A NOTE ON CONCEPT ADRśTA AS USED IN THE VAISṛŚIKASŪTRA

1. The meaning of the word adṛśta has in the VS (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra) is still controversial. It appears that until recently there was general agreement only in one regard: scholars started from the assumption that there is an original conceptual unity to the word whatever the context in which it occurs. Opinions differed greatly, however, on the precise nature of the unity. I do not want to survey all of them here; instead I should like to draw attention to two of them only, viz. that of E. FRAUWALLNER and that of A. THAKUR; these two can, to a large extent, be regarded as representatives.

1.1. FRAUWALLNER, "to whom we owe the most penetrating and reliable analysis of the Vaiśeṣika system", touches upon the concept of adṛśta first in connection with what he calls the supplantation of the old atomistic-mechanistic world-view by new ideas "which changing times call forth". In the first place he mentions an idea "which was introduced at an early date into Vaiśeṣika thought where it was inorganic and destroyed the coherent structure of the old natural philosophy", viz. "the belief in the power of good and bad deeds". On the other hand he observes: "In Vaiśeṣika thought it was not necessary to remodel the teaching of the cosmic power of deeds. It was simply assumed that the good and bad deeds of men, functioning as merit and demerit, produce the invisible (adṛśtam), and it was taught that it not only determines the

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2. Quoted from E. FRAUWALLNER, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. II, Salzburg, 1956, p. 99 f. [60, 63]—The translation from the German original is mine. Numbers within square brackets refer to the pages of the English translation (History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, tr. by V.M. BDEKAR, Delhi, 1975).
destiny of souls in the cycle of mundane existences, but, like a natural force, also has influence upon the physical world". The latter function of the adhyatma is explained by him by stating: "Wherever the cause of a natural phenomenon could not be discovered, the facile explanation resorted to—it is in fact no explanation at all—was that it is caused by the invisible, and thus one got accustomed to dispensing with a penetrating inquiry into the nature of things."

1.1.1. FRAUWALLNER does not discuss when this change of views took place; but from scattered remarks and his exposition as a whole it can be deduced that according to him the introduction of the karmic theory antedates the doctrine of categories. As in other instances also, in FRAUWALLNER's "stimulating, yet inevitably speculative" attempt to reconstruct the early history of the natural philosophy and the Vaiśeṣika system, in this case, too, it is not clear what kind of textual evidence, which observations or deliberations have led him to this view of the development of the system. Indeed, one would really like to know why dharmas and adharmas were not included in the list of guṇas—which, to be sure, originally contained only 17 qualities—if the karmic theory was in fact adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas before they developed their peculiar theory of categories; for, it is conspicuous that, the relevant sūtra, viz. 1.1.5, forms part of those which unmistakably attest to this latter theory. Was FRAUWALLNER influenced by the fact, that "the belief in the power of good and bad deeds...is age-old in India", that it is definitely earlier than the theory of categories? That is, to say, was this the consideration that led him to conclude that the karmic theory was introduced first into the system?

In this case one would have to make the following objection: The history of ideas in India is by no means lacking in clear examples for the

3. O.c., l.c., p. 95 (63).
4. Quoted from HALBFASS, l.c., p. 288.
5. The interpretation of the conjunction or used in VS 1.1.5 as given by PRAṢASTAPĀDA and the commentators of the VS cannot be accepted as corresponding to this sūtra's original intention. HALBFASS (l.c., p. 285, fn. 55) draws attention to the important testimony of "the Jaina author Jinabhadra (probably sixth century and apparently not familiar with Praṣastapāda's work)" who states explicitly that the number of qualities in Vaiśeṣika is seventeen; cf. Vaiśeṣika-saṅgīta, ed. D. MALVANIA (Ahmedabad, 1966-1968), vv. 2972 ff, with commentary.
6. Quoted from his work noted in fn. 2, p. 91 (67).

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coexistence, continuing for a long time, of two or more rival, even incompatible ideas; therefore, it is practically impossible to decide without additional evidence when by a 'system' of thought a certain conception was abandoned in favour of another, originally alien to it. And does not the history of materialism in India, though still largely veiled in obscurity, also show that there were traditional schools of thought able to withstand the pressure of widely accepted ideas, of a mighty trend of a period?

1.2. THAKUR, on the other hand, entertains reasonable doubts as regards the historical reliability of Praṣastapāda's equation of adhyatma with dharma and adharma, and he starts from the assumption that Praṣastapāda might well have been influenced in this case, too, by "the then available exegetical Vaiśeṣika literature no more available to us".

By an independent examination of the occurrence of the word adhyatma in the VS he wants to prove his thesis, stated right at the outset, viz. that Kanḍa seems to divide the entities into known and unknown ones and to distinguish them by the terms adhyatma and adhyatma. That is to say, THAKUR comes to the conclusion that in most cases adhyatma, especially as a member of the compound adhyatma-kārītta, means "unknown".

Yet, THAKUR, too, has a peculiar motive for arguing in this manner. While FRAUWALLNER apparently reproached the Vaiśeṣikas with having become disinclined to critical thought, it is obviously THAKUR's wish to pass Kanḍa off as a true forerunner of intellectually sincere modern scientists; for he openly states: "... The method adopted by him" (i.e., Kanḍa) "is one of our richest heritages. Modern sciences also have adopted it. Nobody will deny the fact that Kanḍa developed in the hoary past a scientific attitude which guided him and his followers to ascertain the truth about this mysterious universe", and he does not even hesitate to add later the remark: "The spirit of the sage who

8. L.c., p. 51.
9. L.c., p. 52.
10. L.c., p. 52.
11. L.c., p. 53.
seems to have firm faith in the ‘gradual progress of human knowledge cannot be sacrificed’.

Indians have, no doubt, some right to be proud of the philosophical achievements of the Vaiśeṣika system; the conception of its assumed founder, Kaṇāda, as a thinker who not only frankly confesses the limits of his comprehension of truth, but is also hopeful as regards the progress to be attained by later generations, however, is clearly inspired by quite modern Western ideas about intellectual sincerity and constant progress.

1.2.1. Nevertheless, the main result of Thakur’s semantic investigation, viz. that adṛśṭa means “not seen, i.e., not cognized, not known”, deserves full attention though it calls likewise for a critical re-examination. That in research into the history of Indian philosophy, one should endeavour to free oneself as far as possible of preconceived ideas need hardly be stressed. Both the scholars, referred to in the foregoing, seem to lie under prejudices: FRAUWALLNER under a too negative one and Thakur under one too positive.

2. From this background boldly stand out the studies undertaken during the last years by W. HALBFASS, to whom we not only owe a veritable revival of research into the Vaiśeṣika system, but who has also set a new and high standard of problem-consciousness and philosophicum-philosophical analysis. In a recent article of his he also deals with “Karma, Adṛśṭa and ‘Natural’ Causality”, especially in Vaiśeṣika thought. In examining the sūtras in which the word adṛśṭa occurs he comes to the conclusion that “it is obvious that adṛśṭa covers at least two different sets of problems and implications, and it may be questioned whether or to what extent there is an original conceptual unity in these two usages. As far as the physical and cosmological usage of adṛśṭa is concerned, its primary function seems to be to account for strange and extraordinary phenomena in nature which would not be explicable otherwise (magnetism, upward movement of fire, etc.), as well as for phenomena which seem to be signs or to contain an element of reward and punishment.”

He further remarks: “Although there is an obvious ethical implication in the second group of cases, the Sūtra text does not indicate in any way that the adṛśṭa, which is supposed to cause these events, is to be understood as inhering in souls (ātman). This assumption would seem to be even more remote in cases like the upward flaming of fire, for which no ethical, retributive, or psychological implications are suggested. In cases like this, adṛśṭa appears simply side by side with other causes of physical motions like ‘gravity’ (gurutva) or ‘fluidity’ (dravatva), which inhere in those material substances which they affect.... The Vaiśeṣikasūtra does not state that the unseen physical power behind such phenomena as the upward flaming of fire and the retributive power of past deeds stored in the soul are identical nor does it state that they are different. We do not know when the identity, which is taken for granted by Praśastapāda and later Vaiśeṣikas, was first established in an explicit and definite manner.... Yet, even the great systematizer Praśastapāda has not been able to harmonize completely or cover the ambiguities and dichotomies inherited from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.”

I must say that I find these cautious considerations of a dichotomy in the concept of adṛśṭa in the VS at the first go-off most plausible, i.e., much more convincing than the interpretations given by FRAUWALLNER and THAKUR. Therefore, I am inclined to accept HALBFASS’ suggestion that adṛśṭa, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the explanation of the universe, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a much more decidedly dharmic and soteriological re-interpretation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the universe.

12. The references are (apart from the article mentioned in fn. 1) to the following articles of his:
(3) “Zum Begriff der Substanz (dravya) im Vaiśeṣika” in: WZKS 20 (1976), pp. 141-166;
(4) “The Vaiśeṣika Concept of guṣṭa and the Problem of Universals” in: WZKS 24 (1990), pp. 225-238; and

15. L. c., p. 286.
2.1. The hypothesis, more hinted at by Halbfass than expressly stated, to which one is nevertheless inevitably led by his important observations, consists in assuming that the ‘conceptual’ unity in the two usages—obviously presupposed by Praśastapāda and those who have written VS commentaries in the strict sense, is not original, but the result of the attempt to bring to a common denominator disparate usages of the word, belonging most probably to historically different layers of the VS. As for Thakur in distrustning the testimony of Praśastapāda, he was on the right track; yet he seems not to have taken into proper account that the extent text of the VS cannot be regarded as a unitary whole, i.e., as a work composed in one piece. That it, on the contrary, contains many historically different layers which can be—and have in part already been—distinguished, and must indeed be held apart, is the basic assumption from which any research in the VS has to start today.

The explanations offered by the commentators, including Praśastapāda, on the other hand, have to be looked at with utter reserve and examined very critically, for they start from the opposite assumption and, hence, consider it as one of their major objects to bring out into relief an internal consistence, systematic coherence and terminological unity they simply presuppose; in effect, they cannot but be regarded as highly biased witnesses, and the question whether they (still) are aware of an original irreconcilability is, apart from being hardly answerable, of little importance as regards the necessity of an independent interpretation of the māla text and the method to be applied towards this end.

2.2. Halbfass’s hypothesis does indeed furnish a much better explanation of various strange elements over which one stumbles in reading the VS. However, one wonders whether over and above its apparent higher plausibility it can be supported by evidence that does not amount to an argumentum e silentio, but is directly based on the usage in the VS. The condition such a piece of evidence has to fulfill is, of course, that in the context of the sūtra concerned the expression adṛṭṭa cannot be interpreted to stand for dharma and adharma, i.e., as having the meaning “the ‘invisible’ [results and purposes of ritual and ethical activities].”

In this connection attention has to be drawn first to the fact that, besides adṛṭṭa, the opposite expression, viz., ṣaḍādṛṭṭa, is likewise attested in the VS. Hence it appears that Thakur is right at least insofar as the VS distinguishes between entities predicated of as ṣaḍādṛṭta and adṛṭṭa, respectively. An examination of all the occurrences of ṣaḍādṛṭta and adṛṭṭa in the VS yields, as regards the first expression, the result that in two cases, viz., VS 8. 13 and 2. 1. 10, even the plural is used; in the first instance with the meaning “seen (i.e. perceived) [things],” whereas in the other case “visible (i.e. perceivable) [entities]” seem to be intended. Yet the latter sūtra, viz., 2. 1. 10, na ca ṣaḍādṛṭtaṃ sparśa ity adṛṭṭadgraiva vāyuk, requires closer study.

2.2.1. Thakur obviously regarded the use of adṛṭṭa in this sūtra as exceptional, for he says: “Of course we find the use of the expression a-adṛṭṭa in the sense of ‘not visually cognized’ in......VS II. 1. 10.” Unfortunately, he does not state explicitly how he interprets the sūtra as a whole; but from his rendering of adṛṭṭa it may be deduced that he took it to mean: “And/but since touch (or tangibility) does not belong to [the type of] visually cognized [marks], wind has for its mark [something] not visually cognized, [but cognized by the sense of touch].”

18. According to a—still unidentified—quotation from a (lost?) Vaiśeṣika work, preserved in Abhayadevaśāri’s Tattvavodhāraksīyin (Acyarāyāsiddhasāraśāra, p. 685), the parokṣa-adṛṭṭasāra was thus described by Vaiśeṣikas: “kārtiṣṭhāvāya ātmamābhāyām ātmamābhāsūya-jogasūya stukṣa-karvāroddhi dharmādharāpatāya bheda-vijñan-adṛṭṭaśvāya” (cf. also Kamalasāla’s Patiṣṭa on Śaṅkarācārya’s Tattvavodhāraksā, v. 690 (ed. E. Krishnamacharya, GOS, 30-31, p. 23; ed. Swami Dwārikās Shastrī, Buddha Bhāratī Series 1-2, p. 286).

19. Quoted from Halbfass, i.e. (cf. fn. 1), p. 285.

20. They can easily be traced with the help of “An Index to the Philosophical Sūtras” by M. Honda in: Proceedings of the Okayayama Oriental Research Institute, Vol. I (1954), pp. 244-305. It should, however, be noted that this index is based on Śaṅkara’s śāstras and word index is presently being prepared by a student of our institute, Mrs. U. Plewnia-Err.

21. The numbering I follow is always that given in: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇḍāda with the commentary of Candrānanda, critically ed. by Muṇi Śrī Jambuvidyājī, (GOS 136), Baroda 1961.

22. L. c., p. 53.

This interpretation is, indeed, in principle conceivable. Yet it would imply that by VS 2.1.8. (viśām kakudmān prāntevālahāḥ sāsānān iti gotte ḍṛṣṭam liṅgam) either the term liṅga is defined (as referring only to something visually cognized) or the term ḍṛṣṭam liṅgam is exemplified. It has to be admitted that the example given in 2.1.8, viz., the characteristic marks of a cow, or rather an animal of the bovine species, might be taken to point in both these directions. However, in this case one would expect 2.1.9 to read ma ca spārṣaḥ, “but touch (or tangibility) is not [a visually cognized liṅga];” not spārṣaḥ ca; for, otherwise one would have to make the most unlikely assumption that only liṅgam is still valid (anuvṛtta) in 2.1.9, that is to say, that the author has, quite needlessly, used a rather obscure wording. Besides, as to the first alternative, the argument could not but be styled as almost foolish: to define first the concept of liṅga as something that is only seen and to add later that it likewise includes something cognized by the sense of touch, i.e., is ultimately something perceived by any sense-organ whatsoever, would reveal a deplorably low standard of almost pre-logical thinking that should not be imputed even to a philosophical text of a comparatively early period of thought. And, to be sure, there is no evidence that the distinction between ‘characteristic marks’ in terms of the sense organ they are perceived by was ever deemed in Indian philosophy to be of significant importance.

Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that ḍṛṣṭam in 2.1.8 means “perceived, cognized by the senses”, that the particular example given was chosen because it is hallowed by tradition, i.e., a mārdhābhīṣṭa udākaraṇa, and that ḍṛṣṭam in 2.1.10 is not a genitivus partitivus,—which, by the way, would also be unnecessarily unequivocal.

2.2.2. There is, however, another interpretation of VS 2.1.10 that calls for a more detailed critical examination; it immediately leads into the intricate problems connected with the theory of inference (lalāgikam jñānam) in the VS. What I am referring to is the study of N. Schuster, the last one to deal with them extensively. She is of the following opinion: “The mark is, normally, something perceived, as horns, dewlap, etc., are the ḍṛṣṭam liṅgam (perceived mark) of the cow”—in a note she refers to VS 2.1.8. “In some cases, the connection between the entities and their marks is not perceived—wind (vāyu),


25. Vs. 8, l. c., p. 386 f.
26. Cf. Vārtika 12 on Pāṇ. 2.2.24 (Mahābhāṣya), Ed. F. Kielhorn, Vol. I, 1962, p. 423.21 ff.; although according to Kalyāyana and Patanjali one would expect the prior member to be in the locative, it is to be noted that there are also bahuvrighths of this type with the stem as prior member; cf. J. Wackernagel, Althindische Grammatik, Bd. II, I, Göttingen 1957, [109 a] 5) as well as A. Debrunner’s “Nachträg”, ib., p. 78.
The other assumption of hers, however, viz., that Vaiśeṣikas in order to name a characteristic mark "the connection of which with its possessor has not been perceived" have coined a technical term adṛśta-līgama, or adṛśtaṃ līgama, is highly problematic.

2.2.2.2. This assumption, which seems to have suggested itself to Schuster because of the expression drstam līgama in 2.1.8, has the following implications: One would have to assume

1. that both these terms are extraordinarily pregnant expressions insofar as—in strong contrast to what is actually denoted by them—the meaning intended would be "a mark the connection of which with its possessor has (not) been perceived";

2. that VS 2.1.15 (nāyur iti samākaraścā pratyakṣābhāvä dvistam līgama na vidyate), whatever the argumentative function it may have within the given context, is either redundant—because according to Schuster it is stated already in the forgoing that in the case of wind the particular mark is of the adṛśta type (in the sense assumed by her for this term)—or it is nonsensical—because in none of the preceding sūtras the existence of a drśta līga would have been asserted;

3. that the stage reached in the development of reflexion on inference as a means of valid cognition could not but be considered to be quite advanced, since the VS would, on her assumption, clearly distinguish between two types of conclusive marks both based on whether their connection with their possessor has been perceived or not, i.e., on the basis of the līgata being perceptible; that is to say, one would have to assume that the VS makes a distinction similar to that drawn by Candramati between adṛśasamānyam and adṛśasamānyam, however what

27. The reading sati samākaraścā found in Candrananda and anonymous Vyākhyā (cf. the edition of the VS noted in fn. 7, p. 21), is most probably of secondary origin.
29. In fn. 13 (l.c., p. 73) FRAUWALLNER remarks: "One is tempted to see in this expression" (of the Chinese translation) "the Indian sāmānyata drstam; the Chinese rendering, however, rather points to adṛśasamānyat and adṛśasamānyam...".

Schuster in fact supposes—and it now appears that it was this assumption that has inspired her to offer this peculiar interpretation—is the influence of the Śamkhyā philosopher Vṛṣāṇa, for she says,18 "...it looks very much as though much of what the Vaiśeṣikasūtras discuss was borrowed directly from the Śaśāstra".

As to the first implication, already the manner in which I have stated it above indicates that I consider the existence of a technical term adṛśta-līgama, or adṛśtaṃ līgama, to be extremely doubtful. Even if it is assumed that the counterpositive term drśta līgama was created first and later re-interpreted so as to mean a mark the connection of which with its possessor has been perceived, one still fails to understand why Vaiśeṣikas should have coined the term adṛśta-līgama, or adṛśtaṃ līgama, that is indeed open to misconception. Just because it is neatly parallel to the other one?

There is, however, no evidence to show that drśta līgama in VS 2.1.8 does not mean what is actually denoted by it, viz., "a mark that has been perceived". This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a later re-interpretation of the term, either within the stages of development comprised by the extant VS itself or in the course of its reception by later commentators or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors of independent works. In fact, drśta līgama is met with again in Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāyasūtra and -bhāṣaṇa. According to his definition this term is equivalent to pratyakṣa-viśayānāmāpaṃkam; that is to say, drśta līgama is conceived as a mark "that allows to infer an object which could in principle also be perceived", and which must have been previously actually perceived, for Bhāsarvajña gives in his Bhāṣāṇa the additional explanation: pratyakṣa-vyogatā ca pārvadṛśta-vaiśvarāgamanyate yasmin yo’rthah pārvam pratyakṣeva drśtaḥ, sa eva deśanartarāḥ kāntaraṁ vāmūnitye 'tas tad anumānaṁ deśṭarthayatvena drśtam uktaṁ..."

Hence it follows that Bhāsarvajña, too, though fully aware of the decisive role which the connection between līga and līgata plays in

30. L. c., p. 352. cf. also p. 349.
32. O. c., p. 272.
33. O. c., p. 230.
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to the nature of a cow [by which it can be inferred that an animal which
is only partially in the field of vision is a cow, or bull]."

To continue now with the last, i.e., third implication: It may well
be that Vṛṣaṅgaṇa exercised influence on some parts of the VS. But as far
as the particular influence assumed by Schuster is concerned, it would
fail to account in a convincing manner for the change in terminology;
for, one would have to assume that in the VS, Vṛṣaṅgaṇa’s viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ
was replaced by dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ and his sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ by adṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ
(or adṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ). This would in many respects be a terminological step
backwards, a passage from preciseness to ambiguity the motive for
which would be anything but intelligible. Of decisive importance, howev-
er, is the fact that Vṛṣaṅgaṇa’s distinction between viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ and
sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ has nothing at all to do with the perceptibility of
the connection between liṅga and liṅga. Instead it aims at the character
of the object inferred, viz., whether it is a particular thing (e.g., the
particular fire), perceived already previously, or something general (e.g., a
fire), that either in a given situation happens to be outside the range of
perception or that by its very nature cannot be perceived at all.

Now, Schuster seems to assume that the relation between
Vṛṣaṅgaṇa’s distinction and that allegedly found in the VS consists in that
the object inferred by a viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ anumāṇam (dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ) has
already perviously been perceived, whereas in the case of a sāmānyato
dṛṣṭaṃ inference (adṛṣṭaṅga) it has not been perceived at all; and on
the basis of her, I think, untenable interpretation of VS 2. 15-17, she further

37. Cf. Candrananda’s introductory remark on VS 2.1.9: yathā aprayakṣayān
goyaktau kathanācād ghyamāṅā viśeṣataḥ liṅgaḥ dṛṣṭaṃ anumāṇaṁ tathā... If
it is all the marks (referred to in VS 2.1.8) taken together and not just one of
them that constitute the liṅga of a cow, then one wonders which situation
Candrananda had in mind when exemplifying the operation of this mark; for it is
hardly imaginable that all the marks are perceived, yet not the possessor itself.
A further question posed by VS 2.1.8 is why, instead of the marks themselves,
the possessor as characterized by them is named; Candrananda’s explanation,
viz., viṣṇubhūdhiḥ ādānaḥ sūdhrapiṇapādakar apy arthavyāpād dharme eva
vyapadiṣṭate, is not at all convincing; it seems rather that the author of VS
2.1.8 wants to describe the actual cognition of a person who sees an animal and
thus knows that it is “characterized by horns, etc.”

38. On Vṛṣaṅgaṇa’s theory of cognition cf. in the first place E. Frauwaller’s article
“Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṅkhya-Systems”, in: WZKSO II (1958),
pp. 84-739.

38a. L. c., p. 248.

34. Cf. his definition of anumāṇa, o. e., p. 194; sanyagāvahāvyena paraśthā
bhavatisādhana anumāṇaṁ, and its explanation by the Bhāṣyaṁ.

35. O. c., p. 272.

36. Candrananda gives the following explanation: pratyakṣaṃśaḥ paryayatratī
tīrthe śāntaṁ anumāṇaśāntaṁ pratyakṣaṃśaḥ paryayatratī śāntah
hitītyapiṇyaviṣṭaṁ tvaḥ ghaṣya-la. The interpretation of pratyakṣaṃśaḥ apart, this seems to correspond to the
author’s intention.
makes the assumption that Kaṇḍa himself distrusted the conclusiveness of a sāṃyāyata-āṭṭha inference (āṭṭhalinga). However, the wording of VS 2.1.8 does not by any means indicate that its author refers to a special inference by which a particular, individual cow, that was previously perceived, is now cognized. Of, at least, equal importance is another quite unpalatable consequence of SCHUSTER’s assumption: one would have to assume that in 2.1.9 only lingam is still valid (as in the case of THAKUR’s interpretation of 2.1.8; see above). Besides, the fact, too, admitted by SCHUSTER herself that in the case of ether no doubts are raised against the sāṃyāyata-āṭṭha inference by which its existence is established, namely in VS 2.1.20, does not speak in favour of her assumption.

Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, whatever the influence Vṛṣagāna may have exercised on the VS elsewhere, at this particular point it is nowhere tangible, in any case not in the sense apparently assumed by SCHUSTER.

I do not, of course, want to dispute that Vṛṣagāna (in paving the way for his ‘rational’ exposition of Sāmkhya metaphysics) was aware of the distinction between an anumāṇa that allows to infer the existence of an object in principle perceivable and an inference for things lying outside the range of perception (arpamāṇa bharadha), but obviously this was not the dichotomy intended by the terms viṣṇu-āṭṭha and sāṃyāyata-āṭṭha. RAUWALDNER too, only assumes Vṛṣagāna’s influence on Candramati, but he does not at all overlook the differences between the inference theories of both these philosophers which he explains by stating36 that the latter “has altered many an element”.

As to the second implication, it too involves considerable difficulties; they are indicated by SCHUSTER herself, yet obviously not realized in their full significance, for she states:37 “The case is somewhat different with wind (vāyu). First, sūtras 2.1.8-10 contrast the perceived marks of the cow (horns, etc.) with the ‘unperceived mark’ of wind which is tangibility (sparīsa). Tangibility is, nonetheless, the mark, perceptible as sound is, and following the model of the argument for sound and physical space, one would expect it to suffice as proof for wind. Sūtras II.1.15-17, however, find it not sufficient as a mark because it is impossible to observe its connection with what possesses it; therefore wind, the possessor of tangibility, has no perceived mark (āṭṭhān ligam) and no particular possessor can be established by ‘seeing from the general’. To compound the reader’s amazement, no further attempt at an inference of wind is even made, and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, which are supposed to admit only two means of cognition, perception and inference, conclude that the only way to know that wind exists is from scripture.

SCHUSTER contrasts VS 2.1.9 f. with 2.1.10 ff., i.e., the sūtras intend to prove the existence of ether (akāra); it is most significant that neither in 2.1.20 itself nor in one of the immediately following sūtras the expression āṭṭhān ligam is used; instead the term actually used is ligam only; likewise due attention has to be given to the fact that objections like those raised in 2.1.15-17 against the inference of wind are lacking in this case, and that on the other hand the objections of 2.1.15-17 agree (except for the very first word) verbatim with those raised in 3.2.6-8 against the proof for the existence of the soul, although in 3.2.4 the term used is again not āṭṭhān ligam, but āśritānigam. Therefore, the conclusion suggests itself that a ‘term’ āṭṭhālingam, or āṭṭhān ligam does not exist at all. But there are further and even more convincing arguments that can be brought forward against the central hypothesis framed by SCHUSTER. It should, however, be borne in mind that in the following I shall only summarize what has been dealt with elsewhere by me in greater detail.

First, it should be noted that Diānaga who in his Pratīyāsaṁuccara devotes considerable space to a critical examination of the theory of knowledge as taught by the Vaiśeṣikas, apparently does not know of a distinction between āṭṭhān ligam and āṭṭhālingam, or āṭṭhān ligam. Otherwise, one would expect him to have mentioned it at least in the context of the criticism he directs against the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference and he would have framed his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika “proof” for the existence of ether, etc., in a different manner: his argument against this particular inference, viz., that neither the dharmin nor its connection with

36. Cf. his article mentioned in fn. 28, p. 79.
37. L. e., p. 342 f.
38. Read: ether 1.
39. Viz. in the study referred to above in fn. 17.
40. For the sake of convenience I refer to the appendix p. XXXI ff. in Jamāvijaya’s edition of the VS (cf. above, fn. 21) as well as to his “saptamān paripāṭṭam”, p. 197 ff.
the dharma are proved, would have a different form had he referred to a Vaiṣeṣika argument which already admitted that in these cases the connection between the linga/dharma and the liṅga/dharmin is not seen or perceived. And, to be sure, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that what Diśnāga’s criticism is directed against is only the inconsistency of the VS in which the inference for wind adduced first is refuted later, while in the case of ether no such scruples are voiced.

Secondly, apart from the fact that Schuster’s interpretation of VS 2.1.17 (tasmād āgamikam) does not stand a critical examination, it is to be noted that she either did not realize or overlooked that in fact another inferential proof for the existence of wind is adduced later, viz., in 2.1.18 and 19, and that these latter two sūtras have, judged from a synchronic point of view, the function of a siddhānta. As to the entire portion of the VS beginning with 2.1.8 and ending with 2.1.19, Schuster obviously fails to recognize its true dialectical structure: this becomes particularly conspicuous in the case of 2.1.15-19 where in reality the first three sūtras form the objections: of an opponent against 2.1.9 ff. and the following two sūtras are meant to refute them. Regarding the relation in which VS 2.1.15-17 stand to 3.2.6-8 it can be shown not only that the latter have served as a model for the former, i.e., that 2.1.15-17 are of later origin than 3.2.6-8, but also that the opponent of 2.1.15-17 is only fictitious in the sense that the doctrine itself could never have existed; for, it can hardly be assumed that an adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the ‘substance’ wind alone. The reason for the later insertion of 2.1.15-17 is most probably that a transmitter or redactor of the VS came to realize that the objections raised in 3.2.6-8 against the gāndhāramādāna are likewise valid with reference to the proof for the existence of wind as given in 2.1.9 f. and, hence, did his best to fill in this gap in the argument by adapting the objections formulated in 3.2.6-8 to the new context (=2.1.15-17) and by adding what he considered a convincing counter argument (=2.1.18 and 19).

Although Schuster already in the introductory passage of her article speaks of her impression that “there seem to be definite strata within those sections of the sūtras dealing with inference”, she obviously did not take into account this possibility as regards the section of the VS now under discussion; nonetheless, this text-critical interpretation suggests itself to any critical and unbiased mind. Her view that it was Kanāda himself who “rejects this possibility” (viz., of proving the existence of wind by means of an sāmānyato dṛśa inference) “because no particular entity can be inferred by this method, only something in general”, is rather strange, to say the least; in any case, it is untenable.

As soon as the real dialectical purpose of VS 2.1.15-17 is taken into account, i.e., as soon as these sūtras are recognized to be formally objections, one cannot but admit that the opponent in 2.1.15 denies (na) the existence (vidyate) of a dṛśam liṅgam. Because of the argument adduced in the preceding part of this sūtra, viz., vāpya iti samikkaraṇa pratyakṣa-bharadā, however, it cannot be gainsaid that the author’s conception of the term dṛśam liṅgam includes the essential condition that the connection between the liṅga and its possessor must have been perceived previously, i.e., that he takes the expression to mean that the character of being a conclusive mark of something perceived is likewise realized by having perceived previously both, liṅga and liṅgin, together.

Yet, this observation does not invalidate what has been stated above on this term in 2.1.8; the criticism of 2.1.15-17 as a whole attests to a much more advanced stage of reflexion on logical problems, and these latter sūtras can be shown, as already mentioned, to be of later origin; therefore, it may be assumed without hesitation that this is a later, more elaborate interpretation. Had the author of VS 2.1.8 himself realized

44. In the study noted in fn. 17 it will be shown in great detail that āgamikam (note that this is a neutre) cannot but mean what Candranaṇa gives as explanation, viz. pravādaṃstotram, “nothing but an (traditional) assertion [of yours] that lacks any proof whatsoever.”
45. In this respect Candranaṇa’s interpretation of these two sūtras, introduced by maitaḥ, is clearly correct.
46. But these latter, in their turn, were apparently equally unknown to Diśnāga.
46a. Viz., that the existence of wind is proved by the word ‘wind’ because the word was created by persons who are tasmādi jñātā, i.e., who have perceived wind before coining its name.
47. L. c., p. 341.
48. L. c., p. 342.
49. Cf. Candranaṇa’s explanation: yathā ‘vāpya vāyum’ iti gos takṣā samikkaraṇa sati pratyakṣeṇa viṣayādāni tadyogitaya dṛśāni kadaśe liṅgam, naivaś ca vāyoga samikkaraṇa sati ‘vāpya vāyum’ iti pratyakṣaṇe tadyogitāyād spaśā upalabhir vēṇa-patalabhyamānaṁ kadaśe vāyum anumāpavetā.
the importance of the connection between līga and līgin, he could not have expressed himself the way he actually does, nor argued in the manner of 2.1.9 f. ! That is to say, my own interpretation of 2.1.15 ff. implies that the author of 2.1.8 ff. (which belong to an earlier stratum of the VS) was—like the author of NS 1.1.5*—aware of the fact that inference presupposes perception, but was yet unable to recognize what was, to be sure, discovered only later and called avinābhāva, vyāpti, etc., i.e., he had taken the step from līga, "characteristic mark", as used in everyday language, to the logical term līga, "conclusive mark", but had not yet clearly realized what is implied unconsciously by the laukika word, viz., that the connection of the mark with its possessor should have been perceived previously.

Inspite of the apparently higher level of reflexion revealed by deśām līgam as understood by the author of VS 2.1.15 (ff.) it has to be admitted that his denial of the existence of a "perceived mark" makes sense—not on SCHUSTER’s assumption⁵⁰, but—only if in the foregoing this had been asserted either explicitly or implicitly. The only sūtra he can be said to is 2.1.10. Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that SCHUSTER’s interpretation of this sūtra does not correspond to its original intention.

2.2.3. Thus, the way is cleared for another and, I think, much better interpretation of VS 2.1.10. I propose to translate it thus: "But (ca) since touch (or tangibility) is not [a characteristic and conclusive mark] of [entities]² that are seen (i.e., perceived), that of which [this] conclusive mark (namely touch, or tangibility) [allows inference] is [an entity] not seen (i.e., perceived). [namely] wind".

That is to say, I take the sūtra to be a rather complex, pregnant argument in three steps, viz.: (1) sparśa is not a characteristic and conclusive mark of visible or perceivable entities; (2) therefore, it must be that of something invisible or not perceivable; (3) the invisible or imperceptible entity the existence of which can be inferred by sparśa is wind

50. Cf. my article "Die 'dreiache' Schlussfolgerung im Nyāyasāstra 1.1.5" in III XI (1969), pp. 190-211.

51. Quoted above.

52. It looks very much as though VS 2.1.10 is based on the assumption that it has still to be determined to which category these entities belong; see below.

53. Candrananda adds by way of explanation: yadd khalv ayan kityodispārio bhavijyad gandhavasarapati sahopalabhemahi...

2.2.4. After what has been said in the foregoing it need hardly to be emphasized that this hypothesis passes muster more easily than that framed by SCHUSTER. But my hypothesis also leads to further questions. Thus, what should perhaps be stressed is that there is every appearance that the conception of līga evident in VS 2.1.8-10 forms the oldest stage in the development of the Vaiṣeṣika theory of inference. This conception is—similar to that of the NS—characterized, as already suggested, by a palpable lack of reflexion on the true nature of logical reason, and this is why it was rejected by later logicians, e.g., by Dīnāga.

The analysis of 2.1.8-10 has, however, yielded the result that here the author distinguishes de facto between a mark that allows to infer something which is in principle itself perceivable and a mark by which the existence of something can be inferred that by its nature lies beyond the range of perception. Nevertheless, this distinction—like that of NS 1.1.5 between pārvata and iṣṭapatī on the one hand and sāṃyata deśām on the other—does not imply that the logical character of the līga and its connection with its possessor had already been reflected upon; on the contrary, e.g., the Nyāyabhaṣya on NS 1.1.5 clearly shows that this was not the case, and the further development of Indian logic no less corroborates this assumption.

However, it may be questioned whether in the VS, e.g. in 2.1.20 and 3.2.4, a still older stage is attested, one characterized by the fact that not even the perceptibility or imperceptibility of the object to be

54. That is to say, my translation is, for stylistic reasons, not in every respect faithful to the original. A literal translation would be: "... (i.e. perceived), that of which the characteristic mark (i.e. touch or tangibility) is one [that allows to infer] what is not seen (i.e. not perceived), is wind."
inferred is taken notice of. I do not dare to decide this question, but I gather the impression that this assumption is confirmed by the criticism Dīnāga directs against the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference.

It was mentioned above that the kind of influence by Vṛṣaṇa on VŚ 2.1.8-10 assumed by Schuster is most unlikely. What has prompted her to make this assumption was obviously the belief that this approach has been suggested by Frauwallner; for she expressly states that56 “it is Frauwallner’s suggestion that the Vaiśeṣika inference theories should be examined in the light of Śāṃkhya epistomology that I am here pursuing”. Now, when going through the two articles of Frauwallner’s referred to by Schuster,57 one fails to detect such a general suggestion; instead what is actually found are quite explicit and clear statements showing that Frauwallner himself while reckoning with specific influences exercised by Vṛṣaṇa on the VŚ, nevertheless saw them only in the first āyika of adhyāya III; for he says58: “It is here that we meet with a theory of inference that is likewise independent of dialectics and that is based on the stable connection between two things, the different types of which connection one seeks to determine.59 Here, too, perception falls back on the second position, behind the theory of inference; and the Vaiśeṣika system makes use also of inference by way of exclusion” (i.e., particāya or rather arita as called by Vṛṣaṇa).

On the other hand Frauwallner advocates the opinion that “already the bipartition of inference” (viz., into dhītāsmayā and adhyātāsmayā60 “as taught by him”, i.e., Candramati, is a striking proof of his dependence from Śāṃkhya”. That is to say, according to Frauwallner a further influence of Vṛṣaṇa can be shown only on the Vaiśeṣika author Candramati whom he dates61 “between 450 and 550. A.D.”. In a footnote he adds the remark that “this bipartition is met with in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras only at two points (II, 1.15-17 and III, 2.6-8)”, which he, however, considers to be “later additions”.

As regards the last three sūtras—2.1.15-17 are of no importance in this respect since they were modelled on 3.2.6-8—to account for the objections raised here by a Buddhist opponent, it is not necessary to assume the influence of Vṛṣaṇa or Dīnāga. The arguments brought forward in these sūtras against the Vaiśeṣika proof for the existence of the soul (ātman) can have been likewise inspired by Ch’ing-mu62; that is to say, similar objections were raised already by earlier Buddhist thinkers.

As to the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference as a whole, Frauwallner speaks only of “beginnings”63 of such a theory in the VŚ “which due to their complex stratification call for a separate discussion”. Since unfortunately he could no longer deal with these (in fact intricate) problems, his own interpretation of VŚ 2.1.8-10 is unknown. Yet, from his remark just quoted it can be inferred that he, too, was of the opinion that on the whole the Vaiśeṣika inference theories attest to a stage in the development of reflexion on logical problems that can hardly be called advanced. In any case, this much becomes highly probable: Frauwallner did not, apparently, consider even privately, as it were, an influence of Vṛṣaṇa’s teaching upon VŚ 2.1.8-10, not to speak of indicating or asserting it.

3.1. Returning now to our starting point, viz., the term adhyātma as used in the VŚ, the first result to be noted is that in VŚ 2.1.10 adhyātma is used as an expression that stands in contradistinction to dhītā in the same sūtra. Since it is not prior to 2.1.11 that an argument is brought forward to prove that wind is a material ‘substance’, adhyātma and perhaps also dhīta in 2.1.10 have to be taken to refer to entities in general, i.e., of which, in the context, it has not yet been decided as to which category they belong. Therefore, one cannot but draw the conclusion that the VŚ, at least at some point of its development, makes the basic distinction between elements of reality that can in principle be perceived and others.

55. L. c., fn. 1, p. 386.
56. Viz. in fn. 1, p. 386; these articles are noted above in fn. 28 and 38.
58. For significant arguments against Frauwallner’s assumption that the division of sambandhaira into different types as taught in the VŚ is influenced by Vṛṣaṇa, cf. Schuster, l. c., p. 368.
59. L. c. (cf. fn. 28), p. 79.
60. Cf. above fn. 29.
61. L. c., p. 80.—Note that Frauwallner’s hypothesis regarding the relative chronology of Candramati and Prajñāpati is questioned by B. K. Matilal, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature (A History of Indian Literature, ed. by J. Gonda, VI,2), Wiesbaden, 1977, pp. 63 ff.
63. L. c. (cf. fn. 28), fn. 30, p. 79.
that by their nature lie beyond the range of (normal human) perception; and, to be sure, there is no evidence whatsoever nor even the least likelihood that this bipartition was originally connected with ethical and retributive conceptions.

This conclusion does not, of course, necessarily imply that \textit{adhistha} when used as a prior member of the compound \textit{adhisthaka\textcopyright} must have the meaning “something unperceived or imperceptible”; yet, I think, the assumption has become much more likely that the \textit{VS} has indeed originally accounted for strange and otherwise inexplicable phenomena by resorting to a cause “not perceived or unperceivable”, i.e., a cause that could not be determined and for that very reason also not classified as regards the category to which it belongs.

In view of Thakur’s interpretation of the term, however, it seems advisable to try to decide also whether \textit{adhistha} in such contexts is used in the sense of “not perceived”, which might amount to “not yet perceived [by me, but, I trust, perceptible to later philosophers]” or, on the contrary, in the sense of “not perceivable, i.e., because by its nature it lies outside the range of perception”.

There is strong evidence for the latter possibility; for, this \textit{dhr\textcopyright}a-\textit{adhistha} dichotomy reminds one of the similar distinction drawn by Mīmāṃsakas and Dharmāstrins between acts that have a visible motive or purpose and those to which an unsee or spiritual purpose is to be ascribed\textsuperscript{64}. Yet, there is another parallel, in terms of chronology and historical relation even closer, namely \textit{NS} 1.1.8: \textit{sa} (\textit{abda\textcopyright} dhr\textsuperscript{2}adist\text-superscript{2}a\textsuperscript{3}arthavā). Pakṣikāvāmin’s explanation can be relied on in this case; for he says\textsuperscript{65}: “yasyeha dhr\textsuperscript{2}yate\textsuperscript{4}arthi\textsuperscript{5} sa \textit{dhr\textsuperscript{2}a}\textsuperscript{6}arthu\textsuperscript{7}ṣabhā\textsuperscript{8}yātmaka pratyayate sa \textit{dhr\textsuperscript{2}a\textsuperscript{6}arthah\textsuperscript{9}evam tīlaukītka\textsuperscript{10}kāya\textsuperscript{11}ḥ vikāga iti\textsuperscript{12}}. The \textit{NS}’s distinction, though referring to \textit{abda\textcopyright} as a means of valid cognition, is tantamount to a dichotomy of things perceptible and things imperceptible here, i.e. in this world of ours. Therefore, the assumption seems to be warranted that it is this very distinction, albeit conceived of as a general one, the author(s) of the \textit{VS} originally had in mind.

67. \textit{Prāśastapadabhadra} (\textit{Padārthadharmanasagraha}) with Commentary \textit{Nyāyakanda\textcopyright} of Sṛḍhara\textsuperscript{4} (\textit{Ganānak\textsuperscript{2}a-Gra\textsuperscript{2}m\textsuperscript{2}am\textsuperscript{2}a}), Varanasi, 1963, p. 27: \textit{ca labdhasamucca\textsuperscript{3}a ca guru\textsuperscript{5}a-dra\textsuperscript{2}rava-sneha-se\textsuperscript{4}i\textsuperscript{5}a-adhistha\textsuperscript{3}a\textsuperscript{3}a\textsuperscript{2}abda\textsuperscript{3}a saptavah\textsuperscript{2} evam ca tattvavāsān\textsuperscript{4}tirṇa\textsuperscript{2}}
68. Quoted from \textit{Halbfass J. c. (fn. 1)}, p. 286.
cannot simply take for granted that this development was a conscious one. It is likewise possible that we have to do here with a phenomenon of terminological interference that became possible because of the lack of vigilance when the term adṛśta—dharma and adharma—was taken over by Vaiśeṣikas and incorporated into the text of the VS.

It should be noted that apart from VS 5.2.19, i.e., a sūtra that for other reasons, too, seems to be of later origin, the use of adṛśta—dharma and adharma—is confined to the second āṅkika of adhyāya VI. While in the VS itself no attempt is made to reconcile the disparate usages of the word, the indigenous commentators did feel the need for an explanation; for to them the internal consistence and hence also the terminological unity of the mūla text was a matter of course. That in reality the whole of adhyāya VI of the VS was inserted only later is not something they could have thought of or would have admitted. However, it is precisely this what I hope to show in a study still under preparation.