

# A NOTE ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA II 366.26 : GUNASAMDRĀVO DRAVYAM

*Studies on Mallavādin's Dvādaśāranayacakra II\**

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## 1

With reference to a particular period in the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika (as tentatively reconstructed by him), Frauwallner<sup>1)</sup> remarks that “just at this time the science of grammar began to penetrate philosophy with its ideas, while the grammarians on their part adopted philosophical ideas, made use of them for their own purposes and developed them further”. Indeed, to say it more generally, the main problem one has to tackle when dealing with ‘grammar’ within the framework of the history of Indian philosophy is — to use an expression as neutral as possible — the influence on each other of ‘grammar’ and philosophy. Though some work has already been done in this field, last but not least by Frauwallner himself,<sup>2)</sup> fellow scholars will agree without hesitation that we are still far from a comprehensive knowledge of the interrelation between these two spheres.

The main source, though of course not the only one, Frauwallner had in view was, no doubt, Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. A good survey of the relevant studies of this text so far undertaken is given by Cardona,<sup>3)</sup> but significantly enough this subsection bears the heading “Discussions of philosophical import” and starts with the simple description that “the Mahā-Bhāṣya contains discussions on the threshold of grammar and philosophy”. Nevertheless, among the studies subsequently mentioned or surveyed by Cardona there are some in which a serious attempt is made to deal also with the historical problems involved. The most perceptive, but at the same time problematical studies of this type are perhaps two articles of Frauwallner's,<sup>4)</sup> viz. one devoted to the

penetration of language theory into the Indian philosophical systems and the other to language theory and philosophy in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Especially the latter article has provoked vehement protest from Western 'Pāṇinīyas'<sup>5)</sup>, both as regards Frauwallner's understanding of Patañjali's discussion as also his very approach. As indicated by me on an earlier occasion<sup>6)</sup>, I, too, should like to dissociate myself from the conclusions arrived at by Frauwallner. In particular I completely fail to understand why such investigations should be inhibited by prejudices about Patañjali's alleged lack of interest in philosophical questions, etc. Instead of being carried away by what looks like an obsession to evaluate, one should rather, perhaps even with sincere gratitude for the information given by him, concentrate on an unbiased and thorough analysis of the various cases where Patañjali mentions philosophical views or actually takes recourse to them.

Yet, one observation of Frauwallner's, though meant as a reproach, is indisputably of no little importance, viz. that Patañjali usually remains silent about the sources drawn upon by him; for, this procedure of Patañjali considerably adds to the difficulties one is faced with when dealing with philosophical tenets in the *Mahābhāṣya*. These difficulties are first of all posed by the scarcity of source material at our disposal which would allow us to gain a clear picture of the stage of development of philosophy in Patañjali's own age. Hampered as we are by this lack of information we would, of course, like Patañjali to have given in each and every case at least a precise and detailed account of his source(s), the title(s) of the work(s), the name(s) of the author(s), etc. That he does not meet these expectations, and, I think, quite understandably not, is no justification for censuring him. Yet, there are even more elementary difficulties one has to grapple with: Often it is by no means easy to recognize a reference to a philosophical view as such, and in this regard the commentators do not always render assistance, or cannot at any rate be relied upon without hesitation.<sup>7)</sup> Hence any additional information is highly welcome, especially if it consists in a statement to the effect that a particular passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* is "taken over" from a certain system of philosophy. It is evident that any such contention is of enormous heu-

ristical importance though it goes without saying that it calls for a careful and critical examination.

Now, there is one recently published text which not only almost abounds in material for a study of the reception of the Mahābhāṣya — and grammar in general — in later philosophical literature, but also contains information of the type just mentioned, viz. Mallavādin's Dvādaśāranayacakra (=NC) together with Siṃhasūri's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī (=NĀA) commentary on it.<sup>8)</sup> This is commendably pointed out by the editor himself, Muni Jambūvijaya, at the end of the subsection “Nayacakre carcitā dārśanikā vādāḥ<sup>9)</sup>” of his “Prākka-  
thanam”.

## 2

Of the two instances to which the Muni draws our attention it is the second only which I should like to study in the present note.<sup>10)</sup> What he says is: “*Pātañjalamahābhāṣye* [5. 1. 119] *varṇitaṃ ‘guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam’ iti matam api Sāṃkhyād evāhṛtaṃ pratiyate, drśyatāṃ Nayacakravṛttau pr° 268 paṃ° 11, pr° 303 ityādi*”.

2.1. The first of the passages runs thus (268. 4–13):

*etad adhunā parikṣyate - a t h a k a t h a m ityādi yāvad v i y a d  
a b h y u p a g a m y a t a iti / yady anekātmakaikakāraṇatvam iṣyate evam  
e k a k ā r a ṇ a t v a p r a t i ṣ e d h ā n a n t a r a ṃ puruṣādyekakāra-  
ṇatvapratīṣedhāhitasamskāratirodhānakālam apy apratīkṣya tvayā katham  
ś a b d a i k a g u ṇ a p r a v ṛ t t i viyad abhyupagamyate? abhyupaga-  
myatām tāvad rūpādisṛṣṭau vyavahārānupātinām eṣāṃ loke drśtānām  
dvitryādyanekasparśarasagandhaguṇānām<sup>11)</sup> anekaikatvāt tadātmakavāyavā-  
disṛṣṭir(,) astu nāma [,] tvanmatena saha ghaṭamānam(;) idaṃ tu na  
yuṣyate(,) śabdena<sup>12)</sup> ekaguṇā<sup>13)</sup> pravṛttir ittham bhūtenāśya(,) tac chabdaika-  
guṇappravṛtti viyat (,) ‘gaṇa guṇa saṅkhyāne’<sup>14)</sup> śabdaikasāṅkhyānapravṛtti  
ekasmāt kāraṇādb havat tvanmatavirodhāt, nānekātmakaikasmāc chabda-  
sparśādidvitrīcatuḥpañcaguṇād bhavad vāyavādivat tvanmatāvirodhāt<sup>15)</sup> /*

*prayogaś cātra- na pravarṭetaiva m, śabdaikaguṇākāśaṃ<sup>16)</sup> tan na bhaved ity arthaḥ, a sandrute ḥ, guṇasandrāvo dravyam [Pā° Ma° Bhā° 5. 1. 119] iti lakṣaṇābhāvāt, bahūnāṃ hi guṇānām ekībhavanam aīkyagamaṇaṃ sandrutīḥ, tadabhāvo 'sandrutīḥ, tato 'sandruter na pravarṭeta, puruṣava d vāndhyāputrava d vety etad anīṣṭā-pādanam iti /.*

The criticism stated in this passage is clearly directed against a specific element of the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution, viz. against the conception of the origination of the 'great elements' (*mahābhūtas*) out of the *tanmātras*: to be more precise, it is directed against this conception in the form it was given when it had to be modified in order to take into account the so-called accumulation theory which had meanwhile been developed in other circles.<sup>17)</sup> According to this modified form already the *tanmātras* possess in ascending number the characteristic qualities of the 'great elements': that is to say, the corresponding process of evolution can be described with the *Yuktidīpikā*<sup>18)</sup> as follows:

*śabdaguṇāc chabdatanmātrād ākāśam ekaguṇam / śabdasparśaguṇāt sparśatanmātrād dviguṇo vāyuḥ / śabdasparśarūpaguṇād rūpatanmātrāt triguṇaṃ tejah / etc.*

Thus the basic view held by the adherents of Sāṃkhya is, according to Siṃhasūri,<sup>19)</sup> that of an *anekātmakaikākāraṇatva*, i.e. that "[each of the 'great elements', too] has a single cause (viz. the corresponding *tanmātra*), [yet a cause] which is in itself of a manifold nature"; and against this view it is stated polemically that it is incompatible with what is taught by the Sāṃkhya about the origination of the first 'great element', viz. ether; for, ether is said to be a manifestation of the *śabdatanmātra*, i. e. of a cause which is, however, by no means *anekātmaka* or an *anekātmakaika*, as it possesses the quality of sound only. Thus the criticism consists essentially in pointing out a particular internal contradiction of this Sāṃkhya doctrine.

On the basis of the passage of the *Vṛtti* as quoted above, Muni Jambūvijaya has reconstructed the corresponding portion of the NC, I think, quite

convincingly, thus (268. 1-2):

*atha katham ekakāraṇatvapratīṣedhānantaram śabdaikaguṇapravṛtti<sup>20)</sup> viyad  
abhyupagamyate? na pravartetaivam, asandruteḥ, puruṣavad vandhyā-  
putravad vā /.*

The final sentence has correctly been recognized by Siṃhasūri to be a *prayoga*, i.e. a proposition which forms a full-fledged inference (*anumāna*). As there is no reason for distrusting Siṃhasūri's explanation of the *hetu*, viz. *asan-*<sup>21)</sup>*druteḥ*, the assumption is fully justified that what Mallavādin on his part has in view here is in fact the—etymologizing—definition of *dravya* found in Mahābhāṣya II 366.26 as it is quoted by the commentator. The gist of Mallavādin's counterargument is hence that ether cannot originate<sup>22)</sup> in the manner asserted by the Sāṃkhya because it does not correspond to their definition of *dravya*, i.e. because it is not a *dravya* or rather because its cause, the *śabdaguṇa śabdatanmātra*, is not a *dravya* just like the soul or the<sup>23)</sup> son of a barren women. The argument as a whole, the context in which it is put forward and the use of *puruṣa* as one of the two examples—all this warrants the conclusion that this definition of *dravya* goes back, at least in substance, to Sāṃkhya itself, i.e. that Mallavādin uses here basic elements of the doctrine of his opponents themselves in order to refute them. But why, so it might be objected, should Mallavādin refer to the Mahābhāṣya for a definition of *dravya* which belongs to Sāṃkhya? Should one not rather expect him to have drawn directly upon a Sāṃkhya source? Not necessarily, and, to be sure, not only if he did not know (any longer) the original Sāṃkhya source, but also if the definition was formulated in a particular manner which was of importance to him (for his critical aims).

It need hardly be explicitly stated that it is the second assumption which has clearly to be given preference: The definition as found in the Mahābhāṣya is characterized by being essentially an etymology<sup>24)</sup>—as was noted already above and will be demonstrated below (p. 18)—and Mallavādin would not have been an Indian had he not taken for this very reason particular delight in it. In view of the methodical significance it should further be emphasized that the testimony of Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri stands by itself, i.e. that it need

not necessarily be confirmed by similar statements in other sources: There can hardly be any doubt that both of them were firmly convinced that in terms of its doctrinal provenance the definition *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* as found in the Mahābhāṣya belongs to Sāṃkhya.

Space being limited, I cannot deal *in extenso* with Simhasūri's explanation. Yet, there are two points I definitely should not pass over in silence. The first is his paraphrase of *sandrutiḥ*, viz. *bahūnāṃ guṇānāṃ ekibhavanam aikyagamanam*, according to which this term is semantically equivalent to "the becoming one of many qualities/properties". And in addition it has to be noted that the term *guṇa* is here evidently not used in its narrower sense, specific to Sāṃkhya terminology, viz. "constituent of primary matter" (although it is open to such an interpretation also as is shown by the passage in the NC following immediately upon that quoted above<sup>25)</sup>), but in that of "quality/property" of a cause, whereas *dravya* is this cause.

2.2. The second passage pointed out by the editor is found almost right in the middle of the third Ara; that is to say, with it we jump as it were into the controversy between the Īśvaravādin and the upholder of Sāṃkhya about the following definitions<sup>26)</sup> of the three "constituents" of Sāṃkhya—in which, however, the terms *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha*<sup>27)</sup> are used instead of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* ([NĀA] 298. 7 ff.): *sukhaṃ laghu apravṛttiśīlaṃ prakāśakam drṣṭam, ...duḥkham calam aprakāśakam pravṛttiśīlaṃ drṣṭam, ...moho gurur aprakāśako drṣṭaḥ*. When the opponent argues that these three are not really different from each other,<sup>28)</sup> the adherent of Sāṃkhya tries to safeguard his theory against this objection by stating (300. 1): *nāpṛthagbhūtatā / sukhaṃ mohād guror anyat, laghutvāt, lohapiṇḍād iva arkatūlaḥ*, etc. What is obviously intended by this counterargument is, and I think on the whole quite correctly,<sup>29)</sup> made clear by Muni Jambūvijaya in a footnote which reads thus:

*sukhaṃ mohād guror anyat, laghutvāt, lohapiṇḍād ivāṛkatūlaḥ, duḥkhād anyat pravṛttiśīlāt, apravṛttiśīlatvāt, ākāśād iva vāyuḥ / duḥkham mohād anyad acalāt, calatvāt, parvatād iva ghaṭaḥ / mohāḥ sukhaduḥkhābhyām agurubhyām anyah, gurutvāt, pṛthivyā iva agniḥ / duḥkhamohau sukhāt*

*prakāśakād anyau, aprakāśakatvāt, pradīpād iva ghaṭaḥ /.*

Among the various reasons advanced by the opponent against these inferences there are also the following (301.1-3):

*anavadhṛtālaghvādidharmatāyām itarātmakam apīty atathātaiva / asajātī-  
yalakṣaṇavyāvṛttārthaviśayatāyām asiddham pakṣadharmatvam asmān  
prati bhavantam ca /.*

“In case the properties ‘light’, etc. [of *sukha* etc.] are not restricted [to *sukha*, etc.] exclusively (i.e. if what is meant by the logical reasons adduced by you is not *laghv eva sukham na guru na calam vā*, etc.<sup>30</sup>), [then *sukha*, etc.] has also the nature of the other [*guṇas*, i.e. it is also *cala* and *guru*]; therefore (i.e. because of the fact that *sukha*, etc. are hence each of a threefold nature<sup>31</sup>) they are in reality (*eva*) not so (i.e. are not different from each other<sup>32</sup>). If [these properties are, on the other hand, exclusively restricted to *sukha*, etc. respectively, and if the logical reasons consequently] refer to an object to which the characteristics of everything different [from it] do not apply, [then] the fact that they are a property of the subject [of the inference] is by no means established for us and for you<sup>33</sup>”. In pursuing this argument further the opponent then demonstrates that concepts like ‘light’, etc. are always relative, and finally states by way of summarizing (302. 4-5):

*evam evāpekṣikalohapiṇḍārkatūlagurutvalaghutve 'navasthitaikatve /.*

“In this very manner the heaviness of a small iron ball and the lightness of the coma of the seeds of the *mudar*<sup>34</sup> is not something absolutely determined [once and for ever] as both of them are dependent [on the quantity/weight in each case<sup>35</sup>]”.

To these objections the adherent of Sāṃkhya replies (303. 1-3):

*atha mamātra kim? dravyam caitad evam laghugurutvāpekṣayā tad eva  
dṛṣṭam, na guṇāḥ / sattvādayo guṇās tv ime laghutvādilakṣaṇā mayocyante,  
dravyatā teṣāṃ sandrāve ekatvāpattau bhavati /.*

“[If you prefer to consider lightness, etc. to be not absolutely determined, then you are right in stating that it is not at all an established fact for you that *sattva*<sup>36</sup> and nothing else is light, etc.; but] what has this to do with me? [For, I, on my part, am of the opinion that lightness, etc. are

specific properties of *sattva*, etc., respectively]. And (i.e. yet) [your own position is ultimately wrong; for] what you refer to (*etad*) is [in reality] a *dravya* [and it is this alone] which is experienced in everyday life in this manner as one and the same with regard to lightness and heaviness, and not the *guṇas*. Yet it is these *guṇas sattva*, etc. [and not any *dravya*] of which I maintain that they are characterized by lightness, etc. The fact of being a *dravya* is given when these [*guṇas*] attain unity in that they come together [and t h e y are different from each other<sup>37)</sup>”].

At the end of his explanation of the last sentence of this latter passage of the NC Sīṃhasūri again quotes the Mahābhāṣya, i.e. adds the remark (303. 16 f.): *guṇasandrāvo dravyam iti lakṣaṇāt*. And again there is no room for any doubt that Mallavādin, too, in fact had in view this definition and regarded it as an authentic element of the Sāṃkhya doctrine,<sup>38)</sup> especially since here it forms part of an argument of an adherent of Sāṃkhya himself. In addition what deserves our attention are the facts

1. that the term *sandrāva* is explained in the NC itself by being juxtaposed with *ekatvāpatti*,<sup>39)</sup> and
2. that the term *guṇa* is made clear in a similar manner by letting *sattvādayo* precede *guṇās (tv ime)* in the third sentence.<sup>40)</sup>

But what about *guṇāḥ* at the very end of the second sentence? In this case Sīṃhasūri says (303. 14 f.): .....*gurulaghvādayo g u ṇ ā ḥ sattvarajastamāṃsi ca*....., i.e. he takes it to refer to the properties at issue in this discussion as well as to the constituents of primary matter. Let us hence make a mental note of the fact that according to him this term as used in the definition *guṇasandrāvo dravyam* may refer equally to the constituents of primary matter a n d to their specific properties a n d to the qualities of the *tanmātras*,<sup>41)</sup> etc. Of equal importance is the observation that the adherent of Sāṃkhya not only distinguishes clearly between *guṇa* and *dravya*, but also takes the latter to become manifest only in the case of a *sandrāva* of the former.<sup>42)</sup>

2.3. Should there still be any doubt about the correctness of my assertion



that both Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri were quite sure that the definition *guṇasandrāvo dravyam* belongs to Sāṃkhya, it can easily be dispelled, at least as regards the commentator. For, in his Vṛtti on NC 15. 1 f. he states—to wit, in order to make clear a quite different conception of *dravya* in its distinctiveness—(15. 20 f.): *na tu yathā guṇasandrāvo dravyam* [Pātañjalama° 5. 1. 119] *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravayalakṣaṇam* [Vai° Sū° 1. 1. 15] *iti vā* /. Considering that according to NĀA 11. 23 the list of philosophical systems—which the “ordinary man” (*laukika*) wants to reveal as useless<sup>43)</sup>—starts with Sāṃkhya, the only conclusion one can arrive at is that Siṃhasūri’s first definition of the two diverging ones equally belongs to Sāṃkhya.

This part of the present study may therefore be concluded by repeating once more

1. that both in the NC as well as in the NĀA there is clear evidence that the definition *guṇasandrāvo dravyam* was regarded by the two authors to be an integral—and obviously also essential—element of Sāṃkhya, and
2. that Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri’s testimonies constitute information in their own right.

### 3

In a note referring to NC 15. 20<sup>44)</sup> Muni Jambūvijaya not only quotes *in extenso* from the Mahābhāṣya [=M.] on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119, but he also adds the remark :

*Pātañjalamahābhāṣyasya Sāṃkhyamatānusāritvaṃ ‘striyām’* [Pā° 4. 1. 3] *iti sūtre Pātañjalamahābhāṣyasya Uddyotāt Pradīpāc cāvagantavyam* /.

Indeed, if one looks into Nāgeśa’s Uddyota on M. II 366. 23 ff., one cannot fail to notice that in connection with a critical remark directed against Kaiyaṭa, Nāgeśa himself refers to the discussion on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 (see below p. 12).

3.1. “The Mahā-Bhāṣya on rule 4. 1. 3”, thus Cardona<sup>45)</sup> aptly summarizes its contents, “takes up the question of gender. The term *liṅga*, used in the meaning ‘gender’, denotes, in normal Sanskrit, a mark or characteristic. If the term is understood in this sense in grammar, then a *liṅga* is a characteristic of males, females, and things which are neither. A female (*strī*) would then be characterized by breasts and hair, a male (*puruṣa*) by his body hair, others by neither. This conception of *liṅga* does not work in grammar, it is noted, so that another concept is introduced. Any thing is characterized by different states of constituent elements or properties (*guṇa*) and these states constitute the genders of things.”

According to the vārttika *saṁstyānaprasavau liṅgam āstheyau svakṛtānta-<sup>46)</sup>taḥ* on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 what has to be regarded as the basis of gender is the act of coagulating,<sup>47)</sup> on the one hand, and the act of procreating,<sup>48)</sup> on the other, the former being equated to *strī* and the latter to *pum̐s*. After having explained this vārttika, Patañjali pursues the question further, viz. thus (II 198. 4–5):

*kasya punaḥ styānam strī pravṛttir vā pumān / guṇānām / keṣām / śab-  
dasparśarūparasagandhānām /.*

Now it is to the answer to the first question, viz. *guṇānām*, that Kaiyaṭa gives the following explanation (which Muni Jambūvijaya must have had in view)<sup>49)</sup> (IV 23 a 12–15):

*sattvarajastamāṁsi guṇāḥ, tatpariṇāmarūpāś ca tadātmakā eva śabdāda-  
yaḥ pañca guṇāḥ / tatsaṅghātarūpaṁ ca ghaṭādi, na tu tadvyatiriktam  
avayavidravyam astīti sāmṁkhyānām siddhāntaḥ //.*

It is hence explicitly stated by Kaiyaṭa that here Patañjali takes recourse to a central conception of Sāmṁkhya according to which any thing like a pot, etc. is considered to be nothing but an aggregate of the qualities ‘sound’, etc., the existence of a substance (lit. “a material whole”) as different from them<sup>50)</sup> being denied.

Yet, the definition of *dravya* as consisting of an aggregate of *guṇas* is not only attested in the Pradīpa, but is also used by Patañjali himself in the very same discussion, viz. in a passage (following upon Kātyāyana’s vārtt. 7) to which attention has already been drawn by Seyfort Ruegg<sup>51)</sup> and which runs

thus (II 200. 12–15):

*kasya tāvad bhavān ekam guṇam nyāyyam manyate stritvam nāma /  
dravyasya / dravye ca bhavataḥ kaḥ sampratyayaḥ<sup>52)</sup> / yadi tāvad guṇasamu-  
dāyo dravyam / kā gatiḥ ya ete bhāvāḥ kṛdabhihitās taddhitābhihitās ca  
cikīrṣā goteti /.*

I must confess that I fail to understand why Seyfort Ruegg<sup>53)</sup> with reference to the phrase *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* speaks of “cette définition du substantif”<sup>54)</sup>; but what he says subsequently, viz. that it “est, il est vrai, introduite comme l’opinion d’un autre”, is, no doubt, correct. Yet, I don’t think that it is of particular importance, at least for the problem at issue here, to which of the participants of the discussion this or that statement belongs. For, what this passage is evidently about is the question of the view of an “individual material thing” (*dravya*) one of the participants holds, and the critical remark that if this participant accepts the definition *guṇasamudāyo dravyam*, there arise certain difficulties—and they are conveniently explained by Nāgeśa.<sup>55)</sup> And again both Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa are to all appearances unanimously of the opinion that this is a definition of the adherents of Sāṃkhya. For Kaiyaṭa e.g. explains *guṇasamudāyaḥ* by stating (IV 30 a 8–9): *rūpādisaṃniveśamātram ity arthaḥ<sup>56)</sup> /.*

There can indeed be hardly any doubt that *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* is but another formulation of *guṇasamdrāvo dravyam*, or *vice versa*, and that the expressions *samudāya* and *sandrāva* are hence considered here to be practically synonymous. Yet, it should not be overlooked that the latter expression is used in the discussion of Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 in a particular context, i.e. that the definition is introduced there by the remark (M. II 366. 25) *anvartham khalv api nirvacanam*, whereas in M. 200. 11 ff. the question of the derivation of the term *dravya*—and of defining *dravya* by pointing out its etymology—is not at issue. The assumption which therefore suggests itself is that the ‘normal’ expression is *samudāya*; and this is strikingly confirmed by the fact that Patañjali in all other instances (viz. I 411. 15 and II 120. 11)<sup>57)</sup> uses the term *guṇasamudāya*, and not *guṇasandrāva*.

The result of the foregoing observations and considerations is that both

discussions in the M., i.e. that of Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 and that of Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119, are thematically connected among other things by the common reference to a definition of *dravya* which according to the commentators belongs to Sāṃkhya.

3.2. Returning now to the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 let us first take a look at Matilal's analysis of this discussion.<sup>58)</sup> Matilal calls attention among other things to the fact that "Nāgeśa is critical of Kaiyaṭa's explanation of the *Mahābhāṣya* passage under Pāṇini's rule 5. 1. 119 and says that Kaiyaṭa uses the Vaiśeṣika notion of substance to explain Patañjali: Nāgeśa, on the other hand, thinks that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga notion of substance is much closer to the grammarians' notion of substance".

It is evidently the following passage of the Uddyota Matilal has in view here (IV 299 a 15-17):

*Kaiyaṭas tu vaiśeṣikādinayānusāreṇa bhāṣyaṃ vyācakṣāṇaḥ katham 'striyām' [Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3] iti sūtrasthabhāṣyeṇa na virudhyata iti cintyam; katham ca 'kiṃ punar dravyam, ke guṇāḥ' [M. II 366. 14, i. e. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119] iti praśnasya na nirdalateti<sup>59)</sup> ca cintyam /.*

Yet, this forms part of Nāgeśa's explanation of M. II 366. 23-25 (quoted below p. 17), that is to say, of a section which is taken by Matilal<sup>60)</sup> to be "Patañjali's second attempt to define substance", whereas the immediately following passage (II 366. 25-26), viz. *anvartam khalv api nirvacanam / guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam /*, is regarded by him as "the third attempt of Patañjali to define substance", and, to be sure, it is this latter attempt to which Matilal refers when reporting Nāgeśa's critical rebuke of Kaiyaṭa and when remarking<sup>61)</sup> that "there is a striking similarity between Patañjali's definition of substance and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga idea of substance". Thus one is rather confused and cannot hence but deem it necessary to reconsider the relevant passages of the original texts. This 'experiment' yields, so it seems to me, among others the following results:

1. What has prompted Nāgeśa to censure Kaiyaṭa was evidently the following passage in the latter's comment on M. II 366. 23-25 (IV 299 a 3 ff.):

.....*tasmād asti rūpāśrayo dravyam / etac ca pākajarūpādyutpattau ye dravyavināśaṃ necchanti tanmatena dravyapratyabhijñāśrayeṇoktam / ye tu pākajarūpādyutpattau pūrvadravyavināśam apūrvadravyārambhaṃ cābhyupagacchanti tanmatena dravyabhede 'pi jāter ekatvāj jātipratyabhijñāśrayeṇoktam / etc.*

2. One cannot but emphatically agree with Nāgeśa on this point: Kaiyaṭa is, as we shall see later, definitely on the wrong track.
3. It does not suffice to state that Nāgeśa differs from Kaiyaṭa and simply to report his own opinion. For Nāgeśa does not at all confine himself to merely contending that Kaiyaṭa is wrong, but he adduces two different, though ultimately related, reasons which—once more—<sup>62)</sup>testify not only to his critical acumen, but also and above all to his remarkable capacities in terms of philological method and its application in interpreting Patañjali's work. The first argument consists in pointing out that Kaiyaṭa's interpretation of M. II 366. 23–25 contradicts what is said by Patañjali on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3, viz. in M. II 198. 4 (see above p. 10) and II 200. 13 f. (see above p. 11); and in this case, too, Nāgeśa is quite right; for the agreement between the passages in these two discussions in terms of their doctrinal affinity is, as we have already seen, as plain as it can be, so that it can easily be recognized even without the help of Nāgeśa who was on his part well aware of this relationship. His second argument shows, if I am not mistaken with regard to the meaning of *nirdalatā* and the implications of this argument of his, that Nāgeśa starts from the assumption that the two questions of M. II 366. 14 make sense only if they are asked by a participant of the discussion who is of the opinion that on the basis of the 'Sāṃkhya' definition of *dravya* (as taught under Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3) it is not possible to account for what is said in vārtt. 5 on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119. For according to Kātyāyana's statement (M. II 366. 10: *siddham tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau*) the suffixes *-tva* and *-tā* are added after a base which is a *dravya-vācaka* to denote a *guṇa*<sup>63)</sup>; and the 'Sāṃkhya' definition of *dravya*, so one might think, implies that there is

no difference between the *samūha* (= *dravya*) and the *samūhin* (= *guṇa*), as explained by Nāgeśa.<sup>64)</sup> That is to say, Nāgeśa starts out again from the idea that the discussion on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 can be properly understood only if it is seen against the background of the discussion on 4. 1. 3; but this second argument is of a slightly different nature in that it amounts to the assumption that the knowledge of the M. on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 is presupposed in the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119, and it is precisely for this reason that Nāgeśa can in this case not meet with our full approval as the two questions of M. II 266. 14 can easily be accounted for by simply assuming that they are provoked by vārtt. 5 on its own.<sup>63)</sup> In spite of disagreeing in this respect with Nāgeśa, I think he can definitely be followed when he starts from the assumption, if this is what is implied by him, that the passages in the two discussions are closely related to each other as regards their doctrinal basis.

There is one more point which I should like to make in the present discussion of Matilal's analysis of the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119, viz. with regard to the question whether we have really to distinguish between a "second" and a "third attempt of Patañjali to define substance". But as this question cannot be discussed independently of the problem which I want to study in the next paragraph, I shall deal with both of them together.

#### 4

What I was just now referring to is a question one cannot but ask oneself, viz. if there is perhaps any internal evidence in the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 itself which would confirm the contention of Mallavādin and Simhasūri, on the one hand, and Nāgeśa,<sup>65)</sup> on the other, that the definition *guṇasaṃdrāvo /° samudāyo dravyam* belongs to Sāṃkhya.

4.1. That in fact two different "attempts to define substance" have to be distinguished, at least formally, can hardly be disputed; for the second is introduced by an *athavā* (M. II 200. 23). The passage with reference to

which Matilal speaks of “the third attempt”, however, runs thus (M. II 200. 25–26):

*anvarthaṃ khalv api nirvacanam / guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam /.*

Therefore, what has to be examined first of all, is the question if the particles *khalv api* are similarly indicative of the fact that still another attempt is made by Patañjali or not. The meaning assigned to *khalv api* in the small Petrograd Dictionary is “nun auch”, the remark being added that it is used<sup>66)</sup> “beim Uebergange zu etwas noch zu Besprechendem”. This observation, though based on another text,<sup>67)</sup> proves quite useful in the case of the M., too.

For, to start with the very first instance where it occurs, what else should be its function in M. I 1. 4: *vaidikāḥ khalv api* / than to indicate that the person who had answered the question *keṣāṃ śabdānām* / by saying *laukikānām vaidikānām ca* (M. I 1. 3) is now turning to the explanation of the term which has still to be “talked about”, viz. *vaidikāḥ [śabdāḥ]* ?. And the next instances found on the same page (lines 16 and 18) are of exactly the same nature—and this holds good also for those referred to by Böhtlingk. Yet, it is by no means easy to exclude the possibility that a slight contrast is also expressed in these cases apart from calling the attention of the person (who had asked the aforementioned question or of the other participant of the discussion) to the other or next topic.

It is therefore advisable to examine instead only those instances where *khalv api* is used in sentences which are, except for their context, identical with that of M. II 200. 25. And there are, if I am not mistaken, just two of them.

The first is found in the discussion on Pāṇ. 5. 2. 29 and 30, viz. M. I 206. 21–25:

*kuto nu khalv etad aca ete guṇās tatsāmīpyāt tu vyañjanam api tadguṇam upalabhyata iti na punar vyañjanasyaite guṇāḥ syus tatsāmīpyāt tv aj api tadguṇa upalabhyata iti / antareṇāpi vyañjanam aca evaite guṇā lakṣyante na punar antareṇācam vyañjanasyoccāraṇam api bhavati/a n v a r t h a ṃ k h a l v a p i n i r v a c a n a m / svayaṃ rājante svarā anvag bhavati*

*vyañjanam iti //.*

“Yet, on account of which [reason did you right now assert]: ‘These (i.e. the *udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*) are qualities of a vowel, but due to its proximity to it a consonant, too, is perceived as being qualified by them’, not, however, [the opposite, viz.] that they are qualities of a consonant, but that due to its proximity to it a vowel, too, is perceived as being qualified by them? [The reason is that] even without (i.e. in the absence of) a consonant they are recognized as qualities of a vowel and nothing else, but that, on the other hand, without a vowel a consonant cannot even be pronounced [so that the question whether it is qualified by an accent and, if so, why, does not at all arise]. And the etymology [of the terms *svara* and *vyañjana*] indeed also corresponds to [this their] meaning (i.e. indicates this important difference between them); [for] ‘vowels’ [are sounds which] ‘shine by themselves / on their own’ [and] a ‘consonant’ [is a sound which] ‘follows’ (i.e. becomes qualified by the accent only afterwards<sup>68</sup>)”.

In this case it is hence as plain as it can be that the sentence *anvartham khalv api nirvacanam* is merely meant to corroborate what is already stated in the preceding sentence, viz. that a vowel by its very nature is a completely independent type of sound, whereas a consonant is in contradistinction to it dependent on a vowel even for being pronounced, not to speak of its being qualified by an accent: The topic to which in the last sentence attention is called is ‘new’ only in the sense that what has been stated in the preceding sentence is now further supported by pointing to the etymology of the terms *svara* and *vyañjana* themselves which—allegedly—confirms the correctness of this phonetic statement.

But what about the second instance? It is found in the M. under Pāṇini’s rule 8. 2. 48, or, to be more precise, in the discussion following upon vārtt. 3 in which it is stated that the root *añj* is in certain cases used *añcatyarthe*, “in the meaning of the root *añc*”, viz. *prakāśana*. In concluding this part of the discussion Patañjali says (M. III 408. 24–409. 2):

*tathāñjer vyañjanam vyañjanam ca prakāśanam / yat tat snehena madhureṇa ca jadīkṛtānām indriyāṇām svasminn ātmani vyavasthāpanam sa*



*rāgas tad vyañjanam / a n v a r t h a ṃ k h a l v a p i n i r v a c a n a m / v y a j y a t e ' n e n e t i v y a ñ j a n a m i t i //*.

“In the same manner *vyañjana* is [a noun derived] from [the root] *añj* [used in the meaning of the root *añc*], and *vyañjana* means ‘that by which [something] is illuminated / made perceptible’<sup>69)</sup>. When the sense-organs, made dull by grease and (i.e. or) [something] sweet, are [again] fixed on themselves,<sup>70)</sup> [then] this is a source of delight (i.e. a condiment), this is *vyañjana* (i.e. this is *vyañjana* as having among others the meaning ‘condiment’, ‘spices’). And the etymology [of *vyañjana*] indeed also corresponds to [this its] meaning; [for] ‘condiment’<sup>71)</sup> is that by which [the flavour of food] is made manifest”.

It is hardly necessary to state explicitly that regarding the function of *khalv api* this passage yields exactly the same result as that examined first. Therefore it is not simply legitimate, but imperative to start from the assumption that the sentence *anvartam khalv api nirvacanam* in M. II 200. 25 forms in a similar manner a statement which is made only in order to corroborate what has been said in the passage preceding it. It is hence practically out of the question that M. II 200. 25–26 should be Patañjali’s “third attempt to define substance”.

4.2. Yet, in order to be able finally to convince oneself of its merely corroborative function, the immediately preceding passage has to be taken notice of in detail (M. II 200. 23–25):

*athavā yasyā<sup>72)</sup> guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanate tad dravyam / kiṃ punas tattvaṃ / tadbhāvas tattvaṃ / tadyathā / āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanty āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati /*.

This “second attempt to define substance”—and, to be sure, it is at the same time also the last one—has been summarized by Matilal<sup>73)</sup> as follows: “Substance is the unchanging state of the objects. Qualities emerge and disappear in order to make room for new qualities. What stays permanent amid all changes is what is called substance. It is the *tattva* ‘essence’ of an entity.

Thus, a mango fruit becomes green at one time and yellow and red at another time, but it still remains the same mango or, at least, we can call it 'the same mango'. What remains unchanging is the mango-essence, the mango-substance".

Now, if the main, nay even the sole purpose of what is stated subsequently by Patañjali, viz. *anvarthaṃ khalv api nirvacanam / guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*/, is to corroborate this second attempt to define substance—and the parallel passages do not leave us any other choice— then it has to be admitted that what Patañjali wanted to say by it is the following: The etymology of the word *dravya* itself, according to which a *dravya* is a *guṇasaṃdrāva*, equally shows that 'substance' or rather an individual material object is that which "remains unchanging" while different *guṇas* "emerge and disappear". But in what respect is this idea expressed by the etymologizing definition, too? The answer to this question is as simple as it is plausible: Because *dravya* is in view of the context defined to be always, i.e. at each and every point of time, nothing but a *guṇa-saṃdrāva*, no matter which qualities "come together" to constitute it at a particular point of time. The fact that the *guṇas* change, or even permanently change, does not in the least affect the nature of the *dravya* as such, i.e. its being nothing but a *saṃdrāva* of *guṇas* at every moment of its—finite—existence. To render this concept of *dravya* by calling it the "unchanging state of the objects" or to apply to it the—anyhow problematical—term "essence" as Matilal does, cannot pass for a really constructive attempt to determine this concept more precisely. According to Patañjali it is the *tattva*, and this term is in its turn explained by *tadbhāva*, in accordance with Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119. But as it is the meaning and purport of this very sūtra which forms the subject of this discussion in the M., this paraphrase does not help much. Nevertheless, the context makes it possible to draw the conclusion that '*tattva*' is, generally speaking, that which remains the same—which in the present case is likewise that by which an object can be recognized.

4.3. Now that it has been established that the sentence *anvarthaṃ khalv api*, etc. of M. II 200. 25-26 is but an additional argument meant to vindicate the preceding 'second attempt' to define the concept of *dravya*, attention can be focussed for a short while on the preceding passage (quoted above p. 17). What has to be noted first is that in reading it one cannot but recall M. I 7. 21-23:

*athavā nedam eva nityalakṣaṇaṃ dhruvaṃ kūṭasthaṃ avicāly anapāyo-  
pajanavikāry anutpatty avṛddhy avyayayogi yat tan nityam iti / tad api  
nityaṃ yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihanyate / kiṃ punas tattvaṃ / tadbhāvas  
tattvaṃ / ākṛtāv api tattvaṃ na vihanyate //*

Which is, by the way, also quoted by Simhasūri (NĀA 21. 22 ff.); yet more important, at least for the question at issue here, is it to remember what has already been observed earlier (see above p. 12), viz. that it is with regard to this passage that Nāgeśa (in reprimanding Kaiyaṭa) emphasizes the "Sāṃkhya-matānusāritvaṃ", to use Muni Jambūvijaya's expression.

Indeed, already the verb *prādur-bhū* points to this direction, though it can admittedly not be regarded as an absolutely unequivocal key word. But we are in this case not at all dependent upon any such indirect evidence or mere conjectures. For, as luck would have it, there are close parallels in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts themselves that the question of the doctrinal provenance of Patañjali's 'second attempt' can be definitely settled. What I have in view is first of all a verse quoted twice in the *Yuktidīpikā*, viz. 49. 10 f. and 75. 6 f., which runs thus:

*jahad dharmāntaraṃ pūrvam upādatte yadā param / tattvād apracyuto  
dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate<sup>74)</sup> //*

Clearly this is a definition of the term *pariṇāma*, and not *dravya*, and moreover in it use is made of the terms *dharmā* and *dharmī* which did certainly not originate in Sāṃkhya itself, but were taken over from other schools of thought, probably the Vaiśeṣika. Nevertheless it is evident that in this verse the same idea is expressed as in the M. passage under discussion; and in spite of the 'modern' terms used the assumption is, no doubt, justified that the idea as

such goes back to much earlier times in the history of Sāṃkhya, i.e. that it is a genuine Sāṃkhya idea, and an old one at that. It is attested also in the Yogabhāṣya, viz. at the very end of what is said on YS 3. 13, but formulated thus :

*avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmānivr̥ttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇā-  
ma itī /.*<sup>76)</sup>

Any doubts one might still have regarding the doctrinal agreement between the M. passage and the Sāṃkhya and Yoga sources quoted just now, are finally dispelled when one takes into account what is said by the author of the Yuktidīpikā in explaining and defending the definition of *pariṇāma* of the verse, viz. (75. 8-11):

*yadā śaktyantarānugrahāt pūrvadharmān tirobhāvya svarūpād apracyuto  
dharmī dharmāntareṇāvirbhavati tad avasthānam asmākaṃ pariṇāma ity  
ucyate / āha—naitad abhidhānamātram dṛṣṭāntam antareṇa pratipadyā-  
mahe / tasmād yathā kim itī vaktavyam / ucyate—yathā palāśam palāśād<sup>77)</sup>  
apracyuta[m] nimittāntarasyātapāder anugrahāc chyāmatām tirobhāvya  
pītatām vrajati tathedaṃ draṣṭavyam /.*

For, the *dṛṣṭānta* given here is essentially the same as that found in the M.; that in one case the leaves of a *palāśa* tree are chosen as example and in the other case fruits like a mango or a *badara* is of little importance. What really counts is that in both cases the concept of *pariṇāma* is illustrated by referring to processes of outward change readily observed in nature.

I don't deem it necessary to adduce more material from Sāṃkhya or Yoga texts; for, I think, that that already quoted is sufficient proof that the "second attempt of Patañjali to define substance" is indeed based on a corresponding view of Sāṃkhya. Yet, in so far as the etymologizing definition of *dravya* has been shown to be nothing but an additional argument meant to safeguard this "second attempt", it can further be stated that there is a very high degree of probability that it, too, is of the very same doctrinal provenance. There is hence no need to confine oneself to observing with Matilal that "there is a striking similarity between Patañjali's definition of substance and the Sāṃkhya-

Yoga idea of substance". One can definitely go a step further and—in view of the internal evidence of the M. as well as of the evidence discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3—simply state that Patañjali has in this case, too, taken recourse to a particular element of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in order to offer an alternative solution to a particular grammatical problem. Plausible as these conclusions are by themselves, the clear testimony of a Sāṃkhya text for this definition of *dravya* would, nevertheless, be highly welcome. Although I am unfortunately not able to adduce an exact parallel from any of the extant sources,<sup>79)</sup> I should like to draw attention to a passage in the Yuktidīpikā which, I think, strikingly confirms this peculiar concept of *dravya*. At the very beginning of the third Āhnika there is a rather long section devoted to defending the *satkāryavāda*, which is taught in the next Kārikā, viz. 9. The opponent is clearly an adherent of Vaiśeṣika who does not, however, confine himself to attacking the Sāṃkhya theory, but deems it also necessary to deal in anticipation as it were with eventual counterarguments brought forward against his own *asatkāryavāda*. One of these counterarguments is that the product is not, because it is not cognized, *asat* before its origination. This is refuted by an argument which runs thus (48. 29–32):

*kriyāguṇavyapadeśāsambhavāt / yad dhi pratyakṣato nopalabhyate tat kriyayāstīti saṃsūcyate / yathā harmyāvasthitānām tṛṇānām udvahanād vāyuh, guṇena yathā mālatīlatā gandhena, vyapadeśena vā kāryādīnā yathendriyāṇi / na tu prāg utpatteḥ kāryasya kriyāguṇavyapadeśāsambhavaḥ / tasmād asat kāryam /*

In the course of his refutation the defendant comes back to this topic in order to reject the opponent's statement in the following manner (51. 14–18):

*yat tūktam kriyāguṇavyapadeśāsambhavād anumānābhāva iti tad anupapannam / kasmāt / pṛthaktvānabhyupagamāt / kāryakāraṇapṛthaktvavādinas tatkriyāguṇānām pṛthaktvam anumātum yuktam ity atas ta(ntva)-vasthāne paṭakriyāguṇa- (read: °guṇā-) grahaṇād anumānābhāva ity ayam upālambhaḥ sāvakāśaḥ syāt / asmākaṃ tu kāraṇamātrasyaiva saṃghātād ākārāntaraparigrahād vā kriyāguṇānām pracitir vyaktiviśeṣo bhavatīti bruvatām adoṣaḥ /*

“.....But [this] reproach is not valid for us because what we teach is that a particular manifest thing originates as the accumulation of movements and qualities on account of the cause and nothing but the cause having coagulated or having assumed another shape<sup>80)</sup>”. Although the key word *dravya* does not occur here and besides *guṇa* the term *kriyā* is also used (evidently because it has to take into account, at least *argumenti causa*, the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika), it is as plain as it can be that virtually the same concept of individual material things is testified to in this passage, for the replacement of *samudāya* by *praciti* is hardly of any importance.

## 5

Matilal is, however, quite right in remarking,<sup>81)</sup> though on what he wrongly takes to be Patañjali's “third attempt”, that “the implication is that the integrated whole or the ‘bundle’ should be conceived as different from the constituent parts”. For, this is indeed the *pratijñā* Patañjali wants to prove in view of what is said in vārtt. 5 on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 (cf. M. II 200. 15 f. and 18). But I don't think that this is only “implied”; it is rather clearly expressed not only in M. II 200. 23–25, but also by the subsequent etymologizing definition, if only this latter is recognized to be but a corroborative statement and is interpreted accordingly. As Patañjali makes use here of a Sāṃkhya view in order to vindicate—once more, though by another argument—the assertion that *dravya* is something different from (the) *guṇas*, it can be safely taken for granted that this is not merely in keeping with the corresponding Sāṃkhya concept, but is rather a faithful rendering of it, especially because this conclusion is confirmed also by the testimony of Mallavādin and Simhasūri (see above p. 9) as well as by that of the *Yuktidipikā*.

If we now take a look at this Sāṃkhya concept, and definition, of *dravya* itself, we cannot but feel some hesitation in assuming that the term *dravya* as such is also of Sāṃkhya origin.<sup>82)</sup> It seems rather that it was coined in or introduced by other circles and became so important an element of philosophical terminology that the adherents of Sāṃkhya were forced not only to take

notice of it, but also to take it over, at least in the sense of making clear what they on their part considered to be a *dravya* within the framework of their own philosophical teachings. Yet, be that as it may, their concept of *dravya*, fortunately preserved by Patañjali, is indeed characterized by distinguishing *dravya* from *guṇa*. Nevertheless, their view is distinctly different from the Vaiśeṣika concepts of *dravya* and *guṇa*.<sup>83)</sup> For, according to the Vaiśeṣikas a *dravya* p o s s e s s e s or rather is inhered in by, qualities or properties, whereas according to the Sāṃkhya a *dravya* c o n s i s t s of *guṇas*, or, to be more precise, is nothing but a *guṇasamudāya*, an “aggregate/integrated whole of *guṇas*”. The *guṇas* may change, or in fact change permanently, but the material object remains always a *guṇasamudāya*, i.e. stays permanent amid all changes. A mango fruit remains a mango fruit, no matter which stage in the process of ripening it has reached.

Yet, the *dr̥ṣṭāntas* given in the M. and the Yuktidīpikā, respectively, raise two questions: viz. firstly, if the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)<sup>84)</sup> is adduced as a reason for the preceding statement or if, on the contrary, the preceding ‘second attempt’ to define *dravya* (and the preceding definition of *pariṇāma*) aims at explaining the fact of recognition; and, secondly, if what is meant by these examples is that the mango remains “the same mango”, as Matilal would have it, or not. Now, the first question is clearly a pseudoproblem, for the position of the Sāṃkhya cannot but ultimately have been that both the alternative propositions are true, i. e. that because of the *dravya* having this nature a particular object is recognized, on the one hand, and that because of recognizing it we are able to determine the nature of the *dravya* as such, on the other. Yet the second is not only a real question, but also one in answering which the line of argument has to be based on circumstantial evidence only. If what is meant by referring to the fact of recognition were the numerical identity, one would expect Patañjali to have said instead of *āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati* rather *idaṃ tad evāmalakam*, etc. The assumption that it is hence the generic identity which is intended,<sup>85)</sup> is further corroborated by the important role the concept of *jātyanuccheda* plays in very similar Sāṃkhya contexts.<sup>86)</sup>

Resuming the problem, provisionally discussed already above, of what precisely is meant by defining *dravya* as “that the *tattva* of which does not change”, it can now be stated that it is that due to which an object is recognized at any point of time of its existence as belonging to a particular species (*jāti*). However, it is hardly conceivable that the adherents of Sāṃkhya should in this connection not have taken into account also the problem of the numerical identity, at least with regard to human beings as individuals bearing proper names. Therefore it seems advisable not to rely too much on the *drṣṭāntas* of the M. and the *Yuktidīpikā*, but to reckon equally with the possibility that the concept of *tattva*, at least, in addition included the numerical identity, too. It should also be noted that the expression *svarūpa* used by the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*—by way of explaining the term *tattva* of the verse, as it were—similarly covers both the individual as well as the generic “own / characteristic shape / nature” of objects and living beings. In any case, however, it has to be stressed that it is by far better not to use just the term “substance” in rendering this peculiar Sāṃkhya concept of *dravya*, the meaning of which is rather “individual material object as remaining the same (in spite of all changes it undergoes while being manifest)”.

In connection with explaining the Sāṃkhya “Doctrine of change” P. Chakravartī<sup>87)</sup> draws attention to “the Sāṃkhya doctrine of immutable eternity and eternity-in-mutation”, for which he refers to the *Yogabhāṣya* on YS 4. 33<sup>88)</sup> where they are stated thus:

*dvayī ceyam nityatā kūṭasthanityatā pariṇāmanityatā ca / tatra kūṭasthanityatā puruṣasya / pariṇāmanityatā guṇānām / yasmin pariṇamamāne tattvam na vihanyate tan nityam / ubhayatra ca tattvasyāvighātān nityatvam /.*

Yet, the *guṇas* referred to here are, of course, the “constituents of primary matter” as becomes clear also from the explanations of the author of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa*.<sup>89)</sup> Nevertheless, this is a highly interesting passage not only because of its striking similarity to M. I 7. 21 f.,<sup>90)</sup> but also because of its contributing to a better understanding of the Sāṃkhya concept of *dravya* qua “individual material object”. For, the Sāṃkhya definition of *dravya* has



been shown to cover, at least first of all, the individual material objects—and the term *guṇa* correspondingly to refer to the “qualities” of the *tanmātras*, etc., too.<sup>91)</sup> Now, in the light of this Yogabhāṣya passage it becomes apparent that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of *dravya* as a *guṇasamudāya* bears a strong resemblance to that of the “constituents of primary matter” as being *pariṇāmanīya*: Just as the “constituents of primary matter”—of which each and every phenomenon ultimately consists—are conceived of as eternal, i.e. as remaining the same in spite of the processes of change they permanently undergo, so individual material objects are regarded by the adherents of Sāṃkhya and Yoga as something which is of a relative permanence if compared to the ever changing “qualities” an aggregate of which they represent. On the other hand the Yogabhāṣya passage confirms that the conception of the *guṇas*=“constituents of primary matter” is distinctly different from that of the *guṇas*=“qualities” of the *tanmātras*, etc.: the former remain the same amid all changes whereas in the case of the latter it is only their *samudāya* which appears in contradistinction to the still much more ephemeral “qualities” as unchanging, albeit for a limited period of time only.

Nevertheless, it is primarily in connection with the peculiar Sāṃkhya conception of the three “constituents of primary matter” that the Sāṃkhya definition of *dravya* becomes fully understandable. For, there could hardly be a judgement more mistaken than one similar to that of Jacobi who, although with reference to the M. on Pāṇ. 1. 2. 64, has voiced the opinion that “this is a very crude theory about the qualities and one that is very far removed from the refined speculations of the Sāṃkhyas and Yogas about the *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas*”.<sup>92)</sup> On the contrary, besides the fact that the Sāṃkhya definition of *dravya* is rightly taken e.g. by Siṃhasūri to refer to these entities, too, one cannot but state that the Sāṃkhya idea of evolution, the concept of *prakṛti* as *sattvarajastamomaya*, etc., are such that this definition can even be styled quite typical for this school of thought. For, the concept of the three *guṇas* is essentially characterized by the lack of distinguishing between ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ as they are conceived of e.g. by the Vaiśeṣikas. The salient point of the Sāṃkhya conception of the three *guṇas*—and, to be

sure, this is what has caused the controversy about the appropriate rendering of the term *guṇa* itself—evidently is that we have to do here with an idea which even we find difficult to understand, not to speak of accepting, viz. that of ‘material qualities’, i. e. ‘qualities’ which are at the same time a/the substance or that which in various and permanently changing combinations constitutes the manifest world in its totality. Seen against this background the definition of *dravya* turns out to be ultimately nothing but an alternative formulation of what is stated e.g. in the Yogabhāṣya on YS 4. 13 thus:

*sarvam idam guṇānām saṃniveśaviseṣamātram (iti parumārthatō guṇāt-mānaḥ) /.*

And, to wit, a formulation by which the adherents of Sāṃkhya wanted to make clear first of all their own concept of individual material objects.

The conception of the three *guṇas* can, of course, be explained historically by the plausible assumption that it was developed at a time when Indian thinkers ‘had not yet learned’ to distinguish between substance as such and its qualities or properties.<sup>93)</sup> Yet, the characterization of this view as being ‘archaic’ which consequently seems to suggest itself is not wholly satisfactory. At least, if this epithet is used contemptuously—and, to be sure, it usually is used with this connotation—I for one would not readily subscribe to such an evaluation, and not only because I think that our knowledge of Sāṃkhya, its origins and development is still fragmentary.<sup>94)</sup>

#### NOTES

\* For “Studies on Mallavādin’s Dvādaśāranayacakra I” see my contribution to: Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, hrg. von K. Bruhn und A. Wezler (Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien 23), Wiesbaden 1981, pp. 359-408.

1) Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, II. Bd., Salzburg 1956, p. 100.

2) Cf., apart from the articles mentioned in fn. 4 and Geschichte der indischen Philosophie II, p. 59. 144. (the recently published) Nachgelassene Werke. I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen, hrg. von E. Steinkellner. Wien 1984, pp. 93 ff.; by the introductory (bracketed) remark on p. 93 it becomes clear that Frauwallner had the plan to deal at some length with the grammarians’ language theory; see also pp. 65 and 137.

- 3) Pāṇini. A Survey of Research. The Hague-Paris 1976, pp. 256-259. For what I looked, in vain however, was a reference to G. Oberhammer's review article in: OLZ LIX (1964), 16 ff.
- 4) Viz. "Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme" in: Indologen-Tagung 1959, Verhandlungen, Göttingen 1960, pp. 239-243 (=Kleine Schriften, hrg. von G. Oberhammer und E. Steinkellner, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 279-283) and "Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im Mahābhāṣya des Patañjali" in: WZKSO 4 (1960), pp. 92-118(=Kleine Schriften, pp. 284-310).
- 5) Cf. Cardona, o. c. (fn. 3), p. 59.
- 6) Cf. my article "Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda (I). Mahābhāṣya zu Pāṇ. 4. 3. 155 und seine einheimischen Erklärer" in: WZKS 26 (1982), p. 164 ff.
- 7) Cf. also below p. 13.
- 8) I use, of course, Muni Jambūvijaya's edition, Bhavnagar 1966. I quote the text always as it is printed in this edition, but sometimes I add in parentheses punctuation marks in order to facilitate the readers' understanding.
- 9) O. c., pp. 23-25.
- 10) The first one I shall study in a monograph which is still in preparation.
- 11) Cf. also the long fn. 1 on p. 268 of the edition in which the editor quotes relevant passages from various commentaries on Sāṃkhyakārikā 22. Nevertheless I do not understand what is meant by *rūpādisrṣṭau*, etc.
- 12) For the use of the instrumental Muni Jambūvijaya here refers to Pāṇ. 2. 3. 21: *itthaṃbhūtalakṣane*.
- 13) As *pravṛtti* is used here in the sense of "coming into existence [by a process of *pariṇāma*]" (cf. fn. 20 below) one would rather expect the reading *ekaguṇāt pra°*; cf. also *ekasmāt kāraṇād bhavat* in the next but one sentence.
- 14) The editor adds here square brackets, but leaves the space in between empty as neither in the Pāṇiniyadhātupāṭha nor in the Haimadhātupāṭha an exact equivalent is found (cf. his fn. 3 on p. 208). My own endeavours to identify this quotation were equally futile. Nevertheless what Sīṃhasūri aims at here is clear, viz. to adduce a grammatical authority for his interpretation of *guṇa* as "number".
- 15) Muni Jambūvijaya wonders (fn. 5 on p. 268) whether one should read here *tvaṇmatavirodhāt* which would in fact be better. But the reading *°āvirodhāt* is also acceptable if the expression is taken to mean: "because [this alone] does not stand in contradiction to your [general] position".
- 16) Note that according to the editor (fn. 6 on p. 268) all the MSS. read *°guṇākāśam*. I do not quite understand why he decided in favour of the emendation *°guṇākāśam* and confined himself to printing out in this footnote that the reading of the MSS. might go back to *°guṇam ākāśam* which is clearly to be preferred if one does not want to go even a step further and decide in favour of *°guṇād ākāśam* (cf. fn. 15).
- 17) Cf. also Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I. Bd., Salzburg 1953, p. 355 ff.
- 18) Ed. R. C. Pandeya, Delhi 1967, p. 118 l. 14 ff.
- 19) He is, no doubt, trustworthy in this regard, too; for, this tenet is evidently based on the Sāṃkhya conception of primary matter as *sattvarajastamoma y a* (cf. fn. 25).

- 20) Note that the term *pravṛtti*—as well as *pravarteta*, of course—is used here in the sense of “becoming manifest by *pariṇāma* in the process of evolution”; cf. also NĀA 324. 17.
- 21) Note that Mallavādin himself uses the expression (*guṇa*-) *sandrāva* at other places, viz. 303. 4 and 73. 4.
- 22) Cf. nts. 13 and 20.
- 23) The soul belongs to the sphere of *sannidhibhavana*, whereas primary matter and its evolutes testify to quite another form of being, viz. *āpattibhavana*. Cf. the article mentioned in asterisked(\*) fn., p. 364.
- 24) Though it is highly probable that Mallavādin himself took, like Siṃhasūri (cf. NĀA 15. 17 and 261. 22), *vyākaraṇa* to be a *sarvatantrasiddhānta*, it would be rather far-fetched, to put it mildly, to assume that this is the reason for his referring to the Mahābhāṣya, and not the manner in which the definition of *dravya* is formulated there.
- 25) Viz. NC 268. 3: *śabde traiguṇyam asty eveti cet ...* and Siṃhasūri on it (NĀA 268. 14 f.): *sarvasyoktasukhaduḥkhamohamayatvāc chabdo 'pi tadātmā triguṇa eveti ced ity āśaṅkāyām ...*
- 26) These go, at least in substance, back to a Sāṃkhya source.
- 27) Though I am unable to deal here with these terms, attention may, nevertheless, be drawn to the fragment from a Sāṃkhya text quoted by Siṃhasūri (12. 17-22), to NC 265. 1 — where *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* are said to be the *ātmānaḥ* of *prakṛti* — and to NĀA 265. 11 f.: *te ... sukhaduḥkhamohāḥ prakāśa[pra]-vṛttiniyamātmakāḥ sattvarajastamolakṣaṇā guṇāḥ śāmyāvasthāyām 'prakṛtiḥ' ity ucyante ...* The interchangeability of the expressions *sukha*, etc. and *sattva*, etc. is also evinced by NC 303. 2 (see below p. 7) versus 300. 1 (see below p. 6), etc. Cf. also below fn. 81 and Sāṃkhyakārikā 12.
- 28) Cf. NC 297. 6 ff.
- 29) Instead of *prthivyā iva agniḥ* he should, however, have said: *agner iva prthivi!*
- 30) Cf. NĀA 301. 13 ff.
- 31) Cf. NĀA 301. 16 ff.: *... ity atathātaiva ananyataivety arthaḥ, iti śabdahetvarthatvāt tryātmakaikatvād ity arthaḥ.*
- 32) Cf. fn. 31.
- 33) In view of the passage quoted below it should be noted that the Īśvaravādin uses the 1. prs. pl. of the personal pronoun with reference to himself and *bhavant* with reference to the adherent of Sāṃkhya.
- 34) *arka* is commonly taken to be the Skt. name of the shrub *Calotropis gigantea* R. which is called in English either “gigantic swallow-wort” or “*mudar*” (<Hindi *madār*); cf. e.g. Kālipada Biśbās and Ek'kaṛi Ghoṣ, *Bhāratīya banaṣadhi*, 2. ed. revised by Asīmā Caṭṭopādhyāy et al., Vol. 3, Kālikāta Biśbabidyālay 1973, p. 742. In the present context, however, what is referred to is evidently not the shrub itself, but some part or product of it which is characterized by being very light like cotton. Unfortunately this holds good for at least three different parts or products of the *mudar*: For (according to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary s. v. *mudar*) “the inner bark of the stem yields a strong silky fibre known as *yercum*”; yet besides (according to D. Brandis, *Indian Trees*, 2. repr., Delhi 1978, p. 471) the “underside of [its] leaves [are] closed with soft white appressed woolly tomentum” and the seeds are described as “flat ovate with a long silky coma”. There is, however, by far greater

likelihood for the assumption that what the Indians had in view when thinking of the *arka* in connection with something characterized by extreme cottonlike lightness were neither the silky bast fibres nor the tomentum of the leaves as both these parts of the shrub would first have to be obtained or torn off before they can exhibit the corresponding property. It is hence much more probable that it is the long silky coma which is referred to; for thanks to it the seeds are when ripened easily driven away by the wind. This assumption is confirmed 1) by the fact that e.g. in Yogasūtra 3. 42 it is cotton itself (*tūla*), i.e. “the white fibrous substance which clothes the seeds of the cotton plant” (Oxford Dict.), which is adduced as an example for something very light (*laghu*) and 2) by the observation that it is precisely the idea of being driven away by the wind which one finds closely connected with *arkatūla* in some other cases, too, viz. e.g. in Pārśvanāthacarita 2. 926 (*aho mama kva tad geham kva paricchadaḥ / vidhinā kvāham āntaḥ pavanēnā rkatūlavat //*; cf. also 1. 740) and in Triṣaṣṭīśālākāpuruṣacarita 3. 1. 52 (*vātena tena mahatā sa mahān api vāridaḥ / arkatūlam i v o d d h ū y a dīśodīśam antyāta //*). —As for *arka* in the proverb *arke cen madhu vindeta kimartham parvatam vrajet* cf. Nilmadhav Sen, “A Note on *akka* — A Ghost Word in Sanskrit” in: Sanskrit and Indological Studies. Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, ed. by R. N. Dandekar et al., Delhi 1975, 341-349.

- 35) Cf. NĀA 302. 26 ff.: *alpavācīni kani* [cf. Pāṇ. 5. 3. 85] *loha piṇḍakaḥ palamātrapramāṇo 'rkatūlabhārāl laghīyān 'palaśatikā tulā, viṃśatis tulā bhārah'* [ ] *iti paribhāṣitatvāt / ayaspiṇḍo gurur api laghur arkatūlo laghur api gurur dr̥ṣṭa ity anavasthitaikagurutvalaghutvatattve gurulaghutve, āpekṣikatvād asmān prati na gurulaghutve parasparato 'nye, tato nāyaspiṇḍārkatūla-dr̥ṣṭānto 'sti /*.
- 36) Cf. fn. 27.
- 37) Cf. NĀA 303. 12-17.
- 38) Cf. the immediately following passage of the NC (303. 4 ff.) and Siṃhasūri's commentary on it (NĀA 303. 18 ff.).
- 39) Cf. also the expression *ekatvagati* NC 304. 1.
- 40) Cf. also NĀA 306. 6 f.
- 41) Cf. also NĀA 73. 25 ff.
- 42) See also below p. 23.
- 43) Cf. the article mentioned in asterisked(\*) fn., p. 370.
- 44) Viz. “Ṭippaṇāni” p. 16. 35 ff.
- 45) O. c. (cf. fn. 3), p. 257.
- 46) It forms part of several *śloka-vārttika* (on which in general cf. Cardona, o. c., p. 247) stanzas on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 and is quoted in M. I 245. 25. On M. II 197. 26 Nāgeśa remarks (IV 22a 30-32): *sāṃkhyamatāvaṣṭambhenāha—svakṛtānta iti / etena sāṃkhyasāstrānusāritvaṃ vyākaraṇasyeti sūcitam /*.
- 47) Neither H. Scharfe's rendering of *saṃstyāna* by “Schwellen” (Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya, Berlin 1961, p. 147) (cf. also Seyfort Ruegg, who o. c., p. 40, translates it by “expansion”) nor that of H. Jacobi by “congelation”, (“The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmins” in: JAOS 31 (1911), p. 27. = Kleine Schriften, hrg. von B. Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 27) nor that of Strauss by “Dickwerden” (“Altindische Spekulationen über die Sprache und

ihre Probleme" in : ZDMG 81 (1927), pp. 99-151 (see p. 146) = Kleine Schriften, hrg. von F. Wilhelm, Wiesbaden 1983, pp. 220-272 (see p. 267)) can be accepted. The latter can easily be misunderstood, and the former two are apparently due to a misconstruction of the sentence *styāyaty asyām garbha(h)* (M. II 198. 3); this sentence which is to illustrate the preceding statement *adhikarāṇasādhanā loke strī* may indeed create in a Western reader's mind the idea that what is referred to is the growth of the foetus, yet Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa clearly are of different opinion and their explanations can hardly be put aside. The former says (Pradīpa IV 22 b 27-30) : *styāyaty asyām iti / saṃghātarūpam prāpnotīty arthaḥ / ... saṃstyānām iti / tirobhāvah, pravṛttir āvirbhāvah, śāmyāvasthā sthitiḥ, etās cāvasthāḥ śabdagocarā evety avaseyam //*, and the latter adds the remark (Uddyota IV 23 a 1-2) : *saṃghātarūpam iti / garbhāpadena tatkāraṇam śukraśoṇitam ucyate /*. Cf. also Nāgeśa's explanations of M. I 245. 27 f. (Uddyota II 98 a 22-24) : *garbhāḥ śukram styāyati śoṇitena saṅghibhavatīty arthaḥ / sūte śukram tyajati yonirūpa ādhāre / styānām āpacayaḥ / pravṛttir vṛddhiḥ //*. What is meant by *saṃstyāna* is hence just the opposite of 'growth', and *styāyaty asyām garbhaḥ* does not refer to the growth of the foetus (though both, Kaiyaṭa as well as Nāgeśa, would not have denied that it grows), but to the "coagulation" of the father's sperm and the mother's "blood", i. e. to what we would call the act of fertilization. Cf. also K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer's article "The Vaiyākaraṇa Conception of 'Gender'" in : Bhāratākāumudī (Studies in Indology in honour of Dr. Ratha Kumud Mookerjee), Allahabad 1945-47, pp. 291-307.

- 48) Note that in both cases, i. e. in M. I 246. 2 and M. II 198. 4, the expression *prasava* is replaced by *pravṛtti* which latter is, however, used in what follows (M. I 246. 6 and II 198. 7) in the broader sense of the 'activity' consisting in the *āvirbhāvatirobhāvasthitiṣṭhāpārīṇām* (cf. Pradīpa IV 24 a 9 ff. and Uddyota IV 24 b 1).
- 49) The edition used in quoting from or referring to Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota is that produced by Bhārgavaśāstri Joshi, Śivadatta Kudāla and Raghunātha Śarmā, Bombay (NSP), 1937-1951.
- 50) Cf. also Nāgeśa's remark (Uddyota IV 23 a 31 f.) : *na tu tadvyatiriktaṃ iti / ata evāgre [viz. M. II 198. 5 f.] sarvāś ca mūrtaya evamātmikā iti bhāṣyakāro vakṣyati /*.
- 51) Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Paris 1959, p. 41.
- 52) Cf. Uddyota IV 30 a 4 f. : *bhāṣye saṃpratyayaḥ iti / kimātmakam dravyam bhavān manyata ity arthaḥ //*.
- 53) O. c., l. c.
- 54) Cf., on the other hand, B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, The Hague-Paris 1971, p. 104. Perhaps Seyfort Ruegg was misled by the question (M. II 200. 14 f.) *kā gatiḥ* etc. which is, however, meant to point out that the gender of certain primary and secondary derivations cannot be accounted for if the definition *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* is accepted (cf. Uddyota IV 30 a 14 ff.).
- 55) Uddyota IV 30 a 14 ff.
- 56) Cf. also Pradīpa IV 29 a 21 ff. — For the term *saṃniveśa* cf. e. g. Yuktidīpikā 48. 6 ff. See also below p. 26.
- 57) Matilal (o. c., p. 104) rightly refers also to the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 2. 42, i. e. II 380. 2; yet, this reference can also be found in the Uddyota IV 298 b 25 (read, however, *tayapsūtre*).

- 58) O. c., p. 101 ff.; cf. also Matilal's article "The Notion of Substance and Quality in Ancient Indian Grammar" in: Acta et Communicationes Universitatis, II, 2, Tartu 1973, pp. 384-407, which does not, however, differ from what he has written in his book in analysing the discussion on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119.
- 59) I take this expression (and the synonymous *nirdalatva*) to mean literally "the fact of lacking in anything unfolding itself" > "the being of no avail" > "unproductiveness" or rather "irrelevancy". It is met with also in the Laghuśabdenduśekhara with Candrakalā, ed. by Gopālaśāstrī Nene, Pt. II. Kashi SS 5<sup>2</sup>, Benares 1924) p. 29 l. 12, 52. 1 and 530. 11 f. as well as in Jayatirtha's Nyāyasudhā on Madhva's Anvākyāna on BS 1. 1. 1 (viz. on verse 79) and on BS 1. 1. 11 (viz. on verse 141).
- 60) O.c., p. 103 f.
- 61) O.c., p. 103 fn. 10.
- 62) Cf. e.g. P. Thieme's characterization and evaluation of Nāgeśa in: "Bhāṣya zu vārttika 5 zu Pāṇini 1. 1. 9 und seine einheimischen Erklärer. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Würdigung der indischen grammatischen Scholastik", NGGW 1935, p. 198 f.
- 63) Cf. also fn. 2 on p. 297 of Vol. IV: ... *yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdāniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalāu iti vārttikena dravyavācakāc chaddād guṇe tvatalau vidhiyete / tayoh prakṛtipratyayārthayor dravyaguṇayoh ko bheda iti praśnaḥ* //.
- 64) Viz. Uddyota IV 297 a 19 ff..
- 65) Kaiyaṭa can, as has been shown, only partly be regarded as trustworthy.
- 66) By using the singular with reference to *khalv api* I want to intimate that it should be regarded as one compound particle.
- 67) Viz. his Sanskrit-Chrestomathie, St. Petersburg 1877, 227. 22 (which is Kāśikā on Pāṇ. 2. 3. 5), 233. 6 (=Kāśikā on Pāṇ. 2. 3. 36), 239. 5 (=Kāśikā on Pāṇ. 2. 3. 70) and and 244. 3 (=Kāśikā on Pāṇ. 3. 3. 135).
- 68) Cf. Pradīpa II 25 b 15 and Uddyota II 25 b 25 f. as well as V. P. Limaye, Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya, Hoshiarpur 1974, p. 78 f.
- 69) Cf. Nāgeśa's remark (Uddyota [Rohtak ed. of the M.] V 401. 28): *bhāṣye' pi 'in d r i y a' śabdena jihvaiva / vyaktibahutvād bahuvacanam* /.
- 70) Cf. Nāgeśa's explanation (Uddyota V 401. 29): *s v a s m i n n ā t m a n i t i / rasāsvādagrāha-katvalakṣaṇe svāsvārūpa ity arthaḥ* /.
- 71) Cf. Kaiyaṭa's explanation (Pradīpa V 401. 18): *t a t h e t i / vyajyate 'nena rasa iti vyañjanam / r ā g a i t i / rajyate 'neneti rāgo vyañjanam eva* /, and Nāgeśa's further elucidation (Uddyota V 401. 27 f.) *v y a j y a t e ' n e n e t i / jihvāyā jaḍibhāvanirākaraṇena raso vyajyata ity arthaḥ* /.
- Cf. also P. V. Limaye, Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya, Hoshiarpur 1974, p. 731.
- 72) Cf. Nāgeśa's remark (Uddyota IV 299 a 13 f.): ... *a t h a v ā y a s y e t i / 'sadbhāvāt' iti śeṣaḥ / yasyāvayavasamūhasya sadbhāvād ity arthaḥ* /.
- What immediately follows is the passage quoted above p. 12.
- 73) O. c., p. 103.
- 73a) The historical interpretation of this Mahābhāṣya passage apart, one could, of course, state on material grounds that the etymologizing definition of *dravya* does not agree really well with the definition it is meant to corroborate, i.e. that the former does not necessarily fol-

low from the latter and *vice versa*. But that is quite a different matter, and evidently not what Matilal had in view.

- 74) As for the expression *tattvād apracyuta-* cf. also the material drawn upon by P. Hacker, Vivarta. Studien zur Geschichte der illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder (Akad. d. Wiss. u. d. Lit., Abh. Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Kl. Jg. 1953, Nr. 4, pp. 179-270) Mainz, 1953, p. 16 and 40 as well as e.g. Helarāja on Vākyapadiya IIII Kriyāsamuddeśa 26 (ed. K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, Poona 1973), p. 21 l. 21 ff. (where the corresponding definition of Yāska, Nir. I 2, is quoted too) and Yogabhāṣya on YS 3. 15: ... *pinḍaḥ pracyavate ghaṭa upajāyata iti dharmapariṇāmakramaḥ* /. Cf. also fn. 76.
- 75) Cf. Frauwallner, Geschichte..., I (cf. fn. 17), p. 389. Note, however, that Frauwallner apparently failed to recognise that the sense in which these terms are used by Sāṃkhya and Yoga authors is significantly different from that it has in Vaiśeṣika texts; cf. e.g. the passage quoted from the Yogabhāṣya in fn. 74.
- 76) Cf. also Nyāyabhāṣya on NS 3. 2. 15. P. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, Delhi 1975<sup>2</sup>, p. 258, fn. 2 refers also to Nirukta I 2 (ed. R. Roth. Göttingen 1852, p. 31 l. 17): *vipariṇāmata ity apracyavamānasya tattvād vikāram* [scil. *ācaṣṭe*].
- 77) The edition reads *pālāśam palāśād* here; yet one would rather expect *palāśam palāśatvād*.
- 78) Cf. fn. 6 above.
- 79) Cf. fn. 94 below.
- 80) I do not hence take this passage to be an explanation of the term *vyaktipracaya* occurring Yuktidipikā 48. 11, 49. 4 and 53. 26 / 31.
- 81) O. c., p. 104.
- 82) In connection with this question (which I cannot, however, discuss here) I should like to draw attention, though in passing only, to the fact that the Sāṃkhya definition of *dravya* bears a strong resemblance to the Sarvāstivādins' conception of phenomenal things as being nothing but an aggregate of atoms on which latter cf. e. g. E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1958, pp. 64, 96 and 120; M. Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, pp. 26 and 88f. (fn. 1. 38 and 39), and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ed. by P. Pradhan and A. Haldar, Patna 1975, pp. 24. 18 (see also Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra, ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1971, Vol. I. p. 68. 4: *paramāṇusañcayasvabhāvā daśaiva...*), 34. 1 f., 52. 24 ff. and 475. 1 ff. (particularly 14 ff.) (Sautrāntika criticism of the Vaiśeṣika concept of *ātman*). This similarity is indeed noteworthy, especially since the basic positions are distinctly different, viz. a marked substantialism in the case of the Sāṃkhyas and a no less clearly expressed antisubstantialism in the case of the Vaibhāṣikas. Likewise it can only be mentioned here that in the twelfth Ara of the NC, i.e. in the context of the critical discussion of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, the expression *guṇasamudāya* is also met with (see 652. 14 together with fn. 1; 668. 5 / 21; 671. 1 / 3), though used with reference to that which is denoted by a proper name like *Dittha*.
- 83) "Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeṣika" in: WZKS 19 (1975), pp. 183-166 and "The Vaiśeṣika Concept of *guṇa* and the Problem of Universals" in: WZKS 24 (1980), pp. 225-238.
- 84) Cf. Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa above p. 13.



- 85) Cf. also Chakravarti, o. c., p. 260: "...its palāśahood remains intact always..."— In this connection it may be noted that the maxim (= Paribhāṣā 37 in Nāgeśa's Paribhāṣenduśekhara) *ekadeśavikṛtam ananyavad bhavati* refers according to e. g. M. I 136. 9 f. likewise to the generic identity.
- 86) Cf. the article mentioned in fn., p. 375 *et passim*.
- 87) O. c., p. 258.
- 88) O. c., p. 264 (referred to also in fn. 2, p. 258 f.).
- 89) Viz. (366. 22 ff.): *nanu pariṇāmināṃ guṇānāṃ katham nityatā syād iti bravtti—y a s m i n p a r i ṇ a m a m ā n e t a t t v a m n a v i h a n y a t e / y a s y a y a d r ū p a m p r a m ā n e n o p a l a b d h a m , t a s y a t a t t a t t v a m / t a d y a s m i n n a v i h a n y a t e n a v y a b h i c a r a t i t a d a p i n i t y a m / g u ṇ ā n ā m a p i s u k h a - d u ḥ k h a m o h ā t m a t ā p r a k ā ś a k r i y ā s t h i t i ś i l a t ā c a t a t t v a m n a v i h a n y a t e / t a s m ā d e t e ' p i p a r i ṇ ā m a n i t y ā h /*.
- 90) Quoted above p. 19.
- 91) See above p. 8.
- 92) L. c. (cf. fn. 44 above), p. 27.
- 93) Cf. Hacker's course of lectures entitled "Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens", which was recorded in 1978 and will be edited by K. Rüping in the near future (in the de Nobili series published in Vienna). Cf. also Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1958, p. 96.
- 94) Space being limited—and I am afraid that I have already taken too much of it—I cannot deal here also with the parallel to this definition of *dravya*, found in the Yogabhāṣya on YS 3. 44, to which attention has been drawn among others by Nāgeśa (e. g. Uddyota IV 299a 30 f.), and with the passage in Nāgeśa's Mañjūśā in which the relation between these two definitions of *dravya* is discussed. It remains for the future to follow up these references in an article which will form a sort of addendum to the present one. Suffice it to say here that I don't think that the Yogabhāṣya passage forms an additional and independent testimony which should also be taken into account in determining the doctrinal provenance of the definition referred to in the M.