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A NOTE ON CONCEPT *ADRṢṬA* AS USED IN THE *VAIṢEṢIKASŪTRA*

1. The meaning of the word *adrṣṭa* has in the *VS* (*Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra*) is still controversial. It appears that until recently there was general agreement only in one regard : scholars started from the assumption that there is an original conceptual unity to the word whatever the context in which it occurs. Opinions differed greatly, however, on the precise nature of the unity. I do not want to survey all of them here; instead I should like to draw attention to two of them only, viz. that of E. FRAUWALLNER and that of A. THAKUR; these two can, to a large extent, be regarded as representatives.

1.1. FRAUWALLNER, "to whom we owe the most penetrating and reliable analysis of the Vaiṣeṣika system"¹, touches upon the concept of *adrṣṭa* first in connection with what he calls the supplantation of the old atomistic-mechanistic world-view by new ideas "which changing times call forth"². In the first place he mentions an idea "which was introduced at an early date into Vaiṣeṣika thought where it was inorganic and destroyed the coherent structure of the old natural philosophy", viz. "the belief in the power of good and bad deeds". On the other hand he observes : "In Vaiṣeṣika thought it was not necessary to remodel the teaching of the cosmic power of deeds. It was simply assumed that the good and bad deeds of men, functioning as merit and demerit, produce the invisible (*adrṣṭam*), and it was taught that it not only determines the

1. Quoted from W. HALBFASS' article "Karma, *Apūrva* and 'Natural' Causes : Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of *Samsāra*", published in : *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, ed. by W. D. O'FLAHERTY, Berkeley, 1980, p. 288.

2. Quoted from E. FRAUWALLNER, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. II, Salzburg, 1956, p. 90 f. [60, 63]—The translation from the German original is mine. Numbers within square brackets refer to the pages of the English translation (*History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, tr. by V.M. BEDEKAR, Delhi, 1973).

destiny of souls in the cycle of mundane existences, but, like a natural force, also has influence upon the physical world". The latter function of the *adṛṣṭa* is explained by him by stating³: "Wherever the cause of a 'natural' phenomenon could not be discovered, the facile explanation resorted to—it is in fact no explanation at all—was that it is caused by the invisible, and thus one got accustomed to dispensing with a penetrating inquiry into the nature of things."

1.1.1. FRAUWALLNER does not discuss when this change of views took place; but from scattered remarks and his exposition as a whole it can be deduced that according to him the introduction of the *karman* theory antedates the doctrine of categories. As in other instances also, in FRAUWALLNER's "stimulating, yet inevitably speculative"⁴ attempt to reconstruct the early history of the natural philosophy and the Vaiśeṣika system, in this case, too, it is not clear what kind of textual evidence, which observations or deliberations have led him to this view of the development of the system. Indeed, one would really like to know why *dharma* and *adharma* were not included in the list of *guṇas*—which, to be sure, originally contained only 17 'qualities'⁵—if the *karman* theory was in fact adopted by Vaiśeṣikas before they developed their peculiar theory of categories; for, it is conspicuous that the relevant sūtra, viz. 1.1.5, forms part of those which unmistakably attest to this latter theory. Was FRAUWALLNER influenced by the fact, that⁶ "the belief in the power of good and bad deeds... is age-old in India", that it is definitely earlier than the theory of categories? That is to say, was this the consideration that led him to conclude that the *karman* theory was introduced first into the system?

In this case one would have to make the following objection: The history of ideas in India is by no means lacking in clear examples for the

coexistence, continuing for a long time, of two or more rival, even incompatible ideas; therefore, it is practically impossible to decide without additional evidence when by a 'system' of thought a certain conception was abandoned in favour of another, originally alien to it. And does not the history of materialism in India, though still largely veiled in obscurity, also show that there were traditional schools of thought able to withstand the pressure of widely accepted ideas, of a mighty trend of a period?

1.2. THAKUR, on the other hand⁷, entertains reasonable doubts as regards the historical reliability of Praśastapāda's equation of *adṛṣṭa* with *dharma* and *adharma*, and he starts from the assumption that Praśastapāda might well have been influenced in this case, too, by "the then available exegetical Vaiśeṣika literature no more available to us"⁸

By an independent examination of the occurrences of the word *adṛṣṭa* in the *VS* he wants to prove his thesis, stated right at the outset, viz. that Kaṇāda "seems to divide the entities into known and unknown ones and to distinguish them by the terms *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*"⁹. That is to say, THAKUR comes to the conclusion that in most cases *adṛṣṭa*, especially as a member of the compound *adṛṣṭakārita*, means "unknown".

Yet, THAKUR, too, has a peculiar motive for arguing in this manner. While FRAUWALLNER apparently reproached the Vaiśeṣikas with having become disinclined to critical thought, it is obviously THAKUR's wish to pass Kaṇāda off as a true forerunner of intellectually sincere modern scientists; for he openly states:¹⁰ "... The method adopted by him" (i. e., Kaṇāda) "is one of our richest heritages. Modern sciences also have adopted it. Nobody will deny the fact that Kaṇāda developed in the hoary past a scientific attitude which guided him and his followers to ascertain the truth about this mysterious universe", and he does not even hesitate to add later the remark:¹¹ "The spirit of the sage who

3. *O. c.*, l. c., p. 95 [63].

4. Quoted from HALBFASS, l. c., p. 288.

5. The interpretation of the conjunction *ca* used in *VS* 1.1.5 as given by Praśastapāda and the commentators of the *VS* cannot be accepted as corresponding to this sūtra's original intention. HALBFASS (l. c., p. 285, fn. 55) draws attention to the important testimony of "the Jaina author Jinabhadra (probably sixth century and apparently not familiar with Praśastapāda's work)" who "states explicitly that the number of qualities in Vaiśeṣika is seventeen; cf. *Vīṣeṣavaiśyākabhāṣya*, ed. D. MALVANIA (Ahmedabad, 1966-1968), vv. 2972 ff. with commentary".

6. Quoted from his work noted in fn. 2, p. 91 [67].

7. Cf. his article "Adṛṣṭa and Dharma in the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy" in: *Ritam, Journal of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad*, Vol. I (1969), pp. 51-58 and the "Introduction" to his edition; *Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda* with an anonymous commentary, Darbhanga, 1957, p. (18) f.

8. *L. c.*, p. 51.

9. *L. c.*, p. 52.

10. *L. c.*, p. 52.

11. *L. c.*, p. 53.

seems to have firm faith in the gradual progress of human knowledge cannot be sacrificed". Indians have, no doubt, some right to be proud of the philosophical achievements of the Vaiśeṣika system; the conception of its assumed founder, Kaṇāda, as a thinker who not only frankly confesses the limits of his comprehension of truth, but is also hopeful as regards the progress to be attained by later generations, however, is clearly inspired by quite modern Western ideas about intellectual sincerity and constant progress.

1.2.1. Nevertheless, the main result of THAKUR's semantic investigation, viz. that *adṛṣṭa* means "not seen, i.e., not cognized, not known", deserves full attention though it calls likewise for a critical re-examination. That in research into the history of Indian philosophy, one should endeavour to free oneself as far as possible of preconceived ideas need hardly be stressed. Both the scholars, referred to in the foregoing, seem to lie under prejudices: FRAUWALLNER under a too negative one and THAKUR under one too positive.

2. From this background boldly stand out the studies undertaken during the last years by W. HALBFASS¹², to whom we not only owe a veritable revival of research into the Vaiśeṣika system, but who has also set a new and high standard of problem-consciousness and philological-cum-philosophical analysis. In a recent article of his¹³ he also deals with "Karma, *Adṛṣṭa* and 'Natural' Causality", especially in Vaiśeṣika thought. In examining the *sūtras* in which the word *adṛṣṭa* occurs he comes to the conclusion that¹⁴ "it is obvious that *adṛṣṭa* covers at least

12. The references are (apart from the article mentioned in fn. 1) to the following articles of his:

- (1) "Remarks on the Vaiśeṣika concept of *sāmānya*" in: *Aṅgali, Papers on Indology and Buddhism. A Felicitation Vol. pres. to O.H. de A. Wijesekera on his 60th birthday*, ed. J. TILAKASIRI, Peradeniya, 1970, pp. 137-151;
- (2) "Conceptualization of 'Being' in Classical Vaiśeṣika" in: *WZKS* 19 (1975), pp. 183-198;
- (3) "Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeṣika" in: *WZKS* 20 (1976), pp. 141-166;
- (4) "The Vaiśeṣika Concept of *guṇa* and the Problem of Universals" in: *WZKS* 24 (1980), pp. 225-238; and
- (5) "Prajāstapāda's Concept of Substance" in: *Ritam, L. Sternbach Felicitation Volume*, Lucknow, 1981, pp. 537-544.

13. Cf. above fn. 1.

14. *L. c.*, p. 285.

two different sets of problems and implications, and it may be questioned whether or to what extent there is an original conceptual unity in these two usages. As far as the physical and cosmological usage of *adṛṣṭa* is concerned, its primary function seems to be to account for strange and extraordinary phenomena in nature which would not be explicable otherwise (magnetism, upward movement of fire, etc.), as well as for phenomena which seem to be signs or to contain an element of reward and punishment."^{14a}

He further remarks¹⁵: "Although there is an obvious ethical implication in the second group of cases, the *Sūtra* text does not indicate in any way that the *adṛṣṭa*, which is supposed to cause these events, is to be understood as inhering in souls (*ātman*). This assumption would seem to be even more remote in cases like the upward flaming of fire, for which no ethical, retributive, or psychological implications are suggested. In cases like this, *adṛṣṭa* appears simply side by side with other causes of physical motions like 'gravity' (*gurutva*) or 'fluidity' (*dravatva*), which inhere in those material substances which they affect.... The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not state that the unseen physical power behind such phenomena as the upward flaming of fire and the retributive power of past deeds stored in the soul are identical nor does it state that they are different. We do not know when the identity, which is taken for granted by Praśastapāda and later Vaiśeṣikas, was first established in an explicit and definite manner.... Yet, even the great systematizer Praśastapāda has not been able to harmonize completely or cover the ambiguities and dichotomies inherited from the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*."

I must say that I find these cautious considerations of a dichotomy in the concept of *adṛṣṭa* in the *VS* at the first go-off most plausible, i.e., much more convincing than the interpretations given by FRAUWALLNER and THAKUR. Therefore, I am inclined to accept HALBFASS' suggestion that¹⁶ "*adṛṣṭa*, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the explication of the universe, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a much more decidedly dharmic and soteriological re-interpretation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the universe".

14a. As to the latter type of phenomena, HALBFASS seems to rely on Candrānanda's interpretations which I, however, consider to be highly doubtful.

15. *L. c.*, p. 286.

16. *L. c.*, p. 289.

2.1. The hypothesis, more hinted at by HALBFASS than expressly stated, to which one is nevertheless inevitably led by his important observations, consists in assuming that the 'conceptual unity in the two usages', obviously presupposed by Praśastapāda and those who have written *VS* commentaries in the strict sense, is not original, but the result of the attempt to bring to a common denominator disparate usages of the word, belonging most probably to historically different layers of the *VS*. As for THAKUR in distrusting the testimony of Praśastapāda, he was on the right track; yet he seems not to have taken into proper account that the extant text of the *VS* cannot be regarded as a unitary whole, i.e., as a work composed in one piece.¹⁷ That it, on the contrary, contains many historically different layers which can be—and have in part already been¹⁸—distinguished, and must indeed be held apart, is the basic assumption from which any research in the *VS* has to start today.

The explanations offered by the commentators, including Praśastapāda, on the other hand, have to be looked at with utter reserve and examined very critically, for they start from the opposite assumption and, hence, consider it as one of their major objects to bring out into relief an internal consistence, systematic coherence and terminological unity they simply presuppose; In effect, they cannot but be regarded as highly biased witnesses, and the question whether they (still) are aware of an original irreconcilability is, apart from being hardly answerable, of little importance as regards the necessity of an independent interpretation of the *mūla* text and the method to be applied towards this end.

2.2. HALBFASS' hypothesis does indeed furnish a much better explanation of various strange elements over which one stumbles in reading the *VS*. However, one wonders whether over and above its apparent higher plausibility it can be supported by evidence that does not amount to an *argumentum e silentio*, but is directly based on the usage in the *VS*. The condition such a piece of evidence has to fulfil is, of course, that in the context of the *sūtra* concerned the expression *adṛṣṭa*

cannot be interpreted to stand for *dharma* and *adharma*¹⁹, i.e., as having the meaning "the 'invisible' [results and purposes of ritual and ethical activities]"²⁰.

In this connection attention has to be drawn first to the fact that, besides *adṛṣṭa*, the opposite expression, viz., *dṛṣṭa*, is likewise attested in the *VS*. Hence it appears that THAKUR is right at least insofar as the *VS* distinguishes between entities predicated of as *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*, respectively. An examination of all the occurrences of *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* in the *VS*²⁰ yields, as regards the first expression, the result that in two cases, viz., *VS* 8. 13 and 2. 1. 10²¹, even the plural is used; in the first instance with the meaning "seen (i. e. perceived) [things]", whereas in the other case "visible (i. e. perceivable) [entities]" seem to be intended. Yet the latter *sūtra*, viz., 2. 1. 10 : *na ca dṛṣṭānām sparśa ity adṛṣṭalingo vāyuh*, requires closer study.

2.2.1. THAKUR obviously regarded the use of *adṛṣṭa* in this *sūtra* as exceptional, for he says²² : "Of course we find the use of the expression *a-dṛṣṭa* in the sense of 'not visually cognized' in.....*VS* II. 1. 10". Unfortunately, he does not state explicitly how he interprets the *sūtra* as a whole; but from his rendering of *adṛṣṭa* it may be deduced that he took it to mean : "And/but since touch (or tangibility) does not belong to [the type of] visually cognized [marks], wind has for its mark [something] not visually cognized, [but cognized by the sense of touch]".

18. According to a—still unidentified—quotation from a (lost ?) Vaiṣeṣika work, preserved in Abhayadevasūri's *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* (*Ācāryaśrīśiddhasenadivākarapraṇiṭam Sāmatitarkaprakaraṇam*...), Ahmedabad, *Saṃvat* 1985, p. 685), the *parokṣādṛṣṭasvarūpa* was thus described by Vaiṣeṣikas : "*kartṛphaladāyī ātmagūṇa ātmamāṇasāmyogajāḥ svakāryavirodhī dharmādharma-rūpatayā bhedavān adṛṣṭākhyo gūṇaḥ*"; cf. also Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v. 690 (ed. E. KRISHNAMACHARYA, *GOS*, 30-31, p. 23; ed. Swami Dvatikadas SHASTRI, *Buddha Bhārati Series* 1-2, p. 286).

19. Quoted from HALBFASS, l.c. (cf. fn. 1), p. 285.

20. They can easily be traced with the help of "An Index to the Philosophical Sūtras" by M. HONDA in : *Proceedings of the Okayurayama Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. I (1954), pp. 244-305. It should, however, be noted that this index is based on Śāṅkaramiśra's *sūtrapāṭha*; a new consolidated Vaiṣeṣika *sūtrapāṭha* and word index is presently being prepared by a student of our institute, Mrs. U. PLEWNIA-ERB.

21. The numbering I follow is always that given in : *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrananda, critically ed. by Muni Śrī JAMBUVIRAYAKI, (*GOS* 136), Baroda 1961.

22. L. c., p. 53.

17. Cf. especially Vol. II of E. FRAUWALLNER's *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Salzburg, 1956, his—still unpublished—article "Der ursprüngliche Anfang der Vaiṣeṣikasūtren", my article "Remarks on the Definition 'yoga' in the Vaiṣeṣika sūtra", to be published in the Felicitation Volume for J. W. DE JONG, finally, my monograph : *Textkritische und exegetische Untersuchungen zum Vaiṣeṣikasūtra*, I. Der sechste Adhyāya, still under preparation.

This interpretation is, indeed, in principle conceivable. Yet it would imply that by *VS* 2. 1. 8. (*viṣāṃ kakudmān prāntevādhīḥ sāsānān itī gotve dṛṣṭam liṅgam*) either the term *liṅga* is defined (as referring only to something visually cognized) or the term *dṛṣṭam liṅgam* is exemplified. It has to be admitted that the example given in 2. 1. 8, viz., the characteristic marks of a cow, or rather an animal of the bovine species, might be taken to point in both these directions. However, in this case one would expect 2. 1. 9 to read *na ca sparśaḥ*, "but touch (or tangibility) is not [a visually cognized *liṅga*]", not *sparśaś ca*; for, otherwise one would have to make the most unlikely assumption that only *liṅgam* is still valid (*anuvṛtta*) in 2. 1. 9, that is to say, that the author has, quite needlessly, used a rather obscure wording. Besides, as to the first alternative, the argument could not but be styled as almost foolish: to define first the concept of *liṅga* as something that is only seen and to add later that it likewise includes something cognized by the sense of touch, i. e., is ultimately something perceived by any sense-organ whatsoever, would reveal a deplorably low standard of almost pre-logical thinking that should not be imputed even to a philosophical text of a comparatively early period of thought. And, to be sure, there is no evidence that the distinction between 'characteristic marks' in terms of the sense organ they are perceived by was ever deemed in Indian philosophy to be of significant importance.

Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that *dṛṣṭa* in 2. 1. 8 means "perceived, cognized by the senses", that the particular example given was chosen because it is hallowed by tradition, i. e., a *mūrdhābhiṣikta udākaraṇa*, and that *dṛṣṭānām* in 2. 1. 10 is not a *genitivus partitivus*,—which, by the way, would also be unnecessarily unequivocal.

2.2.2. There is, however, another interpretation of *VS* 2. 1. 10 that calls for a more detailed critical examination; it immediately leads into the intricate problems connected with the theory of inference (*laiṅgikam* [*jñānam*]) in the *VS*. What I am referring to is the study of N. SCHUSTER, the last one to deal with them extensively²³. She is of the following opinion²⁴: "The mark is, normally, something perceived, as horns, dewlap, etc., are the '*dṛṣṭam liṅgam*' (perceived mark) of the cow",—in a note she refers to *VS* 2. 1. 8. "In some cases, the connection between the entities and their marks is not perceived—wind (*vāyu*),

23. "Inference in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras", in: *JIPh* I (1970-72), pp. 341-395.

24. *L. c.*, p. 342.

thus has tangibility or touch (*sparśa*) as its '*adṛṣṭalingam*' (unperceived mark)"; in another note²⁵ she quotes *VS* 2. 1. 9 and 10, renders them by "And tangibility (is a mark of wind). And tangibility is not the mark of things (which are) perceived—therefore it is the unperceived mark (with respect) to wind", and adds the explicatory remark: "This expression which I translate as 'unperceived mark' as contrasted with 'perceived mark' is a technical term; it does not mean that the mark itself has not been perceived, but that its connection with its possessor has not been".

That is to say, according to SCHUSTER the *VS* distinguishes between the technical terms *dṛṣṭam liṅgam* and *adṛṣṭalingam*. Yet she does not come up with any further evidence for the latter one which one would in any case expect to read *adṛṣṭam liṅgam*. Her sole argument being the occurrence of the word *adṛṣṭalingo* in *VS* 2. 1. 10, it is her interpretation of this *sūtra* on which critical attention has to be focused.

2.2.2.1. The first question that arises here is whether the interpretation of the second part of the *sūtra*, i. e., of *ity adṛṣṭalingo vāyuh*, as given by her is at all grammatically possible. This much is clear right from the beginning: to be precise, this expression cannot be equivalent to "therefore it is the unperceived mark (with respect) to wind"; for, the possibility of a substantival compound having been attracted in gender to the word it refers to, can be safely ruled out. *Adṛṣṭalingo* cannot but be a *bahuvrīhi*; and, on the assumption made by SCHUSTER, it has to be translated verbatim as "therefore wind is something the characteristic mark of which is not perceived". But in view of the undeniable fact that the particular *liṅga* of the wind, i. e., *sparśa*, is on the contrary actually perceived, the interpretation to be preferred with SCHUSTER would be ".....is something the characteristic mark of which is an 'unperceived mark'", and this would, according to SCHUSTER's interpretation, have to be taken to ultimately mean. ".....is something the characteristic mark of which is a mark the connection of which with its possessor has not been perceived". It must be allowed that SCHUSTER has assumed a resolution of the compound that is, no doubt, possible, not only according to the better feeling for words the indigenous grammarians cannot be denied²⁶.

25. *Viz.* 8, *L. c.*, p. 386 f.

26. *Cf.* *Vārtika* 12 on Pāṇ. 2.2.24 (*Mahābhāṣya*, ed. F. KIELHORN, Vol. I, 1962, p. 423.21 ff.); although according to Kātyāyana and Patañjali one would expect the prior member to be in the locative, it is to be noted that there are also *bahuvrīhis* of this type with the stem as prior member; cf. J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik*, Bd. II, 1, Göttingen 1957, [109 a] 5) as well as A. DEBRUNNER's "Nachträge", ib., p. 78.

The other assumption of hers, however, viz., that Vaiśeṣikas in order to name a characteristic mark "the connection of which with its possessor has not been perceived" have coined a technical term *adṛṣṭa-līṅgam*, or *adṛṣṭam līṅgam*, is highly problematic.

2.2.2.2. This assumption, which seems to have suggested itself to SCHUSTER because of the expression *dṛṣṭam līṅgam* in 2.1.8, has the following implications: One would have to assume

1. that both these terms are extraordinarily pregnant expressions insofar as—in strong contrast to what is actually denoted by them—the meaning intended would be "a mark the connection of which with its possessor has (not) been perceived";
2. that *VS* 2.1.15 (*vāyur. iti sannikarṣe²⁷ pratyakṣābhāvād dṛṣṭam līṅgam na vidyate*), whatever the argumentative function it may have within the given context, is either redundant—because according to SCHUSTER it is stated already in the forgoing that in the case of wind the particular mark is of the *adṛṣṭa* type (in the sense assumed by her for this term)—or it is nonsensical—because in none of the preceding sūtras the existence of a *dṛṣṭa līṅga* would have been asserted;
3. that the stage reached in the development of reflexion on inference as a means of valid cognition could not but be considered to be quite advanced, since the *VS* would, on her assumption, clearly distinguish between two types of conclusive marks both based on whether their connection with their possessor has been perceived or not, i. e., on the basis of the *līṅgin* being perceptible; that is to say, one would have to assume that the *VS* makes a distinction similar to that drawn by Candramati²⁸ between *dṛṣṭasāmānya* and *adṛṣṭasāmānya*²⁹, however what

27. The reading *sati sannikarṣe*, found in Candrananda and anonymous *Vyākhyā* (cf. the edition of the *VS* noted in fn. 7, p. 21), is most probably of later origin.

28. H. UI, "The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-Śāstra. . .", London, 1917, p. 97 and E. FRAUWALLNER's article "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram" in *Studia Indologica, Festschrift für W. Kirfel*, Bonn, 1955, pp. 73 ff.

29. In fn. 13 (l. c., p. 73) FRAUWALLNER remarks: "One is tempted to see in this expression" (of the Chinese translation) "the Indian *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*; the Chinese rendering, however, rather points to *dṛṣṭasāmānyam* and *adṛṣṭasāmānyam*. . .".

SCHUSTER in fact supposes—and it now appears that it was this assumption that has inspired her to offer this peculiar interpretation—is the influence of the Sāṃkhya philosopher Vṛṣaṇa, for she says,³⁰ ".....it looks very much as though much of what the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* discuss was borrowed directly from the *Śaṣṭitantra*".

As to the first implication, already the manner in which I have stated it above indicates that I consider the existence of a technical term *adṛṣṭa-līṅgam*, or *adṛṣṭam līṅgam*, to be extremely doubtful. Even if it is assumed that the counterpositive term *dṛṣṭam līṅgam* was created first and later re-interpreted so as to mean a mark the connection of which with its possessor has been perceived, one still fails to understand why Vaiśeṣikas should have coined the term *adṛṣṭalīṅgam*, or *adṛṣṭam līṅgam*, that is indeed open to misconception. Just because it is neatly parallel to the other one?

There is, however, no evidence to show that *dṛṣṭam līṅgam* in *VS* 2.1.8 does not mean what is actually denoted by it, viz., "a mark that has been perceived". This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a later re-interpretation of the term, either within the stages of development comprised by the extant *VS* itself or in the course of its reception by later commentators or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors of independent works. In fact, *dṛṣṭam līṅgam* is met with again in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* and *-bhūṣaṇa*³¹. According to his definition³² this term is equivalent to *pratyakṣayogyārthānumāpakam*; that is to say, *dṛṣṭam līṅgam* is conceived as a mark "that allows to infer an object which could in principle also be perceived", and which must have been previously actually perceived, for Bhāsarvajña gives in his *Bhūṣaṇa* the additional explanation³³: *pratyakṣayogyatā ca pūrvadṛṣṭatvenaivāvagamya yasmād yo'rthaḥ pūrvam pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭaḥ, sa eva deśāntaritaḥ kālāntarito vānumīyate 'tas tad anumānam dṛṣṭārthaviśayatvena dṛṣṭam uktam*/...

Hence it follows that Bhāsarvajña, too, though fully aware of the decisive role which the connection between *līṅga* and *līṅgin* plays in

30. *L. c.*, p. 352, cf. also p. 349.

31. *Śrīmadācārya bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāya-bhūṣaṇam tadetat. . . Svāmī Yogīndranandaḥ. . . sampāditavān, Vārāṇasi*, 1968, p. 229.

32. *O. c.*, p. 272.

33. *O. c.*, p. 230.

inference³⁴, uses the term *dṛṣṭam* *līṅgam* not figuratively, but in the sense (the word *dṛṣṭa* [one actually expects] to have when attributed to *līṅga*). Thus Bhāsarvajña's conception comes close to what SCHUSTER read into *dṛṣṭam* *līṅgam* in VS 2.1.8; yet, significantly enough, the term Bhāsarvajña uses for a *līṅga* of the opposite type, i. e., "a mark that allows to infer an object which by its nature is outside the range of perception" (*svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthānumāpakam*³⁵) is *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*! This distinction, however, is Bhāsarvajña's own, and though probably influenced also by the VS, has to be regarded as a later development. SCHUSTER cannot be said to have adduced a circumstantial proof for the assumption that the author of VS 2.1.8-10 had in mind an equally elaborate dichotomy. Whatever the reason that inspired SCHUSTER to make her bold assumption—the occurrence of the complex expression *adṛṣṭalīṅga* in VS 2.1.10 or the alleged influence of Vṛṣagaṇa or both these points taken together—there is no reason to believe in the existence of a term *adṛṣṭalīṅgam*, or *adṛṣṭam* *līṅgam*.

It has, however, to be admitted that it is not possible to argue against SCHUSTER in the following manner also: Since *dṛṣṭe* in VS 3.1.14 (*pratyāṅginivṛtti ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paratra līṅgam*³⁶) agrees in gender and number with the dual subject and not with *līṅgam*, *dṛṣṭam* in 2.1.8 too cannot be taken to be an attribute of *līṅgam*. For, the syntactical differences obtaining between these two sūtras must not be overlooked, and the existence of a (terminologically) fixed expression *dṛṣṭam* *līṅgam* does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a 'free' use of the participle *dṛṣṭa*. This means that in spite of the apparent internal connection between VS 3.1.14 and 2.1.8, established by the term *dṛṣṭa* (i. e., by the fact that in both cases something perceived is spoken of as forming a conclusive mark), it is advisable to keep both formulations apart and to take 2.1.8 to mean: ".....this (*iti*) is the mark perceived with reference

to the nature of a cow [by which it can be inferred that an animal which is only partially in the field of vision is a cow, or bull³⁷]."

To continue now with the last, i. e., third implication: It may well be that Vṛṣagaṇa exercised influence on some parts of the VS. But as far as the particular influence assumed by SCHUSTER is concerned, it would fail to account in a convincing manner for the change in terminology; for, one would have to assume that in the VS, Vṛṣagaṇa's *viśeṣato dṛṣṭam* was replaced by *dṛṣṭam* *līṅgam* and his *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* by *adṛṣṭalīṅgam* (or *adṛṣṭam* *līṅgam*). This would in many respects be a terminological step backwards, a passage from preciseness to ambiguity the motive for which would be anything but intelligible. Of decisive importance, however, is the fact that Vṛṣagaṇa's distinction between *viśeṣato dṛṣṭam* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* has nothing at all to do with the perceptibility of the connection between *līṅga* and *līṅgin*. Instead it aims at the character of the object inferred, viz., whether it is a particular thing (e. g., the particular fire), perceived already previously, or something general (e. g. a fire), that either in a given situation happens to be outside the range of perception or that by its very nature cannot be perceived at all³⁸.

Now, SCHUSTER seems to assume³⁹ that the relation between Vṛṣagaṇa's distinction and that allegedly found in the VS consists in that the object inferred by a *viśeṣato dṛṣṭam anumānam* (*dṛṣṭam* *līṅgam*) has already perviously been perceived, whereas in the case of a *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference (*adṛṣṭalīṅga*) it has not been perceived at all; and on the basis of her, I think, untenable interpretation of VS 2. 15-17, she further

37. Cf. Candranānda's introductory remark on VS 2.1.9: *yathā apratyakṣāyām govyaktau kathameid gṛhyamāṇā viśāṇādayo līṅgam dṛṣṭam anumāpakās tathā*. . . . If it is all the marks (referred to in VS 2.1.8) taken together and not just one of them that constitute the *līṅga* of a cow, then one wonders which situation Candranānda had in mind when exemplifying the operation of this mark; for it is hardly imaginable that all the marks are perceived, yet not the possessor itself. A further question posed by VS 2.1.8 is why, instead of the marks themselves, the possessor as characterized by them is named; Candranānda's explanation, viz. *viśāṇyādibhiḥ śabdais tadvatpratipādakair apy arthavyāpārād dharma eva vyapadiśyante*, is not at all convincing; it seems rather that the author of VS 2.1.8 wants to describe the actual cognition of a person who sees an animal and thus knows that it is "characterized by horns, etc."

38. On Vṛṣagaṇa's theory of cognition cf. in the first place E. FRAUWALLNER's article "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems", in: WZKS II (1958), pp. 84-739.

38a. L. c., p. 248.

34. Cf. his definition of *anumāna*, *o. c.*, p. 194: *sāmyagavīṇābhāvena parokṣānubhavasādhanam anumānam*, and its explanation by the *Bhāṣya*.

35. *O. c.*, p. 272.

36. Candranānda gives the following explanation: *pratyagātmeti śarīram|śarīre pratyāṅginivṛtti dṛṣṭe ātmānam anumāpayataḥ|śarīram pratyānavatādhiḥ|hitam hitāhitapratyāṅginivṛttimatvād ghaṭavat.*

The interpretation of *pratyagātman* apart, this seems to correspond to the author's intention.

makes the assumption that Kaṇāda himself distrusted the conclusiveness of a *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference (*adṛṣṭalinga*). However, the wording of VS 2. 1. 8 does not by any means indicate that its author refers to a special inference by which a particular, individual cow, that was previously perceived, is now cognized. Of, at least, equal importance is another quite unpalatable consequence of SCHUSTER's assumption: one would have to assume that in 2. 1. 9 only *lingam* is still valid (as in the case of THAKUR's interpretation of 2. 1. 8; see above). Besides, the fact, too, admitted by SCHUSTER herself that in the case of ether no doubts are raised against the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference by which its existence is established, namely in VS 2. 1. 20, does not speak in favour of her assumption.

Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, whatever the influence Vṛṣagana may have exercised on the VS elsewhere, at this particular point it is nowhere tangible, in any case not in the sense apparently assumed by SCHUSTER.

I do not, of course, want to dispute that Vṛṣagana (in paving the way for his 'rational' exposition of Sāṃkhya metaphysics) was aware of the distinction between an *anumāna* that allows to infer the existence of an object in principle perceptible and an inference for things lying outside the range of perception, (*atīndriyā bhāvāḥ*), but obviously this was not the dichotomy intended by the terms *viśeṣato dṛṣṭam* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*. FRAUWALLNER too, only assumes Vṛṣagana's influence on Candramati, but he does not at all overlook the differences between the inference theories of both these philosophers which he explains by stating^{38b} that the latter "has altered many an element".

As to the second implication, it too involves considerable difficulties; they are indicated by SCHUSTER herself, yet obviously not realized in their full significance, for she states.³⁹ "The case is somewhat different with wind (*vāyu*). First, sūtras 2.1. 8-10 contrast the perceived marks of the cow (horns, etc.) with the 'unperceived mark' of wind which is tangibility (*sparsa*). Tangibility is, nonetheless, the mark, perceptible as sound is, and following the model of the argument for sound and physical space⁴⁰, one would expect it to suffice as proof for wind. Sūtras II. 1. 15-17, however, find it not sufficient as a mark because it is impossible to

38b. Cf. his article mentioned in fn. 28, p. 79.

39. L. c., p. 342 f.

40. Read: ether!

observe its connection with what possesses it; therefore wind, the possessor of tangibility, has no perceived mark (*dṛṣṭam lingam*) and no particular possessor can be established by 'seeing from the general'. To compound the reader's amazement, no further attempt at an inference of wind is even made, and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, which are supposed to admit only two means of cognition, perception and inference, conclude that the only way to know that wind exists is from scripture".

SCHUSTER contrasts VS 2. 1. 9 f. with 2. 1. 10 ff., i. e., the sūtras intended to prove the existence of ether (*ākāśa*); it is most significant that neither in 2.1.20 itself nor in one of the immediately following sūtras the expression *adṛṣṭam lingam* is used; instead the term actually used is *linga* only; likewise due attention has to be given to the fact that objections like those raised in 2.1. 15-17 against the inference of wind are lacking in this case, and that on the other hand the objections of 2.1. 15-17 agree (except for the very first word) verbatim with those raised in 3.2. 6-8 against the proof for the existence of the soul, although in 3.2.4 the term used is again not *adṛṣṭa linga*, but *ātmalīṅgāni*. Therefore, the conclusion suggests itself that a 'term' *adṛṣṭalingam*, or *adṛṣṭam lingam* does not exist at all. But there are further and even more convincing arguments that can be brought forward against the central hypothesis framed by SCHUSTER. It should, however, be borne in mind that in the following I shall only summarize what has been dealt with elsewhere by me in greater detail⁴¹.

First, it should be noted that Dīnāga who in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* devotes considerable space to a critical examination of the theory of knowledge as taught by the Vaiśeṣikas⁴², apparently does not know of a distinction between *dṛṣṭam lingam* and *adṛṣṭalingam*, or *adṛṣṭam lingam*. Otherwise, one would expect him to have mentioned it at least in the context of the criticism he directs against the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference and he would have framed his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika "proof for the existence of ether, etc." in a different manner: his argument against this particular inference, viz., that neither the *dharmin* nor its connection with

41. Viz. in the study referred to above in fn. 17.

42. For the sake of convenience I refer to the appendix p. XXXI ff. in Jambūvijaya's edition of the VS (cf. above, fn. 21) as well as to his "*saptamaṁ parīṣṭam*", p. 197 ff.

the *dharma* are proved⁴³, would have a different form had he referred to a Vaiśeṣika argument which already admitted that in these cases the connection between the *liṅga/dharma* and the *liṅgin/dharmin* is not seen or perceived. And, to be sure, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that what Diṅnāga's criticism is directed against is only the inconsistency of the *VS* in which the inference for wind adduced first is refuted later, while in the case of ether no such scruples are voiced.

Secondly, apart from the fact that SCHUSTER's interpretation of *VS* 2.1.17 (*tasmād āgamikam*) does not stand a critical examination⁴⁴, it is to be noted that she either did not realize or overlooked that in fact another inferential proof for the existence of wind is adduced later, viz., in 2.1.18 and 19, and that these latter two sūtras have, judged from a synchronic point of view, the function of a *siddhānta*. As to the entire portion of the *VS* beginning with 2.1.8 and ending with 2.1.19, SCHUSTER obviously fails to recognize its true dialectical structure; this becomes particularly conspicuous in the case of 2.1.15-19 where in reality the first three sūtras form the objections of an opponent against 2.1.9 ff. and the following two sūtras are meant to refute them.⁴⁵ Regarding the relation in which *VS* 2.1.15-17 stand to 3.2.6-8 it can be shown not only that the latter have served as a model for the former, i.e., that 2.1.15-17 are of later origin than 3.2.6-8⁴⁶, but also that the opponent of 2.1.15-17 is only fictitious in the sense that the doctrine itself could never have existed; for, it can hardly be assumed that an adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the 'substance' wind alone. The reason for the later insertion of 2.1.15-17 is most probably that a transmitter or redactor of the *VS* came to realize that the objections raised in 3.2.6-8 against the *ātmānumāna* are likewise valid with reference to the proof for the existence of wind as given in 2.1.9 f. and, hence, did his best to fill in this gap in the argument by adapting the objections formulated in 3.2.6-8 to

the new context (=2.1.15-17) and by adding what he considered a convincing counter argument (=2.1.18 and 19)^{46a}.

Although SCHUSTER already in the introductory passage of her article speaks of her impression that⁴⁷ "there seem to be definite strata within those sections of the sūtras dealing with inference", she obviously did not take into account this possibility as regards the section of the *VS* now under discussion; nonetheless, this text-critical interpretation suggests itself to any critical and unbiased mind. Her view that it was Kaṇāda himself who⁴⁸, "rejects this possibility" (viz., of proving the existence of wind by means of an *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference) "because no particular entity can be inferred by this method, only something in general", is rather strange, to say the least; in any case, it is untenable.

As soon as the real dialectical purpose of *VS* 2.1.15-17 is taken into account, i.e., as soon as these sūtras are recognized to be formally objections, one cannot but admit that the opponent in 2.1.15 denies (*na*) the existence (*vidyate*) of a *dṛṣṭam liṅgam*. Because of the argument adduced in the preceding part of this sūtra, viz., *vāyur iti sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvāt*⁴⁹, however, it cannot be gainsaid that the author's conception of the term *dṛṣṭam liṅgam* includes the essential condition that the connection between the *liṅga* and its possessor must have been perceived previously, i.e., that he takes the expression to mean that the character of being a conclusive mark of something perceived is likewise realized by having perceived previously both, *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, together.

Yet, this observation does not invalidate what has been stated above on this term in 2.1.8; the criticism of 2.1.15-17 as a whole attests to a much more advanced stage of reflexion on logical problems, and these latter sūtras can be shown, as already mentioned, to be of later origin; therefore, it may be assumed without hesitation that this is a later, more elaborate interpretation. Had the author of *VS* 2.1.8 himself realized

43. Cf. Jambūvijaya, o. c., p. 198.

44. In the study noted in fn. 17 it will be shown in great detail that *āgamikam* (note that this is a neutre) cannot but mean what Candrananda gives as explanation, viz. *pravādamātram*, "nothing but an (traditional) assertion [of your's that lacks any proof whatsoever]."

45. In this respect Candrananda's interpretation of these two sūtras, introduced by *naitat*, is clearly correct.

46. But these latter, in their turn, were apparently equally unknown to Diṅnāga.

46a. Viz., that the existence of wind is proved by the word 'wind' because the word was created by persons who are '*asmadvīṣṭa*', i. e., who have perceived wind before coining its name.

47. L. c., p. 341.

48. L. c., p. 342.

49. Cf. Candrananda's explanation: *yathā 'ayam gauḥ' iti go's cakṣuṣā sannikarṣe sati pratyakṣeṇa viśāṇādīni tadyogitayā dṛṣṭāni kadācid liṅgam, naivaṁ tvacā vāyoḥ sannikarṣe sati 'ayam vāyuh' iti pratyakṣeṇa tadguṇatayā spṛṣa upalabdho yenānupalabhyamānam kadācid vāyūm anumāpayet*.

the importance of the connection between *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, he could not have expressed himself the way he actually does, nor argued in the manner of 2.1.9 f. ! That is to say, my own interpretation of 2.1.15 ff. implies that the author of 2.1.8 ff. (which belong to an earlier stratum of the *VS*) was—like the author of *NS* 1.1.5⁵⁰—aware of the fact that inference presupposes perception, but was yet unable to recognize what was, to be sure, discovered only later and called *avinābhāva*, *vyāpti*, etc., i.e., he had taken the step from *liṅga*, “characteristic mark”, as used in everyday language, to the logical term *liṅga*, “conclusive mark”, but had not yet clearly realized what is implied unconsciously by the *laukika* word, viz. that the connection of the mark with its possessor should have been perceived previously.

In spite of the apparently higher level of reflexion revealed by *dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam* as understood by the author of *VS* 2.1.15 (ff.) it has to be admitted that his denial of the existence of a “perceived mark” makes sense—not on SCHUSTER’s assumption⁵¹, but—only if in the foregoing this existence had been asserted either explicitly or implicitly. The only *sūtra* he can be said to is 2.1.10. Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that SCHUSTER’s interpretation of this *sūtra* does not correspond to its original intention.

2.2.3. Thus, the way is cleared for another and, I think, much better interpretation of *VS* 2.1.10. I propose to translate it thus: “But (*ca*) since touch (or tangibility) is not [a characteristic and conclusive mark] of [entities]⁵² that are seen (i.e., perceived⁵³), that of which [this] conclusive mark (namely touch, or tangibility) [allows inference] is [an entity] not seen (i.e., perceived), [namely] wind”.

That is to say, I take the *sūtra* to be a rather complex, pregnant argument in three steps, viz. : (1) *spārśa* is not a characteristic and conclusive mark of visible or perceivable entities; (2) therefore, it must be that of something invisible or not perceivable; (3) the invisible or imperceptible entity the existence of which can be inferred by *spārśa* is wind

50. Cf. my article “Die ‘dreifache’ Schlussfolgerung im Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5” in *III* XI (1969), pp. 190-211.

51. Quoted above.

52. It looks very much as though *VS* 2.1.10 is based on the assumption that it has still to be determined to which category these entities belong; see below.

53. Candrananda adds by way of explanation: *yadi khalv ayam kṣityādisparśo bhaviṣyad gandharasarūpāḥ sahopalabhemahi. . .*

(the other invisible or imperceptible entities, i.e., ‘substances’, being excluded because in order to prove their existence other specific marks are adduced). As to syntax, I take *adṛṣṭaliṅgo* to be equivalent to *adṛṣṭe* or *adṛṣṭasya liṅgam yasya sah* and to be the subject of the sentence⁵⁴. The construction is admittedly a bit awkward; nevertheless, it is, to be sure, not only possible, but also the only one that really makes sense in the narrower and wider context. The complexity of this formulation was apparently felt also by the commentators; as only too often, they do not, however, try to explain it literally, but confine themselves to reformulate its gist.

2.2.4. After what has been said in the foregoing it need hardly to be emphasized that this hypothesis passes muster more easily than that framed by SCHUSTER. But my hypothesis also leads to further questions. Thus, what should perhaps be stressed is that there is every appearance that the conception of *liṅga* evident in *VS* 2.1.8-10 forms the oldest stage in the development of the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference. This conception is—similar to that of the *NS*—characterized, as already suggested, by a palpable lack of reflexion on the true nature of logical reason, and this is why it was rejected by later logicians, e.g., by Dinnāga.

The analysis of 2.1.8-10 has, however, yielded the result that here the author distinguishes *de facto* between a mark that allows to infer something which is in principle itself perceivable and a mark by which the existence of something can be inferred that by its nature lies beyond the range of perception. Nevertheless, this distinction—like that of *NS* 1.1.5 between *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* on the one hand and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* on the other—does not imply that the logical character of the *liṅga* and its connection with its possessor had already been reflected upon; on the contrary, e.g., the *Nyāyabhaṣya* on *NS* 1.1.5 clearly shows that this was not the case, and the further development of Indian logic no less corroborates this assumption.

However, it may be questioned whether in the *VS*, e.g. in 2.1.20 and 3.2.4, a still older stage is attested, one characterized by the fact that not even the perceptibility or imperceptibility of the object to be

54. That is to say, my translation is, for stylistic reasons, not in every respect faithful to the original. A literal translation would be: “. . . (i. e. perceived), that of which the characteristic mark (i. e. touch or tangibility) is one [that allows to infer] what is not seen (i. e. not perceived), is wind.”

inferred is taken notice of. I do not dare to decide this question, but I gather the impression that this assumption is confirmed by the criticism Dinnāga directs against the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference.

It was mentioned above that the kind of influence by Vṛṣagaṇa on VS 2.1.8-10 assumed by SCHUSTER is most unlikely. What has prompted her to make this assumption was obviously the belief that this approach has been suggested by FRAUWALLNER; for she expressly states that⁵⁵ "it is FRAUWALLNER's suggestion that the Vaiśeṣika inference theories should be examined in the light of Sāṃkhya epistemology that I am here pursuing". Now, when going through the two articles of FRAUWALLNER's referred to by SCHUSTER⁵⁶, one fails to detect such a general suggestion; instead what is actually found are quite explicit and clear statements showing that FRAUWALLNER himself while reckoning with specific influences exercised by Vṛṣagaṇa on the VS, nevertheless saw them only in the first *āhnikā* of *adhyāya* III; for he says⁵⁷: "It is here that we meet with a theory of inference that is likewise independent of dialectics and that is based on the stable connection between two things, the different types of which connection one seeks to determine."⁵⁸ Here, too, perception falls back on the second position behind the theory of inference; and the Vaiśeṣika system makes use also of inference by way of exclusion" (i.e., *pariśeṣa* or rather *avṛta* as called by Vṛṣagaṇa).

On the other hand FRAUWALLNER advocates the opinion that⁵⁹ "already the bipartition of inference" (viz., into *dṛṣṭasāmanya* and *adṛṣṭasāmanya*⁶⁰ "as taught by him", i.e., Candramati,⁶¹ is a striking proof of his dependence from Sāṃkhya". That is to say, according to FRAUWALLNER a further influence of Vṛṣagaṇa can be shown only on the Vaiśeṣika author Candramati whom he dates⁶¹ "between 450 and 550

55. L. c., fn. 1, p. 386.

56. Viz. in fn. 1, p. 386; these articles are noted above in fns. 28 and 38.

57. L. c. (cf. fn. 38), p. 134.

58. For significant arguments against FRAUWALLNER's assumption that the division of *sambandha* into different types as taught in the VS is influenced by Vṛṣagaṇa, cf. SCHUSTER, l. c., p. 368.

59. L. c., (cf. fn. 28), p. 79.

60. Cf. above fn. 29.

61. L. c., p. 80.—Note that FRAUWALLNER's hypothesis regarding the relative chronology of Candramati and Prajastapāda is questioned by B. K. MATILAL, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature (A History of Indian Literature, ed. by J. GONDA, VI,2)*, Wiesbaden, 1977, pp. 63 ff.

A.D.". In a footnote he adds the remark that "this bipartition is met with in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* only at two points (II, 1,15-17 and III, 2,6-8)", which he, however, considers to be "later additions".

As regards the last three *sūtras*—2.1.15-17 are of no importance in this respect since they were modelled on 3.2.6-8—to account for the objections raised here by a Buddhist opponent, it is not necessary to assume the influence of Vṛṣagaṇa or Dinnāga. The arguments brought forward in these *sūtras* against the Vaiśeṣika proof for the existence of the soul (*ātman*) can have been likewise inspired by Ch'ing-mu⁶²; that is to say, similar objections were raised already by earlier Buddhist thinkers.

As to the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference as a whole, FRAUWALLNER speaks only of "beginnings"⁶³ of such a theory in the VS "which due to their complex stratification call for a separate discussion". Since unfortunately he could no longer deal with these (in fact intricate) problems, his own interpretation of VS 2.1.8-10 is unknown. Yet, from his remark just quoted it can be inferred that he, too, was of the opinion that on the whole the Vaiśeṣika inference theories attest to a stage in the development of reflexion on logical problems that can hardly be called advanced. In any case, this much becomes highly probable: FRAUWALLNER did not, apparently, consider even privately, as it were, an influence of Vṛṣagaṇa's teaching upon VS 2.1.8-10, not to speak of indicating or asserting it.

3.1. Returning now to our starting point, viz., the term *adṛṣṭa* as used in the VS, the first result to be noted is that in VS 2.1.10 *adṛṣṭa* is used as an expression that stands in contradistinction to *dṛṣṭa* in the same *sūtra*. Since it is not prior to 2.1.11 that an argument is brought forward to prove that wind is a material 'substance', *adṛṣṭa* and perhaps also *dṛṣṭa* in 2.1.10 have to be taken to refer to entities in general, i.e., of which, in the context, it has not yet been decided as to which category they belong. Therefore, one cannot but draw the conclusion that the VS, at least at some point of its development, makes the basic distinction between elements of reality that can in principle be perceived and others

62. Cf. the book of H. UI (noted in fn. 28), pp. 86 ff., as well as M. WALLESER, *Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 3. Teil: Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*. . . , Heidelberg, 1912, p. 106 f.

63. L. c. (cf. fn. 28), fn. 30, p. 79.

that by their nature lie beyond the range of (normal human) perception; and, to be sure, there is no evidence whatsoever nor even the least likelihood that this bipartition was originally connected with ethical and retributive conceptions.

This conclusion does not, of course, necessarily imply that *adr̥ṣṭa* when used as a prior member of the compound *adr̥ṣṭakārīta* must have the meaning "something unperceived or imperceptible"; yet, I think, the assumption has become much more likely that the *VS* has indeed originally accounted for strange and otherwise unexplicable phenomena by resorting to a cause "not perceived or unperceivable", i.e., a cause that could not be determined and for that very reason also not classified as regards the category to which it belongs.

In view of THAKUR's interpretation of the term, however, it seems advisable to try to decide also whether *adr̥ṣṭa* in such contexts is used in the sense of "not perceived"—which might amount to "not yet perceived [by me, but, I trust, perceptible to later philosophers]"—or, on the contrary, in the sense of "not perceivable, i.e., because by its nature it lies outside the range of perception".

There is strong evidence for the latter possibility; for, this *dr̥ṣṭa-adr̥ṣṭa* dichotomy reminds one of the similar distinction drawn by Mīmāṃsakas and Dharmaśāstrins between acts that have a visible motive or purpose and those to which an unseen or spiritual purpose is to be ascribed⁶⁴. Yet, there is another parallel, in terms of chronology and historical relation even closer, namely *NS* 1.1.8: *sa (śabdāḥ) dvividho dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthatvāt*. Pakṣilavāmin's explanation can be relied on in this case; for he says⁶⁵: *yasyeha dr̥ṣyate'rthaḥ sa dr̥ṣṭārthaḥ/yasyāmutra pratīyate so' dr̥ṣṭārthaḥ/evam ṛṣīlaukikavākyaṇām vibhāga itī*. The *NS*'s distinction, though referring to *śabda* as a means of valid cognition, is tantamount to a dichotomy of things perceptible and things imperceptible here, i.e. in this world of ours. Therefore, the assumption seems to be warranted that it is this very distinction, albeit conceived of as a general one, the author (s) of the *VS* originally had in mind.

64. On which cf. P.V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, . . ., Vol. III, 2nd ed; Poona, 1973, p. 836 ff.

65. *Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, A System of Indian Logic*, ed. by G. JHA (POS 58), Poona 1939, p. 21.

3.2. HALBFASS' hypothesis can thus be supported by an additional philological argument and may, hence, be said to gain still greater likelihood. Therefore, one will not rest satisfied with the repeated remark of FRAUWALLNER's that⁶⁶ "the two qualities, merit (*dharmaḥ*) and demerit (*adharmaḥ*), are frequently subsumed under the name 'invisible' (*adr̥ṣṭam*)". Certainly this is true; for, e. g., Praśastapāda, while interpreting the conjunction *ca* in *VS* 1.1.5 as intending the inclusion of seven other qualities⁶⁷, actually enumerates only six, i. e., substitutes the term *adr̥ṣṭa* for *dharma* and *adharma* and only by stating the final total to be "*saptaiṣa*" does he make it clear that *adr̥ṣṭa* is used by him as a comprehensive term for the two. However, what FRAUWALLNER does is obviously not admissible; that is, one may not deduce from an observation of the corresponding usage in Praśastapāda and other later Vaiśeṣika authors that *adr̥ṣṭa* as used in the *VS* has but one conceptually unitary meaning. Likewise abortive is THAKUR's attempt to gainsay the fact that *adr̥ṣṭa* is introduced into the *VS* "to ensure the retributive efficacy of actions which have a ritual and moral significance".⁶⁸

Yet, it is, of course, not enough just to state that *adr̥ṣṭa* used in such contexts comprises both the concepts of *dharma* and *adharma*; instead, one has to pose the question when and why this use of the word *adr̥ṣṭa* was introduced into the *VS*. As to this, in the light of the observations and considerations of HALBFASS, the assumption suggests itself that this happened when the "soteriological re-orientation" of the Vaiśeṣika system took place. That is, by expanding the concept *adr̥ṣṭa* from its older use in physical and cosmological contexts in such a manner that it now became a wider concept also covering both *dharma* and *adharma*, an outwardly seamless connection between two highly different ranges of understanding was established, and two different sets of sūtras were bound together superficially, merely by the identity of a word.

In view of the palpable difficulties even the "great systematizer" Praśastapāda had in trying to keep to an original conceptual unity, one

66. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. II, Salzburg, 1956, pp. 141 and 235 [98 and 169].

67. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*Padārthadharmaśāstrāṅgraha*) with Commentary *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdharaḥṭṭa (*Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā* 1), Varanasi, 1963, p. 27: *caśabdasamuccitāḥ ca gurutva-dravayva-sneha-saṃskāra-adr̥ṣṭa-śabdāḥ saptaiṣeṣa evam caturvīmśatir guṇāḥ*

68. Quoted from HALBFASS, *J. c.* (fn. 1), p. 286.

cannot simply take for granted that this development was a conscious one. It is likewise possible that we have to do here with a phenomenon of terminological interference that become possible because of the lack of vigilance when the term *adṛṣṭa—dharma* and *adharmā*—was taken over by Vaiśeṣikas and incorporated into the text of the *VS*.

It should be noted that apart from *VS* 5.2.19, i.e., a *sūtra* that for other reasons, too, seems to be of later origin⁶⁹, the use of *adṛṣṭa—dharma* and *adharmā*—is confined to the second *āhnika* of *adhyāya* VI. While in the *VS* itself no attempt is made to reconcile the disparate usages of the word, the indigenous commentators did feel the need for an explanation; for to them the internal consistence and hence also the terminological unity of the *mūla* text was a matter of course. That in reality the whole of *adhyāya* VI of the *VS* was inserted only later is not something they could have thought of or would have admitted. However, it is precisely this what I hope to show in a study still under preparation.⁷⁰