On Āśrayāsiddha

Tōru Funayama

The aim of this paper is to clarify how the fallacy of unestablished locus or substratum (āśrayāsiddha, dharmyasiddha) was discussed in the post-Dharmakīrttīan period of Buddhist logic in India. Among the three kinds of fallacious reasons (hetvādhēgas: asiddha, viruddha, and anaikāntika), asiddha is concerned with the minor premise of the syllogism. Dignāga, the founder of this system, further subdivided it into four kinds (i.e. ubhayāsiddha, anyasthā, samādīghaḥ, and āśrayaḥ), which were followed by Dharmakīrti and also by his successors with different terminologies. However, this well-known context of formal logic prohibits a Buddhist proponent of the syllogism from employing an unreal entity as its locus. For if an unreal entity, e.g. a "self" (ātman), a "whole" (avayaviva) or a "universality" (sāmānya), is employed in the minor premise of a svaśāntrasādhana, then the reason connected with the unreal locus is judged to be false. This could lead to the curious conclusion that one cannot demonstrate the non-existence of any falsely imputed entity, as long as one remains in the field of formal logic. How did Buddhist logicians avoid this problem? In this paper, I will historically trace some developments of this problem and some of its traditional solutions.

Another point to be noted at the beginning is that there were some other asiddhas which were sometimes mentioned in actual disputation in the post-Dharmakīrtīan period, e.g. svarūpāsiddha and viśeṣapūṣiddha. Svarūpāsiddha or "non-establishment of its own nature" means a reason which is not connected with the concerned locus in terms of the reason's own nature. Substantially it means the incompatibility between the reason and the locus. The other asiddha, viśeṣapūṣiddha or viśeṣaṇam asiddham, means the non-establishment of the qualifying element of the reason. Later, these asiddhas along with others were systematically
classified by logicians of the Navyānāya school."

(I) Before entering into each problem, we need to make some general remarks concerning the types of syllogisms as related to our problem. Firstly, syllogisms concerning the problem are roughly divided into two classes: one is the anupalabdhi-type of syllogism, by means of which the proponent intends to refute an entity, e.g. a "whole", which is supposed to be real only by the other party; and the other is the vystireka-type, i.e. the contraposition of the major premise of the syllogism in the case of svabhāvahetu, by means of which the proponent excludes the possibility of an eternal entity (nitya) to be really existent (sat). In the latter case, a "sky-flower" employed as an example of an eternal thing is held to be existent neither by the proponent nor the opponent. These two kinds of syllogism should be distinguished, though they contain the same problem in ārayāsiddha: in the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti expresses a radical standpoint that the subject of the syllogism is not necessary when the major premise is in the form of contraposition (vyatireka) concerning the demonstration of momentariness of all phenomena. More concretely, he says: "Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum in this case (the Pramāṇavārttika I, v.26ab)," upon which Sākyamati’s comment runs as follows:

"Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum," i.e. a real locus, "in this case." "In this case" means in the case of svabhāvahetu and kāryahetu. [On the other hand,] in the case of svabhāvānupalabdhi, [the real locus] should be maintained." In this way, Dharmakīrti and his followers think that the subject of a syllogism do not have to be existent, if it has a contrapositional statement (vyatireka) as its major premise in the case of svabhāvya- and kāryahetu; while in the case of a statement of anupalabdhi-type, the subject must be real. However, as is widely known, this contains a more subtle problem, especially in the case of prasaṅgaviparyaya, as is
repeatedly discussed by the later Buddhist philosophers.

One more point to be noted is that the problem of Bhārayānānādha cannot occur in the anupalabdhi inference which is in the form of "Here there is no X (e.g. sāmāno/ avayavin), because of Y (e.g. anupalabdhe)," simply because the locus of the inference is not "X" but "here (atra)" which denotes a place devoid of the object in question.

All these show that the problem of Bhārayānānādha is remarkable especially in the cases of (a) the demonstration of non-momentariness by means of avabhāvahetu and (b) the anupalabdhi inference in which an unreal entity is employed as its locus.

(II) Devendrabuddhi. Dharmakīrti sets about the refutation of the oneness (ekatva) of a whole in his Pramāṇavārttika II, v.84-85, and then in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (ed. T.Vetter, pp.84-85). He does not present any syllogism, while his disciple Devendrabuddhi comments on the passages, making use of various syllogisms. Above all, he uses the avabhāvahetu inference in which the whole is employed as its locus, as well as its viparyaya form.⁸ Substantially the syllogism is judged to be a prasaṅgasādhana. But from a formal point of view, it remains uncertain whether it is a prasaṅga or not in the strict sense of the word, because the minor premise he advances, e.g. "A whole (as a locus) trembles when its parts tremble," will never be admitted by his opponents. We may say that Devendrabuddhi in this context was only vaguely aware of the notion of prasaṅga.

Śāntarakṣita, Kamalāśīla, & Dharmottara. Kamalāśīla in his Tattvasaṃgrahapāñjikā (abbrev. as TSP, hereafter) shows the following syllogism: "atha vā yad ekam tad ekadrayaṁāritam, yathaikāḥ paramāphuh. ekam cāvayavisajñitām dravyam iti vyūpakaevuddhopalabdhi(prasaṅgaḥ) prasaṅgasādhanaṁ ca.⁹ Here, setting forth a syllogism with the whole as its locus, he clearly says that it is a prasaṅga. That is to say, at the time writing of the TSP he thought that an unreal entity can be a locus only if the syllogism is a prasaṅga. This was the first clear
answer to the problem of āśrayāśiddha. It is interesting that this solution was not his final standpoint on this problem; he added a new dimension to the discussion of the ekānekaviyogahetu in his later magnum opus, the Madhyamakāloka, where he expressed his radical idea that an unreal entity can be a locus even if the syllogism is a svatantra-sādhana, because each term of a proposition is no more than a product of differentiation (vyavacchedamātra). However, this epoch-making solution which is far earlier than the similar one by Jñānārīmitra, does not seem to have influenced later Buddhist logicians of India, since the work was written in Tibet.

Going back to the TSP again, we see Kamalaśīla explaining another way that Śāntarakṣita employed to refute a whole, i.e. the usage of a gross object (sthūla) as its locus: yat parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsītām na tad ekāṃ bhavati, yathā gomahiṣam. upalabhyaṃnānapalabhyoṃnarūpaṃ pihatādirūpeṇa ca viruddhadharmādhyāsītām sthūlam iti vyāpalaviruddhāpalabdhiḥ. Here the problem of āśrayāśiddha cannot occur, since the locus is a gross object which is admitted by Buddhists. At the same time, the locus of the syllogism alludes to the whole which has the same meaning as the gross object for the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Dharmottara, too, made a similar syllogism in respect to the employment of a gross object. However, Śāntarakṣita and Dharmottara do not clearly express whether their syllogisms should be considered svatantra-sādhanas or prasaṅgas. The following are the specific features of this type of syllogisms as used by such masters: The locus, a gross object, is admitted not only by the proponent, but also by the opponent to mean the whole in an indirect way; however, it is likely that the minor premise itself is admitted only by the proponent. This kind of syllogism — which was constituted without any explanation of its validity and which could be called "a hypothetical syllogism" — was a second solution in a transitional period of Buddhist logic.

Bhāsarvaṃśa, Vācaspati & Vyomaśīva. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas such as Bhāsarvaṃśa, who criticized Dharmakīrti, and Vācaspatimīśra, who
refuted a syllogism made by Dharmottara, as well as the Vaiśeṣikas such as Vyomaśīva severely censured each Buddhist syllogism. They said that if it is not a prasaṅga- but rather a svatantrasūdhana, it commits the fallacy of non-establishment of the locus. As far as we can now survey the extant texts, Śaṅkarasvāmin, who is mentioned in the TSP, seems to be the earliest Naiyāyika commentator who criticized Buddhist syllogism, dividing them into prasaṅga- and svatantrasūdhana.13) As referred to above, this problem of Ārayaṇīsiddha arose at a different stage in the discussion, i.e. in the treatment of the vyatireka in the demonstration of momentariness. As I discussed in a previous paper,14) we can safely say that the Ārayaṇīsiddha was variously and repeatedly discussed in the contexts of refuting unreal objects and establishing momentariness of phenomena in the last half of the 9th century (i.e. by Bhāṣarvajña) and the 10th century (i.e. by Vyomaśīva and Vaiṣcaspāti).

Āśoka. Āśoka in his Avayavinirākaraṇa introduces the refutation of a whole with a syllogism in the form of vyāpokaviruddhokalabhi: "What is wrongly connected with contradictory properties, is not a unity, as for example a jar. A gross and e.g. blue object is wrongly connected with contradictory properties." In this connection, he clearly says that the locus of this syllogism is not the whole, but a gross blue object which is grasped through direct perception (pratyaśa), so that the syllogism does not commit the fallacy of non-establishment of the locus.15) In that case, however, another question arises: Does not the locus in question have anything to do with the whole? This question is answered through the following statement:

(Opponent:) "In that case [viz., if the locus is not the whole but the gross blue object,] the oneness of the whole would not be denied through [the reason] 'false connection with contradictory properties.'" (Author:) If you say so, then what do you mean by "the whole"? (Opponent:) "It is the object which is one and inherent in many parts." (Author:) Is it different from the manifesting gross and e.g. blue object, or not? Firstly, it [cannot] be different, because you admit [its] perceptibility, and nothing manifests as different
from the manifesting gross and e.g. blue object. [Then,] you might say that the whole is different [from the gross object. But this cannot hold, for] why is not the unitary whole denied, as the oneness of the [gross object] has already been negated?\footnote{The word नारायणसिद्धा indicates the reason attributed of the fallacy,}

Aśoka means that the proponent can duly refute the oneness of the whole without making use of that whole itself as the locus of the syllogism, when a gross object is employed instead of the whole, because the latter is none other than the former. In this most interesting solution, which was derived from Dharmottara's and Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla's second solution stated above, he is very sensitive to the problem of नारायणसिद्धा and thinks that the locus of the syllogism should not be an unreal entity in accordance with the traditional standpoint. In this sense, the syllogism he presents is judged to be a svatantrasādhana. Here in Aśoka's explanation we can trace the development of the second solution to the problem of नारायणसिद्धा which took the discussion one step further than ever before. It is a pity that we have no evidence as to when and how this scholar flourished.\footnote{The word नारायणसिद्धा indicates the reason attributed of the fallacy,}

Falsely imputed entities such as a whole or a universality, though they are not admitted by Buddhists, each have a corresponding entity, viz., the atoms or the individuals, as admitted by themselves, while purely fictitious entities such as a "sky-flower" or "hare's horn" do not correspond to any reality. Aśoka's solution stated above was effective for the former case, but not for the latter. In this sense, it is applied to limited cases. We may surmise that the Buddhist logicians of that period felt the need for other solutions which could be applied to the "sky-flower" employed as a locus in the demonstration of momentariness, until the appearance of ज्ञानाभिंत्रिमित्र and Ratnakīrti\footnote{The word नारायणसिद्धा indicates the reason attributed of the fallacy,} in the last period of Buddhist logic, who finally declared that an unreal locus such as a "sky-flower" could be duly employed if the concerned proposition had a negative and contrapositional major premise. But for the more details we will need further research.

(Key words) asiddha, āsrayāśiddha, prasaṅga, svatantrasiddhāna, Aśoka

(Research Fellow, Kyoto University)