

PRAŚASTAPĀDA AND DIGNĀGA¹

A NOTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF ANUMĀNA

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In the third chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga quotes from a certain Vaiśeṣika treatise a definition of the logical reason (*hetu*), which runs: *tadvaddharmasya (abhidhānam) hetuḥ* = A reason is (a state-

¹ In a recent issue of this journal, L. SCHMITHAUSEN published an article "Zur Lehre von der vorstellungsfreien Wahrnehmung bei Praśastapāda" (WZKSA 14, 1970, pp. 125—129) in which he criticised my paper "Two types of non-qualificative perception" (Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, Wien 1968, pp. 161—169) in some points. His arguments based on careful analysis of the relevant materials were very convincing, and obliged me to make emendations to my interpretation of Praśastapāda's theory of perception. This paper is not intended as a rejoinder. I only discuss Dignāga's influence on Praśastapāda's theory of *anumāna*, which I could not treat in my former article.

In this paper I use the following abbreviations:

- NS: Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, ed. by GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Poona 1939 (Poona Oriental Series, No. 58)
- NV: Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara, ed. by VINDHYEŚVARĪPRASĀDA DVIVEDIN, Benares 1916 (Kashi Skt. Ser.).
- PDhS: Padārthadharmaśamgraha of Praśastapāda (= Praśastapāda-bhāṣya), ed. (1) together with Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara, by VINDHYEŚVARĪPRASĀDA DVIVEDIN, Benares 1895 (Vizianagram Skt. Ser.), (2) together with Sūkti, Setu and Vyomavatī, by GOPINATH KAVIRĀJ, Benares 1930 (Chowkhambā Skt. Ser.). The page and line numbers in ed. (2) are given in parentheses.
- PS: Pramāṇasamuccaya and Vṛtti of Dignāga, Tibetan Version, The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking ed., Reprint, Tokyo—Kyoto 1957. K = Kanakavarman's transl. (No. 5702), V = Vasudhararakṣita's transl. (No. 5701). The reconstituted Sanskrit texts in this paper are taken from MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA's edition of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Appendix 7.
- VS: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, ed. by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA, Baroda 1961 (Gaekwad's Oriental Ser., No. 136).

ment) of a property of *tadvat*². From Dignāga's explanation, it is known that this definition was preceded by a definition of the proposition (*pratijñā*): *sādhyaābhīdhānam pratijñā* = A proposition is a statement of that which is to be proved³. In reference to this latter, the rather ambiguous term *tadvat* is understood as meaning *sādhyaavat*, that which possesses the *sādhya* (-*dharma*), i. e., the subject of a proposition (*dharmīn*)⁴. Also in PS, chap. IV, a Vaiśeṣika definition of the example (*drṣtānta*) is quoted, most probably from the same treatise, as: *ubhaya-prasiddho drṣtāntaḥ* = An example is that in which both (the *sādhya-dharma* and the reason) are well known (to be present or absent)⁵.

Neither the title of the Vaiśeṣika work from which Dignāga quoted, nor the name of the author of that work, is given by Dignāga or by his commentator Jinendrabuddhi. However, we know from these quotations that the Vaiśeṣikas built up their theory of the syllogism before Dignāga's time, giving a definition to each member of the syllogism. Our sources for the study of the early Vaiśeṣika system are very scanty, and we can hardly ascertain in which period the Vaiśeṣikas came to form this theory. It is not traceable in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. The definition of the proposition is virtually identical with that found in the Nyāyasūtra. The definitions of the reason and the example are simpler than those in the Nyāyasūtra⁶. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Vaiśeṣika theories as referred to by Dignāga are older than the Nyāyasūtra. The existence of a series of Vaiśeṣika works attested by Mallavādin and his commentator Siṃhasūri, who is supposed to have lived not much later than Dignāga, seems to show that the school tradition of the Vaiśeṣikas was kept without interruption up to the time of Dignāga⁷. If the more advanced theory of the syllogism had been formulated, prior to Dignāga, by the Vaiśeṣikas, Dignāga ought to have referred to it.

² PS, K 140b.2: *bye brag pa rnams kyañ "de ldan chos ni gtan tshigs so" brjod pa śes bya ba 'jug go*. V 56b.5: *bye brag pa rnams kyi "de dan ldan pa'i chos gtan tshigs so" śes brjod par byed do*.

³ Ibid., K 140b.3: *'dir yañ gal te de'i sgra "bsgrub bya brjod pa" dan 'brel par byed na . . .* V 56b.6: *'dir yañ gal te de śes pa'i sgras "bsgrub bya brjod pa" dan mñon par 'brel par 'gyur te . . .*

⁴ Dignāga gives various possible interpretations to the word *tadvat* in his examination of the Vaiśeṣika definition of *hetu*. Cf. PS, K 140b.3ff., V 56b.6ff.

⁵ Ibid., K 155b.7: *bye brag pa rnams kyi "gñi ga rab tu grub pa ni dpe'o" śes bya ba . . .* V 70a.3: *bye brag pa rnams ni "gñis ka rab tu grub pa dpe'o" śes zer ro*. Cf. also K 152b.3, V 67a.5.

⁶ Cf. NS, 1.1.33—37.

⁷ A. THAKUR, Introduction to JAMBUVIJAYA's edition of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, pp. 10—14.

Thus, it may be reasonable to consider that the theories which Dignāga takes up for criticism were maintained by the contemporary Vaiśeṣikas.

When we compare the Vaiśeṣika definition of the proposition, etc. as referred to by Dignāga with the same as explained in the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Prāśastapāda⁸, we cannot but acknowledge a distinct gap between the two. Prāśastapāda is found to have introduced new ideas to the Vaiśeṣika system with an entirely new phraseology, but, while doing so, he does not explain at all the reason for introducing new concepts. Take for example his definition of the proposition: *anumeyoddeśo 'virodhī pratijñā* = A proposition is a statement of the object of inference which does not involve contradiction. The new word *anumeya* is found employed in place of *sādhya*, and the meaning of *anumeyoddeśaḥ* is deliberately explained as follows: *pratipipādayiṣita-dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo 'padeśaviśayam āpādayitum uddeśamātram pratijñā* = A proposition is a mere statement, with a view to showing that to which the reason (*apadeśa*) applies, of a subject as qualified by the property, which it is desired to prove. The word *avirodhin* is also new to the Vaiśeṣikas, and it is intended to mean that the proposition should be free from the five kinds of fallacy, that is to say, it should not be contradicted by perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), scripture (*āgama*, or accepted theory: *abhyupagata*), one's own treatise (*svaśāstra*), and one's own words (*svavacana*).

Prāśastapāda is known to have composed, besides the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, an extensive subcommentary (*ṭīkā*) on a certain Bhāṣya, which had been written on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra accompanied by a Vākya⁹. It may be assumed that he fully explained in that lost work the new concepts that he introduced to the Vaiśeṣika system. However, even on this assumption there remains a problem to be cleared up. The views propounded by Prāśastapāda are not of such kind as could be derived from the pre-Dignāga Vaiśeṣika doctrines with a slight modification. There must have been an incentive which induced Prāśastapāda to make some essential changes in the Vaiśeṣika theories. On this point Dignāga's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika theories of inference and syllogism seems to throw some fresh light.

Dignāga takes up for criticism the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition: *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* (NS, 1.1.33), which is substantially the same as the older (i. e., pre-Dignāga) Vaiśeṣika definition. According to him the word *sādhya* simply means that which is contrary to *siddha*,

⁸ PDhS, p. 233ff. (p. 599ff.).

⁹ THAKUR, op. cit., p. 14; G. CHEMPARATHY, "Prāśastapāda and his other names," IJ, XII (1970), p. 252, n. 45.

i. e., that which has not yet been proved (*asiddha*). Thus, a reason and an example, which have not yet been proved to be true, should also be recognized as *sādhya*. Such being the case, if the Naiyāyika definition of proposition were to be accepted, there would follow the absurdity that the statement of the reason and the example of this sort would also be regarded as a proposition. For example, when one states, in order to prove that sound is evanescent, the reason 'because it is visible (*cākṣuṣatvāt*)', the statement of this reason would be considered as a proposition, inasmuch as the visibleness of sound has not yet been proved (*asiddha* = *sādhya*). When one states the proposition and the reason as 'sound is eternal', 'because it is not tangible, (*asparśatvāt*)', and then gives the example 'like *buddhi*', the statement of this example is also to be admitted as a proposition, since whether *buddhi* is eternal or evanescent has not yet been proved¹⁰. Thus the defining of proposition as *sādhyanirdeśaḥ* was found to be defective by Dignāga.

After thus refuting the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition, Dignāga states that the same criticism applies to the definition given in the Vādaividhi: *sādhyaḥbhidhānam pratijñā*¹¹. This is exactly identical with the one formulated by the pre-Dignāga Vaiśeṣikas. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas had to answer this criticism either by defending their definition through finding some justification for it or by making an alteration to their definition. Uddyotakara chose the first means: he emphatically repeated that the word *sādhya* was explained by Vātsyāyana as signifying *prajñāpanīyadharmaviśiṣṭadharmin* (a subject as qualified by the property, which is to be made known)¹². On the other hand, Praśastapāda decided for the second means: he adopted a new expression *anumeya* in place of *sādhya*.

The term *anumeya* is used by Dignāga with a purpose. In his criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition, Dignāga points out the ambiguity of the meaning of the word *sādhya*¹³. It could mean, firstly, the subject of the proposition (*dharmin*), secondly, a property possessed by the subject (*dharma*), and thirdly, the combination of the subject and the property. Dignāga then proceeds to demonstrate that any one of these three cannot be recognized as *sādhya*. Take for example the statement 'sound is evanescent'. As a matter of fact, the *dharmin* 'sound' is known to exist (*siddha*), and it is unnecessary to establish it

¹⁰ PS, chap. III, K 125b.2—4, V 43b.6—44a.1. Cf. NV, p. 110.14ff.

¹¹ PS, chap. III, K 126a.3: *ji ltar rigs pa can rnam la skyon brjod pa de ltar rtsod pa bsgrub par bsad pa la yan, bsgrub bya gtan tshigs dan dpe ltar snañ ba bsad pa dam bca^c bar cgyur ro*. V 44a.7. Cf. NV, p. 117.20.

¹² NV, p. 110.14—20.

¹³ PS, chap. III, K 125b.4—7, V 44a.1—3.

by means of a reason. Thus the first alternative would violate the statement in NS, 1.1.34: . . . *sādhyaśādhanam hetuḥ* (The reason is a means to establish the *sādhya*). If *sādhya* were to mean the *dharma* 'evanescence', then there would be no example that possesses a similarity to the *sādhya*. There are things which are similar to sound in their evanescent nature, but nothing is similar to 'evanescence' since this possesses no property. Thus the second alternative would contradict the definition of the example in NS, 1.1.36: *sādhyaśādharmyāt* . . . (Through similarity with the *sādhya* . . .). The third alternative has the defects of the first and the second. The same type of argument is made by Dignāga in his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika definition of the reason¹⁴. Dignāga himself holds that what is to be proved is the subject qualified by the property (*dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*), and termed it *anumeya* (object of inference)¹⁵. It seems likely that Praśastapāda followed Dignāga when he used the term *anumeya* in his definition of the proposition and explained it by the words *dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*.

It has been noticed by STCHERBATSKY and other scholars that the fallacies of the proposition removed by Praśastapāda with the word *avirodhin* are similar to those mentioned in the texts of Dignāga's school¹⁶. Dignāga's definition of *pakṣa* (proposition) is given in the Nyāyamukha as follows: *svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ*¹⁷. The last word is meant for removing the fallacies of the proposition, and it exactly corresponds to *avirodhin* in Praśastapāda's definition. Attention is to be drawn to the similarity of *sādhyatvenepsita* with Praśastapāda's expression *pratipipādayiṣita*. Praśastapāda had no precedent to follow in the use of this desiderative form, but Dignāga evidently derived it from the definition of *pakṣa* in the Vādaividhāna of Vasubandhu, which runs: *pakṣo yaḥ sādhyaitum iṣṭaḥ* = A proposition is that which it is desired to prove¹⁸. Uddyotakara, who takes up this definition for criticism, understands that the word *iṣṭa* is intended for distinguishing the proposition from the reason and example which are

¹⁴ Ibid., K 140b.3ff., V 56b.6ff.

¹⁵ Ibid., K 111a.6: *rjes su dpag pa(r bya ba) ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te*. V 30a.1: *rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyī khyad par du byas pa'i chos can no*. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, ed. by R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA, Patna 1953, p. 580.14.

¹⁶ STCHERBATSKY, „Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique de la connaissance et l'enseignement des autres écoles philosophiques de l'Inde," le Muséon, V, p. 129ff. (Cf. *Buddhist Logic*, vol. I, p. 346, n. 2); RANDLE, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, London 1930, p. 216.

¹⁷ Nyāyamukha, k. 1, cited in NV, p. 116.7, 9, 17.

¹⁸ NV, p. 113.6.

not yet proved¹⁹. A disputant does not set forth a reason and an example with the desire to prove, but he mentions them as a known property of the subject of the proposition and as a known fact in which both the reason and the *sādhya*dharma are present or absent. Thus the word *iṣṭa* is effective to characterize the proposition as distinct from the yet unproved reason and example. As we have seen above, this idea underlies Dignāga's criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition, and we may assume that Dignāga inherited it from Vasubandhu. In his *Ṭīkā* on the *Vādaśāstra*, Dignāga slightly modified Vasubandhu's definition by adding the word *svayam* to it, as he thought it necessary to make clear that it is the disputant himself, and not an opponent, who desires to prove his proposition in a debate²⁰. The definition found in the *Nyāyamukha* was formulated through this process. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*²¹ we find the expression *svarūpeṇa* in place of *sādhya*tvena. But this does not make an essential change, because Dignāga himself explains in the commentary that *svarūpeṇa* means 'in its own form as a *sādhya*' but not 'as a yet unproved *sādhana*'. The essential term *iṣṭa* is of course not omitted in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Thus in the case of Dignāga, the process through which he came to formulate his definition of the proposition is clearly traceable. On the contrary, in the *Vaiśeṣika* system, there is no internal evidence to explain a considerable change from the older theory to *Prāśastapāda*'s. It is highly probable that *Prāśastapāda* was conscious of the implication of the word *iṣṭa* (or *īpsita*) in Dignāga's definition when he expressed his thought with the desiderative form *pratipipādāyīṣita*.

It has already been remarked by scholars that the theory of the three necessary conditions that an inferential mark should satisfy (*liṅga-trairūpya*), which *Prāśastapāda* sets forth in a verse and ascribes to *Kāśyapa*, is exactly identical with the theory generally acknowledged as being expounded by Dignāga. It has also been pointed out that there

¹⁹ Cf. NV, p. 113.5—7: *sādhya*yor *hetu*ṛṣṭāntayoḥ *prasaṅga* itī *manya-*
*māna*iḥ *kaiścid* *anyathā* *pakṣa*lakṣaṇāni *kriyante* *tadyathā* *pakṣo* *yaḥ* *sādhya*-
tum *iṣṭa* itī.

²⁰ Cf. NV, p. 117.1—2: *yad* *api* *vādaśāstra*ṇaṭīkāyāṃ *sādhya*tīti *śabdasya*
svayam *pareṇa* *ca* *tulyatvāt* *svayam* itī *viśeṣaṇam*. For the authorship of this
ṭīkā, see FRAUWALLNER, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im
Nyāyavārttikam," WZKM 40 (1933), pp. 294—296.

²¹ PS, K 124b.7—8 (V 43a.4—5): *de* *yaṅ* *raṅ* *gi* *no* *bo* *kho* *na* *bsta-*
bdag *ḥdod* (cf. *Nyāyabindu*, ed. by D. MALVANIA, Patna 1955, III.38: *sva-*
*rūpeṇa*iva *svayam* *iṣṭo* 'nirākṛtaḥ *pakṣa* itī). *raṅ* *gi* *no* *bo* *śes* *bya* *ba* *ni* *bsgrub*
bya *yi* *no* *bo* *g* *yi* *sgrub* *byed* *ma* *grub* *pa* *i* *no* *bo* *ni* *ma* *yin* *no* (cf. *Nyāya-*
bindu, III.39—40: *svarūpeṇeti* *sādhya*tvenēṣṭaḥ, *svarūpeṇa*iveti *sādhya*tvenai-
veṣṭo *na* *sādhana*tvenāpi).

is a close affinity between Prāśastapāda and Dignāga in their theories of fallacious reasons. And the dependence of Prāśastapāda on Dignāga was accepted by STCHERBATSKY and other scholars on the basis of the fact that these theories are ascribed by the later Bauddhas and their opponents always to Dignāga and never to Prāśastapāda²². However, some other scholars like FADDEGON and RANDLE did not admit the chronological priority of Dignāga to Prāśastapāda and assumed that both of them had a common source from which each derived his theory independently of the other²³. When we examine Dignāga's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika view of fallacious reasons, we cannot but believe that Prāśastapāda changed the older Vaiśeṣika theory under the influence of Dignāga. I will show some evidence below.

Dignāga quotes VS, 3.1.10—11, which he understood as mentioning three kinds of *anapadeśa* (fallacious reason), i. e., *aprasiddha*, *asat* and *saṃdigdha*. According to Dignāga's interpretation as explained by Jinendrabuddhi, a reason is to be recognized as *aprasiddha* when its relation to what is to be proved is 'not well known'. Suppose, in order to prove the proposition 'there is fire on the mountain', one states the reason 'because of smoke'. If the causal relation between smoke and fire is not well known to either or both of the disputants through previous experiences, this reason is called *aprasiddha*. On the basis of this interpretation, Dignāga points out that *aprasiddha* is not a fallacy of the reason. The relation of smoke with fire is not well known when one has never seen or does not remember a hearth and the like, in which smoke is co-present with fire, or when he, though experiencing the co-presence of smoke with fire, does not realize that smoke is the effect of fire. Thus the fallacy of *aprasiddha* is to be found not in the reason but in the example: the fallacy lies either in the fact that there is no example to be cited (*drṣṭāntābhāva*) or in the fact that smoke is not well known in the example as a cause for proving fire (*hetvarthenāprasiddhaḥ*). Another possible interpretation may be that *aprasiddha* refers only to the object to be proved: if fire is not well known, the reason 'because of smoke', which is stated to prove the existence of fire, is characterized as *aprasiddha*. However, this interpretation would violate VS, 3.1.9: *prasiddhipūrvakatvād apadeśasya*, which is intended to say that one should have perception of fire as related with smoke before he mentions smoke in the reason²⁴.

²² STCHERBATSKY, op. cit.; FRAUWALLNER, "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram," *Studia Indologica*, Festschrift für W. Kirfel, Bonn 1955, pp. 71—73.

²³ FADDEGON, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam 1918, pp. 319—320; RANDLE, op. cit., p. 188.

²⁴ PS, chap. III, K 147a.4—7, V 62b.8—63a.3.

Praśastapāda also quotes VS, 3.1.10—11, and interprets them, like Dignāga, as mentioning three kinds of *anapadeśa*. However, he differs from Dignāga in his understanding of the meaning of *aprasiddha*, etc. He bases his explanation of fallacious reasons on the theory of the triple-conditioned inferential mark (*trirūpaliṅga*), and adopts the terms *asiddha* (unreal reason), *viruddha* (contradictory reason) and *saṃdigdha* (dubious reason) for *aprasiddha*, etc. in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra²⁵. It is not clear which one of these three was recognized by Praśastapāda himself as corresponding to *aprasiddha*. Since *saṃdigdha* is common to the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, he must have understood by the word *aprasiddha* either *asiddha* or *viruddha*. He distinguished from *saṃdigdha* the fourth type of fallacious reason, i. e., *anadhyavasita* (inconclusive reason) and states that the word *aprasiddha* in the sūtra is to be applied also to this type of fallacious reason²⁶. His explanation that *anadhyavasita* is *asiddha* in either direction seems to show that he identified *aprasiddha* with *asiddha*²⁷. However, his commentators Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara take *aprasiddha* as standing for *viruddha*, for the reason that *viruddha* is not known to exist (*aprasiddha*) in the instances similar to what is to be proved (*sapakṣa*)²⁸. This interpretation is also acceptable as representing the idea of Praśastapāda himself, because he explains the second condition of the inferential mark that a *viruddha* does not satisfy with the words: *yad ... anumeyadharmānvite ... prasiddham ...* (that ... which is known to exist ... in things possessing the property of what is to be proved ...)²⁹. Whichever the case may have been, it is noticed that the interpretation of *aprasiddha* proposed by Praśastapāda or his commentators is entirely different from that given by Dignāga.

²⁵ PDhS, p. 204.24—26 (p. 562.14—17), p. 238.9—10 (p. 604.13—14).

²⁶ Ibid., p. 239.13 (p. 605, 15—16): *ayam aprasiddho 'napadeśa iti vacanād avaruddhaḥ*.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 239.11—12 (p. 605.14—15): *so 'nyatarāsiddho 'nadhyaavasāya-hetutvād anadhyavasitaḥ*. For the meaning of the term *anyatarāsiddha* in this passage, see RANDLE, op. cit., p. 213, n. 1. *anadhyavasita* is illustrated by Praśastapāda as follows: *satkāryam utpatteḥ* — Proposition: An Effect exists (in its cause), Reason: Because it originates (from its cause), PDhS, p. 239.12 (p. 605.15). This reason is mentioned in the Vādaividhi as an example of *viruddha*. In his criticism of the Vādaividhi theory of fallacious reason, Dignāga points out that this reason is either *asiddha* or *asādhārāṇa-naikāntika*. Cf. PS, K 145a.6, 145b.1—2, V 61a.4, 61a.5—6.

²⁸ Vyomavati, p. 569.25—27: *aprasiddho 'napadeśa iti viruddhāvaro-dhaḥ, tasya sapakṣe 'prasiddhatvāt*. Nyāyakandali, p. 205.2—3: *aprasiddha iti viruddhāsādhārāṇayoḥ parigrahaḥ tayoḥ sādhyadharmena saha prasiddhya-bhāvād ahetutvam*. Cf. Candrānanda on VS, 3.1.10.

²⁹ PDhS, p. 201.18—20 (p. 562.10—12). Cf. also ibid., p. 237.16—17 (p. 603.4—5): *yad ... tatsamānājātiye sarvatra sāmānyena prasiddham ...*

It seems that Dignāga understood the meaning of *aprasiddha* in accordance with the traditional interpretation of the same term by the Vaiśeṣikas. In Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PS, chap. II, there is a passage cited from a certain Vaiśeṣika work, which explains *anapadeśa* with the following words: "Smoke, for instance, is an *anapadeśa* for a person to whom the relation of smoke with fire is *aprasiddha*"³⁰. Apparently the thought that is expressed in this passage is reflected in Dignāga's criticism of the *aprasiddha* fallacy. The work is named Bhāṣya. It may be the Bhāṣya of Rāvaṇa, whose theory of perception is referred to in PS, chap. I, or the Bhāṣya of an anonymous author, on which Praśastapāda is said to have written an extensive subcommentary. Certainly it is not the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha which is called Praśastapādabhāṣya; nor is it a post-Praśastapāda work, because the interpretation of the word *aprasiddha* given in it is acknowledged, in contrast with that in the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, to be more faithful to the original idea of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. Originally the Vaiśeṣikas recognized only two kinds of fallacious reason, i. e., *asat* and *saṃdigdha* mentioned and illustrated in VS, 3.1.11—12³¹. The sūtra 3.1.10: *aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ* immediately follows the sūtra which states that a valid reason is preceded by the universal knowledge (*prasiddhi*) of the relation of an inferential mark (*liṅga*) to its possessor (*liṅgin*)³². Therefore it seems clear that the sūtra 3.1.10 is meant for giving a definition of fallacious reason in general with the word *aprasiddha*: = A mark whose relation to its possessor is *aprasiddha* is a fallacious reason. Perhaps the same sūtra came to be interpreted by some of the Vaiśeṣikas before Dignāga's time as mentioning *aprasiddha* as a type of fallacious reason distinct from *asat* and *saṃdigdha*. However, the import of the word *aprasiddha* as referring to the relation of an inferential mark to its possessor was not changed by them. Dignāga states that three kinds of fallacious reason are recognized by the Vaiśeṣikas, but evidently he does not know any new interpretation of the word *aprasiddha*. In his criticism

³⁰ Viśālāmalavati 'Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā, Tibetan version, Peking ed., Mdo-hgrel CXV Re, 132b.6—133a.1: *de ltar ni bśad 'grel las "... gañ śig gi du ba la sogs pa rnams me la sogs pa rnams dar'ebrel pa rab tu grub pa ma yin pa de'i nor du ba la sogs pa rnams dmigs kyis bstan pa ma yin pa'o" ses pa ...*

³¹ Cf. STCHERBATSKY, op. cit., p. 168; FADDEGON, op. cit., p. 302; RANDLE, op. cit., pp. 190—191.

³² It is stated in VS, 3.1.8 that a *liṅga* is *saṃyogin*, *samavāyin*, *ekārtha-samavāyin*, or *virodhin* of the *liṅgin*. In reference to this sūtra, the word *prasiddhi* in VS, 3.1.9 is understood as signifying the universal knowledge concerning the relation of a *liṅga* to the *liṅgin*.

of the Vaiśeṣika theory, there is no trace to show that *aprasiddha* was taken to imply *asiddha* or *viruddha*. The *asiddha* fallacy is not acknowledged to have been known to the Vaiśeṣikas or to the Naiyāyikas before a systematic classification of fallacious reasons based on the theory of *līṅga-trairūpya* was made by Praśastapāda. The explanation given by Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara for identifying *aprasiddha* with *viruddha* is obviously forced. That which is *aprasiddha* in similar instances is not always a *viruddha*. What constitutes the characteristic feature of *viruddha* is that it proves the opposite of what is to be proved.

Thus it seems quite likely that Dignāga's criticism impelled Praśastapāda to abandon the older Vaiśeṣika theory of the fallacious reason. Instead of introducing modifications to the older theory, Praśastapāda found it more convenient to adopt wholly Dignāga's classification of fallacious reasons based on the theory of *līṅga-trairūpya*. Apparently *aprasiddha* was no longer recognized by him as a type of fallacious reason. He cited the sūtra with a pretence of following the tradition, but his commentators were compelled to a forced interpretation of the older terminology.

The other two fallacious reasons, *asat* and *saṃdigdha*, are illustrated in VS, 3.1.12: *viṣāṇī tasmād aśvo viṣāṇī tasmād gauḥ* (It is a horse, because it has horns; It is a cow because it has horns). Dignāga says first that the reason itself, i. e., hornedness (*viṣāṇitva*) in both illustrations, is neither absent (*asat*) nor doubtful (*saṃdigdha*): it is a well-known property of the subject of the proposition. This is no more than a quibble: it is clear that *asat* and *saṃdigdha* in the sūtra are meant for expressing the reasons which prove respectively that which is absent and that which is doubtful. But, Dignāga continues, that which is absent (*asat*) is not proved by this type of reason: what is proved by the reason 'hornedness' is not the absence of a horse, but it is that which is contrary (*viparīta*) to a horse. "Therefore, this [reason] is called a contradictory reason (*viruddha*) as it proves the opposite [of what is to be proved] (*viparītasādhana*)"³³.

Both Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara identify *asat* with *asiddha* for the reason that *asiddha* is absent in the subject of the proposition³⁴. But, as stated above, the *asiddha* fallacy was not known to the older Vaiśeṣikas. Evidently *asat* in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra corresponds, as Dignāga

³³ PS, K 147a.7—147b.2 (V 63a.3—6): ... *deḥi phyir eḍi ni egaḥ ba yin te bzlog pa sgrub par byed pa'i phyir ro*.

³⁴ Nyāyakandali, p. 205.4: ... *dharmīṇi vṛttīyabhāvāt* ... Vyomavatī, p. 569.26—27: *asann ity asiddhaḥ, tasya hi pakṣadharmatvenāsattvāt*. Cf. Candrānanda on VS, 3.1.11.

understood it, to *viruddha*. Praśastapāda cites '*viśāṇi tasmād aśvaḥ*' as an example of *viruddha*³⁵.

Noteworthy is the phraseology that Praśastapāda uses in his explanation of *viruddha*. It is surprisingly close to Dignāga's expression. Praśastapāda says: "The reason . . . which is present in the opposite of the object of inference, is a contradictory reason (*viruddha*), because it proves the opposite of what is to be proved (*viparītasādhana*)"³⁶. It is highly improbable that Dignāga criticized the Vaiśeṣika theory with the phraseology borrowed from Praśastapāda or his Vaiśeṣika predecessor. Dignāga fully discusses elsewhere the fallacies of reason on the basis of the *hetucakra*, which he invented to examine all the possible relations between a reason and a *sādhya*dharma³⁷. The characteristic feature of each type of fallacious reason is made clear by him through this procedure. Praśastapāda also has a clear notion of each fallacious reason, but his description of it is rather concise. He seems merely to summarize the theories elaborated by someone. But Dignāga's criticism shows evidently that the distinctive feature of *viruddha* was not properly known to the pre-Dignāga Vaiśeṣikas. It is almost certain that Praśastapāda is indebted to Dignāga for his explanation of the *viruddha* fallacy.

As for the reason that causes doubt (*saṃdigdha*), Dignāga criticizes the Vaiśeṣikas for their mentioning only the one which is present both in things homogeneous with the subject of the proposition and in things heterogeneous to it, which Dignāga calls *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, and for their not mentioning *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvvyabhicārin*³⁸. *asādhāraṇa* means that which is present exclusively in the subject of the proposition, as for example the audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*) of sound, while *viruddhāvvyabhicārin* signifies a pair of valid reasons which, when combined, proves two contradictory properties predicated of the same subject, thus causing doubt. These two types of doubtful reasons are classified by Praśastapāda under the head of *anadhyavasita*, which is not found in Dignāga's system. It has already been shown by scholars that the view to which Praśastapāda refers with '*tti kecit*' when distinguishing *anadhyavasita* from *saṃdigdha* is the one held by Dignāga³⁹. In the light of Dignāga's

³⁵ PDhS, p. 238 (p. 604.25).

³⁶ Ibid., p. 238.17—19 (p. 604.23—24): *yo hy anumeye 'vidyamāno 'pi tatsamānājātīye sarvasmīn nāsti tadviparīte cāsti sa viparītasādhanaḥ viruddhaḥ*.

³⁷ PS, chap. III, K 131b.6ff., V 49a.6ff.

³⁸ Ibid., K 147b.2ff., V 63a.6ff. For the same reason Dignāga criticizes the Vādaividhi, cf. PS, K 145a.7, V 61a.5—6.

³⁹ The explanation of *viruddhāvvyabhicārin* in the Nyāyamukha is cited by Praśastapāda, cf. TUCCI, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, Heidelberg 1930, p. 31, n. 58.

criticism, we may know the incentive that urged Praśastapāda to create a new category. He intended to defend the older Vaiśeṣika theory against Dignāga's attack.

The reason for the marked difference between Praśastapāda and the Vaiśeṣikas known to Dignāga in their theories of the example may also be explained if we place Dignāga between the two. Dignāga mentions four kinds of fallacious example, among which the last one is that which simply shows the simultaneous presence or simultaneous absence of the *sādhya*dharma and the reason without stating the invariable relation between them⁴⁰. In the passage explaining the fallacy of this type of example, the Vaiśeṣika definition '*ubhayaprasiddho drṣṭāntaḥ*' is cited by Dignāga. According to Dignāga, one has to show in the example that the reason is pervaded by the *sādhya*dharma⁴¹: the reason should be accompanied by the *sādhya*dharma on the one hand, and it should be on the other hand absent where there is no *sādhya*dharma. The relation of pervader and pervaded between the *sādhya*dharma and the reason should not be reversed. If that which pervades the *sādhya*dharma were stated as the reason, it would not be sufficient to prove the proposition, since it allows the case in which there is the reason but not the *sādhya*dharma. Thus, the example which shows the mere simultaneous presence of the *sādhya*dharma and the reason is not a true example, because the simultaneous presence of the two does not prove that their relation is invariable; and moreover it allows the possibility of the relation of pervader and pervaded being reversed.

Praśastapāda must have been well aware of Dignāga's theory when he observed, with terms similar to Dignāga's, that the exemplification (*nidarśana*) is the showing of the invariable conformity (*anuvīdhāna*) of the inferential mark to the object of inference, or that it is the showing of the absence of the inferential mark in that which is opposite to the object of inference (*anumeyaviparyaye līngasyābhāvaḥ*)⁴². The classification of an example into two, the one through similarity (*sādharmya*) and the other through dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), is found in the Nyāya-sūtra, but the relation of pervader and pervaded between the *sādhya*dharma and the reason was not properly understood even by Vātsyāyana⁴³. Dignāga emphasized his explanation of this relation, while Praśastapāda simply states it without giving any explanation. This, I believe, is evidence of Praśastapāda's dependence on Dignāga.

⁴⁰ PS, chap. IV, K 152b.2—4, V 63a.6—7.

⁴¹ Nyāyamukha, k. 11 = PS, chap. IV, k. 2, K 148a.6, V 63b.8. Cf. NV, p. 129.11ff.

⁴² PDhS, p. 246.15—18 (p. 611.16—19).

⁴³ Cf. Nyāyabhāṣya, ad sūtra 1.1.35—37.