehensive principle that determined the nature of Jaina thought in all its branches—social, ethical, psychological, ontological, metaphysical and the like. It was Ācārya Siddhasena with whom the application of non-absolutism to the various branches of Jaina thought started. After dealing with the nature of varieties of the valid sources of knowledge, Siddhasena added, at the end of his *Nyāyāvatāra*, an investigation into the nature of non-absolutism signifying its unavoidability in every such treatise. Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Haribhadra, Māṇikyanandi, Vādideva, Hemacandra and others also discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of non-absolutism. The principle of non-absolutism was not in the least adversely affected with the development of the science of logic and epistemology, but its importance was rather enhanced as a criterion of the investigation of the nature of logico-epistemological tools. And as a result the concomitance of being and non-being, one and

many etc. was gradually firmly established, and Jaina metaphysics developed with the growth of the logical thought.

There is, however, no reason to believe that these axioms of non-absolutism were not effective in the *Āgamic* period. Nor is it a valid assumption that these axioms were discovered in the period of philosophical speculations. The difference, if any, lay in the spheres of the application of these axioms in those two periods. In the *Āgamic* period, the principles were applied mainly in the field of ontology, while in the speculative age it was in demand for the synthesis of philosophical issues of all types.

5. The Concomitance of Being and Non-being

The following dialogue between Lord Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama throws welcome light on the problem.

Gautama: O Lord! Does being change into being? Does non-being change into non-being?

Lord: Yes, Gautama! This is exactly so.
Gautama: O Lord! Does this change of being into being and non-being into non-being take place owing to some effort or occur spontaneously?
Lord: Gautama! It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.
Gautama: O Lord! Does your non-being change into non-being exactly in the same way as your being changes into being? Similarly does your being change into being exactly as your non-being changes into non-being?
Lord: Yes, Gautama! That is exactly so.[11]

The above dialogue clearly defines Lord Mahāvīra's assertion of the concomitance of being and non-being in the same entity as also their distinct causal identities.

Lord Mahāvīra rejected both the propositions viz. everything exists (*sarvam asti*) and nothing exists (*sarvaṃ nāsti*). He proposed a synthesis of the two. Both being and non-being are true. They are distinct, though predicable of the same entity. The distinctness of the two is unambiguously demonstrated in the following words of Gautama addressed to the upholders of heterodox doctrines. 'We never, O beloved of gods! speak of being as non-being and non-being as being. We affirm being of the concept 'everything exists'

(*sarvam asti*) and non-being of the proposition 'nothing exists' (*sarvaṃ nāsti*). The implication is that being is true as being and non-being is true as non-being. In other words, being and non-being are both real. It is interesting to note here that it is exactly these two propositions which were advanced by two rival Buddhist schools viz., the *sarvāstivādins* and the Mādhyamika *śūnyavādins*.

The implication of the above dialogue is the rejection of absolute being and absolute non-being, and acceptance of the synthesis of the two as concrete aspects of an entity. Being and non-being are also explained as possessed of their definite place and value in the above dialogue.

6. The Concomitance of the Permanent and the Impermanent

'Is it true, O Lord!', asked Gautama, 'that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable breaks whereas the stable does not break?'

'Yes, Gautama! This is exactly so.'[13]

A substance is the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence. This is explained in the following dialogue between Maṇḍitaputra and the Lord.

Maṇḍitaputra: 'Is it true, O Lord! that the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it passes through various states?'

Lord: 'Yes, Maṇḍitaputra! This is true.'[14]

The same has been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity in Jainism.[15]

The permanence of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while its impermanence is due to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is manifest from the following dialogue:—

Gautama: 'Is the soul permanent or impermanent, O Lord?'
Lord: 'The soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in

another respect. It is permanent in respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes which originate and vanish.'[16]

This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor absolutely impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.

7. The Concomitance of Identity and Difference of Substance and Modes

'Knowledge is the defining characteristic of a soul.' Here the soul-substance and the knowledge-quality are given from the standpoint of difference.[17] On the other hand, it has also been said that what is designated as the soul is the knower, or conversely what is designated as the knower is the soul.[18] Such *Āgamic* texts assert the identity of soul and knowledge.

The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water, before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally different from earth.[19] A pot is a product and earth is its material cause; in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity-cum-difference.

8. The Concomitance of One and Many

There are dialogues which throw light on the concomitance of one and many. The following dialogue is an illustration in point:—

Somila: 'Are you one or many, O Lord?'
Lord: 'I am one in respect of substance, O Somila. However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance) I am immutable, eternal and unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.'[20]

The nature of the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The

substance stands for the universal and the modes for the particular. The substance is eternal while the modes are changeable.

The universal is two-fold—the horizontal (*tiryag*) and the vertical (*ūrdhva*).[21] The proposition 'I am one', refers to the horizontal universal which is the experience of unity (*ekatva*), pervasiveness (*anvaya*) and essence (*dhruvatva*). The proposition 'I am many', in respect of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universal. There is the experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universal is the essence pervading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The vertical universal consists in the successive changes that are similar, which establishes a unity running through the past, present and future.

We find elaborate investigations into the nature of non-absolutism and the doctrine of relativism in the *Āgamic* literature. The dictum—no word of the *jina* is independent of *naya* (a particular viewpoint) is the reputed principle of *Āgamic* exegesis. Each proposition of the *Āgama* was explained by means of the *nayas*. The tradition says that the *Dṛṣṭivāda*, the twelfth text of the basic scripture, contained philosophical discussions based on different viewpoints. By the third century B.C. the main part of the text was lost, leaving behind only a fragment of it. Vācaka Umāsvāti and Ācārya Siddhasena were the pioneers in the application of the *nayas* to the different philosophical problems of their times and Ācārya Samantabhadra carried this process to its consummation by including a good number of new issues that had cropped up by his time. Siddhasena clearly demonstrated that the Sāṃkhya system illustrated the substantial standpoint whereas the Buddhist philosophy is a representative of the modal viewpoint. In this way he made an evaluation of all the systems of thought that were extant, from the relativistic standpoint, with reference to different *nayas*. The most important treatise of his on the subject is the *Sanmati Tarka,* while the most significant work of Samantabhadra on this subject is the *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, in which he has most successfully been able to apply the principle of sevenfold predication to the current problems of universal and particular, identity and difference, existence and non-existence and such other mutually opposed doctrines to establish a synthesis between them. Both these treatises can be regarded as pioneer works of the philosophy of non-absolutism.

Non-absolutism: Results and Problems

The philosophical speculations based on the non-absolutistic attitude gradually gained in depth. By the eighth century A.D. Ācārya Haribhadra and Akalaṅka further widened its scope. Ācārya Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* bears self-evident testimony to this process. The synthetic approach had also an uninterrupted growth. A serious doubt, however, presented itself. The question arose as to whether Jaina philosophy is a mere syncretistic eclectic movement or it had its own original thinking. Some modern scholars also adopt this line of thinking and are convinced that the Jaina thinkers developed their own philosophy by appropriating alien doctrines. Such thought owes its origin to the synthetic approach of the Jainas to philosophical problems. Vācaka Umāsvāti raises the question whether the *nayas* are the proponents of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition inspired by diverse opinions, and answers that they are only different estimates (literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision) of the object known.[22] *Yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇaireko'rthaḥ pramīyate svaviṣayaniyamāt, na ca itā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvad nayavāda iti.* It is also asserted in this connection that there is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between different cognitions of the same object by different instruments of knowledge, such as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person.

This topic will receive a special treatment in the next chapter on the doctrine of *nayas*.[23]

IV

The Doctrine of *Nayas*: Infinity of Modes and Approaches: The Synthetic and Analytic View point

Existence is a generic attribute of a substance. There is no substance which is not existent. From the attribute of existence the non-dualistic nature of a substance follows.[1] The consummation of such non-dualism is pure existence or absolute existence. From the standpoint of such existence the nature of the universe would find expression in such proposition as—the universe is one because existence is an all-pervading feature of it.[2]

This non-dualistic approach to reality is the viewpoint called synthetic (*saṃgraha naya*). The propounders of non-absolutism have attempted at reconciling the thoughts of the systems like Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya. But this does not mean that they borrowed this non-dualistic or generic viewpoint from the Vedānta or the Sāṃkhya systems. On the contrary, they have made a critical estimate of the systems that believed in absolutistic non-dualism. The ultimacy of the universal (existence) and the unreality of the particulars is a pseudo-synthetic viewpoint. The universe can be a unity viewed as existence, but there are attributes other than existence in a substance. Particularity is one such attribute of the substance. Viewed from this attribute of particularity the universe would appear a dualism of existence (universal and particular). The real (*sattā*) has two facets, viz. substance and the modes or the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*).[3]

The universal is an attribute of the substance. The experience based on such universal supports non-duality. The particular is also an attribute of the substance. The experience based on such particular supports dualism. In fact, the variety of experience is attested by the corresponding variety of the attributes. This is the reason why any system of thought based on any particular attribute of the real can be accepted on the basis of various particular standpoints. A real presents itself in a number of ways depending on the knower's interest, inclination. and aesthetic as well as moral

equipment. The synthetic attitude is an outcome of this doctrine of *nayas* (ways of approach and observation). There is, therefore, no room for the misconception that the doctrine of *nayas* is an eclectic outcome of the different systems of philosophy.

Pantoscopic Viewpoint (*Naigama naya*)

A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes, but it does not possess all kinds of attributes. Thus a soul has an infinite number of attributes, just like a non-soul (i.e. substance other than soul). There is absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) between a soul and a non-soul mutually, that is, a soul can never become a non-soul and a non-soul can never become a soul. The reason for such absolute non-existence is their own specific natures. A soul is possessed of the specific attribute of consciousness which is absolutely non-existent in a non-soul. The category of a non-soul comprises five substances—

(1) *Dharmāstikāya* which has the attribute of being the medium of motion.
(2) *Adharmāstikāya* which has the attribute of being the medium of rest.
(3) *Ākāśāstikāya* which provides accommodation.
(4) Matter which has the attributes of colour, odour, taste and touch.
(5) Time which has the attribute of duration.

The above specific attributes of the non-soul are absolutely non-existent in the soul. These specific attributes constitute the dividing line, between the soul and the non-soul. On the basis of the generic attributes, it is, however, possible to establish unity between the soul and the non-soul and their absolute difference can also be asserted on the basis of specific attributes as noted above. A substance has a character of its own. Its substancehood is not dependent upon external relations and spacio-temporal determinations. Each substance has its own basic nature, its own specific particularity. It acquires fresh attributes from various relationships, and determinations, but such attributes are not the defining characteristics of it.

A substance possesses attributes and, therefore, it is called the substratum (*dharmī*) of those attributes. The attributes are twofold —qualities and modes. The qualities coexist with the substance while the modes occur in succession. Consciousness is a co-existing attribute of a soul, while pleasure, pain, happiness, sorrow etc. are

attributes that occur in succession. An attribute and its substratum are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical. An attribute can exist only in its substratum, and, therefore, there is non-absolute difference between them on account of this relationship of the content and the contained. The substance is one unitary principle, while the attributes are many, and from this viewpoint they cannot be absolutely identical, as one and many have evidently contrary natures. Identity and difference are thus synthesized in a substance. Such synthesis gives rise to two distinct experiences. Thus (1) the proposition 'the soul exists' embodies the experience of the predominance of identity. The attribute of knowledge is not intended here to be distinct from the substratum soul. (2) The proposition 'the soul is possessed of knowledge' embodies the experience in which the element of difference is predominant. Here the attribute of knowledge is intended to be a feature different from the substratum soul.

In brief, the attribute is subordinate in the viewpoint of identity, while the substratum occupies a predominant place in such experience. In the viewpoint of difference the positions of the attribute and the substratum are reversed.

The cycle of modes ceaselessly revolves about a substance. The modes that occur at the present moment are existent (real) and those that are past and about to come are non-existent (unreal). While the existent mode is related to the object, the non-existent one is to knowledge. The mode that is past does not reside in the object, but is merely an object of knowledge. We imagine an object and construct an image of it. The image, however, does not exist in the world outside, but that remains as an idea inside. The modes, past and future, are ideas in the mind. The will is a reality, and the experience arising from it determines our activity. The pantoscopic viewpoint accepts also the reality of the will. The authenticity of the popular concepts of causality, substratum etc. is established on the testimony of this way of pantoscopic observation.

1. The Treatment of Cause as an Effect

In the proposition 'this is one year old plant' the transformation of plant is the effect while the period 'one year old' is the cause. The identification of plant with 'one-year-oldness' is by way of treatment of the cause as identical with its effect.

2. The Treatment of Effect as Cause

In the proposition 'violence is suffering', violence is intended

to be the cause of suffering. Here violence itself is identified with suffering by way of the treatment of the effect as identical with the cause.

In the usages like the above, the subject-predicate relation is determined on the basis of causality which justifies the act of predicating a cause of an effect, or an effect of a cause.

3. The Treatment of the Content as the Container

In the proposition 'the summit of the cosmos is the place of emancipation (*mokṣa*)', the cosmic summit is not intended to be called emancipation which really belongs to the soul and not to any particular place in the cosmos.

4. The Treatment of the Container as the Content

By the proposition 'the dais is shouting', what is meant is that the persons seated on the dais are shouting. Here the container, viz. the dais has been used to denote the content viz. the persons seated on it.

Although the pantoscopic viewpoint is right so far as its own place of application is concerned, it becomes a pseudo-*naigama* viewpoint as soon as it engages itself in considering the difference between an attribute and its substratum, or between a part and the whole as absolute and eternal. The *Vaiśeṣika* system, according to this estimation of reality, is an instance of pseudo-*naigama* viewpoint, because it considers an attribute as absolutely different from its substratum.

The Momentary Viewpoint (*ṛjusūtra naya*)

Identity and difference may be experienced with reference to either many things or a single entity. The experience of identity owes its origin to the substantial continuity whereas the experience of difference to the temporal modes. The experience focussed on the immediate present as distinct from the past and the future is the momentary standpoint, which has manifold ramifications, some of which are as follows:[4]

1. Process and Product (*kriyamāṇa-kṛta*)

Suppose a piece of cloth is being made, which is a long process. But in this process the part already made is definitely a product. If this part is not considered as a product, then what is produced at the last moment of the process won't also be a product. Even at the first instant of the process the cloth cannot be said to be absolutely

unproduced. It is, therefore, expedient to say that every moment of the process is a product, which has the present moment of experience as its cognitional counterpart.

2. Unconditional Annihilation

Origination and cessation are natural to an object. The origination itself is the cause of cessation. An entity spontaneously originates in the first moment and vanishes in the second. If a thing did not vanish immediately after its origination, it would be eternal.[5] It is, of course, found that a pot is broken when struck by a piece of stone. But such destruction is the law of the gross world of things. This rule , however, is not applicable to the subtle world, which is governed by laws that determine the incessant destruction of things.

3. Unconditional Origination

A thing, at the moment of its origination, does not produce the second moment which is its effect. What had originated in the first moment ceases to exist in the second moment, and so it cannot act as the cause of the latter. The preceding moment cannot be a cause of the moment that succeeds. It is thus evident that origination is unconditional and spontaneous.

4. Modes are without Substratum

A crow is not black. A black colour is black, a crow is crow. Both are distinct. If the black colour was crow, a black bee also, on account of its black colour, would become a crow. Had the black colour been the nature of the crow, there could not be a white crow. The red flesh, white bones and the yellow bile of the crow should also be accepted as black. But the fact is otherwise. It, therefore, follows that black colour is black by itself, whereas a crow is a crow by its own nature.

Such type of thinking represents the philosophy of absolute difference between a substance and its modes. The basic presumption of such logic is the absolute impossibility of any point of contact between a substance and its modes which belong to the substance though absolutely unrelated with it.

5. Absence of Co-existence

The black colour and the crow cannot co-exist in the same substratum, because the modes (such as the colour and crowhood) are possessed of their own potencies which are independently

existent, there being nothing called substance as the substratum of those modes. If on the basis of the predominance of black colour in it a crow is called black, then even the blankets, that are predominantly black, should be classed with the crows. The predominance of a particular mode cannot be accepted as the essence of another subordinate mode that is co-existent with it.

6. Impossibility of Substantive-Adjective Relationship

The admission of substantive-adjective relationship between two different modes would entail promiscuity of thought. And in the case of identical modes, such relationship is out of the question.

7. Absence of Cognitum-Cognition Relationship

A cognition does not know an unrelated object. Had it done so, the same cognition would have cognised all kinds of things, and this would destroy the possibility of a determinate congition. A cognition cannot also cognise a related object, because the latter ceases to exist when the former is supposed to cognise it. The cognitum-cognition relationship is based on causality. A cognition can know its cognitum only when the latter has presented itself to the former. But with the passing away of the moment of such presentation, both the cognition and cognitum are things of the past. The question of a cognition knowing its cognitum in such a situation does not simply arise.

8. Absence of Denotatum-Denotative Relationship

The meaning conventionally related to a word cannot be the connotation of the latter. This is so because the relationship determined between a word and its meaning is a thing of the past when the word is requisitioned for use at a subsequent moment. In short, the temporal diversity stands in the way of establishing any relationship between the word and meaning. And the admission of a meaning that is unrelated to the word would cause nothing but confusion. An unrelated meaning, therefore, cannot be the connotation of a word.

A word is not produced by the meaning (idea or thing). It is produced by the palate, tongue, lip etc. This is self-evident. The meaning (idea or thing) also is not produced by the word. The meaning is there even before the production of the word. There is thus no causal relationship between the word and the meaning.

The relation of identity also does not obtain between the word and meaning. They also exist apart in point of space. There is

diversity also in respect of the organs which cognise them. The word is cognised by the auditory sense-organ whereas the meaning (idea or thing) is cognisable by any kind of sense-organ, external or internal. The relationship of identity can never be possible on account of the diversity of spatial location and the organs of cognition. The admission of the relation of identity between word and meaning would entail burning sensation in the mouth at the time of articulation of the word 'fire'.

A concept also, like the meaning, is not the referent of a word. The difficulties consequent upon the admission of meaning as the referent of a word should equally apply to the doctrine of the concept as the referent of a word.

The momentary viewpoint (*ṛjusūtra naya*) is an experience arising from a momentary mode that is immediately present before the person. It rejects the past and the future as unreal. It does not also admit any nexus even between two modes and also between two relations. Such experience, however, has no sanction of the popular viewpoint which shows that the momentary viewpoint is only a partial representation of reality, because otherwise the momentary viewpoint would be an instance of a pseudo viewpoint. It is pantoscopic viewpoint that represents the popular estimation of reality.[6] It is only the combination of all viewpoints that is capable of satisfying the popular need and demand, intellectual as well as practical.[7]

The momentary viewpoint is compared to the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux, but because of its being only a partial view of reality at the cost of other views, it can be called a pseudo-momentary viewpoint.[8]

Verbal Viewpoint

The word is a powerful medium of our daily life, social and intellectual, which was invested with the power of expressing his meaning (idea or thing) by man himself. The word has also an intrinsic power of expression of its own. It travels from the mouth of the speaker to the ears of the listeners to reveal its meaning. Such revelation or expression is possible also by physical gestures. But the clarity of words is not possible in those gestures or other kinds of symbols, which also suffer from the difficulty of transmission and communication. This is why that language is requisitioned for conveying meanings. Our ideas arise from language, and language in its turn makes those ideas capable of deep thinking in

philosophy, logic and science. This is indeed the reason why the verbal viewpoint which is mainly concerned with the philosophy of word, meaning and propositions, occupies an important position in the doctrine of *nayas*. In grammar the difference of tense, case-endings etc. do not entail the difference of the referent, but this is not accepted to be so by the verbal standpoint, which claims that the difference in the tense and case-endings of a word necessarily implies difference in the nature of the referent.

Novelty of Object due to the Difference of (1) Tense, (2) Gender and (3) Number

For instance, the propositions—'there was a city named Jaipur', 'there is such a city', and 'there will be such a city'—have different and distinct references, because the city of Jaipur is a variable place without any constant character of its own. Here the difference of meaning is due to the difference of tense represented by the verb. Similarly the difference of gender entails novelty of the thing referred to. For instance in the expressions, 'baby boy and baby girl', the component 'baby' has different connotations on account of the change of gender effected by the second component. Similarly, the terms 'god' and 'goddess' have intrinsically different connotations according to the verbal viewpoint. The expression 'mean' which is a singular noun stands for a condition or quality, whereas the plural form 'means' stands for money.

The implication of this *naya* is that the meaning of a word necessarily varies with the variation of the tense, gender and number, because no additional part of a word is meaningless. Any additional element in a word is bound to introduce a novelty of meaning.

The Etymological Viewpoint (*samabhirūḍhanaya*)

This viewpoint of etymology is much subtler than the verbal viewpoint. The synonymous words, according to this viewpoint, have different meanings, and they do not stand for an identical referent. For linguistic exactness we use specific words to connote specific modes. The practice of bracketing synonyms followed in the vocabularies is a defective method according to this viewpoint. Each word has a shade of its own which makes it irreplaceable by any other word, however close its connotation may be. A morphological difference in a word presupposes a corresponding difference in the meaning intended by the speaker. No two words can be used to denote the selfsame referent. Such use would involve confusion and contradiction. The power of expression should vary from word

to word because the absence of variation would obliterate the morphological distinction of the words. Consequently the two words should be admitted as one single verbal symbol. It is, therefore, asserted by this etymological viewpoint that the use of different words should be governed by the difference in the meaning sought to be expressed by them.

The problem of the relation between word and meaning (ideas and things) is worthy of consideration in this connection. Word and meaning are quite distinct entities. Their causal efficiences are distinct. The conditions of their productions are different.

A word and its meaning stand in the relation of significant and significate. The significant is the word, sign or symbol while the significate is the thing or the idea meant by the significant. There cannot be the relation of identity between the significant and the significate and, therefore, how can diversity of the significate follow from the diversity of the significant?

The solution of the problem can be sought in the light of the words like cognition-cognitum and the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc. (1) There is no relation of identity between a cognition and its cognitum although the former is the determinant of the latter. Now, if the knower-known relationship can be admitted between the cognition and the cognitum in spite of their (epistemological) difference, what is the difficulty in accepting the denotatum-denotative relationship between a word and the thing (meant by the word), in spite of their (ontological) difference. (2) It is common sense that the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc. illumine a pot and other things, though they are physically different from one another. But, if there can exist illumined-illuminator relationship between a pot and a lamp in spite of their (ontological) difference, then what is the reason that the denotatum-denotative relationship cannot obtain between them?

Therefore, as there exists the denotative-denotatum relationship between a word and the thing, it is self-evident that there should be a difference of meaning denoted, consequent upon the difference of the denotative word.

This difference of meaning resulting from the difference of word can be illustrated by the following propositions:

(a) He is mortal.

(b) He is a man.

The expressions 'mortal' and 'man' are synonymous, but they represent different modes of the same entity, and as such they do not have an identical referent as explained below:

(a) A man is mortal and, therefore, he is represented by the term 'mortal'. The expression 'mortal' expresses the mortality-aspect of a man.

(b) A man is so called because he is the descendant of Manu. The word has a reference to his descent from a certain person, named Manu.

Similarly in the propositions (a) it is the current of *Bhāgīrathī* and (b) it is the current of *Haimavatī*, the expressions '*Bhāgīrathī*' and '*Haimavatī*' refer to the selfsame *Ganges,* but stress two different modes that have reference to the origin of the river. The first term refers to the myth of Bhagīratha digging up the bed of the *Ganges,* whereas the second expression refers to the physical origin of the *Ganges* from the *Himālayas.*

The Viewpoint of Function (*evambhūta naya*)

In this viewpoint the relationship between the denotative and the denotatum is further delimited in that the etymological meaning of the former must be satisfied by the latter. A word in order to be an exact denotative of the sense must refer to the present mode instead of a bygone aspect or an aspect that is to come. In the interest of precision of expression one should use only the word that is indicative of immediately existing mode of the denotatum. In the proposition 'a teacher is teaching the student', the expression 'teacher' has been properly used because he is engaged in the act of teaching at the moment. But in the proposition 'a teacher is taking his lunch', the use of the word 'teacher' is not logically proper because he is taking food instead of doing any kind of teaching at the moment.

The Scope of Viewpoints

The substance stands for the universal whereas [illegible] refer to the particular aspects of a thing. Substance and modes are indeed the basic objects of cognition. [illegible] viewpoints have been conceived on the basis of the [illegible] of a real—

(a) The cognition or the experience of the substance or the universal of a thing is the source of what is known as the substantial viewpoint (*dravyārthika naya*).

(b) The mode or the particular in a thing is responsible for what is called the modal viewpoint (*paryāyārthika naya*).

Of the seven *nayas* the Pantoscopic, the Synthetic and the Analytic viewpoints fall under the category of substantial viewpoint. The remaining four, viz. the Momentary, Verbal, Etymological and Functional viewpoints constitute the category of modal viewpoint.

According to another system of classification the first four viewpoints which are mainly concerned with the ontological aspect of a thing are called the ontological viewpoint (*artha naya*). The remaining three, being mainly concerned with the linguistic aspect, are called the verbal viewpoint (*śabda naya*).

The Pantoscopic viewpoint is called an idealistic standpoint (*jñāna naya*) on account of its being concerned with the speaker's will or intention and also because the past and future modes referred to in this viewpoint are mere ideas and do not reside in an external object.

A viewpoint (*naya*) has a double function, viz. experience of the object and its verbal expression. All the viewpoints may be considered idealistic (*jñāna naya*) on account of their being of the nature of experience. They can also be considered as linguistic (*śabda naya*) on account of their being expressed in verbal propositions.[9]

The nature of a thing (substance) is sometimes determined with reference to its intrinsic nature or the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) while on other occasions it is determined with reference to modes arising from extraneous sources. In the former case the viewpoints may be called material (*niścaya naya*) and in the latter the formal (*vyavahāra naya*).

The doctrine of non-absolutism falls under two divisions, viz., complete comprehension through *pramāṇa* and partial assessment through *naya*. The entire object is revealed by the *pramāṇa,* whereas only a particular aspect is determined by the *naya*. The entire object comprehended through the principle of non-absolutism is analysed in parts by means of the system of *nayas.*[10] The water from the ocean contained in the pot can neither be called an ocean nor non-ocean, but it can be called only a part of the ocean. Similarly, a *naya* though arising from the *pramāṇa* is neither a *pramāṇa* nor a non-*pramāṇa.*[11]

A viewpoint (*naya*) is limited in its activity to the presentation of its own subject-matter. It is called a *naya* so long as it does not refute the rival viewpoint.[12] As soon as the refutation of a rival

viewpoint is attempted, it falls in the category of pseudo-*naya* (*durnaya*) on account of its being absolutistic in character.

An absolutistic viewpoint that asserts its own validity independently of any other viewpoint gives rise to controversy whereas the relativistic viewpoint or a coordinated viewpoint gives rise to reconciliation or absence of controversy.

Even as gems strung together merge their individuality into a necklace, exactly so the different viewpoints embodying different experiences merge into the philosophy of non-absolutism, being held together on the string of relativism.[13]

The propounder of non-absolutism does not claim the validity or invalidity of a viewpoint but proclaims that a viewpoint independent of other viewpoints is false whereas a viewpoint dependent upon other viewpoints is true and genuine.

Nikṣepa or Classification of import of words

Nikṣepa stands for a special method of exposition of the import of words. A word expresses numerous modes and shades of its import. For the expression of such modes and shades the selfsame word is qualified by a number of adjuncts. For instance, the word '*indra*' can be used as a name of a particular person (*nāma-indra*) or an image of the king of heaven (*sthāpanā-indra*) or person who once enjoyed the status of the king of heaven (*dravya-indra*) or a person actually enjoying the glory and magnificence of the king of heaven (*bhāva-indra*).

The method of *nikṣepa* was developed in the *Āgamic* period itself. In the speculative period and also in the period of logical developments, the method continued to flourish. While rhetorics gives the method of determining the particular meaning of a multi-sensed word, it is only the commentaries on the Jaina *āgamas*, which give the method of determining the intended meaning of a unisensed word. This method is useful not only for the treatises on logic but the analytic approach of this method has a universal utility in that it is a valuable instrument for defining the intended meaning and purpose of any systematic treatise on any subject.

The gradual development of knowledge and practical behaviour including verbal expression takes place in the following

order—the object in its wholeness is known through valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) in the first instance, and subsequently the same object is cognised in parts through the *nayas* (viewpoints). All our knowledge is synthetic in the beginning, and becomes analytic at the next stage. When an object is known through valid cognition and the *nayas*, a name is assigned to it. For instance, a thing of a particular shape and capable of holding water is named 'jar'. This nomenclature is responsible for the relationship of denotative and denotatum between the word 'jar' and its referent (the objective jar). This is the initial stage of word-meaning relationship which undergoes semantic expansion in due course. Thus a drawing or a picture of a jar, though incapable of carrying water, is also called jar; likewise a mass of clay (material cause of jar) and a potsherd is also called jar. At this stage of semantic expansion it becomes imperative to ascertain the intended meaning of a word precisely in a particular context of its use. It is only for the purpose of defining the particular intended meaning of such word that an adjunct is added to it. This method is called the classification of imports of words (*nikṣepa*).[14]

There is no prescribed limit of exposition through *nikṣepa*. The scope of such classification of imports is co-extensive with the range of meanings that a word is capable of expressing. The minimum types of such classification are four—an object must have some name and also some shape; it had also modes that are past, as well as the modes that are to come along with the modes that it has at present. This is how the four basic *nikṣepas* naturally follow:—

1. A name (*nāma-nikṣepa*) or a demonstrative symbol.
2. Form (*sthāpanā-nikṣepa*), an image, imaginary or real.
3. Substance (*dravya-nikṣepa*), past or future modes of the material cause.
4. Essence (*bhāva-nikṣepa*), the present mode constituting the essence of the thing.

Ācārya Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa's exposition of *nikṣepa* is quite different. According to him the *nāma-nikṣepa* consists in nomenclature of a thing, while its shape, material cause and the effect are respectively the *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva nikṣepa*.[15] In fact, the nomenclature, assumption of a form, causality and the sequel are the minimum determinations of a thing. An object, therefore, must necessarily have these four determinants.[16]

Naya and *Nikṣepa* (Viewpoints and the Classification of Imports)

A viewpoint has a reference to the object, the knowledge or the verbal symbol, the *nikṣepa* has also a similar reference.[17] The *naya* is knowledge whereas the *nikṣepa* is the practical application or usage. The *naya* and *nikṣepa* are mutually related as theory and its practical application.

Theory	Practical application
Verbal viewpoint	*Nāma-nikṣepa*—verbal usage.
Pantoscopic viewpoint concerned with the will or the intention of the speaker	*Sthāpanā-nikṣepa*—cognitional usage
Pantoscopic synthetic analytic and momentary viewpoint[18]	*Dravya-nikṣepa*—objective usage.
Verbal viewpoint	*Bhāva-nikṣepa*—objective usage.

When a single word denotes the name, form and the different modes of an object, the question of the intended and unintended denotatum comes up. The word 'lion' may mean the picture of a lion or the lion as a living animal. The dead body of a lion is also denoted by the word 'lion'. The lion *qua* meaning presents itself as soon as one hears the expression 'lion'. In this way the different modes of the meaning as classes of imports arise. Such classifications as determined by adjuncts are requisitioned for defining the meaning of a particular word under exposition. The *nikṣepa* in fact is the selection of a particular meaning from among the meanings of a word.[19]

Knowledge and meditation are only the two stages of a single process. An object acts as a cognitum in respect of an unsteady state of the cognition. The same object, however, becomes a meditatum (an object of meditation) with reference to a steady state of the mind called meditation. The *nikṣepa* has an important bearing on the process of meditation. One may concentrate on mere name as the meditatum, or on a form or on any past, future or a present mode. In this way any of the numerous modes of an object can become a suitable meditatum.[20]

An image is the representative of the original object, and this is the reason why the pantoscopic viewpoint identifies the original substance (thing) with the idea. The name (nomenclature) has reference to the denotatum and so the verbal viewpoint identifies

the original object with the verbum (verbal object). The past and future modes are super-imposed on the object, and thus the pantoscopic, synthetic and analytic viewpoints identify the past and future modes with the present mode of the original object. The verbal viewpoint considers the present mode alone as real. In this way the qualified verbal usage is approved by the *nayas* for giving expression to the different modes of an object. By this process one can arrive at the meaning intended by the speaker through words by overcoming doubt, perversion (error) and uncertainty.[21]

Dialogue

Question 1. From the above discussion of the nature of *nayas,* it is obvious that the purport of one *naya* is not only different from that of the other *nayas* but it is definitely opposed to the latter. Under such circumstance which should be considered true between the two? If one of them is considered as true, then the other will evidently be untrue. Both of the two mutually opposed views cannot be accepted as true. Is truth also divisible on the basis of viewpoints?

Answer - A thing is a composite of the universal and the particular. The generic attribute in it is the universal, whereas the specific attribute is called the particular. A generic attribute is not absolutely different from the specific attribute and *vice versa.* A thing, therefore, is a natural composite of the generic and the specific attributes. The generic attribute is eternal, while the specific attributes arise and vanish every moment, each succeeding moment replacing the preceding one without break. Each preceding moment is the cause of the moment that succeeds it as its effect. The generic attribute is also the cause of that effect. The auxiliary conditions also enjoy causal efficiency. This is an objective estimate of the nature of a real. The entire range of human thinking or search for truth is based on the duality of universal and particular, identity and difference or substance and modes. The pantoscopic viewpoint is the will or intention concerned with the universal and, therefore, it accepts the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (the Doctrine of Satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya system). A believer in the generic attribute cannot think differently. But the specific attribute or the particular is as much real as the generic attribute or the universal. This leads us to the momentary viewpoint (*ṛjusūtra naya*) which is the outcome of the speaker's attitude based on the particular or the specific attribute, and this is the reason why it rejects such causality by asserting the non-

existence of the effect in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*). In other words, whereas one of the viewpoints propounds the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause, the other denies it. Such opposition is not whimsical, because it is based on the divergent experiences of the thinkers. Both these experiences are certified by the behaviour of the reals. The generic attribute is as much a true component of a thing as the specific attribute. The generic attribute is eternal. The verbal or conceptual mode (*vyañjana-paryāya*) endures for a while whereas the objective mode (*artha-paryāya*) is evanescent and momentary. The causal relationship is applicable in the first two cases only, while in the latter case causality assumes a different meaning, for example, the doctrine of '*pratītya-samutpāda* in Buddhism. Both these alternatives are based on two different truths and as such both are true. And this is why the two different viewpoints look at the two truths differently as they actually are and verbally represent them in accordance with their divergent experiences. A viewpoint is essentially an experience. It does not create the object. It is limited in its function to know the object and express it as it is. A real is not divided on the basis of the viewpoints but the latter are divided on the basis of the objectivity of the former. The philosophies based on absolutistic viewpoints accept as the whole truth either of the alternatives exclusively viz., the system propounding the generic attributes or a theory based on the specific characteristics. This is the reason why some among them assert the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, while the others deny it. The Jaina philosophers, however, regard the viewpoints as relativistic in nature on account of their origin from the relativisim of the generic and the specific attributes. The dialogues of Lord Mahāvīra as recorded in the *Ardhamāgadhī* canon are all permeated with the spirit of relativism. And this is why the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the doctrine of non-existence of the effect in the cause are both considered as relatively true by the Jaina thinkers. The apparent mutual contradiction of the two alternatives is explained on the basis of their relativistic approach. The former is a valid estimate of the aspect of generic attribute, while the latter derives its validity on account of being concerned with the specific attributes of a real. Both the estimates are objectivistic and are based on relativism. The generic as well as the specific attributes belong to the same object, as limited to themselves, and as such are free from mutual opposition or inconsistency. If the two aspects are not mutually opposed or inconsistent, why should the diverse experiences arising from them be considered as mutually contradictory. The appearance of contra-

diction should be an occasion for our attention as to whether it is due to the divergence of the referents, viz. the generic and the specific attributes. All philosophical contradiction would melt away spontaneously if a real is looked at from all plausible viewpoints without putting an exclusive stress on any one of them.

The *Sāṃkhya* system propounds the '*puruṣa*' as an unchanging eternal entity. The Buddhist philosophers, on the other hand, believe in momentariness of everything. The substantial (*dravyārthika*) and the modal (*paryāyārthika*) viewpoints are not inspired by these doctrines. The substance, in Jainism, is synthesis of continuity, origination and cessation. Neither origination-cessation independent of continuity nor continuity independent of origination-cessation is given to experience. This mutual entailment of the two aspects (origination-cessation and continuity) is responsible for the substantial and modal viewpoints, which demonstrates that the continuity aspect of the substance is permanent and unchanging whereas the origination-cessation aspect is impermanent and ever-changing. The permanence and impermanence of the substance is not based on the viewpoints. But in fact the latter are based on the former. In other words, it is the nature of things that is the source of *nayas* and not that the nature of the things is determined by them.

Identity and difference are the intrinsic attributes of the substance. The substantial viewpoint represents the former whereas the modal viewpoint is based on the latter. The modes are twofold, viz. (1) represented by an identical concept (*vyañjana paryāya*), and (2) the modes that are objective (*artha-paryāya*). The former are a kind of continuity of homogeneous change expressed by words. The latter appear indivisible or the like being ultimate in appearance or reality. The substance as an entity is unitary and indivisible. It becomes many and infinite as divided into objective and conceptual or verbal modes. A person is called 'man' from birth to death. The onlooker always finds him as a person on account of the conceptual or verbal symbol, viz. 'person'. This is the identity aspect of the substance. But the person passes through infancy, youth and such other stages. Infancy again is also divisible in sub-stages, for instance, the milking babe, a three year old child and so forth.

In this way the conceptual or the verbal modes represent both identity and multiplicity of a thing.

According to the *Upaniṣads* the ultimate reality is ineffable, being expressible only negatively by the verbal symbols (*neti neti*).[22]

In the *Ācāränga Sūtra* the 'self' has been described as unspeakable, being unamenable to any sort of verbal expressions. Lord Buddha also characterised the 'self', 'the life here-after' etc. as indeterminable. The analysis of the nature of the substance reveals that the inexpressibility itself is only relatively true, because it is expressible in reference to another attribute of the real. The objective mode, being momentary and infinitesimal, is not susceptible of being expressed in language. And, therefore, the substance is ineffable in reference to the objective mode. The conceptual or verbal mode, on account of its prolonged continuity, grossness and being originator of a homogeneous flow of change, is amenable to linguistic expression. The substance, therefore, is speakable in respect of the conceptual or the verbal mode.

The above discussion should clearly show that the viewpoints are based on the fundamental nature and the congregation of modes of the substance. These viewpoints are neither the eclectic combinations of heterogeneous systems nor conceptions based on whim.

Question 2. Is there any special viewpoint for the expression 'barren woman's son'?

Answer. 'Barren woman's son' is a concept. No concept can be independent of any reference to something else. An unreal entity cannot even be conceived. Neither a 'barren woman' is unreal, nor a 'son' is unreal. Neither the 'sky' is unreal, nor a 'flower' is unreal. The expressions like 'a son of a barren woman' or 'a sky-flower' are compound concepts. The 'son' is objectively true, and 'a barren woman's son' is a negative concept with reference to a 'son'. Similarly, the 'flower' is a truth. And a 'sky-flower' is a negative concept formed on the basis of the 'flower' existing in its own capacity. A barren woman cannot have a son, but in the absence of any son anywhere, the concept of 'a barren woman's son' would be impossible. The sky cannot have flowers, but if the flowers were not present anywhere in the world, the concept of sky-flower would be impossible. And, therefore, the concepts like 'barren woman's son' or 'a sky-flower', are negative ideas born out of the real existence of their components elsewhere in the world. The pantoscopic viewpoint (*naigama naya*), on account of its being based obviously on the speaker's will or intention, is competent enough to explain such hypothetical truths.

V

The Doctrine of Conditional Dialectics and Sevenfold Predication

The expression *Syādvāda* (conditional dialectics) is composed of two words, viz. '*syāt*' and '*vāda*'. The word '*syāt*' is an indeclinable that appears like a verbal form in the potential mood. It stands for multiplicity, obligation, reasoning etc.. But in the present context it stands for multiplicity or multiple character (*anekānta*).[1] The term is also used to denote particular space and time,[2] as well as probability (*sambhāvanā*) and doubt. The word '*syāt*' in the expression '*syādvāda*' has not been used to mean doubt. It is used to denote multiplicity or multiple character (*anekānta*). The implication is that *Syādvāda* is the doctrine of the multiple character of real. It is a doctrine that is known as *Anekānta* or the non-absolutistic estimation of reality in its infinitely multiple character. This non-absolutistic estimation is definite in its character and free from all doubts as indicated by the expression *syāt* which is absolutely free from any kind of association, direct or indirect, with the verbal form '*syāt*' used in the potential mood of *Sanskrit* conjugation of verbal roots.[3] Probability (*sambhāvanā*) and relativity, however, are implied by the word '*syāt*'.

The word '*syāt*' is necessary for the affirmation of the desired attribute to the exclusion of the undesired one. And this is why all the propositions, in order to be precise in meaning, should be accompanied by the use of the word '*syāt*'.[4] The propositions without such express use of '*syāt*' should be understood to have that word implicitly. The word '*syāt*' has a double implication:

(1) Negation without affirmation or affirmation without negation is not possible.
(2) The generic attribute (continuity or the universal) and the specific attribute (origination, cessation or the particular)—both these are relative. We never experience origination-cessation without continuity or the latter without the former.

The nature of a real is not omnigenous and so it exists in its own nature and does not exist in the nature of alien things, or, to be

more exact, a real exists in its present mode and does not exist in its modes that have passed away or will come in the future.

The cycle of origination and cessation goes on uninterrupted. The mode that arises is the affirmation, whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise is the negation of the object. Affirmation and negation are thus simultaneous moments of the real.

A sensuous cognition of an object is positive in character and never negative according to some thinkers. The inference (*anumāna*) is, however, positive and negative both. According to the conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*) affirmation and negation are the attributes of the real. We perceive fire and the affirmation in this case means that the fire exists in a particular place. When we try to infer fire from smoke, the existence of smoke proves the existence of fire in a particular place while the existence of a contradictory probans (*hetu*) proves the non-existence of fire. But the affirmation or the negation in the conditional dialectics is not related to space or time of the object. They are related to the determination of the nature of the object. The fire in a particular place or time exists in its own nature, that is, its affirmation is dependent on its constituents and its denial is dependent on the elements that do not constitute its character. Affirmation and negation are co-existent in an object. On account of its positive character a thing is existent in its own nature, while on account of its negative aspect it is not mixed up with what is other than itself. In other words, the nature of an object is definite on account of its self-affirmation and negation of alien elements. This is indeed the reality of the real.[5] The word '*syāt*' defines this definiteness of the nature of an object.

The conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*) is also known as the exposition by division (*vibhajyavāda*)[6] or the doctrine of alternatives (*bhajanāvāda*).[7] This follows from the following exhortation of Lord Mahāvīra: 'A monk should take resort to the doctrine of exposition by division (*vibhajyavāda*); he should utilise all possible alternatives and should never adhere to an absolutistic attitude in explaining the nature of a thing.' The Lord himself explained many a problem by means of this method of division.

Once Jayantī asked the Lord which was better between the states of slumber and awakening.

'For some souls, O Jayantī! the slumber is commendable, but for others awakening is wholesome.'[8]

'Why is it so, O Lord!?'

'The slumber is wholesome for those who are engaged in sinful activities, while for the virtuous awakening is commendable.'

The exclusive assertion of the wholesomeness of slumber or awakening would be an absolutistic answer which was not approved by Lord Mahāvīra who explained all the questions by means of divisions of issues avoiding exclusiveness.

If the identity of the substance and the attributes is accepted, both will merge into each other, losing their duality, and as a consequence the proposition 'the attribute subsists in a substance' would be impossible.

If, again, the attribute were absolutely different from the substance, the proposition 'this attribute belongs to this substance' would be impossible, because in the absence of some sort of identity the proposition would be meaningless. According to the doctrine of alternatives (*bhajanāvāda*) the rule of exclusiveness of identity or difference cannot be acceptable. The doctrine of alternatives (*bhajanāvāda*) approves of both identity and difference. The adjective-substantive relationship between the substance and the attribute would be impossible if there were absolute identity between them. This difficulty is resolved by the relativistic viewpoint of the doctrine of alternatives. In the proposition 'a blue lotus', 'blue' is the adjective while 'lotus' is the substantive. The quality 'blue' is identical with the 'lotus', yet the substantive-adjective relationship substists between them. 'A man with a beard is coming', in this proposition the expression 'with a beard' is the adjective of the expression 'man' which is the substantive. The adjective must be in some respect different from the substantive, and this is why the substantive-adjective relationship does not offer any logical inconsistency of the relationship of identity-cum-difference is accepted between the substance and its attributes.

There is no contradiction between the positum and the negatum. This is the implication or pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*). The duality of apparently contrary attributes enjoys mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) as a synthesis of infinite number of such dualities is established. The conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) is, in essence, the system of propositions expressing such multiple character of the real. In these propositions affirmation, negation and such other alternatives

define the nature of the real. This can be demonstrated by the doctrine of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) which is as follows:

1. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists in some respect (*syāt*).
2. The pot certainly (*eva*) does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
3. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists and does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
4. The pot is certainly (*eva*) indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
5. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
6. The pot certainly (*eva*) does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
7. The pot certainly (*eva*) exists, certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).

It represents the existence of the pot, relegating the other attributes to a secondary position by excluding them from the intended area of reference.

The expression '*eva*' (certainly) in the above propositions indicates the definite character of the assertion or the negation or indescribability or their possible combinations. Sometimes it is suggested that the expression 'also' (*api*) should be substituted for the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) in the above propositions. But such substitution would not carry much meaning. Without the use of the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) the intended attributes (existence, non-existence etc.) would not be definitely determined. In the absence of relativism indicated by the phrase 'in some respect' (*syāt*) the use of the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) would confer an absolutistic import on the propositions. But by the use of the word '*syāt*' (in some respect) indicative of relativism, the expression certainly (*eva*) loses the absolutistic import and confers definiteness on the intended attributes predicated in the propositions.

The expression '*eva*' (exclusively) is used to serve three purposes—

1. The exclusion of non-relationship. (*ayogavyavaccheda*)
2. The exclusion of the relationship with others (*anyayogavyavaccheda*).
3. The exclusion of absolute non-relationship (*atyantāyogavyavaccheda*).

In the proposition 'the conch is white exclusively' there is the exclusion of non-relationship. The expression '*eva*' (exclusively) is attached to the adjective for excluding the doubt about the existence of the adjective. When the whiteness of the conch is under query, the assertion is made that the conch is white exclusively.

In the proposition 'Pārtha alone is the archer', the exclusion of archership from any person other than Pārtha (Arjuna) is intended. Nobody is in doubt about the archership of Pārtha, but the use of the expression 'exclusively' (*eva*) is used to set at rest the common doubt as to whether there is any other person equal to Pārtha in the art of archery.

In the proposition 'a blue lotus certainly exists', the absolute non-relationship (between a lotus and blueness) is excluded. In this proposition 'certainly' (*eva*) is attached to the verb 'exists' in order to exclude the doubt about the affirmation of universal existence or absolute non-existence (of blueness in the lotus).

In the proposition 'the pot certainly exists in some respect', the word 'pot' is the substantive and the word 'exists' is the adjective. The word 'certainly' (*eva*) is connected with the adjective (viz. *asti*) and determines the attribute of existence of the pot. If the phrase 'in some respect' (*syāt*) were not used in the proposition, the admission of absolute existence would be the result, which was not desirable, because there are also attributes other than existence in the pot. The use of the expression '*syāt*' (in some respect) precludes such undesirable consequences. It also widens the limit imposed by the expression '*eva*' (certainly). The unambiguous assertion of the intended attribute and the comprehension of many an unmentioned attribute are effected by the joint use of the words '*syāt*' and '*eva*'.

In the doctrine of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) the affirmation and negation of the predicate are respectively made in the first two propositions, the predominant feature in the first being position and in the second negation. The attribute verbally mentioned is evidently predominant, while the attribute not so mentioned, but only understood, is secondary and subordinate.

A thing is not absolutely devoid of its own nature and so it is described by means of affirmation as a predominant character. Nor is it omnigenous and so it is described by means of negation as a predominant factor. Negation is as much an attribute of a thing as affirmation. A pot has existence in respect of its own substance. This is affirmation. The pot has non-existence in respect of an alien substance. This is negation. Apparently thus the negation is a relative mode, that is, a mode with reference to another thing. But truly speaking this is not so. Negation is an intrinsic potency of a

thing. A substance, if it were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would not be able to preserve its substancehood. Negation is predicated with reference to other things and so it is called relative or 'dependent on others'. The negation acts as a protecting shield by not allowing the encroachment of alien existences. A pot exists in respect of its own substance and does not exist in respect of an alien substance—both these propositions reveal the truth that the pot is a relative entity, as much dependent on itself as on others for its definite nature. This relativism falsifies either of the propositions, viz. the moment of existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence or that the moment of non-existence of a thing is bereft of existence. Existence and non-existence (affirmation and negation) are simultaneous. But this simultaneity is incapable of being expressed by a single word at a single moment. This is why a third proposition is requisitioned for expressing the simultaneity of existence and non-existence through the expression 'indescribable' (*avaktavya*). The implication is that the existence and non-existence are necessarily co-existent, but they are unspeakable simultaneously by a single expression on account of the absence of any linguistic symbol capable of discharging this ambivalent function.

It would follow from the above that there are only three fundamental predicables, viz. existent, non-existent and indescribable. The remaining four predicables are but the different combinations of these three taken two or three at a time. In the *Āgamic* period the use of three predicables was mostly in vogue. The use of the seven predicables is also found in some cases.[9]*

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* In the case of the objects that are non-composite (for instance, a monad), the attributes are only three in number, viz. self, not-self and indescribable. Here 'indescribable' means the impossibility of the object being spoken of or described exclusively as 'self' or 'not-self' because of the same object being both (self and not-self) at the sme time. These three attributes, however, become six in the case of a dyad (a composite body of two space-points) as follows: (1) self, (2) not-self, (3) indescribable, (4) self and not-self (one attribute for each space-point), (5) self and indescribable (one attribute for each space-point), (6) not-self and indescribable (one attribute for each space-point). These six ways again become seven in the case of a triad (a composite body of three space-points) in the following way: (1) to (6) as above, and (7) self, not-self and indescribable (one attribute for each of the three space-points). Here the fourth, fifth and sixth ways have each two more subdivisions. Thus the fourth, viz. self and not self, has the following two additional subdivisions (1) self (for two space-points) and not-self (for the remaining one space-point). The fifth and sixth ways also have similar subdivisions.

Once Gautama asked Lord Mahāvīra—'O Lord! is a two-spaced aggregate self, not-self or indescribable?'

Lord replied—'O Gautama! a two-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, not-self in some respect and indescribable in some respect.'

Gautama said—'How is it so, O Lord!?'

Mahāvīra replied—'O Gautama! it is self in respect of its own nature, it is not-self in respect of alien nature and it is indescribable in respect of both.'

Four additional predicables follow spontaneously, viz.—

1. A two-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not-self in some respect.
2. A two-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
3. A two-spaced aggregate is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
   The seventh predicable follows in respect of a three-spaced aggregate—
4. A three-spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.

A thing is positive and negative rolled into one. The doctrine of sevenfold predication has been framed on the basis of this dual attribute of position and negation. The dualities of universal-particular, permanent-impermanent, describable-indescribable can also constitute this system of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*). Each of these dualities can be used as the predicates of the seven propositions. Three propositions constituted by these duals are given below by way of illustration. It should be noted here that the Jaina philosopher's conception of universal is quite different from that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. The Jainas substitute similarity for universal—

1. The pot certainly is similar in some respect.
   The pot certainly is different in some respect.
   The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
2. The pot certainly is permanent in some respect.
   The pot certainly is impermanent in some respect.

The pot certainly is in escribable in some respect.
3. The pot certainly is speakable in some respect.
The pot certainly is unspeakable in some respect.
The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.

Each attribute of an object can give rise to a system of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*). Permanence and impermanence being mutually contradictory attributes, how could they qualify the same pot. It is on the basis of relativism that a synthesis is established between these mutually opposed attributes.

The Greek poet-philosopher Heraclitus of the 6th - 5th century B.C. believed in the doctrine of the co-existence of contraries. His relativism is the spur which pricks the side of a sluggish conservatism in all departments of life—taste and morals, politics and society—and it is the absence of relativism that, according to Heraclitus, is responsible for absolutisms and stagnation in philosophical thinking. Heraclitus announced for the first time in Greek thought the principle of relativity of qualities which he pushed forthwith to its extreme consequences in the words 'good and bad are the same', 'we are and we are not'. The movement of life, according to him, is like the back-returning of the bow, to which he compares it,[10] an energy of traction and tension restraining an energy of release, every force of action compensated by a corresponding force of reaction. By the resistance of one to the other all the harmonies of existence are created.*

Heraclitus was a fluxist and, therefore, a relativist. In point of fact his doctrine of flux and his doctrine of relativity lead to the same result; the successive states of an object as well as its simultaneous qualities frequently both bear the stamp of a far-reaching diversity which amounts at times to complete contradiction. In one aspect, according to him, X is 'good', in another aspect it is 'bad'. He believed in a fundamental law in the natural as well as the spiritual world that contraries were not mutually exclusive, but rather pre-supposed and conditioned, or were even identical with each other. His theory of relativity contained like a folded flower the correct doctrine of sense-perception with its recognition of the subjective factor, and it taught Greek thinkers the lesson they were bound to acquire if they were to be saved from a bottomless scepticism.**

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* Śri Aurobindo, Birth Centenary Library, Vol. XVI, page. 3521.

** T. Gomperz, op. cit. pages 66-70.

The relativism of Heraclitus is based on fluxism. But the basis of relativism of the Jaina philosopher is quite different, according to whom the momentariness is as much dependent on permanence as the latter is dependent on the former. Momentariness and permanence both together constitute the nature of the real. They do not occur in succession but are co-existent and inseparable. Change or momentariness is only one aspect of the thing and is meaningless without its co-ordinate, viz. the permanence. Relativity, in fact, is understandable on the inter-dependence of the two aspects, viz. momentariness and permanence, in the absence of which it is unthinkable. It is only on the simultaneous existence of the two contrary aspects or attributes that relativity acquires a meaning.

Śri Aurobindo thinks that Heraclitus seems to recognise the inextricable unity of the eternal and the transitory, that which is for ever and yet seems to exist only in this strife and change which is a continual dying.

If this estimate is acceptable, the philosophy of Heraclitus would be nearer to the Jaina standpoint. But even then the Jaina philosopher would disagree because the transitoriness and eternality are co-ordinate factors, neither being sub-ordinate to the other, as Śri Aurobindo or the Vedāntists would like to believe. Ācārya Amṛtacandra has brought out the equipollence of the two contrary attributes by the examples of churning by a milkmaid, who moves her left and right arm alternately in opposite directions to make butter, thus exercising both the arms in succession. In the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*), similarly, of the two contrary attributes one is assigned prominence by relegating the other to the background at a time.[11] This explains the nature of relativism or relativity of the Jaina philosopher. None of the attributes is sub-ordinate to the other, both being active in their own way to discharge their respective functions and constitute the nature of the real.

The doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syadvāda*) and its results.

1. In the science of logic causality is a universal postulate. But in the conditional dialectic causality is not universally applicable principle which is active only in the gross world. The subtle or the micro-cosmic world is governed by its own rules where the cause-effect relationship becomes too thin to be recognised. The succession of cause and effect becomes meaningless at that stage.

Momentariness changes into smooth passing from one state to another without any gap. Origination and cessation become meaningless. In the language of the traditional *karma* doctrine the causal concatenation can be detected in the phenomena of the fruition or disappearance of *karma*. The changes taking place in the gross atomic aggregates also appear as subject to causality. However, in the changes that are spontaneous and intrinsic, the principle of causality is not applicable in the ordinary sense of the term. In Jaina ontology it is averred that the colour of an atom definitely changes after the lapse of a definite period, the cause of such change being undefined. An atom is here governed by its own intrinsic nature. The instantaneous modality (*artha paryāya*) of an atom is beyond the range of the principle of causality. A substance undergoes change every moment. The reality of the present moment can remain intact in the succeeding moment provided the former could mould itself in consonance with the latter. The nature of the instantaneous mode (*artha paryāya*) has found expression in the following traditional verse—

Anādinidhane loke, svaparyāyāḥ pratikṣaṇam/
Utpadyante vipadyante, jalakallolavajjale//

'In the substance, which is without beginning and without end, the modes arise and vanish by themselves every moment like the waves that emerge and merge in the ocean without interruption.'

The doctrine of causality stands exposed in the light of the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayas*) thus—

The doctrine of causality finds its proper place and exposition in the pantoscopic, analytic and the momentary viewpoints (that take note of the prolonged mode).

The doctrine of causality assumes quite a different meaning that is tantamount to its abrogation in the verbal, etymological and functional viewpoints. An effect arises by its own nature spontaneously according to these viewpoints. An effect cannot depend on anything else for its origination. It is meaningless to say that a self-created object has a cause that is something other than itself. When the cause and effect are identical, it is redundant to assert a relationship *tertium quid* between the two. It follows, therefore, that an effect arises spontaneously and intrinsically from and by itself independent of anything outside it.[12]

2. The existence of mode is made subordinate and ignored in the purely substantial viewpoint (*śuddha-dravyārthika-naya*), and, therefore, the divisions of time into the past, future and present do not exist.[13] The three verbal viewpoints (*śabda-nayas*), being concerned with 'becoming', accept modes and, therefore, three divisions of time are real according to them. The implication is that the unchanging aspect of the substance is timeless, the instantaneous mode being just momentary is also virtually timeless. It is only the verbal or conceptual mode (*vyañjana-paryāya*) that depends on the divisions of time, being a sort of prolonged existence. The substance in its three aspects virtually represents three different systems of philosophy, viz. the monistic Vedānta that believes in absolutely unchanging Brahma, the Buddhist fluxism that adumbrates unceasing change and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that believes in both permanence and change.

3. The substance consists in modes that are successive and non-successive. Such modes exist in the present in the aspects as intended or known by the cogniser, but do not exist in those aspects in the other divisions of time. This differentiation of aspects owing to the condition of time is matched by a similar differentiation on account of other causes and conditions as well. A novel system of sevenfold predication of the conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) can be conceived on this variety of causes and conditions, viz.[14]

1. The substance is one.
2. It exists in some respect.
3. It has an originating condition.
4. It has also a source of origin.
5. It is also related to something else.
6. It has also a location.
7. It has also a time.

Among the modes that occur in succession it is only the present one that is definite, whereas the modes that are to come are not regulated by any rule regarding their probability and indefinite occurrence. It is not possible to predict definitely that such a mode could necessarily occur in succession of a particular mode. In this connection one should note Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics according to which it is impossible to assert in terms of the ordinary conventions of geometrical position and of motion that a particle (as an electron) is at the same time at a speci-

fied point and moving with a specified velocity, for the more accurately either factor can be measured, the less accurately the other can be asserted.

4. The doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) is applicable not only for the explanation of spatial, temporal and quantitative relative modes, but it can be validly applied for ascertaining the intrinsic modes of the substance. Permanence and impermanence are the intrinsic modes which appear as contraries in the gross world. These are not contrary in essence and, therefore, their contrariety can be solved by relativity.

5. In the context of the doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) a study of the relativity of the modern science is very valuable.

Some expert statisticians have studied this sevenfold predication of the doctrine of conditional dialectic in the light of the principles of statistics. We quote here an excerpt from an article of Prof. P.C. Mahalanobis.—

'I should now like to make some brief observations of my own on the connection between Indian-Jaina views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of *syādvāda,* namely *avaktavya* or the 'indeterminate' is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1) assertion ('it is'), (2) negation ('it is not'), and (3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of *syādvāda*, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative (but not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability. Used in a purely qualitative sense, the fourth category of predication in Jaina logic corresponds precisely to the meaning of probability which covers the possibility of (a) something existing, (b) something not-existing, and (c) sometimes existing and sometimes not existing. The difference between Jaina '*avaktavya*' and 'probability' lies in the fact that the latter (that is, the concept of probability) has definite quantitative implications, namely, the recognition of numerical frequencies of occurrence of (1) 'it is', or (2) 'it is not', and hence in the recognition of relative numerical frequencies of the first two categories of 'it is' and 'it is not' in a synthetic form. It is the explicit recognition of (and emphasis on) the concept of numerical frequency ratios which distinguishes modern statistical theory from the Jaina theory of *syādvāda*. At the same time it is of interest to note that 1500 or 2500 years ago

syādvāda seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.

Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jaina view that 'a real is a particular which possesses generic attributes.' This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jaina view, in fact, denies the possibility of making any predication about a single and unique individual which would be also true in modern statistical theory.

The third point to be noted is the emphasis given in Jaina philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern statistics.

The Jaina views of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. 'A real changes every moment and at the same time continues' is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.

Fifthly, the most important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. In *syādvāda* the qualification *'syāt'* that is, 'may be or perhaps' must be attached to every predication without any exception. All predication, according to *syādvāda,* thus, has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of 'uncertain inference' in modern statistical theory. The Jaina view, however, is essentially qualitative in this matter (while the great characteristic of modern statistical theory is its insistence on the possibility and significance of determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely certain predication naturally leads Jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the inadequacy of 'pure' or 'formal' logic, and hence to stress the need of making inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.

I should also like to point out that the Jaina view of causality as 'a relation of determination' based on the observation of

'concomitance in agreement and in difference' has dual reference to an internal condition 'in the developed state of our mind' which would seem to correspond in any given context and also to an external condition based on 'the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events' which is suggestive of a statistical approach.

Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of Jaina philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jaina philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of reality in modern times.'*

Dialogue

Question 1. How can *syāt* mean 'in some respect'? Is it not a verbal form in the potential mood?

Answer. Just as the expression *'asti'* in the sentence 'the world is inhabited by the heroes' (*astivīrā vasundharā*), is an indeclinable (*nipāta*), exactly so in the expression *'syādvāda'* the word *'syāt'* is an indeclinable. It is not used to denote the potential mood. It is possessed of many senses, one of them being 'in some respect'.

Question 2. Both the sentient and the non-sentient are possessed of infinite number of attributes. What, then, is the line of demarcation between them, when it has been virtually asserted that everything has the nature of everything—a proposition which expresses the universal property of a real (both sentient and non-sentient)?

Answer. The attributes are of two kinds—generic and specific. By the specific attributes a substance is defined in its independent and discrete aspect. Sentience is one such specific attribute which belongs to the substance that is sentient and not to what is non-sentient. From the viewpoint of the attribute 'sentience' there is absolute difference between the sentient and the non-sentient. And this is why the sentient and the non-sentient are absolutely different substances. Every substance is possessed of

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* P.C. Mahalanobis's article *"The Foundations of Statistics"*, published in Switzerland in *Dialectica*, Part VIII, No. 2, June 15, 1954.

infinite number of attributes. All the substances have their own separate identities due to their uncommon properties and so the Sāṃkhya-Yoga dictum that 'every thing is possessed of the nature of everything (*sarvaṃ sarvātmakam*)' is not acceptable to Jainas, who do not admit the evolution of the physical cosmos from the single principle of *Prakṛti* (primordial matter).

The existence of sentience in a sentient being is natural and independent of anything else. In the non-sentient material particle or body there are attributes that are natural and intrinsic, viz. colour, smell, taste and touch. All attributes, momentary or durable, originating from the combination of soul and matter, are dependent on extraneous conditions and factors. A substance is possessed of infinite number of attributes on account of the combination of modes that are intrinsic as well as extrinsic.

Question 3. The Naiyāyikas and others also define the nature of an object by means of a determining characteristic, just as in the system of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) the nature of the real is determined by a specific attribute. What, then, is the difference between the two philosophies, as both of them admit a real as independent of anything else so far as its own nature is concerned? There must be a point of departure between the two which should characterise the Jaina thinker's standpoint as the proponent of relativity as implied in the conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

Answer. In the proposition 'the soul certainly exists in some respect', that is, in its aspect of sentience, the existence of sentience is affirmed; that does not mean that existence alone is its own characteristic, but that non-existence also is an equally valid aspect of it. Here the question may arise that if the extraneous non-existence is a nature of the soul, then the colour etc. of physical objects should also be considered as the nature of the latter. The solution is obvious. That both existence and non-existence constitute the nature of a thing is attested by experience, just as smoke and fire exist in the same locus, say a kitchen. Existence and non-existence are similarly concomitant attributes, there being a natural relationship (*svabhāva-sambandha*) between the two. This in essence is the principle of relativity propounded by the doctrine of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

The nature of the substance does not follow from the doctrine of conditional dialectic. The substance is as it is by nature. One

cannot explain why that is so. Philosophy does not create a real. It only explains it. And exactly this is the aim and purpose of conditional dialectic. The Jaina philosopher admits five special qualities on the basis of experience which are responsible for the postulation of five substances—

Quality	Substance
1. Motion	*Dharmāstikāya* (the substance which is the medium of motion)
2. Rest	*Adharmāstikāya* (the substance which is the medium of rest)
3. Accommodation	*Akāśāstikāya* - Space (the substance which is the medium of accommodation).
4. Colour, smell, taste and touch	Matter
5. Consciousness	Soul.

(We have not translated the word '*astikāya*' in the above renderings. The above substances are called '*astikāya*' because they have extension and are conceived as consisting of space-points, countable, countless or infinite.)

All the qualities other than the above five are generic attributes. The distinction between them is explained by means of conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*).

Question 4. It has been said that the sevenfold predication can be applicable with respect to each and every attribute of a substance. If so, is the non-absolutism (relativism) itself available to the system of sevenfold predication? If the reply is in the affirmative, the predication of negation (that is, the second among the seven propositions) would be a kind of absolutism. And in this way non-absolutism (relativism) would not be a universally applicable doctrine.

Answer. Ācārya Samantabhadra has explained non-absolutism (relativism) from the non-absolutistic standpoint itself. When the system of conditional dialectic is applied for the knowledge and exposition of an object in its entirety, non-absolutism (relativism) is proper and genuine. And when only a particular attribute is cognised and explained, the services of a particular *naya* (viewpoint) is requisitioned and that is a sort of

absolutism, *ekānta* (singular viewpoint). The propounder of non-absolutism (relativism) admits both non-absolutism and absolutism in their proper perspective. This is why the system of sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) is applicable to non-absolutism (relativism) itself in the following manner.

1. There is absolutism in some respect.
2. There is non-absolutism in some respect.
3. There are both absolutism and non-absolutism in some respect.
4. There is indescribability in some respect.
5. There is absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
6. There is non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
7. There is absolutism, non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.

There is no contradiction in absolutism by itself. What is denied is only the absolutism that refutes the contrary viewpoint. Absolutism thus is twofold, viz. right and wrong. The absolutism that is right is *naya*, while the wrong one is pseudo-*naya*. Non-absolutism is not an obstinate and rigid doctrine because the admission of the co-existence of contrary attributes not attested by any valid source of knowledge does not fall within the purview of genuine non-absolutism. Thus non-absolutism is of two kinds, viz. right and wrong. The former is valid knowledge, while the latter is a sham simulation of it. The right non-absolutism has a universal application.[15]

Ācārya Akalaṅka has subjected the substance '*jīva*' to the system of sevenfold predication as follows—

*The soul exists (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.

*The soul does not exist (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.

The implication of the above two propositions is that the soul is a conscious substance only so far as its activity of consciousness is concerned. But it has also other aspects, such as the aspect of being a cognitum or an agent of will, and so on, which are the attributes quite apart from consciousness. In this way all such attributes that are not opposed to reason and logic are the subject-matter of the doctrine of non-abolutism.[16]

Question 5. Is relativity itself subject to the system of seven-

fold predication? If so, the admission of an absolutistic truth would be inevitable.

Answer. An object is relative in some respect and non-relative (absolute) in another. Both these alternatives may be acceptable. From the standpoint of the instantaneous or spontaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*) a thing is absolutely independent of anything else. The substance of space is nothing but space from the standpoint of its instantaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*). A thing is a relative reality from the standpoint of extraneous and alien modes. Viewed from the standpoint of relativity the same substance of space is perceived as circumscribed by a jar or a canvas, etc. All the prolonged modes (*vyañjana-paryāya*) are relative aspects. There is not a single element in the cosmos that may be described as independent of anything else. But every substance is a synthesis of the absolute and the relative, which can never be absolutely disconnected. Such disconnection itself can be effected only relatively. The modes are intertwined and can never be disentangled, though the instantaneous mode (*artha-paryāya*) can be called independent in contradistinction to the prolonged modes (*vyañjana-paryāya*) that are relative.

VI

Organs of Knowledge (*Pramāṇa*).

It was Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara of the fifth century A.D. who laid the foundation-stone of the science of organs of knowledge in Jaina philosophy. There was not any independent treatise on the subject before that period, though there was a huge literature concerned with epistemology, which was a common heritage of Jainism and Buddhism, handed down from ancient times. This literature was mainly concerned with epistemo-psychological problems and the systems of extra-sensory perceptions such as mind-reading, clairvoyance and omniscience. In the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, under the *Jñāna-guṇa-pramāṇa*, there is an exposition of the time-honoured four categories of valid knowledge propounded by the Nyāya school viz. *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *āgama* (scripture). The illustrations of the varieties of inference quoted in the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* are not found in the extant Nyāya treatises. Nor are they strictly logical. They perhaps represent an ancient tradition, probably a popular version of the strictly logical expositions of the relevant concepts. The Nyāya school had a long history which is now not known to us. The logical ideas developed slowly and passed through various stages. The *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* might be representing one such stage. There is, however, no doubt that the science of logic had reached a stage of perfection before the Buddhist logician Dignāga and the Jaina thinker Ācārya Siddhsena Divākara composed their treatises on logic.

The Buddhists and the Jainas entered the arena of logic rather at a late period, their main interest at the early stages being mainly soteriological. Like Vasubandhu in Buddhism, Siddhasena Divākara perhaps was the first Jaina logician who composed his *Nyāyāvatāra*, introducing a system of logic in Jaina thinking. It was a desideratum, because old notions and concepts had to be defended on a logical basis using technical terms that had been invented by the Nyāya school by that time. The credit of the development of a comprehensive system of organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) can be assigned to Ācārya Akalaṅka, who can be considered as the greatest pioneer in the field of Jaina logic. Both Haribhadra and Akalaṅka belong to the 8th century A.D., the former hailed from Rājasthān in the north and the latter from

Mānyakheṭa in the south. While Haribhadra's field of activity was mainly related to ontology and the problems of non-absolutism and relativism, Akalaṅka's main concern was the science of logic and epistemology on which he composed the great works like *Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniścaya* and *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* etc., which provided a solid base for further development of the subject for centuries to come.

The Buddhists, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools and the Sāṃkhya thinkers had already made some progress in this field by composing valuable works on the subject and inventing technical terms and their definitions. Akalaṅka and his followers came a bit later in the arena with fresh interpretations, and terminology. They fully utilised the thought that had developed by that time in bringing out the implications of their own traditions giving them a new meaning in the light of new ideas and concepts. As a result they could give more precise definitions, sometimes effecting improvements that provoked further thought among the rival schools.

Definition of Organ of Knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The great Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti has defined *pramāṇa* (valid organ of knowledge) as a cognition that is free from contradiction,[1] 'freedom from contradiction' standing for the fulfilment of the desired end (*arthakriyāsthiti*). The Naiyāyika philosophers have defined the *pramāṇa* (valid organ of knowledge) as the condition of the experience of the (true) object.[2] The Buddhists recognised the cognition as the valid organ (*pramāṇa*), while the Naiyāyikas included the auxiliary conditions of such cognition in the definition of an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The Jaina logicians did not approve of this definition of the Naiyāyikas. They were in favour of admitting cognition as the organ of knowledge. Ācārya Siddhasena defined the organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa)* as cognition that reveals itself and others and is free from contradiction.[3] What is conducive to the cognition of the object is the organ of knowledge, that is, the most vital instrument (*sādhakatama*) of *pramā or* valid knowledge. Though this definition was generally agreed upon, there was difference of opinion about the most vital instrument. The *Naiyāyikas* considered the senses and the sense-object-contact as the 'most vital instrument' of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The Jainas and the Buddhists, however, did not consider contact as the 'most vital instrument' but substituted the cognition itself for it. It is on this account that the use of the term 'cognition' was considered necessary in the definition of an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

There cannot be a valid organ of knowledge if there is doubt or error (perverted cognition). The adjective 'free from contradiction' (*bādha-vivarjitam*) has been used in the definition of a valid organ of knowledge in order to exclude them (viz. doubt and error). The adjective is representative of the word '*samyak*' (meaning right). In the theory of knowledge the two words that are frequently used are *jñāna* (cognition) and *ajñāna* (non-cognition). Non-cognition includes doubt and error. This is why 'a cognition is a valid organ of knowledge' can be regarded as a sufficient definition of a valid instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Umāsvāti has defined a valid organ of knowledge as cognition.[4] A cognition is positively right and determinative. What is false and indeterminate is not a cognition, but a piece of non-cognition. This definition of Umāsvāti has been made easily understandable to the rival schools by adding the adjective 'freedom from contradiction' (*bādhavivarjitam*). A cognition reveals an object. But if it did not reveal itself simultaneously, it could not have revealed an object either. It is, therefore, both self-cognizant and a cognizant of others. This adjective 'cognizant of self as well as of others' has been used to explain this aspect of an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Ācārya Akalaṅka has introduced some clarification by making some new additions and alterations. He has replaced the phrase 'freedom from contradiction' by the expression 'non-discrepant' (*avisaṃvadī*). Doubt and error are not non-discrepant cognitions and this is the reason why they are not valid organs of knowledge. A valid organ of knowledge is only the cognition that is non-discrepant. The second adjective introduced in the definition of a valid organ of knowledge by Akalaṅka is 'what cognizes an object not known before.'[5] This adjective, however, does not appear appropriate in view of the fact that Akalaṅka has recognised memory (*smṛti*) also as a valid organ of knowledge. But from the modal viewpoint (*paryāyārthika naya*) the adjective is meaningful, although from the substantial viewpoint (*dravyārthika naya*) a cognition that knows an object cognized before, or is continuously knowing the same object, is a valid organ of knowledge. From the modal viewpoint the object that is changing every moment is necessarily an unknown object, being fresh every moment. And so what we know was never known before and is unknown in this sense. The adjective 'not known before' (*anadhigata*) expresses this aspect of the object of a valid organ of knowledge. In the Buddhist logic we find the adjective 'cognition of an object not known before' (*anadhigatārthādhigama*) used in the

definition of a valid organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Ācārya Akalaṅka has followed the Buddhist logician in his own definition, with the purpose, probably, of clarifying a non-absolutistic standpoint in respect of absolutistic implication of the Buddhist logician's definition of the valid organ of knowledge. It should, however, be noted in this connection that the meaning of the term 'not cognised before' is not, according to the substantial viewpoint, what is absolutely unknown but what is only relatively unknown. In brief, while the substantial aspect, being a permanent feature of an object, is never absolutely unknown, the modal aspect remains ever unknown beforehand because of its momentariness. The Buddhist philosopher's rejection of memory as an invalid organ of knowledge on the ground of its being cognizant of an already unknown object is not proper according to Akalaṅka.

Māṇikyanandi has used the expression *apurva* (novel, new) for the expression *anadhigata* (not known before),[6] which, however, was not much appreciated in the later logical tradition of the Jainas. According to the Mīmāṃsakas cognition is only indirectly known (*parokṣa*), that is, a cognition knows its object and never itself. The cognition is only inferable. What is known is the object, and the instrument by means of which it is known is the cognition. In other words the cognition is inferred from the cognition of the obejct.

The Naiyāyika philosophers also regard cognition as knowable by another cognition. According to them the cognition of a human being is revealed by the Divine Cognition, the self-cognized cognition being possible only for God

The Sāṃkhya philosopher regards cognition as unconscious, as it is only an evolute of the primordial matter, the *prakṛti*.

The position of the Jaina thinker in this respect is quite different. According to him a cognition reveals itself along with the object, because what does not reveal itself cannot reveal others. Here 'itself' stands for the cognition, while 'others' stands for the object which is other than the cognition.[7] At the time of revelation a cognition is turned towards itself as well as towards the external object and is thus respectively the self revealer and the revealer of the object as well. For instance, the proposition 'I know the pot', implies that the subject knows three things, viz. the 'I' (that is, the knower), the 'pot' as well as the 'act of the cognition of the pot'.[8] A cognition is not the revealer of the object alone like the eye, but like

the sun it reveals the object as well as itself. Even as the revelation of the sun does not need any other revealer for its own revelation, a cognition does not need the service of another cognition for its own revelation. The *ācāryas* like Māṇikyanandi,[9] Vādidevasūri,[10] Vidyānanda[11] etc. have used the expression *svaparavyavasāyi* (determinately cognizing the self and the other) in place of *svaparābhāsi* (revealing the self and the other), thus doing away with the adjectives like '*bādhavivarjitam*' (free from contradiction) or '*avisaṃvādi*' (non-discrepant). Ācārya Hemacandra considered the element of 'self-revelation' as redundant.[12] He has defined a valid organ of knowledge as the right determination of an object. He asserts that self-revelation is a common feature of both the valid and erroneous cognitions. A cognition never remains unknown in any of its part. The philosophers of ancient times, according to Hemacandra, purposely incorporated the element 'self-revelation' in the definition simply in order to examine the epistemological doctrines that upheld the indirect revelation of cognition by means of inference (*anumāna*) or by a subsequent cognition arising in the next moment.[13]

Consciousness is the nature of the soul. The homogeneous transformation (*anvayī pariṇāma*) of consciousness is known as *upayoga* (experience), which is twofold, viz. indeterminate (*anākāra*) and determinate (*sākāra*). The indeterminate (*anākāra*) consciousness is formless, while the determinate (*sākāra*) is possessed of form. The indeterminate experience is *darśana* (intuition) and the determinate experience is *jñāna* (knowledge, cognition)*. The intuition (*darśana*) can be compared with the Buddhist conception of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpa jñāna*). The Buddhist philosopher regards the indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) as the perceptual organ of knowledge (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). In the Jaina system, however, the intuition (*darśana*) is not considered as a category of valid organ of knowledge because it is not determinate and definite cognition of the object.[14]

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* Intuition (*darśana*) and cognition (*jñāna*) are interpreted in two ways, viz. the traditional and the critical. The traditional exposition is as follows—

In intuition (*darśana*) there is no such differentiation regarding the external objects as expressed in the proposition 'this is a pot and not a piece of cloth'. Nor is there any such comparison in regard to an external object—'this is a jar', and 'that is also a jar'. And so such intuition (*darśana*) does not comprehend an external object but is only a form of consciousness. When consciousness assumes a form, that is, assumes the form of the external object, it is called a cognition.

Validity and Invalidity.

The cognition by nature reveals both, the object and itself. In its aspect of self-revelation it is always valid whereas in its aspect of being a revealer of the external object it may be valid or invalid.[15] Validity consists in its being free from contradiction or non-discrepant, that is, being the cognizer of the object as it is. Contradiction or discrepancy is a source of invalidity, because in their case the object is not cognized as it is.[16]

Whether the validity or invalidity of a cognition is natural or due to extraneous causes, is a very hotly-debated issue of logic.

The issue of validity is discussed in two parts, viz. the origin of validity and the determination of validity (*jñapti*). The origin of validity or invalidity, according to the Jaina philosopher, is due to extraneous causes. Their determination, however, is self-certified in the case of repeated experience and dependent on extraneous testimony in the case of fresh or novel experience.[17]

It should, however, be noted that the issue can properly be considered with reference to its different aspects by taking resort to the method of dividing the problem in its relevant viewpoints. The above view of validity or invalidity has been stated in the context of discussions in logical treatises. In the light of the epistemology of the *āgamas*, however, a somewhat divergent line of interpretation crops up. The doctrine that the origin of validity is necessarily due to extraneous conditions is not exclusively acceptable. In the case of extra-sensory perception the validity arises spontaneously

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The indeterminate or the generic experience that takes place immediately after the contact between the subject and the object, is intuition (*darśana*). And the determinate experience that takes place consequently is cognition (*jñāna*). This is the critical interpretation of the nature of intuition (*darśana*) and cognition.

Our statement about consciousness as 'assuming a form' requires some clarification. The meaning of the word 'form' is either a concept or a particular or epistemological object. The Buddhist logician asserts that the cognition of a particular object occurs as originating from and being of the shape of that object. This is not acceptable to the Jaina philosopher. The formless cognition cannot assume the form of the external object, possessed of a particular shape. The meaning of 'assuming form' or 'being of the shape of the object', in the present context of Jaina logic is that a concept arises in the cognizer in order to cognize the object. Such internal concept is technically called an experience (*upayoga*) that is 'possessed of form' or 'is in the shape of the object'.

whereas in ordinary sensory perception it is on account of extraneous conditions. The extra sensory perception depends on itself and so the question of extraneous conditions determining its validity is irrelevant. A sensory perception is always dependent on other factors and this is why the origin of its validity is due to alien conditions. In case the conditioning factors of sensory perception are free from faults the resulting cognition is valid, but otherwise it is invalid.

The power of sensory cognition is very much limited and uncertain, and as such the line of demarcation between validity and invalidity in such case is very thin and indistinct. Ācārya Akalaṅka has analysed the issue very minutely which is very significant being based on the doctrine of discussion of problems through divisions (*vibhajyavāda*). The validity or invalidity of a cognition, according to him, cannot be ascertained by any exclusive angle of vision. A cognition has a number of aspects. The aspect that is efficient in determining the nature of a real is the determinant of the validity of a cognition. The question of the validity and invalidity respectively of a perception or a pseudo-perception is thus problematic in the sense that a person, even though possessed of unimpaired and faultless senses, perceives the moon as touching the horizon which is obviously an illusion. Similarly a person of impaired vision sees double moon, the dual number in such cognition being contradictory. But such cognition is a valid cognition so far as the moon is concerned. What should, then, be the criterion of validity or invalidity? Akalaṅka asserts in this connection that even as a fragrant powder is so called because of the predominance of fragrance in it, in spite of its various other ingredients, just so the cognition which has a greater amount of concordance (with truth) is called a valid organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), whereas a cognition with a preponderance of discordance is designated as an invalid piece of knowledge (*apramāṇa*).[18] A sensory perception cannot enjoy an absolute validity on account of the limits of the power of sensory cognition and the relative character of the conditions that produce such cognition. It is on such grounds that Ācārya Akalaṅka arrived at the doctrine of the problematic character of the criterion of validity and invalidity of a cognition. A very few among the logicians have been able to make a correct estimate of this great contribution of Akalaṅka to the field of Indian logical speculations.

Result of the Valid Organ or Knowledge

As a believer in the existence of soul the Jaina philosopher identifies the soul as the knower (*pramātā*). Consciousness (*jñāna*) is an attribute of the soul, and because it is the most vital instrument of a valid cognition, the Jaina philosopher asserts that consciousness (*jñāna*) is the valid organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The cessation of ignorance is effected only by means of consciousness (*jñāna*), and so the consciousness *qua* cessation of ignorance is the result of the valid organ of knowledge.

The Naiyāyika philosophers here argue that the selfsame consciousness (*jñāna*) cannot be accepted both as the organ and the result of knowledge. If the consciousness itself is the organ as well as the result, it should be only one of the two, viz. cognition and its result. How can a consciousness be both the organ and the result at the same time? The solution to the problem as proposed by the Naiyāyika philosopher is that the function of the senses, contact between the object and the senses etc. that are the indispensable instruments of cognition, constitute the organ whereas the resultant cognition of the object or the experience (*pramā*) is the result of that organ.

There is no difference of opinion between the Jaina and the Nyāya logical traditions about the nature of valid organ of knowledge as the most essential instrument of a valid experience (*pramā*). But the difference lies in the fact that the Nyāya school has admitted the function of the senses, sense-object-contact etc., that are insentient elements, as the vital instruments of the valid experience (*pramā*). The Jaina philosopher, on the contrary, does not accept such insentient factors as constituting the vital instrument, but according to him the cognition alone is such instrument. According to Nyāya philosopher the instrument that produces the cognition is the valid organ and the cognition is the result (of that organ). The implication of the Jaina position is quite different, according to which the immediately preceding moment of cognition (that is the cause) is the organ while the cognition which immediately succeeds it (as the effect) is the result (of the organ). As the conscious soul itself *qua* the organ is transformed into an effect (viz. cognition), it is not admitted that the cognition *qua* result is the effect of an organ that is insentient. The upshot is that the cognitive function directed on the object is the organ and the consequent cognitive function *qua* the cessation of ignorance is the result. The direct result of cognition is the cessation of ignorance,

but the latter is not identical with the former. The cessation of ignorance is effected by cognition, and this is why the latter as the organ is the instrument of the cessation of ignorance. The organ and its result occur in succession, and this temporal sequence is responsible for the organ-result relationship. In fact the organ and the result are the two successive modes of the cognizer related as cause and effect. The distinction between an organ and its result is also thus determined modally. It is the cognizer that cognizes the object, and is subject to the cessation of ignorance. In other words, the cognizer that is transformed into cognition is identical with the cognizer that is transformed into the result. From this standpoint there exists an identity between the organ and the result. Considered in the light of relativity there does not exist an absolute difference between the moments of the organ and the result because both of them belong to the same stream of consciousness; nor are they absolutely identical because there is temporal succession and cause-effect relationship. The immediate direct effect of the organ is the cessation of ignorance whereas the subsequent concepts of acceptance, rejection or indifference are the indirect consequences. On the cessation of ignorance the cognizer accepts some object, rejects or remains indifferent with respect to others. The incidental result of omniscience is pure indifference, because the omniscient, on account of his having got rid of all desires, is absolutely free from the acts of acceptance and rejection.

Division of Organs of Knowledge

The organs of knowledge are divided into two classes, direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). These two classes have been conceived on the basis of the twofold aspects of the sensuous and super-sensuous objects. The dictum that the establishment of an object is dependent on the valid organ of knowledge can be stated reversely as 'the classification of the valid organs of knowledge is dependent on the nature of the object'. The super-sensuous objects are perceived directly (by the soul) whereas the sensory objects are perceived indirectly (by means of the senses). The two classes of organs of knowledge came to be formulated in this manner.[19] Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa also has approved of this principle of classifying knowledge on the basis of the classification of the objects as super-sensuous and sensuous.[20]

The Buddhist logician also has divided the organs of knowledge into two classes on account of the twofold character of the object.[21] Two fundamental aspects of cognition are recognised by

Dharmakīrti, viz. direct intuition of the object and conceptual thought (*kalpanā*). In direct intuition a bare perception of the object arises in such intuition. It is mere perception without any kind of conceptual construction. On the other hand, a cognition, as influenced by the past memories and impressions, presents conceptions by means of language through necessary additions and alterations of the past experiences. The mind employs five kinds of permanent devices inherited through the eternal predispositions, viz. name, class, substance, attribute and function, to interpret the object. All the intuited data are poured into these devices and are shaped into diverse concepts, thus becoming the source of conceptual thinking. The concepts are a sort of mental construction, but because of their being super-impositons, through exclusion of others, on the 'desired' objects, they are indirectly invested with practical efficiency in regard to the external object. Concepts are twofold, viz. (i) based on reals and (ii) purely imaginary without any sort of reference to the object. In other words, there are concepts with objective reference and also concepts which are purely subjective and imaginary. The objective concepts fall in the category of valid organs of knowledge, called inference (*anumāna*). In this way the duality of the valid organs of knowledge follows from the duality of the cognitive process, viz. direct intuition and objective thought. In brief, the direct intuition is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) whereas the objective concept is concerned with the inferential form of knowledge. All the objective cognitions thus are included in these two classes of valid organs of knowledge.[22]

The Buddhist logician distinguishes two kinds of epistemological objects, viz. the discrete particular (*svalakṣaṇa,* thing in itself) and the general concept (or a universal) as the exclusion of all things other than the thing in itself (*anyāpoha).* The discrete particular is the object of inference (*anumāna*).

The above two dualities of the organ of knowledge based on the duality of the epistemological object, endorsed by the Jaina and Buddhist logicians, have a point of departure as regards their nature. This point of departure is on account of two distinct ontological conceptions of the Jaina and Buddhist schools. In the Jaina tradition the object is a combination of the universal and the particular rolled into one, the two being real characters of the object. The indeterminate cognition (that is, formless experience or

intuition) is not admitted as a valid organ by the Jaina logicians, on account of its undecided character as regards the object. A direct (super-sensuous) cognition, according to the Jaina logician, is 'immediately' cognitive of the object, whereas the indirect cognition knows the object only mediately, that is,through some media.

A direct cognition in Jainism is twofold, viz. empirical (*sāṃvyāvahārika*) and metempirical (*pāramārthika*), the former being represented by the sensuous or mental experience and the latter by extra-sensory perception. The indirect cognition is of five kinds – memory, recognition, reasoning, inference and verbal testimony.

The self-conscious cognition is necessarily direct. It is twofold, perceptual and non-perceptual with reference to its nature as experience of the object. The cognition that is 'lucid' and instantaneous (*viśada*) cognizes the object directly without any intervening medium, and there being no intercession between the knower and the known, is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, the cognition that does not fulfil the above conditions is non-perceptual (*parokṣa*).

The lucidity-cum-instantaneousness (*vaiśadya*) is the defining characteristic of perceptual cognition. On account of its being dependent on the self (soul) alone it never lapses and falters in comprehending its object. And this is why it is transcendental or metempirical perception (*pāramārthika pratyakṣa*). The sensuous or mental cognition, on account of its being not dependent on the self alone is not lucid-cum-instantaneous. In spite of this deficiency it cognizes the object more clearly and distinctly than inference and other kinds of non-perceptual cognitions. This also explains its character of being empirical as distinguished from the metempirical and the transcendental.[23]

Absence of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness is the determinant of non-perceptual cognition. Inference depends upon probans as its medium, and so it is devoid of the power of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness.

The perceptual cognition is indeterminate according to the Buddhist logician. The Naiyāyikas, however, consider it to be both, indeterminate and determinate. According to them the indeterminate cognition produces the determinate knowledge. In the Jaina

tradition the perceptual cognition is of two kinds, viz. indeterminate and determinate as explained below. The gradual development of the sensuous and the mental perception is explained thus: There is a contact between the senses and the sense-objects in the beginning. The four senses excepting the eye and the mind, are in physical contact with their objects, while the latter two have no such contact. In other words, in the case of four senses there is a kind of direct contact with the object, but in the case of the eye and the mind the conjunction (*sannipāta*) with the object is called appropriate 'nearness'. This is followed by the intuition which cognizes the generic aspect of the object. And thereafter there is the comprehension of a particularized generic aspect (*avāntara sāmānya*) which is called determinate perception (*avagraha*). Such determinate perception is preceded by a contact-perception (*sambandhabodha vyañjanāvagraha*) in the case of the four senses, which is followed by the cognition of the object. The eye and the mind cognize the object straightway, there being no contact-perception in their case. In determinate perception (*avagraha*) the object is indefinite 'something', that is indescribable generic aspect, there being no thought in terms of name, class, substance, attribute and function.[24] It is mere sensation bereft of any distinct judgmental character like, 'this is sound', 'this is colour' etc. Such determinate cognition is followed by doubt which brings up the rear of speculation (*īhā*). Such investigation is made by means of the process of agreement and difference through propositions like, 'this is being cognized by the ear and not by any other sense and hence it must be a sound'. This is followed by the determinate perception, this is definitely sound, which is called a perceptual judgment (*avāya*). This perceptual judgment gives rise to impressions which are called retention (*dhāraṇā*).

The above cognition relates to the phase of soundhood of the audible object. The same process of determinate cognition, speculation, etc. is repeated in the case of the other phases of the sound. For instance, the determinate cognition (*avagraha*) 'this is sound' is followed by doubt, speculation etc, in the following way:- 'the sound is sweet, it is not harsh, hence it is the sound of a conch and not of a horn'. Such judgments fall under the speculation (*īhā*).

'This is definitely the sound of a conch', this is practical judgment (*avāya*). The non-lapse of the cognition 'this is the sound of a conch' is retention (*dhāraṇā*). In this way the finer and finer

modes are cognized in succession.[25]*

In brief each cognitive process is incomplete in a sense, because it can be supplemented by many other relevantly-related processes which may form a compact process that unfolds gradually more and more particularised modes of an object.

The mental perception like the sensuous perception also takes place gradually in four stages, viz. determinate perception (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), judgment (avāya), and retention (dhāraṇā). In the sensuous perception the senses are active upto determinate perception (*avagraha*), and the function of the mind starts from the speculation (*īhā*) onward. The function of the senses is limited to the cognition of the object as present before them at the moment. The thought that follows this is not the function of the senses, but of the mind. The question may rise why such cognition should be designated as a sensuous cognition when it is the mind that directs it to the stage of perceptual judgment (*avāya*) followed by retention (*dhāraṇā*)? The reply is that the process of such cognition starts from a sensuous determinate cognition which relates to a particular external object of a particular sense which is responsible for its being designated as a case of sensuous cognition and not of a mental thought. The

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*The tetrad of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment and retention are of two kinds, viz. (i) concerned with the fundamental modes and (ii) concerned with the secondary modes, the former being called the ultimate (*naiścayika*) and the latter practical (*vyāvahārika*).

In one tradition the determinate perception (*avagraha*) is a specific cognition. According to it the *darśana* (intuition) e.g., 'this is something' relates to a particular aspect which is indistinct (*avibhājita viśeṣa*), while *avagraha* (determinate perception) relates to a particular that is distinct, e.g. the proposition 'it is colour'. As regards the distinction between *samśaya* (doubt) and *īhā* (speculation), the former is expressed in propositions like 'it is white or black' while the latter in proposition like 'it should be white'. As regards *avāya* (perceptual judgment) it is expressed in the judgment 'this is only white and not black'. According to Akalaṅka 'He is a person' is a case of *avagraha* (determinate perception). The curiosity about the particular characteristics such as the language, age etc. is *īhā* (speculation). *Avāya* (perceptual judgment) consists in certitude arrived on the basis of the cognition of the specific character, e.g. the judgment 'this person is a southerner', this person is young'.

Ācārya Jinabhadra has considered this process of *avagraha* (determinate-perception), *īhā* (speculation), and *avāya* (perceptual judgment) as only provisional and elative, because at every stage it is generic with reference to the succeeding process until the ultimate particular or distinctive aspect is not arrived at. The intermediate processes in such a series of processes are generic-cum-specific, whereas the first and the last are purely generic and specific respectively.

mind in such cases is only an auxiliary condition and not the initiator of the process. In the case of mental cognitions the process starts with the mind itself as the initiator. The objects perceived by the senses are comprehended by the mind through devices of association of ideas (*saṃkalana*), investigation (*mīmāṃsā*) and discursive thought (*vitarka*), thus effecting a construction of new ideas based on novel laws of thought. All these mental activities are not initiated by the senses which are more or less passive conditions of intuition. Such activities belong to the sphere of the mind. The author of the *Nandī Cūrṇi* has shown that the mind cognizes sound, colour, etc. in dream following the process of determinate cognition, speculation etc. In the waking state also, in the absence of sensuous function, the mind alone cogitates through the same stages of determinate cognition (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*) etc.[26]

The succession of determinate cognition and speculation etc. is an invariable feature of sensuous and mental perceptions. But this process is so quick that the stages are not usually discernible. The successive stages are recognised in the case of hitherto unknown novel objects. But in the case of the cognition of the accustomed objects these stages are not so evident in spite of their necessary occurrence in them.

An intuition is not determinate and hence in logic it is not included in the category of valid organs of knowledge. The question then arises as to how determinate cognition (*avagraha*) and speculation (*īhā*) are recognised as valid organs of knowledge? Such a question can be answered in two ways. Firstly, as determinate cognition (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*) and perceptual judgment (*avāya*) are the three stages of the process of cognition and the last stage (viz. the perceptual judgment) is avowedly a valid organ of knowledge, there should be no inconsistency if the other two (viz. the determinate cognition and speculation) were considered as valid organs of knowledge. Secondly, there is an experience of the object in determinate cognition (*avagraha*) and the function of investigation is discharged through agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*) in the case of speculation (*īhā*), while both these activities (of determinate cognition and speculation) are confirmed at the stage of perceptual judgment. In this way at every stage of the process of perceptual cognition a novel mode is revealed and if there is no discrepancy at any stage, there should not be any difficulty in recognising the whole process as a valid organ of knowledge.

The Buddhist logician has recognised four kinds of perception, viz.,

1. Sensuous cognition.
2. Mental perception.
3. Self-cognition.
4. Transcendental perception.

In the Jaina tradition the self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) is not counted independently. The cognition, according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, reveals only the object and for its own revelation it depends on inference (*anumāna*) from the objective cognition as the probans. The *Naiyāyikas* admit that a cognition is known by another cognition that follows it (*anuvyavasāya*, apperception). The perceptual judgment (*avāya*) 'this is jar' is a case of determinative cognition (*vyavasāya*). The mental cognition of such perceptual judgement (*avāya*) is called apperception (*anuvyavasāya*). Such apperception is illustrated by the proposition 'I see that it is a jar'. The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism also does not admit the self-luminosity of the cognition. The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti assigned an independent status to self-cognition as a variety of perception in order to distinguish his position from the above views regarding the problem. In the tradition of the Jainas the cognition is self-revealer as well as the revealer of others, which means that self-cognition is the universal characteristic of all cognitions, and as such it cannot be a specific aspect of the perceptual knowledge alone. Self-cognition, in fact, is an indeterminable experience or intuition characterising the consciousness. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy the word '*darśana*' (intuition) stood for the experience of the generic aspect of an object while *jñāna* (cognition) stood for the specific aspect of an object. But this obviously needs a critical estimation and assessment. A substance is a composite of specific and generic characters and so how can a determinate cognition that knows only the specific character be a valid organ, while the intuition that is indeterminate and free from conceptual thought and is cognizant of only the generic character be considered as an invalid organ? Such an explanation also fails to expose the meaning of cognition and intuition in the case of the omniscient soul. And if such cognition and intuition are considered as taking place simultaneously, both should be assigned the status of a valid organ jointly, if the traditional interpretation of cognition and intuition is given credence to, and not either of the two individually. If they are accepted as occurring in succession, either

of them would be invalid organs on account of their being cognizant of only any one aspect of the object.

The problem of the inconsistency of the occurrence of two experiences of intuition (*darśana*) and cognition (*jñāna*) simultaneously can be solved if the former is regarded as self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) or internal consciousness and the latter as the cognition of the external objects. This would also make the invalidity of *darśana* (intuition) an irrelevant issue inasmuch as in self-cognition there is no effort for the knowledge of an external object, and consequently no question of validity or invalidity, which arises when there is any possibility of error. Such intuition (*darśana*) is cognizant of itself alone and so it is inarticulate (*anākāra*), and as such it cannot be recognised as an organ of knowledge so far as the cognition of an external object is concerned. A cognition *per se* does not endeavour to know or assume any form of the external object. A cognition is considered as possessed of form on account of its being the cause of the cognition of an external object and is an organ of knowledge because it is possessed of form with reference to the external object. In such interpretation the validity of omniscience also remains intact, because the intuition and knowledge of the omniscient are concerned with diverse objects instead of being cognizant of two different aspects of the same object as endorsed by the traditional view of *jñāna* (cognition) and *darśana* (intuition). A cognition is direct so far as its nature is concerned. The division of it as direct and indirect in the logical treatises is only due to its experience of the external object. The classification of the organ of knowledge as valid or invalid is only with reference to its experience of an external object. The consistency of such hypothesis also becomes admissible if intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge are respectively recognised as cognizant of itself and as cognizant of the object outside. The meaning of the word *darśana* (intuition) is also direct cognition or cognition without any media. The self-cognition is necessarily direct and so the expression *darśana* (intuition) rightly conveys that connotation.

The super-sensuous perception (*atīndriya pratyakṣa* or *noindriya pratyakṣa*) is of three kinds, viz. clairvoyance (*avadhi jñāna*), mind reading (*manaḥparyaya*) and omniscience. On this point there is no essential difference between the logical and epistemological methods of investigation. Clairvoyance (though a species of super-sensuous perception) can also be due to birth and so it is not

exclusively a species of knowledge acquired through the spiritual efforts of a *yogī* in this life. But excluding this type of clairvoyance the other cases of clairvoyance and also mind reading can be compared with the *yogic* perception of the Buddhists and the preception born of *yoga* of the Neo Naiyāyikas.[27]

The concept of *kevalajñāna* (omniscience) has been very critically assessed by the ancient as well as modern thinkers. There is a vast literature both in favour and against this issue. The meaning of the expression *kevalajñāna* is usually identified with the knowledge of everything, i.e. omniscience. One who knows all, knows the *dharma* of necessity. The Mīmāṃsakas assert that a human being cannot be omniscient and as such he cannot know the *dharma*. The Buddhist philosophers make a different approach to the problem. Dignāga, for instance, argues that an ordinary human being, even an *arhat*, can at best know the *dharma* but can never be omniscient. The case of the Buddha stands apart. One need not accept the validity of the *Vedas* for the knowledge of the nature of *dharma*. The standpoint of the Jaina philosopher is quite different from the two. According to him a human being is capable of acquiring omniscience and the omniscient one has necessarily the knowledge of *dharma*. In fact the ultimate proof of the knowledge of *dharma* is omniscience itself.

Ācārya Kundakunda has explained omniscience on the basis of the *nayas* (viewpoints). According to the practical or pragmatic viewpoint (*vyavahāra naya*) the *kevalin* (omniscient) knows everything, but according to the ultimate viewpoint (*naiścayika naya*) the *kevalin* knows himself alone. The implication is that the *kevalin* is omniscient from the practical viewpoint (*vyavahāra naya*) and the knower of himself alone from the ultimate viewpoint (*naiścayika naya*)[28].

All philosophies believing in the independent existence of the soul or a principle of conciousness accept super-sensuous perception or the direct experience of reality. The point of controversy is whether they believe in omniscience, that is, the knowledge of everything. Different interpretations have been proposed regarding the meaning of 'everything' in the context of omniscience. In the Jaina tradition 'everything' implies that the *kevalajñāna* knows all substances, the entire space and time and all modes.[29] Not only the Mīmāṃsakas but all the Buddhists differ from the Jainas in respect of this all-comprehensiveness of omniscience. The Nyāya and Sāṃkhya systems also have their own standpoint on this issue.

The main issue in the concept of omniscience that concerns the Mīmāṃsaka is whether a particular human being can be omniscient. He, however, has no objection if a person succeeds in knowing everything through the Vedas which embody knowledge of everything. And as regards *dharma,* it is only the Vedas which can reveal it. The Buddhist does not consider it necessary that a person should be omniscient in order to attain *nirvāṇa.* There are others who are not omniscient but that does not stand in their way of attaining emancipation. The Mahāyāna Buddhists distinguish between *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa* which are to be eliminated by the bodhisattva in his endeavour to attain Buddhahood. But in his case also ominiscience is not absolutely necessary. Moreover, a person capable of knowing everything is not always cognizant of everything. He can,however, know anything if he wants to know. In the Sāṃkhya school omniscience is called *vivekajaṃ jñānam* which is not always attained by the aspirant for *kaivalya.* The *vivekakhyāti* and the highest *vairāgya* are the sufficient conditions of attaining *nirvāṇa.* In the Nyāya school omniscience is possible by means of *yoga,* but it is not a universal characteristic of an emancipated person. It is only God, according to this school, who is always free and always omniscient and omnipotent.

From the doctrinal standpoint the following are the implications of *kevalajñāna* (perfect and pure knowledge) of the *Āgamic* period—

1. Absolutely uncovered consciousness consequent upon the destruction of the veil of knowledge.
2. Pure consciousness which becomes manifest on the destruction of the passions.
3. Pure and perfect knowledge that is revealed on the elimination of the emotions due to passions.

It is accepted unequivocally that Lord Mahāvīra attained pure and perfect knowledge (*kevalajñāna*). But what exactly follows from the nature of such pure and perfect knowledge as reflected in his sermons during his life-time is not, in respect of the knowledge and intuition of everything in all their modes, like what is found in the interpretations and expositions of such knowledge in the treatises of Jaina thinkers of the speculative period. The Jaina logicians explained this pure and perfect knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) on the basis of what they found about the concept in the *Nandī Sūtra*

and what was transmitted by tradition and recorded in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. Many valuable arguments were proposed in favour of the conception, some of which are reproduced here below:

1. Soul is by nature capable of knowing. It falls into ignorance only in the presence of obstructions to knowledge, and consequently fails to know the subtle, covered and remote objects directly. On the annihilation of the obstructions it becomes capable of such knowledge, and in that case there is no veil between the knower and the known and there is no reason why all knowables should not be reflected in such pure consciousness.[30]

2. The opponents of omniscience argue that a human being cannot be omniscient. But they may be asked—'Why should you say so? Do you say so by comprehending that there is no omniscient, or without such comprehension? If you are sure that never and nowhere there was, is or will be an omniscient, then that would amount to yourself being an omniscient person. But if you deny the existence of an omniscient without such comprehension, your assertion would be an *ipse dixit* and not a statement supported by reason.'

3. The existence of a fact is proved by means of arguments in favour of and absence of arguments against it. There is no definite argument in opposition to omniscience and so its acceptance as a fact is free from contradiction of any kind.[31]

4. The objects which are subtle, covered, and remote in space and time must be directly known by some person because they are inferable, for instance, (the inferable) fire which is actually perceived by some person or other.[32]

5. Difference in the manifestation of the knowledge is an accepted fact. Such manifestation must have a consummation. Even as volumes of bodies that relatively differ in extension find their maximum in infinite space, the relative variation in the manifestation of knowledge finds its plenum in pure and perfect knowledge (*kevalajñāna*).[33]

Memory

Determinate perception (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), determinate judgment (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*) are the successive stages of a single process of direct perception. The stages that

follow it fall under the category of indirect cognition. This division of direct and indirect cognition is on the basis of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness or the absence of it. But from the viewpoint of causality both these categories are interrelated, the latter being a continuation of the former. Thus what is called retention (*dhāraṇā*) is identical with the traces formed in our mind which are awakened on the presentation of relevant causes and conditions.

In some logical schools the validity of memory is not accepted, but in Jainism it is considered as a valid organ of knowledge. Memory is a non-discrepant experience which includes also the knowledge of the previous birth, which implies that the remote past is within its reach. Memory is an authentic experience which leads to successful activity that proves its undeniable validity.

The Buddhist logician refutes the validity of memory on the ground that it is dependent on a previous experience and does not reveal anything that was not known before. A valid organ of knowledge must be the revealer of a novel object. But as memory is devoid of such characteristic, it cannot be considered as a valid organ.

The great Mīmāṃsist Kumārila also has rejected the validity of memory on account of its cognition of what has already been cognized.

The great Naiyāyika Jayanta has refuted the validity of memory on the ground that it is not produced by an object. A cognition must be directly produced by its object. If a cognition is not produced by an authentic object, there is no reason why it should be accepted as a valid organ.

The Jaina logicians, however, have refuted the above charges on the criterion of pragmatic efficiency of memory. We drink water and the thirst is quenched. We travel on the road and the destination is reached. Water quenches thirst, and this experience is responsible for the rise of memory in the future that makes a man drink water to quench thirst. The memory of the route linking two places enables a person to follow the right path to reach his destination. The fulfilment of activity proves absence of discrepancy of memory. Why, then, should one reject its validity even though it is dependent on a past experience or cognizant of what has already been cognized.

The rejecti .ı of the authenticity of memory on the ground of its not being p oduced by the object would invalidate the authenticity of the inf ence (*anumāna*) also. We infer the rise of the *Puṣya* asterism from the presence of the *Punarvasu* asterism in the sky at present. In such inference the inferred object, viz. the *Puṣya* asterism on account of its absence at the time would not produce the inference, if the presence of an object were a necessary condition for the validity of the memory (of that object). Similarly, the inference of a foregoing asterism by means of a post-coming asterism would also be invalid. In the same way the inference of rainfall in the upper region on the sight of the flood in the lower region would not be a case of valid inference. All these instances are proofs against the argument that memory is not a valid organ on account of its not being produced by an object that is actually present before the knower.

Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)

Memory is due to retention (*dhāraṇā*) alone. But recognition has two conditions, viz. perception and memory. This is the reason why it is called a synthetic cognition. Memory is represented by the propositions like 'that person' (whom we met before), while recognition finds expression in judgments like 'this is the same person' (whom we saw before). The proposition 'this person' is a perceptual cognition while 'that person' is memory. A combination of these two cognitions is the recognition of the identity of the person in front with one seen in the past.

The herbivorous animal drinks water like the cow, but the carnivorous animal does not drink water like the cow, it licks water with the tongue. Between these two judgments the first is the recognition of similarity, while the latter embodies the recognition of dissimilarity. The following propositions express recognition based on relative aspects: 'This is smaller than that', 'this is bigger than that', 'this is farther than that', 'this is nearer than that', 'this is higher than that', 'this is lower than that'.

The knowledge of relation between the definiens (or name, *samjñā*) and the definiendum (or nameable, *samjñī*) is also known by recognition. Somebody defined a swan as a bird that is capable of separating milk from water. The tree possessed of three-leaved bunches is called *Butea Frondosa* (*palāśa*). The listener is familiar neither with swan, nor with *palāśa*, but as soon as he hears the definitions from the speaker, the impressions are formed in his

mind. And now he finds that as soon as the milk in a cup is touched by the bird's beak, it is split up, i.e. milk and water are separated. Here perception and memory are joined together to form a synthetic judgment of the relation between the definiens and the definiendum (i.e. the word 'swan' and the word 'bird' denoted by it.) Similarly when a man finds a tree possessed of three-leaved bunches, his present perception and past memory join together to enable him to recognise the relation between the definiens and the definiendum (i.e. the word *palāśa* and the tree represented by it).

The cognition of the number two etc. is also the result of recognition. All the synthetic mental concepts originating from memory and perception are examples of recognition.[34]

The Buddhist logician does not admit the validity of recognition. In the proposiion 'this is that cow', 'this' refers to an object that is immediately cognized and 'that' to an object that is indirectly known (as the object of a past experience). Thus in recognition there are two separate cognitions, each with an object of its own and as such it is a combination of two cognitions and cannot have a single object as its referend. Recognition, therefore, is not an independent organ of knowledge.

But the Jaina logicians do not accept this argument as valid. They assert that the direct and indirect cognitions are the conditions of recognition, which arises as an independent cognition from them. Such recognition enables us to know the identity between 'this' (this object in front) and 'that' (the object perceived in the past). Such identity is known neither by direct perception nor by indirect knowledge, independently of each other. The indirect and the direct cognitions function jointly to produce a novel form of cognition that reveals the identity between the two (the present and the past object of experience). Such identity is not perceptual and hence it is classed as an object of indirect cognition. If the Buddhist logician has no objection in accepting the two contrary aspects (viz. *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the selfsame object as the originator of the indeterminate as well as the determinate cognition, why should there be any difficulty in accepting recognition as a valid organ of knowledge of two contrary (temporarily different) aspects of the same object?

The Naiyāyikas regard recognition as a species of perceptual cognition. According to them ordinary perception is concerned

only with the present, whereas in recognition the present perception is influenced by the memory of the past. The difference, if any, between perception and recognition is that the former is concerned with the present, pure and simple, whereas the latter is related to the present as qualified by an aspect that is past.

According to Jaina logician recognition cannot be a species of perception. The purpose of recognition is not the cognition of an object that is present, but it is the cognition of the identity of the object existing at two different times that is really intended. The function of perception ends with the knowledge of the present aspect of a thing and so the persistent identity cannot be comprehended by it.

As regards the nature of analogy (*upamāna*) there is no unanimity among the Indian logicians. The Buddhists do not admit analogy as a category separate from perception. The Vaiśeṣika logician includes it under inference. The Naiyāyika logician, however, admits it as an independent organ. In the tradition of the Jaina logic analogy (*upamāna*) is a kind of recognition. The argument in support of this assertion is: 'a gayal is similar to a cow'. The knowledge of the gayal and the cow is not a predominant factor here. What is predominant is the cognition of similarity between the two. And this is the reason why such cognition is not essentially different from recognition.

There should, however, be no objection if analogy is considered an independent organ, as was actually done in the earlier stratum of Jaina tradition. But it can be included under reognition in order to check the undue inflation of the number of organs of knowledge. It is for this reason that in the logical period analogy was considered a form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*).

Reasoning (*tarka*)

Tarka (reasoning) is an important term of Indian logic. Some specific topics are absolutely outside its domain. But even then in thought it enjoyed a great predominance from the beginning. It has a special significance in logic. The universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) is an essential factor of inference (*anumāna*) and the concomitance has an imperative need of reasoning without which the necessary character of concomitance cannot be determined. Almost all the schools of Indian logic have recognised the importance of reasoning. The diversity of opinion, if any, is about its validity as an inde-

pendent organ of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas and others count it as neither valid nor invalid but consider it as only an auxiliary to a valid organ of knowledge. In Jaina logic, however, it has been accepted as an independent organ of knowledge. It has a distinct function of its own and as such it belongs to a separate category of indirect cognition (*parokṣa pramāṇa*) in addition to the other four, viz. memory, recognition, verbal testimony and inference. The universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) is embodied in propositions like 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. The knowledge of such concomitance is obtained neither by sensuous nor by mental perception. The perception cognizes the effect and the cause but cannot know their relationship. Inference, on the other hand, occurs after the universal concomitance is known and so the concomitance cannot be comprehended by the inference too. If the universal concomitance is established by inference and if inference is established by universal concomitance, then in such circumstance of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) no decisive certitude would be possible. In order to solve this problem the Jaina logicians accepted the validity of reasoning (*tarka*) as an independent organ of knowledge for the dicovery of universal concomitance.

The function of reasoning is to ascertain the universal concomitance. Whatever is smoke is produced by fire and not by anything else. Reasoning is based on the cognition (*upalambha*) of smoke on the occurrence of fire and the non-cognition (*anupalambha*) of smoke in the absence of fire, which (i.e. cognition and non-cognition) lead to the ascertainment of the causal relationship between the smoke and the fire.

Causality is determined by the observation of concomitance in agreement and of concomitance in difference which has been analysed by the Buddhists into five cases of cognition, two positive and three negative. In the first instance there is non-apprehension of the effect, say smoke, in a particular place. This is called non-cognition number one. In the second case, there is cognition of fire and cognition of smoke. These are two positive cognitions. In the third place there occurs non-cognition of fire accompanied with non-cognition of smoke. There are two non-cognitions in this case. Thus in all, there are five cognitions, viz. the initial negative-cognition, the two subsequent positive cognitions, and finally the two negative cognitions. This fivefold cognition at once gives us to understand that the two events are causally related—the antecedent being called the cause and the consequent the effect. The Sanskrit

text on which the above account of causality is based is as follows:

Kāryahetau tāvadvyāpteḥ pratipattiḥ pratyakṣānupalambhapañcakād jāyate ..... anupalambho'pi pratyakṣaviśeṣa eva lakṣayitavyaḥ ..... yadāh (Dharmakīrtiḥ)—

dhūmādhirvanhivijñānam, dhūmajñānam adhis tayoḥ/
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām, iti pañcabhir anvayaḥ//
—Syādvādaratnākara, page 514

It is by means of such reasoning that the relation of invariable occurrence (of the cause on the occurrence of the effect) or non-occurrence (of the effect on the non-occurrence of the cause) obtaining at all times, places and between individuals, is established as universal concomitance (*vyāpti*). The relationship that does not obtain at all times, places and between individuals does not enjoy the support of reasoning, and as such it cannot become a valid means to an inference. Only on the establishment of the necessary relationship (concomitance) by reasoning, an inference, i.e. cognition of the probandum by means of the probans, is possible.

Scriptural Knowledge (*Āgama*)

Ācārya Siddhasena has recognised two kinds of indirect knowledge, viz. inference and verbal testimony, i.e. *Āgama.*[35] He does not mention memory, recognition and reasoning as species of indirect knowledge. The set of five kinds of indirect knowledge is the contribution of Ācārya Akalaṅka. The basis of such classification is found in the concept of *matijñāna,* as explained in the *Tattvārtha-Sūtra* and *Nandī-Sūtra.*[36] Memory, recognition, reasoning and inference are the varieties of *matijñāna,* whereas *āgama* is identified with *śrutajñāna* (verbal testimony). Akalaṅka has included inference under *śrutajñāna.*[37] Siddhānta-cakravartī Nemicandra has recognised two kinds of verbal testimony, viz. *āgama* produced by a word as the probans and inference produced by an object as the probans.[38]

The Jaina logicians have explained verbal testimony (*āgama*) as both ordinary (popular) and extraordinary (trans-popular). Scriptural knowledge stands for a cognition of an object on the basis of the words of a trustworthy person (*āpta*). Metaphorically the words of a trustworthy person are also *āgama* (verbal testimony). At the trans-popular level a person possessed of extra-sensuous perception is the trustworthy person and at the popular level the criterion of a

trustworthy person is non-discrepancy or non-contradiction in his statement. According to this connotation of *āpta* any person who is not untrustworthy with reference to a subject is *āpta* in respect of that subject.[39]

In the tradition of Jaina Logic Divine Revelation and impersonal scripture has no place or validity. Knowledge acquired by human beings and the scriptures composed by them enjoy authenticity in the Jaina tradition. A sound is composed of matter, being a transformation of the latter. As the transformation of matter it is evidently impermanent. When sound itself is impermanent, how can scripture that is composed of sounds (words) be considered as eternal?

According to the grammarian the sound of a syllable being momentary cannot produce the knowledge of the object. He, therefore, postulates an eternal entity called *śabda* (verbum) which is manifested through a syllable (*varṇa*) and is what is called *sphota*. The *sphoṭa* is manifested by the sound of a syllable, and as a result the meaning is known.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas the verbum is not subject to origination and cessation. It is eternal. It is not always heard because of the cover or obstruction. As soon as the cover is removed, we hear it. According to this doctrine, therefore, the verbum becomes manifest and is not newly produced.

The above view of verbum is not acceptable to the Jainas. According to them the origination of the word is a new occurrence due to collision of material bodies or their disintegration. When two objects are united or separated or broken, there arises the word.[40] The power of expression is inherent in it, though the property of expressing a particular meaning is imposed on it by convention. Any word is competent to express any meaning, but convention confers on it the power of connoting a particular meaning in a particular context. The inherent power and the convention jointly make the word convey its particular meaning. Only the person who knows the convention is capable of knowing the meaning of a particular word. For example, the fire as fact is imposed by convention on the fire as word. If this convention is known to me, I shall be able to know the object fire signified by the word fire. A person, ignorant of the word *agni* in the Indian language, will not be able to know the object signified by the word.

The waving of the index finger symbolises an act of admonishing and the person conversant with the act is capable of understanding the warning. The verbal conventions function exactly in the same manner.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas the word stands for the universal alone. The word cow does not stand for a particular cow but refers to the universal called cowhood. A convention is possible only with reference to the universal and not in respect of particular cows that are countless in number. The standpoint of Jaina logician is quite different. According to him the referend of a word is the thing, that is, a composite of the universal and the particular. Pure universal has no causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). The particular object like a jar, or a piece of cloth, has such efficiency, but jarhood or clothhood are devoid of any such function. It is not difficult to comprehend the verbal convention in spite of the countless number of individuals signified by the particular word. The fire *qua* probandum and the smoke *qua* probans are countless, but there is no difficulty for the organ of reasoning to comprehend all those particular fires and smokes for ascertaining their universal concomitance. If so, why should it not be possible to understand a particular word or symbol as standing for the countless individuals. A real is *ipso facto* a universal and particular rolled into one, and as such pure universal or pure particular cannot be the meaning of the word. It is only the entity as universal-cum-particular that is a referent of a word.

The relation between the word and the meaning is not like the relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire. Their relation is one of identity-cum-difference. If the relation between the word and its meaning is one of absolute identity, then the word fire and the meaning fire would be identical and that would mean the act of combustion on the utterance of the word 'fire'. But this does not happen, implying thereby that there is no relation of universal concomitance between a word and its meaning. On the other hand, if a word is absolutely different from its meaning, the relation of denotative and denotatum (*vācyavāca-ka-sambandha*) between them would be impossible. The object jar is understood from the jar as a verbal symbol, because there is some sort of relationship between the objective aspect called denotatum and the verbal aspect called denotative.

The objective jar alone and not anything else is known to be the meaning of the word jar as the verbal symbol. The popular con-

vention is the determinant of this word-meaning relationship which is not natural, but one that is imposed by the human will. The word-meaning relationship is thus arbitrary, and this is the reason why in different parts of the world, the same word denotes different objects. Had this word-meaning relationship been natural, the entire world would have one language and invariably one word for one object.

The concept of '*sphoṭa*' can be explained on the basis of the principle of relativity. Language is ontologically a mode of matter. The speech-material (material aggregates capable of being transformed into linguistic symbols) ever remains spread over the entire cosmic space (*lokākāśa*), and a person cannot utter a word without taking in this speech-material. The process of speech consists in taking in of the speech-material by physical effort, transforming it into linguistic symbols and finally exploding it. This moment of explosion is the word which is audible and before and after this moment of explosion it is non-existent *qua* word. The sound of the syllable at the time of explosion is momentary and impermanent. The speech-material *qua* the continuum of material aggregates may be considered as eternal and compared with the *'sphoṭa'*.

Memory is a case of indirect cognition because the object remembered is not present at the moment. Similarly, recognition of identity and similarity is a kind of indirect cognition, because the objects compared are not present. In the same way the universal concomitance in the case of reasoning (*tarka*) and the denotatum in the case of verbal testimony (*āgama*) are conceptual in nature and, therefore, reasoning and verbal testimony are also instances of indirect cognition.

Dialogue

Question 1. The process beginning from determinate perception (*avagraha*) and ending in memory is obviously causal. Why, then, is retention (*dhāraṇā*), that precedes memory, considered direct cognition, whereas memory, recognition etc. upto inference are subsumed under indirect cognition?

Answer. The distinction between direct and indirect cognition has been made on the basis of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness (*vaiśadya*) and its absense. The stream of consciousness from determinate perception (*avagraha*) to retention (*dhāraṇa*) is lucid-cum-instantaneous and, therefore, is accepted as direct cognition.

But as in the consciousness continuum concerned with memory etc. upto inference, the object is not lucid, it is a case of indirect cognition.

Question 2. In recognition the object recognised is directly perceived. Why, then, is it considered as a case of indirect cognition?

Answer. In inference (*anumāna*) the smoke is directly perceived, but it is not the object of inference. And the fire that is the object of inference is not an object of perception. Similarly, the object of recognition is not the object in front and it is the identity existing between the past and the present modes of the object, which is not an object of direct perception on account of its being shared by the past and present epistemological data.

Question 3. The function of speculation (*īhā*) is to investigate, through concomitance in agreement and difference, the perceived object. How do you, then, distinguish speculation (*īhā*) from reasoning (*tarka*), which also is concerned with the determination of concomitance through agreement and difference?

Answer. Speculation is a cognition engaged in distinction, because the aspects of an object are distinguished in it through agreement and difference in order to ascertain the probable nature of the object in front. The function of reasoning, however, is to examine universal concomitance. The functions of speculation and reasoning, therefore, are quite different and not identical in any way. Of course the expression *'ūha'* (investigation) has been used as a synonym of both speculation (*īhā*) and reasoning (*tarka*),but the expression *ūha* has quite different connotations in the two cases. The expression *ūha* has, moreover, quite a different meaning when it is used for the *ūha saṃjñā* of one-sensed organisms.

Question 4. It is only the perceptual judgment (*avāya*) that is the definitive cognition. Why, then, determinate perception (*avagraha*) and speculation (*īhā*) also are considered as cases of valid organ of knowledge?

Answer. Suppose a jar has just been taken out of an oven by the potter. A drop of water is poured on it. It quickly dries up. In the same way two, three or four drops of water dry up. The process of pouring drops of water is continued, and a moment comes when

the jar appears wet. Now, is that jar wet on account of the last drop of water? Did it not become wet with the very first drop of water? It is not proper to consider the last moment alone as the moment of wetness. The very first moment also made its contribution to the wetting process. If the jar was not wet at the first moment, it could not be wet at the last also. Similarly, had not the process of definitive cognition started at the first moment, the state of definitive perceptual judgment could not have been reached even at the last moment. The perceptual judgment is a consummation of a process that started from the very beginning. It is in this sense of consummation that the *avāya* or the perceptual judgment is called definitive cognition, though precisely speaking the stages of determinate perception (*avagraha*) and speculation (*īhā*) are also definitive in their own way.

VII

7. Inference

Inference is an important topic of the science of logic. Its jurisdiction is very extensive. It is on the basis of inference that the science of reasoning or rational investigation is developed. The expression *anumāna*, which stands for inference, is composed of two words, viz. *anu* and *māna*, and it literally means knowledge (*māna*) that is consequent upon (*anu*) perception. According to the tradition of Jaina *āgamas* it is the verbal testimony (*śruta*) that follows in the wake of perception (*mati*)—*maipuvvayaṃ suyaṃ*. In the Nyāya system also *anumāna* (inference) is considered as resulting from perceptual conditions.[1]

Inference has two limbs, viz. the probans (*sādhana*) and the probandum (*sādhya*). The probans is directly perceived whereas the probandum is cognised indirectly (through the probans). We perceive the probans at the outset and then remember the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) which is followed by the inference of the probandum.

Inference is of two kinds, viz. (1) subjective (that is, for one's ownself) and (2) syllogistic (that is, for others). In the Jaina tradition the entire domain of knowledge is divided into two categories, viz. (1) those that are for one's own self, and (2) those that are for others. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* two sources of knowledge have been distinguished, viz. (1) by oneself (*ātmataḥ*), and (2) through other means (*parataḥ*).[2] The self's knowledge is knowledge for oneself and the verbal knowledge (or propositions) is for others. The four categories of knowledge, viz. perception (*mati*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*), mind reading (*manaḥparyava*) and omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*) are for oneself, while the verbal knowledge (*śruta*) is for self as well as for others. In fact, knowledge *per se* is never for others, but it is made to serve the purpose of others by expressing it through language. There is no relation of identity or causality between knowledge and language. Language is the conveyor of one's knowledge to others and so metaphorically the former is identified with the latter which is consequently treated as made for others. In fact, it is the language that is made for others and not knowledge.

The conception of knowledge as for oneself or for others is old, but the division of inference into two similar categories is borrowed from the Nyāya and the Buddhist school. Ācārya Siddhasena has considered the perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) also, like inference, as made for others. He says: 'Perception as well as inference serve to communicate one's knowledge of a fact to others being the necessary means (of the emergence of such knowledge in their minds). And so both of them should be regarded as serving the purpose of other persons.'[3] Vādidevasūri has also followed this view of Siddhasena.[4] The linguistic expression of a fact, whether it is a case of inference or that of perception (*pratyakṣa*), is necessarily made for others. The subjective inference (*svārthānumāna*) consists in the knowledge of the probandum by means of the probans. For instance, a person perceives smoke and infers the existence of fire at a remote place. In such knowledge there is no formal need of the statement of the subject and the citation of an example. A syllogistic inference (*parārthānumāna,* that is, made for others) requires the explicit statement of the subject, and the probans for convincing others. For instance, a person asks another person to look for fire on the other bank of the river by pointing out the presence of smoke there. As a consequence the subjective inference of fire arises in the mind of the listener. An organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is essentially of the nature of knowledge, whereas the syllogistic inference, made for others, is only a linguistic medium and as such it is not, truly speaking, an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) but it may be called so metaphorically. The syllogistic inference produces a subjective inference in the mind of the listener, and so metaphorically the former is called an organ of knowledge *qua* the producer of the latter.

In Nyāya philosophy inference is given as of three types, viz. *pūrvavat* (from cause to effect), *śeṣavat* (from effect to cause) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (usually observed).[5]

In the Sāṃkhya System[6] as well as in Caraka[7] also these three types are mentioned. Āryarakṣitasūri has accepted these three with a slight change in the type called *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* which is changed by him as *dṛṣṭasādharmyavat.*[8] This classification practically lost importance with the development of the Buddhist logic.*

* The discussion moves on to the three kinds of inference distinguished in the *Sūtras.* (1) *Pūrvavat.* There is a lengthy discussion as to whether this means inference from cause to effect or from effect to cause. Jayanta and Kumārila agree that the former is correct. (2) *Śeṣavat.* The discussion here follows familiar lines. (3)

In the Jaina tradition it was Ācārya Siddhasena who defined inference for the first time.[9] He was followed by his successors.

Probans (*Hetu*)

Ācārya Vasubandhu enumerated three characteristics of the probans which were further developed by Dignāga, according to whom the three characteristics are as follows:

1. *Pakṣadharmatva*—existence of the probans in the subject.
2. *Sapakṣasattva*—existence of the probans in the homologue.
3. *Vipkṣāsattva*—non-existence of the probans in the heterologue.

Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* improved the implication of these three characteristics by adding the particle '*eva*' as follows:

1. *pakṣe sattvameva*—necessary existence of the probans in the subject.
2. *Sapkṣa eva sattvam*—existence of the probans exclusively in the homologue.
3. *Vipkṣa eva asattvam*—non-existence of the probans in the heterologue alone.

The Jaina logicians have rejected these three characteristics of the probans as insufficient conditions of inference. They proposed *anyathānupapatti* (logical impossibility in the absence of the other) or *avinābhāva* (universal concomitance) as the single characteristic of a probans.[10] It was Svāmī Pātrakeśarī who established

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Vātsyāyana's example of this type of inference, from difference in location to the fact of a thing having moved, is rejected on the ground that the relation is the reverse. We infer difference in location from motion, so that this is an example of *śeṣavat*. In place of Vātsyāyana's example Jayanta gives as an example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* the inference to a wood-apple's taste from its colour and other qualities. He apparently agrees with Udyotakara that any non-causal inference belongs here.

Jayanta reviews the second type of explanation offered by Vātsyāyana. In connection with *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* there is a discussion with the Mīmāṃsakas as to whether its object is necessarily beyond the senses or not. The Mīmāṃsakas say no. They give as an example the inference to Devadatta's motion when it has not been seen. Another example is an inference about causal efficacy. Jayanta rejects these examples.

(*Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, page 363).

anyathānupapatti as the characteristic of a probans by refuting the doctrine of triple characteristic in his work *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana.* In the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntirakṣita and the *pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla a number of extracts have been quoted from Pātrasvāmī who criticised the triple characteristics of the probans initiated by Dignāga and elucidated by Dharmakīrti. Both the forceful language and the logical cogency of the arguments of Pātrasvāmi are arresting. He has proved with convincing logic that the triple character does not necessarily entail the concept of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the probans with the probandum and the lack of the latter reduces the triple character to an irrational inflation.*

We give below the verse reputed to be composed by Pātrasvāmī which runs as follows:

anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim/
nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra treyeṇa kim//

'Where there exists *anyathānupapannatva,* what purpose is to be served by the triple character, and where the *anyathānupapannatva* does not exist, what purpose is to be served by the triple character?'

The existence of the probans in the subject is not necessary for a probans to be valid in the inferential proposition 'the asterism *Rohiṇī* will arise because the asterism Pleides (*Kṛttikā*) has already arisen'. The characteristic of existence of the probans in the subject is not available in this example. There is the relation of universal concomitance between the rise of the *Kṛttikā* asterism and the rise of the *Rohiṇī* asterism that follows the *Kṛttikā* after one *muhūrta.* But the 'rise of *Kṛttikā* asterism' does not exist in the subject 'the future rise of the *Rohiṇī* asterism.' It follows from this that the existence of the probans in the subject is not an invariable characteristic of a probans.

In the syllogism the 'word is impermanent, because it is audible, i.e. it is the object of the auditory sense-organ' there is no homologue (*sapakṣa*) where the relation between word (sound) and audibility could be verified. Whatever is amenable to hearing is a sound and as such there is no scope for a homologue. A sound is

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impermanent because it is audible and whatever is audible is a sound. Here there is internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) between sound and audibility. Such concomitance is impossible of exemplification anywhere else. In external concomitance (*bahirvyāpti)* the homologue is available and it is used in order to show universal concomitance by means of an example. But a probans does not enjoy the inferential power simply on account of the external concomitance (*bahirvyāpti*) exhibited in an example, that is, the homologue.

In the inferences like, 'everything is momentary because it is real', there is no homologue for the probans. According to the Buddhists, there is nothing that is not momentary and so how could there be a homologue? In inferences like, 'this place is fiery because there is smoke, for example, a kitchen', the homologue is available, Smoke exists in the kitchen just as it exists in the subject (where the existence of fire is sought to be inferred). In the case of internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) all the entities are included in the subject without any residuum. And so the existence of the probans in the homologue (*sapakṣasattva*) cannot be a valid characteristic of a probans.

The non-existence of the probans in the heterologue is *anyathānupapatti* (logical impossibility in the absence of the other). This alone is the characteristic of a probans. In the tradition of Jaina logic this characteristic has been unanimously accepted.

The Types of Probantia

In the logical tradition of the Jainas universal concomitance is not dependent only on identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). Universal concomitance (*avinabhava*) is twofold, viz. (1) concurrence (*sahabhāva*), and (2) successive occurrence (*kramabhāva*). The concurrence may be due to identity and also in the absence of identity. Similarly, successive occurrence (*kramabhāva*) may be on account of causality or even without it. On the basis of this wide connotation of universal concomitance the probans has been classified into eight types, viz. identity (*svabhāva*), determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*), determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*), effect (*kārya*), cause (*karma*), antecedent (*pūrvacara*), subsequent (*uttaracara*), and concurring (*sahacara*). Among these some probantia are of the nature of observation (perception) and some are of the nature of non-observation (non-perception). Each of these, viz. observation and non-observation

can lead to a valid inference of probanda which may be positive as well as negative. For the detailed discussion of the problem the reader is referred to consult *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*, 3/54-109 and *Bhikṣunyāyakarṇikā*, Appendix I.

Inferential Limbs or Syllogistic Premises.

The Jaina logicians considered this problem from the standpoint of non-absolutism or relativism as they usually do with regard to all problems of logical importance. As regards the *nayas*, their view is that they (*nayas*) should be explained in accordance with the competence of disciples. This is exactly the method followed by them in regard to the use of the limbs of a syllogism. It appears that in ancient times examples occupied a place of importance as is evident from the citation of a large number of instances for the proof of the probandum. The probantia were used for the enlightened and advanced students, 'The words of the *jina'*, says Bhadrabāhu, the reputed author of the *Niryuktis*, 'are self-evident truths. But even then for the sake of immature tyros the use of examples was felt necessary. For a mature student the use of probans alone was recommended.'[11]

The said author has mentioned five or ten limbs with regard to the use of syllogistic premises[12] and has given five alternatives of their uses—

Two Limbs—

1. Thesis (*pratijñā*)
2. Example (*udāharaṇa*)

Three Limbs—

1. Thesis
2. Probans
3. Examples

Five Limbs—

1. Thesis
2. Probans
3. Example
4. Application (*upanaya, upasaṃhāra*)
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*)

Ten Limbs—

1. Thesis

2. Rectification of thesis (*pratijñā viśuddhi*)
3. Probans
4. Rejection of probans
5. Example
6. Rectification of example
7. Application
8. Rectification of application
9. Conclusion
10. Rectification of conclusion

Ten Limbs—

1. Thesis
2. Exposition of thesis (*pratijñā vibhaktī*)
3. Probans
4. Exposition of probans
5. Heterologue (*vipakṣa*)
6. Negation (*pratiṣedha*)
7. Example
8. Doubt (*āśaṅkā*)
9. Negation of doubt (*tatpratiṣedha*)
10. Conclusion

Siddhasena has discussed only three limbs, viz. subject (*pakṣa*), probans (*hetu*) and example. Generally all the logicians mention thesis (*pratijñā*) and probans for subjective inference (*svārthānumāna*) and for syllogistic inference (*parārthānumāna*), they add the following for enlightening the dullard: example, application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*). Vādidevasūri has supported the use of a single limb, viz. probans, like the Buddhists.

To define briefly, the thesis means the mention of the probandum that is to be proved, for instance, 'the mountain is fiery'.

Probans stands for the mention of the reason for proving the probandum, for instance, 'because it is smoky'.

Example means an instance similar in nature to the subject of inference, such as a place which is possessed of the probandum, for instance, 'where there is smoke there is fire, for example, a kitchen'.

Application (*upanaya* or *upasaṃhāra*) means the demonstration of existence of the probans in the subject, for instance, 'the mountain is smoky'.

Conclusion (*nigamana*) means the repetition of the thesis (that was to be proved *qua* a proved fact), for instance, 'and therefore the mountain is fiery.'

In the Nyāya school generally five limbs are recognised. According to them an inference consisting of the use of the limbs is called a five-limbed proposition, a syllogism (*mahāvākya*) or logical demonstration (*nyāyaprayoga*).

Dialogues:—

Question 1. What importance is attached to 'number' in the exposition of ontological and ethical problems and the doctrine of *karma* in Jainism?

Answer. The Jaina philosophy is looked at by some thinkers as a great system based on 'numbers'. This is in some sense true, because the metaphysical speculations of the Jainas make use of 'number' in a good number of instances. For instance, the *āgamic* literature itself is divided under four sections—

1. *Dravyānuyoga*—Ontology or disquisition on the nature of substance.
2. *Caraṇānuyoga*—Ethics or disquisition on moral conduct and the doctrine of *karma*.
3. *Dharmakathānuyoga*—Didactic narratives—parables, allegories, myths, fables, epilogues etc.
4. *Gaṇitānuyoga*—Positive Sciences—Mathematics, Astronomy, Biology and other sciences.

It is not possible to precisely separate sections of the scripture into these subjects which can, however, be clearly distinguished. Sometimes entire texts are found devoted to one or the other of the subjects and sometimes more than one subject are dealt with jointly. For instance, Mathematics has been requisitioned on many occasions in works on ontology and the doctrine of *karma*.

The investigation of the seven or nine categories like soul, non-soul, *āsrava* etc. have been exposed under fourteen heads,[13] viz.

1. *Nirdeśa*—Nomenclature and definition of the nature.
2. *Svāmitva*—Ownership.
3. *Sādhana*—Cause of origin.

4. *Adhikaraṇa*—Location.
5. *Sthiti*—Duration.
6. *Vidhāna*—Division or classification.
7. *Sat*—Reality or existence.
8. *Saṃkhyā*—Enumeration of number or the ascertainment of the basis of quantitative difference or division of classes.
9. *Kṣetra*—Present abode.
10. *Sparśana*—Spatial extention.
11. *Kāla*—Time-limit.
12. *Antara*—Interval between two states or modes.
13. *Bhāva*—Kinds of transformation.
14. *Alpa-bahutva*—Numerical difference as less or more.

'Number' occupies the eighth position among the above fourteen heads. It is through number that the quantity of a category is measured. It is thus obviously an important factor of exposition of categories.

In the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* the following six aspects of a mode have been distinguished[14]—

1. *Ekatva*—Identity or similarity.
2. *Pṛthaktva*—Distinction or dissimilarity.
3. *Saṃkhyā*—Number one, two etc. in popular transaction.
4. *Saṃsthāna*—Configuration or shape.
5. *Saṃyoga*—External conjuction of two entities.
6. *Vibhāga*—Disjunction or separation of two entities.

A substance is a compendium of qualities and modes. The qualities are inherent in it and do not need anything else for their substance, which are known relatively with reference to others. Little or more, high or low, far or near, two or three—all these modes are known with reference to what is other than themselves and so they are dependent on their relationship with co-related facts.

Number is a relativistic mode of the substance, which is not dependent on the knowledge of the knower. Whatever is independent of the knowledge of the knower is not made on account of being known by some person, nor does it cease to exist being not known. John Locke has recognised two kinds of qualities—primary and secondary. The primary qualities are the real attributes of the substance. The secondary qualities are not so, being only subjective impressions in the soul. The solidity, exten-

sion, figure or shape, motion, rest and number are original or primary qualities in that they are realities belonging to the substance, being cognizable by more than one sense-organ. When there is contact between the senses and the primary qualities, there arises a cognition in the soul.* Hume has divided human knowledge into two categories, viz. (1) knowledge of the relations of the ideas, and (2) knowledge of the matters of fact.

The knowledge derived from Mathematics and the Science of Logic owes its origin to the mutual relationship between cognitions and so it is possible to formulate universal and unconditional principles in Mathematics and Logic. 'Two plus two make four' is only a concept which has nothing to do with the real world. Locke and Hume were protagonists of idealism. According to the neo-realists the cognition of number is not due to ideas but is based on perception (*pratyakṣa*). The postulation 'two plus two make four' does not depend on any time or space for its validity but it is true independently of space and time. The truth implied in such postulation is absolute, being reflected directly on the experience of the knower and not through any other idea or concept. The postulations in Logic and Mathematics, according to the realists, are independent of the knower and are capable of leading to the discovery of scientific principles and not to their artificial construction. This lends support to the thinking that a scientist is engaged in realistic data when he works by means of formulae, equations, application and analysis and experiment in the laboratory.

The Jaina approach is quite different from that of idealism and realism with regard to number. According to them a number is not a mere concept. It is a mode of the real. It is known neither by pure concept or idea nor by pure perception, but it is known by the joint function of conception and perception, called recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Such recognition is responsible for all kinds of cognitions based on relationship, comparison or relativism. Recognition results from the combination of perception and memory and so all relativistic knowledge is due to it. A straight line is called smaller only with reference to a bigger line. A single line by itself is neither small nor big. The small-big-relationship can obtain only between two things, being a bilateral relation. Memory of a past cognition and perception of the present datum work jointly in order to be able to know the two relative states of being, small or big. Two lines drawn

* *Great Books of the Western World*, Vol. 35, page 134.

on a piece of paper appear to be perceived simultaneously. In the cognition of their comparative length also the cognition of the previously known line is indirect. In directing our comparative look at two lines, as soon as the attention is directed on one of those lines, the cognition of the other line becomes indirect. The cognition of number also follows the same process. We see one jar at first and then another and consequently by joining these cognitions together we get the cognition of two jars. This mode of duality is relativistic which is revealed as dependent upon two things. Similarly, all sorts of numbers, symbolising manifoldness, are relativistic in nature. The primary judgment, 'two plus two make four', is a case of perception which is subsequently converted into impression. As soon as two twins are perceived, the impressions are awakened into memory and we happen to have the judgment 'two and two make four'. Observations of the past and the subsequent give rise to relativistic experience, resulting in the experience of the number.[15]

In *Āgamic* literature there is a detailed classification of the valid organs of knowledge. In the *Anuyogadvāra* the *pramāṇa* is divided into four categories—

1. *Davvappamāṇa*—Standard (of measurement) of substances.
2. *Khettappamāṇa*—Standard (of measurement) of lands.
3. *Kālappamāṇa*—Standard (of measurement) of time.
4. *Bhāvappamāṇa*—Standard (of measurement) of states.

The *Bhāvappamāṇa* is of three kinds—
1. *Guṇappamāṇa*—Standard of attributes.
2. *Nayappamāṇa*—Standard of standpoints.
3. *Saṃkhāppamāṇa*—Standard of numbers.[16]

Ācārya Akalaṅka has included number and comparison under the same category of valid organ of knowledge.[17] The attribute of number available in substances and qualities has been called *saṃkhyāpramāṇa* (Standard of numbers) in Jayadhavalā.[18] In *āgamic* period the *saṃkhāppamāṇa* and *upamāppamāṇa* were independent categories. In the logical period they were placed under a common category called recognition.

VIII
Universal Concomitance (*avinābhāva*)

Inference is based on probans and a probans is characterised by universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the probandum. In other words, the principal factor in inference is the probans and the predominant feature of a probans is the universal concomitance. The universal concomitance is also called pervasion (*vyāpti*), necessary relationship or necessary connection (*sambandha* or *pratibandha*). Universal principles are formulated by means of universal concomitance and on the basis of those principles a probans determines the probandum.

The following are the basis of universal concomitance (*avinābhava*):

I. *Tādātmya* (Identity).
II. *Tadutpatti* (Causality).
III. *Sahabhāva*—Concurrence or co-existence.
IV. *Kramabhāva*—Succession or successive occurrence.

The relation of identity (*tādātmya*) obtains between those that are co-existent. For instance, the probans and the probandum, from the standpoint of existence, are identical as exemplified in the inference 'this is a tree, because it is *aśoka*'. In this syllogism 'tree' is probandum and 'because it is *aśoka*' is the probans. In such inferences the probandum does not need any other kind of probans than the existence of property derived from or implied by the probandum itself. Such probans is called *svabhāva hetu*, i.e. what is identical with the probandum in some respect. There is necessary concomitance between *aśokahood* and treehood and so such universal concomitance is rooted in the relation of identity. The pervasive probans (*vyāpaka hetu*) is also rooted in such identity. For instance, 'this region is bereft of jack tree (*panasa*), because there is no tree here.' In such inference the entity called the 'jack tree' is what is pervaded and the 'tree' is what pervades. There is necessary co-existence of what pervades with what is pervaded.

'Where there is no treehood there cannot be *panasatva'*,—on the basis of such concomitance pervasive probans is formulated—'what pervades is the probans'.

Smoke is produced by fire and not by anything else. On the basis of this causality there is the relation of universal concomitance between smoke and fire which are effect and cause respectively. The smoke thus leads to the inference of fire.

The co-existence is not always based on the relationship of identity, because it is possible also when there is no such identity. A concurrent fact (*sahacara*) can become a probans on account of its pure co-existence with the probandum. For instance, colour and taste are two co-existent attributes. Colour is cognized by the eye and taste by the tongue. The two are distinct by nature and so cannot have the relationship of identity. On account of this absence of identity they cannot function as probans and probandum *qua svabhāva hetu*. Colour and taste are produced simultaneously and so cannot be related as cause and effect, because causality is not possible between two simultaneously produced facts. And consequently there is no possibility here of a probans based on causality. Colour and taste can mutually function as probans and probandum on account of their necessary concomitance. There should, therefore, be no difficulty in accepting a co-existent fact as a probans even in the absence of the causal relationship. Suppose a person is sucking the mango fruit in darkness. On account of the taste that he is enjoying, he is capable of inferring that the mango fruit is a coloured object on the ground that wherever there is taste, there must exist colour.

The successive occurrence (*kramabhāva*) is not necessarily due to causality, because the former is found even in the absence of the causal relationship. The precedent (*pūrvacara*) and the subsequent (*uttaracara*) phenomena can act as probantia on account of such successive occurrence. The *Rohiṇī* asterism would arise after a *muhūrta* (48 minutes) because the asterism Pleides (*kṛttikā*) has already arisen, is an instance in point. Similarly, we can say that *pūrvāphālgunī* asterism arose a *muhūrta* ago because at present the *uttarā-phālgunī* asterism has arisen.

As there is temporal interception between the preceding and succeeding phenomena, there cannot be the relation of identity or causality between them and as such they cannot function as probantia based on these types of relations. The relation of identity

subsists between contemporary facts and things and the causal relation obtains between successive occurrences that take place without any sort of interruption. Thus in the case of identity or causality there is no temporal intervention of any other fact between them. Where there is temporal interception, the succeeding fact cannot be called a probans *qua* effect (*kāryahetu*), and so in spite of the relation of succession between a preceding and the succeeding fact, the latter cannot be included in the category of a probans *qua* effect (*kāryahetu*). Only that which is engaged in the production of an effect is the cause. A potter who has engaged himself in producing a pot can be considered as the cause of the pot. And only that which is present at the moment can engage itself in the production of an effect. What has ceased to exist or what has not come into existence is 'unreal' (*asat*). And what is 'unreal' can never engage itself in the production of any kind of effect. In brief, what is not exercising its power of production cannot be accepted as a cause. The rise of the *Rohiṇī* asterism which will take place after a *muhūrta* is 'unreal' (*asat*) in the sense of being a future event, and similarly the already arisen *Pūrvāphālgunī* asterism is also 'unreal' (*asat*) in the sense of being a past fact. This is the reason why neither the *Kṛttikā* nor the *Pūrvāphālgunī* asterisms can respectively be considered as causally related to *Rohiṇī* and the *Uttarāphālgunī* asterisms. The succession of the rise of the *Rohiṇī* after the *Kṛttikā* asterism and prior rise of the *Pūrvāphālgunī* in relation to the *Uttarāphālgunī* asterism are invariable facts, there being no irregularity in the order of succession in these cases. On this account, both the preceding and the succeeding facts, in the above cases, are valid proofs and there should be no logical difficulty in admitting such proofs as valid probantia.

According to the Buddhists identity and causality are related to the nature and effect and on this relationship the relation of the cognition and the cognizant (*jñāpya-jñāpaka sambandha*) is based, and so a thing, i.e., a positive fact is established through the effect (*kārya*) and the nature (*svabhāva*). In this way there are only two types of probantia, viz. a probans *qua* nature (*svabhāva hetu*) and a probans *qua* effect (*kāryahetu*), that prove the existence of the positive fact (*vidhi*). According to the Buddhist logicians an effect cannot exist without the cause, which proves the relation of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of an effect with the cause. A cause, however, can exist even in the absence of the effect, which proves the non-existence of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the cause with the effect. In other words, there is no universal

concomitance of the cause with the effect and so a cause cannot be a probans capable of establishing the existence of the effect.

The Jaina logician, however, argues as follows to establish the validity of cause *qua* probans (*kāraṇahetu*). Each and every cause cannot be a probans, but the cause which is free from all hindrances and obstructions impairing its capacity to produce the effect, and is accompanied with all the auxiliary conditions, can certainly function as a probans. A cause with unimpaired potency and in the presence of the total assemblage of auxiliary conditions must necessarily produce the effect and as such it has the relation of universal concomitance with the effect. A person sucking the mango fruit in the dark night can infer the total conditions which produce the taste. Here the juice that is being sucked is the effect produced by the preceding moments of taste and colour, and thus is the cause of the succeeding gustatory cognition. In this case the cause is inferred from the effect. The person sucking the mango fruit infers the colour of the present moment from the colour of the preceding moment. This is an inference of the effect from the cause. According to the Buddhist logician the taste, colour etc. of the preceding moment jointly produce the taste of the succeeding moment, the preceding moment of taste being the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), and colour the auxiliary condition of the taste of the succeeding moment. Thus the inference of the succeeding moment of colour from the preceding moment of colour of the same is a case of inference of the effect from the cause.

The Determinant of Universal Concomitance (or Pervasion)

The universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) is based on invariability at all times. Without the cognition of universal invariability the determination of the principle of universal concomitance is impossible. According to the Naiyāyikas repeated observation leads to the knowledge of universal concomitance. When the concurrence of two facts is repeatedly observed, that concurrence enables one to ascertain the regularity of such occurrence of those events. The concurrence alone is not the basis of regularity, but the absence of exception (*vyabhicāra* or *apavāda*) must also be there. Thus for the cognition of pervasion (*vyāpti*), the determination of two things is necessary, viz. the cognition of concurrence (*sāhacarya*) and the absence of the cognition of any exception (*vyabhicāra*). There is concurrence of fire with smoke and the absence of any fortuitousness (*vyabhicāra*) between them. Thus the knowledge of

pervasion (*vyāpti*) is dependent on non-contingent (*avyabhicārī*) concurrence between two facts.

While Darwin upholds the maxim *nature non facit saltum*—'nature does nothing by jumps', and seems to suppose a blending of hereditary factors, according to Mendel inheritance is particulate. The advances in genetics, since Darwin's day, do not alter the main outlines of his theory. The mechanism of heredity may be much more complicated than what Darwin knew and involve much of which he was ignorant, such as, mutation-rates or the various types, causes and effects of hybridization. But that merely leads to a more elaborate or different explanation of genetic variation in offspring and the transmission of ancestral traits. No matter how these are explained, their occurrence is all that is needed to permit new species to originate through natural processes of heredity and selection. 'If Darwin were alive today', Julian Huxley writes, 'the title of his book would have to be not the 'origin' but the 'origins' of species. For perhaps the most salient single fact that has emerged from recent studies is that the species may arise in a number of quite distinct ways.'*

According to the theory of leaps and jumps (*plutasaṃcāra-vāda*) there are transgressions of the general laws. One can know the particulars by means of sensuous cognitions. But the searching out of the general laws and their invariability among those particulars is a tremendous task, and the question of the universal validity of those principles is still more intractable. The universal concomitance is possible only when the invariability of the relation at all times is known, and no exception of the law at any space or time is possible. The absence of contingency in the concurrence can be ascertained only in the cases that are before us at present or within our memory of the past, but it is not possible to assert the validity of the law with reference to the past beyond the memory or in the infinite future. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the element of 'validity at all times', so closely associated with the principle of concomitance. The discovery of a principle is made on the basis of the experience that we have, although the range of our ignorance is more vast than the ambit of our experience. Under such circumstances how is it possible to arrive at the unconditional certainty of the concomitance? The principle of concomitance must necessarily be based on the experience that we have. The Jaina logicians also

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**The Great Ideas, A Syntopicon*, part I, page 456.

have recognised the validity at all times of the principle of concomitance. But the ever-growing range of knowledge and the ceaseless conversion of ignorance into new knowledge through the progress of philosophy and science oblige us to realise that the proviso, viz. 'valid at all times', cannot be satisfied independently of these developments in the range of human knowledge.

It is not found that the validity of many a so-called universal concomitance now stands rejected with the acquisition of new knowledge and discovery of scientific truths? It should not also be thought that all the ancient laws of universal concomitance were always considered to be unconditionally valid. It is, of course, true that at the time when the concomitances were ascertained and the rules for arriving at the principle of universal concomitance were formulated, such concomitances were considered true at all times. But it is not proper to say that their truth remained constant even in subsequent epochs of philosophical thinking. Our perceptual experience (*pratyakṣa jñāna*) alone is the deciding factor in formulating universal concomitances. When we experience the repetition of a fact by means of a repeated observation, we happen to arrive at a concomitance, such as, 'this would happen on the happening of that and in the absence of that this would not be possible'.

It was universally admitted that the universal concomitance must be equally acceptable to both sides, viz. the proponent as well as the opponent. A fact whose pervasion (*vyāptī*) has not been ascertained by means of a valid organ of knowledge, is not accepted as a valid probans, but is considered as a fallacy called non-existent (unestablished) probans (*asiddhahetvābhāsa*). 'The word is subject to transformation because it is visible', is an instance in point. Here the visibility is accepted as non-existent in the word, both by the proponent and the opponent. There is no concomitance between the word and the object of eye, and so the visibility of the word is not an established fact. The example given by Dharmakirti in his work *Nyāyabindu* in this connection is as follows[1]—

'The trees are animate beings, because they sleep' or 'the trees are animate beings, because they die when the entire bark is taken off'. These two probantia, viz. the sleeping and the death on the bark being taken off, are not established facts for the opponent (the Buddhists), who believe that their slumber indicated by the contraction of the leaves is not true in the case of some trees,

because all trees do not contract the leaves in the night. According to the Buddhist philosopher death is characterised by the cessation of the sensations, the sense-organs and the life, and such a death is not possible of the trees. Again the universal concomitance, established by the Jainas, between death and taking off the entire bark, is refuted by the Buddhists in the following way—death which consists in the cessation of sensations etc. is not possible in the case of the trees because the sensations, whose cessation is asserted, do not exist in them. Exsiccation cannot also be regarded as death, because the latter presupposes the existence of the sensations. Exsiccation alone, independently of the cessation of sensations, is not presupposed by the existence of the sensations. It, therefore, follows that the death which is the real probans is not an established fact in respect of the trees, and exsiccation, that is accepted by both the proponent and the opponent, is not a valid probans. The Jainas, however, adduce death alone irrespective of its concomitance with the subject (*pakṣa*) as the probans, being quite ignorant of its real nature. They identify exsiccation with death, which is found in the trees. The opponent, however, is conversant with the true nature of death which is identical with the extinction of consciousness. Had the proponent been familiar with the connotation of the word 'death', the probans would have been an unestablished fact (*asiddha*) for him also.*

The Jaina logician, however, believes that 'the trees are animate beings'. Had the Buddhists been conversant with this truth, the above probans (viz. exsiccation) would not be an unestablished fact for them. The Buddhists consequently assert that the trees are not animate beings, becaue they do not have the death identical with extinction of the sensations, sense-organs and life. Such probans is an established fact for the Buddhist proponent, but it is quite otherwise for the opponent Jainas.

The universal concomitances are most controversial issues. The concomitances concerned with the facts of nature are multifarious. We have just mentioned one such case of concomitance. The concomitances related to theoretical doctrines are most divergent in nature. In fact, every philosophical system has constructed specific universal concomitances in consonance with their own philosophical beliefs. For instance—

**Dharmottarapradīpa*, page 190-191; *Nyāyabindu* (Govindacandra Pandey), p. 85.

1. The Jaina philosopher, as an exponent of the doctrine of permanence through change (*pariṇāmī-nityavādī*), has proposed the universal concomitance of a real with the trio of origination, cessation and continuity, that is, a real, according to him, is both permanent and impermanent.

2. The Buddhists, on the other hand, in support of their doctrine of momentariness, have asserted that what is real is necessarily momentary, that is, the real is absolutely impermanent.

3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school considers some substances as permanent and others as impermanent, and consequently their view of universal concomitance is quite different from those of the above-mentioned schools.

From these examples it easily follows that in spite of consensus about the basis (co-occurrence or occurrence in succession) of the ascertainment of necessary concomitance the results are divergent. The reason appears to be that the different schools do not agree on the nature of subtle metaphysical truths. This doctrinal divergence is responsible for the diversity of the element of necessity in concomitance viewed by the different schools. It may be that, with the discovery of new secret truths, the universally-accepted concomitances would change and the principles governing them may stand refuted.

At the metaphysical level there are fundamental differences among philosophers about the capacity of knowledge. Kumārila, the great Mīmāṃsist, for instance, does not believe in super-sensory perception when he asserts that whatever super-excellence is found in the capacity of knowledge, does not transcend the prescribed limit; a sense-organ can perceive a thing at a distance or a thing that is subtle; but this perception does not transcend its own sphere of activity; the ear can never see the colour nor can the eye hear the sound.[2]

But this is not endorsed by the Jaina thinkers, who believe that on the manifestation of the power of joint perception of the sense data (*sambhinnasrotopalabdhi*) the specific and restricted power of the senses comes to an end. And consequently any sense-organ can perform the function of any other sense-organ. For instance, one can see, hear or touch by the sense-organ of eye. This has been confirmed also by modern science, because in the physical science

the cells of the body are considered as uniform although some among them are vested with specific powers. If properly trained, the skin covering the eye can also see. The teeth, compared with the bones of the ear, are relatively better conductors of sound. A suitable instrument fitted on the teeth can be used as the organ of hearing. In the light of such scientific discoveries, the universal concomitance like 'whatever is sound is audible', will lose its validity. If the sound is perceptible by the teeth also, its concomitance with its perceptibility by the ear loses its universal necessity. In Siddhasenagaṇi's commentary on the *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya,* it is said that it is possible to read by means of the fingers. That was not understandable to me at that time. But after some time I read in a scientific journal that a Russian girl could read by means of her fingers and a French girl could perceive colour by her fingers. This was not magic, nor through the power of incantations. The sensory nerves of their fingers became so peculiarly developed that they could discharge the function of the eye. The minutest part of our body is sensitive and is charged with consciousness. If properly developed, any part becomes capable of knowing anything ordinarily known by any sense-organ.

It is generally found in nature that a heavy body falls downward. For instance, a fruit when disjoined from the tree falls down due to its heaviness. This leads to the formulation of the universal law that 'whatever is possessed of heaviness is liable to fall down'. This ancient law of concomitance stands superseded by Newton's Theory of Gravitation and recently by Einstein's Theory of Curvature of Space. 'The heavy body goes downward while the light one goes upward'—this principle is formulated on the basis of weight. Newton established that the downward or the upward movements of two material bodies are determined on the basis of their mass and distance. Both these bodies attract and create motion in each other. The body of a heavier mass attracts a body of lesser mass in proportion to their distance from one another. The mass of the earth is greater compared to the mass of the fruit and so the former attracts the latter. Einstein introduced a change in this theory of Gravitation. According to him a body effects a curvature in the space occupied by it. The downward movement of a body is due to that curvature. With the change of the theories, the natural laws also change or are rather differently formulated on the basis of new knowledge. It thus follows that the idea of validity of a concomitance at all times is mere wishful thinking. One can at best take note of the past and present achievements in science and

formulate the concomitance in their light. But to think of the validity of the rule remaining uncontradicted in future is wide of the mark. The future should be allowed to take care of itself. The sensuous experience and the logical thinking have their own prescribed limits and, therefore, one can depend upon them to a limited extent. The experience of validity at all times would depend upon super-sensuous experience which is immediate and direct and as such beyond the range of inference. For a student of logic the knowledge of the limits of concomitance and probantia is an absolute necessity. The purport of such knowledge is not to subject oneself to uncertainty and doubt or scepticism but it is identical with freedom from obstinate adherence to what is fictitious instead of an unrelenting search for what is factual. And in this way one can preserve his receptivity to new scientific discoveries intact.

The western philosopher Hume has criticised sequence of events (*kramabhāva*) based on causality. The causal relationship, according to him, is unknowable. We experience, of course, discrete sensations or feelings occurring in uninterrupted succession, but we never experience their internal causal relationship and its invariability. We never have a direct experience of such invariable connection between such phenomenon. The unbroken series of our sensations comes to be mistaken on account of the relationship of immediate succession among the moments, as an internal invariable causal process. All this is due to our habits and pre-dispositions fostered by repeated experiences of succession uncritically interpreted as causation. The uniformity of nature cannot be empirically ascertained. We cannot arrive at a universal or invariable rule by means of the senses.[3]

The necessary and invariable causal relationship cannot be, according to Hume, a subject-matter either of perception (*pratyakṣa*) or of inference (*anumāna*). Ācārya Hemacandra has raised the problem of universal concomitance as incapable of being ascertained by sensuous perception. Had perception been able to ascertain the universal concomitance, then the entire cognitive activity will be satisfied by perception itself, which would make universal concomitance a fictitious enterprise. The activity of sensuous perception is strictly confined to the object that is immediately present, and that is the limit of its activity. It is not possible to formulate any principle or arrive at any law on the basis of sensuous perception alone. If the universal concomitance again

was to be established by inference, there would obviously be a fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), because the proof of one would depend on the proof of other. There will be no end if an inference is verified by universal concomitance and again the former by the latter.

For the ascertainment of pervasion (universal concomitance, *vyāpti*) one stands in need of independent mental effort which could examine the relationship between the probandum and the probans on the basis of observation and non-observation. Such effort that is capable of determining the universal concomitance is designated as *tarka* or reasoning, which we have already discussed.

It is possible to draw a line of demarcation by means of *tarka* or reasoning between co-existences that are rooted in identity or are without it. Similarly reasoning is capable of distinguishing a series with its moments causally related from another whose moments are not so related.

The relation between fire and smoke is not that of mere succession, but it is an internal one of invariability. Fire is the agent that produces and smoke is the object that is produced and this is the internal invariability existing between them. Sunday is followed by Monday. This is a case of mere succession. Sunday does not produce Monday and, therefore, there is no producer-produced relationship or internal invariability between them. The imagination of causality on the basis of mere succession is indeed a perverse knowledge. Sensuous cognition is limited to the particulars and so is incapable of formulating a principle that is universally and invariably applicable. But it cannot be denied that the human mind has an independent function of its own, that does not simply analyse or synthesize the sensuous feelings and cognitions, but is capable of transcending the limits set by the senses. It is against commonsense experience that a thought cannot go beyond the empirical experience. Thought is certainly dependent on the sensible data, but it is not entirely bound by them, being free and independent in many other respects. It can exercise its freedom and determine universal laws true for all times. Apparently Sunday is invariably followed by Monday on account of the mere order of succession. The Jaina logicians postulated necessary relationship (*avinābhāva*) between them on account of that invariable succession. Monday necessarily follows Sunday, and this establishes the probans-probandum relationship between them. The asterisms of

Rohiṇī and *Krttikā* are also similarly related, their relationship being apparently based on the fact of their rising in a certain temporal order. The Jaina logicians thus preferred to draw a line of demarcation between such cases of succession and the clear cases of causality as between fire and smoke. They could also go a step farther and find a remote causality behind the phenomenon of day and night and the rise of the asterisms after fixed intervals. They have obviously to wait for the advancement of the science of astronomy and knowledge of the cosmos for linking the apparent cases of mere succession with causality discovered between them with the advancement of our scientific knowledge. The full credit of establishing the faculty of thought functioning quite independently of the sensuous experience and the experience dependent thereon, goes to the Jaina logicians, who thus solved the problem of determining universal concomitance on a firmer basis.

Dialogue.

Question 1. Absence of contradiction is the criterion of the valid organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). A cognition that is liable to contradiction is not a valid organ. If so, what is the point in regarding the *āpta* (reliable person) as uncontradicted or non-deceptive?

Answer. It is undeniable that absence of contradiction is the criterion of the validity of a cognition, but a cognition *ipso facto* belongs to a person. Where there is no other source determining the validity of a cognition, we refer to the person to whom that cognition belongs. When we are sure of the reliability of a person, we are left with no doubt about the reliability of his cognition too. In such cases, the cognition of the object is called *āgama* (scripture). In other words if the person, from whose words our knowledge of the object is derived, is reliable and dependable as the unquestionable revealer of the object, his words would be accepted as valid. If the words of such person stand contradicted by other valid organs of knowledge, they would not be valid. The speaker should be possessed of a valid cognition and his words should be in conformity with his cognition. The criterion of reliability (*āptatva*), therefore, consists in valid cognition and valid expression of the contents of that cognition.

Non-contradiction is the criterion of the validity of an organ of knowledge, as we have already said, but when we have accepted the words of a person as authoritative, we have entirely to depend

on him instead of depending on ourselves. In sensuous cognition one has to depend on the senses, and consequently the absence of contradiction of the function of these senses, which is identical with the cognizer himself, is invariably necessary. The absence of contradiction in the case of *āgama* (scripture) is concerned with another person. This explains the predominant role of reliability of other person in such cases. This is the reason why the expressions, viz. 'freedom from contradiction' and 'freedom from deception' are added as adjuncts of the *āpta* (reliable person).

Question 2. What is the criterion of *āptatva* or the reliability of a person? A person may be reliable in respect of a particular subject but may be equally unreliable with reference to another subject. What, then, is the absolute criterion of reliability (*āptatva*) of the person, when he is both reliable and unreliable, as explained above?

Answer. Reliability is not an exclusive characteristic valid with reference to all subjects and all persons. In other words, it cannot be ascribed to a particular person in all respects or to a particular subject with reference to all persons. Wherever there is absence of contradiction or deception, there is *āptatva* (reliability) and wherever there is the presence of contradiction and deception there is the absence of *āptatva* (reliability). In the sphere of abstract reasoning no ordinary person can be considered as a reliable person (*āpta*) absolutely and unconditionally.

Question 3. The problem of identity needs further illustrations. Its difference from succession also needs a clear exposition by means of illustrations.

Answer. The relation of identity is not the only basis of necessary concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*), but the relation of succession is also such a basis. There is no relation of identity between Sunday and Monday that follows it in succession, nor is Monday produced by Sunday, that is, the relation of causality does not obtain between them. Monday necessarily comes after Sunday and not before. Such immediate sequence (*ānantarya*) or succession can also form the basis of universal concomitance. By observing an event necessarily taking place immediately after another, the physicist is in a position to arrive at a number of principles governing such succession. If there is an invariable relationship between a succeeding and preceding mode, either can lead to the

knowledge of the other. Two events taking place at two different moments with temporal remoteness between them have no common locus, but even then their occurrence, one after the other, remains unobstructed. In identity treehood cannot be separated from *śiṃśapāhood*. But between Sunday and Monday there is no such identity, and as such they can be separated, although the relation of succession cannot be disrupted. Succession, like identity, is capable of leading to the cognition of the related fact and so there should be no difficulty in formulating universal laws based on such relationship.

IX
Contribution of Jainism to the Development of Indian Logic.

Freedom of thought generated variety of thought which is the *sine qua non* of the development of thought. Indian thought has two mainstreams, viz. *Śramaṇic* and *Vedic*. Both are dedicated to the search of truth and the advancement of knowledge. The corpus of Indian logic is nourished by the intellectual exchange and inter-influence between the two and contains specific contributions of individual schools as well as a general advancement achieved in common. An outline of the basic contributions of Jainism to the field of Indian logic is being attempted here. It has resulted in two achievements; relativity and reconciliation. While non-absolutism has characterised the thought of the Jaina logician, the *syādvāda* (the doctrine of conditional dialectic) has dominated their linguistic vehicle, and relativism and synthesis were the outcome. It is through relativism alone that one can understand the universe in its vastness and attempt an explanation of its working. The universal is made up of substances, each possessed of infinite modes. The substances are inter-related and they influence each other. Every event has its own set-up and context, and, therefore, a satisfactory explanation of the apparent contradictions and discrepancies in it would be impossible without the relativistic approach.

Relativism is an all comprehensive principle which is applicable in the context of an effect or an event in its manifold, rather infinite-fold, character. Usually an entity, though infinitely complex in character, is explained with reference to a particular attribute which necessitates the use of the linguistic tool '*syāt*' to imply the remaining attributes. The perfection of our language is made up by the device of '*syāt*' which indicates that the specific attribute is not the whole entity. Nor is our cognition competent enough to know the truth in parts but the principle of relativism does not allow us to remain ignorant of the other parts making up the whole. The absolutists forget the fact that though the reals are independent so far as their own existence is concerned, they are not

absolutely independent in their relationship with one another, which explains their existence in the context of the universe as a whole.

The determination of the laws of pervasion or concomitance is possible only on the basis of the principle of relativism. The laws of the gross world are not applicable to the working of the subtle world. The analysis of the nature of the universe in its cosmic and supra-cosmic aspects has been explained from two different *nayas* or standpoints. The truth in its subtle or ultimate nature is to be studied through *niścayanaya* (ultimate or scientific standpoint), whereas the gross or the external world is explained through *vyavahāra naya* (the pragmatic or the practical standpoint). The dictum 'the self is the doer of its own *karman*'—is acceptable to all the spiritualist philosophers, but this is only a commonplace statement and the formula represents pragmatic or practical view point. It cannot be the formula of the ultimate or the scientific standpoint, because the real in its ultimate nature is the doer of its own nature. The self is a conscious substance and, therefore, it can be the doer of a mode that is conscious. The *karman*, on the other hand, is material and as such is heterogeneous and quite different from the self in nature. And as there cannot be any relationship between two principles of diverse nature, the self cannot be the doer of *karman* which is quite unlike the latter. Had the self been the real doer of the *karman,* it would never achieve freedom from it. The proposition 'the self is the doer of *karman*' is, therefore, only a pragmatic and commonplace statement, couched in a language expressive of the pragmatic standpoint.

Some bodies are felt heavy and some others light, but heaviness and lightness are dependent on the location of those bodies in space at different distance from another body on account of the Law of Gravitation. A body loses its weight as soon as it crosses the field of gravitation.

Sometimes we determine the nature of an entity with reference to its length and breadth. This is understandable with reference to a material body, but such determination is impossible of the immaterial or the formless entity, there being no length and breadth. It occupies space but does not obstruct it. Length and breadth are, therefore, relative to a material object. When the energy in the form of heat is transformed into motion, its quantity remains constant. This is the first principle of 'thermodynamics'. The

second principle is that energy passed through an instrument loses its quality which gradually decreases. It has not been possible to invent an instrument, therefore, which is capable of changing energy into motion that is perpetual and does not consume the quantity of the initial energy. It has been presumed by some thinkers that, although it is not possible to preserve the quantity of energy intact in this space and time, yet it may be possible to do so in a different space and time so that an instrument supplied with a quantum of energy would ever remain in motion without involving any decrease in the initial energy. From such instances or scientific discoveries and inventions it is evident that the concomitances valid in a particular space and time are not applicable universally in a different space-time context. The concomitances are, therefore, to be determined on the basis of the principle of relativism[1].

Many a theory of statistics and physics has found an adequate exposition in the light of relativism.

The second important outcome of *syādvāda* (the doctrine of conditional dialectic) is synthesis. The Jaina sages and saints have not accepted the exclusive validity of impermanence etc. given in experience, but attempted to discover their coherence with their opposites, such as permanence and the like. The philosophical doctrines have a cyclic fate due to reasoning (*tarka*). By one set of reasoning it is confirmed that a real is impermanent because it is a product and whatever is a product is impermanent, for instance, a jar. In another set of reasoning, on the other hand, it is established that the sound is permanent because it is not a product. What is not a product is permanent, for instance, the space. One can search for a synthesis between these two mutually opposed sets of reasoning. Opposition leads to synthesis. The proposition 'sound is impermanent', is true because it becomes an entity of the past immediately after becoming the object of the ear. It is not illogical to accept a sound as impermanent on account of this change. The Mīmāṃsaka philosophier's characterisation of *'sphoṭa'*, which is the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the sound as eternal is also not unreasonable. The material bodies that transform into sound do never change their material character, and in this sense their permanence should also be acceptable. No attribute of a real, according to relativism, is independently true. The attributes can be true only as inter-related. Ācārya Sāyaṇa Mādhava of 14th century A.D., in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,* has refuted one system of philosophy by another in order finally to establish the ultimate

validity of Vedānta. Much earlier, the great Jaina logician Mallavādin, in the fifth century A.D., in his *Dvādaśāranayacakra* demonstrated the inadequacy of one philosophy by another in a graduated scheme of *nayas*. He ultimately established the validity of none independently, emphasizing the soundness of a philosophy that encompasses all individual schools into a comprehensive whole, synthesising all of them, pointing out their relevance and proper place in the world view.

The philosophy propounded by an individual *naya*, being only a partial estimate of reality, is untrue. Only the co-ordinated view of all those philosophies is true. This synthetic approach has saved logic from the whirlpool of wrangling and given the search for truth a sound and dependable basis.

An important contribution of Jaina logic to Indian thought is the classification of the valid organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The fault of intermixture (*saṅkīrṇatā doṣa*) or overlapping is avoided by the classification of the organs as *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). All possible valid organs of knowledge are comprehended by it. The object is either known directly or through other means or medium. These are the only two ways of knowing which are the basis of the above-mentioned two divisions. The Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika logicians accepted *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference) as the two valid organs of knowledge, but they had to prove the *āgama* (scriptural testimony) as included under the inference (*anumāna*). It is not beyond controversy to include *āgama* under the inference. Under *parokṣa* (indirect) organ of knowledge it is easy to include inference, *āgama*, memory (*smṛti*), reasoning (*tarka*) etc. and thus their definitions also can be made free from the faults of intermixture or overlapping (*saṅkīrṇatā doṣa*). Thus considered the Jaina classification of the valid organs of knowledge is universally acceptable, being based on a realistic estimate of the problem.

The consecutive stage of sensuous perception (*avagraha, īhā, avāya* and *dhāraṇā*) of the Jaina is also an important contribution to Indian epistemology. This has been discussed in the first chapter entitled *'The Jaina Logic of the Āgama Period'* and also in the sixth called *'Organs of knowledge'*. This analysis of perceptual cognition is very important from the psychological viewpoint.

The problem of self-validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge is a widely discussed topic of logic. In the tradition of

the Jaina logic the ultimate source and validity of experience is man himself. It is human being that is self-valid and not any particular scripture or text. The denial of the self-validity of any particular text and the acceptance of the self-validity of a human being is a very unique principle. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsists accept the self-validity of text (like the Vedas) and deny the self-validity of a man. According to them a human being cannot be absolutely free from greed and attachment, and in the absence of such freedom nobody can claim omniscience, and a person who is not omniscient is not *ipso facto* a possessor of self-validity. According to the Jaina thinker it is possible for a human being to become absolutely free from greed and attachment and consequently attain pure and perfect knowledge and omniscience. This is why only a human being can claim the self-validity of his knowledge. The verbal assertions of such man or the books written by him derive their validity from the writer and are not valid in themselves. The self-validity of human experience is a fundamental contribution of Jaina logic. In the entire range of Indian logic it is indeed the Jaina tradition that is the chief and the earliest upholder of omniscience. And it is but natural that a huge literature devoted to the proof of omniscience is available in Jainism. The Buddhists have asserted the self-validity of Buddha's knowledge and the secondary authenticity of their texts, but they considered Buddha as the knower of *dharma* and not the knower of all things like the Jainas.[2] According to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa a human being cannot be the knower of *dharma*. The Buddhist, however, went a step farther and asserted that the nature of *dharma* is accessible to the human mind. The Jainas went still farther and affirmed that a human being can be an omniscient being as well. Kumārila has vehemently criticized the concept of omniscience upheld by the heterodox schools. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti has dismissed the concept of omniscience as irrelevant to the knowledge of a religious prophet. He asserts that one may see at a distance or not, but let him see the truth that is profitable and beneficent. If a person who can see at a distance is a valid authority, come, let us worship the vultures who can identify the prey at a great distance![3]

The refutation of omniscience and the oblique accusation against it have been adequately answered by the Jaina logicians for over a millennium and a half and they have put up a strong defence against them.

Along with this influence of Jaina thought on other schools, it would not be irrelevant to discuss the counter-influence of the non-

Jaina systems on Jainism itself. The Jaina logicians have definitely borrowed some valuable concepts from logical systems contemporaneous with it. In their determination of the nature of inference they have followed the tradition of the Buddhist and Naiyāyika logicians. They have attempted clarification and amendment in conformity with their own thought and tradition about the subject of inference. The Buddhist logicians proposed the triple characteristic of a probans. But the Jaina thinkers made a remarkable advancement on it by proposing a unitary characteristic, viz. the logical impossibility in the absence of the other (*anyathānupapatti*). The following four categories of probantia are also unique contributions of the Jaina logicians—

(1) A positive probans leading to an affirmative conclusion.
(2) A positive probans leading to a negative conclusion.
(3) A negative probans leading to a negative conclusion.
(4) A negative probans leading to a positive conclusion.

The above-mentioned examples unambiguously demonstrate the fact that Indian thought unceasingly went on enriching itself by inter-disciplinary influences and was never stagnant on account of dogmatism and stalemate consequent upon individual aloofness. It was to an appreciable extent free from the obsession that refutation of alien systems and confirmation of one's own was the only aim and object of a particular system of thought. The process of give and take was always in vogue—a phenomenon which characterises the entire range of Indian literature in all its ramifications.

Philosophy and Logic: New possibilities.

In concluding the discussion of the science of logic it would not be out of place to turn our attention to new possibilities in the field. There is no doubt that epistemology and logic in their developed form have been recognised as essential parts of philosophical speculations. It is also undeniable that logic brought about a stagnation in the stream of philosophical thinking by keeping it bogged down to exposition of the tenets and the doctrines of the bygone days. The entire energy of the majority of philosophers remained engaged in splitting hair in place of discovering new truths. And as a result dry logic drove scientific observation to a place of unimportance. The doors of new discovery and investigation of new facts were completely closed in the absence of the power of deep observation and scientific experiment.

The search for truth has three avenues, viz. (1) observation, (2)

reasoning or logic, and (3) experiment. These are the only tools by which discovery of new truths and facts in the field of the various branches of science, viz. Metaphysics, Physics, Psychology, Botany, Biology etc. have become possible. .It is with these instruments that humanity has been in search of truth since the times when such search was initiated.

Whatever new facts were discovered by philosophers was possible only on account of scientific observation in those days. So long as our philosophers were not averse to the method of observation, there was a genuine search of facts and truths. When logic raised pure intellect to a predominant position and reasoning (*tarka*) came to occupy an extra-ordinary place in thought, the method of scientific observation lost its importance in the speculations of philosophy and completely fell into oblivion. The result was that the subsequent thinkers were rather philosophical commentators than philosophers in the true sense of the term. Only those who searched out and established new facts and truths through subtle observation were genuine philosophers. Over the past millennium and a half no new discovery has been made or even attempted, but our thinkers rested on their oars, engaged in vain discussions of the discoveries of ancient philosophers, and endless mutual criticism and refutations, fighting with phantoms created by themselves. Nothing else could be expected from them for want of the development of new methods of observation of minute facts. There was, of course, one effective way of deep observation which is epitomised by what is called super-sensuous perception (*atīndriya jñāna*) of the *yogins*. But this was also neglected and not properly used and developed in a scientific way.

The successful search of new knowledge and new principles by the different sciences is also, no doubt, due to the faculty of super-sensuous experience illustrated by the epoch-making discoveries spontaneously made by the great scientists like Newton and Einstein. These discoveries were certainly the outcome of incessant search for truth based on the analysis of the properties of matter and mind and causal and acausal relations existing between them. It is absurd to think that a modern scientist has not played his part in developing the way of super-sensuous perception. Their approach may be different, but there is no doubt that science has provided methods and instruments to discover super-sensuous truths. The subjects that fall under super-sensuous perception are three, viz. (1) subtle, (2) concealed and (3) remote, which cannot be

known by the ordinary normal sense-organs. The scientist today has invented instruments like microscope, telescope and X-rays, through which we can study the subtle matter or objects hidden from the senses or situated at a distance and unknown in the past. The modern scientist, however, is not conversant with the power of the soul capable of knowing such objects by its faculty of super-sensuous perception. But he has invented physical instruments capable of performing the task of knowing the subtle, concealed and remote. A philosopher has to go a step farther and utilise the experience of the *yogins* of ancient times and the discoveries of modern science to arrive at a comprehensive truth, integrating all the valuable contributions of *yoga* and science. But philosophy at present is not performing this function. It should be appreciated that whereas on the one hand logic produced some good results, it is also responsible for stalemate and stagnation of knowledge and thought in some ways. Today super-sensory experience is a suspect. We have let the lucid intervals of super-sensuous perceptions go in vain. There are two such occasions—

(1)We some time pass on a problem to the sub-conscious mind which continues acting on it for some time and then suddenly the solution flashes across the mind in a dream. This possibility of discovering new truths and solutions through dreams by sowing seed of the problem in the sub-conscious mind in a semi-conscious state, has been abandoned by the modern philosophers. (2) Another occasion for such flash presents itself at a moment of pure intuition. A moment may come in our life when we are in a state of absolute equilibrium of mind free from the influence of reason and discursive thought. At such lucid interval there dawns an enlightenment that is spontaneous and revealer of facts unknown and hitherto considered impossible of being known.

These two possibilities were living issues before the ancient philosopher and he applied them in the discovery of truth. Modern science also has attempted to throw light on these two possibilities. In non-conceptual consciousness or pure intuition the sublter states of the mind become active and present solutions of penetrating problems. Even in the state of dreams the gross consciousness becomes inactive. At that state the subtle consciousness comes in touch with the minute truth. I cannot believe that such power is absent in a modern philosopher. This power lies hidden under the faculty of discursive thought and the philosopher has become more a logician than an intuitionist. His power of observation lies

dormant and inactive. While discussing the new possible courses of philosophy one should not lose sight of facts contained therein. The importance and the efficacy of reasoning (*tarka*) cannot be denied. It cannot be divorced from philosophy. But reason is, on no account, superior to experience. It is rather subordinate to it. Observation and experiment occupy the first position. In the expression *anumāna* (inference) the particle '*anu*' indicated that inference is preceded by perception and observation which is subsequently subjected to reasoning. The science of logic or reasoning is also called *ānvīkṣikī*, which is derived from *anu* + *īkṣā*, thus meaning a science which is preceded by observation. General principles are derived from observation and experiment. And then the successful working of these rules is carefully observed. These methods of experiment and verification make it possible for us to formulate a plausible theory. Such theories obviously are not based on pure intuition. It is reasoning alone which is the instrument which enables us to derive conclusions from observed facts and finally to arrive at universal laws. This is the method of philosophy and also of modern science. By experiment the scientist discovered the rule that metals expand when they are heated and contract when they are cooled. But this general rule has a solitary exception in that water gradually expands in volume when its temperature is reduced from four degrees to zero degree, and it does not contract even when cooling. This is a special law. It thus follows that nothing can be affirmed about actual facts exclusively on the basis of the general rules. This maxim applies to theoretical science, medicine as well as law. Definite predictions can be made on the basis of special laws. For instance, one can predict the bursting of water-pipe from the temperature of its water going below four degrees. This is the function of logic which has thus a paramount importance. But it cannot be considered as valuable as observation. In the absence of observational evidences it is neither possible to discover the general laws nor to apply logic when there are no data supplied by experience. The most urgent need and solid basis of philosophy can be summed up in the following three maxims—

1. Investigation of new truths and facts and deriving necessary conclusions from them.
2. Development of the method of the minute observation.
3. Development of the purity of mind for acquiring the power of subtle observation.

For the successful implementation of all these conditions of development of knowledge, it is necessary to undertake co-ordina-

ted study and research of the science of yoga, karma and psychology along with logic. Without this co-ordinated study and research the approach of minute observation cannot flourish or be successful. The yogic experience is an important part of philosophy. It is not cultivated exclusively for physical health and elimination of mental tension, but it has a great part to play in illuminating the minute strata of our consciousness. It is a successful medium of communication with subtle truths. Maharṣi Caraka, it is said, could know the properties of medicinal herbs, simply by a sympathetic association with them without the help of microscope or other such subtle instruments to observe them. He used to sit down in deep meditation and the properties of medicinal herbs reflected themselves in the mirror of his pure consciousness. In ancient Jaina literature also there are recorded many such properties of vegetation as were intuited in special state of trance.

For the right growth of the method of minute observation the study of the science of karman is also very valuable. Behind our physical body there is a karmic body which is finer than the former and its subtle functions manifest themselves in the reactions of the physical body. By developing the power of observing the function of the *kārmic* body we can succeed to expose the reactions manifested in the physical body and also determine the nature of the causal relationship between the two (viz. the karmic body and its reactions manifested in the physical body).

By a careful study of the different faculties of the mind and different phases of the consciousness behind them as well as the external data conditioning the consciousness, it is possible to add new dimensions to the power of observation.

It is not sufficient for a philosopher to be a mere logician to be successful in such co-ordinated study and aptitude for discovering new truths and facts. A philosopher has to cultivate the faculty of intuition by means of *yoga*. He has to achieve purification of mind by freeing it from perversions, angularities and idols. Many among the scientists are also saints and live an astute life as pure as that of an ascetic. In the minds, engaged in the search after truth, pollution and blemishes cannot subsist, and in case they subsist, obstructions are bound to present themselves to obstruct the quest of truth. While the scientific observation is the pre-requisite for the search after truth, the purity and one-pointedness of mind is the pre-condition of that search. In the scientific atmosphere of the modern times

the examination and verification of the observed facts are to be pursued with requisite zeal. Science has inherited the legacy of philosophy and as such why should there be an impassable hiatus between the two. Philosophy can be a live pursuit and can re-occupy its primal place if right observation followed by examination and experiment and the application of the logical are brought to bear upon it in a harmonised way. The merits of the sciences of epistemology and logic would also thus receive their due appreciation and estimation.

APPENDIX—1

Varieties of *Pamāṇa*

Pamāna is stated to be fourfold, viz.

(i) *davva pamana—standard (of measurement) of substances,*
(ii) *khetta pamana—standard (of measurement) of lands,*
(iii) *kala pamana—standard (of measurement) of time,*
(iv) *bhava pamana—standard (of measurement) of states.*

Davva pamāṇa (the standard of measurement of substances) is twofold, viz.

(i) *payesa nipphana*—concerned with the space-points (of the things to be measured),
(ii) *vibhaga nipphanna*—concerned with the various types (of measures).

Vibhāga nipphanna (the standard of measurement concerned with the various types of measures) is fivefold, viz.

(i) *māṇa*—measurement of quantity,
(ii) *ummāṇa*—measurement of heavier weights,
(iii) *omāṇa*—measurement of length,
(iv) *gaṇimā*—measurement by counting.
(v) *paḍimāṇa*—measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights.

Khetta pamāṇa is twofold—

(i) *payesa nipphanna*—concerned with the space-points (of land to be measured),
(ii) *vibhāga nipphanna*—concerned with the various types (of other measurements of land).

Kāla pamāṇa is twofold—

(i) *payesa nipphanna*—concerned with the time points,
(ii) *vibhāga nipphanna*—concerned with the various types (of time).

Bhāva pamāṇa is threefold—

(i) *guṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attributes,
(ii) *naya pamāṇa*—standard of standpoints,
(iii) *saṁkhā pamāṇa*—standard of number.

Guṇa pamāna is twofold—

(i) *jīvaguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attributes of the soul,
(ii) *ajīva guṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attributes of the non-soul.

Jīvaguṇa pamāṇa is threefold—

(i) *ṇāṇaguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attrjbutes of determinate knowledge,
(ii) *damsanaguna pamāna*—standard of attributes of indeterminate intuition,
(iii) *cārittaguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attributes of conduct (of behaviour).

Ṇāṇaguṇa pamāṇa is fourfold—

(i) *paccakkha*—perceptual cognition,
(ii) *aṇumāṇa*—inferential knowledge,
(iii) *ovamma*—analogical knowledge,
(iv) *āgama*—scriptural knowledge.

Paccakkha is twofold—

(i) *indiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organs,
(ii) *no-indiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition without the sense-organs.

Indiya paccaṇkha is fivefold—

(i) *soindiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of ear,
(ii) *cakkhuindiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of eyes,
(iii) *ghāṇendiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of nose,
(iv) *rasa-indiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of tongue,
(v) *phāsendiya paccakkha*—perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of touch.

No-indiya paccakkha is threefold.

(i) *ohiṇāṇa paccakkha*—perceptual cognition called clairvoyance.
(ii) *maṇapajjavaṇāṇa paccakkha*—perceptual cognition called mind reading.
(iii) *kevalaṇāṇa paccakkha*—perceptual cognition called omniscience (or perfect knowledge).

Inferential knowledge is threefold—

(i) *puvvavaṁ*—inference by a previously known characteristic,
(ii) *sesavaṁ*—inference by the remainder (between two related facts),

(iii) *diṭṭhasāhammavaṁ*—inference by a known common characteristic.

Sesavaṁ is fivefold—
(i) by effect,
(ii) by cause,
(iii) by attribute,
(iv) by a part of body,
(v) by support.

Diṭṭhasāhammavam is twofold—
(i) *sāmannadiṭṭhaṁ*—known in general,
(ii) *visesadiṭṭhaṁ*—known in particular.

Visesadiṭṭhaṁ is threefold—
(i) *aīyakālagahaṇaṁ*—comprehension of the object of the past time,
(ii) *vaṭṭamāṇakālagahaṇaṁ*—comprehension of the object of the present time,
(iii) *anāgayakālagahaṇaṁ*—comprehension of the object of the future time.

Ovamma is twofold—
(i) *sāhammovaṇīta*—achieved through similarity.
(ii) *vehammovaṇīta*—achieved through dissimilarity.

Āgama is twofold—
(i) *loiya*—mundane.
(ii) *loyottara*—supramundane.

Daṁsaṇa guṇa pamāṇa is fourfold—
(i) *cakkhuguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attribute of eye-intuition,
(ii) *acakkhuguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attribute of non-eye-intuition,
(iii) *ohiguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attribute of clairvoyance-intuition.
(iv) *kevalaguṇa pamāṇa*—standard of attribute of omniscient-intuition.

Cārittaguṇa pamāṇa is fivefold—
(i) *sāmāiya*
(ii) *chedovaṭṭhāvaṇīya*
(iii) *parihāravisuddhi*

(i) *sūhumasamparāya*
(ii) *ahākkhāya*

Naya pamāṇa is threefold—
(i) *patthaya*—by the illustration of the *patthaya*.
(ii) *vasahi*—by the illustration of abode.
(iii) *payesa*—by the illustration of space-point.

Saṁkhā pamāṇa is eightfold—
(i) *saṁkhā* as name,
(ii) *saṁkhā* as arbitrary attribution,
(iii) *saṁkhā* as substance-potential,
(iv) *saṁkhā* (determinate knowledge) by comparison,
(v) *saṁkhā* (number) as compass (*parimāṇa*),
(vi) *saṁkhā* (determination) as *jñāna* (knowledge).
(viii) *saṁkhā* (conch-shells) as essence.

Pamāṇa is twofold—
(i) *laukika*
(ii) *lokottara*

Laukika pamāṇa is sixfold—
(i) *māṇa,*
(ii) *ummāṇa,*
(iii) *omāṇa,*
(iv) *gaṇīmā,*
(v) *paḍimāṇa,*
(vi) *tappamāṇa.*

Lokottara pamāṇa is fourfold—
(i) *davva pamāṇa*
(ii) *khetta pamāṇa*
(iii) *kāla pamāṇa*
(iv) *bhāva pamāṇa*

Davva pamāṇa is twofold—
(i) *saṁkhā*
(ii) *uvamā*

Pamāṇa is sevenfold—
(i) *nāma*
(ii) *ṭhavaṇā*
(iii) *saṁkhā*
(iv) *davva*
(v) *khetta*
(vi) *kāla*
(vii) *nāṇa*

APPENDIX—2

(Author, time and Work)

S. No.	Author	Time century	Works
1	2	3	4
1.	Abhayadeva	10th-11th	*Tattvabodhavidhāyinīṭīkā (Vādamahārṇava)*
2.	Abhyatilaka	14th	*Nyāyālaṅkāravṛtti, Tarkanyāyasūtraṭīka, Pañcaprasthanyāyatarkavyākhyā.*
3.	Akalaṅka	8th	*Aṣṭaśatī, Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniścaya, Siddhiviniścaya, Nyāyacūlikā, Pramāṇasaṅgraha.*
4.	Anantakīrti	9th-11th	*Bṛhatsarvajñasiddhi, Laghusarvajñasiddhi.*
5.	Anantavīrya	10th	*Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā.*
6.	Anantavīrya	11th	*Prameyaratnamālā.*
7.	Āśādhara (Paṇḍita)	1188-1250	*Prameyaratnākara.*
8.	Bhāvasena	11th-13th	*Viśvatattvaprakāśa.*
9.	Candrasena	12th-13th	*Utpādasiddhi.*
10.	Cārukīrti (Paṇḍitācārya)	—	*Pramāṇaratnālaṅkāra.*
11.	Devabhadra	11th-12th	*Nyāyāvatāravārtikaṭīkā.*
12.	Devanandi (Pūjyapāda)	6th	*Sarvārthasiddhi.*
13.	Devaprabhasūrī	12th-13th	*Nyāyāvatāraṭippaṇa.*
14.	Devasena	10th	*Darśanasāra.*
15.	Dharmabhūṣaṇa	14th-15th	*Nyāyadīpikā, Pramāṇavistāra.*
16.	Guṇaratnasūrī	14th-15th	*Tarkarahasyadīpikā.*
17.	Haribhadra	8th	*Anekāntajayapatākā, Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.*
18.	Hemacandra	11th-12th	*Pramāṇamīmāṁsā.*
19.	Jinabhadraganī	5th-6th	*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya.*
20.	Jinadatta sūrī	13th	*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayavṛtti.*

21. Jinapati sūrī	13th	*Prabodhavādasthala.*
22. Jineśvara sūrī	12th-13th	*Pramālakṣma saṭīka.*
23. Jñānacandra	14th-15th	*Ratnākarāvatārikāṭippaṇaka.*
24. Kumāranandi	8th	*Vādanyāya.*
25. Kundakunda	2nd	*Pravacanasāra, Niyamasāra, Pañcāstikāya.*
26. Mallavādī	4th-5th	*Dvādaśāranayacakra.*
27. Mallavādī	8th	*Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇaka.*
28. Malliṣena	14th	*Syādvādamañjarī.*
29. Maṇikaṇṭha	—	*Nyāyaratna.*
30. Māṇikyanandi	10th-11th	*Parīkṣāmukha.*
31. Merutuṅga	15th	*Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya.*
32. Muni Candrasūrī	12th	*Anekāntajayapatākāvṛttiṭippaṇaka.*
33. Naracandrasūrī	13th	*Nyāyakandalī.*
34. Narendrasena	—	*Pramānaprameyakalikā.*
35. Pātrakesarī	5th-6th	*Trilakṣaṇakadarthana.*
36. Prabhācandra	10th-11th	*Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Nyāyakumudacandra etc.*
37. Pradyumnasūrī	12th	*Vādasthala.*
38. Rājaśekhara sūrī	14th-15th	*Ratnākarāvatārikāpañjikā.*
39. Rāmacandrasūrī	13th	*Vyatirekadvātriṁśikā.*
40. Ratnaprabhasūrī	12th-13th	*Ratnākarāvatārikā.*
41. Samantabhadra	2nd-3rd	*Āptamīmāṁsā, Yuktyanuśāsana.*
42. Samantabhadra (Laghu)	13th	*Viṣamapadatātparyaṭīkā.*
43. Śāntiṣeṇa	12th	*Prameyaratnasāra*
44. Śāntisūrī	11th	*Nyāyāvatāravārtika.*
45. Siddharṣi	10th	*Nyāyāvatāraṭīkā.*
46. Siddhasena	4th-5th	*Sanmatitarka, Nyāyāvatāra.*
47. Śivārya	5th-6th	*Siddhiviniścaya.*
48. Somatilaka Sūrī	14th-15th	*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaṭīkā.*
49. Śricandra Sūrī	12th	*Nyāyapraveśa (Haribhadra-vṛttipañjikā).*
50. Śridatta	7th	*Jalpanirṇaya.*
51. Śubhacandra	16th	*Ṣaḍdarśanapramāṇaprameya-saṁgraha.*
52. Śubhaprakāśa	—	*Nyāyamakarandavivecana.*
53. Sukhaprakāśa	—	*Nyāyadīpāvalī ṭīkā.*
54. Sumati	8th-9th	*Sanmatitarkaṭīkā.*
55. Umāsvāti	1st-2nd	*Tattvārthasūtra and Bhāṣya.*
56. Vādībhasiṅha	8th-9th	*Syādvādasiddhi.*

57. Vādidevasūrī	11th-12th	*Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, Syādvādaratnākara.*
58. Vādirājasūrī	11th	*Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa, Pramāṇanirṇaya.*
59. Vasunandi	11th-12th	*Āptamīmāṁsāvṛtti.*
60. Vidyānandi	7th-9th	*Pramāṇaparīkṣā, Pramāṇamīmāṁsā.*
61. Vimaladāsa	15th	*Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī.*
62. Yativṛṣabha	5th-6th	*Tiloyapaṇṇattī.*

APPENDIX — 3

Brief life-sketches of the Authors of the Works on Logic.

1. Abhayadeva (10—11th century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Pradyumna Sūrī belonging to the Candra family and Candra order (*gaccha*). The family of his students and disciples whom he initiated was very large and was divided into many sections. Many learned scholars came of this family and many of these scholars earned great honour from the kings. Nothing is known about his caste, parentage and birth-place. The area of his tour was Rajasthan and Gujarat. Two of his disciples, Dhaneśvara and Jineśvara were highly learned. He wrote a commentary entitled *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* on the *Sanmatitarka*. Its other title is *Vādamahārṇava*.

2. Abhayatilaka (14th century A.D.)

It is quite possible that he was a classfellow of Somatilaka Sūrī. He was having the status of a preceptor (*upādhyāya*). He wrote many works like *Nyāyālaṅkāravṛtti, Tarkanyāyasūtraṭīkā, Pañcaprasthanyāyatarkavyākhyā* etc.

3. Akalanka (8th Century A.D.)

He was born in the house of Puruṣottama (also named as Laghuhavva or Laghuavva), the minister of King Śubhatuṅga (Rāṣṭrakūta Emperor Kṛṣṇarāja I) of the city of Mānyakheṭa in the province of Karṇātaka.* The name of his mother was Jinamatī. 'Bhaṭṭa' was his family title. His brother's name was Niṣkalaṅka. Once the two brothers lived in a Buddhist monastery to study Buddhistic logic. It was leaked there that they were Jaina. Niṣkalaṅka was killed; but Akalaṅka somehow escaped. After getting the status of an *ācārya* for himself he had a debate with the Bauddhas in the court of Himaśītala, the king of Kaliṅga. The opponents installed goddess Tārā in an earthen pot and by virtue of her power became invincible. Akalaṅka knew this secret. He invoked the deity of his order and after breaking the pot defeated the Bauddhas in the debate.

*In the *Rājabalīkathe*, a work in Kannaḍa by Devacandra, the name of his father has been mentioned as Jinadāsa Brāhmaṇa.

The works composed by him are as under:

1. *Tattvārtharājavārtika* with *Bhāṣya.*
2. *Aṣṭaśatī*—An exposition of the *Āptamīmāṁsā* written by Samantabhadra.
3. *Laghīyastraya*—It has three chapters on *pramāṇa, naya* and *pravacana.*
4. *Nyāyaviniścaya*—It contains a discussion about the direct, inferential and testimony types of organs of knowledge.
5. *Pramāṇasaṁgraha*—It is a work dealing with various topics related with the organs of knowledge.
6. *Siddhiviniścaya*—It is full of discussion about the organs of knowledge, the *nayas* and other similar topics.
7. *Nyāyacūlikā.*

Akalaṅka is said to be the pioneer in the field of Jaina logic. It is believed that the science of logic was given a definite shape in his time. The writers of the later age like Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandi, Vidyānanda, Hemacandra, Yaśovijaya etc. have followed and extended the system of Jaina logic as established by Akalaṅka. Extensive commentaries have been written on *Aṣṭaśatī* by Vidyānanda, on *Laghīyastraya* by Abhayacandra and Prabhācandra, on *Nyāyaviniścaya* by Vādirāja and on *Pramāṇasaṁgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya* by Anantavīrya.

4. Anantakīrti (between the 9th and the 11th century A.D.)

He was a famous *ācārya* of Logic. He composed two works entitled *Bṛhatsarvajñasiddhi* and *Laghusarvajñasiddhi.* On account of the absence of a eulogy no details are available about his life. It is believed that his *Bṛhatsarvajñasiddhi* has influenced *Nyāyakumudacandra* by Prabhācandra.

5. Anantavīrya (10th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Ravibhadra and lived at Śravaṇabelagolā. He was the Chief Commentator of the works of Ācārya Akalaṅka. He wrote the commentary on the *Siddhiviniścaya.* He was considered as having a penetrating and true knowledge of the works of Akalaṅka. Ācārya Prabhācandra has also expressed his ideas about Anantavīrya's scholarship and depth of comprehension. He states, "I have been successful in understanding Akalaṅka's methodology of exposition and Anantavīrya's state-

ments only after studying them hundreds of times. Who could have understood the abstruse topics of Ācārya Akalaṅka, if they had not been explained through the writings of Anantavīrya?"

6. Anantavīrya II (11th century A.D.)

He composed *Prameyaratnamālā*. The impact of the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and the *Nyāyakumudacandra* on it is clearly descernible.

7. Āśādhara, Paṇḍita (1188 A.D.—1250 A.D.)

He was a Vaiśya of the Bagheravāla caste of the city of Dhārā. The name of his father was Sallakṣaṇa, of his mother Śrīratnī, of his wife Sarasvatī and of his son Chāhada. He studied at the institution named Śāradā Sadana in the city of Dhārā, and for the enlightenment of the Jaina religion he migrated to Nalakacchapura (Nālachā). Living there he served the cause of Jaina learning and literature for nearly thirty five years.

Some of the works of Paṇḍita Āśādhara are as under:

1. *Prameyaratnākara*—It is a work composed both in prose and poetry.
2. *Jñanadīpikā*—It is a self-commentary on the *Dharmāmṛta*—both *Sāgāra* and *Anagāra*.
3. *Mūlārādhanā ṭīkā*—It is a commentary on the Prakrit work *Ārādhanā* by Śivārya.
4. *Ārādhanāsāra ṭīkā*—It is a commentary on the *Ārādhanāsāra* by Ācārya Devasena.

8. Bhāvasena (12th-13th century A.D.)

He was an *ācārya* of the Sena stem (*gaṇa*). He earned the title of 'Traividya'. Three of his works have been published, out of which two are on logic.

1. *Viśvatattvaprakāśa*—It contains an examination of the contentions of different philosophies from the Jaina point of view.
2. *Pramāprameya*—An exposition of the organs of knowledge from the Jaina point of view.

The unpublished works on logic are these:

1. *Nyāyadīpikā*.
2. *Nyāyasūryāvalī*.

9. Candrasena (12th-13th Century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Pradyumnasūrī. He composed a work named *Utpādasiddhi* in 1207 V.S.

10. Devabhadra (11th-12th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Prasannacandra, the disciple of Abhayadeva, the commentator on the nine *Aṅgas*. His former name was Gunacandraganī. He composed many works. He wrote the *Pramāṇaprakāśa* on logic.

11. Devanandi (Pūjyapāda) (5th-6th century A.D.)

The first half of sixth century of the Vikrama Era is accepted to be his period. There is a mention in the *Darśanasāra* of the latter half of the tenth century of the Vikrama Era (990) that Vajranandi, the disciple of Pūjyapāda, founded the Draviḍa Saṁgha at Southern Mathurā (Madurā). Devanandi was a disciple or a disciple of the disciple of Candranandi of the Deśīyagaṇa of the lineage of Kundakunda. His main works are as under:

1. *Jainendra-Vyākarana.*
2. *Sarvārthasiddhi*—The first available commentary on the *Tattvārthasütra.*
3. *Samādhitantra.*
4. *Śabdāvatāra*—A *Nyāsa* (commentary) on Pāṇini grammar.
5. *Jainendra-nyāsa*—A self-commentary (*svopajña nyāsa*) on the *Jainendra-Vyäkaraṇa.*

12. Devaprabhasūrī (12th-13th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Śrīcandrasūrī, the disciple of the disciple of Maladhārī Hemacandra. He has written the *'Nyāyāvatāra-tippaṇa'.*

13. Devasena (10th century A.D.)

The name of his teacher was Vimalasena Gaṇadhara.* It is believed that he was an *ācārya* of Kundakunda's lineage. He composed *Darśanasāra* + in 990 V.S. in the temple of Pārśvanātha in the city of Dhārā on the 10th of the bright half of Māgha.

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* Bhāva-Saṁgraha, 701.
sirivimalaseṇagaṇaharasisso, ṇāmeṇa devaseṇo tti.

\+ Darśanasāra, 49, 50.
puvvāriyakayāiṁ gāhāiṁ sañciūṇa eyattha/
siridevasenagaṇiṇā dhārāe saṁvasantenam//
raio damsaṇasāro hāro bhāvvana navasae navae/
siripāsanāhagehe suvisuddhe mahāsuddhadasamīe//

14. Dharmabhūṣaṇa (14th-15th century A.D.)

He was an *ācārya* of the Nandi saṁgha. He wrote *Nyāyadīpikā* and *Pramāṇavistāra* on logic.

15. Guṇaratnasūrī (1400 A.D.—1475 A.D.)

He was a disciple of Ācārya Devasundarasūrī, an influential *ācārya* of his age. Gujarāt and Rājasthān constituted his tour area. He was an expert of the art of debating. He wrote *Kriyāratnasamuccaya*, *Karmagrantha*, *Avacūrī* etc. He also wrote a commentary named *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by Ācārya Haribhadra.

16. Haribhadra (7th-8th Century A.D.)

He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of Citrakūṭa (Chittaur). He took the Jaina ordination after being enlightened by a Jaina nun, Yākinī. He was the disciple of Ācārya Jinabhaṭṭa of the Vidyādhara stem (*gaccha*). The name of his ordination-teacher was Jinadatta. He was the first commentator in Sanskrit and created varied literature.

He did yeoman's service for the enhancement of Jaina philosophy. Some of his works on logic are as under:

1. *Anekāntajayapatākā*
2. *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya*
3. *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*
4. *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya.*

Nearly 100 works produced by him have come to light so far. He is said to be the author of 1444 chapters (*prakīrṇakas*).*

17. Hemacandra (1088—1172 A.D.)

He was born in a Vaiśya family of the town of Dhandhūkā in Gujarāt. He was ordained in the order of Ācārya Devacandra in his boyhood and attained the status of an *ācārya* in the 22nd year of his life. He was called the ominiscient of the *Kali* age. His chief works are as under:

1. *Siddhahemaśabdānuśāsana.*
2. *Anekārthacintāmaṇikośa.*
3. *Abhidhānacintāmaṇikośa*
4. *Deśīnāmamālā.*
5. *Kāvyānuśāsana.*

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* For his traditional history see *Haribhadravṛttānta* in the *Prabhāvaka-caritra.*

6. *Chandānuśāsana.*
7. *Pramānamīmāmsā*—his important work on logic.

18. Jinabhadraganī Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th - 7th century A.D.)

He was a versatile scholar. His chief work is the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya.* It contains a deep discussion on the Āgamic subjects and the contentions of others that follow from the contexts. It also contains independent thinking about the various limbs of the science of logic. Hemacandra has accepted him as a pioneer among the commentators.

19. Jinadattasūrī (13th century)

He was a disciple of Jīvadevasūrī of the Vāyaḍa stem (*gaccha*). He wrote the *Vivekavilāsa.** There is a topic entitled *Ṣaḍdarśana-vicāra* in its eighth chapter.

20. Jinapatisūrī (13th century)

He is the writer of the *Prabodhavādasthala.*

21. Jineśvarasuri (12th—13th century A.D.)

A rich businessman lived in the city of Dhārā. His name was Lakṣmīpati. There lived a Brāhmaṇa from Madhya Pradesh near him. He had two sons Śrīdhara and Śrīpati. Both of them were initiated by ācārya Vardhamānasūrī. They were re-named as Jineśvara and Buddhisāgara. Later on Jineśvarasūrī established the Kharatara stem (*gaccha*).

While living at Jābālapura he wrote many works out of which the main works are *Pañcalingīprakaraṇa, Haribhadrāṣṭakaṭīkā* and *Pramālakṣma saṭīka.*

22. Jñānacandra (14th—15th century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Ācārya Guṇacandra of the Sādhupūrṇimā (Sārdhapūrṇimā) stem (*gaccha*). He was a contemporary of Rājaśekhara. He wrote explanatory note (*tippanaka*) on the *Ratnākarāvatārikā.*

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* It has been published in 1976 v.s. by the Sarasvatī Granthamālā Kāryālaya, Āgrā.

23. Kumārananandi (776 A.D.)

He was a disciple of Candranandi. His disciple was Kīrtinandi who had Vimalacandra as his disciple.

His composition is the *Vādanyāya*. He belonged to Kundakunda's lineage.

24. Kundakunda (127 A.D. - 179 A.D.)

According to an ancient reference Hemagrāma in Southern India was his birthplace. It is identified with the village Ponnūra of the state of Tāmilnādu. This very village is called Koṇḍakuṇḍapura (Kuṇḍakundapura). His foot-image *(caraṇa pāduṭkā)* is also installed on the Nīlagiri hills near it. He bore five names, *Padmanandi, Kundakunda, Vakragrīva, Elaka* and *Gṛddhapiccha*. The history and reasons behind these names are as under:

1. *Padmanandi*—It was the name given to him at the time of his ordination.
2. *Kundakunda*—He was so named after his village.
3. *Vakragrīva*—He was so named, because of his neck being a little bent.
4. *Elaka*.
5. *Gṛddhapiccha*—While returning from Videhakṣetra his broom of peacock-feathers fell down, and he came back with a broom of vulture-feathers. So this name was attributed to him.

It is believed that he possessed the special power of flying in the air (*cāraṇa ṛddhi*) and moved at a height of four fingers (about two inches) above the surface of the earth.

His ordination-teacher was Jinacandra and he was taught by Kumāranandi. He was the third influential *ācārya* of the Nandi *saṃgha* (Vīra nirvāṇa era 593) established by Arhadbali.

He composed 84 *pāhuḍas—prābhṛtas* (gifts), but only 12 *pāhuḍas* are available at present. A commentary on the *Daṁśaṇapāhuḍa, Cārittapāhuḍa, Suttapāhuḍa, Bodhapāhuḍa, Bhāvapāhuḍa* and *Mokkhapāhuḍa* out of them by Śrutasāgarasūrī is also available. His other chief works are *Samayasāra, Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Niyamasāra, Rayaṇasāra* etc. He also wrote a commentary named *Parikarma* of the magnitude of twelve

thousand *ślokas* on the first three parts of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*. A preliminary discussion of Logic is found in the *Samayasāra*, the *Pravacanasāra*, and the *Pañcāstikāya*.

25. Mallavādī (4th-5th century A.D.)

He was an inhabitant of Balabhīpura in Saurāṣtra. The name of his mother was Durlabhadevī. He got ordination from his maternal uncle, Ācārya Jinānanda. He was a great logician. Once he was defeated by a Bauddha ācārya. As a result king Śilāditya turned the Jaina ascetics out of his kingdom. Mallavadi was highly annoyed at it. He devoted his life to the study of logic, and defeated the Bauddha *ācāryas* in the court of king Śilāditya. He composed the *Dvādaśaranayacakra*, but it is not available in its original form at present. An attempt has been made to restore it on the basis of a commentary written by Simhasūrī.

26. Mallavādī (700 A.D. - 750 A.D.)

He wrote a *tippanaka* on the commentary by Dharmottara of the *Nyāyabindu* by Dharmakīrti.

27. Malliṣeṇa (14th century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Udayaprabhasūrī belonging to the Nāgendra *gaccha*. He composed the *Syādvādamañjarī* with the help of Jinaprabhasūri. It is a commentary on the *Anyayogavyavacchedikā* by Hemacandra. *Upādhyāya* Yaśovijaya has written a commentary (*vṛtti*) named *Syādvādamañjūṣā* on *Syādvādamañjarī*.

28. Māṇikyanandi (993-1053 A.D.)

According to the Gurvāvalī of the Deśīya *gaṇa* of the Nandi *saṁgha* he was a disciple of Traikālyayogī. He was the teacher of Prabhācandra. His main work is *Parīkṣāmukha*. His learned disciple Prabhācandra wrote a commentary on it.

Ācārya Śubhacandradeva and Ācārya Śāntivarṇī wrote *Parīkṣā-mukhavṛtti* and *Prameyakaṇṭhikā* commentaries respectively on *Parīkṣāmukha*.

29. Merutuṅga (15th century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Mahendraprabhasūrī belonging to the

Añcala *gaccha*. Māṇikyaśekharasūrī, the famous writer of the *Dīpikā*, was his disciple. He wrote a work entitled *Ṣaḍdarśana-nirṇaya*

30. Municandrasūrī (12th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of upādhyāya Āmradeva*, the disciple of Uddyotanācārya, belonging to the Bṛhad *gaccha*. His co-disciple was Nemicandrasūrī who wrote a commentary named *Sukhabodhā* on *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*. It is believed that the original inspiration to write it was given by Municandrasūrī.

Śāntisūrī had thirty two disciples. They studied the literature on knowledge (science of Logic) from their teacher. Once Municandra, touring from Nādola, reached there and after hearing the lectures (*vācanā*) of Śāntisuri went away. This programme continued for fifteen days. On the sixteenth day he was examined along with the thirty-two disciples. Śāntisūrī, being influenced by his talents, detained him with himself and made him study the science of knowledge deeply.

He has written a *tippaṇa* on the *Anekāntajayapatākāvṛtti*.

31. Naracandrasūrī (13th century A.D.)

He was a disciple of Devaprabhasūrī. He wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*.

32. Pātrakesarī (5th-6th century A.D.)

He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family. He was the royal priest of Ahicchatranagar. Hearing the *Devāgamastotra* written by Samantabhadra he became a Jaina ascetic. He was a well-versed scholar of Logic. His work on logic is the *Trilakṣaṇa-kadarthana* which deals with the refutation of the definition of causation as propounded by the Bauddha *ācāryas*. It is not available at present.

*33. Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.)**

His teacher was Padmanandi Saiddhāntika, a disciple of

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* Some take him to be a disciple of Yaśobhadra.

* *Nyāyakumudacandra*, part II, Introduction, p. 58.

Gollācārya. The sphere of his activity was the city of Dhārā and its adjoining area. He belonged to the *ācārya* tradition of the Nandi *gaṇa* under the Mūla *saṁgha*. He was a scholar in the city of Dhārā and was respected by king Bhoja. His co-religionist (*sadharmā*) was Muni Kulabhūṣaṇa. He composed a number of works independently and wrote commentaries on many books. *Gadyakathākośa* is his independent composition. His principal explanatory works are as under:

1. *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*—It is an annotation on *Parīkṣā-mukha* written by Ācārya Māṇikyanandi.
2. *Nyāyakumudacandra*—It is an annotation on *Laghīyastraya* by Ācārya Akalaṅka.
3. *Tattvārthavṛttipadavivaraṇa*—It is an annotation on the *Sarvārthasiddhi.*
4. *Śākaṭāyana-nyāsa*—It is an annotation on *Śākaṭāyana Vyākaraṇa.*
5. *Śabdāmbhojabhāskara*—It is an annotation on the *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa.*
6. *Pravacanasārasarojabhāskara*—It is a commentary on the *Pravacanasāra* by Kundakunda.

Scholars believe that the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and the *Nyāyakumadacandra* contain the treasures of logic and hold a special place among the works of the middle age on Jaina philosophy. Although these are annotations, they evince the versatile knowledge of Ācārya Prabhācandra at every step. They are the bases for the logical works of the later period.

34. Pradyumnasūrī (12th century A.D.)

His disciple was Candrasena. He composed the work entitled *Vādasthala.*

35. Rājeśvarasūrī (14th-15th cen. A.D.)

He was the disciple of Ācārya Tilakasūrī belonging to the Maladhārī stem (Santānīya-Harṣapurīya branch) of Maladhārī Abhayadevasūrī. He wrote a running commentary (*pañjikā*) on *Ratnāvatārikā* in the first and the second decades of the fifteenth century of Vikrama era. He composed many works like *Syādvāda-kalikā, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* etc.

36. Rāmacandrasūrī (13th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Hemacandra, the omniscient of the *kali* age. He wrote the *Vyatirekadvātriṁśikā.*

37. Ratnaprabhasūrī (12th-13th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Vādidevasūrī, the author of *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka.* Vijayasenasūrī was his ordination-teacher. There is a self-commentary named *Syādvādaratnākara* on the *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka.* Ratnaprabhasūrī cooperated in its composition, as had been mentioned by Ācārya Devasūrī. As this commentary was very comprehensive, Ratnaprabha wrote a small commentary named *Ratnākarāvatārikā* on it. But it too could not be so easy. Then many *ācāryas* wrote running commentaries (*pañjikās*) and notes (*tippaṇas*) on it.

38. Samantabhadra (2nd-3rd century A.D.)

He was the son of the king of Uragapura. His birth-name was Śāntivarmā. He was a great debater. He earned ten titles as the *Ācārya,* the *Kavi* (poet), the *Vādirāṭ* (king of debaters), the *Paṇḍita* (learned), the *Daivajña* (astrologer), the *Bhiṣak* (doctor), the *Māntrika* (master of *mantras*), the *Tāntrika* (master of Tantricism), the *Ājñāsiddha* and the *Siddhasārasvata* (proficient in learning). From these adjectives we easily know about his versatile genius. The following are his main works:

1. A commentary on the first five parts of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama.*
2. *Karmaprābhṛtaṭīkā.*
3. *Gandhahastimahābhāṣya.*
4. *Āptamīmāṁsā.*
5. *Yuktyanuśāsana.*
6. *Tattvānuśāsana.*
7. *Svayambhūstotra.*

39. Samantabhadra (the junior) (13th century A.D.)

He has written a commentary named *Viṣamapadatātparyaṭīkā* on the *Aṣṭasahasrī* by Vidyānandi.

40. Śāntiṣeṇa (13th century A.D.)

His work named *Prameyaratnasāra* is available.

41. Śāntisūrī (11th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Ācārya Vardhamāna of the Pūrṇatala stem (*gachha*). He composed explanatory rules (*vārtika*) on *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena and also wrote a commentary on it. It has got four chapters (*prakaraṇas*), namely *Pramāṇa, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna* and *Āgama.*

42. Siddharṣi (9th-10th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Ācārya Durgasvāmī. He wrote *Upamiti-bhavaprapañcakathā* on the fifth day of the bright half of Jyeṣṭha in 962 v.s. He also wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena.

43. Siddhasena Divākara (4th-5th century A.D.)

He was the disciple Ācārya Vṛddhavādī of the Vidyādhara branch emanating from Vidyādhara Gopāla. He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of the Deccan. Once he attempted to translate the *Āgamas* into Sanskrit but dropped the idea on being disallowed by his teacher.

Two of his works dealing with the *Pramāṇa* are very important:

1. *Sanmatitārka*—It contains a vivid exposition of the *nayavāda* in 167 Prākrit verses.
2. *Nyāyāvatāra*—There is a brief exposition of the *Pramāṇas* in 32 *ślokas* in it. It is considered to be the first work on the *Pramāṇa.*

44. Śivārya

He is the writer of the *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā.* He has written a work named *Siddhiviniścaya* in Sanskrit.

45. Somatilakasūrī (1355-1424 v.s.)

His other name was 'Vidyātilaka'. He was born in 1355 v.s., was ordained in 1369 v.s., attained the status of an *ācārya* in 1373 v.s. and expired in 1424 v.s. He composed a commentary (*vṛtti*) on the *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya* by Haribhadra at Ādityavardhanapura.

46. Śrīcandrasūrī (12th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Śīlabhadrasūrī. His other name was Pārśvadevagaṇī. He wrote commentaries on many *Āgamas*. He wrote a running commentary (*pañjikā*) on Haribhadrasūrī's commentary of the *Nyāyapraveśa* by Dignāga. Its name is the *Nyāyapraveśaharibhadravṛttipañjikā*.

47. Śrīdatta (6th century)

He was born a little earlier than Pūjyapāda. He was a great logician. According to the *Tattvārthaślokavārtika* by an eminent *ācārya* like Vidyānanda of the fourth centry of the Vikrama era, he defeated 62 opponents. He wrote the *Jalpanirṇaya* which is not available.

48. Śubhacandra (1516-1556 A.D.)

He was the disciple of Vijayakīrti and a teacher of Lakṣmīcandra. He earned the title "the Poet of Six Languages" (*Ṣatbhāṣā kavi*). He wrote many works. Some of them are *Prākrit Vyākaraṇa, Aṅgapaṇṇatti, Samasyāvadanavidāraṇa, Ṣaḍdarśana-pramāṇaprameyasaṁgraha,* the commentary on the *Svāmikārti keyānuprekṣā* etc.

49. Sumati (8th-9th century A.D.)

Vādirājasūrī has made a mention of his *Sanmatitarkaṭīkā* in the *Pārśvanāthacarita* written by himself. There is a mention of his *Sumatisaptaka* in the eulogy of Mallişeṇa.

50. Umāsvāti (44-85 A.D.)

He composed the *Tattvārthasūtra*. It is the first work in Sanskrit on Jaina philosophy. The composition of this work has a history behind it.

A layman, named Dvaipāyana, lived in Saurāṣṭra. He once thought that he should write a book dealing with the path to emancipation. After deep thinking he promised, "I shall take my daily food only after writing one aphorism, failing which I shall observe a fast." In accordance with this resolve he composed the first aphorism as '*darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*' (faith, knowledge and conduct constitute the way to liberation). He wrote

it on a pillar lest he should forget it. The next day he went out on some business. A saint who visited his house for alms, chanced to catch sight of the pillar on which the aphorism was written. He read it, and adding the word '*samyak*' (right) at its beginning retired from there. When the layman Dvaipāyana came home, he felt great joy to see the addition of the word '*samyak*' in the beginning of the aphorism, and realized himself lacking in knowledge. He approached the saint and humbly requested him to compose the work. Honouring his wish he commenced composing it. As a result of this effort *Tattvārthasūtra* was composed in its ten chapters. *Tattvārthasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* are his chief works. Both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions respect them equally.

51. Vadībhasiṁha (8th-9th century A.D.)

It is a title, not a name. Many *ācāryas* bore this title. He was the disciple of Ācārya Puṣyaṣeṇa Akalaṅka. Ācārya Puṣyaṣeṇa was a co-student of Akalaṅka. What his original name was is not known. Two of his works are available, namely *Syādvādasiddhi* and *Navapadārthaniścaya.*

52. Vādidevasūrī (1087-1170 A.D.)

He was the devout (paṭṭa) disciple of Municandrasūrī. He was born in the Prāgvāṭa family of Gurjaradeśa in 1087 v.s. He was ordained at the age of nine at Bhaḍoñca in 1096, and attained the status of an ācārya at the age of thirty-one years in 1118 v.s. He debated with a Digambara scholar Kumudacandra in the court of Jayasiṁha Siddharāja, the king of Aṇahilapura. Enlarging the *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandi he compossed the *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* and wrote a voluminous commentary named *Syādvādaratnākara* on it. He left for the heavenly abode in 1117. [1]

Bhadreśvara was his favourite disciple, and Ratnaprabha was his chief disciple. The abridged form of the *Syādvādaratnākara* is known as the *Ratnākarāvatārikā.*

53. Vādirājasūrī (11th century A.D.)

He was a respectable debater in the court of the famous king Jayasiṁha I of the Solaṅkī dynasty of the Deccan. From the eulogy of the *Pārśvanāthacaritra* written by him it is learnt that he lived nearabout Kaṭṭageri. It is still a simple village the ruins of which testify that it must have been a big city in the past. He was

the disciple of Matisāgara, the disciple of Ācārya Śrīmāla belonging to the Arūṅgala lineage of the Nandi *saṁgha*. His co-student was Dayāpāla. Vādiraja was a sort of title. His real name is still unknown. His titles were Ṣaṭṭarkaṣaṇmukha, Syādvādavidyāpati and Jagadekamallavādī.

54. Vasunandi (11th-12th century A.D.)

He was the disciple of Nemicandra. His other name was Jayasena. His works are *Āptamīmāṁsāvṛtti, Mūlacaravṛtti, Vastuvidyā, Śrāvakācāra* etc. The *Śrāvakācāra* is also called *Upāsakādhyayana*. At the end of this work he has mentioned the lineage of his teachers. According to it there was an Ācārya named Śrīnandī in the lineage of Kundakunda. His disciple was Nayanandī, and Nayanandī's disciple was Nemīcandra. He was his teacher.

55. Vidyānandi (Vidyananda) (775-840 A.D.)

He holds a special position among the Jaina logicians. He was a learned scholar in the court of Magadha. He was enlightened to hear the text of the *Devāgamastotra* written by Samantabhadra from Muni Caritrabhūṣaṇa in the temple of Lord Pārśvanātha. It is believed that he was born in the lineage of Akalaṅka a little later than he. His main works are:—

1. *Pramānaparīkṣā.*
2. *Pramānamīmāṁsā.*
3. *Pramāṇanirṇaya.*
4. *Āptaparīkṣā.*
5. *Jalpanirṇaya.*
6. *Nayavivaraṇa.*
7. *Yuktyanuśāsana.*
8. *Aṣṭasahasrī.*
9. *Tattvārthaślokavārtika.*
10. *Patraparīkṣā.*

He was a great commentator from Southern India. He composed a work entitled *Aṣṭasahasrī* by combining the *Āptamīmāṁsā* of Samantabhadra and its *Aṣṭaśatī* commentary by Akalaṅka. His work '*Vidyānandamahodaya*' is not available.

56. Vimaladāsa (15th century A.D.)

He was a Jaina laity. He lived at Tejānagara. His teacher was Anantadevasvāmī. He wrote the *Saptabhaṅgītaraṅginī*.

57. Yativṛsabha (5th-6th century A.D.)

The *Tiloyapaṇṇattī* is his most important work. It is a Prakrit composition in eight thousand verses. According to a narrative found in the *Kathākośa* of Hariṣeṇa, once Ācārya Yativṛsabha went to impart religious knowledge to king Jayasena of the city of Śrāvastī. There a detective sent by an enemy in the disguise of the disciple of Yativṛsabha murdered the king at a lonely place. In order to shield the Jaina order from the guilt of the royal murder Yativṛsabha sacrificed himself.*

**Vīraśāsana ke Prabhavaka Ācārya*, p. 38.

APPENDIX—4

References

CHAPTER 1

1. *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* verse 4.
   dṛṣṭamanumānamāptavacanaṁ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt/
   trividhaṁ pramāṇamiṣṭaṁ prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi//
2. *Tattvārtharājavārtika,* 1.10.
   prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇādhīnā.
3. *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi,* 28. 4-14.
4. *Pravacanasāra,* 29.
   jāṇadi passadi ṇiyadaṁ, akkhātīdo jagamasesam.
5. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 3.2.
   smaraṇapratyabhijñānatarkānumānagamabhedatastat pañcaprakāram.
6. *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrinśikā,* verse 5.
   ādīpamāvyomasamasvabhāvam, syādvādamudrānatibhedi vastu/
   tannityamevaikamanityamanyaditi tvadājñādviṣatām pralāpāḥ//
7. *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* 9.
   asadakaraṇādupādānagrahanāt sarvasambhāvābhāvāt/
   śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam//
8. *Pañcāstikāya,* 15.
   bhāvassa natthi ṇāso, ṇatthi abhāvassa uppādo.
9. Ibid, 19.
   evaṁ sado viṇāso asado jīvassa ṇatthi uppādo.
10. Ibid, 60.
    evaṁ sado viṇāso asado jīvassa hoi uppādo.
11. *Nyāyabhāsya,* 1.1.1.
    pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ.
12. *Tattvārthasūtra,* 1.6.
    pramānanayairadhigamaḥ.
13. *Nyāyavārtika,*
    samastapramāṇavyāpārādarthādhigatirnyāyaḥ.
14. *Tiloyapaṇṇattī,* 1.82.
    jo ṇa pamānanayehiṁ ṇikkhevenaṁ ṇirakkhade atthaṁ/
    tassājuttaṁ juttaṁ juttamajuttaṁ ca paḍihādi//
15. Ibid, 1. 83, 84.

ṇāṇaṁ hodi pamāṇam ṇao vi ṇādussa hidayabhāvattho/
ṇikkhevo vi uvāo juttīe atthapaḍigahaṇaṁ//
iya ṇāyaṁ avahäriya āiriyaparamparāgadaṁ maṇasā/
puvvāiriyāāṇāṇusaraṇaaṁ tiraṇayaṇimittaṁ//

16. *Svayambhūstotra,* 102.
sarvathā niyamatyāgī yathādṛṣṭamapekṣakaḥ/
syācchabdastāvakenyāye nānyeṣāmātmavidviṣām//
17. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1. 12.
äkäro vikalpaḥ.
18. *Aṇuogaddārāiṁ,* 2.
tattha cattāri nāṇāiṁ ṭhappāiṁ ṭhavaṇijjāiṁ, ... suyanāṇassa uddeso, samuddeso aṇuṇṇā aṇuogo ya pavattai.
19. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya,* 172, 173.
ṇa parappabodhayāiṁ jaṁ do vi sarūvato matisutāim/
takkāraṇāiṁ doṇha vi bodhenti tato ṇo bheto siṁ//
davvasuttamasādhāraṇa kāraṇato paravibodhakaṁ hojjā/
20. *Bhagavatī,* 8. 2. 317.
21. *Ṭhāṇam,* 2. 1. 103.
22. *Pravacanasāra,* 57, 58.
paradavvaṁ te akkhā ṇeva sahāvo tti appaṇo bhaṇidā/
uvaladdhaṁ tehi kadhaṁ paccakkhaṁ appaṇo hodi//
jaṁ parado viṇṇāyaṁ taṁ tu parokkha tti bhaṇidamaṭṭhesu.//
23. Ibid, 58.
jahi kevaleṇa ṇādaṁ havadi hi jīveṇa paccakkham.
24. Ibid, 54.
jaṁ pecchado amuttaṁ muttesu adindiyaṁ ca pacchaṇṇāṁ/
sayalaṁ sagaṁ ca idaraṁ taṁ ṇāṇaṁ havadi paccakkham//
25. *Veśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya,* 93.
indiyamaṇonimittaṁ parokkhamiha saṁsayāibhāvāo/
takkāraṇaṁ parokkhaṁ jaheha sābhāsamaṇumāṇam//
26. *Niyamasāra,* 11.
kevalamindiyarahiyaṁ asahāyaṁ taṁ sahāvaṇāṇaṁ ti/
saṇṇāṇidaraviyappe vihāvaṇāṇaṁ have duvihaṁ//
27. *Jainasiddhāntadīpikā, 2. 27.*
pratiniyatārthagrahaṇamindriyam.
28. Ibid, 2. 33.
sarvārthagrāhi traikālikaṁ manaḥ.
29. According to *Nandīsūtra,* 37, *matijñāna* is of two kinds—*Śrutaniśrita mati* and *aśrutaniśrita mati. Mati* of special knowledges is called *Śrutaniśrita* and *mati* knowing the rules and relationships of unknown do's and dont's through intellect is called *aśrutaniśrita.*

CHAPTER 2

1. (a) *Bhagavatī,* 8. 184, 185.
   (b) *Tattvārthasūtra,* 1. 26.
   matiśrutayornibandho dravyeṣvasarvaparyāyeṣu.
2. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1. 26.
   atīndriyeṣu materabhāvāt sarvadravyāsampratyaya iti cet; na; noindriyaviṣayatvāt.
3. Ibid, 126.
   śrutamapi śabdāśca sarve saṁkhyeyā eva, dravyaparyāyāḥ punaḥ saṁkhyeyā'saṁkheyānantabhedāḥ, na te serve viśeṣakāreṇa tairviṣayīkriyante.
4. (a) *Tattvārthasūtra,* 1. 27.
   rupiṣvavadheḥ.
   (b) Ibid, 1. 28.
   tadanantabhāgo manaḥparyayasya.
5. *Ibid, 1. 29.*
   sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya.
6. *Daśavaikālika niryukti, gāthā* 49.
7. *Tiloyapaṇṇattī,* 7. 613.
   adindiyesu padatthesu chadumatthaviyappāṇamavisaṁvādaṇiyamābhāvādo. taṁhā puvvāiriyavakkhāṇāpariccāeṇa esā vi disā hetuvādāṇusāriviyupaṇṇasissāṇuggahaaṇuppaṇṇajaṇauppāyaṇattaṁ ca darisedavvā.
8. *Sanmatiprakaraṇa,* 3.43-45.
   duviho dhammāvāo aheuvāo ya heuvāo ya/
   tattha u aheuvāo bhaviyā'bhaviyādao bhāvā//
   bhavio sammaddaṁsaṇa-ṇāṇa-carittapaḍivattisampanno/
   ṇiyamā dukkhantakaḍo tti lakkhaṇaṁ heuvāyassa//
   jo heuvāyapakkhammi heuo āgame ya āgamio/
   so sasamayapaṇṇavao siddhantavirāhao anno//
9. *Dhavalā,* 6. 1. 9. 6.
   āgamo hi ṇāma kevalaṇāṇapurassaro pāyeṇa/
   aṇindiyatthavisao acintiyasahāo juttigoyarādīdo//
10. *Āyāro,* 5. 124, 125.
    takkā tattha ṇa vijjai. mai tattha ṇa gāhiyā.
11. *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi,* 14. 19.
    no indiyagejjha amuttabhāvā.
12. *Āptamīmāṁsā,* 78.
    vaktaryanāpte yaddhetoḥ sādhyaṁ taddhetusādhitam/
    āpte vaktari tadvākyāt sādhyamāgamasādhitam//
13. *Tattvārthasūtra,* 1. 9-12.
14. *Tattvārthabhāṣya, 1.1.*

dṛśeravyabhicāriṇī sarvendriyānindriyārthaprāptiretatsamyagdarśanam. praśastam darśanam samyagadarśanam. saṁgataṁ vā darśanaṁ samyagdarśanam. evaṁ jñānacāritrayorapi.

15. Ibid, 1.12.
anumānopamānāgamārthapattisambhavābhāvanapi ca pramāṇānīti kecid manyante. tat kathametaditi? actocyate. sarvāṇyetani matisrutayorantarbhūtānīndriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt.
16. *Svayambhūstotra,* 63.
prasparekṣānvayabhedalingataḥ, prasiddhasāmānyaviseṣayostava/
samagratāsti svaparāvabhāsakaṃ, yathā pramāṇaṃ bhuvi buddhilakṣaṇam//
17. *Nyāyasūtra,* 1.1.4.
indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam.
18. *Ṭhāṇam,* 2.87.
paccakkhe ṇāṇe duvihe pannatte, taṁ jahā—kevalaṇāṇe ceva, nokevalaṇāṇe ceva.
19. *Anuogaddārāiṁ, sūtras* 516, 517 and 518.
20. *Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 95:
eganteṇa parokkhaṁ lingiyamohāiyam ca paccakkhaṁ/
indiyamaṇobhavaṁ jaṁ taṁ saṁvavahārapaccakkhaṁ//
21. Ibid. *gāthā* 95 (*svopajña vṛtti*)
yat punah sākṣādindriyamanonimittaṁ tat teṣāmeva pratyakṣam, aliṅgatvāt, ātmano'vadhyādivat, na tvātmanaḥ, ātmanastu tat paroksameva pararanimittatvāt anumānavat ityuktam. teṣāmapi ca tat saṁvyavahārata eva tatpratyakṣaṁ, na paramārthatah. kasmāt? acetanatvāt, ghaṭavat, ityuktam.
22. (a) *Laghīyastraya,* 3.
pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhyasaṃvyavahāratah/
parokṣaṃ seṣavijñānaṃ pramāṇa iti saṃgrahaḥ/
(b) *Laghīyastraya vivṛttikārikā,* 4.
tatra sāṁvyavahārikamindriyānindriyapratyakṣam.
23. *Āptamīmamsa,* 105.
syādvādakevalajñāne, sarvatattvaprakāśane/
bhedaḥ sākṣādasākṣācca, hyavastvanyatamaṃ bhavet//
24. Substance is without attributes and is inexpressible. It is beyond the reach of our speech and intellect. Intellect points towards substance, but can't comprehend it fully well. It is a subject of experience without distinctioin. Attributes are

distinctions of intellect. To point out the attributes of a thing is to limit that thing by that attribute. To interpret an object means to limit it by that degree of interpretation. Limit or *pariccheda* means 'the exclusion of other attributes', as to describe a white thing means the non-existence of black, yellow, or red colours in it. Substance is limitless and, therefore, it is without attribute and is indescribable.

(Pāścātya Darśana, p. 109).

25. *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 30.
nayānāmekaniṣṭhānāṁ, pravṛtteḥ śrutavartmani/
sampūrṇārthaviniścāyi syādvādaśrutamucyate//
26. *Sūyagaḍo,* 1. 1. 50.
sayaṁ sayaṁ pasaṁsaṁtā garhaṁtā paraṁ vayam/
je u tatha viussaṁti, saṁsāre te viussiyā//
27. *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya,* 3. 15.
28. *Sanmatiprakaraṇa,* 3, 48-52.
jaṁ kāvilaṁ darisaṇam eyaṁ davvaṭṭhiyassa vattavvam/
suddhoaṇataṇaassa u parisuddho pajjavaviappo//
dohi vi ṇaehi ṇīaṁ satthamulūeṇa taha vi micchattaṁ/
jaṁ savisaappahāṇattaṇeṇa aṇṇoṇṇaṇiravekkhā//
jaṁ santavāyadose sakkolūyā bhaṇaṁti saṁkhāṇam/
saṁkhā ya asavvāe tesiṁ savve vi te saccā//
te u bhayaṇovaṇīā sammaddaṁsaṇamaṇuttaraṁ honti/
jaṁ bhavadukkhavimokkhaṁ do vi na pūreṁti pāḍikkam//
natthi puḍhavīvisiṭṭho ghaḍo tti jaṁ teṇa jujjai aṇaṇṇo/
jaṁ puṇa ghaḍo tti puvvaṁ ṇa āsi puḍhavī tao aṇṇo//
29. *Sanmatiprakaraṇa,* 3. 47.
jāvaiyā vayaṇapahā, tāvaiyā ceva honti ṇayavāyā/
jāvaiyā ṇayavāyā, tāvaiyā ceva parasamayā//
30. *Āptamīmāṁsā,* verse 108.
mithyāsamūho mithyā cenna mithyaikāntatāsti naḥ/
nirapekṣā nayā mithyā, sāpekṣā vastu te'rthakṛt//
31. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā,* 949.
micchattasamūhamayaṁ, sammattaṁ jaṁ ca taduvagā-
rammi/
vaṭṭati parasiddhanto tassa tayo sasiddhanto//
32. Ibid, *gāthā,* 1528.
iya savvaṇayamatāiṁ parittavisayāiṁ samuditāiṁ tu/
jainaṁ bajjhabbhantaraṇiddesaṇimittasaṁgāhi//
33. *Tattvārthabhāṣya,* 1. 35.
34. *Himsāphalāṣṭakaprakaraṇam,* 1-8.
35. *Bhagavaī,* 1/33, 34.

CHAPTER 3

1. *Pramāṇavārtika,* 2. 4.
   arthakriyāsamartham yat, tadatra paramārthasat/
   anyat saṁvṛtisat proktaṁ,te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe//
2. *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṁśikā,* verse 23.
3. *Tattvārthasūtra,* 5-29.
   utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ sat.
4. *Bṛhad nayacakra,* 191.
   kammāṇaṁ majjhagadaṁ jīvaṁ jo gahai siddhasaṁkāsam/
   bhaṇṇai so suddhaṇao khalu kammovāhiṇiravekkho//
5. Ibid, 194.
   bhāve sarāyamādī savve jīvammi jo du jaṁpedi/
   so hu asuddho utto kammāṇovāhiṇiravekkho//
6. Ibid, 192.
   uppādavayaṁ gauṇaṁ kiccā jo gahai kevalā sattā/
   bhaṇṇai so suddhaṇao iha sattāgāhio samaye//
7. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, gāthā* 72.
   evaṁ vivadanti ṇayā micchābhiṇivesato paropparato/
   idamiha savvaṇayamayaṁ jiṇamatamaṇavajjamaccantam//
8. *Pravacanasāra,* 100 and 101.
   ṇa bhavo bhaṅgavihīṇo bhaṅgo vā ṇatthi sambhavavihīṇo/
   uppādo vi ya bhaṅgo ṇa viṇā dhovveṇa attheṇa//
   uppādaṭṭhidibhaṅgā vijjante pajjaesu pajjāyā/
   davve hi santi ṇiyadaṁ tamhā davvaṁ havadi savvam//

9. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1/6:
   athavā nāmasthāpanādravyabhāveṣu yo vivakṣitaḥ saḥ svātmā, itaraḥ parātmā. tatra vivakṣitātmanā ghaṭaḥ, netarātmanā. yadītarātmanāpi ghaṭaḥ syāt, vivakṣitātmanā vā'ghaṭaḥ, nāmādivyavahārocchedaḥ syāt.
10. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 450 (*svopajñavṛtti.*).
    ukkosayasutaṇāṇī vi jāṇamāṇo vi te'bhilappe vi/
    ṇa tarati savve vottuṁ ṇa pahuppati jeṇa kālo se//
    ——iha tānutkṛṣṭaśruto jānāno'bhilāpyānapi sarvān (na) bhāṣate, anantatvāt, parimitatvāccāyuṣaḥ, kramavartinītvād vāca iti.
11. *Bhagavaī,* 1.133-135.
    se nūṇaṁ bhante ! atthittaṁ atthitte pariṇamai? natthittaṁ natthitte pariṇamai?
    hantā goyamā! atthittaṁ atthitte pariṇamai.
    je ṇaṁ bhante! atthittaṁ atthitte pariṇamai, natthittaṁ natthitte pariṇamai, taṁ kiṁ payogasā? vīsasā?

goyamā! payogasā vi taṁ, vīsasā vi taṁ.
jahā te bhante ! atthittaṃ atthitte pariṇamai, natthittaṃ natthitte pariṇamai? jahā te natthittaṃ natthitte pariṇamai, tahā te atthittaṃ atthitte pariṇamai? hantā goyamā! jahā me atthittaṃ atthitte pariṇamai, tahā me natthittaṃ natthitte pariṇamai. jahā me natthittam natthitte pariṇamai, tahā me atthittaṃ atthitte pariṇamai.

12. Ibid, 7. 217.
tae naṁ se bhagavaṁ goyame te aṇnautthie evaṁ vayāsī---no khalu vayaṁ devāṇuppiā ! atthi bhāvaṁ natthi tti vadāmo, natthi bhāvaṁ atthi tti vadāmo. aṃhe ṇaṃ devāṇuppiyā ! savvaṁ atthi bhāvaṁ atthi tti vadāmo, savvaṃ natthi bhāvaṁ natthi tti vadāmo.

13. Ibid, 1. 440.
se nūṇaṁ bhante ! athire paloṭṭai, no thire paloṭṭai? athire bhajjai, no thire bhajjai?---hantā goyamā! athire paloṭṭai, no thire paloṭṭai. athire bhajjai, no thire bhajjai.---

14. Ibid, 3. 143.
jīve ṇaṁ bhante ! sayā samitaṁ eyati,veyati,calati,phandai, ghaṭṭai, khubbhai, udīrai, taṁ taṁ bhāvaṁ pariṇamai?
hantā maṇḍiaputtā ! jīve ṇaṁ sayā samitaṁ eyati---taṁ taṁ bhāvaṁ pariṇamai.

15. Ibid, 7. 150.

16. Ibid, 7. 58-59.
jīvā ṇaṁ bhante! kiṁ sāsayā? asāsayā?
goyamā ! jīvā siya sāsayā, siya asāsayā.
se keṇaṭṭheṇaṁ bhante ! evaṁ vuccai---jīvā siya sāsayā, siya asāsayā?
goyamā ! davvaṭṭhayāe sāsayā, bhāvaṭṭhayāe asāsayā.

17. *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi*, 28. 10.
jīvo uvaogalakkhaṇo.

18. *Āyāro*, 5. 104.
je āyā se viṇṇāyā, je viṇṇāyā se āyā. jeṇa vijāṇati se āyā.

19. *Sanmatiprakaraṇa*, 3. 52.
natthi puḍhavīvisiṭṭho ghaḍo tti jaṁ teṇa jujjai aṇaṇṇo/
jaṁ puṇa ghaḍo tti puvvaṁ ṇa āsi puḍhavī tao aṇṇo//

20. *Bhagavaī*, 18. 219-220.
ege bhavaṁ? duve bhavaṁ? akkhae bhavaṁ? avvae bhavaṁ? avaṭṭhie bhavaṁ? aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie bhavaṁ?
somilā ! ege vi ahaṁ jāva aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie vi ahaṁ
se keṇaṭṭheṇaṁ bhante ! evaṁ vuccai.....?
somila ! davvaṭṭhayāe ege ahaṁ, nāṇadaṁsaṇaṭṭhayāe

duvihe ahaṁ, paesaṭṭhayāe akkhae vi ahaṁ, avvae vi ahaṁ, uvayogaṭṭhayāe aṇegabhūyabhāvabhavie vi aham.

21. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 5.3.
sāmānyaṁ dviprakāraṁ—tiryaksāmānyamūrdhvatāsāmānyañca.
22. *Tattvārthabhāṣya,* 1.35.
kimete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣagrāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti. atrocyate. naite tantrāntarīyā nāpi svatantrā matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ. jñeyasya tvarthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇyetāni.
yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇairekorthaḥ pramīyate saviṣayaniyamāt, na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti, tadvannayavādā iti.
23. See fourth *prakaraṇa.*

CHAPTER 4

1. *Bṛhad nayacakra,* 246.
savvāṇa sahāvāṇam, atthittaṁ puṇa suparamasabbhāvam/
attnisahāvā savve, atthittaṁ savvabhāvagayam//
2. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 7. 16.
viśvamekaṁ sadaviśeṣāditi.
3. Ibid, 7. 24.
yat sat tad dravyaṁ paryāyo vā.
4. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1.33:
pūrvāṅstrikālaviṣayānatiśayya vartamānakālaviṣayamādatte. atītānāgatayorvinaṣṭanutpannatvena vyavahārabhāvāt. samayamātramasya nirdidhikṣitam.
Kasāyapāhuḍa, part 1, pp. 223-243.
5. *Kasāyapāhuḍa,* part 1, p. 227.
jātireva hi bhāvānāṁ nirodhe heturiṣyate/
yo jātaśca na ca dhvasto, naśyet paścāt sa kena vaḥ//
6. *Tattvārthavārtika,* p. 133.
sarvasaṁvyavahāralopa iti cet; na, viṣayamātrapradarśanāt, pūrvanayavaktavyāt saṁvyavahārasiddhirbhavati.
7. *Sarvārthasiddhi,* p. 133.
sarvanayasamūhasādhyo hi lokasaṁvyavahāraḥ.
8. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 7, 30, 31.
sarvathā dravyāpalāpī tadābhāsaḥ. yathātathāgatamatam.
9. *Tattvārthaślokavārtika,* 1. 33.
sarve śabdanayāstena, parārthapratipādane/
svārthaprakāśane māturime jñānanayāḥ sthitāḥ//

10. *Āptamīmāṁsā*, 106.
sadharmaṇaiva sādhyasya, sādharmyādavirodhataḥ/
syādvādapravibhaktārthaviśeṣavyañjako nayaḥ//
11. *Tattvārthaślokavārtika*, 116.
nāyaṁ vastu na cāvastu,vastvaṁśaḥ kathyate yataḥ/
nāsamudraḥ samudro vā, samudrāṁśo yathocyate//
12. *Sanmatiprakaraṇa*, 1. 28.
ṇiyayavayaṇijjasaccā savvaṇayā paraviyālaṇe mohā/
te uṇa u diṭṭhasamao vibhayai sacce va alie vā//
13. Ibid, 1. 22-25
jaha'ṇeyalakkhaṇaguṇā, veruliyāī maṇī visaṃjuttā/
rayaṇāvalivavaesaṃ ṇa lahanti mahagghamullā vi//
taha ṇiyayavāyasuviṇicchiyā vi aṇṇoṇṇapakkhaṇiravekkhā/
sammaddaṃsaṇasaddaṃ, savve vi ṇayā na pāventi//
jaha puṇa te ceva maṇī, jahā guṇavisesabhāgapaḍibaddhā/
'rayaṇāvalī'tti bhaṇṇai, jahanti paḍikkasaṇṇāu//
taha savve ṇayavāyā, jahāṇurūvaviṇiuttavattavvā/
sammaddaṁsaṇasaddaṁ, lahanti ṇa visesasannāo//
14. *Laghīyastraya, 74 (svopajñavivṛtiḥ).*
tadadhigatānāṁ vācyatāmūpannānāṁ vācakeṣa bhedopanyāsaḥ nyāsaḥ.
15. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 60.
adhavā vatthabhidhāṇaṁ ṇāmaṁ ṭhavaṇā ya jo tadāgāro/
kāraṇayā se davvaṁ kajjāvaṇṇaṁ tayaṁ bhāvo//
16. Ibid, *gāthā* 73.
nāmādi bhedasaddatthabuddhipariṇāmabhāvato ṇiyatam/
jaṁ vatthumatthi loye, catupajjāyaṁ tayaṁ savvam//
17. *Pravacanapraveśa*, 74.
nayānugatanikṣepairupāyairbhedavedane/
viracayyārthavākpratyayātmabhedān śrutārpitān//
18. Standpoint of Momentariness is of two kinds—related to pure substances and related to impure substances. The former receives the ready modes. The latter receives a number of momentary visible modes. So *dravyanikṣepa* becomes its subject.
19. *Laghīyastraya*, 74 (*svopajñavivṛtiḥ*).
aprastutārthāpākaraṇāt prastutārthavyākaraṇācca nikṣepaḥ phalavān.
20. *Bṛhad nayacakra*, 270.
davvaṁ vivihasahāvaṁ, jeṇa sahāveṇa hoi taṁ jheyam/
tassa ṇimittaṁ kīrai, ekkampi ya davva caubheyam//
21. *Dhavalā*, 1. 1. 9.
saṁśaye viparyaye anadhyavasāye vā sthitam tebhyo'pasārya

niścaye kṣipatīti nikṣepaḥ. athavā bāhyārthavikalpo nikṣepaḥ. aprakṛtanirākaraṇadvāreṇa prakṛtaprarūpako vā.

22. *Āyāro,* 5. 139.
apayassa payaṁ ṇatthi.

CHAPTER 5

1. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 4. 42.
sa ca liṅanta (tiṅanta) pratirūpako nipātaḥ. tasyānekāntavidhivicārādiṣu bahuṣvartheṣu sambhavatsu tha vivakṣāvaśāt anekāntārtho gṛhyate.
2. *Kasāyapāhuḍa,* part I, p. 370.
siyāsaddo ṇivāyattādo jadi vi aṇegesu atthesu vaṭṭade, to vi ettha kattha vi kāle dese tti edesu atthesu vaṭṭamāṇo ghettavvo.
3. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1. 6.
syādvādo niścitārthaḥ apekṣitayāthātathyavastuvāditvāt.
4. *Nyāyakumudacandra,* part II, p. 694
syātkāramantareṇa iṣṭāniṣṭayorvidhiniṣedhānupapatteḥ.
5. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1.6.
svaparātmopādānāpohanavyavasthāpādyaṁ hi vastuno vastutvam.
6. *Sūyagaḍo,* 1. 14. 22.
saṁkejja yā'saṁkitabhāva bhikkhū,
vibhajjavāyaṁ ca viyāgarejjā/
bhāsādugam dhammasamuṭṭhitehim,
viyāgarejjā samayā'supaṇṇe//
7. *Kasāyapāhuḍa,* part I, p. 281.
8. *Bhagavaī,* 12. 53. 54.
9. Ibid, 12. 2. 9.
10. *Pāscātya Darśana,* pp. 5, 6.
11. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya,* verse 225.
ekenākarṣantī ślathayantī vastutattvamitareṇa/ •
antena jayati jainī nītirmanthānanetramiva gopī//
12. *Kasāyapāhuḍa,* part I, p. 319.
edaṁ ṇegama-saṁgaha-vavahāra-ujusudāṇaṁ, tattha kajjakāraṇabhāvasambhavādo. tiṇhaṁ saddaṇayāṇaṁ ṇa keṇa vi kasāo, tattha kāraṇeṇa viṇā kajjuppattīe. ahavā odaieṇa bhāveṇa kasāo. edaṁ ṇegamādicauṇhaṁ ṇayāṇaṁ. tiṇhaṁ saddaṇayāṇaṁ pāriṇāmieṇa bhāveṇa kasāo. kāraṇeṇa viṇā kajjuppattīdo.
13. Ibid, part I, p. 260.

appahāṇīkayapariṇāmesu suddhadavvaṭṭhiesu ṇaesu ṇādī-dāṇāgayavaṭṭamāṇakālavibhāgo atthi.

14. Ibid, part I, p 309 (quoted from *Jayadhavalā*)
kathancit kenacit kaścit kutáscit kasyacit kvacit/
kadācicceti paryāyāt syādvādaḥ saptabhaṅgabhṛt//
15. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 1.6.
anekānto'pi dvividhaḥ:-samyaganekānto mithyānekānta iti. tatra samyagekānto hetuviśeṣasāmarthyāpekṣaḥ pramāṇaḥ prarūpitārthaikadeśādeśaḥ. ekātmāvadhāraṇena anyāśeṣanirākaraṇapravaṇapraṇidhirmithyaikāntaḥ. ekatra saprati-pakṣānekadharmasvarūpanirūpaṇo yuktyāgamābhyāmaviruddhaḥ samyaganekāntaḥ. tadatatsvabhāvavastuśūnyaṁ parikalpitānekatmakaṁ kevalaṁ vāgvijñānaṁ mithyā'nekāntaḥ. tatra samyagekānto naya ityucyate. samyaganekāntaḥ pramāṇam. nayārpaṇādekānto · bhavati ekaniścayapravaṇatvāt, pramāṇārpaṇādanekānto · bhavati anekaniścayādhikaraṇatvāt.
16. *Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī,* p. 79.
evamayaṁ syājjīva iti mūlabhaṅgadvayam. tatropayogātmanā jīvaḥ, prameyatvādyātmanā'jīva iti tadarthaḥ. taduktam Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadevaiḥ—
prameyatvādibhirdharmairacidātmā cidātmakaḥ/
jñānadarśanatastasmāccetanā'cetanātmakaḥ//
iti. ajīvatvaṁ ca prakṛte'jīvavṛttiprameyatvādi dharmavattvaṁ, jīvatvaṁ ca jñānadarsánādimattvamiti draṣṭavyam.

CHAPTER 6

1. *Pramāṇavārtika,* 3.
pramāṇamavisaṁvādi jñānaṁ arthakriyāsthitiḥ/
avisaṁvādanaṁ śābde'pyabhiprāyanivedanāt//
2. *Nyāyavārtika,*
arthopalabdhihetuḥ pramāṇam.
3. *Nyāyāvatāra,* 1.
pramāṇaṁ svaparābhāsi jñānaṁ bādhavivarjitam.
4. *Tattvārtha,* 1. 9-10.
matiśrutāvadhimanaḥparyayakevalāni jñānam. tatpramāṇe.
5. *Aṣṭaśatī,*
pramāṇamavisaṁvādi jñānamanadhigatārthalakṣaṇatvāt.
6. *Parīkṣāmukha, sūtra,* 1.1
svāpūrvārthavyavasāyatmakaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇam.

7. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 1. 15.
   jñānādanyo'rthaḥ paraḥ.
8. *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, sūtra 2, vṛtti.*
   'ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi' ityādau kartṛkarmavat jñapterapyavabhāsamānatvāt.
9. *Parīkṣāmukha,* 1.1.
10. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 1.2.
    svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṁ pramāṇam.
11. *Tattvārthaślokavārtika,* 1.10. 17.
    svārthavyavasāyātmakaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇam.
12. *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, sūtra* 2.
    samyagarthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam.
13. Ibid, *sūtra 3.*
    svanirṇayaḥ sannapyalakṣaṇam apramāṇe'pi bhāvāt.
    vṛtti—svanirṇayastu apramāṇe'pi saṁśayādau vartate, na hi kācit jñānamātrā sāsti yā na svasaṁviditā nāma. tato na svanirṇayo lakṣaṇamukto'smābhiḥ, vṛdhaistu parīkṣārthamupakṣipta ityadoṣaḥ.
14. See *Kaśayapāhuḍa,* part I, p. 338.
    Dhavalā, part I, p. 149.
    Bṛhad dravyasaṁgraha ṭīkā, gāthā 43.
15. *Āptamīmāṁsā,* verse 83.
    bhāvaprameyāpekṣāyāṁ pramāṇābhāsaniṇhavaḥ/
    bahiḥ prameyāpekṣāyaṁ pramāṇaṁ tannibhaṁ ca te//
16. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 1. 18.
    jñānasya prameyāvyabhicāritvaṃ prāmāṇyam. taditaratvamaprāmāṇyam.
17. Ibid, 1. 19.
    tadubhayamutpattau parata eva, jñaptau tu svataḥ paratasca.
18. *Aṣṭaśatī* (*Āptamīmāṁsā,* verse 101 vṛtti):
    buddheranekāntāt yenākāreṇa tattvaparicchedaḥ tadapekṣayā prāmāṇyam. tataḥ pratyakṣatadābhāsayorapi prāyaśaḥ saṁkīrṇā prāmāṇyetarasthitirunnetavyā. prasiddhānupahatendriyadṛṣṭerapi candrārkādiṣu deśapratyāsatyādya bhūtākārāvabhāsanāt tathopahatākṣāderapi saṁkhyādivisaṁvāde'pi candrādisvabhāvatattvopalambhāt. tatprakarṣāpekṣayā vyapadeśavyavasthā gandhadravyādivat.
19. *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 1.
    pramāṇaṁ svaparābhāsi jñānaṁ bhādhavivarjitam/
    pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣam ca, dvidhā meyaviniścayāt//

20. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 400.
...aṁ puṇa catuvvidhaṁ ṇeyabhetato teṇa jaṁ taduvayutto/
ādeseṇaṁ savvaṁ davvāticatuvvidhaṁ muṇati//
svopajñavṛtti—iha jñeyabhedāt jñānabhedaḥ.
21. *Pramāṇavārtika,* 2.1.
mānaṁ dvividhaṁ meya...vidhyāt.
22. *Nyāyabindu* (with Hindi translation by Govindacandra Pāndey). p. 4.
23. *Laghīyastraya,* 3.
pratyakṣaṁ viśadaṁ jñānaṁ, mukhyasaṁvyavahārataḥ/
parokṣaṁ śeṣavijñānaṁ, pramāṇe iti saṁgrahaḥ//
24. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 251.
sāmaṇṇamaṇiddesaṁ sarūvaṇāmātikappaṇārahitam.
25. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, gāthā* 281-283,
vṛtti—iha yad vastusāmānyamātragrahaṇamanirddeśyamayamarthāvagraho naiścayikaḥ samayamātrakālaḥ prathamaḥ. tataḥ 'kimidam' ityantaramīhitavastuviśeṣasya śabdaviśeṣe vijñānarūpo yo'vāyaḥ sa eva hi punarbhāvinīmīhāmavāyaṁ cāpekṣyā'vagraha ityupacaritaḥ sūtre, yasmādeśyadviśeṣāpekṣayā sāmānyamālambate. sāmānyārthāvagrahaṇaṁ cāvagraha iti. tato bhūyaḥ kimayaṁ śāṁkhaḥ śārṅgo vetyādi viśeṣākaṅkṣayehānantaramavāyaḥ śāṁkhaḥ śārṅgo vetyādi. sa eva bhūyastadviśeṣākāṅkṣāto bhāvinīmīhāmavāyameṣyadviśeṣāṁś cāpekṣya sāmānyālambanādavagraha ityupacaryate. ityevaṁ sarvatra sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣayā yāvadantyo bhedastadākaṅkṣāvinivṛttirveti.)
26. (a) *Nandī, sūtra* 56, *cūrṇi.*
evaṁ maṇaso vi suviṇe saddādivisaesu avaggahādayo ṇeyā, aṇṇattha vā indiyavāvāraabhāve maṇemāṇassa tti.
(b) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, gāthā* 293:
thāṇu-purisai-kuṭṭhu-ppalai-sambhiyākārillamansai/
sappu-ppalaṇalaiva samāṇarūvaivisayāim//
27. The modern Naiyāyikas have classified *pratyakṣa* (perception) as *laukika* (ordinary) and *alaukika* (extraordinary). Gangeśa Upādhyāya categorises *alaukika pratyakṣa* as universal, particular and *yogaja.*
28. *Niyamasāra, gāthā* 158.
jāṇadi passadi savvam, vavahāranaeṇa kevalī bhagavaṁ/
kevalaṇāṇī jāṇadi passadi ṇiyameṇa appāṇaṁ//
29. *Nandī, sūtra* 33.

davvao ṇaṁ kevalanāṇī savvadavvāiṁ jāṇai pāsai.
khettao ṇaṁ kevalanāṇī savvaṁ khettaṁ jāṇai pāsai.
kālao ṇaṁ kevalanāṇī savvaṁ kālaṁ jāṇai pāsai.
bhāvao ṇaṁ kevalanāṇī savve bhāve jāṇai pāsai.

30. *Yogabindu*, verse 431.
jño jñeye kathamajñaḥ syādasati pratibandhake/
dāhye' gnirdāhako na syāt kathamapratibandhakaḥ//

31. *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā*, 1. 1. 17.
bādhakābhāvācca.---vṛtti—
suniścitāsambhavadbādhakatvāt sukhādivat tatsiddhiḥ.

32. *Āptamīmāṁsā*, verse 5.
sūkṣmāntaritadūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacidyathā/
anumeyatvato' gnyādiriti sarvajñasaṁsthitiḥ//

33. *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā*, 1. 1. 16.
prajñātisáyaviśrāntyādisiddhestatsiddhiḥ.
vṛtti—prajñāyā atiśayaḥ—tāratamyaṁ kvacit viśrāntam, atisáyatvāt parimāṇātiśayavadityanumānena niratiśayaprajñādisiddhyā tasya kevalajñānasya siddhiḥ.

34. *Pramāṇapraveśa*, 21.
idamalpaṁ mahaddūramāsannaṁ prāṅśu neti vā/
vyapekṣātaḥ samakṣe'rthe, vikalpaḥ sādhanāntaram//
dṛṣṭeṣvartheṣu parasparavyapekṣālakṣaṇaṁ alpamahattvādijñānam adharottarādijñānaṁ dvitvādisaṁkhyājñānam anyacca pramāṇam, avisaṁvādakatvāt upamānavat.

35. *Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 5, 8, 9:
sādhyāvinābhuno liṅgātsādhyaniścāyakaṁ smṛtam/
anumānaṁ tadabhrāntaṁ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat//
dṛṣṭeṣṭāvyāhatādvākyātparamārthābhidhāyinaḥ/
tattvagrāhitayotpannaṁ mānam śābdaṁ prakīrtitam//
āptopajñamanullanghyamadṛstestavirodhakam/
tattvopadeśakṛtsārvam śāstram kapathaghaṭṭanam.//

36. (a) *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 13:
matiḥ-smṛtiḥ-saṁjñā-cintā'bhinibodha ityanarthāntaram.
(b) *Nandī, sutra* 54.

37. *Nyāyaviniścaya*, verse 473.
sarvametacchrutajñānamanumānaṁ tathāgamaḥ.

38. *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīvakāṇḍa*), verse 315:
atthādo atthantaramuvalambhamtam bhaṇanti sudaṇāṇam/
ābhiṇibohiyapuvvaṁ niyameṇiha saddajaṁ pamuham//

39. *Āptamīmāṁsā*, verse 78, *Aṣṭaśatī:*
yo yatrāvisaṁvādakaḥ sa tatrāptaḥ, tataḥ paro'nāptaḥ. tattvapratipādanamavisaṁvādaḥ.

40. *Ṭhāṇam*, 2. 220.
dohiṁ ṭhāṇehiṁ saddduppāte siyā, taṁ jahā—
sāhaṇṇantāṇaṁ ceva poggalāṇaṁ saddduppāe siyā,
bhijjantāṇaṁ ceva poggalāṇaṁ saddduppāe siyā.

CHAPTER 7

1. *Nyāyasūtra,* 1. 1. 5.
   tatpūrvakam.
2. *Sūyagaḍo,* 12; 19.
   je ātato parato vā vi ṇaccā.
3. *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 11.
   pratyakṣenānumānena, prasiddhārthaprakāśanāt/
   parasya tadupāyatvāt, parārthatvaṁ dvayorapi//
4. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka,* 3. 26-27:
   pratyakṣaparicchinnārthābhidhāyi vacanaṁ parārthaṁ pratyakṣaṁ, parapratyakṣahetutvāt.
   yathā paśya puraḥ sphuratkiraṇamaṇikhaṇḍamaṇḍitābharaṇabhāriṇīṁ jinapatipratimām.
5. *Nyāyasūtra,* 1. 1. 5.
   pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ ca.
6. *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* 5: (*Māṭharavṛtti*)
   prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṁ trividhamanumānamākhyātam/
   talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakamāptaśrutirāptavacanantu//
7. *Caraka, sūtrasthāna,* verses 28, 29.
8. *Aṇuogaddārāim, sūtra* 519.
9. *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 5.
   sadhyāvinābhuvo liṅgāt, sādhyaniścāyakaṁ smṛtam/
   anumānaṁ tadabhrāntaṁ, pramāṇatvāt sapakṣavat//
10. Ibid, verse 21.
    anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetorlakṣaṇamīritam.
11. *Daśavaikālika niryukti, gāthā* 49.
    jiṇavayaṇaṁ siddhaṁ ceva bhaṇṇae katthai udāharaṇam/
    āsajja u soyāraṁ heu'vi kahiñci bhaṇṇejjā//
12. Ibid, *gāthā 50.*
    katthai pañcāvayavaṁ dasahā vā savvahā na paḍisiddham/
    na ca puṇa savvaṁ bhaṇṇai handī saviāramakkhāyam//
13. *Tattvārthasūtra,* 1. 7-8.
    nirdeśasvāmitvasādhanādhikaraṇasthitividhānataḥ.
    satsaṁkhyākṣetrasparśanakālāntarabhāvālpabahutvaiśca.
14. *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi,* 28, 13.
    egattaṁ ca puhattaṁ ca, saṁkhyā saṇṭhāṇameva ya/
    saṇjogā ya vibhāgā ya, pajjavāṇaṁ tu lakkhaṇam//
15. *Siddhiviniścaya,* p. 150.
    saṁkhyādipratipattiśca, pūrvāparaṇirīkṣaṇāt.
16. For details see appendix I.
17. *Tattvārthavārtika,* 3. 38.
    nṛsthitī parāvare tripalyopamāntarmuhūrte.
18. *Kasāyapāhuḍa,* part I, p. 38.

CHAPTER 8

1. (a) *Nyāyabindu,* 3. 59.
   cetanastarava iti sādhye sarvatvagapaharane maraṇam prativādyasiddham, vijñānendriyāyurinirodhalakṣaṇasya maraṇasyānenābhyupagamāt, tasya ca taruṣvasambhavāt.
   (b) *Dharmottara pradīpa,* p. 191.
   digambarastu sādhyena vyaptamavyāptaṁ vā maraṇamavivicya maraṇamātrahetumāha. tadasyavādino hetubhūtaṁ maraṇaṁ na jñātam. ajñānāt siddhaṁ śoṣarūpaṁ, śoṣarūpasya maraṇasya taruṣu darśanāt. prativādinastu jñātamato'siddham. yadā tu vādino'pi jñātaṁ tadā vādino' pyasiddhaṁ syāditi nyāyaḥ.
2. *Ślokavārtika, sūtra* 2, verse 114.
3. Pāścātya Darsána, pp. 161, 162.

CHAPTER 9

1. See *"Syādvāda aura Saptabhaṅgī Nyāya",* *prakaraṇa* 5.
2. *Pramāṇavārtika,* 1. 34.
   heyopādeyatattvasya, sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ/
   yaḥ pramāṇamasāviṣṭo, na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ//
3. Ibid, 1. 35.

APPENDIX—5

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