

Shree Shwetambar Murtipujak Jaina Boarding Series - 18



NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

Kokila H. Shah



Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre
'Darshan' Opp. Ranakpur Society
Sahibaug Ahmedabad-380 004 (Gujarat State) INDIA

NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

(A STUDY IN RETROSPECT—A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY)

**SHREE SHWETĀMBAR MŪRTIPŪJAK JAINA
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General Editor
Jitendra B. Shah

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DEDICATION
IN LOVING MEMORY
OF
MY PARENTS
LATE(MRS.) ZAVERBEN HEMCHAND SHAH
&
LATE(MR) HEMCHAND RAVJI SHAH

FOREWORD

The tradition of Indian Philosophy is rooted in deeper past. The growth and development of the several differing thought patterns, perceptions and conceptions in regard to the Verities and Reality in Indian Philosophy took place within the perimeter of this broad tradition. These philosophical schools can be divided into two main branches : Vedic and Śramaṇic. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems can be reckoned within the main stream of Vedic tradition. The Nirgrantha/Jaina, Ājīvika, and the Buddhist systems belong to the Śramaṇic tradition. Indeed, several works relating to the tenents/doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśanas have been written in the past. Their comparison can for certain be very interesting and informative. Their comparative study is published here in the book form. This study, hopefully, will be found useful to the scholars and the students alike.

Smt. Kokilaben Shah is author of the present book. Her doctoral thesis was based on this late medieval work. It is a matter of great pleasure that her work is now published by this Centre.

The Computer operators M/s, Makawan Vikram and Akhilesh Mishra, the proof reader Naranbhai Patel, and the Administrative officer Chandraprakash Shah of this centre have assisted in preparing the copy of this book, for which I express deep appreciation and thanks.

Ahmedabad, 2001

Jitendra Shah

Director

(Sharadaben Chimanbhai
Educational Reserach Centre)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I acknowledge my debt to the writers and publishers of the books I have referred to. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my obligation to all those who have been of great help in preparing this thesis. Mention must be made of Prof. (Dr.) R. A. Sinari, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, I. T. (Bombay) for his valuable comments and suggestions. My warmest thanks are also due to my esteemed friend Prof. R. M. Dave of S. I. E. S. College, Bombay, for his whole-hearted assistance.

I can hardly find appropriate words to express my indebtedness to my revered professor Dr. S. G. Mudgal, Principal, Ruparel College, Bombay, under whose erudite, inspiring and affectionate guidance this research is done. It was a matter of joy for me to have such an eminent, loving and scholarly guide from whom I received constant encouragement and whose profound interest in this research has enabled me to complete this work in time.

Finally, I take this opportunity to thank Principal M. V. Shingre of Ramniranjan Jhunjhunawala College where I am teaching, Prof. J. Sta-Maria, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Jhunjhunwala College and also the librarians of this college, Ruparel College and University of Bombay for their cooperation and facilities rendered to me.

I cannot refrain from thanking Mr. M. M. Shirodkar for his efficient typing of the thesis.

April, 1980

Kokila H. Shah

PREFACE

This book is slightly revised version of my thesis submitted to the University of Bombay for which I was awarded Ph.D degree. I am thankful to the authorities of Bombay University for granting me permission to publish this thesis.

The problem of idealism versus realism is one of the most fascinating problems in epistemology. The present thesis is an attempt to discuss epistemological problems of Nyāya and Jaina schools of thought. Jainism has a unique virtue of being a purely realistic system. Nyāya while clearly containing realistic elements, in the end falls short of full-fledged realism. Jaina realism successfully refutes agnosticism with the help of its concept of 'Omniscience.'

The second part of the book deals with Jaina Logic. Anekāntavāda with its two methods of Nayavāda and Syādvāda complements Jaina realism. Relativistic Epistemology to which Jainism is committed can give realism an adequate basis. It reveals many interesting facts about knowledge hitherto unknown. The uniqueness of Jaina realism must be recognised. Because of its non-absolutistic standpoint, Jaina realism presents itself as the significant form of epistemological realism which has no exact parallel in any system of thought.

Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre is an institution of oriental learning and research in Indology. I express my profound gratitude to Dr. Jitendrabhai B Shah—

Director of this institution and also thank Trustees of the institution for their co-operation in connection with the publication of my thesis.

I acknowledge my debt to the writers and publishers of the books I have referred to. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. R. A. Sinari, Prof. Ramesh Dave, Prof. N. G. Kulkarni and Dr. S. S. Antarkar. I can hardly find appropriate words to express my gratitude to Dr. S. G. Mudgal under whose erudite, inspiring and affectionate guidance this research was done. Last but not the least, I wish to thank Mr. Chandulal Selarka for taking keen interest in my work and for writing 'words of welcome'.

Kokila H. Shah

WORDS OF WELCOME

I feel very happy to welcome the Publication of a book on JAINISM—"NYĀYA and JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY" (A study in retrospect—A critical and comparative study) by Prof. (Dr.) Kokila Hemchand Shah.

Dr. Kokila Shah is an ardent scholar of Jaina Philosophy and this book bears the stamp of her erudition.

Jainism is perhaps the most scientific religion and a rational system of Philosophy in the world. It has its followers not only in India, but all over the world.

The new generation of Jainas who do not learn their mother tongue will be immensely benefited and enlightened by this book. Similarly, the book will be useful to non-Jainas living in India and abroad to understand and appreciate very subtle features of Jaina Philosophy and its unique relativistic Epistemology.

This book is an important addition in the field of Comparative Philosophy. I congratulate Dr. Kokila and welcome this book as a valuable contribution to the literature of Philosophy.

Chandulal B. Selarka

(B.A. B.Com. L.L.B. F.C.A.)

(First Ex-Chairman of Maharashtra State
Gujarat Sahitya Academy).

The book offers a comparative and critical account of the epistemologies of the two realistic and pluralistic systems of Indian Philosophy—Nyāya and Jainism. It also argues that Jainism has an edge over Nyāya as it does justice to the manifold character of reality by propounding *anekāntavāda* and to the relativity of partial truths by subscribing to *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, without denying the possibility of absolute knowledge (*Kevalajñāna*). I hope that the book will enrich the understanding of the subject.

S. S. Antarkar

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PART — I

I

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy should begin with the theory of knowledge. The problem of knowledge is origin and nature of knowledge, its sources and limitations. Philosophy—the quest for ultimate reality would be futile without an inquiry into the problem of knowledge. If the capacities of human mind are limited and if there are no other sources to know the nature of Reality then philosophy would be meaningless. Epistemology, the science of knowledge, therefore, must precede ontology, the science of Reality.

Epistemology, which concerns itself with systematic reflections about knowledge has come to occupy a central place in philosophy.

Epistemologically, the chief philosophical problem is when an individual apprehends any sort of object, can the object, thus, apprehended retain its existence and character apart from its relation to the apprehending subject ? The dispute over the epistemological problem regarding the status of what appears in our cognition leads to the problem of Realism versus Idealism. In fact, different positions can be taken towards this epistemological problem like objectivism

or naive realism, dualism, subjectivism or idealism and relativism. The conflict between realism and idealism is fundamental to any epistemological inquiry.

Realism versus Idealism

Realism maintains that (i) the objects of knowledge do not depend on any mind for their existence or character.

(ii) the world is plurality and not unity, i. e. there are many reals existing in the world independent of mind.

Idealism, on the other hand holds that external reality is the figment of imagination and that which imagines it is the only reality. Therefore, reality is non-dual.

Realism is, thus, opposed to idealism, which is the doctrine that no external reality exists apart from our knowledge of it; the whole universe, thus, being dependent on the mind or in some sense mental. Realism also clashes with phenomenalism which would deny that material objects exist except as groups or sequences of sense, actual and possible. It is also against absolute monism.

The assertion of idealism is that "our perceptions of the external world cannot give us the assurance that its nature is ultimately such as are revealed by them. In other words, our perceptions are in some sense illusory"¹. While Baldwin in his Dictionary of Philosophy, speaking of realism says, "The realist is one who considers that in sense-perception we have assurance of the presence of a reality distinct from the modification of the perceiving mind and existing independently of our perceptions"². It is clear that

the statement of realism is in some sense in conflict with the assertion of idealism that our perceptions of the external world are in some sense illusory. The problem of Realism versus Idealism is the fundamental epistemological problem.

Idealistic outlook in Indian Philosophy

Idealism is the view that attributes primacy to the spirit or consciousness or mind. Metaphysical idealism is not necessarily inconsistent with epistemological realism. But when it considers consciousness as the fundamental reality and as such makes the material world given to us in our sensations etc. dependent on it, it tends towards subjectivism which is inconsistent with realism. Historically, in Indian philosophy, such a view was first clearly given by some Upanisads in which idealistic outlook was proclaimed mainly in the form of some mystical realization. Subsequently, Advaita Vedāntins with their rigid adherence to the idealistic speculation in the Upanisads carried it forward.

Some schools of Mahāyana Buddhists also held a similar position. Their general philosophical conclusion was practically the same as that of Berkeley in European philosophy, one of his main arguments, too, being that since you cannot jump out of your own ideas and know an object apart from the knowing mind, the ideas alone are real and, therefore, the material world does not exist. However, Indian idealism is characteristically peculiar which marks the difference between Berkeley's and Buddhist's position. Though Berkeley denied the external material world and viewed everything as mere ideas of our mind, he was certainly anxious to differentiate facts from fictions, i. e. to avoid a chimerical scheme of things. This he tried to do by bringing God

superstitiously into his philosophy. Everything is idea, of course, but the idea imprinted on the senses are not mere ideas of our own, like imagination but are presentations. However, Buddhists were atheists and, therefore, there was no question of these philosophers following such a line of argument. Rather they thought that since ideas alone were real, the world of experience was unreal like 'city of the Gāndharvas'.

Thus, idealism as an epistemological theory maintains that what appears in our cognition has no objective status. That is, phenomena have no objective reality and they are merely subjective ideas. This is, because according to idealism the world-show is nothing but a manifestation of consciousness and has no reality apart from consciousness. Berkeley had to appeal to God to save idealism from slipping into subjectivism. But the Indian idealists, in fact, amounted to this position. They showed a marked tendency to establish the primacy of the spirit by proving the unreality of material world. This tendency was carried to its extreme by some schools of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. Both argued that phenomenal world has no intrinsic reality. Moreover, they also argued that since the world was unreal and since the so-called sources of our valid cognition pretended to present it as something real, these were to be considered as invalid and false. Thus, it means the doctrine of intrinsic falsity of knowledge is logically the position of all the Indian idealists. Since the extreme form of Idealism does not recognize any extramental reality the corollary is that all means of knowledge because of their pretentious claim to reveal extramental are to be treated as false.

Idealism has been one of the most dominant phases of Indian philosophy. Epistemologically, the conclusion that

follows from idealism is that the objects of our knowledge are only phenomenal in character. The extreme form of idealism may lead to nihilistic position resulting in impossibility of all knowledge. It either denies the objective existence of world or possibility of knowing it, i. e. either things of the world are sense-data or unknowable in themselves. Agnosticism is logically the consequence of idealism.

As against idealistic outlook in Indian philosophy, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Madhva and Jainism present realism. These philosophers and logicians differ among themselves in many a point of details but they seriously defend empirical knowledge which is regarded by the idealists as false.

The present thesis—Nyāya and Jaina Epistemology — is retrospective study of epistemological theories of two different yet important realistic schools, orthodox Nyāya and heterodox Jainism. Incidentally, the doctrines of some of the other schools both Indian and Western are also considered in so far as their contribution has some relevance to the problems of knowledge. Among orthodox systems, Nyāya is through going realism. It is primarily a logical and epistemological system strongly defending realism in Indian philosophy. Jainism—a non-vedic system—also presents a significant form of epistemological realism. Epistemological study of both these systems may contribute significantly to realism in particular and problems of knowledge in general. The analysis of various problems like sources of knowledge, validity of knowledge and consequent problem of error, etc. shows how far the realistic stand is maintained by both these schools. Jainism has, no doubt, some important similarities with Nyāya, it has

its own peculiarities as well. It is evident in the end that Nyāya system of thought while clearly containing realistic elements is not purely realistic. It falls short of complete realism in spite of its adherence to basic realistic principle of knowledge. Jainism, on the other hand, has a unique virtue of being a purely realistic system of thought. An analysis of Jaina epistemology quite clearly reveals that it is the most consistent and significant form of epistemological realism. Lastly, it may be pointed out that Jainism with the help of its Anekānta logic and with its unique methods of Nayavāda and Syādvāda has succeeded in evolving the most reasonable form of realism; advocating an advanced type of theory of knowledge which has no exact parallel in any thought Indian or Western. As against absolutist theory of knowledge the relativistic epistemology to which Jainism is committed can only give realism an adequate logical basis.

Annotations :

1. Dasguptā, S. N. : *Indian idealism*. p. 26
 2. Ibid.
-

II

DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN NYĀYA AND JAINISM

The problem of knowledge has long aroused the interests of the thinkers all over the world.

In the history of modern philosophy, the systematic study of epistemology can be traced back to Locke. In his "Essay concerning human understanding", Locke attempted to deal with the problem of knowledge which culminated in Kant's "Critique of pure reason".

In Indian philosophy, the systematic treatment of the means of knowledge—Pramāṇas—is to be found in Gautama's Nyāya sūtras. The new Nyāya school founded by Gaṅgeśa discussed the theory of knowledge as an independent branch of study and after that epistemology came to be regarded in Indian thought as an indispensable part of philosophy. In Jaina canons which form the earliest Jaina literature, we find the various problems relating to knowledge. In fact, Jaina contribution to the problem of knowledge deserves attention because of its peculiar approach to the problem.

The Nyāya epistemology is developed as an answer to the challenges posed by Buddhist idealists. Scepticism concerning knowledge is untenable. Russell in the book 'Problems of Philosophy' also brings out this point. The study of epistemology cannot start without the recognition of fact that there is very existence and possibility of knowledge. We have to assume that there is knowledge and this fact was recognised by the philosophers of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy except Idealistic Buddhists who believe that the world of experience including knowledge and the means of knowledge has only an illusory existence. The Nyāya, in keeping with its basic realistic tenet maintains that authentic knowledge depends upon what there exists in the world of reality, thus, strictly adhering to empiricist position.

In Nyāya sūtras, we find systematic and critical exposition of means of knowledge.

Epistemology in the Nyāya Sūtras

The first account of the means of knowledge which forms the nearest approach to the later systematic exposition of the same in Nyāya sūtras, is to be found in *Caraka saṁhitā*¹. The philosophical position of *Caraka saṁhitā* as a whole is in accordance with that of Nyāya school. There are four means of knowledge described in Nyāya sūtras :

1. Pratyakṣa — direct knowledge i. e. sense-perception.
2. Anumāna — inference.
3. Upamāna — knowledge by similarity.
4. Śabda — verbal testimony.

The existence of the means of knowledge is established from the fact that there is actually knowledge of the cognised object. The existence of the means of

knowledge cannot be doubted. They are compared to the lamp of light which illumines other things and itself. Means of knowledge also reveal objects as well as themselves.

In Nyāya sūtras no definition of Pramāṇa is given. Direct knowledge is defined as that which is not the result of a mark i. e. inferential mark. This distinguishes sense-cognition from other means of knowledge like inference and verbal testimony. It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance in modern times. It is also described as non-erroneous and definite. This emphasises its epistemological character as distinguished from mere psychological-mental process of sense-cognition which may be subjective.

Inference is defined as that which is based on direct knowledge and its different kinds are recognized.

Knowledge by similarity is defined as the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well known. The value of this means of knowledge lies in definitely identifying an object. Verbal testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. It is an independent means of knowledge irreducible to inference because the relation between a word and its referend is not the same as the relation between inferential mark and the object inferred.

Nyāya sūtras thus admit four independent sources of knowledge. They do not recognize other means of knowledge recognized by some of the systems such as presumption, negation, etc.

While they deal with the acquirement of the knowledge, they also admit the possibility of error which can be revealed by seeing a contrast between the real object and its counterpart.

Later Nyāya Epistemology

Theory of knowledge in Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya.

Vātsyāyana gives analysis of problem of knowledge. According to him, the means of knowledge always refer to an object. The knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon the following factors :

i. the knower, ii. the means of knowledge, iii. the cognised object, iv. the form of cognition.

While discussing the relative value of the various means of knowledge, direct knowledge is said to be the most convincing of all.

Epistemology of Neo-Nyāya

Neo-Nyāya is primarily an epistemological theory in so far as it confines its discussion to the theory of means of knowledge independent of the objects of knowledge. Gaṅgeśa is recognized as a founder of this school. In the history of Nyāya school, Gaṅgeśa's *Tatvacintāmaṇi* is the first systematic work discussing theory of knowledge. While dealing with the nature of Pratyakṣa, i. e. perception or direct knowledge, he criticises the definition of it as given in old Nyāya sūtras as too wide and also too narrow, because it includes remembrance and excludes some form of perception such as Yogaja one. He simply defines direct knowledge as that which is not produced by any other knowledge. The condition of the contact of an object with the sense-organs had been deleted from the definition of direct knowledge much earlier by Jaina and Buddhist logicians as is correctly observed by Jwālā Prasad². Later Nyāya logicians seem to agree with this view of direct knowledge.

As far as the means of knowledge are concerned, he accepts usual four means of knowledge but he defines verbal testimony as the means of knowledge which is the result of knowledge of the meaning of words according to usage. He also holds the distinction between right and wrong knowledge and advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge as against Mīmāṃsā theory of self-validity of knowledge.

Development of Jaina Epistemology

In early Jain literature, we do not find any systematic treatment of logical doctrine until the time of Umāsvāti. Of course, in some of the sūtras like Bhagavatī sūtra, Sthānāṅga sūtra, we find reference to the issues concerning knowledge.

In Umāsvāti's "Tattvārtha sūtra"³ knowledge is classified as :

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| i. Mati, v. Keval. | ii. Śruta, |
| iii. Avadhi, | iv. Manahparyaya, |

Of these five kinds of knowledge, the first two are known as indirect and the rest direct. The peculiar point here to be noted is that which is perceived without the medium of the senses is direct knowledge while that which requires the instrumentality of senses is indirect. Again, of these five kinds of knowledge, Mati, Śruta and Avadhi can be erroneous while the rest cannot be.

Error is the opposite of knowledge and it consists in a failure to distinguish between that which is and that which is not.

Later on, Jaina epistemology shows signs of influence of the other Indian schools. The definition and classification

of knowledge as found in the works of important Jaina logicians like Siddha-Sena and Deva-Sūri show a remarkable difference from those given in early works of Jaina logic like Umāsvāti's 'Tattvārthādhigama sūtra'. For example, the definition of direct knowledge is modified. It is defined as that which refers to the object presented to the senses.

Jaina Epistemology as discussed in Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara

Nyāyāvatār is a small work which contains logical and epistemological views of Siddhasena Divākara—a Jaina logician. He defines knowledge as that which is free from obstruction and which illuminates itself and other things. It can be either direct knowledge or indirect knowledge. Ordinary direct knowledge is that which perceives the objects which are not beyond the senses. This definition of direct knowledge is in contrast with that found in the earlier Jaina works. Inference is defined as the knowledge of the major term through a mark which is inseparably connected with it. Verbal testimony is defined as knowledge arising from words. It also discusses the doctrine of Naya and Syādvāda.

Pramāṇanaya Tattvālokālankāra of Vādi Deva Sūri

It is an important treatise on Jaina logic and epistemology. It defines Pramāṇa as valid knowledge about the self and the not-self⁴. It is opposed to superimposition. It is either direct or indirect. Direct knowledge is clear and vivid while indirect knowledge is not clear. Direct knowledge is again of two types :-

- i. knowledge in the ordinary sense;
- ii. knowledge in the highest sense.

Direct knowledge in the ordinary sense is either sensuous or non-sensuous and both of them can be of the nature of avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā:

The direct knowledge in the highest sense depends for its genesis exclusively upon the soul and is of two kinds :

- i. Vikala—limited which includes avadhijñāna and manaḥparyāyajñāna;
- ii. Sakala—complete and correct knowledge which includes kevalajñāna.

It will be seen that this classification of knowledge is a combination of the different classifications found in different Jaina works.

Annotations :

1. Jwālā Prasād : *History of Indian epistemology*. P.11
 2. Jwālā Prasād : *Indian epistemology*.
 3. Umāsvāt : *Tattvārthasūtra*, I 9-10
 4. Bhattāchārya, H. : *Pramāṇanaya tattvālokālāṅkāra* of Vādi Devasūri p. 13.
-

III

NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY IN GENERAL

NYĀYA EPISTEMOLOGY IN GENERAL

The first question which every one of the Indian systems of philosophy tries to settle is that of knowledge. Although different systems have divergent attitude towards this problem, it occupies central place in their philosophical discussion.

Philosophers of Nyāya school were seriously interested in the problem of knowledge. They defend empirical knowledge which was challenged by the idealist as useless and false. Nyāya is essentially an empirical epistemology as against idealism which treats empirical knowledge as inherently false.

As a system of realistic pluralism, Nyāya deserves special attention. Nyāya epistemology effectively deals with all the main problems of knowledge and logic avoiding scepticism and emphatically asserts that problem of knowledge is capable of being solved. As the literal meaning of the term Nyāya suggests, it is primarily the philosophy of

argumentation. It is essentially an intellectual, logical, analytical and epistemological system of thought. It is also called science of reasoning, or science of logic and epistemology which is remarkable for its critical approach to the problems. Its logical realism becomes obvious when it recognizes Pramāṇa or valid means of knowledge as the first of the sixteen categories. This clearly brings out the important characteristic of the system, viz. its predominantly logical and epistemological interest in the study of any problem.

The distinctive feature of Nyāya is its logical method of inquiry, by the application of which Nyāya logicians demonstrate the falsity of scepticism and establish realism. An examination of sources of valid knowledge substantiates this view, according to these philosophers. Etymologically, the term Nyāya suggests that its aim is critical examination of the sources of valid knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof.

Nyāya is the science of right reasoning—the science of demonstration or correct knowledge.

It can justifiably be characterised as logical realism. It believes in independent existence of the objects of the world apart from mind. This realism of Nyāya has a logical basis, and is not just the result of mere faith or feeling or scriptural testimony. It is arrived at by critical reflections. It is because of this, that Nyāya deserves special attention as a system of realism. It is analytic in its approach. It discusses in detail the mechanisms of knowledge, arguing against sceptical consequences, resulting from the false analysis of the problem.

As regards the origin of knowledge, the views held by
Nyā.-2

rival systems are criticized by Nyāya philosophers. According to Nyāya, knowledge is to be regarded as an effect and like any other effect, it originates in joint collocation of causes. There is no transcendental element involved in the production of knowledge. Therefore, Sāṅkhya view is rejected by Nyāya. Similarly Buddhist view that knowledge shows itself as both knowledge and its object is also considered as irrational and, therefore, untenable by Nyāya philosophers.

Valid knowledge is defined as definite knowledge of an object which is true and presentational in character. "Gaṅgeśa maintains that *pramā* is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists¹." It is clear that Nyāya view of valid knowledge resembles correspondence theory of western realists.

The nature of the knowledge as valid or invalid depends upon the four means of valid knowledge. The means of knowledge are the operative causes, the determining conditions of origin of valid knowledge. Nyāya logic is both formal and material. It is interested in consistency as well as in truth. This helps us to have a right apprehension of an object as well as to test the validity of knowledge.

It discusses the different ways in which knowledge is acquired. These are the sources of valid knowledge which are :-

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| i. Perception | ii. Inference |
| iii. Comparison | iv. Testimony |

These are not merely ways and means by which human mind acquires knowledge that is psychological processes by which knowledge as mental content is gained,

but are canons of knowledge by means of which we can evaluate or check the knowledge. Nyāya theory of knowledge has this psychological as well as logical aspect. Validity of knowledge is shown by its compatibility with reality. Knowledge thus is not exclusively psychological phenomenon, its validity depends upon reality. Nyāya is, therefore, not merely science of consistency—a formal logic but it is empirical epistemology.

Nyāya definition of knowledge is also realistic as knowledge is manifestation of objects. It is in accordance with its emphasis on the extramental reality of the world of objects. Knowledge is cognition of an object as it refers to an object. Nyāya view of knowledge, however, does not clearly suggest the objective reference that is found in knowledge. That is why some western realists like Russell advocate relation theory of knowledge. But Nyāya seems to hold the view that “knowledge may be said to arise ultimately out of the relation between the soul and body. Still, it is not merely a relation between the two, but a new property accruing the soul therefrom².”

Nyāya theory asserts reality outside knowledge, as knowledge reveals the object. It also admits that reality can be known. External world is real of its own but it is through knowledge that we can reach to it. Knowledge, thus always presupposes some object to which it is directed and which is outside and different from knowledge. In Nyāya realism the difference between knowledge and its object is emphasised. Nyāya philosophers insist that mind which knows and the object which is known are externally related. Knowing makes no difference to the existence of the objects. The object is out there independent of the knowing minds. In the act of

knowing, mind conforms to the object and not vice versa. This is essentially realistic concept of knowledge insisted by Nyāya epistemologists.

Valid knowledge in Nyāya is definite, unerring, presentative cognition of an object. On this view, doubt, error, memory and hypothetical reasoning are excluded from valid knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is admitted by the Nyāya as valid but it is treated as a kind of extraordinary perception.

As regards the question what constitutes true knowledge. Nyāya maintains correspondence theory of truth. Knowledge is true when it corresponds to the nature of an object as it is; otherwise it becomes false, e. g. when you have cognition of a rope as a rope, it is valid knowledge. If you are uncertain whether it is a rope or a snake it is doubt and not valid knowledge. If you recall the rope you have perceived, it is memory—a reproductive experience which may be true but not valid knowledge. If you mistake the rope for the snake, there is an error which is, no doubt, knowledge indeed; may also be presentative, but it is certainly not true knowledge. While the nature of truth consists in its correspondence with the facts outside, the criterion of truth is pragmatic. A piece of knowledge is true is known from the fact that it leads to successful activity. If it fails to lead to successful activity then it is regarded as false.

Nyāya view is, therefore, that of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, i. e. a knowledge cannot be the test of its own truth because it cognizes objects distinct from itself. Neither truth nor falsity is self-evident. Both the schools of Nyāya old and new believe that both truth and falsity are extrinsic to knowledge. Knowledge intrinsically is only a manifestation of objects.

The question of its validity or invalidity arises only subsequently. Nyāya theory is that knowledge is produced in the soul when it comes in contact with non-soul. Knowledge is not the essential property of the soul but it is adventitious property of the soul which is generated in it by the object. Knowledge is valid when generating conditions are sound, if the conditions are not sound, i. e. if they are defective, knowledge is invalid. Hence both validity and invalidity of knowledge depend upon some extraneous conditions. Knowledge produced by its cause is neither valid nor invalid in itself. Validity has reference to some positive excellence in the generating conditions of knowledge while invalidity is because of some positive defects in the conditions. Nyāya position is, therefore, that truth or falsity of knowledge is both constituted and known by external conditions. It is theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge as against theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge. As chatterjee puts it, "knowledge, according to Nyāya, cognises objects that are distinct from and outside of itself. It cannot turn back on itself and cognise its own existence, far less its own validity³."

The Nyāya theory of knowledge is, thus, realistic and pragmatic—realistic as regards the nature of truth and pragmatic as regards the test of truth.

Jaina Epistemology in general

Jaina theory of knowledge is a unique contribution to Indian epistemology as such. Jaina philosophers have discussed the problem of knowledge elaborately. According to it all knowledge is relative and can be acquired by direct and indirect sources.

Knowledge, according to Jainism, is an essential,

attribute of the soul. The soul being essentially consious, knowledge is manifestation by the soul of its intrinsic character. Consciousness enlightens itself as well as the objects. It presents different degrees due to the obstruction of Karmas. The object of knowledge being infinitely complex can be fully comprehended only in the highest degree of knowledge, i. e. omniscience which is absolute and perfect knowledge and which is of course not possible for ordinary human beings who cannot rise above the limitations of sense-organs. This kind of perfect knowledge is revealed in the soul when the obstructive karmas are destroyed.

Jaina theory of knowledge is of great antiquity. Its origin is said to be pre-Mahāvīr according to some scholars. Jaina canons discuss means of cognition as well as categories of knowledge. The sources of valid knowledge described in sūtras are four. They are the Pramāṇas or means of valid cognition as follows :-

- | | |
|----------------|----------------|
| i. Perception. | ii. Inference. |
| iii. Analogy. | iv. Authority. |

Again, knowledge is classified into five categories in Jaina canons. The Uttarādhyayana sūtra and Tattvārtha sūtra refer to five types of knowledge which are :-

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| i. Matijñāna | - perceptual knowledge |
| ii. Śruta jñāna | - knowledge derived through sacred books. |
| iii. Avadhijñāna | - Clairvoyance |
| iv. Manaḥparyāyajñāna | - telepathy |
| v. Kevalajñāna | - the highest and ultimate knowledge. |

Like other systems of Indian philosophy Jainas have critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. But Naya (the point of view) is a distinctive feature of Jaina epistemology. Jaina philosophers maintain that knowledge is of two types, viz (i) Pramāṇa—which refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is; (ii) Naya—knowledge of a thing in a particular context, or from particular standpoint.

Knowledge is acquired by means of pramāṇas which are the instruments of knowledge and Naya which refers to a particular point of view.

Knowledge through Pramāṇa

Pramāṇa is defined as valid knowledge about the self and the not-self⁴. Jaina definition of pramāṇa implies that valid knowledge of both self and not-self is possible.

Valid knowledge is to be distinguished from doubt, illusion and inattention. The recognition of the not self distinguishes Jaina position from absolute idealism while that of the self distinguishes it from some of the realistic systems like Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Further, Jaina definition of valid knowledge includes both direct and indirect forms of knowledge and, therefore, it is neither too narrow nor too wide because it includes all forms of knowledge and clearly excludes all invalid forms of knowledge. It is clear that Pramāṇa determines the nature of a thing as it really is and is opposed to false cognition like doubt, illusion and inattention.

Knowledge through Pramāṇa is divided into two categories. Tattvārtha sūtra first of all divides knowledge into five categories and then these categories have been included

under two types—direct and indirect.

Direct knowledge is a correct knowledge of an object without any mediation, or the aid of sense-organs. On the other hand, indirect knowledge is mediate knowledge which is not directly by the soul but it is through the intervention of the senses. Of the five types of knowledge, noted above, the first two i. e. perception and scriptural knowledge are regarded by Jainas as indirect or mediate and the last three are classified as direct knowledge. Here it is clear that Jaina classification of direct and indirect knowledge differs from general Indian concept of it where perception is regarded as direct. However, later Jaina thinkers have slightly modified this classification and accordingly *matijñāna*—perception—is regarded as empirically direct as distinguished from transcendently direct. Ordinary perception is empirical which depends on sense organs and hence is limited. As is said “the perception which has for its condition the senses and mind is called empirical perception⁵.” In general, scheme of classification of knowledge in Jainism can be represented as follows :-

Knowledge is first of all divided into two kinds :

- i. direct, and ii. indirect.

Direct knowledge can again be classified as :

- i. empirical, and ii. transcendental.

Empirical perception can again be of five kinds corresponding to five sense-organs. These five types come under sensuous knowledge, viz. :

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| i. eye-sensation, | ii. Touch-sensation |
| iii. ear-sensation | iv. nose-sensation |

v. tongue-sensation

Epirical perception can again be mental when it is related to mind.

All these forms of knowledge can come under Matijñāna.

Transcendental perception can be divided into three kinds :

- i. Clairvoyance — Avadhi jñāna
- ii. Telepathy — Manahparyāya
- iii. Omniscience — Kevalajñāna.

These can be regarded as the forms of extrasensory perception.

Secondly, indirect knowledge is non-perceptual cognition of which the different varieties are :-

- i. Recollection — smṛti
- ii. Recognition or conception — pratyabhijñā
- iii. Inductive reasoning — tarka
- iv. Inference—deduction — anumāna
- v. Authority — verbal testimony

All these kinds of knowledge in Jainism cover instruments as well as categories of knowledge which include canonical as well as logical concept of knowledge. Jainism discusses means of valid knowledge like other systems of Indian philosophy. In some of the sūtras, Lord Mahāvīr says, "There are four means of valid knowledge, viz. perception, inference, analogy and authority⁶."

It is the Jaina view that knowledge is essential quality

of the soul. However, knowledge of mundane soul is restricted because of veil of Karma. Perfect knowledge is possible when the veil of Karma is totally removed. Thus, in Jainism subsidence-cum-destruction of the veil of Karma is a necessary condition of knowledge. Indian—Jaina realists admit the reality of both soul and non-soul. Jaina epistemology starts with the distinction between knowledge and its object. It is realism according to which external objects possess reality independent of the perceiving subject. The function of knowledge is merely to reveal, on the one hand, the objective reality which is already existing and also to reveal itself, on the other hand. Jainism, thus, favours the self-illuminating nature of knowledge. Knowledge, like a lamp, reveals other objects as well as itself, the object so revealed being real. The external objects are independent and they are revealed by knowledge. Soul is both subject and the object of knowledge. *Pramāṇas* are the right means of knowledge. All the forms of knowledge reveal the objects. *Pramāṇa* is defined as right knowledge which is free from obstruction and which illumines itself and other objects. The peculiar Jaina theory is that knowledge reveals its object because the obstacles to knowledge are removed.

Jainas, thus, make the distinction between *Pramāṇa* and its fruits. What is effected by *Pramāṇas* is its fruit and this solves the epistemological problem as to how a thing which is mere being becomes known.

Right knowledge, according to Jainism, is *pramāṇa*. The validity of knowledge is either determined intrinsically or extrinsically. In some cases, it is intrinsic while in others it is extrinsic. Fallacious knowledge is misunderstanding the nature of a thing. It is that which falsely appears. Jainas thus,

accept correspondence theory of truth. False knowledge is of three kinds :-

- i. Illusion,
- ii. Doubt,
- iii. Inattention.

Perfect knowledge, according to Jainism, is free from doubt etc. Though fallacious knowledge is possible, it is to be noted that one cannot have fallacious mind-reading, i. e. telepathic knowledge or omniscience though one can have fallacious clairvoyance. In other words, of the different forms of knowledge, telepathy and omniscience, the forms of transcendental perception are such that they cannot be fallacious. One can have them either in their correct forms or not at all.

Jaina concept of Naya

In addition to knowledge by pramāṇa, Jains recognize knowledge by Naya, i. e. knowledge of an object in relation to other objects. This emphasises non-absolutistic standpoint of Jaina epistemology. This results in Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda. every object possesses infinite aspects. Because of this nature of reality, the theory of relativity of propositions and theory of different standpoints result. Only this dialectical method can succeed in giving true picture of reality. As is rightly observed by M. Mehta, "Jaina thinkers did not hesitate to put Syādvāda on an equal status with omniscience. As is said : Both Syādvāda and kevalajñāna illuminate the whole reality. The difference between them is only this much that while the former illuminates the objects indirectly the latter illuminates them directly". (apta

Mīmāṃsā, 105)⁷. When Jainas say that an object has infinite attributes, these attributes are not creations of mind but they have ontological character in the sense that they exist in the object. This marks the distinctive realistic approach of Jaina epistemology. Further, it believes in interrelatedness of objects. Therefore, the two methods of analysis and synthesis are the unique instruments in the act of knowledge. Knowledge is not merely a cognitive act but it is also an organizing principle. Needless to say that Jaina epistemology is empirical. It is also relativistic. It is in this connection that we can grasp the significance of the statement that “a man who knows only one object with all its properties, knows all objects⁸.”

A critical evaluation of Nyāya and Jaina theory would reveal that there is fundamental difference as regards the relation between soul and knowledge in Nyāya and Jainism. Nyāya puts forward quality theory of knowledge. According to Nyāya, consciousness or knowledge is not the essence of soul. Soul is connected with knowledge accidentally. Again Nyāya maintains that soul is absolutely immutable. This is inconsistent with its theory of knowledge. The quality theory of knowledge would lead to scepticism. Nyāya should subscribe to some such view as held by Jainas that consciousness is not merely attribute of soul but is nature of soul. If soul is essentially unconscious, it cannot know the objects and again if soul is absolutely immutable then cognition or knowledge cannot be possible. Pluralistic realism of Nyāya is untenable on Nyāya view of soul. An essentially unconscious soul cannot possibly become a knower.

In spite of these defects, Nyāya has made a great

contribution to the field of knowledge. It is a significant form of realism though its realism is not developed to its logical conclusion. Jaina realism seems to be more developed and consistent as far as its contents and methods are concerned.

Annotations :

1. Bijalwan, C. D., *Indian Theory of Knowledge* P. 39.
 2. Chatterjee, S., *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. (University of Calcutta, 1950), p. 17.
 3. Chatterjee, S. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 3.
 4. Vādi Devasūri, *Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokāṅkāra*.
 5. Mohanlal Mehta, *Jaina Philosophy*. P. 152.
 6. *Bhagavati sūtra* V. 43. 192.
 7. Mohanlal Mehta, *Jaina Philosophy*, p. 174-175.
 8. Mohanlal Mehta, *Jaina Philosophy*, p. 166. Acāranga sūtra, (I. 3.4 122)
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IV

COMMON SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE IN NYĀYA AND JAINISM

Different views about the sources of knowledge

Western philosophers generally recognize only two sources of knowledge, viz. immediate, i. e. perception and mediate, i. e. inference. Among Indian thinkers, there is a difference of opinion as regards the sources of valid knowledge. The number of sources varies from system to system.

Chārvāka

Chārvākas are radical empiricists who believe in perception as the only source of valid knowledge.

Buddhism

It holds that perception and inference are the two ultimate sources of true knowledge.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga

These systems recognize perception, inference and

testimony as the three independent sources of knowledge.

Mīmāṃsā

The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā recognizes that there are five sources of valid knowledge, viz. perception, inference, comparison, testimony and postulation.

The Bhatta Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta

They recognize six distinct kinds of knowledge admitting non-perception in addition to the five sources accepted by Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā.

Vaiśeṣika

Vaiśeṣika philosophers generally believe in four kinds of valid knowledge; viz. perception, inference, memory and intuitive experience; however some of them accept only perception and inference as the two independent sources of knowledge.

Nyāya

According to Nyāya, there are four independent sources of knowledge viz. perception, inference, comparison and testimony. They maintain that the other sources of knowledge may be included within these four sources and, therefore, need not be recognized as independent sources of knowledge.

Jainism

According to Jainism, both ordinary and

extraordinary perception, inference, testimony, *pratyabhijñā* or recognition, *smṛti* or memory and induction are all independent sources of knowledge which may be classified under the heads of immediate and mediate knowledge.

Nyāya philosophers believe in extraordinary perception but their classification differs from that of Jainism. According to Nyāya, recognition is only a kind of qualified perception and therefore, should not be regarded as a distinct source of knowledge. Nyāya also refuses to acknowledge *smṛti* or memory as a separate source of knowledge on the ground that it is not directly based on the object. According to Nyāya, in memory, we have knowledge of what was once presented to our experience but is not presented. So it is recollection of what was once presented. So Nyāya thinks that it is not knowledge born of objective facts.

Jainas, on the contrary, accept memory as a source of valid knowledge. According to them, memory, by definition, is knowledge of the past. But its basis is the object; though experienced in the past. Hence, we are not justified in rejecting memory as a distinct source of knowledge just because it refers to something previously known. If memory itself is invalid then knowledge based on memory cannot be valid. The validity of memory, thus, must be recognised if inference which is based on memory is regarded as a separate source of valid knowledge. In Indian philosophy. Madhva also recognises memory as a valid means of knowledge though it is regarded by him as a direct perception by mind. Jainism, however, recognizes it as a form of mediate knowledge. It is important to note that modern western philosophers, like Russell, have also recognized memory as an important source

of our knowledge. Jainas are quite right when they maintain that memory is a recollection and as such not a knowledge of a datum perceived at present; this does not undermine its objective basis as it is definitely based on the object, though object, no doubt, is experienced in the past. Here Jaina realists seem to be more reasonable than Nyāya logicians who reject memory as a source of valid knowledge.

Jainas are in agreement with Nyāya philosophers when they maintain that negation is not different from perception and hence negation as an independent means of knowledge need not be recognized.

Jaina epistemology is, thus, rich in its content as far as the ways of knowing are concerned. It has, no doubt, some similarities with Nyāya epistemology, it has its own peculiarities as well.

Five Kinds of Knowledge in Jainism

In Tattvārtha sūtra of Jainism, we find five categories of knowledge.

1. Matijñāna : It can be called empirical perception resulting from five senses and the mind and is limited. It is either sensuous or non-sensuous depending upon senses or mind. It involves four stages of sensation, attention, determinate perception and retention.
2. Srutajñāna : It is the knowledge which is the result of some reliable authority which communicates the truth. It is knowledge derived from words of a trust-worthy person or scriptures. This knowledge from authority can be based on either human authority or superhuman authority. However, Jainas do not believe in authority of vedas, though they recognize authority of Tīrthaṅkaras, the omniscient beings.

3. Avadhi : It is clear perception of material objects which cannot be perceived by the senses usually. It is innate or acquired. It differs in scope and durability with different persons according to their capacities. It arises when its enveloping obstacles subside in a particular way. It can be called clairvoyant perception.

4. Manahparyāya : It is higher than Avadhi and is generally termed as telepathy. It is knowledge of other minds and arises when its peculiar hindrances which cover it are annihilated. It can know things and modes which are beyond the reach of Avadhi. Its acquisition depends on higher spiritual virtues like self-control, purity. It is reading of minds of others.

5. Keval : It is omniscience—the most perfect, pure, infinite, unique knowledge of all things directly. It arises when all knowledge-covering kārmiic-veils are destroyed.

Of these five kinds of knowledge the first three can be erroneous, while the last two are always valid. The peculiar point in this classification is that, that which is perceived without the help of sense is considered here as direct and that which is perceived through the sense is indirect by early Jaina logicians. In this sense, empirical perception is regarded as not direct knowledge by them. Avadhi, Manahparyāya and Keval are forms of transcendental perception which can be considered as extrasensory perception.

The Nyāya Theory of Perception

Perception as a method of knowledge in Nyāya :

The Nyāya recognizes four distinct and independent means of knowledge of which perception is the first and

the most fundamental. In fact, the first valid source of knowledge recognized by all Indian philosophers in general is perception. Even Cārvaka begins with perception. It may be said that, in a sense, all knowledge must begin with perception though it is not adequate to explain the entire body of knowledge as empiricists contend.

In Nyāya, the position accorded to perception is primary because perceptual knowledge is the final basis of all other kinds of knowledge. Western realists over-emphasize the validity of perception as the source of knowledge. The Nyāya realists, however, do not grant the self-evident validity of perception. They are of the opinion that what is directly perceived may not be immediately doubted and, therefore, need not be further tested but when any doubt arises as regards its validity, it needs verification. The Nyāya logicians, thus, do not agree with the view that "what one sees or feels, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels."¹

The Nyāya Definition of Perception

The old Nyāya defines perception as the knowledge which is produced by the contact between sense-organs and objects and it is infallible as well as definite. The definition of perception in terms of sense-object contact emphasises that right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is the product of perceptual process. As far as nature of contact is concerned Nyāya believes that contact is real and not imaginary.

Logical realism of Nyāya enumerates six kinds of contacts :

1. The contact with substance.
2. The contact with the qualities through the thing in which they inhere.
3. The contact with the qualities in the generic character as universals of those qualities.
4. The contact by which sounds are said to be perceived by the auditory organ.
5. The contact by which the generic character of sound as the universal of sound is perceived.
6. The contact with negation, i. e. the contact by which negation is perceived.

It should be noted that in Nyāya realism, the contact is not in any sense metaphorical but is actual. It is also not transcontinental as is the case in Kant's philosophy. Nyāya admits not only substance and qualities but also all kinds of relations as real and can be perceived directly. A special kind of relation or sense-contact with the object is, thus, the indispensable condition of all perceptual knowledge in old Nyāya.

However, Modern school of Nyāya opposes the old definition which insists on sense-object-contact on several grounds. It is objected that definition of perception given by old Nyāya is too wide as it will include other forms of knowledge too and is too narrow as it excludes divine omniscience which is direct perception. It is rightly pointed out that "the Nyāya gives undue importance to indriyārthasannikarṣa and belittles the importance of the element of immediacy which ought to be treated as the essential element in pratyakṣa."²

Modern Nyāya logicians define perception as that knowledge which is not the result of any previous knowledge. It is “knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any previous knowledge”.³ It is clear that the element of immediacy in perception is emphasised here. This definition of perception comes close to Jaina definition of perception which also emphasises that it is direct knowledge. This Neo-Nyāya definition of perception seems to be more appropriate as it is applicable to all kinds of perception human as well as divine and it excludes all other kinds of knowledge which are non-perceptual in character like inference etc. It seems true to maintain that sense-contact with the object is not the essential condition of perception. There may be the cases of knowledge which are perceptual in character and yet not the results of sense object contact. Modern Nyāya philosophers seem to realize this truth.

Classification of perception

Perception has been classified by Nyāya into two broad classes :-

1. Ordinary.
2. Extraordinary.

When the contact between the senses and the object is ordinary, we have ordinary perception while in case of extraordinary perception the contact between the object and the senses is not usual but is extraordinary.

Ordinary perception is again divided into :

1. External.

2. Internal.

External perception takes place when the five external organs of sense come into contact with their respective external objects. It is of five kinds, namely, visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory and olfactory brought about by the senseorgans of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively. Of the five senses, some Nyāya philosophers believe that the visual sense reaches an object and is, therefore, *prāpyakāri*.

Mind is regarded as an internal sense in Nyāya and internal perception is brought about by the mind's contact with psychical states or processes.

According to another classification, ordinary perception is of three kinds :-

1. Indeterminate — *nirvikalpaka*
2. Determinate — *savikalpaka*
3. Recognition — *pratyabhijñā*.

Indeterminate and determinate perceptions are the two stages of the same process of perception. One is less advanced, the other is more advanced. Indeterminate perception is the primary cognition of an object as just an existing real without any characterization it as something.

Determinate perception is the perception of an object as qualified by certain attributes, though, it does not discover anything that is not there in the object itself.

Thus, indeterminate and determinate perceptions are the two grades of a process which is essentially identical and continuous in nature.

Here, Nyāya seems to recognize the fundamental fact about knowledge that it involves both sensation and conception. The extreme view held by some of the systems like Cārvaka and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja that all perception is determinate is difficult to accept. Most of the Jaina logicians also accept both these forms of the perception. Nyāya while recognizing these two forms of perception; makes it clear that same reality is presented at indeterminate stage which is there at the determinate stage of perception.

Recognition

The third variety of the ordinary perception is termed as *pratyabhijñā* which is re-cognition of same object. It is cognition of an object as that which was cognized before. Here, present perception is qualified by past perception. The thing which we perceive at present is known to be perceived in past, e. g. 'This is the same man that I saw'.

In Jainism, *pratyabhijñā* is understood in different sense and it is regarded as a different kind of knowledge and not a form of perception. Nyāya concept of comparison or *upamāna* can be included under the concept of *pratyabhijñā* as understood by the Jainas.

Extraordinary perception

It is of three distinct kinds :-

1. The perception of classes — *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*
2. Acquired perception — *jñānalakṣaṇa*

3. Intuitive perception — *yogaja*.

1. The perception of Classes

It is the general perception of the common features or class of individuals. It can be called the perception of universal on the basis of class-concept. Nyāya realism recognizes universals as distinct class of reals. Ordinarily we have the knowledge of particulars alone and not universals but when a particular object is perceived, we first perceive the universal which inheres in particular. Some of the later Nyāya philosophers suggest that by this kind of perception, we can arrive at the universal proposition in inference and can explain negative judgements of perception. It is knowledge through the class-essence, definition. This kind of perception is obviously different from ordinary kind of perception and here it is classified as an extraordinary form of perception.

2. Acquired Perception

It is a 'complicated' perception through association where different percepts become associated and form one integrated perception, e. g. seeing sandalwood at a distance, we come to know its fragrance, though its fragrance is not ordinarily perceived due to distance. It is still cognized immediately. There is extraordinary contact between sense and the object which is in the form of past experience. There is past experience of fragrance which is revived in memory since it is associated with the visual appearance of sandalwood, the present visual perception of fragrance is brought about. Thus, here, some past experience serves as a contact between sense organ and the object perceived.

Therefore, the basis of present perception is past knowledge.

Illusions are explained by Nyāya with the help of this kind of perception. Error is the case of wrong synthesis of two reals.

3. Intuitive perception—Yogaja

This is immediate perception belonging to yogins alone who by their super-normal powers can have the perception of all objects, past, present and future, which are ordinarily imperceptible to others. The possibility of this kind of intuitive perception is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. It may be compared with kevalajñāna of the Jainas, bodhi of the Buddhists, the kaivalya of Sāṅkhyas and sākṣātkāra of the Vedāntins. Though Nyāya view of yogaja can be said to be analogous to Jaina view of omniscience, the fundamental and essential difference between the two must be recognized. It is the Jaina view that this kind of perception cannot be through sense organ or mind and even meditation cannot produce omniscience until kārmic veil which obstructs right knowledge is destroyed. It is direct knowledge by soul in Jainism. Generally, the kind of perception recognized by Nyāya as yogaja is not regarded absurd. Even psychology accepts some such form of perception. However, it is criticized that "The Nyāya is a philosophy of realism and to assign perceptuality to such a subtle and extrasensory form of knowledge is not consistent with its pronounced principles. The yogaja perception does not require the help of the senses. So, by accepting it the Nyāya drifts from realism to subjective Idealism."⁴

This criticism seems to be based on misunderstanding of the nature of reality and knowledge. It is also based on the

assumption that extrasensory perception has no place in realism. This is, however, not the case.

Perception can reach the highest degree of perfection and to acknowledge it is not to go against realistic principle of knowledge.

Thus, Nyāya presents a comprehensive account of modes of perception.

The Jaina theory of Perception

'Pratyakṣa' is described in Jainism as "that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous".⁵ It is a direct mode of 'cognition' and, therefore, is essentially clear.

Nyāya definition of perception which emphasizes sense object contact as an instrument for the production of perception is considered as inadequate by the Jainas. The essence of perceptual cognition consists in giving us immediate and clear knowledge. This view corresponds to Neo-Nyāya view of perception that it is direct and immediate knowledge.

It is classified by Jainas into two categories; namely,

- i. Practical or empirical.
- ii. Transcendental.

Empirical perception is a kind of ordinary perception. It is sensuous perception which is the result of operation of senses and the mind. Corresponding to five senses, there are five types of sense-perception, viz. the visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory. Non-sensuous empirical perception is mental. For Jainas the mind is not exactly a sense-organ. It is quasi-sense organ. Again, Jainas believe that in case of

sense perception except the sense of vision, other organs come in contact with the object. Perception arises, according to Jainas, when there is destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge obscuring karmas. Jainas maintain that Nyāya view that eye comes in contact with the visual object cannot be accepted because "it cannot explain the facts of our visual perception of two or more objects at one and the same moment."⁶ Jainas refute the Nyāya view that it is impossible for the visual sense organ to do the act of visualising unless it comes in actual contact with the object. Jainas argue that act of visualizing is possible without contact. "They point to the power of mantras or mystic syllables, by the mental contemplation of which one can attract, say, a beautiful woman from any part of the universe and put her before any one."⁷ Hence, it is the Jaina view that visual organ produces vision without contact with its object. That is why, sometimes, we can see an object although there is some intervention between it and the eyes.

Both sensuous and non-sensuous perception is analysed into four stages, which are :

1. Avagraha — sensation
2. Īhā — attention
3. Avāya — determinate perception
4. Dhāraṇā — retention

1. Sensation

It is the first and primary stage of perception which is just grasping of a thing vaguely. Details are not comprehended at this stage. This may be said to correspond to the stage of indeterminate perception in Nyāya which is

just a bare awareness of an object.

2. Attention

It consists in inquisitiveness in which an attempt is made to enquire into the details of the object apprehended. Sensation has a meaning and reference to an object beyond itself. So at this stage the details of an objective datum are attended to.

3. Determination

It is a stage of determinate perception corresponding to Nyāya concept of it. At this stage specific characteristics of an object are cognized. Therefore, it is clear and decisive knowledge of an object.

4. Retention

It is the final stage in perceptual experience. It is the firm retention of the details determined, i. e. keeping them before the mind. It is a condition of a recall. Perception is complete when this stage is reached.

This is the order of development of perception according to Jainism. Jaina account of the process of perception is psychological, though it involves logical and epistemological analysis. According to psychology, perception is not a simple process. It involves organization and interpretation of perceived datum. The Jaina analysis of perception has a great psychological significance. As it is pointed out, "The psychic factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly

removed through the destruction and subsidence of knowledge obscuring karma. Such a psychic factor may be described as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptual experience.”⁸ This indicates that perception is not possible merely through the sense-organs. This view seems to be in agreement with modern psychology.

Transcendental Perception

The transcendental perception arises directly from the soul. It is “dependent on the soul alone for its genesis.”⁹ It is supersensuous perception as distinguished from empirical sensuous perception. It is classified into three kinds :-

1. Avadhi — clairvoyance
2. Manahparyāya — telepathy
3. Keval — omniscience

1. Avadhijñāna

It is the limited direct perception. It can be translated as clairvoyance. Its genesis depends upon the destruction of karmic veil in a particular way. It is clear perception of the objects having forms, which are not ordinarily perceptible by the senses. There are differences in the degrees of clairvoyant perception according to the differences in subsidence and destruction of karmic veils. It is capacity to know things irrespective of time and space. Jainas have developed a method of mathematical calculation to interpret capacity of perception in such a clairvoyant knowledge. Even lower animals and birds can possess this type of perception. This kind of extrasensory perception is becoming the topic of great interest in psychology to-day. Kalghataghi in his book

'some problems in Jaina psychology' points out "The psychic phenomenon called 'French sensitiveness' sometimes called psychometry may be included as a form of avadhi, although in psychometry mind and the senseorgans do play their part. There may be physical contact with the object. However, physical contact serves only as an occasion to create a psychical rapport."¹⁰

2. Manahparyāyajñāna

It is generally termed as telepathy. It is direct apprehension of others psychoses. It has for its object mind and its modes. A person possessing this kind of perception has a direct knowledge of the mental states of others without the instrumentality of sense-organs and minds. In terms of western psychology it can be described as thought-reading. This kind of experience is not common and easy to get. It is acquired when kārmiic veil which suppressed it is destroyed due to merit and by the practice of moral disciplines and self-control. According to traditional Jaina view, only human beings who have reached a particular stage of spiritual development can possess this kind of knowledge. Some Jaina logicians like Siddhasena Divākar maintain that lower organisms possessing two or more senses are also found to possess this kind of cognition. Modern psychology has also recognized this truth while dealing with the problems of birds and animals. The two different varieties of this form of perception are recognized. The first is more pure and permanent and the second is less pure.

Today, modern psychologists admit that telepathic experiences certainly exist. "Extrasensory perception in the form of clairvoyance and telepathy is an actual demonstrable

occurrence. It is not a sensory phenomenon.”¹¹

3. Kevalajñāna—Omniscience

It is pure knowledge which is highest and complete called omniscience. It is the highest kind of extrasensory perception. “It is the culmination of the faculty of cognition of a living being.”¹² It is direct knowledge of all substances and their modes and arises because of destruction of all possible hindrances. It is unique, complete, perfect, direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe without the instrumentality of external senses and mind. Its cognition is directly produced by self. Jaina logicians refute Mīmāṃsā view that omniscience is impossible. jainas admit that the possibility of omniscience cannot be established on the basis of empirical method. However its logical possibility must be admitted. Jaina arguments for existence of omniscience is : “The proof of omniscience follows from the proof of necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition.”¹³

Thus, in case of omniscience, knowledge reaches the highest limit when infra-sensible particles of matter are destroyed totally. All the systems of Indian philosophy except Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā accept the possibility of such experience of perfect knowledge in one form or the other. The distinctive feature of Jaina view is that omniscience arises in soul directly and not through senses or mind. Sense-organs are inherently imperfect and, therefore, they cannot produce perfect knowledge. Even meditation cannot produce omniscience until karmic veil which is obstacle to right knowledge is destroyed. It is complete transcendental experience.

The problem of extrasensory perception is old in Indian psychology. In the west also phenomena of extra-sensory perceptions are established facts. The possibility of their occurrence is undisputed. In the field of parapsychology today, extra-sensory-perception has been an interesting problem. The evidence for such occurrence is good which promises that such phenomena certainly exist. Further research and scientific analysis of the problem need to be done which can reveal the mystery of such perceptions.

Jainism attempts to give a more or less scientific account of this problem. Jaina realism sees no inconsistency in recognizing these forms of knowledge. Credit must be given to Jaina epistemologists for their novel, scientific and empirical approach towards the problem of knowledge. The classification of knowledge and different ways of knowing clearly reveal realistic basis of Jaina epistemology.

Nyāya Theory of Inference

Inference is the second *pramāṇa* and Nyāya has made the important contribution on this subject.

Anumāna literally means a cognition which follows some other cognition or knowledge. It is knowledge which presupposes some other knowledge. In this sense etymologically it is after proof. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a 'mark' the 'middle term' which is invariably connected with the major term. So Nyāya regards it as the knowledge of an object, not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a sign and that of its universal relation with the inferred object. Invariable concomitance is the nerve of inference. Inference consists in making an

assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark which is associated with it. As when finding smoke rising from the hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire there must also be fire on the hill. We make the inference as follows, "The hill is firey because it smokes and whatever smokes is firey". We pass from the perception of smoke in the hill to the knowledge of existence of fire in it. On the ground of our previous knowledge of the universal relation between smoke and fire. Thus, inference as a *pramāṇa* is the process of knowing not by perception but through the instrumentality of a mark that a thing possesses certain character. Where perception is available inference has no place. It is also defined as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within the range. All the systems of Indian philosophy except Cārvāka agree in holding that *anumāna* is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of *vyāpti*—the universal relation between two things.

In Jainism also *anumāna* is a kind of indirect knowledge in which there is knowledge of unperceived object through the perception of a mark and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object.

In inference, we arrive at the knowledge of some unperceived character of a thing through the knowledge of some mark and that of invariable concomitance to the inferred character, e. g. we infer the existence of unperceived fire in a hill when we observe smoke in it and remember that smoke is always related to fire. First of all, there is apprehension of smoke in the hill. Secondly, there is a recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance

between smoke and fire as observed in the past. Thirdly, there is resulting knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire in the hill. Subject of inference is called *pakṣa*—minor term, e. g. hill. Object of inference is called *sādhya*—major term, e. g. fire inferred in relation to hill. The mark or sign of the unperceived fire in the hill is called *līnga* or *hetu*—middle term. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called *vyāpti*.

An inference is, thus, defined as knowledge arising through the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with the major. The ground of inference is, therefore, not the mark as such but a consideration of it as invariably related to the *sādhya* and present in the *pakṣa*. In a valid inference middle term must possess certain characteristics. Firstly, middle term must be related to the minor term, e. g. 'the hill is smoky'. Secondly, it must be existent in all positive instances in which the major exists, i. e. it must be distributively related to the major, e. g. 'all smoky objects are fiery'. Thirdly, it must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent, e. g. whatever is not fiery is not smoky. Fourthly, middle term must not establish such absurd and contradictory objects as coolness of fire. If these characteristics are not found in middle term there will be fallacies of inference.

The Nature of Vyāpti and its establishment

Vyāpti is a kind of invariable relation between two facts. It is the fundamental basis, the logical ground of the inference. In *Nyāya* inference is possible because of the invariable relation between middle term and the major

term.

Vyāpti implies some kind of correlation. But this special relationship is not that of essential identity and succession as is the case in relation of cause and effect as Buddhists hold. It is invariable relation of coexistence between two facts and not the case of identity. Perception preceeds the inference. The present perception of the middle term and memory of the connection of the middle term with the major lead to inference. Vyāpti is established by means of uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things and is not based on a priori principle like causality or identity as Buddhists believe. The validity of generalization by which we come to know the relation depends upon discovery of certain universal features of particular things. Thus, Nyāya emphasizes importance of universals for establishing invariable relation between two things. Some Nyāya logicians maintain that we have perceptual knowledge of Vyāpti with the help of a particular kind of supernormal contact or with the help of sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception. In this way, Nyāya realists explain the problem of formulation of general proposition through perception. According to them, validity of universal proposition from particular instances depends upon discovery of common features of particulars i. e. discovery of universals. This provides justification of our going beyond particulars and making generalizations. The function of knowledge of Vyāpti is the synthetic correlation of the three terms of inference, i. e. there is synthesis of data in the process of inference which makes the discovery of conclusion possible. This is the view held by some Nyāya philosophers that knowledge of Vyāpti leads to interrelation of the three terms of inference which demonstrates the conclusion. It is this correlation which makes transition from

premise to conclusion possible. Mere knowledge of middle term cannot lead to conclusion.

As regards the conditions of valid inference there is agreement in general between Indian and Western logicians that there should be relation of implication between premises and conclusion. Realists like Russell believe in this logical condition but he does not recognize the psychological condition which involves knowledge on the part of thinker. But some of the Western logicians like Johnson and Stebbing have recognised both the logical and psychological aspects of inference and accordingly, they maintain that both epistemic and constitutive conditions condition the validity of inference. But the epistemic condition of valid inference which points to the criterion of novelty is not accepted by all Indian Nyāya logicians. However, they agree with the view that for inference there must not only be a true premise and a relation of implication between proposition but these must be known by a thinker who draws the conclusion. According to Indian logicians inference is conditioned "not by mere fact but by knowledge of something as a thing and that of its invariable relation to something else although the reality of these things and their relation is independent of our minds."¹⁴

Inference is, thus, a demonstrative process which does not prove that there is some fact but that some fact follows from some other facts. It is a passage from datum to conclusion.

Classification of Inference in Nyāya

Nyāya philosophers have given three different

classifications of inference :

1. According to one classification ~~inference is classified~~ into (i) svārtha—inference for oneself, and (ii) parārtha—inference for others.

Svārtha is an inference which is meant to satisfy one's own self. It intends to remove doubt of one's own mind while parārtha is an inference meant for others. Inference for oneself is used for acquiring knowledge for oneself while inference for others is made when a man aims at proving the truth of the conclusion to others. It tries to convince another man who doubts the truth of his knowledge. Then the inferential process takes the different form. Generally it is expressed in syllogistic form which may consist of five members. The verbal form of an inference only directs the mind of the others to think in a particular way and reach the conclusion. Verbal form in itself does not constitute the part of an inference. Unlike western logic, it is clear that Indian logic is not exclusively formal. The formalistic approach common in the west is not accepted by Indian logicians. It may be said to be the distinctive feature of Indian logic that its subject matter is thought and not the form. Though it is necessarily in some verbal form, it aims at truth. In this sense it is interesting to consider the remarks given by Italian philosopher Croce in his book 'Logic as the science of pure concept' "Indian logic is notably anti-verbalist....Indian logic studies the naturalistic syllogism in itself, as internal thought, distinguishing it from the syllogisms from others, that is to say, from the more or less usual but always extrinsic and accidental forms of communication and dispute. It has not even a suspicion of the extravagant idea of a truth which is merely syllogistic and formalist and which may be false in

fact. It takes no account of the judgement, or rather it considers what is called judgement and what is really the proposition, as a verbal clothing of knowledge; it does not make the verbal distinction of subject, copula and predicate.....All these are extraneous to logic, whose object is the constant knowledge considered in itself.”¹⁵

Thus, it becomes easy to understand the significance of the distinction which Nyāya Indian logic recognizes between inference for oneself and inference for others. Inferential process involves both induction and deduction. It is because of this view of inference that Indian logic has not become purely formal without considerations of material truth. It is this feature which distinguishes it from western logic.

2. According to second classification, inference is classified into three kinds.

i. Pūrvavat, ii. Śeṣavat, iii. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa

i. A pūrvavat inference is an inference from a perceived cause to the unperceived effect. It is based upon observation of resemblances perceived in the past, e. g. from the appearance of dark clouds the inference of rain. Knowledge of cause leads to the knowledge of an effect.

ii. A śeṣavat inference is one in which we infer unperceived cause from the perceived effect, e. g. muddy water leads to an inference of past rain.

iii. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference depends upon our knowledge of uncontradicted experience. Vyāpti depends upon uniform relation in our experience, e. g. change in position of sun leads to the inference of the motion of sun because in our experience whenever we perceive change of

position there is motion also.

3. According to the third classification, inference is classified into :

i. Kevalānvayi, ii. Kevalavyatireki, iii Anvayavyatireki.

i. An inference is said to be kevalānvayi when middle term is only positively related to major term. In this case, knowledge of Vyāpti between middle and major terms is arrived at through the method of agreement in presence. Symbolically, it can be presented as :

All M is P

S is M

Therefore, S is P

ii. In Kevalavyatireki inference, middle term is only negatively related to the major term. The knowledge of Vyāpti is arrived at only through the method of agreement in absence. It may be represented as :-

No not-P is M

S is M

Therefore, S is P

iii. An inference is called Anvayavyatireki when its middle term is both positively and negatively related to major term. Knowledge of Vyāpti, here is arrived at through the joint method of agreement in presence and in absence.

Not all the philosophers agree with this classification of inference. However, logically an inference is said to be of one kind—an inference based on invariable relation between

middle term and major term.

The Nyāya classification of inference shows that it is based on different principles than those recognized by western logicians.

The Form of Inference in Nyāya

Inferential reasoning generally resembles in form to pure categorical argument. But there is a great deal of controversy among different philosophers as regards the number of constituent parts of an inference.

According to Buddhist theory of inference two members are quite adequate to form an inference. They, therefore, put forward the theory of two-membered inference. While Mīmāṃsākas believe in three-membered inference. The Nyāya view differs from both these views. According to some old Naiyāyikas, the total number of members of an inference is ten. These are :-

- i. Jijñāsā — A desire to know the truth or probandum.
- ii. Saṁśaya — Doubt regarding the probandum, i. e. doubt about the real nature of a thing.
- iii. Śakyaprāpti — Belief in the probability of the probandum to lead to true knowledge.
- iv. Prayojana — The object or the purpose of inference.
- v. Saṁśaya-vyudāsa — removal of all doubts regarding the truth of an inference.

- vi. Pratijñā — The first proposition, i. e. the thesis.
- vii. Hetu — The reason.
- viii. Udāharaṇa — The example.
- ix. Upanaya — The application of the example.
- x. Nigamana — The conclusion.

The above view of the inference that it consists of ten members has been criticized by later Naiyāyikas. They do not accept this view and according to them, of these ten, the first five members are only psychological conditions leading to discussion and they do not represent logical steps forming the parts which constitute an inference. Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* discards this earlier view of an inference consisting of ten members. It is argued that the first member, viz. the desire to know may be regarded as a condition of all knowledge. Similarly, doubt is force leading to desire to know and, therefore, a condition of knowledge but cannot be regarded as a factor of inferential reasoning. The validity of the methods of knowledge cannot be regarded as a part of argument. The purpose of an inference is also no part of an inference itself. The removal of doubt indirectly supports the conclusion but does not prove it. Hence, later Naiyāyikas believe that the first five members of the ten are unnecessary and the syllogism consists of the last five members mentioned above and they form necessary parts of complete syllogistic expression. They are explained as follows :-

1. The first member is called the pratijñā or an assertion. It is the thesis set down. It is the statement of the conclusion at the outset. It tells us what the subject of an inference is and what we want to prove about it. It is the suggestion and it has two factors. Subject or what is observed and the

predicate which is to be proved. It defines the problem and narrows down our scope of inquiry, e. g. 'The hill is fiery'.

2. The second member is called Hetu or Reason. It states the presence of the middle term in respect to the minor term. It is the statement of the mark being present in the subject. It suggests that subject or minor term possesses certain property predicated of it, e. g. 'Because it smokes'.

3. The third member of the syllogism is called Udāharana or the example. By example is meant a similar instance possessing the essential property of the major term, and Gautam and Vātsyāyana believed that this example only illustrates the case but does not prove it. Later Nyāya regards this third member as the statement of the general relation. It makes the assertion of Vyāpti between middle and major terms giving some example. The example is based on observation. Therefore, the mention of it indicates that inference is both deductive and inductive, i. e. formally valid and materially true. The reasoning proceeds from particulars to particulars through the universal. The knowledge of the invariable connection the middle and the major term is derived from the statement of example, e. g. 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire as in kitchen'.

4. Upanaya or the application is the fourth member of an inference. It consists in asserting the presence or absence of the ground suggested in the minor term. It is not merely the repetition of the second member but it is the synthesis of second and the third member. Though it appears to be superfluous, it is useful for the purpose of the proof as it indicates that neither the mark nor the inductive relation by itself leads to a knowledge but only the proper combination of them which results from Upanaya, e. g. 'So the hill

smokes'.

5. The final statement—*nigamana*—is the statement of conclusion. It restates the thesis to be established. What is tentatively put forth in the first step is established in the conclusion. It is not that conclusion is purposeless repetition of the first proposition. What is in the first proposition reappears in the conclusion, no doubt, but as demonstrated and proved.

Thus, the logical form of syllogism in *Nyāya* can be illustrated as follows :-

The hill is fiery;

Because, it smokes;

Whatever smokes is fiery; e. g. the kitchen;

so the hill smokes;

Therefore, it is fiery.

In this way, for *Parārthānumāna* syllogism of this kind is necessary but for *Svārthānumāna* or inference for oneself no verbal statement is required in the form of syllogism. For demonstration of the truth, however, five-membered syllogism is considered both psychologically and logically necessary.

In Western logic, the syllogism is generally stated in the form of three propositions. There is a structural difference between Indian and western syllogism. But five members of *Nyāya* syllogism has three terms. Conclusion repeats the first proposition and the fourth member is the repetition of the second. So strictly speaking, every syllogism consists of only three members. Out of the five propositions two seem to be redundant, e. g. we may leave out either the first two or the

last two which are same essentially. Then, if we compare it with Aristotlean syllogism, we find that it corresponds to the Barbara mood of the first figure, e. g. the syllogism will take the form :-

All things which have smoke have fire.

The hill has smoke.

Therefore, the hill has fire.

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In Western logic, the syllogism is generally sated in the form of three propositions. There is a structural difference between Indian and western syllogism. But five members of Nyāya syllogism has three terms. Conclusion repeats the first proposition and the fourth member is the repetition of the second. So strictly speaking, every syllogism consists of only three members. Out of the five propositions two seem to be redundant, e. g. we may leave out either the first two or the last two which re same essentially. Then, if we compare it with Aristotlean syllogism, we find that it corresponds to the Barbara mood of the first figure, e. g. the syllogism will take the form :-

All things which have smoke have fire.

The hill has smoke.

Therefor, the hill has fire.

In view of this similarity, some thinkers think that the

development of Indian syllogism is due to the influence of Aristotle. But this view is difficult to accept because of some fundamental points of distinction between the two. Aristotle's syllogism is only deductive and formal but Nyāya regards deduction and induction as inseparably related and, therefore, Nyāya syllogism is both deductive-inductive and formal-material. Inference, according to Nyāya is neither from the universal to the particular, nor from the particular to the universal, but from the particular to the particular through the universal. Like the Aristotelean syllogism there are three terms in Nyāya inference. The major, the minor and the middle are here called Sādhya, Pakṣa and Liṅga or Hetu respectively. But there are certain important differences between Nyāya and western forms of syllogism. Nyāya logic also rejects the verbalist view of logic Nyāya recognises that verbal form is not the essence of inference and is required only to convince others. Nyāya studies thought as such and not the forms of thought alone. "The chief function of inference as a means of valid cognition is to enable one to realize how certain facts are inseparably and necessarily connected with each other in accordance with a general principles.....It never makes the extravagant claim that formal validity may be viewed apart from, and independently of, material validity."¹⁶ Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya¹⁷ refers to five membered syllogistic expression and explains how four pramāṇas accepted by the Naiyāyikas meet in the five-membered syllogism. The statement of thesis stands for verbal testimony, the reason or hetu for inference, the example for perception and upanaya for upamāna. Conclusion is regarded as the culminating stage of demonstrative expression. Some critics regard udāharaṇa as useless and superfluous member of Nyāya inference. But it

may be pointed out that if correctly interpreted, udāharaṇa is an instance which on the basis of invariable relation observed between the two terms—major and middle—helps one to pass in the minor term from a similar case of the middle term to a similar case of major term. It emphasises the inductive basis of deductive reasoning. The logic of Nyāya, thus, combines discovery and proof. Thus, Nyāya logicians think that introduction of instance is not superfluous. A complete syllogistic expression is a synthesis built up by five members each of which forms a necessary part of an inferential process. This Nyāya doctrine of five-membered syllogism is as old as Gautam, the founder of Nyāya, and is accepted by almost all later Nyāya philosophers.

Jaina theory of Inference

Non-perceptual knowledge is of five kinds :

- i. Deduction or inference.
- ii. Induction.
- iii. Recognition or Pratyabhijñā.
- iv. Recollection or smṛti.
- v. Authority.

Inference : Inference is the kind of indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge is defined as that which is not clear. The knowledge of sādhyā that takes place from sādhana is anumāna. So it is knowledge of probandum on the basis of probans.

Inference is of two types :-

- i. For one's own self — subjective inference.
- ii. For others — syllogistic inference.

The inference for one's own self is the real inference and when it is communicated to another, it is called the inference for others. "The Parārtha or the inference for others, which consists in statements of the Abode (Pakṣa) and of the mark (hetu) is an inference so called because of the transference of epithet."¹⁸

Anumāna is so called because it is knowledge which is based on a previous cognition of the mark and a recollection of the relation between the mark and the proven and which consists in a determination of the object, subsequent to that previous cognition. It takes the form 'That hill has fire because it has smoke.' If the Hetu or Mark is valid Anumāna is valid Mark is Valid, i. e. the middle term which is invariably connected with the major term. This invariable connection between smoke and fire is called Vyāpti. The characteristics of a valid middle term generally are as follows :-

1. It must be present in subject of inference, e. g. hill.
2. There must be relation of Vyāpti between middle and major term, i. e. smoke and fire. But the first characteristic is not an essential characteristic of a valid middle term according to Jainas. The one and the only characteristic of middle term is its incapability of being known otherwise than in connection with major term.

Nyāya describes five characteristics of middle term as follows :-

- i. Pakṣa-dharmatva—That means middle term must

exist in subject of inference, e. g. smoke existing in the hill.

ii. Sapakṣa-sattva—It means that middle term should exist not only in the Pakṣa but also in the Sapakṣa like kitchen etc. containing fire.

iii. Vipakṣasattva—A valid middle term must not abide in the vipakṣa e. g. the tank where smoke is pakṣa. Vipakṣa is that which contains what is opposed to the matter of inference.

iv. Abādhita-viśayatva—it means that a valid middle term should not lead to a conclusion which contradicts what is given in direct perception or authoristative scriptures e. g. 'A fiery body is not hot because it is a substance like water' is invalid because it proves things which go against the matters of perception.

v. Asatpratipakṣatva—This characteristic means that a valid middle term should not be such that what is proved may be contradicted by a different line of argument.

Jaina philosophers, however, do not agree with this view of Naiyāyikas that a valid middle term must possess these five characteristics. It may be fallacious even though it may have all these characteristics and these characteristics are unnecessary and superfluous in the sense that they are included implicitly in one and the only characteristic that 'it is never cognized otherwise, than in connection with the sādhyā or major term.' "If an unconditional relation is found to subsist between the mark and the proven, there remains nothing more to be noticed as an additional characteristic so far as Vyāpti is concerned¹⁹." Against Nyāya Jaina philosophers point out that they recognize two kinds of inference viz. kevalānvaya and the kevala-vyatireka, i. e.

inference based on positive and negative experience respectively but in these two forms of Anumāna, Nyāya thinkers cannot attribute all the five characteristics stated by them.

In this way Jaina philosophers maintain that there is one and the only characteristic of valid middle term that it is never cognized otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya. The five characteristics of Naiyāyikas are nothing but an elaboration of this one-characteristic described by the Jainas i. e. its invariable connection with major term.

The ascertainment of Vyāpti, according to Jainism, depends upon tarka.

Kinds of Inference

1. Inference for oneself is also known as subjective inference. It consists in a knowledge of the Sādhya by one's own self through the apprehension of the Mark—middle term and a recollection of its inseparable relation.

2. Inference for others—It is also called syllogistic inference. "Syllogistic inference is definite cognition resulting from a statement of a probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum."²⁰ The most important feature of inferential knowledge is the middle term being inseparably connected with major term. On perceiving middle term the existence of major term (probandum) is inferred.

There is difference of opinion among the philosophers regarding the constitution of syllogistic inference. Sāṅkhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts, viz. thesis, reason and example. Mīmāṃsakās admit four parts with the

addition of application. Naiyāyikas assert five parts with the addition of conclusion. Jainas say that strictly speaking only two parts are sufficient—pakṣa and hetu, e. g. “The hill is fiery” (Pakṣa), “because of smoke” (hetu). But for making the people of less wisdom understand, even the use of ten parts is admitted by them. But ordinarily, five parts are used. The other three members of the five-membered syllogism are “wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen” (udāharaṇa). “The hill is smokey” (upanaya), “Therefore, it is fiery” (Nigamana).

Five-members of Syllogism

1. Thesis—(Pakṣa). Pramāṇamīmāṃsa defines thesis as the statement of the theme to be proved, e. g. the hill is possessed of fire. By this sādhya becomes clear.
2. Reason or hetu—The definition of reason is ‘statement of a probans ending in an inflexion (vibhakti) unfolding the character of probans is called reason’. The inflexion is fifth or the third case ending expressed in such as ‘because’ or ‘since’ in English. e. g. The hill is possessed of fire because it has smoke’. The existence of smoke is justifiable only because of its invariable relation with fire.
3. Example—Udāharaṇa—Example is the statement which gives illustration. It is of two types. Statement of illustration based on similarity of attribute or secondly, it may be based on dissimilarity of attributes.
4. Application—Application is the act of bringing the middle term into connection with the minor term, e. g. The hill is smokey.

5. Conclusion—‘Conclusion is the predication of probandum, e. g. Therefore, it has fire. Reason gives us a hint regarding the conclusion.

Thus, five-membered syllogism is accepted in Jainism since it is useful to a layman not expert in logic. Even ten-membered syllogism is referred to in some of the Jaina texts but they are merely persuasive statements which are often adopted in discussions but many of them are superfluous and irrelevant from formal point of view.

Nyāya theory of inference is based on this theory and some scholars like Dasgupta maintain earlier origin of Jaina theory of inference than inference of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The development of Nyāya view of inference is due to Jaina theory of inference.

Thus, inference is regarded as a valid source of knowledge in both Nyāya and Jainism. In fact, except the Cārvākas all schools of Indian philosophy accept the validity of anumana as a method of knowledge. All systems agree in believing that inference proceeds from the knowledge of invariable concomitance between middle and the major terms coupled with the knowledge of the minor term as being characterized by the middle. But they are not unanimous as to the definition and function and means of ascertaining Vyāpti which is the basis of inference.

The Form of Inference in Jainism

As regards the constitution of inference philosophers of different school hold different views.

The Jaina view regarding the proper form of

sylogism is that "The thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person."²¹ The Jaina theory of two limbed Anumāna is opposed to the views given by different philosophers of different schools. Jaina philosophers argue that given the Pakṣa and the reason, a man of intelligence would come to the right conclusion, e. g. The hill is fiery because there is smoke. So strictly speaking only two propositions are necessary. This two-limbed syllogism comes close to enthymeme of the 1st order in western logic. The Jaina view seems to be that other members are redundant because the characteristic feature of an inferential type of knowledge is that because of knowledge of Vyāpti, on perceiving the reason, the existence of probandum is inferred. "The essential thing in an argument for the sake of convincing others of a truth is to support and demonstrate the Reason and for establishing it. Reason must be verified even though the example premise' or other premises are used....Hence the premises of Example. Application and Conclusion are superfluous."²²

But the two-limbed argument is meant only for intelligent persons. Where a person is dull, a more elaborate process of the argumentation is necessary. In such a case not only are all the five premises of a Nyāya syllogism necessary; but Jaina logicians go even further than this and conceive of a ten-limbed syllogistic argument.²³ As Bhadrabāhu has remarked, "The syllogism is said to consist of five parts or ten parts in the alternative. We denounce neither but accept both as legitimate."²⁴

These ten members are :-

1. Pakṣa — the proposition indicating the abode.

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|---------------------|---|
| 2. Pakṣa śuddhi | — the proposition verifying the abode. |
| 3. Hetu | — the proposition stating the reason. |
| 4. Hetu śuddhi | — the proposition demonstrating the reason. |
| 5. Dṛṣṭānta-premise | — the proposition stating the example. |
| 6. Dṛṣṭānta śuddhi | — the proposition verifying the example. |
| 7. Upanaya | — the proposition describing the application. |
| 8. Upanaya śuddhi | — the proposition verifying the application. |
| 9. Nigamana premise | — the proposition stating the conclusion. |
| 10. Nigamana śuddhi | — the proposition verifying the conclusion. |

In Jaina tradition, thus, we have mention also of ten-membered and five-membered syllogisms.

The Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā contains definition of the five-members of syllogism as follows:-²⁵

1. Thesis—is the statement of the theme to be proved.
2. Reason—Statement of probans unfolding the character of probans is called reason.
3. Example is the statement of an illustration.
4. Application is the act of bringing the probans into

relation with the minor term.

5. Conclusion is the predication of the probandum.

The five-membered syllogism is accepted in Jainism since it is useful to the layman who is not expert in logic.

Thus, in Jainism the constituent parts of syllogism for others are either two, five or ten. These three forms of an inference for others can be used according as the persons are super-intelligent, intelligent or dull respectively. Regarding the ten-membered syllogism Dasgupta comments "These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant."²⁶

It is clear that Jaina view of inference in general is similar more or less to that of Nyāya.

Nyāya View of Testimony—Śabda

The Import of a Sentence and Meaning Problem

Testimony : Śabda or testimony is the fourth *pramāṇa* admitted by the Nyāya. The literal meaning of the term Śabda is verbal knowledge. "It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences".²⁷ But all verbal knowledge is not valid. Hence Śabda as a *pramāṇa* is defined in the Nyāya as "the assertion of a trustworthy person".²⁸ It consists in understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning. According to old Nyāya, the power in a word to convey its meaning comes from God and according to later Nyāya from long established convention. Testimony is always personal as it is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Valid verbal

testimony comes from a person, who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of others.

A sentence by itself cannot give us any knowledge. Similarly a mere perception of the words or of a sentence cannot lead to any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meanings that he acquires any knowledge from a verbal statement. Thus, the validity of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement of a trustworthy person and its possibility depends on the understanding of the meaning of that statement.

There are two ways of classifying śabda. According to Vātsyāyana "verbal knowledge is of two kinds—viz. *dr̥ṣṭārtha* or that relating to perceptible objects and *adr̥ṣṭārtha* or that relating to imperceptible objects."²⁹ Under the first head is included the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons and scriptures which are limited to ordinary sensible objects of this world, e. g. evidence given by witness in law courts. The second includes all the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons related to supersensible objects which cannot be known by means of perception.

According to another classification given by later Naiyāyikas, śabda is of two kinds, viz. Vaidika or scriptural and Laukika or secular. In Vaidika testimony, we have the words of God. It is perfect and infallible by its very nature. Here the question of validity does not arise. As distinguished from this, secular testimony is not always valid. Only that which consists in the words of trustworthy persons is valid.

The first classification of śabda is based on the nature

of the objects of knowledge while the second classification refers to the nature of source of knowledge in śabda.

Naiyāyikas recognise śabda as a distinct Pramāṇa because according to them such knowledge as is derived from śabda can neither be due to perception nor due to inference. According to Cārvāka, śabda cannot be regarded as a valid means of knowledge because it is only a case of inference and inference cannot be accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Some Indian logicians like the Buddhists hold that śabda cannot be a separate pramāṇa and it is a form of inference. They say that the ascertainment of the meaning of a verbal statement in no way differs from the inferential process. Of course, this argument is met by an appeal to our introspection which shows that the two processes of inference and interpretation are not identical or it can be reduced to perception if it is used to prove that there are facts corresponding to a sentence. Vaiśeṣikas include it in inference since, according to them the ground of our knowledge is the same in both.

Samkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems accept śabda as a separate source of valid knowledge, though the nature of śabda as a source of valid knowledge differs from system to system. In Jainism also śabda is recognised as a distinct source of knowledge.

Nyāya contends that śabda cannot be reduced to perception of inference because knowledge derived from valid verbal testimony is the result of knowledge of words and for this reason śabda deserves to be recognised as an independent source of knowledge.

The Import of a Sentence

According to Nyāya śabda gives us knowledge about the objects through the understanding of the meaning of the sentence. Now, the question is what is the meaning of 'meaning'? Nyāya logicians have discussed the various aspects or problem of meaning. A sentence is a collection of words. Words have significative power which is the same as the relationship existing between the word and its meaning. By this we cognize the meaning whenever the word is heard. Nyāya gives the theory of conventional origin of this relation as against Mīmāṃsā which believes in its natural origin. Jainism strikes the balance between the two views. The theory that words have natural capacity to express anything is not accepted by Nyāya. Gautama says that "it is by the conventional significance that the meaning of a word is understood".³⁰ Their argument is if there were natural relationship between word and its meaning, then the word should have co-existed with the object signified. But this is not the case. Secondly, the same word does not mean same thing everywhere. We find variations in the meaning of words at different places which is against natural view. Thirdly, we use different words for the same object which refutes the theory of natural connection between words and their meanings. According to old Naiyāyikās, relation between the word and its meaning is not natural but it is established by the will of God. According to later Naiyāyikās it is not always established by will of God. It can also be established by will of man.

A word is a combination of letters arranged in a certain order. The essence of a word is its meaning. The primary meaning of a word is its inherent potency called abhidhā.

When the relation between a word and its meaning is established by authorities, it is called technical meaning of a word or *paribhāṣā*. The secondary meaning of word is its indirect or implied meaning called *lakṣanā*. The primary meaning is retained in the implied meaning. The meanings of words can be learnt by different ways such as grammar, dictionaries etc. which show that the relation between a word and its meaning is a conventional relation.

Import of Words

As regards the import of words, Nyāya view is that the primary meaning of a word is all the three namely, the individual, the universal and a particular form or the configuration. All the three factors are present in the primary meaning of a word though with different degrees of prominence. This is the view held by old Naiyāyikās. Some of the modern Nyāya philosophers are of the opinion that a word means an individual as characterized by the universal while others maintain that it means an individual as qualified by both the universal and the configuration. It is clear that in Nyāya logic non-connotative terms of western logic have no place.

A word is a collection of letters and the unity of the word is due to memory.

The Nyāya philosophy held that *śabda* is linguistic utterance and is only a collection of sounds which are produced by the movements of the vocal organs of speech. "The sounds vanish as soon as they are produced and, therefore, are ephemeral. The Nyāya does not accept permanent letters as the Mīmāṃsakās do; instead, Naiyāyikās explain the recognition of the letters when

uttered by different persons at different times due to the fact that they are particular instances of the same universal; the idea of identify is only due to their similarity".³¹ Nyāya view that meaning of a word is presented jointly as they come one after another in mind; they are not perceived as a whole is linguistically unsatisfactory.

Early Naiyāyikās discussed the import of words and they paid little attention to the problem of a sentence, because according to them a sentence is only a collection of words. Any combination of words, however, does not make a significant sentence. A sentence in order to be intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These are the conditions of knowing a meaning of a sentence. They are ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi and tātparyajñāna.

1. *Ākāṅkṣā*—It is mutual implication or syntactic expectancy of the words. It consists in a word incapable of conveying a complete judgement in the absence of another word. Certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense, e. g. the word 'bring' requires some object. This kind of syntactic need is called *ākāṅkṣā*. A mere aggregate of unrelated words will not make a significant sentence and by itself a word cannot convey a complete meaning. Therefore, the first condition to know the import of a sentence is *ākāṅkṣā* or the mutual need that the words of a sentence have for one another in order to express a complete sense.

2. The second condition is *yogyatā* or logical consistency or compatibility of the words in a sentence for mutual association. There should not be any incompatibility between the meanings of different words so as to render the whole sentence meaningless, e. g. the sentence, "sprinkle the plants with fire" is devoid of meaning because there is a

contradiction involved in its constituent words.

3. The third requirement of valid verbal cognition is sannidhi or phonetic contiguity of the words. It consists in the juxtaposition or proximity between the different words of a sentence. A sentence becomes intelligible only when its constituent words are continuous with one another in time or space. Spoken words when they are separated by long intervals of time cannot make a sentence. Similarly written words when they are separated by long intervals of space cannot construct a sentence. Thus, the words "bring a cow" will not make a sentence when uttered at the interval of time or written at the interval of space even though they satisfy the first two requirements.

4. The fourth condition is tātparya or the intention of speaker or general purport of a sentence. It stands for the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence. This condition is given by some later Naiyāyikās according to whom a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is important factor in case of verbal comprehension of a sentence but they did not agree with the extreme view taken by Schiller that the meaning of any sentence is the notion actually present in the mind of the speaker.³² They considered that "the meaning of any sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the listener".³³ So words have different meanings in different cases. Some of the Naiyāyikās go to the extent of saying that even in ordinary sentence like 'Bring the cow' it is the intention of the speaker which fixes the meaning of the utterance. If the intention of the speaker is different through the secondary significative power. The word 'cow' could mean anything say, even a 'fish'. Here we may agree with Kunjunni Raja that "this view ignores completely the

status of language as an objective instrument of communication",³⁴ because speaker's intention and normal signification are quite distinct. Every word signifies something independently of the intention of speaker otherwise linguistic discourse would be impossible when a speaker uses a word and chooses it to mean what he wants, no one can understand what he means when he says something because what he intends to refer to may be different from what he actually did refer to.

So it is said that this extreme view of Naiyāyikās regarding the importance of speaker's intention in determining the meaning of an utterance is difficult to accept. This view is against the view that every sentence has an inherent capacity to convey its meaning. This contrast is due to Nyāyaview of śabda that as a means of knowledge śabda is 'valid' verbal testimony and it consists in a statement of a trustworthy person (Nyāyasūtra I. I. 7) It is because of this that they hold this view of the nature of knowledge derived from language. However, among Naiyāyikās, there is much difference of opinion regarding the importance of speaker's intention in comprehending the meaning of a sentence. According to some, it is an accessory cause; others hold that it is required only in case of ambiguous expression and yet others maintain that it need not be referred to as a separate condition as it is included in ākāṅkṣā. "Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and Visvanātha hold that a knowledge of the tātparya is the fourth requisite along with the first three for verbal comprehension. According to these Naiyāyikās tātparya is the meaning intended by the speaker".³⁵ While some consider that tātparya is an all embracing factor and it has an important part to play in the working of the first three factors.

Naiyāyikās do not agree with the view that it is

contextual factors that determine the meaning of an utterance.

Almost all Indian philosophers believe in importance of knowing speaker's intention though they differ as regards the degree of emphasis put on it. Naiyāyikās are not wrong when they say that the meaning of an utterance is what the speaker intends the listener to understand. Even Jainas admit it in some sense. The purposive character of speech cannot be denied. But it is equally true that for language to be an objective instrument of communication, it must be independent of subjective element.

According to Nyāya a sentence is a concatenation of the individual words. Words give their own meaning but the problem is to find out how the relation between the word-meanings comes. This is because the whole is always something more than parts. Even the gestalt psychologists who hold this view could not satisfactorily explain from where the additional element comes in. Nyāya explains this problem by referring to the function of *tātparya* the intention of the speaker. For Naiyāyikās the primary meaning is imported into the words by the intension of the speaker. "This function of the sentence to convey the sentence-meaning on the basis of speaker's intention is called *tātparyavṛtti* by some early Naiyāyikās and *samsargamaryāda* by the later Naiyāyikās".³⁶

Comprehension of the Meaning of a Sentence

Every word has its own definite meaning but sentence which is a collection of words has a meaning like the constituent words. The question is the relation between the meaning of a sentence and the meanings of its constituent words. Two different explanations are given to explain the unified meaning of a sentence.

1. Anvitābhīdhāna theory (the theory of expression of correlated) According to this theory unitary sense which is the meaning of a sentence arises directly from the collection of words. There is an expression of the construed meaning of the sentence. Both the word-meaning and their mutual relations are conveyed by the words themselves. No additional factor than word meaning is needed to understand a sentence. Among Indian philosophers prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakaś and grammarians advocate this theory and among modern writers on linguistics Wundt represents this theory.

2. Abhihitānvaya theory (The theory of correlation of the expressed) : According to this theory unitary sense which is the meaning of a sentence arises indirectly through the recollection of the meaning of the individual words that comprise it. The words convey only the individual word-meaning and mutual relation is conveyed by the word-meanings and not by the words. There is abhihitānvaya i. e. the construction of meanings as expressed in the words. This theory holds that the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by words. First, we understand separate meanings, then we put together these meanings according to the four factors—expectancy, proximity, fitness and intention and we know the meaning of a sentence. From the connection of word meanings we have cognition of the meaning of the sentence. It is by observing the use of words in each actual context of situation that we learn the meaning of words, e. g. child learns that way “A word indicates its meaning by rousing the mental impression of such contexts and hence the knowledge of the meaning of a word is only a kind of recollection”.³⁷ So word is a reminder of meaning. Word reminds us of the

former experience when it was used and it gives us idea of its meaning. It is easy to observe that this view illustrates psychological process of learning a language. The meaning of sentence is not just the meaning of sum of words but it is something more. Sentence gives unified meaning through the law of association. Nyāya advocates abhihitānvaya theory.

Among Indian philosophers Bhatt-Mīmāṃsakaś and Vedāntins accept the second view. Among modern philosophers, Russell's view comes close to Abhihitānvaya theory.

The later theory seems to be conceivable because meaning of a sentence depends on meaning of words. If it is not accepted, then any sentence would have conveyed any meaning. Therefore, it is true that meaning of a sentence is the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words.

On closer examination, it will be seen that the two theories are not mutually exclusive but they imply each other, and both contain some elements of truth. Some philosophers like Bhoja reject both the theories and prefer a third view according to which "words convey the sentence—meaning by their cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakarita*. It should be noted that the Naiyāyika scholar Jayanta advocates in the *Nyāyamanjarī* (p. 391), the same view where he attributes the cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakarita* to the *tātparyaśakti* of words. He modified abhihitānvaya theory and advocates that words have power called *tātparyaśakti* by which is conveyed the meaning of a sentence through mutual relation of words and their meanings".³⁸ As Kuppaswami says, "The additional element conveyed by a sentence over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts and this additional

element which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgement is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words and not through a primary and significative power of words (abhidhā or lakṣaṇā)".³⁹

The Naiyāyika—Jayanta concludes that tātparya is a separate vṛtti of the words which conveys the syntactic relation of the word-meanings.⁴⁰ Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri says "that the mutual relation of the word-meaning is conveyed by a process of suggestion".⁴¹ Suggestion is interpreted to mean impression through suppression. All schools of thought have to accept a kind of suggestion. Individual words give their own isolated meanings and mutual relation of meanings is conveyed by suggestion. The Naiyāyikās call it tātparyavṛtti or Neo-Naiyāyikās call it saṃsargamaryāda. In this connection it is remarked that "Tātparya or the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called tātparyavṛtti that is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers".⁴²

The essential features of the Nyāya theory of the import of propositions should be noted. According to Nyāya, only a determinate judgement is conveyed by a proposition. It consists of a subject and a predicate subject is substantive and predicate is the adjective which is referred to the subject. On this analysis, the subject is called determinandum and predicate determinant. so far, a sentence corresponds to a proposition in western logic but there is no need for copula according to Nyāya. Copula is not an essential part of the proposition. This view is also held by some modern logicians like Bradley and Bosanquet. Naiyāyikās go to the extent of saying that the implied verb in a sentence stand for no

objective content when it is said that 'the hill is fiery', the context of our assertion is the "hill as fiery". So according to this, the import of a sentence is the predication of an attribute regarding subject. It expresses the relation between two reals : a substantive and an adjective. The proposition does not bring one in relation with the other but finds them related. Nyāya, therefore, refutes the view of idealists that a proposition is the reference of an ideal content to reality nor does the proposition expresses relation between two ideas. As realists, Nyāya philosophers put forward the objective view that a proposition expresses a real relation between two reals.

To sum up, according to Nyāya, the referend of the word constitute all three—universal, individual and image—together or either of the three; the one being prominent depending upon contexts. The word cow means the image of a cow which is the object cow, a particular, which is that by virtue of universal cowhood in which it participates.

As regards the meaning problem, Nyāya maintains that relation between word and its meaning is conventional. Words have power to denote particular objects due to convention of God which is known from usage of elders.

As a realism, Nyāya is consistent in maintaining the view regarding import of words and sentence when it holds that sentence refers to external objects and not to ideas though purposiveness or intention of the speaker is the main aim of each and every sentence. There is an additional power—*tātparya*—because of which words convey a related meaning born through words contained in a sentence. In addition to primary meaning denoted by the primary power of words which can only refer to isolated word-meaning, there is another power, *tātparya*, which conveys the syntactic

relation of words. this view combines both the theories abhihitānvaya and anivṭābhīdhāna and maintains that as far as verbal comprehension is concerned, the import of a sentence consists in tatparya—the intention.

Jaina View of Testimony—Śabda Import of Words

Testimony : It is knowledge from authority. The authoritative knowledge is produced by the words. The authority is one who knows the object as it is and describes it according to his knowledge. The statement which is the result of authority can never be false. The authority is of two types : (i) ordinary (ii) extraordinary, which can also be described as human and superhuman respectively. If the source is ordinary human being it is ordinary authority. On the other hand, if the source is superhuman, that is, Tīrthaṅkaras in Jainism, who are omniscient beings, then authority is called extraordinary. Hence the knowledge which is acquired from their words is called āgama. Āgama means the word of an Āpta, i. e. authority, a person who is free from debasing emotions and, therefore, he knows a thing as it is and describes it in accordance with his knowledge. His saying is never false and is free from inconsistencies. Here, the difference between Jaina and Nyāya view of knowledge must be noted. The Jains do not believe in authority of the Vedās which are regarded as embodiment of authoritative knowledge by orthodox systems of India. Orthodox systems like Mīmāṃsā believe in authority of the Vedās which are regarded as eternally self-existence because not man-made. However, Nyāya though, believes in authority of the Vedās, believes in productive nature of statements as against

Mīmāṃsā. The difference between Nyāya and Jaina view consists in the fact that Jaina view of śabda does not admit sayings of scriptures as necessarily authoritative. as against heterodox Jainism, the orthodox Nyāya rather dogmatically believes in authority of Vedās. Āptavākya may be the statement of scriptures according to Nyāya. Nyāya in spite of being a rationalistic system of thought believes in infallibility of vedās and also bases theistic argument on this view by pointing out that belief in infallibility of scriptures implies an infallible author, that is, God. However, Nyāya realism combines the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge with the concept of śabda as a distinct source of knowledge and maintains that validity of this source of knowledge must be confirmed extrinsically through verification in experience. In Jainism words of Tīrthaṅkaras constitute superhuman authority. Thus, Jainas, though do not believe in authority of Vedās, believe in divine authority of Tīrthaṅkaras.

A statement consists of words and śabda as a means of knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of a sentence. Hence the theory of import of words and meaning problem.

Meaning Problem

Āgama or knowledge from authority is knowledge derived from words. It is regarded as one of the means of indirect cognition in Jainism.

“Knowledge arising from words which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception is known as śabda or the verbal testimony”.⁴³

It is knowledge for the sake of others as it produces decision in others. Word or speech is a medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others. A word of a speech itself is not knowledge but metaphorically it is called knowledge.

A word is defined as combination of letters which are related to one another and a similar combination of words makes a sentence. "A word signifies its object by means of both its natural force and applied meaning".⁴⁴ The Jaina view is that a word has natural power to signify its corresponding object and by convention also it signifies its object.

As against Buddhist view of non-relationship of words and objects Jainas put forward the doctrine of significant relationship between the two. They refute the view that the object signified by a word is a subjective idea 'externalized' and 'generalized' and that there is no real counterpart of the word. This Buddhist view that words cannot properly indicate the things as the object signified by word has no existence outside mind cannot be supported. Jainas also set aside the view held by some Buddhists the knowledge about an object which we derive from hearing a word involves intention of the speaker. As against it, Jainas believe that a word does not signify its object mediately through an inference about the person's intention but it signifies its object directly by its own force. As it is said "A word is not afraid of its object".⁴⁵ Since a thing is constituted of both individuality or particularity and generality, a word which signifies an object has also these two aspects. A word produces in us a knowledge about an object which has both these aspects. The word reveals the object just as the light reveals an object. So the word has natural force to express an

object but revelation depends on the knowledge of significance of the word, i. e. meaning attributed to word by convention. So the natural function of the word is to express the object no matter whether it is real or unreal and the correctness of revelation depends on the competency or incompetency of the speaker. It is inconsistent to say that the words in and by themselves express the truths. Where the assertions are the assertions of unreliable persons they are not regarded as authoritative.

Thus, the Jainas disagree with a school of Buddhism in holding that words cannot express the true nature of an object external to us. As against this, Jainas put forward the doctrine of relationship between words and objects. This relationship between them is not that of causation or identity but it is that of signifier and signified. The Nyāya school agrees however, with the Jainas in affirming this kind of relationship between a word and its object but there is a fundamental difference between the two views. The old Nyāya holds that it was God who endowed a word its conventional significance. The meaning of a term was fixed by God. However, neo-Nyāya does not hold that it was fixed by God. The Jainas dispense with any idea of God in this connection, though they believe in Tīrthaṅkaras. "According to them, every word has the capacity of expressing all the objects of the word but its particular significance is due to the environmental circumstances limiting its original unlimited capacity".⁴⁶ Jainas maintain that there is a Natural Power in a word to signify its corresponding object. But it alone is not competent to express the object. There is also applied meaning, i. e. conventional meaning which is useful in a subsidiary way. It is criticized that if a word has a Natural Force, it cannot have different meanings but we find

that one and the same word has different meanings in different parts of the country. This shows that a word cannot have a Natural Force. The Jaina answer to this criticism is that all the words have power of expressing all the objects but the particular significance of a word is determined by particular circumstances and these particular conditions attach what we call the Applied Force of the word.

As against old Nyāya Jainas, thus, attribute a natural capacity to a word for expressing an object in addition to its conventional significance. The reason for this is that conventional meaning is the meaning applied to a word by will of man which is incapable of determining the complete nature of relationship of things. Only omniscients can do that.

Import of Words

As regards the import of words, the Jainas put forward 'configuration' theory. According to this theory, a word denotes the particular form or configuration of individuals. The form of a thing is the particular arrangement of the constituent parts of a thing. The form indicates generality and its characteristics. One thing is different from another because each has a peculiar form, e. g. a cow is different from another because each has a peculiar form, e. g. a cow is different from all other animals by its peculiar form. Words denote the objects according to their forms. Forms determine the nature of an object. So the word primarily means neither an individual nor a universal alone but the form or the structure which determines the individuality of an object. This view is criticized by some of the Naiyāyikās. According to them a form by itself cannot determine the nature of an object. On this view then, e. g. a

clay model of a cow will be regarded as a cow. Hence they say it is not correct to maintain that a word primarily means only the form or shape of an individual in space. It is the universal class character which is the import of a word.

As regards the import of a sentence, the Jainas say that verbal testimony is required to be founded on *syādvād*.⁴⁷ Knowledge of an object consists in applying an attribute to the object. Every judgement consists of an object and of features attributed to it and the correct knowledge arises when we have correct understanding of the relationship between the object and the attribute. According to Jainism, a definite determination of judgement involves both affirmation and negation. In this connection, the Jaina view of negation must be mentioned. According to them negation is real. Like existence, non-existence also is constitutive of the nature of a real thing. Non-existence is an essential adjective to a real entity. Buddhists, in their doctrine of *Apoha*, rightly emphasise the negative function of a word though it is not the only function. The Jainas maintain that a word has two distinct significances—positive and negative each of which is real in its own way. According to them, the pre-conditions of knowledge are that both subject and object of knowledge are real. There are reals which are the objects of cognition independent of cognizing self. Language expresses the thoughts of the speaker as well as the true relationship between the objects of knowledge. words are so related to the facts and phenomena of our experience that they signify the latter correctly and faithfully.

A word refers to an individual which is a combination of a universal and a particular. Thus, we have to accept the reality of universals if we accept that words have meaning as words mean universals.

Even Nyāya position is that, no doubt, words mean universal but the Jaina view is that universals are inherent only in things. Similarly, a word refers to individual and image. A word, no doubt, refers to an individual but an individual participates into universal without which it cannot exist and it refers to an image of things.

An examination of the problem of verbal knowledge shows though many schools of Indian philosophy recognize verbal testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge, there is difference of opinion among them as to the nature of it. But we find striking similarity between the Jainas and the Naiyāyikās regarding some of its aspects. Both take śabda as a statement of a perfectly reliable person. According to both of them verbal testimony as a means of valid knowledge is a sentence which is spoken or written by a trustworthy person or statement of some authority. The other schools take śabda as a sentence whose import is not contradicted. Both Jainism and Nyāya classify śabda or testimony into ordinary and extraordinary. Jainas and Naiyāyikās agree in maintaining that ordinary testimony consists in words of ordinary reliable persons. But Jainas maintain that extraordinary testimony consists in the words of a liberated self of extraordinary powers and relates to supersensible realities. It is knowledge derived from scriptures, no doubt, but the Jaina definition of scripture points to the fact that scripture cannot be verbal if it does not embody the word of a particular person. It cannot be impersonal nor self-evidently valid. In Nyāya of course, scriptural testimony is neither impersonal nor self-evidently valid but it depends on divine revelation. In Jainism, it depends on perfect, omniscient self. Nyāya holds that scriptures are not man-made but created by God but Jainism

dispenses with God. However, it believes in omniscient self having almost same attributes as God.

As regards the import of words also there is a difference of opinion. The primary meaning of a word according to Nyāya and Jainism differs. "According to Nyāya of the old school, a word means the particular, the generic shape of form and the universal".⁴⁸ That means a word denotes the particular and connotes the universal and it also indicates shape, distinguishing the particular from dissimilar things. According to some modern Naiyāyikās, the primary meaning of a word is particular as characterized by the universal and form. According to others, the primary meaning is the particular as characterized by the universal only. While some Naiyāyikās with Sāṃkhya believe that the primary meaning of a word is the perception of the particular.⁴⁹ According to Jaina philosophers, a word like cow does not mean a particular cow, the word applies to all animals having a general shape of a cow. So the primary meaning of a word is shape. This view is criticized on the ground that there are cases where in spite of similarity of shape, there is no identity of meaning, e. g. clay cow.

The Nyāya view of import of a proposition makes it clear that in a proposition both subject and predicate are related, the proposition does not relate them but finds them as related. It is against the idealist view held by Bradley etc., that proposition is the reference of an ideal content to reality, predicate is not ideal content, but is real, Similarly relation is also an actual fact. As realists Naiyāyikās put forward the theory that the proposition expresses a relation between the reals.

According to Jainas, words mean something and that is not unique particulars but something which has universals.

Therefore, words mean combination of universal and particular.

Though one is heterodox and the other is orthodox, both Jainas and Nyāya regard śabda as an independent source of knowledge irreducible to any other. Again, Śabda as the understanding meaning of a sentence gives us more knowledge about the objects of the word than perception and inference. In verbal knowledge there is construction of the meanings of sentences according to certain conditions. so there is no fixed relation between a sentence and its meaning. The meaning depends upon some specific conditions. But both agree in maintaining that there is some kind of relationship between a word and its meaning.

In west, also, some modern thinkers like Russell recognize testimony as a separate source of knowledge. A sentence represents the significant combination of words which signify objects and the knowledge which we obtain from the meaning of a sentence is peculiar kind of knowledge different from ordinary kinds of knowledge.

It is clear that though both Nyāya and Jaina views are different in certain respects are opposed to idealistic interpretation of meaning problem that words do not signify referents. The Jainas are one with Naiyāyikās in opposing the Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist doctrine of words. They agree that the word and its object are not essentially related, and that the word is not unrelated to its object. Nyāya and Jaina realists emphatically reject Buddhist doctrine of Apoha and refuse to admit that a word is incapable of expressing real nature of the object and thus not directly related to the object signified by it. Yet, Jaina logicians do not accept the Nyāya view that God, the world-creator, has fixed the meaning of words. Jainas are opposed to divine origin of the

meaning of words as they do not believe in God as a creator of the world. The significance of the word is not fixed by God, though a word signifies an object. Jainas further point out that convention is not all. The word itself is competent to signify an object. In other words, it has a natural capacity to express an object and only what particular meaning it signifies is indicated by the circumstances prevailing.

Thus, Jaina theory about the relation of words to their object seems to be more convincing as it states that meaning is determined by something not under man's control. That is, the theory of natural power of words in addition to conventional power is more reasonable to hold. This can be considered a form of an objectivist doctrine and is undoubtedly in keeping with its realism. The Buddhist denial of direct relationship between word and object may be interpreted to emphasise subjective factor in the theory. Even Nyāya contention of the divine origin of the word may be said to amount to an element of subjectivism in the theory. Jaina view is more consistent and realistic. What Jainas assert is that words have natural expressive capacity. Meaning of the words is not derived from the words in the sense that words do not produce the meaning. Rather, meaning has its root in the things according to their character. So the words merely express the reality as it is.

Annotations :

1. Mill, J. S. : *A System of Logic*, p. 4.
2. Kuppaswamy Sastri : *A primer of Indian Logic*, p. 172.
3. Chatterjee, S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 127.
4. Bijalwan, C. D. : *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p. 126.
5. Kalghatagi, T. G. : *Jaina View of Life*, p. 70.

6. PNT. of Vādi Devasūri, com.by H. Bhattacharya, p. 100.
7. Ibid. p. 104.
8. Kalghataghi, T. G. : *Jaina View of Life*, p. 73.
9. Bhattacharya, H. : *Pramāṇanaya Tattvālokālamkāra of vādi Devsūri*, II. 18. p. 114.
10. Kalghataghi, T. G. : *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*, p. 136.
11. Rhine : *Extrasensory Perception*, p. 222.
Kalghataghi, T. G. : *Jaina View of Life*, p. 87.
12. Mehta, Mohanlal : *Jaina Psychology*, p. 119.
13. *Pramān-Mīmāṃsā*, I. I. 16.
Mehta, Mohanlal : *Jaina Philosophy*. p. 149.
14. Chatterjee, S : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 258.
15. Kuppaswamy Sastri : *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 218-219.
16. Kuppaswamy Sastri, S. : *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 219.
17. Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 1. 1.1. to 39.
18. Bhattacharya, H. : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra of Vādi Devasūri*, P. 187.
19. Bhattacharya, H. : Tr. and commentary on 'Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra of Vādi Devasūri. p.197-8.
20. Mohanlal Mehta : *Jaina Philosophy Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā II. I. I*, p. 161.
21. Mohanlal Mehta: *Jaina Philosophy Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā. II. 1. 9*, p. 162.
22. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra of Vādi Devasūri*, III 41. p. 221.
23. Bhattacharya, H. : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra*, p. 222
Daśavaikālika nirukti, 50.
24. Mehta, Mohanlal : *Jaina Philosophy*, p. 162.
25. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* : II 1, 11, 12, 13.
26. Dasgupta, S. N. : *Indian Philosophy*, p. 56.

27. Chatterjee, S : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 137.
 28. NS. I. I. 7 - *Aptopadesah śabdah*.
 29. NS and NB. I. I. 8 : Chatterjee, S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 318.
 30. *Nyāya Sūtras*, II. 1.55.
 31. *Nyāyasūtras*, II. 2 13-18.
 32. Thomas, F. N. : *Parts of Speech*, TPS. p. 130.
 33. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*—p. 176.
 34. Ibid. p. 177.
 35. Vidyābhūṣaṇa : *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 448.
 36. Kunjanni Raaja : *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 187.
 37. Kunjunni Raja : *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p.205.
 38. Dr. Raghavan, V. : *Bhoja's Sṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 21.
 39. Kuppaswami Sastri : *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 258.
 40. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 372.
 41. *Highways and byways of Grammar*, p. 309.
 42. Kunjunni Raja : *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 224.
 43. *Nyāyāvatāra* : *Siddhasena Divākara* 8. ed. by s. Vidyābhūṣaṇ, p. 6.
 44. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālmkāra* : Vādi Devasūri, IV.11.
 45. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālmkāra* : Vādi Devasūri, Trans. And commented by Bhattacharya. p. 326.
 46. Bhattacharya, H. : *Anekāntavāda*. p. 18.
 47. *Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra*, ed. by A. N. Upadhye, (1971) p. 70.
 48. *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 265.
 49. Ibid. II. 259.
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V

OTHER KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE IN NYĀYA AND JAINISM

Upamāna in Nyāya

Upamāna or comparison is the third source of knowledge recognised by Nyāya. Upamāna literally means the knowledge of similarity between two things. It is defined as “the ground of our knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously well known”.¹ It is that means of valid knowledge by which with the help of an example the relation between name and the object denoted by name is known. It, thus, consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. It helps in knowing of the relation between a word and its denotation. By it we know that a word denotes a certain class of objects on the basis of some authoritative statement. Knowledge of similarity is the efficient instrument of such assimilative cognition, e. g. A person is ignorant of the exact meaning of the word ‘gavayā’. He has learnt from somebody that a ‘gavayā’ is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest, sees the animal called ‘gavayā’ which is similar to a cow; and recollects the information

conveyed by the assimilative proposition and then the cognition arises. 'This is the animal denoted by the word 'gavayā'. This knowledge is due to Upamāna.

When we analyse the process of Upamāna we find that first of all we have an authoritative statement that a word denotes objects which have certain characteristics, i. e. 'the gavayā is like a cow'. Then when we observe any such object we have the knowledge that it is in accordance with the given description and there is recollection of the descriptive (authoritative) statement. From this, the knowledge results that this kind of object is denoted by the word in question. So a man does not know what objects are denoted by the particular word comes to know that the word denotes some definite object and thus, it makes identification possible.

According to old Naiyāyikās, the operative cause of knowledge derived from the Upamāna is authoritative statement while later Naiyāyikās hold that perception of similarity etc. is the operative cause which revives in memory the authoritative statement and leads to knowledge. The immediate cause of knowledge is perception. The scope of this pramāṇa is quite narrow yet in practice it is useful and helps us in extending our acquaintance with language. As thorough going realists Naiyāyikās do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of mind. Similarity is no doubt perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and authoritative statement is a separate act and is a distinct means of knowledge called comparison.

Nyāya, thus, recognises Upamāna as an independent

source of valid knowledge. Cārvākas contend that upamāna is not a pramāṇa at all. The Buddhists reduce upamāna to perception and testimony. The sāṅkhya reduces it to inference. Mīmāṃsakās and Vedāntins though recognize upamāna as a separate source of knowledge, they explain it in a different way.

Nyāya rejects Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā view that reasoning about likeness and unlikeness are obtained through upamāna. Nyāya contention is that in all cases of upamāna, we compare the unfamiliar object with something familiar.

In Jainism, upamāna is not recognized as an independent source of knowledge but it is included under pratyabhijñā or recognition. Jainas use concept of pratyabhijñā in a wider sense to include all the kinds of judgement like 'this is like that', 'this is unlike that' etc. In other words in Jainism pratyabhijñā includes any knowledge which is conditioned by perception and memory. It includes any knowledge which is conditioned by perception and memory. It includes Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta as well as Nyāya view of upamāna.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that Jaina view is not accepted by all. The critics think that the view that upamāna is a form of pratyabhijñā is based on wrong assumption. "They seem to think that a knowledge is explained when we explain the constituent parts of it. But to explain the component parts of knowledge is not to explain knowledge itself. To say that it is so is the fundamental error of all associationist theory of knowledge. It is were really so, the Jaina view of pratyabhijñā itself as a distinct type of knowledge will have to be discarded since it is constituted by perception

and memory. On this assumption we may reduce all kinds of knowledge to perception, since the constituents of all knowledge ultimately come from perception".²

The Nyāya theory of upamāna explains how to know the denotation of a word. Upamāna is the process of knowledge by which we come to know that a particular word denotes a particular class of objects, and the nature of process of knowledge involved in our understanding the denotation of words is such that it is neither the case of perception nor can it be reduced to inference or testimony or any combination of these. It cannot be explained by memory. The essential point in upamāna is neither the perception of similarity nor the verbal knowledge of the denotation of a word but the recognition of certain object not known before as belonging to a certain class denoted by certain word. Upamāna in Nyāya really aims at the knowledge of the denotation of a word. This knowledge is not even inferential cognition because it is possible without the knowledge of Vyāpti, between two terms which is the fundamental characteristic of an inference. Further, there is difference between the forms of cognitions in inference and upamāna. In Upamāna the resulting cognition is in terms of likeness, we compare and do not infer. Again all knowledge of likeness is not memory. So it is not exclusively based on remembrance. Though upamāna involves perception and memory, neither perception alone nor memory alone can give us knowledge of the denotation of a word. The process of knowing the denotation of a certain word is unique. Nyāya, therefore, concludes that such a method of knowledge is known as upamāna which is a valid source of knowledge. It should be given an independent status as it is irreducible to any other means of knowledge. As it cannot be

reduced to any other pramāṇa it is required to be classed apart.

Nyāya view of upamāna should not be confused with analogical argument in western logic. In analogy, we infer the resemblance from other resemblance but in upamāna, we infer not the knowledge of resemblance between two things but we have the knowledge of denotation of a word. Knowledge of resemblance is only instrumental in identifying an object.

Thus, in Nyāya upamāna is given a distinct place and is recognised as an independent means of valid knowledge. It will be seen from Nyāya conception of upamāna that Nyāya logicians have cleverly restricted its scope in order to save it from falling into any other pramāṇa.

Jainas attempt to reduce upamāna to recognition or pratyabhijñā. Jaina objection to Nyāya view of upamāna is that it is restricted only to the judgement of similarity. The cognition, e. g. 'This is the object signified by the word gavayā' is a definitive knowledge according to Nyāya which is different from perception and other sources of knowledge. Knowledge leading to definition is upamāna. Jainas point out that the same kind of defining knowledge based on judgements of dissimilarity, e. g. 'That is the object signified by the word buffalo', on the basis of judgement 'A buffalow is dissimilar to cow' cannot be included in Nyāya view of upamāna which is based on observation of similarity only. Jaina philosophers find this to be illogical. According to them it is unreasonable to exclude the cognition resulting from judgement of dissimilarity from the scope of upamāna. Similarly Naiyāyikās cannot account for the judgement

embodying negative judgement, such as—‘That is not the animal signified by the word cow’. Such cognitions based on dissimilarity lead to definition exactly in the same way as the knowledge based on similarity. As it is said “The Jainas take the right course by bringing all forms of knowledge negative or positive which consist in comparison and synthesis under the one all-embracing *pratyabhijñā* or conception”.³

Nyāya view regarding Tarka

Hypothetical Reasoning—Tarka

In Nyāya, Tarka is not considered as a form of valid knowledge. Tarka is an indirect argument, i. e. *reductio ad absurdum*. In this reasoning employed is of implicative form. We take the contradictory of given conclusion and if it is true, the argument is invalid; if false, it is valid. It is also called hypothetical reasoning, e. g. “If there were no fire, there would be no smoke”. Here *tarka* indicates the inference of fire as valid by deducing an inadmissible proposition from the contradictory of conclusion.

This kind of argument is useful for establishing a proposition which is doubted. Tarka, therefore, serves limit to dispute. It helps to decide between two possible alternatives. But it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* in Nyāya because the invalidity of a position is not a ground of the validity of its opposite. so *tarka* is not a source of valid knowledge by itself but it is auxiliary to *pramāṇa* because to argue that ‘if there were no fire, there would be no smoke’ is not to know that there is fire. Hence *tarka* does not generate true knowledge, although it confirms a *pramāṇa* which actually generates the knowledge in question.

Therefore, it is *pramāṇasahāyaka*—helper to *pramāṇa*. It performs the function of testing the validity of some reasoning.

Tarka corresponds to antilogism or inconsistent triad of propositions in western logic. The logical character of *tarka* is that it has a form of inconsistent argument developed out of the conclusion of the given argument and then its validity is determined by *reductio ad absurdum* method. However, the logical form of the reasoning in *tarka* does not exactly correspond to that of antilogism because *tarka* is in the form of hypothetical argument while antilogism is in the form of categorical syllogism. So *tarka* itself is not an argument as *Nyāya* believes. It is itself not a *pramāṇa* but a mental process favourable to *pramāṇa*. It is, therefore, no doubt an aid to *pramāṇa* as it contributes to the ascertainment of truth by facilitating the operation of a relevant means of knowledge.

Kinds of Indirect Knowledge in Jainism **Inductive Reasoning (Tarka)**

It is the knowledge of universal concomitance arising from facts observed and non-observed. The facts of experience are the cause of induction. It establishes relationship such as 'the relationship between the proven and the mark' and this relationship subsists for all the times, e. g. invariable connection between the smoke and the fire. The form of inductive reasoning is 'this being, this is', e. g. 'There being smoke, there must be fire'. "The nature of induction consists in a cognition of such truths of universal and eternal application".⁴ Thus inductive reasoning gives us knowledge

of universal concomitance which consists in necessary occurrence of determinant concomitant i. e. major term on the occurrence of determinate concomitant, i. e. middle term.

Thinkers of other systems refuse to admit the validity of inductive reasoning as a separate source of knowledge. But Jainism points out that tarka or induction should be regarded as an independent means of knowledge because in it the knowledge of the relation of two things is acquired. Jains admit that it arises from the facts of perception and non-perception but Vyāpti is known through a distinct source of knowledge called tarka. Knowledge of universal concomitance cannot be derived from perception alone since perception is limited whereas knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. Again, it cannot be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible without universal concomitance. Jains further point out that to deny the validity of induction would lead to agnosticism which is an impossible position.

It, therefore, follows that inductive reasoning or tarka is an independent means of knowledge of universal concomitance which cannot be apprehended by any other recognised means of knowledge.

Naiyāyikās do not accept tarka as a pramāṇa but regard it as pramāṇa-sahāyaka (helper).

Recollection

Smṛti is the third kind of non-perceptual knowledge. It should be noted that Jainism and Madhva, among all the systems of Indian philosophy, regard recollection as a valid and separate means of knowledge.

It is the recollection of an object cognised before in the form 'it is that' and it is due to the stimulation of a memory impression. The soul can retain impressions and when these impressions wake up the result is recollection. The object of recollection is the object cognised before. Though it consists in the form of knowledge recalling its object as 'that' in all cases statements based on recollection do not explicitly use 'that' but it is implied. This distinguishes recollection from *pratyabhijñā* which consists in identification or knowledge expressed in the form which explicitly uses 'that' e. g. 'that is but he'.

The necessary conditions for the occurrence of recollection are destruction and subsidence of obstructive veils, observations of similar objects and the like, i. e. some of the conditions of memory recognised by modern psychology such as similarity, contiguity and contrast etc.

The general objection against recollection as a means of valid knowledge is that recollection has for its matter something that is not a present substance, that it is not knowledge of a datum perceived at present and, therefore, it is said, it has no objective basis. The Jaina reply to this objection is that it is true that recollection has no present substance for its matter but that does not mean that it is not a form of valid knowledge. "The reality of the object and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition".⁵ Another objection is that recollection is not a valid means of knowledge because it is knowledge of the objects which were the objects of a previous experience. Therefore, validity of recollection cannot be determined without referring to past experience; the previous experience is the real valid knowledge; recollection simply revives the

idea of its object. The Jaina reply to this objection is that it is true that recollection is possible because of the impressions of previous experience. So previous experience is its generating condition but as regards the determination of its object it is independent of previous experience. In recollection, we have knowledge of the fact that object was perceived. Jainas further argue that validity of inference would be impossible without the validity of recollection as inference depends upon the recollection of invariable relationship between middle term and major term. Similarly, though the object of recollection is the same as that of perception, the process of recollection is different from that of perception. Hence, it is established that recollection is a valid means of knowledge.

Philosophers are generally, critical as regards the contribution memory can make to knowledge. All systems of Indian philosophy except Jainism and realism of Madhva exclude memory from the means of valid knowledge particularly because of its representative character. Nyāya definition of *pramāṇa* excludes memory as a source of valid knowledge. Though memory may be true, it is not a valid means of knowledge in Nyāya because memory does not arise out of the object itself. The object of memory according to Nyāya realists, is not existent and, therefore, no longer real at the time of remembrance. Memory is not a presentational experience, as they argue and, therefore, it does not refer to any objective fact. Hence it cannot be regarded as a valid means of knowledge. Jainas, however, refute the Nyāya position by saying that though the origin of memory is conditioned by the revival of impressions of past experience, its essence lies in the knowledge of something as 'that', that is, something as past. By its very nature, memory refers to past experience and such knowledge of past which

is the result of memory must be regarded as valid as it leads to successful activity. The validity of knowledge by memory cannot be denied simply on the ground that it refers to previously known object.

Even modern western thinkers like Russell recognise memory as an important source of our knowledge concerning past. Russell's view is that "memory resembles perception in point of its immediacy and differs from it in being referred to the past".⁶ However, in Jainism memory is regarded as a kind of mediate knowledge.

Pratyabhijñā

It is translated as conception or recognition which is assimilated knowledge. Its ground is perceptual cognition and remembrance. Jainā view of pratyabhijñā is peculiar. "It consists in sythetic knowledge with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essence underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics".⁷ It, therefore, can be expressed in the judgements of similarity, difference, like 'This is similar to that', 'This is different from that' etc. It arises from observation and recollection. Yet it cannot be included in either of the two but must be recognized as a distinct way of knowing because of its synthesis of past-present. These are different forms of pratyabhijñā when we say, e. g. 'This is necessarily that table' it is judgement of identity. When it is said, 'the cow is different from buffalo' it is judgement of dissimilarity.

It is clear that Jaina view differs from that of Nyāya. In Nyāya Pratyabhijñā is classified as a kind of perception and in upamāna only judgements of similarity are included. Nyāya view of comparison is thus, restricted. Jains point out that if

conception, i. e. Pratyabhijñā is restricted to the form of upamāna of Nyāya school, then for judgements of dissimilarity etc. you will have to find some other pramāṇa. Jains maintain that negative judgements like “That is not the animal like Cow” etc. cannot be explained by Nyāya view of upamān. Therefore, Jaina philosophers are right in bringing all the forms of knowledge negative or positive involving comparison and synthesis based on memory and observation under the one all-inclusive Pratyabhijñā. Jaina concept is much wider as it also includes judgements like “this is longer than that” which are instances of comparison and synthesis. Jains maintain that our ideas of similarity etc. are real ideas and in the cases where they are found out by comparing the given with the past idea and synthesizing the two, we have conception as a valid means of knowledge. It is neither the form of perception nor the memory alone but the synthesis of the two.

Annotations :

1. NS and N. B. 116. S. Chatterjee : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 299.
 2. Chatterjee, S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 305.
 3. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra* : Vadi Devasūri : tr. by H. Bhattacharya, p. 175.
 4. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra* : Vadi Devasūri III 7 comn. by H. Bhattacharya, p. 182.
 5. Mohanlal Mehta, *Jaina Philosophy* : p. 156.
 6. Russell, Bertrand : *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 76.
 7. H. Bhattacharya, *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra Vadi Devasūri*, III. 15, Tr. and comn. p. 172.
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VI

THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH AND VALIDITY

The concept of valid knowledge logically involves the concept of truth. Whether truth is intrinsic or extrinsic is a disputed point. The question takes the form of criterion of knowing the validity or invalidity as regards the origin and ascertainment of truth. Different systems of Indian philosophy have tried to answer this question differently. Accordingly, there are two different theories known as *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, i. e. the doctrine of extrinsic validity of knowledge and secondly, *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, i. e. the doctrine of intrinsic validity of knowledge. The former holds that validity or invalidity of knowledge is constituted and known by the external conditions while the later theory maintains that we have not to depend upon the outside test for the verification of the validity or invalidity of our knowledge but the same conditions which bring about that knowledge, make known, the validity or invalidity of that knowledge. On the first view, both truth and error are tested or evidenced by external conditions, while on the second view both truth and error are self-evident and need no proof by external conditions. The alternative solutions given by different Indian theories may be summarized as follows :-

1. Sāṃkhya : According to sāmkhya both validity and invalidity are inherent in knowledge itself and hence are self-evident.
2. Buddhism : Buddhists support the view that invalidity is inherent in all cognitions and, therefore, self-evident in knowledge while validity, if any, is established by something else.
3. Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta : They advocate the view that validity of knowledge is intrinsic while invalidity is due to certain external conditions.
4. Nyāya : According to Nyāya neither validity nor invalidity is self-evident but both are known as well as constituted by extraneous conditions.
5. Jainism : Jainism is generally in favour of extrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge but holds that sometimes, they can be intrinsic also.

It is clear that theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge understands by knowledge, truth. Knowledge cannot be erroneous. It is only pseudo-knowledge which becomes falsified according to this view, then the theory of intrinsic validity becomes superfluous if not refutable. It is difficult to maintain that knowledge as such is true and the criteria cannot any more prove its truth. If what is not true, cannot be said to be known, the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge becomes paradoxical in some sense. The notion of truth would appear trivial on this view and problem of illusory knowledge becomes inexplicable.

Nyāya philosophers, therefore, do not seem to be in favour of the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge. However, there is difference of opinion between the ancient

and the modern Nyāya philosophers on this view. The older Nyāya philosophers take a more common-sense view of the validity of knowledge insisting that it must be established by external conditions. As it is pointed out "But that the truth of some cases of knowledge is self-evident is admitted by some Naiyāyikās.....Later Naiyāyikās, however, do not insist that every knowledge must be tested and proved before we can accept its validity. According to them, the validity of knowledge need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it. Its validity is practically self-evident so long as it is not contradicted.....To say that a knowledge is evidently valid it is not necessary to prove its infallibility or to exclude all other possibilities contrary to it".¹ Among such cases of knowledge having self-evident validity Nyāya philosophers include inference and comparison. However, in Nyāya the intrinsic character of truth differs from the sense in which philosophers of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools understand it. It is intrinsic so long as it is not contradicted but it is liable to error according to Nyāya. It seems that Nyāya concept of intrinsic validity is less paradoxical. This Nyāya view also seems to resemble Jaina position according to which validity of knowledge is both intrinsic as well as extrinsic.

The Nyāya Theory of Parataḥprāmānya

Nyāya is the principal advocate of the theory of extrinsic validity as well as invalidity of knowledge.

Nyāya advances quality theory of knowledge. The Nyāya concept of knowledge is that knowledge is an attribute of self. It is a 'guṇa' of a self which is not capable of modification. It is not an activity but a product. It is a product arising out of a collocation of causal conditions. It

should be noticed that Nyāya view of knowledge is in sharp contrast to the views held by Sāṃkhya or Vedānta according to which knowledge is modification of buddhi. Knowledge, according to Nyāya does not bring about any new property in the object that is known. Epistemologically, knowledge refers beyond itself to something. Because of this it is distinguished from the other qualities of self like desire, pleasure, etc. As it is aptly put, "Knowledge alone has this self-transcending reference to object and this reference is intrinsic to knowledge as knowledge".² In Nyāya to be conscious means having knowledge of something. So the term knowledge is used in a wider sense.

Nyāya puts forward the theory of direct realism. Knowledge is the knowledge of an object because it is always directed to an object. Nyāya considers that the object-directedness or property of being related to some object is the distinctive character of knowledge. Cognitive act is nothing but the content towards which the act is directed. Nyāya realists believe that knowledge does not generate any feature in the object. To say, e. g. that a knowledge is of a pot is the same as saying that a knowledge content refers beyond itself to a pot. This very content constitutes knowledge.

In Nyāya knowledge is classified into true and false knowledge. The false knowledge is also knowledge because it has ability to manifest. However, true knowledge has certain characteristics by which it is distinguished from false knowledge. It is knowledge of the object as it is. A more precise definition is given by Vācaspati : "It is the knowledge that does not deviate from its object and that is other than memory".³ It is a kind of right apprehension, an

uncontradicted awareness of an object which is free from doubt and manifests its object independently, i. e. not based on prior experience. Valid knowledge, therefore, excludes error, doubt and memory. Gaṅgeśa rejects copy theory of truth because knowledge could not be copy of its object. "The two are entirely heterogeneous in nature".⁴ Gaṅgeśa rejects some of the definitions of truth and gives rather more realistic definition. "True knowledge is an experience whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object".⁵ The important feature of this definition is that it refers to both ontological as well as epistemological aspect. It is rightly said. "Truth is neither a property of the object nor a mere property of the knowledge. It is rather relational in nature and as such has to be defined with reference to both the relata, the object and the knowledge and this what Gaṅgeśa does".⁶ Let us take an example. When a piece of silver is known as silver, the knowledge is expressed in the form 'This is silver'. This knowledge has the qualifiers 'thisness', 'silver' and 'silverness'. This knowledge is true as 'silverness' belongs to 'this' really. On the other hand, in case of error, say a piece of shall is mistaken for silver. The knowledge is expressed in the same judgement. 'This is silver'. Erroneous knowledge has also 'silverness' for its qualifier. Therefore, qualifiers are the same both in case of truth and error. What distinguishes right knowledge from error is the fact that in error the silverness which functions as qualifier is not possessed by qualificandum 'this'. In true knowledge 'this' possesses 'silverness'. Similarly, in doubt we possess knowledge having mutually contradictory qualifiers. The knowledge takes the form—'Is this silver or not' ? Out of the two contradictory qualifiers, obviously both of them cannot belong to 'this'. Hence doubt is not the cognition whose qualifier is such that

it really belongs to the object.

It becomes clear that in Nyāya no knowledge is completely false. Even the forms of false knowledge are partially true and not false in all respects. Gaṅgeśa's definition of knowledge makes this point fairly clear. Nyāya position can be stated as with regard to some one of its qualifiers as least a knowledge must be true. This is quite in keeping with its general realistic standpoint. Though a false knowledge is not false in all respects; it must have no qualifiers which do not belong to the qualificandum. The criterion of correspondence is strictly maintained as regards the truth.

In view of these considerations, it has been rightly pointed out. "Gaṅgeśa's concept of truth impiles that truth is a 'hybrid' entity having both epistemic and ontological components....Truth is a unitary notion having heterogeneous components not merely epistemological".⁷

This notion of truth has relevance for Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge.

Nyāya philosophers could not agree with the extreme alternative suggested by Mīmāṃsākas and Vedāntins regarding validity of knowledge. According to them, all knowledge cannot be intrinsically true. As regards the genesis of truth, they maintain that the truth of a knowledge is not produced by the very conditions that give rise to the knowledge itself. It is rather produced by some extrinsic factors, some additional factors known as *guṇās* or excellences. Similarly, ascertainment of truth depends upon certain external conditions like its production. Nyāya believes in extrinsic nature of truth as well as falsity. Knowledge is

invalid because of some additional condition called demerit or doṣa.

The argument advanced for the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge is that if validity originated from the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge as knowledge, then it would be difficult to distinguish valid knowledge from invalid knowledge because it has the same originating conditions. As regards the question of apprehension of truth, it is argued that if it is apprehended intrinsically; for the very first time we also know it to be true, then that knowledge cannot be doubted subsequently. Nyāya contention is not that when a knowledge originates it is at the beginning neither true nor false. It rather means that every knowledge is either true or false at the very beginning. Only its truth or falsity is due to certain conditions that are different from those other conditions that give rise to the knowledge itself. These conditions are merits and demerits in case of truth and falsity respectively.

In this view, in Nyāya truth of a knowledge is not ascertained *ab initio*. But then it seems that in those cases where there is no doubt soon afterwards, truth is apprehended intrinsically. In case of inference, it must be admitted that it is known right from the beginning as valid. "There is no room left for subsequent doubt in the validity of inference because amongst the originating conditions of inference there is certainty about the universal major premise. Udayana most reluctantly concedes that truth is here apprehended *ab initio*. He tries to reconcile this with the *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda* theory by suggesting that in such cases both may be true. The Navya Naiyāyikās take up a more uncompromising position and deny that the truth of an

inference is ever apprehended *ab initio*. For them, there is always the possibility of doubt".⁸

According to Nyāya, though cognition is by means of sense perception, the truth of a knowledge is ascertained by means of inference. It may be then asked, how is the validity of that inference is to be established, because if it depends upon another inference then there will be infinite regress. Nyāya answer is, it neither depends upon another inference nor is it intrinsically valid and does not require further validation. But they maintain that inference is accompanied by a sense of certainty that comes to be questioned only if the universal major premise is doubted for some reason or the other.

There is also another difficulty in case of confirmations, e. g. our perception of water is true if it quenches the thirst. The question arises, 'how is this confirmation itself to be validated ?' The answer given by a Nyāya philosopher Vācaspati is that confirmation is never questioned because of its familiarity. "Thus, instead of taking confirmation as intrinsically true and self-validating. Vācaspati includes it in a much wider class of 'familiar' cases where sheer familiarity rules out any need for further validating them".⁹ Of course this seems to be somewhat mysterious. The criterion of 'familiarity' is unintelligible here.

To sum up, the general Nyāya position regarding the question of truth is that it is extrinsic to knowledge both as regards its origin and apprehension. The nature of truth consists in its correspondence to reality while test of truth consists in its practical utility. Truth exists even if it is not tested. Subjective utility is a means for subsequent verification of truth. Knowledge of truth as well as falsity is

not thus selfevident but known through inference.

Nyāya view is important as it signifies that there is relation between our knowledge and the reality of which we have knowledge. Knowledge is a quality of soul while reality exists in the external world. Therefore, knowledge is neither valid nor invalid when it arises. That is, it is not valid by itself. But its validity is known by making an appeal to facts.

The Jaina Theory of Parataḥprāmānya

Generally speaking, Jaina realists support the doctrine of extrinsic validity of knowledge. Valid knowledge, according to Jainism, determines the nature of an object as it really is as opposed to invalid or false cognition. Jaina concept regarding illusion is that in illusion the object of apprehension is really there, but its real form is concealed and the different form is perceived. Jaina position is here practically the same with that of Nyāya that in knowledge, what is cognized is the object of knowledge which is different from cogniser—the subject, objects exist as reals. The validity of knowledge consists in its correspondence with the facts. Valid knowledge thus represents the exact nature of an object. As regards the question whether validity is intrinsic to knowledge or extrinsic. Jaina position in accordance with its non-absolutistic standpoint acknowledges the truth of both apparently contradictory theories. Validity and invalidity of knowledge is intrinsic in some cases while extrinsic in other cases.

Valid knowledge is produced when the factors producing it are not defective while invalid knowledge is produced when these factors are defective. Jaina position is described as :-

“With respect to their origination, both validity and invalidity depend upon something other than itself, while their consciousness is due to itself and the other”.¹⁰

Thus, as regards the origin of truth Jainas maintain that it is extrinsic to knowledge while as regards the ascertainment of truth it is both intrinsic as well as extrinsic to knowledge. Origin of a mode of knowledge is caused by certain factors and knowledge is originated valid when these factors are not faulty, otherwise it becomes invalid. Jainas maintain that knowledge itself cannot be responsible for its own validity but the factors which cause knowledge are different from the factors which cause valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is, therefore, due to *guṇās* or goodness in generating factors.

However, the apprehension of validity and invalidity sometimes depends upon the knowledge itself while sometimes upon the factors other than it. The truth of repeated observations is self-evident while the truth of the knowledge of an object which is not repeatedly cognised is determined by external factors. The consciousness of truth is, thus, intrinsic in some cases while extrinsic in other cases. In case of repeated observations, we have intuitive apprehension of validity or invalidity and we have not to examine the grounds on which validity or invalidity might be depended. In other cases, of course, consciousness that knowledge is valid or invalid is not intuitive but is dependent on external factors.

It is clear that Jaina view of extrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge is more or less similar to that of Nyāya. It is opposed to Mīmāṃsā theory that valid knowledge is not dependent on anything other than itself and consciousness of valid knowledge is also always intrinsic.

Jainas argue against Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge that just as invalidity of knowledge is extrinsic, validity is also extrinsic except in some cases.

Jainas are one with Nyāya realists in maintaining that validity of knowledge is not intrinsic but depends upon extrinsic conditions but disagree with Nyāya according to which validity is also known by external conditions. Jainas here maintain that it is known sometimes by knowledge itself and sometimes by other factors. The pragmatic criterion of the knowledge of truth and falsity laid down by Nyāya philosophers is not recognized by Jaina philosophers. Their view is that when from the observation of same object, same knowledge arises repeatedly, we have intuitive knowledge that it is valid knowledge. Where the same object is observed again and again and at each time, the knowledge differs, we intuitively know that it is invalid knowledge. In this way in case of repeated observation of a phenomenon, we have intrinsic knowledge of validity or invalidity comes of itself and is not forced from outside as it were. But in the cases where our cognitions are not the cases of repeated observations, "we have to examine the evidence and the aspects of the phenomenon under observation and other relevant things before we can have the consciousness that we have the valid knowledge or otherwise; here such consciousness is not intuitive but is dependent on factors other than the knowledge itself."¹¹

Jaina and Nyāya views radically differ from Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Sāṃkhya views regarding the validity of knowledge. Jaina and Nyāya realists refuse to maintain that it is the knowledge itself which is responsible

for its validity. They cannot accept the view that what you know subjectively is also true objectively by itself. For them, knowing a thing is different from being of it. Subjective condition cannot be sufficient guarantee for its objectivity unless it is verified subsequently and hence they are one in concluding that validity of knowledge depends upon certain extrafactors. As realists, they are committed to correspondence theory of truth and underline the thesis that validity of knowledge is not inherent in knowledge itself. That truth is intrinsic to all knowledge is not admitted by them but that truth of some cases of knowledge is self-evident is admitted by some of the Nyāya and Jaina philosophers.

Annotations :

1. Chatterjee S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 98-99.
 2. J. N. Mohanty : *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 27.
 3. Vācaspati : *Nyāya darśana*, p. 16.
 4. Mohanty, J. N. : *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 40.
 5. Ibid. p. 42.
 6. Ibid. p. 43.
 7. Mohanty, J. N. : *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 45-47.
 8. Mohanty, J. N. : *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, p. 49.
 9. Ibid. p. 52.
 10. Vādi Devasūri : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāraḥ*, I. 20.
 11. Bhattācārya. H. : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāraḥ of Vādi, Devasūri, Eng.Tr. and commentary*. p. 75.
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VII

THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

The problem of knowledge is connected with the problem of truth and error. Particularly realism finds it difficult to explain the problem of error. Strictly speaking, there is little or no provision for distinction between truth and error in realistic epistemology. However, not all forms of realistic theories necessarily take this position. Though things have independent existence, they may not be known immediately as they are and this explains the phenomenon of error. The distinction between truth and error is thus accounted for and is not inconsistent with a moderate form of realism. Because, possibility of valid knowledge does not exclude the possibility of error.

The problem of error leads to the problem whether error is subjective or has some objective basis or it is the result of both subjective and objective elements. Different philosophers have expressed divergent opinions as regards this problem. Error is regarded as a form of invalid knowledge in which object is cognized as something else or possessing certain characteristics that do not belong to it in reality, e. g. shell is cognized as silver. Idealism describes

error as partial truth while according to critical realism error is ascription of a wrong character to reality.

Different Theories of Error

1. **Buddhist Idealism** : It puts forward the theory of self-apprehension according to which error consists in projecting subjective ideas as objective facts. This school of Buddhism believes that error is a concept which exists only in the mind and in error what is internal appears as external. The object of illusion is though real, is not external as realists hold.

Ultimately, this view can be included under the view that error is presentation of a given something as something that it is not.

2. **Buddhist Nihilism** : It advocates the view that error consists in manifestation of non-existent as existent. The object of erroneous cognition is non-existent.

It is clear that this view is based on Buddhist theory of reality which cannot be accepted.

3. **Advaita Vedānta** : The advaitic view is known as *Anirvacaniyakhyāti*, i. e. theory of indefinable's apprehension according to which error is experience of a relatively real object which is neither absolutely existent nor absolutely non-existent nor both. Erroneous experience is indescribable and undefinable.

4. **Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā** : It puts forward the theory of *akhyāti*—the theory of non-apprehension according to which an error is the result of lack of discrimination between two different cognitions, e. g. In the illusory perception of shell as silver; two cognitions are there, in fact. There is first perception of shell which takes the form 'this' and the

distinctive features of it are not cognized. It is perceived as shining white something. This perception produces recollection of silver previously cognized elsewhere. Thus, there is fusion of two cognitions. In cases of error two distinct cognitions—the perception and recollection arise, their distinction is missed. As a result of this non-discrimination of non-relation identity judgement of the form ‘This is silver’ arises.

It is clear that Prabhākāras though are prepared to admit error, according to them, all experiences are valid and so called cases of error are only undiscriminated fusions of cognitions. In other words, in accordance with their realistic stand, they want to suggest that all knowledge is valid and that there is no error in the logical sense. The sublating cognition does not contradict the illusion but simply recognizes the distinction between two cognitions.

However, this view can also be included under the view that error is apprehension of a thing as something else.

All the above views are either inadequate to account for the error or they can be safely included in the theory known as *anyathākhyāti* or *viparitakhyāti* propounded by Nyāya and Jainism.

Nyāya theory of Error :

Anyathākhyātivāda or Viparitakhyātivāda :

Nyāya realism recognizes complete difference between the object and the subject. So it is faced with the problem of truth and error. If the known object is wholly different from cognizing knowledge, the question of bridging the gulf

between the two arises. Knowledge is knowledge of the object outside. Nyāya philosophers do not subscribe to the view that essence of a thing lies in its being perceived. Knowledge comes in relation with a real object existing outside knowledge through self-linking relation of subject and object. Nyāya advocates the doctrine of externality of relation and thus, solves the problem of relation between cognizing reality and cognized reality. Nyāya philosophers do not maintain as idealists do, that it is knowledge of ideas which are copies of the objects. In Nyāya epistemology, therefore, knowledge is knowledge of objective reality. But then the question of explaining the distinction between true and false cognition arises. Nyāya realists advocate correspondence theory of truth. It makes the distinction between cognition and objective content of it. In a valid cognition the objective contents exactly correspond to the external realities. In an invalid cognition where error arises when we say 'This is silver', something else is mistaken for silver and there is no correspondence between the objective content of cognition and external realities due to wrong correlation.

Nyāya believe in theory of extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. Knowledge is just the manifestation of objects. Invalidity is due to some deficiency in the conditions of knowledge. Neither truth nor falsity is self-evident. Falsity does not belong to knowledge just at the time we have that knowledge. It is known sometime after the knowledge itself has appeared. Knowledge, no doubt, points to a real object beyond itself but this is restricted to indeterminate perception alone. Its data can not be false, for, we are then in direct contact with reality. Therefore, an erroneous indeterminate cognition is contradiction in terms. But error may arise when we try to relate two or more objects given in

it. That means it is determinate perception that is the subject of logic where the question of the distinction between true and false knowledge arises.

Nyāya advocates correspondence theory of truth. If the content of knowledge exactly corresponds to the objective reality, we have truth, otherwise error. When we have wrong perception of silver in shell, the thing, the silver, the relation of inherence, are facts of objective world. They are given in indeterminate perception. But while 'silverness' is not related to the thing by inherence, there, they appear related in knowledge due to some defects in conditions of knowledge. The real silverness which belongs to the real silver existing elsewhere is presented in this visual perception as the attribute of 'this' due to some extraordinary contact. Nyāya theory of error is known as *thus anyathākhyātivāda* or *viparitākhyātivāda*, i. e. erroneous cognition is misapprehension of one thing as another thing.

What Nyāya realism wants to emphasise is the fact that even the content of error has a complete objective basis and what does not exist can never be the object of knowledge. In erroneous judgement, subject is actually given, the predicate also is, though elsewhere so that non-existent is never perceived as is believed by some idealists.

According to Nyāya, valid knowledge has objective reality as it is grounded in the object itself while "all error is subjective in so far as it is due to the introduction of a certain foreign character into the object by the knowing subject....The object all the while remains what it actually is....there is no error in the object.....The error lies in the cognition..as the cognition of a thing as something which it is not".¹

Thus, according to Nyāya, error is a misrelated fact.

Jaina Theory of Error—Viparītakhyātivāda :

Jaina attitude to knowledge is empirical and realistic.

Valid knowledge is that which determines the nature of a thing as it really is. It is opposed to false knowledge. Error is one of the modes of false knowledge which consists in misunderstanding the nature of a thing or determination of a thing as it is not. Jaina realism also accepts correspondence theory of truth. False apprehension does not tally with the facts of reality. It is not true to the thing as it is.

Jainism, in accordance with its principle of non-absolutism, asserts that a thing has many aspects and error is defined as judging a thing from one of its aspects. "Viparyāya or illusion consists in determining a thing from one aspect which is different from the thing in its entirety".²

If you look at a thing from one aspect, neglecting the others, your knowledge would be erroneous, e. g. in illusory perception of shell as silver we mistake one aspect of shell viz. whiteness for silver. Error is thus positive perception of a different thing. It is misapprehension. In an illusion 'This is silver' where actually there is shell, shell is not perceived as a shell but is perceived as something different that is silver. The subsequent knowledge contradicts illusory perception by removing it and makes it clear that previous perception was illusory.

Jain realism thus, emphasises the objectivity of error by pointing out that the object of perception is a real object but its real form is concealed and it assumes a different form, when it is not perceived from all its aspects. As a result of this, the peculiar characteristics of a real object are not perceived and some of the characteristics of illusory one are

perceived; which give the object the form of illusion.

Jainas further maintain that illusion is due to the defects in organs of knowledge which misrepresent the object.

It is clear that Jainas agree with Nyāya in maintaining that error is the knowledge of a thing different from what it is. Both Nyāya and Jainism thus, advocate viparitakhyātivāda as against akhyātivāda of Prabhākar Mīmāṃsā. Illusion is not the result of non-discrimination of differences in the objects of perception and recollection as the advocates of akhyātivāda hold. The theory that error is non-discrimination cannot explain the perceptual character of illusion. Error is not merely the subjective appearance of an object. We do really perceive the illusory object and not only imagine that we perceive it. In 'shell-silver' illusion silver is somehow perceived and not merely there is recollection of it. This perceptual character of illusory experience can only be explained by theory that error is misapprehension of an object. No other theory of error can explain this perceptual character of error. Even in error we have knowledge of external reality though invalid. It is not merely the results of our ideas. It is cognition of an object; though invalid and, therefore, unsuccessful. It is not perception of ideas or images. This explanation of erroneous cognition seems to be the most consistent from realistic point of view. Even illusions are excited by external stimuli and have objective basis; otherwise distinction between one illusion and another would become impossible. The object of error is always real and this is precisely the point emphasised by Nyāya and Jaina views regarding error. Both agree in holding that error lies not in what is presented in perception but in determination of what is presented which results in judgement of the object as something different from what it is. So according to both erroneous cognition is presentational in

character and has its basis in objective facts.

It is sometimes held that theory of errors as 'non-discrimination'—akhyātivāda—is more consistent with realism because according to it, there is no error in logical sense. However, it is rightly pointed out that "the Naiyāyikās would answer in the affirmative, the question 'Is error possible in realism ?' and would explain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive and a real attribute may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and, thus, save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error".³ Nyāya and Jaina realism are right when they emphasise the fact that an unreal object can never be experienced. Illusion is an error of perception and not of memory and, therefore, cannot be the result of non-discrimination but it is cognition of a thing different from what it is. Again, the other theories can be reduced to Viparitakhyātivāda. Though it introduces some subjective element in the apprehension of error, it combines objectivism with subjectivism which is compatible with realism. This theory also seems to be in conformity with the view held by some of the modern realists like Alexander.⁴ It is no exaggeration to say that the theory of error as misapprehension of a thing is the most scientific theory not inconsistent with realistic standpoint.

Annotations :

1. Chatterjee, S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 34.
2. Bhattācharya, H. : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra of Vādi Devasūri*, I. 9. tr. and comm. O. 38.
3. Kuppuswamy Sastri, S. : *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 136.
4. Alexander : *Essays in Critical Realism*, p.135-36.

VIII

THE PROBLEM OF NEGATION

The problem of negation is one of the most important problems in epistemology. The problem is perplexing as the concept of negation is complex. Since epistemology is concerned with the knowledge of reality, particularly in realistic epistemology, the problem of the meaning and objective reference of a proposition assumes significant form.

As we do not find a negative fact in the world, the problem of the determination of the truth of a negative proposition becomes difficult. A negative proposition asserts the absence of a property. It is, therefore, wondered how the truth of a statement which denies some property of an individual could be verified by a fact which is admittedly positive. In the negative judgement like 'This book is not on the table' there is no perception of any negative object on the table. Therefore, the question regarding the object of a negative judgement arises; though it might seem paradoxical to speak of an object of a negative judgement. Unless we assume that things also have negative characters, we cannot in negative statement claim to characterize a thing. A true negative judgement describes a true situation and if truth

ultimately refers to reality outside, one is led to the view that a negative judgement has for its object a negative entity; however, paradoxical may seem the notion of a negative entity. The difficulty has been solved by some by equating a negative judgement with a number of the positive judgements and, thus, conceiving a negative judgement as an affirmative assertion.

In negative statements, it is said that something is not the case. It is pointed out that they may not give some significant information about what is the case. In spite of the objections against negative statements, in reality, we do make such statements. It can be argued that the negative statement may not be informative in the sense a statement describing some positive character of a thing would be all the same it says something about a thing. Of course, it is almost tautological to say that a negative statement does not report a positive fact which makes it true. The objection that a negative statement is trivial is based on the general assumption that reality presents only positive facts which may be doubted.

There is a difference of opinion among philosophers regarding nature and status of negative judgement. In Indian philosophy, the paradox of negative judgement is an epistemological problem¹ concerning perception.

There are two different approaches to the problem which try to solve the problem of negation.

1. Realism : Epistemological realists assign a place in the outside world to whatever the mind can know. According to them, therefore, absence has reality, it is a real object, a real non-existence. Negative reality is not the exception to the general realistic principle that reality exists independently of

our knowledge. Negative judgements assert the non-existence of an object which is the object of cognition. The non-existence depends for its cognition on the positive counterentity. Existence and non-existence are the two categories and these two parts of reality correspond to their respective cognitions. In other words, non-existence or negation is cognized in the negative judgement.

2. Idealism : Idealists, on the other hand, do not accept a negative entity. They rather conceive a negative judgement as an affirmative assertion.

If we examine history of philosophy, we find that the fact of negation is recognized by almost all the philosophers in some form or the other. Plato understood negation not as 'non-being- but as 'difference'. This concept perhaps comes close to Jaina concept of negation that without difference one thing cannot be distinguished from the other. Aristotle conceived negation in the logical sense, according to which negation is a denial of affirmation. Modern logic defines negation in terms of truth values. Negative statement is of the form 'no-p' which is true or false depending upon the truth-value of an affirmative proposition. But still knowledge of a negative proposition presupposes a direct experience of negation. "Thus, Russell was led to believe that there must be some negative 'basic propositions'." ¹ According to Russell, "a basic proposition is that which arises on occasion of perception, which is the evidence for its truth and it has a form such that no two propositions having this form can be mutually inconsistent if derived from different percepts". ²

According to Hegelian logicians, "negative statements are significant in so far as they presuppose a corresponding attribution of a contrary or even contradictory property. There

'it is not blue' means it is either green or red or....etc".³ Ryle argued⁴ in favour of the view that negative propositions are significant. He perhaps agrees with the view held by plato that negation expresses otherness or difference. The proposition, e. g. "This is not red" means "This is different from or other than red". The negative proposition can also be analysed into a disjunctive affirmation like 'This is green or blue or yellow....etc'. Ryle thinks that both of these types of analysis of negative propositions are descriptions not directly of 'the particulars but of the character of the particulars'. Yet they are objective or informative.

Dialectics of Double Negation

Dhirendra Sharma⁵ has in his book 'The Negative dialectics' brought out the point that it is not that denial is always expressed only in a negative proposition and affirmation in affirmative proposition. Russell⁶ has also argued that both affirmative and negative judgements have the same status logically. Even an affirmative judgement may be denial of a negative judgement. A negative judgement can be expressed without using the sign 'non' or 'not' while by repeating these signs we can equally express an affirmative judgement. This is the principle of double negation.

This logical function of double negation is not emphasised by early Nyāya philosophers, though Neo-Nyāya logicians seem to have recognized it and maintain that negation is determined by its counter positive whereas in the case of double negation, negation is delimited by its own characters. Negation has, thus, formal significance. It does not render it superfluous. This kind of dialectical negation is the basis of our discriminatory behaviour. Though affirmation and negation are mutually exclusive, pure affirmation or pure

negation is an impossibility. This dialectical approach to negation has its basis on the principle of contradiction.

Negative Epistemology

Nyāya concept of Negation

A realistic epistemology has to postulate reality of negation. Nyāya logicians posit a negative entity as the object of negative judgement. They are pluralistic realists. Reality, according to them is either positive or negative, existence or non-existence. Affirmation has for its object a positive entity, negation a negative entity. Even a negative proposition asserts a perceptual datum which refers to the factual situation, viz. 'absence of something'. Negation is regarded as one of the categories by Nyāya philosophers though early Nyāya does not explicitly mention it, it is nevertheless suggested. Pluralistic realism entails negation. Unless ontological character of negation is accepted the delimitation of the positive categories will not be possible. In this connection it is pointed out that negation becomes indispensable for realism as a delimiting factor.

Nyāya logicians refute the view that negative statements are subjective as according to them they refer to objective content which is significant. They refuse to admit that positive statements are the only type of statements to describe world of experience. Actually, Nyāya philosophers are not inclined to believe that there should be any affirmative-negative water-tight compartments among propositions. Every cognition asserts something which is the content of assertion. "The components of such a content are divided broadly by Nyāya into the qualifier and the qualified and, which are related by a qualification relation. Nyāya

asserts that to say that a judgement is affirmative or negative amounts to saying that the qualifier is expressed in ordinary language by a positive phrase or by a negative phrase structure".⁷ Thus, according to Nyāya affirmative and negative assertions are merely assertions of presence per absence of some property respectively. It is, therefore, rightly said, "Nyāya construes negation as an objective component of the content of a judgemental cognition, as an absence not as the psychological act of denying something".⁸ Nyāya realism further asserts that "a property is genuine if there is something, i. e. some locus that it characterizes....Only an empty or unexampled property is unreal.....According to Nyāya ontology, all things are knowable and hence knowability characterizes everything and absence of knowability characterizes nothing. Thus, absence of knowability is an empty or unreal property and is on par with the property of being a rabbit's horn".⁹

A necessary feature of 'absence' as a property, according to Nyāya is that it is necessarily dependent upon its counter-positive. This saves Nyāya position against the objection that absence is simple—the cognition of bare locus.

Thus, there is clear tendency in Nyāya to regard non-existence as an ontological category though it is also logical in character.

Epistemologically, the question is the problem of cognition of negative facts. In other words, how the absence of something becomes known to us ? As regards this problem of cognition of negative facts, early Nyāya logicians held the view that negative cognition is an inferential judgement. Russell also seems to hold the similar view when he says, "we judge the absence".¹⁰ What we perceive is what a thing is and

not what a thing is not. Hence negation is not perceived immediately; rather it is inferred. However, later Nyāya logicians explained it as a perceptual cognition. In Neo-Nyāya negation is regarded as an object of perception.

According to Nyāya, Negation is construed as the cognition depending upon the cognition of the counterpositive. It is related to affirmative judgement. In negative judgement, there is cognition of locus, which qualifies the absence. There is negation of the counterpositive. Therefore, negative facts are objective. There is knowledge of absence. The distinction between affirmation and negation is rooted in reality itself. Non-existence like existence has objective character.

Now, the question is problem of non-existence as a means of knowledge, i. e. negation as a way of knowing. In Nyāya sūtras, we find the refutation of it as a means of knowledge. With the exception of Bhatta Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, all the systems of Indian philosophy have rejected negation as a distinct way of knowing.

In Nyāya, though absence is considered as a separate category, that is, it is an object of true cognition no doubt; but cognition of negation does not need a separate means of knowledge. The Nyāya philosophers maintain that cognition of a absence is a perceptual judgement through sense-organs. The view that negation is cognized through inference is not accepted by later Nyāya logicians. According to them, non-existence is an object of perception. It is directly perceived. As non-existence is not identical with bare locus and as it is rather adjectival to it; it qualifies the grounds, it is the character of the ground and, therefore, it is perceived like other qualities of grounds, when there is perception of

grounds. Even there is a specific kind of contact laid down by them to effect this perception. It is a relation of predicate and subject qualifier and qualificand. In perception of absence of anything there is a contact between the bare locus and visual sense-organ. Secondly, there is also a unique relation, which can be called a qualifying relation between the locus and the absence of the particular thing. In this way, non-existence is perceived as qualifying the ground, where a particular thing is absent. Hence the Nyāya view that cognition of absence is a perceptual judgement. Nyāya realists have, thus, postulated a unique relation between the absence and the locus. They admitted the reality of relations.

In Nyāya logic, negative statements are not meaningless or non-sensical. Though non-existence is itself negative, the notion of it is positive.

Nyāya argues that it is wrong to maintain that a negative fact is cognisable only by means of negative means of proof. Nyāya also opposes subjectivist view of negation according to which negation has no corresponding negative fact. Its words refer to the real, reality of negation is undeniable. Its object is not subjective but is external to mind. Nyāya as a system of realism postulates objective reality to negation. Nyāya realism, thus, propounds that non-existence is a proper object of cognition and that awareness of negation is direct. Hence negation as a means of knowledge is not required. It is included in perception.

Jaina Concept of Negation

Jainas like Nyāya realists admit the reality of negation as according to them difference is real. However, Jaina concept of negation is different from that of Nyāya and it

also contains certain novel features.

According to Jainism, negation is an essential aspect of reality. Every existent is dialectical in nature. It involves both positive and negative characteristics. Each thing is also not every other thing. In Jainism, negation is not real by itself but it is an element of the nature of a real. It is not real by itself, i. e. substantive in itself, but is of the nature of an adjective to a thing. It is the Jaina view that a thing is many-sided. It is existent as well as non-existent. This assertion is not self-contradictory as a thing is not existent in the very respects in which it is non-existent. The peculiar Jaina concept is that a thing is non-existent with respect to the nature of other things. If this is not granted, the conclusion would be that a thing has the nature of all things which is absurd. Pluralistic realism of Jaina asserts that it is because of negation in this sense that a thing is exclusive in the sense of different. Again it is not that this kind of negation has no real content in the sense that it simply implies affirmation with respect to its own nature. But negation cannot be the same thing as affirmation and negation undoubtedly points to a real aspect of a thing. If we do not admit the reality of negation then negation of the nature of other things in the thing would be impossible. In accordance with the principle of double negation, "the nature of a thing is the negation of the negation of itself".¹¹ Negation is an essential aspect of reality. Negation consists in otherness. It is the principle of difference and a thing is described as identity-in-difference. Jaina dialecticians do not say that positive element is identical with its negative element. This will lead to identification of the two-existence and non-existence. It will in fact negate all distinction between positive and negative and ultimately will negate all existence. Reality becomes fictitious if negation is identified with position. This is exactly the

position of Advaita Vedānta and Śūnyavāda Buddhism. Jaina realists, however, emphatically maintain that the positive and negative aspects are different and not the same. Position and negation are the aspect of a thing and one aspect or part should not be identified with the other. These two opposing aspects are complimentary parts of a thing. Negation, in Jainism, is thus, an essential element in a thing. As is rightly said, "The negation with the Jaina is a significant negation which embodies a rich content within itself and not a species of total vacuity".¹²

The Nyāya thinkers also accept reality of negation but as a thing in itself. Existence of non-existence have existence independently or separately. Though Nyāya maintains negation to be real; according to it, negation inheres in a thing different from the one in which existence inheres. Nyāya philosophers, it seems, have failed to understand the fact that affirmation and negation can be made of one and the same object. Jainas, on the other hand seem to think that when we try to subordinate existence to the principle of excluded middle saying that a positive existent cannot be negative and what is negative can not be positive, we make existence impossible in fact negating all existence. Reality is existence-cum-non-existence as is proved by experience. This a posteriorism underlies Jaina epistemology which makes it self-consistent and strengthens its realistic standpoint. Nyāya realism considers distinction between being and non-being as absolute. According to Jainism, this stands against the character of reality as revealed by experience. As it is rightly observed : "The Naiyāyika errs by emphasising the one or the other as the exclusive characteristic. But the nature of reals, as has been sufficiently proved by the Jaina, is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent cum non-existent".¹³

It is thus clear that according to Jainism that a thing has both the aspects, the aspect of existence and the aspect of non-existence corresponding to the notion of identity and difference. The aspect of negation is not identical with the aspect of affirmation but is complementary to it. Jainas thus do not posit absolute reality to non-existence. Though non-existence is real, it is not the exclusive character of things. Jainas rightly assert that if reality is considered exclusively of positive character, then on this hypothesis one thing cannot be distinguished from another and diverse aspects of the same thing cannot be explained. Advaita Vedānta, thus, has to explain away the principle of difference. On the contrary, if reality is considered to be exclusively negative, the result is nihilism as is the case with Voidist Buddhism. Hence, we have to admit both the characters of the object. In Jainism, negation is conceived as the idea of difference- the otherness and it has also positive implication. Therefore, negative judgements are significant and not devoid of content.

The problem of cognition of negation is solved by saying that negation as a distinct way of knowing need not be accepted because negation is non-different from perception. Here Jainas agree with Nyāya in maintaining that negation is not a separate source of knowledge, though they differ as regards the detailed account of it. Since reality has both the characters—existence as well as non-existence—there cannot be independent object of negation. "Since reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own....It is evident that a perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation, its object in the following way when we say that a jar is not on the ground, we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar.

The surface of the ground itself is the negation of the jar. The experience of negation is not additional which compels us to admit an independent means of cognition in the form of negation or non-existence".¹⁴ Jain logicians, thus, argue that negation has no separate object and that non-being does not require a separate means in order to have knowledge of it, because apprehension of being implies the non-apprehension of non-being. It, therefore, follows that since there is no pure non-existence or non-being of anything apart from existence or being, negation as a separate means of knowledge has no place in Jainism.

Annotations :

1. Matilal, B. K. : *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 89.
2. Russell, Bertrand : *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 99.
3. Matilal, B. K. : *The Navya Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 89.
4. Ryle, G. : *Negation*, p. 80-96.
5. Sharma, Dharendra : *The Negative Dialectics*.
6. Russell, B. : *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 77-78.
7. Matila, B. K. : *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 92.
8. Ibid. p. 93.
9. Ibid. p. 93.
10. Russell, B. : *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 73-74.
11. Bhattacarya, H. : *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra of Vādi Devasūri*, tr. and comm. p. 400.
12. Padmarajah, Y. J. : *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 157.
13. Mookerjee, S. : *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism*, p. 91.
14. Mehta, Mohanlal : *Jaina Philosophy*, p. 141.

IX

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL

The problem of universal is the epistemological problem as existence of universals is required not only ontologically to explain the nature of reality but also to explain the nature of our experience of the reals. That in some sense or other, there are universals, is recognized by almost all philosophers. However, difficulties arise when we try to be more precise. With regard to the question of nature and status of universals, there is wide disagreement. Semantically, the problem of universal is the problem of relation between general words and their referends. Universals are indicated in language by abstract names and they are generally contrasted with particulars. The objects of experience have certain general features and what is involved in the generality and in our experience of it, is a matter of dispute.

Different theories of universals give different accounts of the 'generality' which is 'universal' the class-essence. The main views regarding the problem of universal are—realism, conceptualism, nominalism and resemblance theory.

For the realist, universals exist in themselves. They

have objective reality independent of the particular objects. Universal is the common essence in different individuals of a class. As opposed to realism, conceptualism holds that universals are mind dependent. They do not have independent existence apart from particulars. "Universal is not separate from the individuals but is identical with them in point of existence".¹ It is not anything like a separate essence but is in the individual object. Nominalism believes that only particulars are real; universals are only mental concepts. They do not stand for any positive essence that is present in individual. So universals are mere names.

In Indian philosophy, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of universal is realistic, while Buddhists are nominalists. Jainas are conceptualists though their conceptualism tends towards realism. In fact, Jain view can be identified with what is called in modern times 'resemblance theory' of universal propounded by Russell. It is not a separate essence but 'similarity' which is the basis of classification of objects. It is different from identity. This theory attributes objective reality to universals; but denies that they have separate existence. Universal exists concretely as an element of the individual.

Nyāya View of Universals

Nyāya philosophers accept the view that corresponding to general term or class-concept in our mind, there is a real entity called universal. It is one single essence present in many individuals of a class. Universal is defined as what produces similar cognition and is one, eternal and inheres in many individuals. It is one of the categories of reality. Unlike nominalistic Buddhists, they maintain that the universal is not merely mental idea, it is as real as individual

and is the object of perception. Old Nyāya realists believed that perception of universal is possible by different kinds of sense-contact. While according to later Nyāya logicians, the universal is perceived through a kind of extra ordinary perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property perceived in an object belonging to that particular class.

Universals, in Nyāya, are eternal. They are not destroyed with individuals. Universals have existence outside the mind like other objects. Further, they are given in perception. They are public; their existence is unaffected by observing mind. Similarly, 'universal' plays an important role in 'inference'—a source of knowledge in Nyāya. The third source of knowledge—comparison also refers to universal and as regards the import of words also Nyāya believes that words mean 'universal' with particular and form. Nyāya is, thus, radical realism and as uncompromised realists they are committed to prove the existence of the universal. Universal, they maintain, is not merely mental construction of our minds. We simply discover it. It is not invented by us. The Buddhist position that universal is merely phenomenal is refuted. Again, according to Nyāya universal is an eternal reality. Universal has its locus in particular object in the sense that it inheres in it and it is perceived by the senses.

Jaina View of Universals

Jainas, as realists, no doubt, defend the reality of universals; but their concept of universal differs from that of Nyāya. Jaina position as regards universal is neither uncompromising nominalism nor uncompromising realism. Jaina logicians agree with nominalism in denying the

existence of class-essence in the individual objects but they differ from them in admitting the existence of resemblance among them which is regarded as the real universal. Jaina view is not that only individuals are real and there is no similarity among them. But according to them, this similarity is universal and there is nothing like class-essence. Universal is not an identity but similarity which is different in different particulars.

The Jaina view is that words mean both universal and particular. A thing is having both general and particular nature. The so-called class-essence which is similarity or universal and particularity are not absolutely opposed to each other. Words have reference to universals but these universals are ultimately inherent only in particular things. Similarly words mean particular but particulars cannot be devoid of universals. Jainas emphatically maintain that it is not necessary to assume the separate existence of universal, because universality consists in similarity. Resemblances and not identities are the basis of class concepts. Jainas can be called, thus, conceptualists in so far as they maintain that universals are not mental constructions and they have existence in individual. They are not over and above particulars. But their conceptualism is tending towards realism. There is some objective foundation in things for the class-concept. Thus, Jaina position rather goes beyond realism when it advocates resemblance theory of universal. Jainas does not believe in any universal other than similarity and Jaina argument for it is that because it is an object of perception and nothing beyond it is perceived. In other words, Jaina logicians rightly observe that the hypothesis of any other universal than resemblance is not warranted

by the facts or experience.

Nyāya rightly recognises the objective reality of universals but extreme position taken by them that universals are separate entities is untenable. The theory of universals is the foundation of Nyāya epistemology. Underlying realism of Nyāya is the principle that the universal is positive and objectively real, the denial of which would affect its realistic position rendering the world unreal. But ontologically, it is rightly said, "the acceptance of universals as separate entities violates the principle of parsimony embodied in 'Occam's razor'.²

Jainas seem to be right when they say that similarities on which our use of general words rests are the constituents of the external world but it does not mean that they are entities over and above particulars which manifest them. Again Jainas say universals are real only as features or characteristic of individual objects but this does not mean that they are figments of imagination.

"The difference between Nyāya on the one hand and Jainism on the other is that according to the former, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the class-essence in the individuals, which is different from them and is one, eternal and ubiquitous while according to the latter, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the common character of many individuals which is not one, but many, existing in many individuals—not eternal but temporary, being produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists and not all-pervading but confined only to the individual in which it exists".³

What Jaina realists want to emphasize is the fact that we have perceptions of both universal and particulars

which are the aspects of an object of knowledge.

Nyāya view of universals as separate entities resembles Plato's view of Ideas as universals, while, Jaina view which is a moderate kind of realism; seems to resemble Aristotle's doctrine that universal exists concretely only as an element of the individual object. It has objective reality but not a separate existence like ideas of Plato. Realists like Russell are committed to defend reality of universals because knowledge would be impossible without them. But the notion of universal has undergone development in recent times. Even Russell recognizes similarity as the universal and advocates Resemblance theory of universal. The same truth is admitted by Jainas when they recognize real existence of similarity among the individuals of the same class. In Indian philosophy, Ramanuja's position comes close to this view. It is clear that Jaina view avoids most of the difficulties of extremistic theories and presents a balanced view of universals. It is this view which explains human knowledge satisfactorily.

Annotations :

1. Chatterjee, S. : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 166.
 2. Mishra, Arjuna : An article on 'Universals in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy—*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, July, 1979, Vol. VI, No. 4, p. 649.
 3. Sinha, J. : *Indian Psychology*, p. 173.
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PART — II
JAINA LOGIC

X

ANEKĀNTAVĀDA THE THEORY OF MANIFOLDNESS

Jainism has made some original contributions in the field of logic and epistemology which have greatly enriched the world-philosophy. The unique feature of Jaina epistemology is its theory of manifoldness or 'indetermination'—Anekāntavāda, the two wings of which are Syādvāda and Nayavāda—the doctrine of possibility and the doctrine of standpoints respectively.

The cardinal principle of Jaina theory of knowledge is its through-going realism. Jainims is pluralistic realism. It accepts the independent reality of the external world apart from mind. It believes, as against agnosticism, that every substance is knowable but at the same time reality is manyfaced. The anekānta view represents a coherent picture of reality by taking into account all possible viewpoints. It rightly emphasises that "there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified".¹ In a sense it presupposes—the metaphysical theory of reality—the theory of identity—in-difference which refutes idealistic concept of concrete universals and which declares the objectivity of material

universe. Knowledge signifies the knower, consciousness, on the one hand and the objects on the other. This duality of the consciousness and universe is based on principle of distinction which is developed into comprehensive scheme of Anekānta realism—the Jaina theory of reality and knowledge which gives a synthetic picture of the whole. Anekāntavāda reflects the multiple nature of reality. Knowledge based on some one particular aspect of reality should not be regarded as complete knowledge of that Reality as it commits the fallacy of exclusive predication. Similarly, no element given in experience should be rejected as false on the basis of abstract logic. There are different points of view all of which are formal as well as material conditions of validity of a judgement. As uncompromised realists, Jainas believe that world is objectively real, and not only reality is manifold but each real is complex in its character. The realism is developed on the basis of principle of distinction. As Y. J. Padmarajiah rightly points out “Anekāntavāda is the most consistent form of realism as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus in the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge”.²

The consequence of the operation of the principle of distinction is the recognition of multiplicity of ultimate reals constituting the universe. Then the next step is to recognize the inherent complexity within each of the reals of the universe.

Jaina atomism illustrates the manifoldness or indeterminateness as it is sometimes described, of reality. Though atoms according to Jainism are homogeneous, the material world which evolves from diversification of them consists of infinite variety of things. Jainism endeavours to show that each real is infinitely complex and diversified.

Logically, thus, Jainism develops into the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy on the basis of principle of distinction which is inherent in realistic methods. First of all Jainas postulate reality of objective world independent of minds. Then they proceed to show the many-ness in reality. From pluralistic universe they proceed to manifoldness of each such real. "The last step which completes the logical picture of this realistic procedure is an implicit recognition of what may be called, after Kant, the principle of 'Reciprocity' or of 'Interaction' or of 'Community' among the reals of the Universe".³

Anekāntavāda postulates the relativity of reals. Reality is never absolute but is always dynamic. It has many aspects in accordance with its relationship to other reals. So it implies the principle of interaction, though it is not explicitly stated. Jaina view of universe as interrelated, relativistic system of reals should not be taken to amount to Idealism. Reals are dynamic which mutually influence each other. The logical development of Jaina theory from concept of dualism to manifoldness of reals expresses the consistent theory of knowledge—the significant form of epistemological realism.

The non-Jaina epistemological theories which are idealistic are ekāntavāda, e. g. Advaitic monism. This theory is in sharp contrast to Jaina theory of diversified real as it does not admit of distinction in any form. It leads to a kind of mentalism (subjectivism) which asserts the identity of the knower and the known. This is the case with all kinds of idealism according to which there is no independent, non-mental reality. Since they do not admit of objectivity, the principle of distinction has no place in it. The view that there is nothing except mind and their ideas ultimately leads to

subjectivism which cannot be accepted. G. E. Moore in his essay "Refutation of Idealism" clearly proves that the dictum 'esse est percipi' on which idealism is based is untenable. Through this essay, he has extended great influence towards the foundation of modern realism. The realistic stand of objectivity only can avoid subjectivism. Idealism which attributes reality by courtesy to the universe cannot fit in with the modern Einesteinian theory of relativity. In this connection Russell writes under the title 'Realism in relativity'. "It is mistake to suppose that relativity adopts an idealistic picture of the world—using 'idealism' in the technical sense in which it implies that there is nothing which is not 'Experience'. The observer who is often mentioned in expositions of relativity need not be a mind but may be a photographic plate or any kind of recording instrument. The fundamental assumption of relativity is realistic".⁴ Thus, we have to admit the intrinsic and independent reals in the world. the principle of distinction which is, thus, introduced should be carried to its logical extreme so that everything in the universe becomes an infinitely diversified fact of nature representing *anekānta* view of reality. Jaina logicians maintain that different systems which recognize independent objectivity of the objects have to admit necessarily *anekānta* view in their concept of knowledge. Because the culmination of logical principle of distinction leads to it. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism comes close to this *anekānta* view but it tends towards mechanical pluralism and does not flourish into *anekāntavāda* like Jaina realism. Jaina *anekānta* view resembles 'functional realism', a form of modern realism, according to which "Things exist only in fields, in mutuality with other things and they have properties only in their

dynamic interrelations".⁵ It is clear that functional realism is a kind of relativistic realism, if we are permitted to use this designation. For, every reality is determined by everything else in the universe.

Thus, Jaina *anekānta* view is the most consistent form of realism based on the principle of distinction and objectivity as against idealism logically culminating into subjectivism, which is self-defeating and as such an inadequate philosophical theory. The notion of manifold nature of reality logically follows from realistic principle of distinction.

Anekāntavāda or theory of manifoldness of reality is the special characteristic of Jaina point of view. It is discussed in Jaina canonical literature and it has been fully dealt with by Jaina logicians. In *Bhagavatī sūtra*, *Tattvārthasūtra* etc., we find a clear expression of this theory. Some of the Indian schools of thought also seem to be aware of the *anekānta* e. g. Buddhist doctrine of *madhyama mārga*, resembles *anekānta* view. However, systematic and perfect exposition of it is found in Jainism and not in Buddhism.

Anekāntavāda is the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge. It emphasises that reality is complex. It not merely consists of manyness but is manifold so that it is difficult to understand it fully. A real possesses an infinite number of qualities and enters into an infinite number of relations so that it may be comprehended from different standpoints. Valid knowledge consists in a faithful understanding of the exact nature of an object. Jaina *anekāntavāda* repudiating scepticism states that such knowledge is possible. It is held that every judgement consists of an object to which some quality is attributed and

correct knowledge involves a correct understanding of the exact relationship between the object and the quality. The relativistic character of Reality described by Anekāntavāda is brought about by two doctrines—Nayavāda, the doctrine of standpoints and Syādvāda—the dialectic of seven-fold judgements. These two doctrines are the logical outcome of Anekāntavāda.

Anekāntavāda—the theory of manifoldness, Nayavāda—the doctrine of standpoints and Syādvāda—the doctrine of dialectical predication are interrelated. Nayavāda and Syādvāda can be characterized as methods of knowledge which help the mind to understand the relativistic nature of reality. “Logically, Nayavāda and Syādvāda are two complementary processes forming a natural and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics”.⁶ Nayavāda emphasises analytic approach to Reality while Syādvāda emphasises synthetic approach to Reality. “Nayavāda is primarily conceptual and Syādvāda is synthetic and mainly verbal”.⁷ Nayavāda is an attempt at comprehending a thing from one particular standpoint; Syādvāda is an epistemological method which synthesises the different view points arrived at by Nayavāda. As such Nayavāda precedes Syādvāda and Syādvāda complements Nayavāda. As A. N. Upadhye states. “The Nayavāda enables one to analyse the various points of view and appraise their relative validity.....A synthesis of these different viewpoints is an imperative necessity, therein every view point must retain its relative position and this need is fulfilled by Syādvāda”.⁸

These two corollaries resulting from Anekāntavāda are the correlative methods by which true nature of reality is depicted.

Annotations :

1. Mookerjee, S. : *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism*, p. 70.
 2. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : *A Comparative Study of Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 274.
 3. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 284.
 4. Russell, Bertrand : An Article on 'relativity' in '*Encyclopedia Britanica*' also, 'The A. B. C. of Relativity', pp. 219-220.
 5. J. E. Bood in 'Punctional Realism' (*The Philosophical Review* March, 1934.)
 6. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 303.
 7. Upadhye, A. N. : *Pravacanasāra of Kundakundācārya*, Upadhye, A. N. (ed.) (Bom) 1935, Introduction.
 8. *Bhagavān Mahāvīr and His Relevance in Modern Times*, ed. by Bhanawat, Jain and Bhatt, 1976; Article on 'Mahāvīr and His Philosophy of life' by A. N. Upadhye, p. 10.
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XI

NAYAVĀDA

THE DOCTRINE OF STANDPOINTS

The doctrine of standpoints is the characteristic feature of Jainism. The pluralistic realism of Jainas asserts that not merely reality consists of many-ness but it is also manifold. Jainism attaches great importance to Anekānta logic which brings out the complex character of reality. As regards the place of Anekānta logic in Jaina philosophy it is pointed out that "It is in Jainism what the science of Ideas is in Plato or the Metaphysics in Aristotle".¹ The standpoint of Anekāntavāda is realistic. The realistic nature of Jaina point of view is further manifested in theory of Nayas or standpoints. In fact, doctrine of nayas which is so essential in Jaina logic is basic to any science of thought. Correct or valid knowledge involves correct understanding of diverse aspects of an object. However, only omniscients can obtain such a complete knowledge. But Jainas emphatically assert that this need not lead us to scepticism. Valid knowledge of one or the other attribute of an object is possible if we consider different ways of approach. The cardinal principle is that truth is relative but relative to our standpoints. The character of

reality being infinitely complex, it possesses a number of qualities and enters into a number of relations. Analytically, therefore, the logical consequence is that the nature of Reality may be comprehended rightly from different angles by discerning its various aspects. Nayavāda is the doctrine which enables one to comprehend the object from various possible angles. The pluralistic realism of Jainas is, thus, developed into relativistic pluralism which holds that all empirical knowledge is relative to some particular point of view. The Jaina philosophy of non-absolutism based on the principle of difference presents the *naya*-technique by means of which more or less comprehensive picture of an object can be contemplated. For complete comprehension of an object knowledge of *nayas* is indispensable.

Jainism recognises two forms of valid knowledge :-

1. Knowledge by *pramāṇas*—*Pramāṇa* gives us knowledge of a thing as a whole, i. e. in its totality with all its qualities.
2. Knowledge by *naya*—It is knowledge of a thing in its relation and, therefore, it gives us incomplete knowledge. It is knowledge of a thing from a particular point of view.

A *naya* is a standpoint from which a person views a thing. It consists in a particular way of approach of the knower by which we can get the knowledge of a particular aspect or aspects of an object. An object has innumerable aspects all of which are real. A *naya* represents only one particular point of view from which an object can be looked at. It does not rule out other different view points although other view points do not enter into particular view point. Every point of view is real, though an object as a whole cannot be identified with particular point of view which is its single aspect. A *naya*, thus, gives us abstract ideas about an

object in the sense of one sided and partial truth about an object. It ignores the other aspects of an object though does not deny them. It deals with some particular aspect of an object. In Nyāyāvātār, the earliest Jaina work on pure logic, we find this theory. "Since things have many characters, they are the objects of all-sided knowledge but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of Naya".²

Naya is neither a form of false knowledge nor a pramāṇa since it produces certain knowledge about a part of an object.

An entity can be looked at from different standpoints. Theoretically such view points can be infinite in number but the main approaches generally recognized by Jaina philosophers are seven in number. Accordingly, Jainism has formulated the methodological scheme which consists of seven ways of looking at reals. They are :-

1. Naigamanaya : The non-distinguished standpoint. It is a view point which does not distinguish between general and particular properties of a thing. Here object is taken in its generic and specific capacities because an object possesses both and since they are relative, they remain undistinguished, e. g. we may understand by the term "bamboo" its genus and differentia. "The distinction between the generic and the specific features of the bamboo is not within the focus of our attention, although it is undoubtedly at the back of our minds. This truth, namely that when some aspect of concrete situation in reality is in the foreground of our attention, the other aspects recede into the background, is one of the cardinal principles of the modern Gestalt, or Configurationist, school of psychology. Also, it holds, good of not merely the 'non-distinguished' standpoint, but also of all

the others under the present method".³ This universal-particular standpoint is also called 'the way of pantoscopic observation'.⁴

According to another interpretation, Naigamanaya means looking at things from the standpoint of purpose of individual, e. g. a person carrying fuel, water, rice, when asked, 'what are you doing' ? says, 'I am cooking' instead of saying, 'I am carrying fuel and so forth'.⁵

If we make the distinction between the general and particular absolutely then there is fallacy of Naigamanaya of which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is an illustration according to Jainism.

2. Saṁgrahanaya : The generic or the class view.

This standpoint takes into consideration the general qualities of the object though is it not opposed to considering it in its specific attributes. It emphasises that special qualities can have no existence apart from general qualities e. g. when we speak of a mango tree we refer to a tree without taking into account its special features. It seeks unity in diversity by finding the common element in the variety of things. When we consider general property alone as constituting a thing, i. e. an exaggerated emphasis on universal, disregarding particulars leads to the fallacy of saṁgrahanaya, e. g. when we consider "pure existence as the only reality for the particularities apart from that are not apprehended".⁶ This is the position of Advaita and Sāṁkhya systems of philosophy. According to Jainism exclusive emphasis on unity results in the view that existence is the only character of reality and particularities are unreal. However, this is against experience. This extreme view is guilty of exclusiveness of outlook. Jainism admits the distinction between universal

and particular features though it regards it as a relative one. The class point of view does not signify that Jainas are arguing for the universal as against the particular. It only means that extracting the one is quite meaningful under certain context. Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta deny particularities while Nominalistic Buddhism denies universal. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system accepts both but it looks upon the distinction between universal and particular as absolute.

The class point of view is concerned with the class-characteristics which bind the divergent individual or particular entities of a class. As regards the problem of universals, Jaina position is unique. Jainism believes in resemblance theory of universals propounded by Russell in modern times. Jainas are not conceptualists who believe that universals exist only in mind as concepts. They are neither realists like Naiyāyikās nor nominalists like Buddhists. In Indian philosophy, Jaina view comes close to Madhva's realistic view. Jainas argue that there cannot be universal without a particular. "Universal devoid of particular is like a skyflower, quite a non-entity".⁷ Similarly particular qualities have no existence apart from general qualities. Both are co-existent. But this does not mean that the universal is an unfounded concept. There is synthetic unity among the particulars of a class which cannot be overlooked. Therefore, universal must be given status in the scheme of reality though it is identical with particulars in point of existence. As is said by Nathmal Tatia, "Of course, the absolute identity of the universals in different individuals is not endorsed by the Jaina philosophers. But he does not repudiate the universal as an unfounded concept. The universal is an empirical concept and must be given a status in the scheme of reality. The close resemblance of the individuals of a class is too

pronounced and patent a fact to be dismissed without incurring the charge of infidelity to experience".⁸

Thus, the Jaina position is that the nature of the universal is not one of class essence but of similarity or resemblance. A such resemblance is the actual fact of experience. This provides the objective ground to the notion of universals. In fact, a consistent form of realism must lead to this position. If each individual is unique and particular and distinct from the other, it is inconsistent to believe in single universal class-essence leading ultimately to Idealistic Monism.

3. Vyavahāranaya : The particular standpoint.

It is an analytic approach which emphasises diversity in the universe. It takes into account an object as possessing of specific properties without ignoring that particular apart from general is a non-entity.⁹ If saṁgrahanaya can be called standpoint of genus, this can be called standpoint of species. As Vādi Devasūri states, "The vyavahāranaya is that view point by which matters which are the objects of saṁgraha naya are systematically divided, e. g. substance must be either soul or matter or any of the six substances".¹⁰

The fallacy with regard to this naya consists in ignoring generic correlative of a specific feature. For instance, Cārvāka materialism.

4. Rjusūtranaya : The standpoint of momentariness.

This view point is straight expression which does not trouble itself with the past nor the future aspect of a thing but it is only confined to the present and natural aspect of a thing because that alone is useful for the moment.¹¹ This view point is based on the concept of immediate utility which

emphasises that mode of a thing existent for the present, e. g. Now there is pleasure. While realizing the relative validity of this aspect, we should not overlook the continuity of a thing. When the momentary aspect of a thing is overemphasised and permanence of a thing is altogether denied, there is a fallacy of *ṛjusūtra naya*, e. g. Buddhism which denies the substance in toto and puts exclusive emphasis on impermanent and phenomenal aspect of a thing.

5. *Śabda naya* : The standpoint of synonymous words or verbal standpoint.

This standpoint treats synonymous words as all having the same sense. For instance, *Kumbha*, *Lajasa*, *Ghata*, etc. are all expressive of one and the same object.¹² The implication is that *śabda naya* does not concern itself with the difference of synonymous words and treats them as if they all signify identically the same thing, i. e. as pure equivalents of one another. It emphasises denotative aspect of terms. *Śabdanaya* fallacy occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of *śabdanaya* and deal with empty words as if they were applicable without reference to time, gender, number, etc. as absolutely equivalent.

6. *Samabhirūḍha naya* : The etymological standpoint.

It considers connotative aspect of a term and accordingly recognizes differences of senses in case of synonyms. It is an extension of *śabdanaya*. *Śabdanaya* treats synonyms as equivalents; this standpoint distinguishes them from one another on etymological grounds. It holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs, e. g. a jar, a pitcher and a pot—*kumbha*, *kalaśa* and *ghaṭa* though synonymous signify different things according to their etymological or derivative

sense.¹³ The point is that if different synonyms of a thing do not signify different things there can be no such distinction between a jar and a cloth which have also different words for them. Samabhirūḍhanaya is a subtle standpoint which makes distinctions among the synonyms, applying each name according to their etymological derivation.

Fallacy of this *naya* occurs when we treat the synonymous words as having absolutely different meanings. This viewpoint is based on the following principles of Jaina philosophy. As Padmarajiah says, "The first principle is that whatever is knowable is also expressible i. e. knowledge or the meaning of anything in reality is not possible except through the meaning of words. The second principle is that strictly speaking there can be only one word for one meaning and vice-versa."¹⁴ Thus, there are no synonyms in the strict sense of the term. There is a determinate relation between a meaning and its words. "Accordingly, several words which are conventionally supposed to convey one and the same meanings, have in actual fact as many meanings as the number of words found there".¹⁵

7. Evambhūtanaya : The 'such-like' standpoint.

This view point is an extension of samabhirūḍhanaya. In this standpoint the meaning of the word is restricted to the function connoted by the name. "It recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word".¹⁶ For example, as long as a building is used for a residential purpose, it can be called a house, but if it is used for some different purpose then it ceases to be a house and cannot be called so. What is meant is that it is absurd if a thing does not perform its function

expressed by the term and still it be recognised as that thing. Because, then even a pot can be called a cloth. This standpoint, therefore, insists that designations should be derived from the different functional states of what is ordinarily known as the same object.

The fallacy of this standpoint arises when we make the existence of a thing absolutely dependent on the performance of the special function with reference to which a name has been awarded to it, i. e. we refuse to give the object its usual name when it is not functioning according to etymology of the word.

These are the seven standpoints and each standpoint represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. Of these, the first three are considered to be *Drvyānayas*—substantive standpoints and the remaining four *Paryāyanayas* or modal standpoints.¹⁷

It is sometimes disputed whether the seven *nayas* can be reduced in number. There are three traditions as regards this. The first tradition adopts a classification of seven *nayas*. The second one reduces the number to six by eliminating *naigamanaya*. The third tradition reduces the number to five by subsuming the last two *nayas* under *śabdanaya*. *Umāsvāti* is responsible for the first and the third tradition. In his work, *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, in its *Digambara* version, we find the mention of seven *nayas*. While the same *sūtra* of the same work in its *Śvetāmbara* version gives the list of only five *nayas*. The second tradition is maintained by *Siddhasena Divākara*.¹⁸

The various standpoints analyse reality from different angles. These standpoints, are therefore, relative and

overemphasis on any one view point and regarding it as absolute is fallacious. Jainas emphasize that all these aspects are not isolated but integrated in concrete fact. "The different approaches only illustrate the truth that the tendency to differentiation and specification, if not checked by reference to the other concomitant traits, will culminate in disastrous results".¹⁹ This philosophy of standpointism is thus, a revolt against building a closed system of philosophy which look upon partial standpoints as absolute ones ending in extremism and fanaticism and according to Jainism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta may be said to be illustrations of this.

Annotations :

1. Latthe, A. B. : *An intro. to Jainism*, p. 108.
2. *Nyāyāvatāra*—29, Siddhasena Divakar, tr. by Vidyābhūṣaṇ, S. C. p. 23.
3. Padmarajiah, Y. : *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 315.
4. *Bhagavān Mahāvīr and His Relevance in Modern Times*, ed. by Bhanawat, Jain and Bhatt. Chapter on 'Nayas' by Nathmal Tatia, p. 29.
5. *Syādvādaratnākara*, by Vādi Devasūri, p. 105 2f.
6. *Pramāṇanayatatvalokālāṅkāra of Vādi Devasūri*, VI. 18. comm. by H. Bhattācharya, p. 521.
7. *Naya-Karṇikā*, 6 : by Vinaya Vijaya ed. with English tr. by M. D. Desai, 1915, p. 227.
8. *Mahāvīra and His Relevance in Modern Times*, ed. by Bhanawat, Jain, Bhatt, 1976, Chapter on 'Nayas', p. 31.

9. Naya-Karṇikā, S. Vinaya Vijaya, ed. With English tr. by M. D. Desai, 1915.
 10. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*—Vādi Devasūri, VII 23.
 11. Naya Karṇikā, 11, 12, Vijaya Vinaya, ed. by M. D. Desai, 1915. p. 230.
 12. Ibid, 14, p. 233.
 13. *Naya Karṇikā*, 15, Vinaya Vijaya, ed. by M. D. Desai, 1915, p. 233.
 14. Y. Padmarajiah, : *Jaina Theories of Reality And Knowledge*, p. 322-3.
 15. *Devabhadra on Nyāyāvatāra*, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, p. 81.
 16. *Naya-Karṇikā*, 17, Vinaya Vijaya, ed. by N. D. Desai, 1915.
 17. *Tattvārthāśloka-vārtika* by Vidyānanda—a commentary on *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvāti*, by M. Sastry, p. 268.
 18. *Sanmatitarka*, by Siddhasena Divakar, ed. by Sanghavi and Doshi, English translation by Malavania, Bombay, 1939, p. 1402.
 19. *Bhagavān Mahāvīra and His Relevance in Modern Times*, ed. by Bhanavat, Jaina, Bhatta, 1976, Chapter on Nayayas, p. 35.
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XII

SYĀDVĀDA The Doctrine of Possibility The Theory of Seven-fold Predication

The doctrine of Syādvāda can be considered as an extension of Nayavāda. It is the dialectic of seven steps or the theory of seven-fold predication. In *Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkārah*, we find description of this celebrated doctrine which is also called *Saptabhaṅgī*. “The law of seven-fold predication consists in using seven sorts of expression regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects, one by one, without any inconsistency by means of affirmation and negation made either separately or together all these seven expressions being marked with in some respects (*syāt*)’.¹

Syādvāda literally means assertions of possibility. It is also called as ‘*quodammodo*’ doctrine ‘the term *quodammodo* in mediaeval philosophy denotes what is only ‘in a sense correct’ is regarded as equivalent to the Jaina ‘*syād*’.² It implies not doubt or probability but discrimination of aspects. It emphasises un-one-sidedness as by it a thing is judged with ‘equivocal particularization’. It asserts that every proposition

is true but only under certain conditions. A statement about a thing independent of the stipulation of occasion, can not be informative in the genuine sense of the term. The Jaina point of view is non-absolutistic. Reality is many-sided. A thing literally has innumerable features. Therefore, a genuine characterization of a thing consists in prefixing each statement by the expression 'syāt'. The word 'syād' indicates modal predicate. It is indicative of possibility. But it is not logical possibility or possibility proper. Rather it is possibility in the sense of contingency. Syādvāda harmonises apparently opposite features of a thing and presents the view of truth as comprehensive synthesis. It affirms consistency of contradictories. In Syādvāda all the aspects of truth are synthesised. As is said, "Syādvāda is that conditional method in which the modes or predication affirm negate or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven different ways a certain attribute of a thing without incompatibility in a certain context".³ Padmarajah rightly points out "the Jainas maintain that saptabhaṅgī offers such a well ordered scheme in which the modes are exclusive of one another but at the same time in their totality, exhaustive of the many-sided truth of the indeterminate real under discussion".⁴

The saptabhaṅgī is a set of seven formulae. In this method of seven-fold predication, the expression 'syāt' i. e. in some respect is invariably accompanied in every mode. It is suggestive of the determinate context of the mode. Jainism believes that to guarantee the correctness of each, assertion should be qualified by giving determinate values to determinables. Because of inexhaustibly diverse character of reals assertions made from one point of view cannot be regarded absolute. A thing may have aspects significant in

different contexts. Therefore, it is necessary that an act of abstraction must precede every judgement about a thing. Our judgement is true in so far as it is abstracted in relevant context. Consequently, every proposition is true under certain conditions. We should not be bound dogmatically to absolute unqualified judgement as the possibility of other alternative judgements is left open as suggested by the word 'syāt'.

The description of this doctrine of conditional predication is found in old Jaina texts. In the writings of later Jaina logicians, we find its systematic exposition.

The Syādvāda consists of seven predications, i. e. it is an exposition of the relation of an object to one of its given features or modes. Each predication presents one definite aspect of the relationship of an object to its modes. Syādvāda is the synthetic method which aims at comprehensiveness of knowledge and, therefore, incorporates in one and the same judgement the results of investigations from different standpoints without departing from the rules of logic. There are seven different types of predication which cover all possible judgements—affirmative and negative, simple and complex. Each of these predication is qualified by the word syāt, which literally means 'in some respects'. It suggests we cannot deny other possible aspects of a thing. The seven predications are seven ways of describing a thing and its features. They are as follows :-

1. Syād asti : In some respects everything is existent. The first predication is an affirmative statement which asserts the existence of the thing. The expression in some respects indicates that in some definite way a thing exists, e. g. a jar exists with respect to its own substance, attribute, place and

time. Thus, though a thing exists, absolute existence to a thing is denied.

2. *Syād nāsti* : In some respects, everything is non-existent. Just as existence is conditioned, in the same manner non-existence is also not absolute, e. g. the judgement 'jar does not exist' implies jar does not exist with reference to another substance, place, time and mode. It does not deny the existence of the jar in so far as its specific attributes are concerned. But it denies its existence when other attributes not present in it are considered. So in this predication determinate negation of an object is asserted.

In this connection, the Jaina view of negation may be discussed. The Jainas admit the reality of negation. They maintain that negation like affirmation forms the part of the nature of reality. Each presents before us a new aspect of the object under consideration. A thing has both existential and non-existential aspects and the two are different and real, though connected. Affirmation and negation are not contradictory but complementary. It is important to note that the Jainas as consistent realists put forward the view that negation forms a necessary element in reality. It is significant to note that the Jaina view of negation is distinct from the views of negation put forward by other systems of Indian philosophy. The Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, Cārvāka and Buddhist thinkers deny the reality of non-existence. Nyāya philosophers while admitting that non-existence is real, maintain that it inheres in the thing which is other than that of which existence is affirmed. They fail to see that apparently contradictory predication may be made about a thing in different contexts. It is not only not impossible but necessary. The word has both affirmative and negative significances each of which is real in its own way. The

Buddhist doctrine of Apoha rightly points out the negative aspect in the significance of the word. Of course, they were wrong in putting exclusive emphasis upon it; denying positive significance altogether. The Jainas rightly point out that both affirmation and negation are real and supplement each other.

The significance of this second predication consists in realizing that "non-existence is the obverse of the existent side of the object".⁵ It means, e. g. jar does not exist as cloth or anything else and not that jar does not exist as the jar. Negation is implied in affirmation but is not to be identified with it.

According to Prof. Mukherjee, the first two predications are logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence.⁶

3. Syād asti nāsti : 'In some respects, everything is existent; in some respects, it is non-existent.' This predication consists in making affirmative and negative statements made one after the other, e. g. the jar is and is not. The ground for this kind of judgement is that a thing exists with reference to its own substance, place etc. and does not exist with reference to the substance, place etc. of other things. This apparently absurd statement reveals genuine logic. This predication is not a mere aggregate of the first two but is a synthesis of them. Though analytically it is constituted of the first and the second forms of predication, it expresses a new aspect of the object. There is no ambiguity or uncertainty or contradiction about this mode of predication. It is not merely a subjective view but has a counterpart in the objective reality. Thus, this predication though conjunction of the first two is not

redundant as it may be objected; because it is statement of consecutive togetherness and, therefore, exhibits a unique feature of reality.

4. Syād avaktavyam : In some respects, a thing is inexpressible. However, the ascription of inexpressibility to the object described is not absolute. Inexpressibility is determined by place, time, mood and nature of the object. Because of the simultaneous presentation of the two aspects, affirmative and negative, the real nature of a thing is inexpressible, i. e. beyond predication in the form of words. This judgement is of great philosophical significance. As A. N. Upadhye states, "In view of complex objectivity, limited knowledge and imperfect speech, the Jaina logic admits situations which cannot be described in terms of plain 'yes' or 'no'.⁷

It is to be noted that inexpressibility is not from subjective point of view but it has corresponding element in objective reality. As K. C. Bhattāchārya rightly points out, "The inexpressible is object as given : it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time, it is not the definite distinction of position and existence, it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted and it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood".⁸

5. Syād asti avaktavya : 'In some respects, everything exists and in some respects everything is inexpressible', e. g. with reference to its own substance etc. a jar is existent and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are

simultaneously attributed to it. This predication combines the aspects of existence and indescribability.

6. Syād nāsti avaktavyam : 'In some respects, everything is non-existent, in some respects everything is inexpressible', e. g. a jar is non-existent with reference to the substance, etc. of other things and is inexpressible when both existence and non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. This mode of predication consists in making a negative statement together with a combined affirmative and negative statements made simultaneously. It combines the aspects of non-existence and indescribability.

7. Syād asti nāsti avaktavyam : 'In some respects, everything is existent; in some respects, everything is non-existent, in some respects, everything is inexpressible. Thus, e. g. a jar is existent with reference to its own substance, etc. and is non-existent with reference to the substance, place etc. of other things; it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are attributed to it simultaneously; so this mode of predication consists in making an affirmative and a negative statement one after the other, together with a combined affirmative and negative statements made simultaneously.

Thus, Jainas maintain that in view of the infinite-fold characteristics of a thing, there are seven modes of predications. Syādvāda is a synthetic method of seven-fold judgements. It is a unique system of predication which indicates the limits of knowledge and expression. It will be seen that affirmation, negation and inexpressibility are three fundamental predications. Jaina realism strongly suggests that negation is based on affirmation. The introduction of category of inexpressible is the greatest contribution of Jaina logic to modern linguistic and analytic logic. In this context, the Jaina

philosophy of language the relation between a word and its meaning may be discussed. In Indian philosophy there are different views regarding import of the words. According to grammarian view the whole order is the manifestation of word and whatever exists is expressible. This is an extreme view. Another extreme theory is the Upaniṣadic view that reality is absolutely inexpressible by means of words. As against these views, the Jainas strike the balance by maintaining that reality is both expressible and inexpressible. This is not merely not inconsistent but it is philosophy of consistency par excellence. This can be proved by considering the Jaina view of the relation between a word and its meaning. Jaina position is one word expresses one meaning only. Sometimes a word conveys more meaning than one. But then it should be regarded not as one word but as many words as the number of meanings it appears to convey. This relation is designated by Jaina writers as 'ekārthatvaniyama'.⁹ The etymological standpoint confirms this view. No single word can have two meanings. Two or more meanings can have same linguistic symbols like two different persons having the same name. The words expressing different meanings are different in spite of common linguistic symbols. Thus, as regards the import of the words, Jaina view is different from the views held by other schools. The question is whether meaning of word is in the word as a natural power or it is a matter of convention. Jainas take the middle position as against Mīmāṃsākas on the one hand and Naiyāyikās on the other. Mīmāṃsākas maintain that meaning of a word is in the word as a natural power while Naiyāyikās maintain that it is conventional. Reconciling these two extremes, Jainas maintain that a word has potentiality to convey its natural meaning. Still it needs the aid of convention for its discovery and use. In other words, though power is natural, it is made

explicit by convention. If we believe in principle of one word for one meaning, the concept of inexpressible becomes easy to understand when we say 'a jar is inexpressible' an attempt is made to present the aspects of being and non-being in the jar at once and these concepts are not contradiction or absolutely independent but are relative and complementary.

Syādvāda emphasises that different features can be predicated of a given thing and such features are actualised either simultaneously or successively. "In contrast to the view of the modern logicians, the Jaina logicians seem to hold that although a given sentence may express the same proposition on different occasions, yet in spite of the fact it is the same proposition its truth-value changes with time. The propositions that are relevant in the context of Syādvāda are descriptive propositions. As sameness of a thing does not preclude it from underdoing change and taking on different features, similarly although it is the same proposition that is expressed on different occasions, this itself should not prohibit it from taking different truth-values".¹⁰ However, this theory of change of truth-value does not amount to the doctrine of relativity or scepticism. Because it is not that criterion of truth changes but only because features of a thing change.

It will be seen that the Jaina standpoint of non-absolutism is essentially realistic as is revealed in the theory of Syādvāda. "In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, etc., we often come across a tendency to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus, synthesize its various aspects but the utmost insistence that every aspect of everything must be viewed from every possible standpoint and the unflinching faith that the consummation of all thought processes lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy".¹¹

In Jaina realism the principle of non-absolutism is carried to its logical extent. Syādvāda, which is the distinguishing feature of Jaina epistemology claims to yield valid knowledge by synthesizing the partial standpoints regarding a fact of experience in an organized totality resulting in completeness and comprehensiveness of knowledge. The attitude of Jainism is through and through realistic. The seven judgements of Syādvāda are not merely subjective views about the object but there are actual elements in the objective world corresponding to them. These elements are limited by the time, nature, mood and place and accordingly there are seven forms of real relationships. The Jaina view of subjective-objective relationship comes close to realist theory of material object and its attributes. Berkeleyan idealism deprives the primary qualities also of their reality and reduces matter to subjective idea. However, modern realism is a protest against this form of extreme idealism and it advocates the doctrine of independent reality of matter and extreme realists go to the extent of saying that even secondary qualities have a real basis in matter itself. The Jaina theory of Syādvāda can be compared to this extreme realistic theory of the secondary qualities. The predications of the Syādvāda express our subjective views, i. e. what we have experienced but they have grounds in objective reality itself. "It is the real relations subsisting in the objective reality, outside and independent of us that are faithfully reflected in the propositions of the seven-fold predication".¹²

Annotations :

1. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra*-Vādi Devasūri, IV, 14, tr. by H. Bhattacharya, p. 333.

2. *Syādvādamāñjarī of Malliseṇasūrī*, tr. into English by Thomas, p. 1.
 3. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, ed. by Dhruva, pp.142-43.
 4. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : *A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. p. 337.
 5. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : *The Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 344.
 6. Mukerjee, Satkari : *Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* Ch.VI.
 7. Caillat, Upadhye, Bal Patil : *Jainism; Article on 'Jainas and Jainism'* by A. N. Upadhye, p. 66.
 8. *The Jaina Theory of Anekāntavāda*, by K. C. Bhattacharya an article in the *Philosophical Quarterly*, the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, April, 1925.
 9. Vimaldas : *Saptabhaṅgītaranginī*, p. 61.
 10. An analysis of 'Syāt' in Syādvāda' by M. P. Marathe, an article in 'Indian Philosophical Quarterly', Vol. III, April. 1978. p. 409.
 11. *Fundamental Problems of Indian Philosophy*; P. S. Sanghavi, tr. by I. H. Jhaveri, p. 399.
 12. Bhattacharya, H. : *Anekāntavāda*, p. 98.
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XIII

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF ANEKĀNTAVĀDA

Anekāntavāda or the theory of manifoldness is the nucleus of Jaina philosophy. It claims to impart valid knowledge and the claim is substantiated by the two methods of Nayavāda and Syādvāda. The non-absolutist standpoint forms the ground of the doctrine of manifoldness.

In the theory of seven-fold predication, Jain logicians describe the seven modes of predication and it is maintained by them that in predicating about a thing all these seven modes are to be taken into consideration in order to understand the real nature of a thing in all its aspects. In Jainism, a thing is defined as that which is beset with totality of all features potentially.¹ The theory of seven-fold predication consists in the exposition of an object to one of its given features and there are seven considerations, each presenting one definite aspect of its relationship.

Since a thing has infinite-fold characteristics, it may be questioned why predications are confined to seven only. There may be infinite number of predications corresponding to infinite aspects of a thing. The reason why the number of

predications is neither more nor less than seven is because when Jainas give theory of predication, it does not mean that a thing is possessed of only seven attributes or modes. They maintain that though a thing possesses an infinite number of attributes and has an infinite number of modes, the number of predications can be seven only; because if one of these attributes or modes is considered in relation to the thing, the thing would present seven aspects only. Therefore, as H. Bhattacharya rightly points out, "The question of infinite number of predications as an epistemological theory in aspect of the nature of a thing does not arise".² In any way an attempt to increase the number of predications would be futile as it would result in tautology. Similarly, the number of the predications cannot be decreased as all predications are indispensable in order to have a complex view of reality. In this connection Chakravarti observes, "The complex nature of a real object is amenable to description by the seven and only seven proposition".³

The theory of seven-fold predication has been imperfectly understood and grossly misinterpreted. It has received severe criticisms from various quarters as follows :-

1. A charge of self-contradiction has been raised against Syādvāda by saying that in trying to compromise it involves itself into contradiction. It is said that affirmation and negation cannot co-exist in one substance like blue and non-blue owing to their mutual exclusiveness. In this connection, we may refer to criticisms by Saṅkara and Rāmānuja. In his commentary on the Vedānta sūtras, Saṅkara says it is intrinsically impossible for contradictory features like being and non-being to inhere in one and the same object. It is like a mad man's cry than the words of a reliable person.

Rāmānuja also says that contradictory features like existence and non-existence are impossible to be simultaneously attributed any more than light and darkness.

In defence of Jainism it may be said that the charge is not well-founded. In this connection, we may quote Radhakrishnan,⁴ "The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract coexist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place. Thus, the attribution of contradictory features to a thing is not only not impossible but is conducive to the correct understanding of the nature of an object. The position that is adopted by the Jainas is this—"Pure logic prior to and independent of experience is a blind guide to the determination of truth. Logic is to rationalize and systematize what experience offers".⁵ The Jainas do not deny the simple fact that contradictory features cannot be attributed to an object in the same context. It is only when the determinants are different that a thing has contradictory features. "According to Syādvāda, the contradiction is not a fact transcending or confounding the laws of logic, i. e. to say, a fact which because it is a fact, has somehow to be accepted whatever the difficulties of thought—as is done in the Anirvacaniyavāda of Sāṅkara school, it is a fact perfectly amenable to the laws of logic, a fact which logic easily succeeds in showing to be no contradiction at all in as much as supposed contradictory elements refer to two different aspects of the same reality".⁶ If the contexts vary, the features that are applicable to an object under certain conditions can

be denied. Jainas do not assert absolute identity of being and non-being but only state their relation to the same subject from different standpoints. Saṅkara totally omits the consideration of the significance of the word 'syāt'. Therefore, it is clear that the ridicule to which Saṅkara has subjected it is completely unjustified.

2. Another popular misconception regarding the theory is it is the doctrine of doubts. It is said that Jaina theory of Syādvāda makes knowledge undetermined and indefinite. To attribute contradictory features to an object would lead to doubt and indefiniteness. Critics point out the Anekāntavāda leads one nowhere and consists in vague and indefinite doubt. It is considered as a variety of scepticism.

The objection is answered by saying that the different contexts necessitate attributing opposing features to an object. Therefore, we are justified in attributing contradictory features to an object. Therefore, we are justified in attributing contradictory features to an object. This attribution does not render knowledge of that object uncertain but on the contrary, omission of it would make it so. Syādvāda is not the doctrine of doubt, but is one which eliminates all doubts. The critics fail to realize the true significance of the word 'syāt'. Doctrine of Syādvāda needs to be considered in a wider perspective. Since things change in spite of retaining their identity, their truth-values also change. But the doctrine of the change does not amount to scepticism or doctrine of relativity in the sense of subjectivism. Jaina logic seems to amount to the view that truth-value of a proposition changes not because our criterion of truth changes. "Since things change, the truths we have discovered will have to undergo change too. For we shall have to rediscover the truths about the changed thing although

the criterion of truth viz. correspondence which Jaina philosophers accept, is retained. For Jaina logician, in this way, discovery of truths about changing things is a never-ending and yet not a hopeless and fruitless programme".⁷ The word 'syāt' in Syādvāda only indicates limitations inherent in making any proposition. It is not the doctrine of 'may be' or 'perhaps'. When Syādvāda is confused with doubtfulness, probably the critics mistake 'It exists in some context' to mean that "It perhaps exists". Syādvāda, therefore, does not assert indefiniteness. On the contrary, it is by this method that we come to know certain definite relationship between a thing and its attribute. The position of a subjective relativist or a sceptic is, therefore, different from a Jaina logician. It presents the doctrine of conditional predication and not 'may-be-ism' or perhapsism.

3. It is sometimes objected that Jaina view leads to agnosticism. S. K. Belwalkar says, "The position of Jaina philosophy dealing with knowledge as based on Syādvāda is incorrect and incongruous. 's' can be and 's' cannot be, both can be and cannot be....etc. In this way a negative and agnostic assertion cannot be called a theory".⁸ In the same way, some have also said that it is strange according to Syādvāda to say that a curd and the buffalo are one and the same thing but they eat the curd and do not eat the buffalo. Therefore, Syādvāda is false. Saṅkara criticizing agnostic and negative attitude of Jainas says, "As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge, are all alike indefinite how can Tīrthānkara teach with any claim to authority".⁹ But it can be said that Syādvāda never says that knowledge is unattainable. Critics say when Jainas assert two contradictory judgement the question arises whether such a theory at once positive in some sense and

negative in some sense is comprehensible at all. According to them such a reality though factual is incomprehensible. But Jainas answer it in affirmative. When Jainas assert that a thing is and is not—"it is not an indefinite judgement or disjunction but is a stark reality. When we say that a line is and also is not short or long, it is short in relation to a long line and is not short in relation to a shorter line".¹⁰ Critics have not grasped the essence of 'is' and 'is not' and pronounce it as dubitable and agnostic. 'When applied to real thinking this principle is as true as two plus two is equal to four'.¹¹

In this connection we may agree with H. Bhattāchārya when he maintains that "the logical principle of consistency stands in the way of understanding a thing when it is at once existent and non-existent. Kant, in his 'Critique of pure Reason' confined himself within the limits of logical categories and was led to conclude that "things in themselves" were unknowable. In reply, it must be admitted that the principle of normal logic precludes the possibility of understanding an object when it puts on contradictory aspects at one and the same time. But it may be pointed out that reality is not limited within the bounds of logical categories. It transcends the schemata of the formal logic. Admittedly a thing has more than one aspect and admittedly we have the experience of the reality as it is. Notwithstanding the protest of the formal logic, we have, as a matter of fact the cognition of an object with all its varied features compresent in it".¹² Thus, agnostic contention about the impossibility of valid knowledge of external reality is refuted on the basis of verdict of experiences.

4. The charge of eclecticism is also raised against Jaina theory

of Syādvāda. The seven modes of Syādvāda express partial truths and it is said, that they are the collection of arbitrary half truths. As it is put "the jaina philosophy of relativity which can be characterised as refreshingly modern or a happy blend of naturalistic and spiritualistic, realistic and idealistic tendencies.....On close scrutiny, it fails to satisfy some of the deepest metaphysical and religious aspirations of mankind. Its fascination is the fascination of eclecticism....a philosophy of compromise".¹³

This charge is also not well-founded. The Jaina philosophers point out that the theories of the other systems of philosophy present partial views of the reality and they find their reconciliation in Syādvāda. Though it is true that Syādvāda incorporates the truth of all systems, it is not just the arbitrary collection of different truths. It is philosophy of reconciliation based on relativity and not eclectic synthesis as absolutists maintain. It is not just the collection of partial truths but is the true way of understanding real nature of a thing.

It is, thus, clear that all these objections against Anekāntavāda are based on misconceptions and misunderstanding. Jainas prefer to take a more realistic attitude and face the facts as they are. The critics fail to appreciate the intellectual approach on which the doctrine is based. The Jaina view is neither scepticism nor agnosticism but is standpointism, relativism based on realism. It brings out the relative character of the judgement arising out of the very nature of the object of knowledge. Because of this non-committal attitude, Jaina logic is saved from extremism, dogmatism and fanaticism. Criticisms by various scholars reveal that they have not been able to grasp the significance

of the Jaina theory which with its comprehensiveness helps in solving the intricate world problems. Each predication of the Syādvāda refers to new aspect of reality. The introduction of category of 'inexpressible' is the greatest contribution of Jainism to Indian logic. Even Saṅkar implicitly recognises it when he says that a thing is neither real nor unreal and yet he criticizes Jaina theory. Syādvāda goes beyond the formal logic and asserts that between A and non-A there is always a third possibility. It appeals to experience for the knowledge of reality as it is and finds that 'antinomies of logic are merely figments of formalism'. With the help of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda with its two methods of Syādvāda and Nayavāda Jainism succeeds in disposing of all those hard problems of philosophy which have proved a fruitful source of errors and disputes to the followers of all non-Jaina religions in the world.

If we interpret Jaina doctrine in terms of Western thought we find that the modern western realist thinker Bertrand Russell comes close to Jaina view as far as problem of knowledge of the physical world is concerned. Russell like Jainism believes that the world is objectively real and that reality is many and manifold. As P. K. Mathur rightly says, "Anekāntavāda in general and the doctrines of nayavāda and syādvād in particular have great resemblance to Russell's doctrine of perspectives."¹⁴ The system which consists of all the views of universe perceived and unperceived is called by Russell the system of perspectives. According to this doctrine an object is totality of its aspects which include not only the perceived aspects, i. e. 'sense-data' but also the unperceived aspects, i. e. 'sensibilia' or unsensed sense-data or to use Russell's terminology 'unperceived perspectives'. All these

aspects of a thing are real and a thing cannot be identified with a single aspect of it. All the same, a thing is real from a particular point of view at a particular time. As Russell puts it "All the aspects of a thing are real where as the thing is merely a logical construction".¹⁵ This implies that though the external world has objective reality which is the cardinal principle of realism, a particular individual views it from a standpoint peculiar to himself. Of course, this subjective character is physical or physiological and not mental in the Berkeleyan sense. The world is real objectively and is not a subjective idea, though reality can be viewed from the particular point of view. In this connection we may agree with Mainkar when he says, "So long as perception is an act of perceiving mind, inference an act of inferring mind, verbal knowledge of the reasoning mind, till then all knowledge is bound to have a subjective element that is too difficult to be totally eliminated".¹⁶ Thus, Jainism is realism based on relativity. Similarly, Whitehead's philosophy comes close to Jaina *anekānta* view. He says, "No entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe....".¹⁷ Again he says, "The systematization of knowledge cannot be conducted in water-tight compartments. All general truths condition each other and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities".¹⁸

Einstein's theory of relativity is great contribution of 20th century to scientific world. We find amazing similarity between *Syādvāda* and theory of relativity. *Syādvāda* is nothing but logic of relativism. Einstein mentioned time as the fourth dimension and *Syādvāda* also maintains that everything is to be considered in the context of its own space-time. The theory of relativity is accepted to day as perfect

mathematical theory in the scientific world. It is also believed that it is one of the greatest discovery of the present century. It is "the farthest reach that the human mind has made into the 'unknown'¹⁹ yet critics point out that it is utter non-sense, logically erroneous etc., because its conclusions are difficult to accept. Same is the case with Syādvāda. Mistaken beliefs about Syādvāda are groundless.

Even Radhakrishnan who is not so unsympathetic towards Jainism and who defends the Jaina theory of knowledge against Vedānta criticism ultimately points out that "theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without that hypothesis of an absolute. The Jainas admit that things are one in their universal aspect and many in their particular aspect. Both these according to them are partial points of view. A plurality of reals is admittedly a relative truth. We must rise to the complete point of view and look at the whole with all the wealth of its aptitudes. If Jainism stops short with plurality. Which is at best a relative and partial truth and does not ask whether there is any higher truth pointing to a one which particularises itself in the objects of the world, connected with one another vitally essentially and immanently, it throws overboard its own logic and exalts a relative truth into an absolute one".²⁰

This criticism seems to be because of the prejudice against non-absolutism. Non-absolute nature of things compels us to believe in relativity and Radhakrishnan's logic, however, consistent cannot weaken it. The Jainas emphatically assert that why should we superimpose absolute nature upon things when things themselves have non-absolute nature. The criticism assumes that perfect truth must be absolute. But Jainas point out that relative truth is not different from absolute or perfect truth, e. g. when we

say that an orange is both small and big it is the absolute truth in the sense of real truth because it is so in relation to things bigger and smaller respectively. Thus, everything in the world is stamped with non-absolutism. Hence the thesis of Syādvāda that all truth is relative and perfect or real truth is not different from it. It is logically tenable view and is supported by modern theory of relativity. Of course, it is not to be understood in the sense of subjectivism of Berkeleyan type, it is realistic relativism. It is similar to theory of post-Hegelian realists. Our ideas of objects and their relations are not purely subjective as subjective idealists maintain. Again, these ideas are not unconnected with real objects as Kant maintained in his 'pure Reason'. "According to post-Hegelian realists although the objects are not self-estranged subjects, as Hegel contended, the former have among them real relationships of space and time and it is possible for the subjects to have ideas of those objects and to understand these relationships subsisting among them, exactly as they are. Space and time are realities; according to the Jainas, the objective reality also is reality independent of the subjective self and the varying aspects of the objective realities also according to the Jainas are not unreal. The spatial, the temporal, the essential and the modal relationships between objects or subjective phenomena are real relations, pertaining to the objective realities themselves....So if experience and reason make us judge that what is attributed to an object holds good only in respect of the particular nature, location, time and mood of an object, we are to conclude that it is because those categoric presentations are not subjective schemata for understanding the outside objects but because they have their basis in the real nature of the object itself".²¹

Thus, Anekāntavāda is the rational method of

understanding the world. In its realistic aspect Syādvāda presents the true nature of knowing a thing. The conclusions of this method are to-day supported by the scientists.

Brijkishore prasad in his article "Anekāntavāda as seen in the light of some western views" points out "Each entity is like a cell-fission, a microscopic organism. Knowledge of a thing, therefore, is the not result of a reciprocal interaction between the perceiver and the perceived, leading to a variegated view of it".²²

James observes that "our knowledge of reality depends on the perspective into which we throw it".²³ According to James this initiates a novel, radical method of approach towards the objects of knowledge "because it is contended to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypothesis liable to modifications".²⁴ Scientific research, thus, becomes an unending process as things change and yet discovery of truths about objects is not a hopeless task. Jaina logic in spite of being relativistic is not sceptical as it believes in absolute criterion of truth viz. correspondence and also in possibility of omniscience—the perfect knowledge.

As regards the relation of syādvād to modern theory of probability it is said, "There are certain ideas in Indian Jaina logic called Syādvāda which seem to have close relevance to the concepts of probability and which can, therefore, supply a convenient background on the foundations of statistics."²⁵

The fourth category is a synthesis of three basic modes of 'It is—assertion, It is not—negation and inexpressible or indefinite and supplies the logical foundations of the modern concept of probability. The fifth

category of knowledge in Jaina logic predicates the existence of indetermination which we may perhaps interpret, in modern language as the assertion of the existence of a probability field. The sixth category denies the existence of a probability field; while the seventh category covers the whole range of possibilities mentioned in the other six categories.....It is the explicit recognition of the concept of numerical frequency ratios which distinguishes modern statistical theory from the Jaina theory of Syādvāda”.

In conclusion, we can say that Anekānta logic examines the very foundation of knowledge and tries to avoid one-sided-ness in knowledge. The dialectic of seven-fold predication takes into account material conditions for the validity of knowledge and does not allow a single element given in experience to be rejected as false on the basis of formal logic as it is not only against the verdict of experience but also logically erroneous. Thus, it succeeds in giving a fairly reliable picture of an object having multiple facets. It is therefore, a remarkable method designed to attain truth in knowledge. Again, it is not inconsistent with its own philosophy as all that it intends to convey is because of inexhaustible diversity of reality we cannot but recognize the limitations of our knowledge and realize its relativity. It means intellectual toleration, catholicity of outlook and respect for the view points of others. Reality can become the object of our judgement only in so far as it is abstracted in relevant context. Jaina logicians seek to establish the view that infinitely complex nature of reality baffles all attempts to describe or know it precisely unless we make seven predications about it and do not commit ourselves to any exclusive predication.

It is clear that Jainism fulfils its claim to valid knowledge by developing a unique form of realism which is, of course, the most consistent form of epistemological realism. The relativistic epistemology of Jainism is in accordance with the realistic principle as against absolutistic theory of knowledge put forward by orthodox systems in India like Nyāya. It is against all sorts of Idealism and agnosticism. It is consistent realistic attitude which underlines Jaina relativism. There is no doubt that this kind of realistic epistemology can truly depict the nature of reality. Its contribution to Indian thought in particular and world-thought in general is undeniable.

Annotations :

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10. Nagrajji Muni : *Jaina Philosophy and Modern Science*, p. 37.
 11. Ibid, p. 38.
 12. Bhattacharya, H. : *Anekāntavāda*, p. 124.
 13. Article on 'Anekāntavāda or the Jaina Philosophy of Relativity' by G. H. Rao, *The half-yearly Journal of Mysore University*, March, 1942. p. 79.
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XIV

CONCLUSION

Epistemology is an essential part of philosophy. Any philosophical theory that leaves knowledge just impossible stands self-defeating. In this sense, the ultimate and the central philosophical problem is that of epistemology. Hence, the supreme significance of theory of knowledge.

Philosophers, both in the east and in the west have analysed the fundamental questions concerning knowledge. It is generally recognised that scepticism is untenable and problem of knowledge is capable of being solved. Though problem of knowledge in a more sophisticated form was explicitly formulated by Kant, it is an approach to knowledge that characterizes entire European philosophy. In India, there is no system of thought which has not contributed to the problem of knowledge. Indian philosophy is knowledge dominated. Both Nyāya and Jainism have advanced a comprehensive theory of knowledge and contributed significantly to the epistemological problems.

The nature of knowledge, the means of acquiring knowledge, criterion of truth and knowledge and consequent question of error are some of the problems concerning

knowledge. Epistemologists have divergent attitudes towards these problems and accordingly they are classified as idealists or realists.

Realism and Idealism as Epistemological Theories

The conflict between realism and idealism is one of the most fascinating problems of epistemology. In modern times, realistic trend of thought has come into existence as a revolt against empiricism and absolute idealism. For an idealist, object of knowledge is in some sense mind-dependent. It is obvious that extreme form of idealism is mistaken which denies the knowledge of external object. On the other hand, for a realist, the object of knowledge is existent independent of the knower and knowing makes no difference to the thing known. The thing known is not modified by being related to the mind. Hence, it cannot be said to depend for its existence or being on mind or knowledge. Realism tends towards pluralism and upholds the doctrine of externality of knowledge relation.

Realism seems to be right in asserting that knowledge has self-transcending character. It aims at something beyond itself—the object. It would be no exaggeration to say that all reasonable human discourse is based on realistic assumptions. It is significant to note that what realism stresses is :-

- i. Objectivity of knowledge;
- ii. Knowledge refers to an object which is distinct from mind or mental activity;
- iii. Object is that which can be referred to.

Realistic attitude is in accordance with commonsense and science. Modern western realists are G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Whitehead, Alexander and Santayana, among others. All of them, though they differ among themselves in some points of details, have one important point in common viz. that knowledge necessarily involves an object beyond itself to which it refers. In the course of time realism has acquired slightly different forms. Neo-realism holds that object perceived is identical with object existent while critical realism believes that the object existing and object perceived are two different entities. However, both agree in holding that perception reveals some object other than consciousness. Yet, there is another form of modern realism known as Relativistic or Functional Realism as formulated by J. E. Boodin. It assumes the reality of substance and qualities independent of thinker and holds that object presented in perception is real but is the function of the thinker and the environment. While Nyāya is naive realism, Jaina realism comes close to this functional realism founded on empirical logic.

As against realism, idealism as an epistemological theory denies objectivity of knowledge. It is clear that idealistic logic cannot build a consistent epistemology. It will not make much sense even if we give a science of knowledge without the object of knowledge. In fact, epistemology becomes difficult, if not impossible, on idealistic assumptions. Idealism carried to its logical conclusion results in the doctrine of intrinsic falsity of knowledge. So we have to admit the independent existence of the objects of knowledge for all serious epistemological purposes. Strictly speaking, idealism is incompatible with epistemology and logic. Those idealists who have built up epistemology had to compromise

somewhere. They cannot speak of it without being inconsistent. Idealism, thus, makes genuine knowledge impossible.

In Indian philosophy, realism is advocated by Nyāya, Jainism, Mīmāṃsā and later on by Madhvā who is a staunch representative of realism, though as systems of realism Nyāya and Jainism deserve special attention because of their preoccupation with epistemological problems. Nyāya and Jaina epistemology is significantly realistic. Both of them present a thorough analysis of problem of knowledge. However, Jaina view of knowledge is somewhat peculiar and distinct. The uniqueness of Jaina realism becomes obvious when it is established as the most consistent form of realism.

Nyāya and Jaina view regarding Knowledge

Nyāya and Jainism both have propounded pluralistic realism with emphasis on realistic epistemology. These systems occupy significant position in the history of realism. Both believe that all knowledge by its very nature refers to an object beyond and independent of it. Both of them establish the reality of external world by means of *pramāṇas*. This contravenes the view that world and its objects are illusory. As against idealistic position they maintain that knowledge and its objects are all real. Thus, both agree in holding the extramental characters of things. Nyāya, like Jainism emphatically asserts that reality can be known. Whatever is, is knowable. Hence, agnosticism is refuted. They maintain that though external world stands real by itself, knowledge is the means of reacting to it. Therefore, the problems of logic and epistemology come to occupy central place in the philosophical discussions of both the systems of thought.

In this way, both Nyāya and Jainism present significant forms of epistemological realism in the history of Indian thought.

Nyāya has developed realism based on experience. It asserts that we are able to know directly substance, universal, qualities and also negation of a perceptible object with the help of same sense-organs which perceive that object. Though in details of their epistemological analysis Nyāya and Jainism differ, the similarity between them is not superficial. However, Jaina realism is unique with its theory of many-sided-ness of reality which is the most original contribution of Jainism to Indian thought. Nyāya epistemology though realistic, Nyāya realism has failed to reach its logical conclusion. It appears that realism of Nyāya is only half-hearted while that of Jainism is full-fledged. Jainas have made certain lasting contributions in the field of epistemology which are perhaps not without their interest to the modern student of history of philosophy. Some of the concepts in Jaina logic developed in theory of Syādvāda have close relevance to the theory of probability and hence, may serve as foundations of statistics. It cannot be disputed that the most distinctive aspect of Jaina philosophy is its theory of knowledge which is rightly considered as the most consistent form of realism. The non-absolutistic standpoint of Jainism deserves special mention as it leads to multiple and infinitely diversified aspects of reals which implicitly suggests "an open view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery".¹ It seems legitimate to conclude that "the ancient Indian Jaina philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and stastical view of reality in modern times".²

Nyāya theory that knowledge is an accidental quality

of soul has been criticized as leading to scepticism and incompatible with its realism.

Sources of Knowledge

Nyāya and Jainism establish the reality of external world by means of sources of knowledge. They agree in recognising three sources of valid knowledge viz. (i) perception (ii) inference (iii) testimony. In addition to these sources, Jainism recognizes other forms of knowledge also.

As against Nyāya, Jainism holds that authentic cognition is the means of knowledge and not sense-object contact. This is the point which well illustrates the distinction between Jaina and Nyāya view regarding valid knowledge. Though the attitude of both Jaina and Nyāya logicians is empirical and realistic, the peculiar Jaina view is that knowledge is inherent in soul. But because of veil of karma we may get imperfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge is possible directly when veil of karma is removed. However, empirical knowledge is possible indirectly with the help of sense-organs. In this sense, of the five kinds of knowledge recognised by Jainas, the first two, namely, sense-perception and verbal knowledge are indirect while clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience are direct. But later on Jaina theory of knowledge was modified in line with the theories of other systems of Indian philosophy and in that sense perception was regarded as a direct means of knowledge and along with it, the other means of cognition like inference, comparison and authority were recognised.

Perception

The old Nyāya definition of perception as produced by sense-object contact seems to be too narrow as it does not apply to direct perception of a yogin which is undoubtedly a perceptual cognition and yet it is not produced by sense-object contact. Nyāya is, therefore, inconsistent when it recognizes *yogaja* as a kind of perception. Some Nyāya philosophers seem to have realised this fact and in Neo-Nyāya, however, perception is recognised as direct or immediate cognition which more resembles Jaina definition of perception.

There are five kinds of sense-perception arising out of the operation of five sense-organs. We got the similar description of sense-perception in Jainism, the only difference being the sense of sight for Jainas is of fundamentally different nature. According to Nyāya, sense-object contact is a condition of perception but according to Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual perception. Nyāya view which emphasises contact of an object as a condition of perception seems to be erroneous to Jainas as according to them, perception of an object is due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge—obscuring karmas. Jaina view is more in accordance with modern psychology according to which presence of an object and even its contact with the senseorgans may not be effective to produce the experience. Psychological factors of selective attention and removal of psychic impediments are required before we get sense-experience. The later factor may be compared with destruction-cum-subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma of Jainas. The Jaina emphasis on the fact that perception is not possible merely through sense-organs

is a novel and significant feature of Jaina theory of perception. Jaina analysis of stages of perception has predominantly epistemological significance. It also corresponds to analysis of perception given by traditional psychology. Nyāya distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception resembles Jaina view. Both Nyāya and Jainism are in perfect agreement in holding that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate has. The same stuff is transformed into subsequent state. This view is based on the principle that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent. This reflects realistic attitude of Nyāya and Jainism.

Inference

Inference as a source of knowledge is generally recognised by every Indian system of philosophy except Cārvāka. There is general agreement as regards the essential nature of inference in Jainism and Nyāya. It is regarded as a mediate and indirect source of knowledge. Invariable concomitance is the essential feature of inference. It is clear that Jaina and Nyāya account of inference is logical and epistemological. Inference in Indian logic is both formally valid and materially true.

Comparison

In Nyāya, knowledge through comparison is knowledge born of perception of similarity. Jainas take comparison in different sense from that of Nyāya. Most of the Jaina logicians include it in recognition or conception but in some of the Jaina sūtras such as Sthānaṅgasūtra, Bhagavatisūtra, it is recognised as independent source of

knowledge among the four means of knowledge. The Jaina view seems to be more reasonable when it includes comparison under recognition; which takes the form “This is like that”, “That is different from that”, etc.

Testimony—Import of Words

Testimony is a kind of verbal knowledge. It means knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Both Nyāya and Jainism agree in assigning to words the status of being an independent source of knowledge though they differ as regards the nature of knowledge derived from words.

Semantics—the science of linguistic meaning is concerned with (i) meaning power of words (ii) the question regarding the thing meant by a word, i. e. referrend.

According to Nyāya meaning of a word is not natural. It is acquired and its meaning is fixed by God. A word gets power to mean an object because of convention. In agreement with Nyāya view, Jainas maintain that a word does really express its object but they do not agree with Nyāya view that creator God fixed the meaning of words. Jaina position on philosophy of language is unique. According to Jaina logicians a word expresses its object by means of its natural capacity and conventional use. The capacity of the word to express its object is natural and not given to it by God. The natural capacity of a word is power inherent in it. It is like the power of burning inherent in fire. Thus, word does not depend upon anything outside it when it expresses its object. Every word has capacity to express all the objects of the world but what particular objects at what particular time and place are to be signified by it depends upon local circumstances, i. e. they admit that usages

determine the local sense of a word. But they reject Nyāya theory in spite of admitting that words have conventional power of express their objects, because according to Jainism though knowledge of convention is necessary for understanding the meanings of words, convention does not make its natural power redundant.

As regards the problem of referend, Nyāya view is that the referend is the individual participating in the universal, e. g. The word 'cow' means the object 'cow' which is that by virtue of universal 'cowhood' in which it participates. A word denotes the particular, connotes the universal and also indicates shape distinguishing the particular from dissimilar things. All these taken together constitute the meaning of words.

Jainism agrees with Nyāya in maintaining the real relation between word and its referend. Words, according to it mean both universal and particular and neither of them alone. A word denotes an object with its positive and negative nature and general and particular characteristics. A word denotes its object and at the same time negates other objects. An object is of multiform character, and a word, therefore, denotes its both positive and negative, general and distinctive characters. This doctrine is in keeping with Jaina theory of Syādvāda.

As regards the import of a sentence, Nyāya view is that a sentence signifies the mutual relation of component words which denote objects. Knowledge of the import of a sentence results from knowledge of the words which is the main cause and other conditions like expectancy, compatibility, proximity and knowledge of the intention of the speaker. Thus, Nyāya gives realistic interpretation of a

sentence as distinguished from subjective and transcendental interpretation of it. It rejects the view that sentence refers to ideas in their non-relational character as according to Nyāya realism existence of external object is real to which a sentence refers. According to Jainas, a sentence is an independent aggregate of words and it is partly different and partly non-different from the words from which it is made. A sentence is collection of words which are mutually dependent. It is not dependent on other words in another sentence.

The thing to be noted in Nyāya and Jaina account of the problem of meaning is that words cannot mean without referring to universals. Both Nyāya and Jainism when they point out that words mean some referends contravene the view that words cannot express the reality as it is. The deeper significance of verbal knowledge in Jainism must be recognised when they assert that words are only expressive of meanings and not that they produce meaning which is rooted in the nature of things in reality.

In addition to the above means of knowledge, Jainism recognises some other kinds of knowledge like (i) Inductive reasoning or tarka (ii) Pratyabhijñā or conception (iii) recollection or Smṛti.

i. Inductive Reasoning : It is knowledge of universal concomitance based on facts of experience. Nyāya does not regard tarka as a source of knowledge. It is simply an aid to means of knowledge. It facilitates the operation of a means of knowledge but does not itself act as a means of knowledge. It rather helps to resolve indecisiveness in case of alternative possibilities. Jaina view seems to be more reasonable when they point out that non-recognition of it as

a means of valid knowledge will lead to agnosticism.

ii. Conception : It is also called recognition. According to Nyāya, it is a kind of perception. While Jainas maintain that it is a unique experience produced by perception and recollection both, though it is neither of them alone. According to Nyāya, in recognition object is presented as existing at present qualified by past. Jaina view differs from that of Nyāya. According to Jainas, in recognition, we apprehend identity of an object with past and present. So its object cannot be apprehended by perception alone nor recollection alone. Jainas rightly point out that it is not a kind of perception, since it is not direct or immediate cognition. It is not recollection since it apprehends present object. It is the basis of judgements of identity, similarity, dissimilarity, etc. It is not restricted to the form of comparison of Nyāya school but is wider than that.

iii. Recollection : Nyāya definition of *pramāṇa* excludes memory as a means of valid knowledge. Jainism considers it as a valid source of knowledge, though it is a representative knowledge. It is knowledge concerning the past and Jainas are quite right when they maintain that this does not undermine its objective basis.

Extrasensory Perception

With the exception of Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā schools, all the systems of Indian philosophy admit the phenomena of extrasensory perception. Extrasensory perception has been an interesting problem in the field of para-psychology to-day.

Nyāya classifies perception into ordinary and extraordinary. In Nyāya, there are three types of extraordinary perception. Of these, three *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*

and jñānalakṣaṇa perceptions cannot be called non-sensuous from the Jaina point of view because they arise with the help of sense-organs and in that sense, do not produce direct knowledge. Of these, yogaja perception may be called extrasensory, for it is not caused by the senses. It is direct apprehension of an object—past, present and future. It may be likened to omniscience of Jainism, though in Jainism, omniscience is produced by self and not by mind and this marks the difference between the two which is noteworthy.

Jainism classifies perception into empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is ordinary perception depending upon the sense-organs and mind. Transcendental perception is non-sensuous perception which arises directly in the self without the help of sense-organs and mind. It is super-sensuous and direct and in that sense differing from Nyāya view of direct knowledge. Because Jaina theory of knowledge is that knowledge is the essential quality of 'self'. Therefore, in addition to knowledge obtained through sense-organs and mind Jainas recognise the possibility of soul getting what is called direct cognition without instrumentality of sense-organs. When soul is freed from the veil of relevant karma. Jainas have given a detailed analysis of phenomena of extrasensory perception like clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience. Clairvoyance is direct perception of material objects not visible by senses. It may be likened to psychic phenomenon called 'French sensitiveness'. Telepathy is direct knowledge of other people's thoughts. It reaches the mental processes of others. Omniscience is the supreme of all extrasensory perceptions. The development of knowledge reaches its highest limit in it. It is intuition of all substances with all their modes. It is pure perception. In Jaina texts the

possibility of occurrence of omniscience is proved logically by saying that it is the final culmination of progressive development of knowledge. This stage is attained when obscuring karmic obstacles are removed in their entirety. Then an individual knows all objects vividly and precisely as they are. It can be called perception par excellence—pure knowledge unaided by anything.

It is clear that Jaina view of extrasensory perception differs from that of Nyāya. Nyāya emphasises that extrasensory perception is produced by special type of contact between the senses and the object. Jainas, however, do not accept such a kind of contact as according to them the function of senseorgans is limited. Even modern psychology recognises some such kind of supernormal perceptions without the help of senseorgans. Jaina psychology had recognised the same facts that have been established by modern parapsychologists on the basis of experimental investigation. In Indian psychology, the experiences such as telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition are not considered abnormal but no system of Indian philosophy scientifically represents them except Jainism. These are not miraculous powers but forms of knowledge. Cognition independent of the senses is not impossible. Experimental research substantiates this view. Modern science in this field is still in its infancy. In the West, interest in the phenomenon of extrasensory perception is increasing and it is a profound truth which psychology is slowly coming to recognise. Extrasensory perception is being studied scientifically by parapsychologists like Rhine, Tyrell and Price today. Jainism has established these facts long back. That there is occurrence of such a phenomenon in genuine knowledge can hardly be doubted. It is a proposition which modern science does not dispute. Credit must be given to

Jaina realists for recognising such forms of knowledge.

Problem of Truth and Validity of Knowledge

In Indian philosophy, *pramāṇa* is considered as a valid means of knowledge. There is initial agreement among philosophers of different schools as regards the definition of *pramāṇa* as the source of valid knowledge but as regards the nature of knowledge, its causes, etc. philosophers differ.

In Jainism, as in *Nyāya*, *pramāṇa* is taken as valid cognition itself. *Nyāya*, however, emphasises sense-object contact in the act of knowledge. Here, there is sharp contrast between Jaina and *Nyāya* logicians. Jainas do not agree with *Nyāya* in maintaining that sense-object contact is important. They seem to emphasise the fact that knowing is a conscious and this conscious cognition only can illumine the object. The unconscious sense-contact cannot possibly do so. Jaina view, therefore, is that only a conscious cause can generate conscious knowledge.

The idealistic view of some schools that object and its cognitions are non-different is not accepted by Jaina and *Nyāya* realists.

They regard object external and independent of mind. Jaina and *Nyāya* definition of *pramāṇa* is realistic but while Jainas hold that knowledge illumines both self and the object. *Nyāya* realists hold that it illumines object alone and cannot illumines itself. In Jainism, the relation between the self and its knowledge is such that knowledge is different as well as non-different from the self. The *Nyāya* view of complete difference between knowledge and self is rejected by the Jainas because knowledge according to them is the

essential quality of the self. While Nyāya holds that all the sense-organs apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with their respective objects, according to the Jainas, visual senseorgan can grasp its object even when there is no direct contact. Visual organ does not come in physical contact with the object. Eye, e. g. does not go round to the object to get the experience. This is more realistic approach of Jainas. as against Nyāya, Jaina view is, therefore, that authentic cognition is the means of knowledge and not the sense-object contact. Considering Jaina view of valid knowledge in contrast to that of Nyāya, we find that the difference between the two is mainly based upon their divergent views of self and consciousness. Jainism does not agree with Nyāya view which maintains that consciousness is an adventitious quality produced by the contact of various factors.

Again, Jainism, unlike Nyāya, regards cognition of previously known object as a *pramāṇa*. Hence memory is one of the means of valid knowledge in Jainism. Jaina philosophers do not bother about element of novelty in the object as admitted also by Mīmāṃsākas and Buddhists. Cognition of a precognized object is, therefore, accepted as a means of valid knowledge in Jainism. Jaina arguments for this are also convincing. In Nyāya, memory may be true knowledge but not a valid means of knowledge.

It may be remarked here that Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* as the valid knowledge which illumines itself and the object is a synthesis of the views held by Idealists like Buddhists who maintain that knowledge is self-evident and realists like Nyāya logicians and that knowledge illumines object alone.

The Problem of Error in Nyāya and Jainism

Error is a kind of non-valid cognition. The analysis of illusory perception has epistemological value. There is a hot controversy as regards the ontological basis of erroneous perception.

Nyāya and Jainism propound realistic theory of knowledge. Explanation of error becomes difficult on realistic position. If the object known is identical with object existent what possibly can be the place of error or illusory experience in a realistic world ? Nyāya view is that an illusion consists in misapprehension of an object as another. The Jaina view is the same more or less.

Jaina and Nyāya philosophers are one in refuting the theories of error propounded by philosophers of different systems on the basis that they are not founded on sound grounds. They agree in expounding the theory of Anyathākhyātī or Viparītakhyātī in spite of being realists. Strictly speaking, there cannot be error if we consistently hold extreme realistic position. But error as misapprehension of an object is not inconsistent with realistic principles of knowledge as object may not be apprehended as it is immediately.

D. M. Datta observes, "The minimum of realism is the presupposition that there is such a thing as knowledge; in other words that perception and thought refer to some object not the mere experience of perceiving and thinking. The maximum of realism would be the assurance that everything ever perceived or thought of existed apart from apprehension and exactly in the form in which it is believed to exist; in other words, that perception and conception are always direct and literal revelations and that there is no such thing

as error".³

This kind of naive realism which denies that there is a gap between evidence and conclusion is not accepted by Nyāya and Jainism and, therefore, both recognize possibility of error. This position is not inconsistent with their realism. Both Jaina and Nyāya views lay emphasis on objectivity and do not explain the error away.

Problem of Negation

The problem of negation is an epistemological problem though it involves ontological considerations as well. Some of the Indian schools like Sāṅkhya, Buddhism and Cārvāka challenge the reality of negation while Mīmāṃsaka and Vedānta accept non-apprehension as a distinct source of knowledge.

Nyāya accepts the reality of existence as well as non-existence as things which are independent in themselves. Nyāya realism, though regards negation as an ontological reality, does not admit negation as a distinct way of knowing. It elevates negation to a coordinate status with positive being. It is an object of perception and, therefore, non-apprehension as a distinct source of knowledge is not required to be recognised. Nyāya holds that it is wrong to assume that a negative fact is known only by means of a negative source. Negation in Nyāya is always of something. In Nyāya terminology, it is negation of its counter positive. Like cognition negation is negation of something. The Nyāya emphasis on objective content of cognition is significant. Negation is not merely a mental act of denying and, therefore, negative statements are not trivial but informative

and significant.

It is clear that Nyāya view of negation is based on the assumption that things have negative characters. This view implicitly involves the Jaina theory that a thing has an infinite number of characters. It is Jaina view that the world of experience can be described through various types of statements and negative statements are one among them. Thus, Jainism like Nyāya, admits the reality of negation, as according to it difference is real. In Jainism, negation is an essential aspect of reality. But the difference between Jaina and Nyāya view consists in the fact that negation in Jainism is not an independent entity, as Nyāya holds. However, it is neither unreal nor mental construction as Advaitin maintains. But it is an aspect of a thing and it has as much reality as any aspect of a thing has. In this way, both Nyāya and Jaina realism are committed to admit the reality of negation and yet there is a marked difference between the views held by them. Negation, in Jainism, is not real in and by itself, but it is of a tentative character. In keeping with its basic tenet of non-absolutism, Jainism does not assign absolute reality to non-existence though it is an element of a nature of a real thing. It is not substantive in itself but is of the nature of an essential adjective to a real thing.

In Nyāya, negation is real but it inheres in a thing different from the one in which existence inheres. It seems that Nyāya philosophers fail to understand the fact that affirmation and negation can be made of one and the same object as Jainas maintain. In Jainism negation means difference or diversity of being rather than non-being. In Jainism, therefore, problem of negation becomes primarily an epistemological problem. Negative propositions are

expression of something. Negation expresses otherness. This view seems to resemble Ryle's view according to which negative proposition can be analysed into different disjunctions, e. g. 'The table is not red' means 'the table is green or blue or brown etc'.⁴ Thus, negative propositions describe contrary or contradictory characters of the object. Both Nyāya and Jaina realism, however, emphasise genuineness of negation in the sense that in both negative judgements are objective and informative and negative proposition is always the expression of something. Nyāya seems to be hyperrealistic when it points out that as knowledge points to something outside it, the knowledge of negation also implies its existence independent of knowing, i. e. knowledge of negation has an objective fact as its basis. This view may be compared with that of western realists like Russell who also admit the objective existence of negative facts while advocating correspondence theory of truth. Nyāya realists believe that we are able to know directly not only substance, qualities but also negation of perceivable objects with the help of same sense organ which apprehends positive object. Incidentally, Buddhist doctrine of Apoha is significant in so far as it draws attention to negative function of a word. Of course, the Buddhists were wrong in exclusively emphasising negation. Jainas are, however, non-extremists and their position seems to be reasonable when they maintain that negation is complementary to affirmation and hence it is not unreal but is a necessary element in constitution of reality.

The Problem of Universal

Epistemologically, the problem of universal is

significant in order to understand knowledge. Existence of universal is required not only ontologically but also epistemologically. Realists are generally supporters of reality of universals.

In Nyāya, universals are entities different from particulars having a being of their own, though related to particulars. This is extreme realism. It recognizes universal as an independent category of reality. In Jainism, universals are common features of particulars having no being apart from them. It is moderate realism. Similar view is held by Rāmānuja and Mādhvā in Indian philosophy. According to this view, individuals alone are real. There is no class-essence in them but there is close resemblance or real likeness. This view also comes close to Russell's resemblance theory of universals in modern times. He is also of the opinion that reality of universal is undeniable as all knowledge of truth involves acquaintance with universals. There are common characteristics among numerically different particulars. These similarities are recognised as the principles of classification. This is going beyond realism. Jainism seems to emphasise the fact that when we say that similarities on which our use of general words rests are constituents of the external world, we do not mean that they are entities over and above the particulars which manifest them. They are real only as features of individual objects. Again, this does not mean that universals are merely fabrications of human mind. They are not to be classed with pure fiction like sky-lotuses. So Jain view of universals is as opposed to Nyāya realism as it is to Buddhist nominalism. Jaina realists agree with Nyāya in holding that general cognitions have valid objective reference but this does not prove the existence of external class-

essences. Jaina realists seem to be perfectly in the right when they strongly criticize Nyāya view by saying that Nyāya universals are unnecessary to explain general cognitions and there cannot be any universal other than similarity. As realists, Jainas admit a basis for general cognition in the outer world but they do not elevate it to the position given by Nyāya view viz. recognition of universal as a separate objective category. Perhaps, it is rightly maintained that "the acceptance of universals as separate entities violates the principle of parsimony embodied in 'Occam's razor'".⁵ However, existence of universals is logically justified. In accordance with their non-absolutistic standpoint, Jainas maintain that universal is not an identity but similarity which is different in different particulars. Nyāya philosophers posit both universal and particulars as absolutely separate and come to maintain that they are united in the individual ab-extra. It is clear that Nyāya philosophers can not satisfactorily account for their unity. Jainas rightly point out that two differ not absolutely but only in certain respects. In this sense, the two are different but neither universal nor particular has any reality independent of the other. In our experience universal manifests itself through particular and particular appears as the mode of universal. Thus, apparently inexplicable position of Nyāya finds its solution in Jaina doctrine of universal based on non-absolutism. Nyāya system is right in recognising the reality of universals but extreme realism of Nyāya is indefensible. Jainas, though defend the reality of universals, they are not extreme realists. In Indian philosophy, Jainism and in Greek philosophy Aristotle advocated such a moderate form of realism. It avoids most of the difficulties of extremist theories. Jainas point out that the hypothesis of any other universal than resemblance is not

warranted by the facts of experience. Jaina view is consistent with its non-absolutistic standpoint. It is also not incompatible with its realistic attitude. In fact, it goes beyond realism. Extreme realistic view advocated by Nyāya seems to be untenable. Jaina view is in agreement with recent developments which are made in the theory of universal. It resembles the view held by western realists. It is not necessary to assume the separate existence of universals because universality consists in similarity. Jainas, thus, replace universals by resemblances. Resemblances and not identities are the basis of class-concepts. On Jaina view of universal it is possible to explain human knowledge satisfactorily. Nyāya position is rather inexplicable.

Jaina Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvād

The peculiar feature of Jaina logic which represents very advanced theory of knowledge advocating liberalism is the celebrated doctrine of Jaina Anekāntavāda which is perhaps the most original contribution of Jainism. It shows the application of principle of non-violence into intellectual field. It is in sharp contrast to Absolutism of Advaita and Buddhism. Jaina epistemology relies upon sense-data as given to experience although they may vary from person to person with respect to the same thing. This shows a through-going realistic and empiricist attitude of Jainas. Jaina realism is not dogmatic but has a sound logical basis having subtle and far-reaching implications. It not only refutes the impossibility of knowledge but it catholic enough to entertain the possibility of other points of view, thus, resulting in self-consistent system of philosophy. Though it declares all human knowledge to be partial, it recognizes the possibility of omniscience complete knowledge and hence leaves no room

for idealism or scepticism or agnosticism which challenges our claim to knowledge.

Jaina epistemology repeatedly emphasises that object of knowledge is of infinitely complex character and can be fully comprehended only in omniscience. Ordinary human beings who perceive through their sense-organs which are but indirect means of knowledge apprehend reality only partially due to limitations of senses. Hence the doctrines of Nayavāda and Syādvāda—the unique instruments of analysis and synthesis.

The profound implications of the Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda or 'multiple truth' as it may be termed lead to the recognition of the fact that it is unreasonable to criticize any philosophical theory from the standpoint of another. We must understand mutually irreducible different points of view of different philosophers. This truth is beautifully recognized by Jaina logicians. The uniqueness of this epistemological contribution must be noted.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that Jaina theory of multiple truth resembles the views of some leading contemporary western thinkers who seem to substantiate the view that no absolute assertion can ever be made about a thing. Bertrand Russell in his book 'knowledge of the external world' gives analysis of the physical object in the light of modern physics. He admits that sense-data are not mere appearances of external objects but they really reveal the extramental objects. Physical objects of external world are not, of course, known directly in single perception. The different sensations we have of them from different points of view or under different conditions give real but partial glimpses of external objects. The true picture of the external

object can, therefore, be obtained by systematic interrelations of different aspects or different 'perspectives' to use Russell's terminology. A physical object thus, comes to be conceived as a 'system of perspectives'. Such a system consists of all possible aspects—not merely perceived aspects but what he calls 'unperceived perspectives'. Thus, real nature of an object transcends the view of the one who perceives. Its true nature is ascertained in accordance with the different standpoints of the observer, i. e. the *naya*, to use Jaina terminology.

H. H. Price⁶ also supports the above contention when he does not agree with the claims of the naive realists that perception makes no difference to what is perceived and that there is complete unanimity between the sense-data and the object perceived. He seems to support the view that perception of things are determined by many other conditions and, therefore, if we fail to take account of these conditions, our views regarding their nature are likely to be erroneous or partial.

Similarly, relativistic position of A. N. Whitehead and idealistic trends in philosophy of W. James and Schiller support Jaina *Anekāntavāds*. Whitehead in his epistemological theory takes account of spatio-temporal relations, perceiving mechanism, electrons, protons, etc. in the determination of sense-perception. Jaina *Syādvāda* may also be interpreted to suggest implicitly the theory of probability in some form.

All these considerations strengthen the Jaina position. Jaina philosophers have committed to the same truths which the contemporary scientific theories of perception and phenomenology advocate regarding the nature of a thing seen and perceived. The manifoldness of reality is a datum. We

can neither deny it nor can explain it away.

Jaina view has been strongly criticised by different thinkers. In reply to objections against Jaina view it can be said that even western idealists like Hegel and Bradley do not think that any contradiction is involved when qualities of contradictory nature co-exist in a thing. Real is an extramental entity and therefore, can never be devoid of complexity. Although varying attributes belong to reality, they are compatible. Thus, it would be wrong to hold that Jaina Syādvāda stands vitiated by such charges as are laid against it. It does not amount to idealism or scepticism. It is not contradictory to hold that an object possesses different characteristics in different conditions and relations as these characteristics are not incompatible and still in some sense the object remains unaltered though some of its appearances may change. Hence the objections against Syādvāda are not justified.

In the light of foregoing considerations, it will be seen that Jaina and Nyāya epistemology present a significant form of realism. Both Jaina and Nyāya systems are further pluralistic upholding the view of independence as regards the existent real. Both refute the impossibility of knowledge and stand for extramental character of things. Both are, therefore, concerned with the rejection of idealism. Yet, Jaina view regarding knowledge seems to be more acceptable. It avoids the defects of one-sided idealism and extreme form of realism without being slightly inconsistent. In fact, Nyāya epistemology should have reached the same conclusion along with the logical development of realistic principle of knowledge.

Jaina logicians have argued and established a case for

radical realism, or more accurately, what may be designated as revolutionary realism taking their stand on the basis of experience and logic. On the whole, it may justifiably be said that Jaina epistemology succeeds remarkably well in its defence of realism without committing excesses and also in opposition of agnosticism with its concept of most ideal kind of knowledge called by them as omniscience and, thus, presents a wellbalanced theory of knowledge, with its non-absolutist standpoint. Nyāya epistemology, in spite of being fairly realistic falls short of its basic tenet and tends to slip into idealism. Jainism, on the other hand, appears to be more consistent in its approach.

We may end, by saying that both Nyāya and Jainism can be characterized epistemologically as realistic systems of thought. They are realistic as they establish the thesis that it is possible to have faithful and direct knowledge of reality or world. Thus, both are against empirical idealism or subjectivism. As systems of realism both are committed to correspondence theory and satisfactorily explain the problem of error avoiding extreme realistic position. However, Nyāya is ultra realistic when it concedes the reality of abstract universals. In the semantical terms Nyāya position is that a general term applies to actual existent generic property, i. e. universal. Nyāya rather oversimplifies the issue when it presents the epistemological argument for universal that there are universals because we cognize individuals belonging to the same class and that there is something present in the individual which differentiates it from other things and that same thing we call 'universal'. Nyāya acceptance of universal as a separate entity is against the principle of simplicity. Jaina view of universal having objectivity and yet no separate existence seems to be more tenable. Nyāya elevation of

negation to positive entity is in keeping with its realistic position. Jaina view of negation is also realistic in so far as negation is significant negation in Jainism. Nyāya position is rather hyper-realistic when it recognizes independent existence of it. Jain view is more in keeping with its non-absolutism when it holds negation as one of the aspects of reality. As regards the import of words both hold realistic position though Jainism is more consistently realistic. Both recognize different ways of knowing. Thus, to the epistemological question whether our cognition is capable of knowing the world, Nyāya and Jaina realism contrary to idealism maintain that world is objectively given and that its laws can be known. But it is Jaina realism with its doctrine of Anekāntavāda and resulting methods of Syādvāda and Nayavāda which could give an adequate logical basis to realistic epistemology. The essentially realistic position of Jaina logic is obvious when it maintains that existents are multiform and their infinite number of characteristics can be discovered by experience alone and not created by mind. Further Jainas are relativists because of their anti-absolutist attitude. And yet, standpointism or perspectivism of Jainas has no subjective basis but is grounded upon objective data of experience. Though it seems to support dynamism of human subjectivity, it does not end into subjectivism.

Epistemologically, the peculiar features of Jaina realism are :-

- i. It is based on experience. Jaina logic is essentially empirical as distinguished from a priori.
- ii. It asserts that a thing is capable of different predications according to limitations imposed by objective differences of substance, time, space and attribute.

iii. In our perceptual knowledge things are to be cognised as both particular and universal together and neither of them exclusively.

iv. Negation is not different from perception. A real consists of both being and non-being. A perceptual cognition is cognition of both affirmation and negation.

v. As regards the import of words and meaning problem, Jaina theory is a form of objectivism.

vi. Reality is of multiple character. Jaina relativism, in fact, complements its realism and supplies it with logical basis. Relativism of Jainism tends towards objectivism and does not slip into mentalism as relativity has its root in objective universe and is, therefore, not subjective. In spite of its relativistic epistemology, its realistic position is kept quite in tact and it renders Jainism a more consistent and significant form of epistemological realism. It does not end in epistemological anarchism.

vii. Synthetic method of knowledge employed in Jainism amounts to relatedness of things. There is plurality no doubt, but it is not unrelated. It represents a system and yet it is not monistic idealism. The relatedness does not at all belittle the independence of the object.

viii. Jaina concept of extrasensory perception, especially the perfect, infinite knowledge has its basis on realism which leaves no room for scepticism whatsoever.

Thus, Jaina epistemology is remarkable both for its contents and methods. It is significant to note that some twenty-five hundred years ago, Indian—Jaina logicians had propounded the same truth which modern speculative and scientific thought to-day is slowly coming to realize. Jaina

theory of relativity of knowledge represents very advanced type of theory and it may be interpreted as suggestive of statistical or probabilistic implications. It is in keeping with the advancement of knowledge in contemporary western thought. Of course, further research needs to be done in this field which might prove its relevance to modern problems. Its contribution to the world-thought is undeniable.

Jainism, has thus, developed a full-fledged system of realism. Its realism is unique because of its peculiar relativistic epistemology which points to the truism that we have to realize the limitations of our knowledge. Realism is carried to its logical conclusion and reaches its climax in Jaina epistemology. It would be no exaggeration to say that this kind of realism, having empiricistic foundation can provide scientific basis to epistemology.

Annotations :

1. Chattopadhyaya, D. (ed.) : *Studies in History of Indian Philosophy*, Paper by 'P. C. Mahalanobis on 'the Foundations of Statistics—a Study in Jaina Logic, p. 51.
2. Ibid P. 51.
3. Datta, D. M. : *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, P. 296.
4. Matilal, B. K. : *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, pp. 89-90 : G. Ryle : *Negation*, p. 80-96.
5. Mishra, Arjun : *A Paper on 'Universals in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy' in Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No.4, July, 1979, University of Poona, ed. S. Barlingay.
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