ON THE QUADRUPLE DIVISION OF THE YOGASĀSTRA,
THE CATURVYOHATVA OF THE CIKITSĀŚASTRA
AND THE • FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS • OF THE BUDDHA

(Studies in the Pātañjalyaṇgaśāstravivaraṇa II)

1. The publication of the Pātañjalyaṇgaśāstravivaraṇa¹ — wrongly
entitled « Pātañjalyaṇgaśūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa » by the editors² — has, as
the late Paul Hacker aptly remarked³, « raised a new problem in the
study of the history of [Indian] philosophy »⁴. Hacker’s attention was
drawn to this text, though it is a commentary on the Yogasūtra (= YS)
and Yogabhāṣya (= YBh/Ybhāṣya), because it was regarded by the
editors to be a work of Saṅkara, the Advaitin. For, Hacker has, as is
well known, given much thought to the problem of how to distinguish
between the authentic works of Saṅkara, the Advaitin, and the many
spuria ascribed to him, and he has evolved various criteria to prove
authenticity. Therefore, it is by no means unexpected that he accepted
the challenge posed by the publication of yet another text ascribed to
the Advaitin. In his most stimulating article published in 1968⁵ he does
not, however, really want to prove the identity of the author of the

¹ Ed. by Polakam Sri Rama Sastri and S.A. Krishnamurthi Sastri (= MGOS,
no. XCIV), Madras, 1952. Most valuable observations on this text and on the
authorship problem have been made by W. Halārass; cf. the appendix, Notes on the « Yoga-
sūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa », in his recent monograph, « Studies in Kumāra and Saṅkara ».
Reinbek, 1983, to which I should like to refer the reader also as regards the secon-
dary literature so far published on the Vivaraṇa.
² Cf. my article, Philological Observations on the so-called Pātañjalyaṇgaśūtra-
abhāṣyavivaraṇa (Studies in the Pātañjalyaṇgaśāstravivaraṇa I), in IIJ, vol. 25 (1983),
³ Viz. on pp. 124-218 of his article, Saṅkara der Yogin und Saṅkara der Advaitin.
Einige Beobachtungen, in « Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für
Erich Frauwallner », aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstags herausgegeben von G. Ober-
hammer, Wien, 1968 (= WZKSO, 12-13, 1968-69), pp. 119-48 = Kleine Schriften. Heraus-
The following this article is referred to by « (Hacker) 1968 ».
⁴ The German original runs as follows: « ... der der Erforschung der Philoso-
phieggeschichte ein neues Problem stellt ».
⁵ Cf. fn. 3.
2. It is in this connection that Hacker deals with the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra as it is stated, and most emphatically at that, at the very beginning of the Vivarāṇa. He says: "At YBh 2.15, the division of the Yogaśāstra is compared to that of a system of therapeutics. Sāṅkara resumes this idea in the introduction to his YV [=Pātālgalayoṣaśāstra-vivarāṇa] when explaining the purpose of the Yogaśāstra. This shows that he looked upon Yoga as a therapeutic system. The same idea, except for the division itself (which is proper only to Yoga), is repeated by Ś when he in the introduction to his Mābh [=Māṇḍūkya Bāṣya] points out the purpose of the text to be explained [i.e. the Māṇḍūkya Up.]; but what he now brings in is the monistic teaching by which man as one sick due to Suffering has to be led to health of the Self. In introductions to other works of his, Ś recurs to the concept of therapeutics (cikitīta) (viz. USP [=Upadeśasāhasrī-Padyaprabandha] 19, 1), and once again to the idea of illness and health, only that the concept of therapeutic treatment is dropped (viz. USG [=Upadeśasāhasrī-Gadyaprabandha] 47). Here it is natural to assume that the

three works in which the idea of therapeutical treatment is stressed belong together in point of time and are connected with Yoga. For Yoga is a practice that can easily be compared to therapeutics. Ś’s Vedānta, however, does not teach a method by following which one is gradually led to the goal of liberation; that is why he (later) rejects Yoga, cf. below. Accordingly, in the USG (perhaps a later work) it is only the disciple who expects from his teacher a kind of therapeutical treatment; the teacher, however, does not promise any such thing; all he aims at is to lead to liberating insight*.

2.1. The passage of the Vivarāṇa referred to by Hacker is found almost at the very beginning of the text. It is preceded, or rather introduced, by a statement to the effect that the Yogaśāstra will be studied and the method it teaches practised by people only if its sambandha and prayojana are shown. It is to the prayojana, i.e. the «purpose» of the Yogaśāstra, that the Vivarāṇakāra addresses himself first, for he continues:


2.2. In a later part of his article 11 Hacker returns to this passage; what he says there is: 12


The German original runs thus: « YBh 2.15 ist die Einteilung des Yogaśāstra mit der eines Systems der Therapeutik verglichen. S nimmt diesen Gedanken auf in der Einleitung zum V (p. 2), wo er den Zweck des Lehrsystems erläutert will. Damit ist der Yoga als eine Therapie aufgefasst. Den gleichen Gedanken, mit Weglassung der (nur für das Yogasystem passenden) Einteilung, wiederholt S, als er in der Einleitung zu Mābh den Zweck des zu erläuternden Textes angeben will; nun ist es die monistische Lehre, die den Leidenkranz zur Gesundheit des Selbst führt. In Einübungen zu anderen Werken Ss kehrt die Idee der Therapie (cikitīta) noch einmal wieder (USP 19.11) und dann noch einmal der Gedanke der Krankheit und Gesundheit, unter Weglassung des Begriffs der Heilbehandlung (USG 47). Die Annahme liegt nahe, dass die drei Werke, wo der Gedanke der Heilbehandlung betont ist, zeitlich zusammengehören und dem Yoga nahestehen. Denn dieser ist methodische Übung, die leicht mit einer Therapie verglichen werden kann. Ss Vedānta dagegen will keine Methode lehren, die durch Übungen kontinuierlich zum Ziel der Erlösung führe; darumlehnt er (später) den Yoga ab, vgl. unten. Dementsprechend ist es im USG (einem vielleicht späten Werk) blos der Schüler, der von seinem Lehrer eine Art Heilbehandlung erwarten; der Lehrer verspricht ihm nichts dergleichen, er will blos zur Erkenntnis führen».


9. Here the Trivandrum MS (cf. the article mentioned in fn. 2) has the reading cikitāsāstravat tac", which most probably originated under the influence of the preceding tāvat or by dittography.

10. ca tat is an emendation of the editors; it is not corroborated by the Triv. Ms.

11. Cf. YS 2.26; see below p. 295.

12. Cf. YS 2.25; see below p. 295.

13. 1968, p. 139 l. 233 f.

The contents of Yoga are here divided into four chapters (vyāhāra) by analogy with the system of therapeutics (cikitsā-śāstra) and in dependence on YS 2.15 ff.: 1) "Saṃśāra, full of Suffering, is to be avoided". (In therapeutics this corresponds to the teaching of Illness, roga.) 2) "The cause of saṃśāra is the subject of the object with the base of nescience" (this is the "Cause of Illness", roga-hetutā). 3) "The means by which [saṃśāra] is avoided is the unswerving lucidity of discriminating knowledge" (the "Remedy", bhāṣajya). 4) "When this has been attained then nescience is eliminated, and the connection of subject and object ceases entirely; that is avoidance, absolute independence" (in therapeutics: "Health", ārogya). It may be noted in passing that this division shows a certain similarity also to the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Yet the second and third truth — Suffering and Its Annihilation — are gathered into one, and in accordance with the more positive outlook of Brahmanism a chapter is added on the final goal — absolute independence, corresponding to Health.


15. In rendering the term vyāha by "chapter" Hacker has, I think, made the wrong choice, though he is in accordance with the PV (vol. VI, column 1485). If its meaning is not simply "part, division" here, one should rather think of its being used (e.g. in the Árhašāstra) as a military term to denote a "battle-array", i.e. in a more general sense a "purposeful, systematic arrangement". Cf. also R. Garbe's explanation of this term as used in Vījñāna-Bhikṣu's Sānkhyapravacanabhaṣya (see below fn. 31). Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhaṣya ... aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt, Leipzig, 1889, p. 11, fn. 2: "...bei dem vyāha liegt ein kramaṇa 'ugopadhānandā vinyāsa varo...."

Note that the author of the Vivaraṇa offers (p. 169, l. 3 ff.) two alternative explanations of the compound caturvyāha, viz., catura vyāha asya and asya artha (= saṃśāra, saṃśāraheitu etc.) caturdhā vyāha 'asya.

To divide the teaching of Yoga in this manner is, to be sure, by no means improper. But it has to be noted that, firstly, the system of Pātañjala-Yoga contains various elements that do not strictly fit into the [fourfold] scheme, e.g. the teaching of the magical perfections (śiddhi), and that, secondly, this system [i.e. that of Yoga], as it is found in the Sūtras themselves, is not divided in this manner. The division is an interpretation introduced by Sūr.; it wholly corresponds to the decidedly practical, didactic, nay, therapeutic interest that is to be noted again and again in the Advala works of Sūr.'s also.

Therefore, it is noteworthy that the Advala Sūr., at the one place where he expounds the essential content of his teaching without any reference to texts to be explained and in a purely argumentative manner, takes up the very scheme of division he had already established when still a Yogin. The idea of therapeutics had now to recede into the background (cf. above § 2), but the disposition of the 2. pros. prakaraṇa of the USG corresponds exactly to the four vyāha division. USG 45-47 deals with saṃśāra as Suffering. In 48 we have the beginning of the instruction about the Cause of Suffering: nescience. Without sharp cleavage approximately from 58 onwards it gradually yields to initiation into discriminating knowledge. USG 109 describes the attainment of the goal:"

...tād asya mahato duḥkhasaumudāyasva prabhavabijānam avidyā // tasyāt ca samyagyadarsanam abhāvahetvā // yathā cikitsāstra ca tātuṣṭam caturvyāham // rogo rogahetutā ārogyam bhāṣajyam iti evam idam api caturāṃ caturvyāham eva // tadyathā // saṃśārāḥ saṃśārahetu mokṣo mokṣopapāya // iti / tatra duḥkhabahutāḥ saṃśāraḥ heyaḥ // pradhānapuruṣasyaḥ // samyogyo heyaḥhetuḥ // samyogasyāvāntakā nivṛttitā hānam // hānapāyaḥ samyagyadarsanam // ...

This is not only by itself an unequivocal statement, but comparison also clearly shows that it was simply reformulated by the author of

16. Note that this sentence stands in contradiction with what H. had said at the end of the passage quoted above (§ 2).

the Vivarana; the one substantial difference to be dealt with first is the point at which this quadruple division is taught in either work; apparently, by the time of the Vivaranakāra it had become usual for (sub-)commentators or authors of scientific works to deal already at the beginning with the *purpose* (*prayojana*), etc., of their main subject in order to convince the reader or hearer that it was worthwhile to take the trouble of studying it carefully. That is why the Vivaranakāra decided to point out the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra already at the very outset of his commentary; and, to be sure, he need not state explicitly that this *example* (*drṣṭānta*), i.e. the comparison of the Yogaśāstra with the science of medicine, was not his own invention; instead, what was of importance to him was to emphasize that the division is in accordance with explicit statements of Patañjali himself. And this claim of the Vivaranakāra cannot be a *limine* treated with contempt as yet another example of the common practice of commentators to have what is but their own idea or, at least, an idea of later origin sanctioned, as it were, by the accepted authority of the *mūla* text. His assertion that the *caturvyūhasīva* of the Yogaśāstra is pointed out (*pradarśita*) in the *YS* itself, beginning with *sūtra* 2.15, obviously does not belong to the category of such wishful, forced interpretations. Yet, it calls, nevertheless, for closer examination.

The Vivaranakāra’s reference to *YS* 2.15 may have been provoked in the first place by the fact that it is *sūtra* in explaining which the Bhāsyakāra deals with the subject of the *caturvyūhasīva*, i.e. makes the statement (quoted above) about the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra; nonetheless it cannot be denied that the *sūtra* itself:

*parināmatāpasaṃkāradukhkhair guṇavivodhaḥ ca duṣkham eva satyam vivekināḥ*

stands out in that in it the term *duṣkha* is not simply used as in others also, but is central to it; for it declares that *to a vivekin, i.e. the Yogi who possesses discriminating insight into reality as analysed by Yoga, everything is Suffering in view of the various forms of Suffering consisting in change, mental or physical pain and subliminal impressions* and because of the fact that the functions of the constituents [of pramādamental matter] are opposed to each other*. Undoubtedly, this is a central element of Yoga as expounded in the *Sūtra*. Ascribing to life, as it does, the character of being nothing but Suffering, *YS* 2.15 must indeed be regarded as the pivotal statement about the nature of reality in the *YS*. And in the immediately following *sūtra* (2.16: *heyaṁ duṣkham anāgataḥ*) it is taught that *it is Suffering yet to come that has to be avoided*", whereas in *YS* 2.17 the "cause of that which has to be avoided" (*heyahetu*) is defined as *dāraṣṭṛdyayoh samyogah, i.e. the connection of the subject with the object". As the three latter terms call for further elucidation, actually given in *sūtras* 2.18-23, it is only in *YS* 2.24 (*tasya hetur avidyāḥ*) that nescience is expressly stated to be the cause of this connection. The term *hāna*, which the reader now expects, is in fact met with in the next *sūtra* (2.25) which reads thus: *tadābhāvāt samyogabhāvam hānām, tad drṣṭe kaivalyam: “Avoidance is the non-existence of the connection on account of its (i.e. the nescience’s) non-existence; this is the seer’s (i.e. the spirit’s or soul’s) being absolutely-by-himself". The obvious question as to the means of avoidance, i.e. of attaining the state of liberation, is answered by the immediately following *sūtra* (2.26): *vivekakhyāyair aviśvattvam hānāpyāḥ: “The means to avoidance is the steady or firm lucidity-of-discriminating-knowledge", i.e. the complete or perfect realization of the absolute difference between puruṣa and prakṛti.

Thus it is already on the historical level of the *YS* itself that, in a series of *sūtras* obviously forming a unitary whole, four clearly demarcated concepts are attested, viz.

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21. The term is used by the Vivaranakāra himself, viz. p. 168, l. 21.
22. The author of the Vivaraṇa explains (p. 159, l. 12) that strictly speaking all three of them are but "causes of Suffering" (*duṣkha niṣṭhītāḥ*). For further elucidation, I should like to refer the reader to the Bhāṣya and the Vivaraṇa on this *sūtra*. That this *sūtra* clearly exhibits Buddhist influence was shown by L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, V, 1936-37, p. 234 f. The term *sāṃskāra* has, of course, quite another meaning in Buddhist texts. Though one cannot, of course, be absolutely sure, it was probably reinterpreted already by the author of *YS* 2.15.
2. It is expounded likewise by the author of the YBhāṣya, unequivocally and in detail, and it is he who apparently has to be given the credit for comparing the quadruply divided Yogaśāstra to the science of medicine; in any case, this comparison seems to have been added later.

3. The division is but repeated by the Vivaranākāra, viz. for the obvious reasons stated already at the very outset of his work.

In order not to go astray in interpreting the relevant passages, it is further advisable, if not even imperative, not to follow Hacker's argumentary approach. As has also been shown elsewhere, it is by far better for considerations of method not to let oneself be impressed too much by the fact that the Vivaraṇa is in its colophons ascribed to a Saṅkarabhaṅgavat; what we should do instead is to take the authorship of the Vivaraṇa to be a problem which is still unsolved. References to the quadruple division as a whole, or in part, found in a work of S., the Advaitin, should not therefore be studied on the basis of the assumption made by Hacker. Instead of arguing the way he does, viz. that if we assume the identity of the Vivaranakāra and S., the Advaitin, we are able to explain peculiarly Yoga features in the authentic works of S., the Advaitin, in the manner outlined by Hacker, we should face up to the real problem in all its seriousness and intricacy, viz. put ourselves, without bias the pivotal question whether the quadruple division, if met with in a work of S.'s, or even suggestions of such a division there, can in fact best be explained by assuming the Vivaraṇa to be another and then, to be sure, the earliest work of the famous Advaita philosopher.

This assumption could be regarded as necessary if, and only if, the comparative study of the relevant passages in authentic works of S. listed by Hacker himself, on the one hand, and the exposition of the caturyāhatva of the Yogaśāstra in the Vivaraṇa, on the other, were to reveal so specific a correspondence that the hypothesis that the author is one and the same in both cases would suggest itself as the only solution or, at least, the one most plausible.

In view of the close similarity between the Vivaranākāra's exposition and that of the Bhāṣyakāra, specific correspondence could in our case firstly mean 'literal agreement'. No such agreement has, however, been pointed out by Hacker, and, to be sure, there is none. But, secondly, what about the condition of a peculiar property being common both to the Vivaraṇa and an authentic work of S., the Advaitin?

Is not the sequence of the last two members of the fourfold division in the case of the USG reversed, and does not this change, on the one hand, stand clearly in contrast to the order of enumeration as found in the YS and -Bhāṣya, and strikingly agree, on the other, with the Viva-

24. I am, of course, aware of the fact that not all the sūtras quoted are 'definitions' in the strict sense of the word.

25. At least as regards the caturyāhatva as a divisionary scheme, Obviously Hacker had lost sight of the important difference between a systematic division or divisionary scheme as such and its having actually been made the basis of a corresponding disposition of the material.
rañkāra's exposition? One cannot but answer this question in the positive, and it is surprising that Hacker is silent on this. Nevertheless, one will hesitate to rest satisfied with simply noting this admittedly interesting point of agreement, at least, if one wants to escape the reproach of superficiality or of drawing premature conclusions. For, the correspondence might equally be coincidental.

Now, as for the USG, the reason for S.'s giving first what Hacker calls the "initiation into discriminating knowledge" and describing only thereafter the final goal or its attainment, is, I think, clear enough and need not provoke controversy. Since this portion of the USG is conceived by S. as a dialogue between a disciple and a teacher approached for instruction, there can hardly be any doubt that the instruction is given with a view to its application; what S. has in mind is the actual succession of stages the disciple has to pass through; and that in reality the final goal is, if at all, attained last need hardly be mentioned.

The crucial point, however, is: are we to assume that the Vivarañkāra in changing the sequence was led by the same or a similar motive? In his case, the fact that he does not keep to the order of succession as found in the YS and the Bhāṣya is even more striking, since the four vyāhas of the Cikitsāsāstra are enumerated by him exactly in the same sequence as by the Bhāṣyakāra; the result being that the two series lack complete parallelism, and that the author is compelled to make clear in his last sentence that kaivalya in the quadruple division of Yoga corresponds to ārogya in that of the Cikitsāsāstra (cf. ārogyaśāthāṃya' in the passage quoted above).

It is, however, this last sentence, together with the context in which the statement of caturyayāhatsa as a whole stands in the Vivarañ (cf. above p. 291), that provides us with the key for discovering the reason for the transposition in this text. The problem from which the author starts is, as has been noted already above, the exigency of dealing at the outset of his work explicitly with the prayojana of the Yogaśāstra. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that particular stress is laid on that vyāha to which the practice of Yoga is ultimately said to lead, and that this emphasis is achieved also by letting the whole discussion culminate in the exposition of what is taken to be the "purpose", i.e. of kaivalya.

To adduce further circumstantial evidence, if additional arguments are at all necessary: the transition from YS 2.24 to the subsequent one is gained in the Bhāṣya by the following remark: heyam duṣṭkhaṁ heyakāroṇaṁ ca samyogākhyam sanimitam uktam / ataḥ paraṁ hānaṁ vaktavyam /. All the Vivarañkāra says in commenting on the latter sentence is (p. 203.13-14): ataḥ paraṁ hānaṁ ārogyasthāṇyaṁ mokṣāstāsprayojanam vaktavyam / vaksyamānasaṁkrtaṁ ca sroṭbuddhisamādhanāt / . It is true that he does not state explicitly why 'avoidance is to be taught next', but at the same time the absence of any remark on his part to the effect that in reality, i.e. in the practice of Yoga, what is called hānopāya comes, of course, first is, I think, quite conspicuous.

These observations will, I trust, suffice to corroborate the assumption made above, viz. that the conspicuous transposition of the last two vyāhas in the introduction of the Vivarañ is caused by nothing else than the wish to bring out into proper relief the "sāstrārambhaprayojana" (cf. p. 161.11) 27.

Therefore, it can safely be stated that the agreement between the USG and the Vivarañ as regards the interchange of the last two vyāhas is but coincidental, i.e. caused in each case by quite different deliberations. It is hence quite possible, that S., if at all under the influence of Yoga texts in this respect, was inspired either by the YBhāṣya or perhaps even the YS itself. On the basis of the methodological considerations outlined above (p. 297) and in view of the observations made with regard to the exposition of the theory of the caturvyāhatva in the three Yoga texts (cf. above p. 296), one cannot, therefore, help drawing the final conclusion that the comparative study of the USG and the Vivarañ does not by any means yield sufficient evidence for the identity of the authors of the two texts as taken for granted by Hacker.

Although Hacker's basic assumption is thus — once more — shown to be highly problematic, nay practically unjustified, the question arising next should not be left unasked, viz. whether an element in authentic works of S., the Advaitin, reminding us of the Yoga theory of caturvyāhatva warrants the assumption of an external influence in general or of an influence exercised on S. by the YBhāṣya or the YS in particular. What is called for in this connection is a critical reexamination of the passages referred to by Hacker; such a reexamination yields the following results.

27. I do not, of course, want to keep silent about the fact that there is, on the other hand, a passage in the Vivarañ where in striking and awkward contrast to its beginning it is the hānopāya, viz. samyagārthana, that is spoken of as prayojana, viz. p. 169, 1. 14-15: ārāhyamāṇasya śāstrasya samyagārthanaṁ eva prayojanam (cf. also the quite frequent expression samyagārthanaśāstra). If this latter remark is not merely meant to account for the somewhat puzzling fact that the Bhāṣyakāra already in commenting on YS 2.15 (and not only on 2.20) touches on the topic of the hāna (cf. p. 169, 1. 10 ff.), other explanations one could think of are (1) that this apparent inconsistency is due to an upacāra: the term which primarily denotes the means is used metonymically to denote its result; or (2) that samyagārthana insofar as it is the pratipakṣa (cf. 168.16) of Nesience, the true instance of Suffering, is here regarded as the main thing to be achieved, ensuing almost automatically as it does hāna; or (3) that samyagārthana is given preference because hāna is an avastu, i.e. not something positive, but only the not-existing-any-longer of the connection between subject and object (bandhanoparāma) (cf. p. 294, 1. 15-16). On the other hand, however, the text might be corrupt here: ārogya could have replaced an original śāstrasya (cf. also 1. 14 ... śāstram atakparam abhyāte) and samyagārthana could not have been used in a narrower sense in the YBh itself, viz. p. 170, 1. 2.

28. In any case, the Vivarañkāra's motive for the transposition cannot have been S's also. On the order of enumeration of the four vyāhas in Yoga texts and that of the Four Noble Truths cf. below p. 306.
On the one hand it has to be admitted that the disciple in USG 47 compares himself to a sick person (rogaṇ) and that Ś., led by deliberations like those outlined above, might have deliberately changed the sequence of the last two vyāhās against that attested in the YBhāṣya and YS. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that the quadruple division itself is nowhere in the USG stated explicitly. This fact was, admittedly, noticed by Hacker; but is the explanation he offers, viz. that the division «is proper only to Yoga», not too simple a solution, or rather an attempt to avoid addressing himself to the methodological problem involved? In any case, Hacker's remarks are thought-provoking; for he is clearly of the opinion that the dispositional structure underlying the USG materially corresponds to the four vyāhās as enumerated by the Vivaraṇākāra; this might be true, though there still remains a doubt, viz. that when he «discovered» this internal structure of the USG Hacker was fully convinced of the identity of the two authors. It is, of course, not possible to adduce against Hacker the argument that it would then hardly be understandable that Ś. should, nevertheless, have refrained from explicitly introducing the quadruple division itself precisely because it «is proper only to Yoga». For Ś. may have applied the quadruple division to the teaching of Vedānta in spite of its impurity, i.e. deliberately, yet also so inconspicuously that it passes almost unnoticed.

Therefore, what can be said is at best that the possibility of an influence exercised by the YBhāṣya or perhaps the YS itself cannot be entirely ruled out. And if the internal structure of the USG really reflects the quadruple division, such an influence may even be regarded as comparatively probable in view of the fact that Ś.'s works show this influence in other respects, too. But, the other possibility cannot be excluded with absolute certainty, viz. that Ś. was, on the contrary, under the influence of some other tradition, or under no specific influence at all. As to this latter alternative, one cannot but ask the following questions: would not anyone who takes life to be nothing but Suffering, or Illusion, and who accordingly looks upon man as in need of liberation incline most naturally to the view that man as he is can be compared to a person suffering from a physical ailment? Is not anyone who takes such a view of life quite easily led to put himself the question as to the reasons of this metaphysical ailment, the means of overcoming it and the state of final liberation? Thus it is, perhaps, even equally possible that Ś. was here influenced by a general religious tradition or a more specific one to which he himself belonged.

The probative force of the other two passages to which Hacker has drawn attention, viz. USP 19.1. and the introduction of the Māṇḍūkyabhāṣya, turns out to be weaker still if examined on the basis of the methodological considerations which have been outlined above.

The metaphor contained in the expression jñānavirāgabheṣajam and the characterization of this medicine as tṛṣṇāvaranāśakārānam cikitsitam in the USP do not by themselves warrant the conclusion that what Ś. is actually doing here is to resume concepts developed by him when still an adherent of Yoga. This holds equally good for the passage in the Māṇḍūkyabhāṣya Hacker must have had in mind; there the question as to the prayojana of the teaching expounded in this Upaniṣad is answered by the following statement:

rogārtasyeva roganiṣyatau svasthatā / tathā duḥkhātmakasyatmano dvaitaprapaṇcospamsam svasthatā / advaitabhaṇdā prayojanam / dvaitapraṇaśayasyādyāyākṛtyavādā vidyāyā tadvāpaśamah syād iti brāhmaṇudvāyākṛtyādā byāhrambhāḥ kriyate /.

Since the problem from which Ś. starts here is the same as that discussed by the Vivaraṇākāra, one could, of course, take here, too, the view that Ś. is but resuming older ideas of his, but again it is by no means self-evident that other possibilities of accounting for this comparison, possibilities which suggest themselves most easily, can be excluded with any degree of certainty. On the contrary, one cannot but wonder if, before the publication of the Vivaraṇa expressly attributing it to Śaṅkara, Hacker himself or anybody working in the same field would have thought of suspecting these passages of showing an (external) influence.

2.4. What remains to be followed up now is Hacker's suggestion of a certain similarity between the quadruple division of the Yoga-śāstra and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear whether what he had in mind was only a structural similarity or an historical connection: the manner in which he formulates his view, though probably with the aim of revealing yet another instance of Hinduism being indebted to Buddhism, does not by itself preclude the first interpretation. Be that as it may, in order to examine critically his standpoint it is advisable to summarize the results of our foregoing study of Yoga texts, and this is best done by a synoptical chart:

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29. Apart from the self-contradictory character of Hacker's respective remarks (cf. fn. 16), I should like to stress the following: even if Ś did not regard the quadruple division as «proper only to Yoga», the fact that it is not stated by him expressly to be the USG's divisionary scheme might be due to some other reason also; after all this is also not done in the YS. In any case, this possibility does not affect my argument.
30. The term prapañcospāśama is met with also in Nāgārjuna's Mūlāmadhyamakakārikā, viz. 25.4.
Hacker’s remarks imply that the first vyūha, i.e. the first line of our chart, is taken by him to correspond to the first Noble Truth of the Buddha, i.e. that of duḥkha (P. dukkha); and this correspondence can in fact be hardly disputed. Yet, of the second and third truth he says that they are gathered into one; this cannot but mean that there is but one element in the quadruple division of the Cikitsā- and Yogaśastras corresponding to the truths of dukkhasamudaya (P. dukkhasamudaya) and dukkhaniruddha (P. dukkhaniruddha) taken together. Hacker does not specify to which of the remaining vyūhas these two are to correspond, and it is indeed quite difficult to reconstruct his argument. In any case, his assertion is far from being convincing. Therefore, it seems advisable to examine the question at issue once more, without reference to Hacker’s view.

What is meant by the concept rogaheṭu of the Cikitsāśstra and by heyayheṭu, corresponding to it in Yoga, is clearly nothing but what constitutes the cause of the disease or the cause of that which has to be avoided. If dukkhasamudaya, on the other hand, is taken to denote a process, i.e. the rise of Suffering, one would have to take note of a striking conceptual difference, viz. that between cause and process as denoted by these terms respectively. But, can it simply be taken for granted that it is this and nothing else that is meant by the term dukkhasamudaya? Such an assumption is scarcely satisfactory, and not so much because the formation of the primary noun samudaya would, at least according to Pāṇ. 3.3.56 in connection with 3.3.18 and 19, allow among others of a meaning that from which or by which something arises, but because there are passages in canonical Buddhist texts which seem to show clearly that the term was in fact used to denote that by which the rising of duḥkha is caused; e.g. at Vbh 107 it is expressly stated: tathā ca avasesa ca kilesā ayaṁ vuccati dukkhasamudaya; or, to give another example, at S III.158 the question katum ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayo is answered thus: yāyaṁ tathā pana bhikkhavikā nandida rajasahagata tatra tattābhinandini, seyyathādham kāmānanda bhavatānāṁ vihavatānāṁ ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave dukkhasamudayo.

One cannot, of course, be absolutely sure that these explanations are meant to be proper definitions of the term dukkhasamudaya; nor that they meet the original intention of the term; nor that the term was not elsewhere understood to denote a process. But it has, on the other hand,
to be admitted as another possibility that Buddhist monks themselves have taken it to mean the cause of Suffering, i.e. that which causes dukkha to arise. And it is this possibility that alone matters in the present context; for, if understood thus, the second Noble Truth would indeed fully correspond to the second vyāha.

As for duḥkhiṇaṇīrodha, similar observations can be made. In view of its formation, the term could denote the process of suppressing or destroying, viz. that which causes Suffering; or else it could mean the result this process is ultimately to lead to, viz. the final suppression or rather cessation of Suffering. Again, there are passages indicating that Buddhist authors themselves may well have taken the term to denote the result; e.g. at S III.158 it is defined as taniḥaṇya āsasavāvaganirodha cāgā Passive of ussagga mutti andālaya, and explained at Nd 1.94 by niḥbācayam. There are two possibilities of interpreting the first of these two statements: either it is a definition proper; in this case, the implicit equation of duḥkhiṇaṇīrodha with tanhaṇīrodha (which is expressly given at A III.418) precludes the possibility of taking nirodha, to denote the result; or it is a quasi-definition, i.e. an inexplicit explanation where the substitution of the result by that which causes it, i.e. of dukkha by tanha, is quite understandable, and not only in terms of metonymy; in this latter case, it would have to be regarded as evidence warranting the assumption that the term duḥkhiṇaṇīrodha has in fact been used to denote the result. Interpreted in this manner, and, to be sure, this interpretation is more probable, the third Noble Truth could be said to be quite similar to the third vyāha, i.e. ārogya/hāna 32. This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that the nirvāṇa is compared also in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya to the state of ārogya 33.

However, the fact should not be lost sight of that the latter term virtually means the state of “being again free of disease”, i.e. that the basic idea is in this case palpably different in that, in accordance with biological facts, a previous state of health is presupposed which is but regained. The Buddhist analysis of existence does not, of course, know of an analogous previous state of freedom from Suffering; on the contrary, Suffering is recognized as the fundamental constituent element of existence. However, this conceptual difference does not really detract from the conclusion arrived at above, viz. that the third Noble Truth in fact corresponds to the third element in the quadruple division of the Cikīṁśaḷā; for, what has been said with regard to the

relation in which the term duḥkhiṇaṇīrodha stands to the term ārogya, holds good likewise for the comparison between the science of medicine and Yogaśāstra: for, also according to Yoga there is no such thing like a previous state free from dukkha, i.e. preceding samśāra 34. Therefore, one cannot but observe that already the correspondence between the four vyāhas of the Cikīṁśaḷā, on the one hand, and the four divisions of the Yogaśāstra, on the other, is conceptionally and terminologically not an absolutely complete one. Yet, at the same time one will recall the mediaeval proverb “omne simile claudit” 35 and, accordingly, refrain from overrating this element of discrepancy in either case, i.e. as regards the correspondence between the Cikīṁśaḷā and the Yogaśāstra as well as at that between this caturvyāhatava and the Four Noble Truths. In any case, one cannot subscribe to Hacker’s views, including that last voiced by him, viz. that in accordance with the more positive outlook of Brahmanism a chapter is added on the final goal; for, though the concepts of hāna, etc., on the one hand, and of duḥkhiṇaṇīrodha, etc., on the other, are admittedly different in terms of philosophical content, one cannot fail to notice that the descriptions given in Yoga texts of the final goal, i.e. “absolute independence” (kaivalya), too, do not stand out by being particularly detailed. On the contrary, one is rather struck by the obvious reserve of Yoga authors in this regard 36.

Thus one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, since the third line of our chart might well correspond to the third Noble Truth, there is hardly any basis for Hacker’s assumption that this vyāha forms a peculiar addition on the part of the Brahmanical Sāstras, not to speak of the “more positive outlook” of Brahmanism it allegedly demonstrates. The Buddha, too, did not confine himself to analysing existence and to unveiling its basic character of being nothing but Suffering, but has at the same time claimed to have discovered a practical path to liberation.

The final question to be discussed in this connection is whether the last Noble Truth, i.e. that of duḥkhiṇaṇīrodhaṁ āsāt (P. dukkhiṇaṇīrodhaṁ āsāt), can also be compared to one of the four vyāhas. Though Hacker is silent on this question, it is, I think, by no means illegitimate to assume a correspondence between this āryasatya and the remaining vyāha, i.e. bhāṣajya or hānopāyā.

Systematically, they are in fact not different: common to all three of them is the status and function of a remedy. But there are also

32. Note that hāna is explained by Yoga authors to consist in the non-existence (abhāva) or in the coming-to-an-end (nivṛtti, uparama) of that which causes Suffering or in liberation (mokṣa).

33. P. 202.8.; I thank Dr. Ch. Lindner for having drawn my attention to this passage. According to the Mahābhārata, p. 229 le Nirvāṇa est dāyā comparé à l’absence de maladie... dans une stancse gnomique du Madhyamāgama... (MN I.510.9-10). Cf. also Pāṇiniṣkandhaprakaraṇa, ed. by C. Ch. Lindner, in AO, 40 (1979), p. 122, fn. 28, as well as the references s.v. ārogya in the CPD.

34. At least not for the individual living beings.


36. This reserve may be caused either by the Yoga conception of kaivalya itself (cf. the Vīvaṇaśaṇkra’s characterization of hāna as an avastā; see fn. 27) or to the well-known reluctance of mystics to give a detailed positive description of their experience(s); or to the lack of such experience(s) on the part of the authors concerned, or, finally, to a combination of some of these reasons.
differences which cannot be ignored. Terminologically and conceptionally the fourth Noble Truth is distinguished by the fact that it explicitly states that the "remedy" is not something lying at hand, but that in order to reach the final goal of duḥkhanirodha, one has to take a specific route leading to it. Though the distance to be covered is, quite understandably, not specified, the image of a path forms a peculiar and central element of the Buddhist concept 37. Of course, there cannot be the least doubt that it is precisely in this regard that the Yogic concept of "means of avoidance" is virtually identical with the fourth Noble Truth; for, the central purport of Yoga is to teach a practice by applying which one is gradually led to vivekakhyāti that ultimately brings about the irreversible cessation of the connection between subject and object, i.e. kāivalya. But it remains noteworthy that the character of being a process is not indicated by the corresponding term employed in Yoga texts or by the explanations given for it by the commentators 38. Despite of this difference, however, the correspondence between the fourth Noble Truth and the vyāha listed in the last line of our chart cannot but be styled as quite close.

The final result achieved by our comparison of the Four Noble Truths as a whole with the quadruple division of the two Brahmanical Śāstras is, therefore, that the correspondence between them can be regarded as even strikingly close, if we make the assumptions noted above with regard to the explanation of Buddhist terms. It must not, however, be forgotten that it is but a systematic correspondence which has thus been discovered. The historical problems evidently involved have still to be taken up for consideration.

Regarding their order of succession the Four Noble Truths perfectly agree with the four vyāhas of the Cikitsāśāstra and those of the Yogaśāstra as enumerated in the YS and YBhāṣya 40. In view of the above (p. 297 f.) discussion on the transposition of the last two members common to both, the Vivaraṇa and the USG of Saṅkara, the Advaṭa,

and on the basis of the tentative explanations proposed for the transposition in either text, the conclusion that suggests itself is that the traditional order of succession of the Four Noble Truths, strictly observed, as far as I know, whenever all of them are enumerated in Buddhist texts, is like that of the four vyāhas of the Cikitsāśāstra a systematic one, i.e. reflecting logical stages of analysis, but not stages passed through successively in actual practice.

3.1. A further problem, and to be sure, an important one, not discussed in the foregoing is posed by the comparison drawn in Yoga texts between the science of Yoga and the science of medicine. What I am referring to is the assertion met with first in the YBhāṣya that systematically the Cikitsāśāstra is divided into four parts. This is stated in such a manner that one cannot but gather the impression that the division is a genuine one: it is hardly conceivable that the caturvyāha of the Cikitsāśāstra as expounded in the YBhāṣya and the Vivaraṇa is simply a fabrication made for the sole purpose of establishing a parallel to the fourfold division of the Yogaśāstra as implied already by the Sūtra itself. The whole tenor of the relevant passages has, on the contrary, to be taken to clearly indicate that the caturvyāha of the science of medicine was regarded by the authors as an indisputable, if not even a well-known, fact they could draw upon, in accordance with the basic function of a dyēṣṭā, for the sake of illustration.

But, I think, one can go even a step further and make the assumption that this correspondence is not stated merely for the sake of illustration, but that much more is intended by it, viz. to bring the method of Yoga into close systematic proximity to the Cikitsāśāstra and to intimate thereby that it is not merely of equal importance, but that it surpasses the science of medicine in that it does not cure simply an accidental physical disease, but forms the (allegedly) only remedy against the ailment every living being naturally suffers from, an ailment medicine is unable to cope with.

That this interpretation does not go too far is clearly corroborated by a well-known Sāṁkhya text, viz. Īśvarakṛṣna's Sāṁkhya-kārikā where already at the very outset, i.e. in Kārikā 1, it is expressly stated that the perceptible means of removal of the threefold suffering have neither an absolutely sure nor a necessarily final effect (dyēṣe sāpārīh ca naikān-

37. Note that the expression duḥkhanirodhaṃ paṭipadā is replaced by magga in what Norman (cf. fn. 31a) calls the "mnemonic" sets. That this image is met with in the YBh also, viz. in YS 2.26 (p. 205, l. 3 of the Edition of the Vivaraṇa), is most probably due to Buddhist influence (on which in general cf. L. de la Valée Poussin, loc. cit., fn. 22).

38. In this connection cf., apart from passages already quoted, Vivaraṇa e.g. p. 2.23 ff. and p. 121, l. 4 f.: ... kāivalyaśya sadhānaṃ samyagārdhaṇām / yogāshāha-


40. In the Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhaśya (cf. fn. 31) the order of succession has been changed, viz. to roga (= heya), ārogya (= āhāra), roganiddha (heyaheuela) and bhaisajya (= ḫhāna). This is, no doubt, equally a systematic order, only that the rationale is slightly different, viz.: first the contrary states are named and only thereafter, but with reference to them, the cause and the means, which again form a pair of corresponding entities. The term niḍhāna is also noteworthy in that it is used frequently in Buddhist texts, too, though first of all to denote the cause of metaphysical ailment.

41. Cf. p. 12, l. 9 ff. in R. C. Pandeya’s edition, Delhi, 1967.
involved. Is the assumption at all justified that the division when attested in such texts forms at the same time the scheme on which the actual exposition of the argument of the texts concerned is based? In other words: Can we expect to find the quadruple division attested in an Āyurvedic text in such a manner that this text itself is explicitly or implicitly divided into exactly four systematic parts or chapters corresponding to the four vyāhas?

As to this, it seems expedient to proceed with caution; for, a first warning against such an assumption is the observation, simple though it is, that, in any case in Yoga texts, the catuvṛtyāḥatha is at best stated to be a divisionary scheme, but that it is nowhere actually made the basis of a corresponding disposition of the material: there is no Yoga text in which this systematic division is taken seriously in such a manner that the exposition actually follows this scheme. A second warning is given by another division of the science of medicine referred to in medical texts themselves, viz. the octopartite division of therapy. Yet, it is not these eight parts of Āyurveda as listed e.g. in the Suṣruta-saṃhitā I, 1, 7, or in the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya I, 1, 5cd-6ab, that matter in the present context, but a fact stressed by J. Filliozat in the introduction to his recent edition of the Yogaśataka, a medical text attributed to Nāgārjuna; for, referring to an article of C. Vogel's he points out that « dans le titre des Aṣṭāṅgasamhitā et Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdayasamhitā de Vāgbhaṭa, aṣṭāṅga désigne la science médicale en général et non les parties de l’ouvrage ».

What both these observations come to is that it would indeed be well to distinguish between a division of the science of medicine taught somewhere, on the one hand, and the actual internal organisation of medical texts, on the other. Therefore, one has to reckon with the possibility that all one finds in medical texts is simply a reference to the scheme, perhaps even in an offhand manner. The degree of probability that at least this kind of evidence can actually be found is, however, quite high, for the quadruple division is, according to C. Vogel, referred to by yet another witness, and, to be sure, an independent one, viz. Bu-ston (1290-1364) who in his comprehensive « History of Buddhism », coming to speak of medical works, says: « As for the works on medicine, they teach four (topics): disease, cause of disease, medicament as antidote to disease, and method of curing thereby ». Though the succession of the last two members is, again, reversed and the Tibetan gso-ba'i spyod-lam does not fully correspond to the Sanskrit term ārogya, it is highly probable that what Bu-ston has in mind is the same quadruple division as drawn upon in our Yoga texts.

After consulting well-known works of secondary literature on Indian medicine where, however, the quadruple division is apparently not mentioned at all, I decided to turn for help to some of the specialists in this field of learning instead of setting out myself on possibly a wild-goose chase in the impenetrable jungle of the extant Āyurvedic texts (begging pardon for the all too mixed metaphor). It was my colleague R. E. Emmerick who drew my attention to Carakasamhitā, sūtrakāṇa 9.19, i.e. to the following verse:

hetau liṅge praśamane
rogaṇām apunārbhavane /
jaññam catuvṛtham yasya
sa rājādeo bhīṣaktamah //

Cakrāpaṇḍatta does not explain this verse, but there can hardly be any doubt that the « fourfold knowledge » spoken of here is practically identical with our quadruple division of the Cikitsāśātra; for the expression apunārbhava can be equated with our ārogya, the only difference being that by the former health as something regained is paraphrased as « the not-occurring-again [of a disease] »; further, the term praśamana closely corresponds to our bhīṣagyā, at least if taken to denote « that by which [a disease] is tranquillized, i.e. cured » and, finally, as regards the expression liṅga, here it cannot but mean « symptom », and thus it corresponds to our roga, only that it is not the disease itself that is denoted, but its « characteristic sign(s) », and this is clearly done with the aim of bringing out into proper relief an essential virtue of any physician, viz. to make a proper diagnosis by the symptoms. Particularly noteworthy, however, is that it is not every physician who is expected to have this fourfold knowledge, but only a bhīṣaktama, « an excellent physician », and that he is in addition stated to be « fit or worthy of [treating] a king »; for, this cannot but imply that the common variety of a bhīṣaj ordinary people have to depend on need not necessarily be equally well versed in all four parts of the science of medicine. Nevertheless, what is attested in this verse of the Carakasamhitā is clearly a systematic division of the Cikitsāśātra into four parts and, to be sure, a division which may, inspite of certain terminological and conceptional differences, well be taken to be virtually identical with that referred to by the author of the YBhāṣya, etc.; on the other hand, however, it has to be stressed that even if the verse

44. Op. cit., p. IV. In Vogel’s article (the reference should be « p. 291, n. 3 », not « n. 3 »), however, this is not expressly stated though perhaps implied.
45. The reference is to his article mentioned in fn. 43.
46. Quoted from Vogel, loc. cit., p. 290.

47. Viz., insofar as for obvious reasons the medical treatment itself is given prominence and not the aim it has to achieve.
forms an original part of the Carakasamhitā 48; the quadruple division is, strangely enough, given but an extremely marginal importance.

To an eventual second instance 49 of the quadruple division being attested in a medical text my attention was drawn by K. G. Zysk’s review 50 of Filliozat’s edition and translation of the Yogaśāstra, referred to above. Zysk critically examines Filliozat’s rendering of verse 2 which runs thus:

parikṣya hetvānālayaṁśaṇāṁ cikīṣṣatajñena cikīṣaṇaka/ nirādheṣaṁ ha bheṣajjana bhavanti yuktaṁ amṛtopaṁ/Na;

ehe not only proposes an, indeed, more appropriate translation for hetvānālayaṁśaṇāṁ, viz. « the characteristics of the diseases and [their] causes » (which should, however, perhaps be replaced by « the cause[s] and the characteristics of diseases »), but also points out that the Tibetan translator, apparently equally at a loss with the expression nirādheṣaṁ, renders the second line thus: « The body becomes free from disease by the combination of medicines which resemble ambrosia ». Zysk rightly adds the remark that « the Tibetan translation seems more acceptable », but in addition he refers approvingly to Filliozat’s note « T, au 3e pāda, un remplacé āma par nād, āmaya, et entend nirāma "sans dénutrition " comme nirāmaya "sans maladie " ». However, I am not sure that this assumption is justified; for according to Monier-Williams 51 Indian lexicographers list an āma2, « sickness, disease », which is referred to also by Edgerton 52. On the other hand one wonders how the Tibetan translator thought that the line construes and whether his interpretation is at all possible.

Yet I do not want to enter on my part into a detailed discussion of the philological problems involved here; instead, I should like to confine myself to referring to the Tibetan translation; for, it is there that we find the four systematic parts of the science of medicine reflected, to wit, in a manner that reminds us of the verse quoted above from Caraka.

Both these references to the quadruple division — and, of course, first of all the more unequivocal one of the Carakasamhitā — are no more than bare references, and the result of our examination of Ayurvedic texts is accordingly rather disappointing, for in them the quadruple division is not given the fundamental importance peculiar to it in Yoga texts. One is, therefore, left with two alternatives, viz. either that it was these Yoga thinkers who realized the full importance of the division, or that what these Yoga thinkers refer to is but a later development in Indian medicine 53. However, this much is clear beyond doubt: the fourfold scheme as such, even if not also applied in writing medical works, did actually exist.

This conclusion is additionally corroborated by a clearly independent witness not called into evidence so far. What I am referring to is an hitherto unpublished passage in the Sūtramāyī bhāmi of the Yogācārabhūmi which was pointed out and given to me by my friend L. Schmithausen 54. It reads thus: cikīṣaṁ katamā / sā caturkāra vedi-tavyā / ādityaḥ abhakauṣalyaṁ abhāhasanumuttāna-kausalyaṁ uppan-nasyābādaḥ [...] sva praḥnākausalyaṁ praḥnāsya-abādaḥ [...] ydayatiś anu-pāda-kausalyaṁ / āditya ca kausalyānām vibhāṅgo yathāśiram eva vedi-tavyaḥ / 55. « Which of many things (or: Of what kinds) is medical treatment? It has to be regarded as having four forms, viz. skill [in diagnosing] the disease, skill [in determining] the origination (i.e. cause) of the disease, skill [in applying] the means of getting rid of the disease which has arisen [and finally] skill [in ensuring] that [the disease] which one has got rid of does not arise again in future. Moreover, as for the detailed explanation of these [medical] skills, it [is not given here, but] has to be known precisely according [to what has been taught] in the [respective] Sūtras ».

Though the terminology is palpably different, there can hardly be any doubt that the quadruple division taught is practically identical with that referred to in Caraka, and thus, ultimately, also with that drawn upon in our Yoga texts, the four kauśalyas corresponding to roga, rogaḥetu, bhāsajya and ṛgṛga, respectively 56. The last sentence of the passage quoted is of particular importance; for it cannot but be taken as evidence for the fact that this division was expounded already

48. Apart from the fact that this verse is not commented upon by Cakrapāṇidatta (a fact which in itself is, of course, by no means conclusive), what creates suspicion is that the verse does not really fit into the context so that it might well have been added later since in the immediately preceding verse a special designation, viz. praṇābhiśāraṇa, is taught for a bhiṣaj who possesses certain (other) qualifications.
49. The « fourfold physicians » (caturvidhā vaidyāḥ) mentioned in Mbh (Poo.nar.) 12.69.57 are most probably to be taken in accordance with Nālakṣetra’s explanation (vīṣṭaśāraṇagṛhāṇihā) as reference to four different types of medical specialists. Cf. also R. P. Das’ review of G. N. Tirtha, Medicine. Its Magico-Religious Aspects according to the Vedic and Later Literature, in IJL, 27 (1981). p. 235 f.
52. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary s.v. 2 āma.
53. In this latter case one would have to assume that it was not given due attention in later medical texts because the tradition of how a medical treatise should be dispositionally structured had become fixed to such an extent that alterations were not possible (any more).
54. On this occasion I should also like to acknowledge with sincere gratitude the vivid interest he showed in the present study in general and its part 4 in particular, for much of the material referred to there I owe his pigeon-hole.
55. The passage is found in the Patna MS of the Śrīvākārabhūmi 1 B 6.2 (= 96 a 2 of the Patna MS of the Yogācārabhūmi). The former adds ṛgṛga at the very beginning, which, however, seems to have been deleted, and the latter reads druṣṭaṁyā in the place of vedi-tavyā and anu-[..]pāda. By square brackets deleted ṛgṛgas are indicated.
56. Particularly close is obviously the similarity with the Carakasamhitā (cf. the term apruvarbha in the latter); see below p. 323.
in a Śūtra, to be sure a Buddhist Śūtra. In view of the probable date of the Yogācārabhūmi, this Śūtra, according to Schmithausen, can hardly belong to a period after the beginning of the 4th century, but is probably earlier.

In the light of this additional evidence the following observations and assumptions can be made:

a) that the science of medicine or medical treatment can be systematically divided into four parts was common knowledge of educated people, or at least it was widespread;

b) this knowledge is attested obviously independently in Brahmanical as well as Buddhist sources the most ancient of which date back to the first half of the 1st millennium;

c) it seems natural to assume that the division was first conceived by a medical author and only later referred to and utilized by others, i.e. applied to other Śāstras also which, though significantly different, nevertheless exhibited a specific similarity with the science of medicine.

4. In what follows, Buddhism again may serve as a cue for focusing attention on still another problem raised by the theory of the quadruple division of the Čikitsāsāstra, a problem which is perhaps even more important than all those discussed so far in the course of the present study. What I have in view is the assertion found in not a few works on or expositions of (early) Buddhism, viz. that this fourfold division of medicine was that inspired the Buddha to his "Four Noble Truths". Thus e.g. E. Frauwaller simply states as though it were a fact established beyond any doubt, and without giving any reference, that "the fourfold division of the truth discovered [by the Buddha]... is borrowed from the medical method". Equally apodictic is H. Zimmer who in his "Philosophies of India" remarks: "Following the procedure of the physician of his day inspecting a patient, the Buddha makes four statements concerning the case of man. These are the so-called "Four Noble Truths" which constitute the heart and kernel of his doctrine."


61. If the unknown French original of the German *augenscheinlich* (which I render by *obviously*) is used to indicate that there obtains here, to some degree at least, an incertitude (the German expression does indicate this), Bareau's position would have to be classified with the more guarded ones quoted below.

62. Die Religion des Buddhismus I. Der Heilsweg des Mönchstums (Sammlung Göschen Bd. 174), Berlin, 1962, p. 70. H. J. KESSLER, Die Religion der Buddhisten (Uni-Taschenbücher 1049), München, Basel, 1961, p. 66, expresses himself in such a vague manner that it is not possible to decide if he is to be classed with the foregoing group of scholars or with the subsequent one.


64. The Beginnings of Buddhism..., transl. by Richard L. Gage, Tokyo, 1980, p. 43.
the Four Noble Truths. One may find it surprising or even significant that none of the specialists quoted until now thought it, if not necessary then at least, desirable to adduce the reasons, too, that could convince their readers that what they have to do with is not an arbitrary and fanciful assumption, but a well-founded hypothesis. Yet, it is by no means a peculiar feature of Indology that an allegedly true and certain piece of knowledge is handed down from generation to generation, not because of a general lack of the critical faculty, but simply because nobody happened to take a second look at it, and in the present case it is but fair to admit that the assumption is in fact suggestive to such an extent that one is easily lulled into a sense of absolute security. Nevertheless, it bears renewed discussion.

4.1. The first question to be asked, then, is this: Who was the first scholar to make this assumption and what gave him this idea? By a note of Oldenberg’s⁶⁶ one is referred to the original source, viz. H. Kern’s "Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië"⁶⁶ that was translated into German by H. Jacobi in 1882⁶⁶. It is there that for the first time in a footnote it is apodictically stated that "the Four Truths are borrowed from the art of healing"⁶⁶. In the text itself of Kern’s book a statement to the same effect is found at p. 367 (=469 in the German translation), and surprisingly enough followed by a reference to the YBhāṣya on YS 2.15 from which the relevant passage is quoted in translation. Though it is not expressly stated one cannot but draw the conclusion that it was precisely this passage that gave Kern the idea of the Four Noble Truths having been borrowed from the art of healing. This conclusion is in fact corroborated by Kern’s "Manual of Indian Buddhism"⁶⁶ where it is said: "It is not difficult to see that these four Satyas are nothing else but the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science, applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine" (in a footnote a portion of the text of the YBh on YS 2.15 is given), and two passages from the Lalitavistara are quoted to vindicate the assertion that "this connection of the Āryasatyas with medical science was apparently not unknown to the Buddhists themselves"⁶⁶. The Lalitavistara,

however, is of so late a date that it could not by any means be regarded as evidence for the fact that the quadruple division of the science of medicine antedates the historical Buddha or was even developed in his youth. Yet in reality the division as such is not mentioned at all, may not even alluded to in this text; what is said in the two passages⁷⁰ pointed out by Kern is merely that the Buddha is a vaidyārāja in that he is a pramocakah sarvadukkhebhyaḥ or a sarvavādhipramocakah; that is to say, he is but compared to a physician.

4.2. But before continuing the critical discussion of Kern’s remarks, and the arguments brought forward by others, it is advisable to reflect on the implications the assumption examined here cannot but have. This might seem superfluous, but is nevertheless necessary since nowhere in the relevant secondary literature do I find them explicitly stated⁷² so that one cannot help suspecting that they were not clearly realized by Kern and those depending on him directly or indirectly. These implications are, of course, that the science of medicine was either already before the Buddha or at least in his times divided in this manner and that the Buddha knew this systematic division.

Our knowledge of the historical person called the Buddha does not permit us to answer the question whether at all or to what extent he was familiar with the contemporary science of medicine. Therefore it is not possible to check whether the second condition can be regarded as fulfilled. As for the first and basic implication, one would have to look for pre-Buddhist medical literature. As even the most ancient of the so-called Āyurvedic texts are of later origin, it could only be one of the Vedic texts⁷³ where one could strike on a relevant statement. Nobody, however, has so far come up with any such reference. This holds good for the other possibility also, viz. that the quadruple division is attested in a non-medical text of pre-Buddhist origin. Therefore, it has to be stressed that all we actually have are at best references in

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65. Viz. in his: Buddha, Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde, 1923, p. 236. It should be noted that J. Filiozat in the article mentioned in fn. 99 below arrives at the same conclusion.
66. Haaretz, 1882 (Eerste deel), 1884 (Tweede deel).
68. Viz. fn. 4 on p. 207 of the first part (corresponding to p. 265 in the German translation).
69. (Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde III.8) Strassburg, 1896; the quotation is from p. 46 f.
70. The expression = applied to = and the reference to the YBhāṣya prelude, I think, the possibility of taking Kern’s remarks as meant to point out a systematic similarity only.
72. Laudable exceptions to the rule, however, are H. Oldenberg and J. Filiozat. Oldenberg (in the footnote referred to above in fn. 65) clearly dissociates himself from Kern’s opinion with the remark that “it will not be possible to ascertain whether, as regards the fourfold division, Buddhism is the borrowing side”, a remark which does not simply show scepticism, but is most probably due to O’s being well aware of the fact that there is no pre-Buddhist medical text to attest the division; Filiozat in his article (cf. below fn. 99) says more clearly: “Il eut fallu prouver que cette médecine les [= les quatre vérités] possédait avant le Bouddhisme; Kern ne l’a point fait.”
73. From the description of Indian medical literature as given e.g. by J. Jolly (in Medicine, Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde III.10. Strassburg, 1901) it follows that “we have no medical texts of the intervening period [between the Vedic literature and the texts of Caraka and Susruta]”, as stated by A. L. Basham (The Wonder that was India, London, 1954, p. 499).
post-Buddhist Indian literature. To say that the references discussed in the preceding part of this article, including the YBhāṣya, so important to Kern, do furnish the evidence needed, would be nothing but an arbitrary assertion, merely meant to warrant an assumption that cannot be supported otherwise.

4.3. But what about the « evidence » found in Buddhist texts themselves? As regards the Lalitavistara passages, all that can be learned from them is that the Buddha was compared to a physician by his adherents. And this can hardly be regarded as a new and important piece of information. For, firstly, the idea that God or a particular god or the propounder of a doctrine of salvation helps men by healing physical and/or spiritual ailments is so widely spread that there is nothing strange in that such a comparison may have been drawn by Buddhist authors, too, without their possessing any tradition that the Buddha himself had actually learnt from medicine, and shrewdly applied its division to his own teaching; and, secondly, it is already in much earlier Buddhist texts that the Buddha is characterized or sometimes even made to say of himself that he is an anuttaro bhisakka sallakatto, « an unsurpassed physician, (the best) surgeon » 75. This comparison (echoed as it were in statements like those of Conze and Mizuno quoted above) is not only met with rather frequently already in early canonical texts, but has obviously also proved a quite fruitful idea, variously developed in later times, as was shown recently by R. Birnbaum 76 who aptly remarks 77 that « the Buddha frequently made analogies to disease and healing to explain various facets of his teaching ». Nevertheless, one cannot but observe that in the passages inspected or referred to until now the Four Noble Truths are not mentioned at all, not to speak of explicitly paralleling them with corresponding systematic parts of the science of medicine. And, to be sure, passages like Mil 247.11 where a physician (bhisakka) is characterized as roguppattiikusala, « well-acquainted with / competent in discovering the origin of disease », is by no means conclusive.

But what about the passage in Buddhaghoṣa’s Vism 512.7-9 referred to by Birnbaum 74 which runs thus: rogo viya ca dukkhasaccam, rogani-dannam iva samudaysaccam, rogavāpasamo viya nirodhasaccam, bhesajjam iva maggasaccam? It is true, the Four Noble Truths are here clearly compared to corresponding parts of medical science; but, on the other hand, one must not forget that the famous commentator is separated approximately by a millennium from the Buddha himself and one cannot overlook that this is but one in a series of different analogies given by Buddhaghosa without (explicit) reference to canonical texts and that it does not at all imply that the Truths were « borrowed from the medical method ».

There is, however, a further reference by Oldenberg which has still to be followed up, viz. that to an article of L. de la Vallée Poussin 79 who after having quoted the relevant lines from Kern’s « Manual of Indian Buddhism » 80 draws on his part attention to some more material, viz. two passages in the Bodhacaryavatāra and an explanation found in Yaśomitra’s Abhidhrmakosavayākhya. Among these quotations the two former ones are but reformulations of ideas attested already in canonical Pāli texts in the context of the comparisons mentioned above (p. 316). What the author is concerned with is to lay stress (1) on the extreme foolishness of him who though suffering from a disease refuses the help of a person capable of healing it 81 and (2) the (correct) observation that « there is no physician but cures disease with some pain in the treatment » 82. The latter reference, however, is indeed of such a kind

74. Cf. also the recent study of G. Buddrus, Khowar-Texte in arabischer Schrift (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz), Wiesbaden, 1982, p. 12. For an interesting comparison between « God the Lord » and a physician in the contest of a theodicy-like discussion see Bhusavatara’s Nydyabhūṣaṇa, p. 458.16 ff. As noted by W. Halbfass (Studies in Kumārila and Saṅkarā, Reinbek, 1983, p. 15, cf. also fn. 81), « the sanśāramokaka [too] presents himself as a benevolent physician in the wider context of sanśāra », and « reference is made to the expertise of the good doctor who knows that sometimes he has to apply harsh means to bring about a change for the better ». God is called a medicamenta (asudha) by Madhva in his Bhaṣya on Taitt. Up. 2.2.

75. It 101.15-16; cf. (without bhisakko) Sn 560 and (sallakatto only) Sn 562. The first of these passages is referred to Mil. 215.11; as for the well-known parable of the man wounded by an arrow cf. M 1.429 as well as M II.216, Mil 169.9 ff., 247.10 ff.; for a kusala bhisakko in a simile cf. A III.238.5 ff., Mil 229.5 ff.; bhisakko is called an ahiṃavacana of the Buddha A IV.340.5 ff.; the Buddha is compared to a kusalo vēḷo Pj 1.21.19 f.

76. The Healing Buddha, Boulder (Co.), 1979.
77. Viz. on p. 15; cf. also the subsequent sections.

78. Viz. in fn. 37 on p. 22.
79. JRAS, 1903, pp. 578-80. The two passages quoted from the Bodhicaryavatāra are II.55 ff.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>itvaravāyādhīhito 'pi vaidyāvākyaṃ na laṅghayet /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tatra sarvājñavāyāsya sarvājñapādārīṇāḥ /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vākyām uṣṭaḥpāyāni dhīg mām ayantamohitam //</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and VIII.22 ff.:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>sarve 'pi vaidyā kuryanti kriyāduḥkhiḥ aragadān /</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tasmād bhūtiṃ duḥkhāni hastam tuṣṭhāvaṁ abhikram /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kriyām imām aḥ ucitān varavāidyac ca dattavān /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madhirunopacāreṇa cikṣitā mahātūrān //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ādāya śāksiptadāne 'pi niyogyāyaṁ nāyakah /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tat karoti kramāt paścād yat svamānāpy aṣṭāpy aṣṭa //</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

80. Practically all of them are quoted also above, p. 315 and fn. 71.
80a. The same idea is also met with e.g. in Samādhirājaśūtra 9.43-46.
81. This is de la Vallée Poussin’s rendering of the first line of his second quotation from the Bodhicaryavatāra (cf. above fn. 79), the gist of which, however, is that the Buddha differs from a physician precisely in this respect. The idea expressed in the first line was appealed to also by the so-called Samsāramokakas; cf. fn. 74 above.
that it fully warrants Oldenberg’s remark 82 that it «comprises quite expressly the four truths to the quadruple medical teaching of disease, its origin, its healing [and] the prevention of its resurgence». For what Yaśomitra 83 says is:


As stated by de la Vallée Poussin 89 the Sūtra referred to by Vasubandhu and quoted by Yaśomitra is «d’après la version de Hiuan-Tsang, le Sūtra du bon médecin; d’après Paramārtha, le Sūtra de la comparaison du médecin (Samyukta 15.19; 17.14) 88». Unfortunately, de la Vallée Poussin does not give any further explanation on the identity of the «Sūtra du bon médecin». His second reference, however, can be traced, namely with the help of the Hōbōgirin 90 where the relevant passage from the Samyuktagama as preserved in Chinese translation is rendered into French. It clearly shows a close similarity to the quotation by Yaśomitra, but does not, on the other hand, seem to agree fully with it 87. On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that what Dimiéville — or one of his collaborators — actually did was to give but a free paraphrase of the Chinese translation, intermingling later portions of the «detailed explanation» (vibhāṅga) with earlier parts of the Sūtra. When the Chinese translation itself (T 99, no. 389) is compared with the Sanskrit text quoted by Yaśomitra, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that it is precisely this Sanskrit text that was translated by Gubhadra 88, i.e. that what Yaśomitra quotes is in fact nothing else but this Sūtra of the Samyuktakama. The Chinese translator, however, seems to have read rājābhikṣaṇa instead of rājāyogyaḥ and the Chinese text obviously contains a corruption, not recognized by Dimiéville: the character standing between that denoting «King» and that equivalent

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82. Loc. cit., cf. fn. 65.
83. I quote from Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā by Yaśomitra, ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1971, p. 514 f.; see, however, fn. 85. Mr. Yoshihumi Honjo whom I met at the XXXI CISHAAN in Japan kindly drew my attention to the fact that a more complete quotation from that very Sūtra is found in Samathadeva’s Abhidharma-sākāra-vyākhyā, viz. Peking Tanjur, Th 32 b 6 ff.
84. From Sātre ‘py eṣa onwards this passage is also quoted by de la Vallée Poussin, in note 4 on p. 121, of his translation, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit et annoté..., cinquième et sixième chapitres, Paris, 1925, the final part, however, being added by him, viz. ibh. bhikṣaṇas tathāgato ‘rhan idāṁ duṅkhanaṁ ārya-satyaṁ iti yathābhūtaṁ praṇajāti...
85. In his article (cf. fn. 79) de la Vallée Poussin reads vyādhīṣṭātre; the reading as given by Wogihara is, however, also found in the footnote in de la Vallée Poussin’s translation of the Abhidharmakośa and has to be accepted as correct; interpret: «in the Sūtra (dealing with) disease (cause of disease), etc.».
86. The MS has here (and infra) kaśyapaḥ; the emendation, proposed also by de la Vallée Poussin in his article and accounted for by the remark «Suppose that the old Nepalese ligature has been misunderstood by a modern copyist», is most convincing, not only because of the Tibetan equivalent, viz. zug-rhu ‘byin-pa, but also and above all in view of the Pāli parallels (see above p. 316 and fn. 75).
87. The following sentences up till abādha-prahāna-kusālaḥ are in Wogihara’s edition printed in italics and thus characterized as a quotation. This cannot but be a mistake, for evidently the quotation from the Vyādhīṣṭātre, the beginning of which is found already in the Kośa itself, extends as far as yathābhūtaṁ praṇajātīti, the itti indicating its completion, because the reference in the Kośa is introduced by the remark sātre ‘py eṣa eva satyāṇāṁ ṅṛṣṭeṇa ārāṁṣa iti this very analogy of the [Four Noble] Truths is shown also in a Sūtra».
88. In his article de la Vallée Poussin reads anuttaraṁbhikṣaṅ.
89. Viz. in the foot-note to his translation of the Abhidharmakośa referred to in fn. 84.
90. I do not know which edition is referred to by de la Vallée Poussin; by the former reference, however, T 99, no. 346, might be meant and by the latter T 99, no. 389. In the latter passage there are three «aliments» are referred to: kapha, pāpa, and avidyā (roga, or a similar expression) (evidently under the influence of the three dravaśas); however, it is not a comparison that is drawn here between the «Four Noble Truths» and medicine, but the concept of ailments is only used metaphorically in a context modelled after the Truths.
92. For according to Dimiéville (loc. cit., p. 228) it runs thus: «On appelle un grand roi des médecins celui qui réalise les quatre Essences suivantes: (1) Bien connaître la maladie, c’est-à-dire les différentes sortes de maladies; (2) bien connaître l’origine de la maladie: due au Vent, ou au Flegme, ou aux sécrétions salivaires, aux différentes espèces de froid, à un fait actuel, à la saison...; (3) bien connaître le Contre-carractère de la maladie: onguents, expectorants ou vomitifs, évacuations inférieures (purgatifs), instillations nasales..., fumigations..., sudorifiques...; (4) bien savoir traiter la maladie de telle façon qu’ayant été traitée il n’y ait aucun danger de récidive... de même, le Ts-Arhat’s s’buddha, ce grand roi de médecins, réalise quatre vertus grâce auxquelles il soigne les maladies des êtres; en effet, il connaît les quatre Saintes Vériétés: (1) de la Douleur...; (2) de la Formation de la Douleur...; (3) du Barrage de la Douleur...; (4) du Chemin de ce Barrage ... Le médecin Mondain ne connaît pas vraiment, tels qu’ils sont..., les Contre-carractères radicaux (fondamentaux), à savoir le Contre-carractère radical de la Neissance..., et celui de la Vieillesse, de la Maladie, de la Mort, du chagrin, des plaintes, des douleurs, des Tribulations...».
to 'arha, viz. the, seems rather to be an error for ज; if the latter is accepted, there is full agreement between the Sanskrit original and the Chinese translation also as regards the expression rājārha! The comparison further shows that the vibhaṅga portion of the original Śūtra, which preceded the sentence beginning with evam eva caturdhīr anāgaih, was simply left out by Yaśomitra, and it was left out in the Yogācārabhūmi (s. above p. 311) as well, where the reader is, however, referred to the original source precisely as regards this « detailed explanation ».

But there is a very similar passage in a second, probably older, yet rather inaccurate translation of the Śaṃyuktāgama, viz. T 100, no. 254, where also the vibhaṅga is missing. Therefore, one cannot be sure which of the two « versions » of the SĀ are actually referred to by the Yogācārabhūmi and Vasubandhu or quoted by Yaśomitra, respectively. In any case, the passage as a whole is missing in the Pali SN, and there is hence a high degree of probability that it forms but a later addition; for it is quite impossible to discover a motive for a transmitter dropping it. Yet, whatever the exact historical relation may be in which the different sources stand to each other, this much has to be accepted as established: Hīnayānistic Buddhist texts knew of a quadruple division of the science of medicine and compared the teaching of the « Four Noble Truths » to it.

The most important source is, of course, the Vyādhiśūtra passage as quoted in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: it is preserved in Sanskrit and it is here that the Four Noble Truths are expressly compared to the corresponding systematic parts of the science of medicine. The parallel drawn is, however, not completely convincing, as already noted by de la Vallée Poussin who adds the remark: « You will observe that, according to this śūtra, the third satya is the way (mārga, upāya) to the destruction of the disease, and the fourth the way to its not-appearing-again (a-punarbhava). The scholastic point of view, so far as I know, is different ».!

One might feel some reluctance to follow de la Vallée Poussin as regards his interpretation of the expression prahānasyabādhasyātyatām anutpādakutilalāh; for it is highly improbable that it refers to a « way ». However, the impression one cannot but gather is that there is no full correspondence between the last two « medical skills » and the last two of the Four Noble Truths. And this becomes particularly evident in the case of the fourth « Noble Truth » which is clearly different from what is meant by prahānasyabādhasyātyatām anutpādakutilalāh. One further wonders whether de la Vallée Poussin’s adding the term apunarbhava by way of explanation is merely due to a free association or else evoked by a particular passage in an Indian medical text. For, it is exactly the term which is used in the verse from the Carakasamhitā drawn upon above (§ 3.2.). In any case, the fourth systematic part of the science of medicine as taught in the Vyādhiśūtra, conceptionally agrees fully with what is called rogānām apunarbhavah in Caraka, and hence with ṛgroga. In passing it may be noted that the slight unevenness the comparison in the Vyādhiśūtra thus shows was apparently felt among others (cf. Hóbógir p. 230) by Aśvaghoṣa also; for verse 41 of Canto XVI of his Saundarananda reads as thought it were a deliberate improvement on it, viz.

* 9a. Full parallelism can be observed also in Ratagotrivibhāga, 4.32; this kārikā is translated by J. Takasaki, A Study on the Ratagotrivibhāga (Uttaratantra). Being a Treatise on the Mahāyāna Buddhism (SOR, vol. XXXIII), Rome, 1966, p. 367, as follows: « Illness is to be cognized, its cause removed, Health should be attained, and a remedy used; Like that, Suffering, its Cause, Extinction and the Path, Are to be cognized, removed, touched and observed.»
it also stands clearly in contradiction to unequivocal passages in Buddhist texts themselves!

There is, however, still another striking feature in the Vyādhiṣṭūtra passage one should not silently pass over as done by de la Vallée Poussin. What I am referring to is the fact which cannot but be styled as strange that the physician conversant with the four āṅgas is characterized as 'worthy of [treating] a king' (rājārha), 'befitting a king' (rājājaya), and, finally, said 'to class with the king's property' (rājājajate ca saṁkhyaṁ gacchati). It would seem hardly necessary to state that these predicates can by no means have to do with the frequent designation of the Buddha as vaidyārāja.

Yet one might feel induced to refer to the well-known fact that Buddhist monks off and on succumbed to the temptation of acting as medical practitioners, and that for many reasons they might have even tried to qualify as royal physicians. But though it has to be admitted that historical social reality is reflected in Buddhist texts in this regard, too, in the passage under discussion there is no indication whatsoever that we have to do with such a case.

I think I should not any longer avoid coming to the point which, of course, is the following: the characterization of the physician as rājārha, etc., in the Vyādhiṣṭūtra cannot consistently and convincingly be accounted for but by assuming that it was retained when the exposition of the quadruple division of the science of medicine was taken over from another source. Another particular feature that was simply retained was the order of enumeration of the four skills of a physician which, significantly enough, does not perfectly correspond to the traditional order of succession of the Four Noble Truths. And this source cannot have been a Buddhist text; it was in all probability a medical text, or, at least, the science of medicine. This conclusion, though cogent in itself, is further and most clearly corroborated by the fact that the only Sanskrit medical text in which the four systematic parts are at all mentioned, viz. the Carakasaṁhitā, surprisingly enough comes to speak of them only in connection with the description of the qualifications of a rājārha bhīṣaktamaṇa and shows the same order of enumerating them. To regard this striking agreement as quite an accident would, no doubt, be nonsensical. Of course, one cannot be absolutely sure that it was this verse of the Carakasaṁhitā which was the source drawn upon by the author of the Vyādhiṣṭūtra, for the alternative possibility, viz. that both go back to a common, though unknown source, cannot be ruled out with certainty. But this much seems clear: the fact that the science of medicine falls into four systematic parts, viz. those mentioned in quite a few different texts, was discovered first by medical men.

To return now to the central question as formulated at the outset of this paragraph. It has to be stated that Buddhist sources do not by any means support the assumption that 'les Quatre Vérités' du Bouddhisme sont empruntées à la médecine; on the contrary, they give clear evidence that the science of medicine with its four systematic parts was drawn upon only for the sake of illustration; it is but the following hypothesis these sources warrant to frame: the obviously old comparison of the Buddha to a physician, of his teaching to a medicine and similar ideas were in the course of time elaborated, but it was not until the quadruple division of the science of medicine originating in medical circles became known to Buddhist authors that the Four Noble Truths as such were by way of comparison paralleled to the corresponding parts of the Cikitsāsāstra, though a full parallelism, i.e. regarding the order of succession also, was achieved only by a second step. However, it seems that the full importance of this systematic division was not realized by medical men, but significantly enough by quite different people, viz. those Yoga and Buddhist authors who applied it for the first time to their respective doctrines of salvation.

Therefore, one cannot but draw the final conclusion that there is not the slightest evidence for the assumption that this fourfold division of the science of medicine it was that inspired the Buddha to his Four...
Noble Truths. This was virtually already shown by J. Filliozat as early as in 1934, but his article in 1934 does not seem to have been given the attention it, undoubtedly, deserved. The conclusion arrived at in the present more comprehensive study does not, of course, "prove" that such an influence of the contemporary medicine on the Buddha is by no means impossible; all I want to say, yet this emphatically, is that this assumption is without any basis whatsoever, i.e. that as to its philosophical foundation it stands in a vacuum as it were. For, the similarity between the Four Noble Truths and the four parts of medicine, highly suggestive though it is, cannot by itself be regarded as warranting any such assumption: this similarity can consistently be accounted for by assuming a material coincidence arising quite naturally out of the essential element both, physical illness and existence viewed as suffering, do have in common; "for" — to recapitulate what has been stated already above (p. 300 f.), yet this time in the words of Vasubandhu — "that to which one is attached and by which one is given pain and from which one seeks to free oneself, is that which is examined in the first of the four considerations, i.e. the Truth of Suffering; thereafter [one puts oneself the question] "What is its cause (i.e. the cause of Suffering)?" [and thus examines] the Truth of that which causes [Suffering] to arise; [then one puts oneself the question] "What does its suppression (i.e. the suppression of suffering) consist in?" [and thus examines] the Truth of Suppression; [finally one puts oneself the question] "Which is the way [leading to] it (i.e. to its suppression)?" [and thus examines] the Truth of the Way.

5. The idea of a quadruple division of the doctrine of salvation is, however, not confined to the traditions of Pāṭhañjali-Yoga and of Buddhism alone. It is equally attested in yet another school of thought, viz. that of Nyāya. The historical problems the philologist is faced with are hence even more complicated than was assumed until now in the course of the present study.

100. Viz. Abhidharmakosa, ed. by P. Pradhan, p. 328-8; 8 yatra hi sakto yena ca baddhaya yata ca mokṣam prārthitaya tad evdhvavacārānād vahyān duḥkha-satyam parikṣyate / pāscat ko 'syā hetur iti samudaya- satyaṃ ko 'syā niruddha iti nirodhasatyam ko 'syā mārga iti mārgasatyam /.
101. Incidentally, this passage in the Kośa corroborates my interpretation of the term samudaya as given above (p. 303).
102. Cf. also the verse of the Saundarāṇanda quoted above (p. 321) as well as fn. 93a. For the "gradual apprehension" (anupārabhāsasamaya) of the Four Noble Truths cf. also a fragmentary Sanskrit MS from the Turfan discoveries described and edited by E. Wulfschrott, Sanskrit Handschriften aus den Turfanfundem, Teil I (Verzeichnis der Turkischem Handschriften in Deutschland, hrsg. von W. Voigt, Bd. XI.1), Wiesbaden, 1965. p. 294; this passage is of particular interest in another respect also in that it shows close similarity to the passage from the Satyayuktāgama (cf. fn. 92) by equally pointing out different causes of disease and different methods of treatment.

5.1. Commenting on NS 1.1.1 Pakṣilavāmin Vatsyāyana states almost right at the beginning: Atmādhe khalu prameyasya tatvajñānam niḥśreyasādhiṃghamaḥ / tac caitād uttarasūryanāṇḍyata iti / heyaḥ, tasya nirvartakaḥ, hānam āt醜hikāṃ, tasyopayā ḍhigantavyaḥ ity etāni catvāry arthaḥpadāni samyag buddhāv niḥśreyasam adīghacchati /.

103. One has to understand that which is to be avoided, that which brings it forth, [its] absolute avoidance [and] the means [leading to] it; having properly understood these four right statements, one attains the Highest Good.

In justification of my interpretation which is at variance with the explanation given by Uddoyotakara, some brief remarks should be made. According to Uddoyotakara the four arthapadas are heya, hāna, upāya and adīghacchaya equated by him to mokṣa. That is to say, he started from the assumption that adīghacchaya must necessarily be used here in the same sense it has in the santrgama niḥśreyasam adīghacchati, i.e. the predicate of the sentence as a whole. This conclusion is, however, by no means cogent, and the parallel in the introductory portion of the Bhāṣya on the 2. Anhika of the 4. Adhīyāya to which one could refer, viz. apavargo ḍhigantavyaḥ, does not help much because it is continued by tasyādīghacchayaḥ, does not help much because it is continued by tasyādīghacchayanam, i.e. by an unequivocal statement according to which the means for attaining liberation consists in tattvajñāna. On the contrary, in explaining hānam by tattvajñānam, and upāya by śastram, Uddoyotakara stands clearly in contradiction to this statement of the Bhāṣyakāra’s. Besides, the construction of the Bhāṣya passage obviously assumed by Uddoyotakara would be rather odd, there
being no reason why Pakṣilasāmin should in a series of nouns have decided in favour of a verbal and imprecise expression\(^{105}\) as regards the final member. There is hence good reason for taking adhigantayāḥ as predicate to be construed with all four subjects. In addition it should be noted that it is on the basis of this assumption that a proper understanding of the term arthapada can be achieved: evidently it is to be regarded as a tapāraśa-compound the prior member of which corresponds to a dative (arthāya padam), and thus fully agrees with Pāli attāhāpada for which the CPD gives the meaning «a right or profitable word (often referring to the holy texts)», i.e. a word that is to the advantage of another person. The equation of hāna with tattvajñāna is furthermore highly unconvincing because its characterization as ātyantika in the Bhāṣya itself, which clearly echoes NS. 1.1.22 (tadatyaṃtvimokṣa ‘pavargoḥ), cannot but be taken to indicate that what is meant by the expression hāna here is not «means of avoidance», but «avoidance» itself as that which is to be attained. Taking into account this necessary correction of Uddyotakara’s interpretation, one can unhesitatingly subscribe to his concluding remark\(^{106}\): etāni ca caturvādāni sarvāy adhyātmavādyā sarvācāryair varṣyaṃ iī /; it is noteworthy, nay extremely interesting that Uddyotakara did not regard the teaching of this particular system to be a specific feature of Nyāya only, but expressly states them to be a common possession of all adhyātmavādyās without exception\(^{107}\). Evidently it did not bother him where this doctrine developed first: historical problems were not of concern to him — in contradistinction to the Western philologist. He will not rest satisfied with observing that the distinction drawn by Pakṣilasāmin between heyam, tasya nirvārtakam, hānam ātyantikam and tasyopāpyaḥ is in striking agreement with that drawn by Yoga texts between heyam, heyahetāḥ, hānam and hānopāyaḥ, but face up to the historical problem(s) involved.

5.2. Yet, before doing so it is advisable to inspect some more relevant material from Nyāya literature, to the comprehensiveness of this study of the doctrine of liberation in this school of thought. There is, however, one Naiyaśiṣya whose testimony seems to be of such outstanding importance that it should not be omitted, viz. that of Bhāsarvajña

\(^{105}\) The gender, too, would be most disturbing, for Pakṣilasāmin would indeed demand a great deal from his readers who were compelled to realize on their own that it is masculine because apaṇavāḥ has to be supplemented!

\(^{106}\) Nyāyārtha of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Viśākyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyayākṛt of Vācaspāti and the Parāśudhā of Udayana, vol. I, chapter 1. ed. by A. Thakur (Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text no. 20), Darbhanga, 1967, p. 14, 1, 4.

\(^{107}\) Already Pakṣilasāmin is, however, at pains to show that the Nyāya system is by no means an adhyātmavādyā only like the Upaniṣads, but represents, on the contrary, an independent fourth vidyā; cf. NBhāṣya 3.3-8.

(who is anyway an extremely remarkable author). In justifying the question kṣīlakṣaṇan of the mūla, referring to prameyam\(^{108}\), he explains that what is meant is a particular «object of valid cognition» (prameyavāśeṣa) defined by him thus\(^{109}\): yadvīṣayam tattvajñānam anyajñānānupayogītenaiva niḥsreyasāṅgaṃ bhavati, mithyajñānam ca saṃsāram pratanoti, tatt prameyam /; «Object of valid cognition is that the tattvajñāna of which forms a means for [attaining] liberation without being of any use for [the acquisition of] other knowledge\(^{110}\), and the mithyajñāna (i.e. false knowledge) [of which] extends Saṃsāra ». Bhāsarvajña adds the further explanations\(^{111}\):

\[ \text{tād eva tattvato jñātavyam sarvadā bhāvitavyam (read: bhāvavatīvyam) ca / nā tu kītasaṃkhyādy api prameyam teṣam jñānasya niḥsreyasāṅgaṇupayogītā /} \]

\[ \text{tac caturvīdhāṃ: heyam, tasyā nirvartakam, hānam ātyantikam, tasyopāpya iti /; «This is that has to be known according to its true nature and what has always to be kept present. The number of butterflies, and similar things, however, does not equally represent an object of valid cognition\(^{112}\), because knowing them is of no use for [attaining] liberation. This [object of valid cognition] is of four kinds, viz. (iī) that which is to be avoided, that which brings it (i.e. the former) about, absolute avoidance [and] the means for [attaining] it (i.e. absolute avoidance).} \]

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\(^{108}\) Nyāyāsāra (Sanskrit), ed. by Svāmī Yoginīrānanda, Benares, 1968, p. 436.1 f.

\(^{109}\) NBhāṣya 436.11-12; passages which literally agree with formulations of the Nyāyasāra are printed in spaced type.

\(^{110}\) Similarly Nyāyamañjarī (ed. by K. S. Varadacharya, ORI Series no. 46, Mysore, 1969, 22.5-6: admādopavargaprajna (read: admādopavargaprajna) dovadāvi-vadhiprameyāhīnām tāvat anyajñānānupayakīna eva sādgr apavargadāhana iti vakyādhyām (viz. at the beginning of the prameyāhīnāḥ); for anyajñānānupayakīnam Cakaraḥ (Nyāyamañjarīgranthiḥ, ed. by Naṅgaṇ Shāh, L.D. Series 35, Ahme-dabad, 1972) gives the following explanation (5.12-14): anyajñānān apayakīnam advam anvapāyaḥ yayaḥ / upāya evapāyaḥ iti tāvāre vināyadāpyāḥ śhak hrasvat ca (cf. Pān. 5.434 and Gainpāṭha 211.3) / anyajñānānā vāpyaḥ sad apavargadāhana na punaḥ prameyādādāhana itaḥ prameyāhīnānupayakīnāya arthaḥ / It is, of course, the second of these explanations which has to be accepted; the expression used in the NBhāṣya, viz., anyajñānānupayogītenaiva, is unequivocal in this respect: what is meant in both cases is to point out that the prameyāhīnāḥ differs from the knowledge acquired with the help of means of valid cognition, etc., in that the former is of direct importance for liberation.

\(^{111}\) NBhāṣya 436.14-16.

\(^{112}\) The formulations in the Nyāyasāra are slightly different, viz. na ca kīta-saṃkhyādi tajjñānasyānupayogītā /.
My interpretation of the NBḥṣya passage quoted above is thus fully corroborated by Bhāṣarvajña. In addition it has to be noted that Bhāṣarvajña is more explicit than Pāśīlaśvāmin in that he unequivocally states that what falls into these four parts is in fact the "object of valid cognition", whereas in the Nyāyaśāstra it is left open whether the four artha-paddhati are at all related to the category "prameya" and, if so, precisely in which manner. According to Bhāṣarvajña, too, the category "object of valid cognition" is in itself ambivalent: if it becomes the object (viśaya) of proper knowledge, i.e. if its true nature is cognized, its knowledge leads to liberation; however, if its true nature is not understood, this false knowledge has the opposite effect, i.e. causes the process of rebirth to continue. It must, however, be borne in mind that this category includes only certain entities that are to be truly cognized, viz. those which are of direct importance for the attainment of the final goal.

Bhāṣarvajña's assertion that it is divided into four parts only, viz. heyaṃ etc., is quite understandably objected to by an opponent who rightly draws attention to the fact that according to NS 1.1.9 where the different prameyas are enumerated and according to NS 1.1.10 ff. in which the individual "objects of valid cognition" are defined, there is a total of twelve of them, but not four. This objection is met by Bhāṣarvajña by the following arguments: satyaṃ, dvaśāsavidham uktam, kiṃ tv tad dvaśāsavidham api heyādīraṇena catuśrādha bhāvyānāṃ niḥśreyasanamittam bhavatī api catuśrādha uktam / sūtra-kāraṇa tu niśayapraptam catuśrādhyaṃ iti manyamānaṃ sākyan noktaṇān / na hi heyādīraṇānīcayyā sātrāntiṣṭaḥ ahamkāra-nirvīrti vā girṇavāpaṇānāṃ dvīreaṇa tadatantamavimoksā pavargam saṃbhavati catuśrādhaḥpanābhaītvā ca dvaśāsavidhāsyapi. / It is true, [the "object of valid cognition"] is taught [in the Sūtra] as twelvefold; but it functions as the cause [of attaining] liberation [only] when it, though twelvefold, is presented to the mind as fourfold, [i.e.] as having the forms of that which has to be avoided, etc.; it is for this reason that it is stated [by me] to be of four kinds. The author of the Sūtra, however, did not state this expressly as he was of the opinion that the fact that it falls into four parts follows logically [so that it need not be made explicit]; for, liberation as an absolute freeing oneself from Suffering by means of stopping egoism and by creating [in oneself] the state of indifference with respect to ["objects of valid cognition"] like the body and so forth is not possible if [these objects] are not ascertained as having the form of that which has to be avoided, etc.; and [the fourfoldness of the "object of valid cognition"] was not expressly stated by the Sūtrakāra also because [the "object of valid cognition"] even if twelvefold is subsumed in the four groups [of that which has to be avoided, etc.].

That is to say, according to Bhāṣarvajña the two divisions are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, the twelvefold division is contained in the fourfold; the latter one, however, is the decisive one in so far as it, and only it, leads to liberation: evidently the tattvāṇāna of the twelve different prameyas is regarded as not sufficient for attaining the "Highest Good"; each and every "object of valid cognition" is to be looked into as regards whether it represents something that has to be avoided or something that causes which has to be avoided, etc.; and only then is it that knowing their true nature functions as a means to liberation.

This is clearly a doctrine which goes beyond the wording and intention of the NS: the impact of soteriological ideas which had led to refashioning the old Nyāya tradition so as to make it, too, look like a mokṣaśāstra, continued to be felt by Naiyāyikas who met the challenge by elaborating ideas found in the Bhāṣya and, of course, by trying their very best to vindicate their conviction that what are but later ideas were at least thought of and realized by the Sūtrakāra himself.

Nevertheless, Bhāṣarvajña's view, though historically untenable, is, of course, worthy of notice, and not only as regards the manner in which he handles the received mūla text, viz. the NS 114. For, the explanation he gives for the Sūtrakāra's not having expressly stated the catuśrādhya of the "object of valid cognition" is not accepted by his opponent who raises the objection that Gautama should have taught it precisely in view of its central importance. Bhāṣarvajña does not let this objection pass, his answer being: na, paramanitiṣedhārthavāt iśā tāṃ sāṅkhya-nām matam: heyaṃ duḥkhaṃ rakṣayantītām, "draṣṭārthāyoh samyo yoḥ heyaḥ etat" (YS 2.17), "tasya hetur avidyā" (YS 2.24), "tad-bhāvāv samyo gābhāvāhī hānaṃ tad drṣṭeḥ kaivalyam" (YS 2.25), "vivēka-khyātir api vīplavā hānapāyō" (YS 2.26) iti / sākyāṇām ca: duḥkhasamā-

114. Because he follows the tradition of those Naiyāyikas who wrote commentaries on the NBḥṣya, i.e. the so-called Vidyādāraṇa (cf. A. Wezler, in WZKSO, XIX, 1975, 115-146).

115. The term artha-paddha itself does not help in answering this question, and the other passage in the NBḥṣya quoted above (p. 328) can be interpreted in two different ways (cf. in 105).

116. Who is, however, in agreement with Pāśīlaśvāmin (cf. Bhāṣya on NS 1.1.9, 3378: asīty anyaṃ api dravya-vinākarasāmānaśiṣyasvāsamavānyāṃ prameyaṃ, viz. that taught by the Vaiśeśikas) tadbheda cāparīnākhyaṃ: asa v tu (i.e. that taught in NS 1.1.9) tattvajñāṇād eva paśavagro mithyādīrāṇaṃ samāśra iti atra etad upadīṣṭah viśeṣeṇa] /] and Uddyotakara (cf. his Vārttika on the beginning of the 4th Adhiyā; ed. by V.P. Divvedin and L.S. Drawl, KSS 33, Benares, 1910-11, 500-5-10: yād tattvajñāṇa-vyāśyayatva vyaavātīśhamānaṃ samāśra vyāvahacyacchadaḥtair bhavati yāt ca mohavidya-vyāśyayatvat samāśraṃ prātaniḥ sa tattvato jñeya iti f).
dayanirodhamārgākhyacaturāryasatyaṣaṣṭāṃ muktyartham istam /...

tad evam paramate 'pi heyādicatustavyajñānaṃ muktiṃnīhitam istam /
tanmatanāṣedhārtam atmādibhedopanvāsaḥ kṛtaḥ /

To put it in a nutshell: according to Bhāsarvajña — who, on the one hand, almost grotesquely comes short of historical truth, but, on the other, i.e. if his presuppositions are taken for granted, argues in a quite understandable and remarkable manner — Gautama did not expressly state the prameya to be fourfold, but instead confined himself to teach and define the twelve different « objects of valid cognition », because he wanted to refute the opinion of others, viz. the Sāṃkhya-Yogins and the Buddhists, who equally considered the knowledge of the four elements of nitya etc. to be a means for liberation. His final remark may be taken as a hint in the importance Bhāsarvajña attributes in this connection to the concept of atman and the Nyāya view of it. This is corroborated by what he says in the introduction of the next paragraph, viz. tatādratmajñāne sati paralokākāṃkaḥ bhavati nānyatheti vākyāṇām /, » the desire for the other world (i.e. the wish to attain liberation) arises [only] when among these [different kinds of knowledge] there is knowledge of the atman, not otherwise — this I shall teach [later] » 114.

But before examining the further development of his argument it is necessary to dwell on the passage just quoted. Bhāsarvajña was evidently not the first to realize that the idea of the doctrine of salvation being divided into the four systematic parts does not constitute a peculiarity of Nyāya; but Uddyotakara’s relevant remark 122 looks rather colourless in that he still confines himself to claiming for the Nyāyaśāstra the status of being, among other things, an adhyātmavidyā, too, and does not deem it necessary to determine more precisely the relation in which his school stands in this respect to other doctrines of salvation. Viewed against this background Bhāsarvajña’s corresponding remarks are not only much more informative, but are also evidence of a considerable progress in analysis. For he not only points out the basic doctrinal correspondence between the school of Nyāya and particular other systems which he does not hesitate to name, but he also enters into a discussion of the specific doctrinal differences. It is, of course, by no means surprising that what he right from the beginning aims at is to prove the claim that, inspite of the quadruple division being common to other doctrines also, it is the Nyāya doctrine of salvation alone that stands a critical test and should hence be universally accepted. This claim is not, however, connected with the fourfold division as such, but with the definitions of the four systematic parts as given by the Sāṃkhya-Yogins and Buddhists, respectively: it is but the conceptional and doctrinal content that his criticism is directed against. Yet his remarks, systematically comprehensive as they are, arrest the philologist’s attention in other respects, too: They furnish a welcome corroboration of the conclusion arrived at earlier in the present study as regards the problems of the quadruple division being attested already in the YS itself and the correspondence between it and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha.

Noteworthy, however, is that Bhāsarvajña does not refer in this connection to the catuvyabhāvata of the Cikitsāsāstra; he must have known the relevant passage in the YBhāṣya; apparently he was not interested in pointing out this similarity; a further reason may have been the conspicuous absence of this comparison in the older Nyāya tradition.

In continuing his exposition Bhāsarvajña draws attention to the fact that there is still another reason for the prameya having been taught in the NS as being twofold. The argument is as follows 126: when the body (jartra) is recognized as being different from the atman, it is not any longer mistaken for the atman and henceforth one does not commit acts of violence, etc., for the sake of one’s body. When it is realized that the body is the seat of pain and suffering (dukkha), attachment to it ends. The next step consists in coming to know the nature of the senses (indriya), i.e. that defects (doṣa) do not arise when the senses do not function even though there may be causes that could give rise to defects; thereupon one strives to withdraw the senses (pratyāhāra), and in doing so one does not any longer look upon their objects (artha) (which have been recognized as causing suffering) as something one should grasp, and then one frees oneself of all desires (vairāgya). Having realized that false (mithyābuddhi) and true knowledge (tattvabuddhi) are the causes of liberation and samsāra, respectively, one eliminates the former and develops the latter by making consistent efforts for it. Then greatest efforts are made to conquer the mind (manas) which is the root of all functions of the senses 127. When the activities (pravṛtti) are recognized to be the root of suffering in so far as they bring about merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), etc., they are avoided. As soon as the true nature of the defects (doṣa) is understood, viz. in the light of NS 4.1.60 128, one undertakes the greatest exertions to remove them. Then it has to be realized that the beginningless process of rebirth (pretyabhāva) 128a and, hence, the extreme suffering in the form of birth and death cannot be brought to an end but by liberation (apavarga); and similarly it is to be realized that the result (phala) [of activities and defects] 129 consisting

122. Read thus against the edition! In the passage left out here, viz. NBhūs 442.11-19, Bhāsarvajña gives a brief explanation of the Four Noble Truths.
123. NBhūs 442.22.
124. Viz. NBhūs 461.15 ff.
125. Cf. above p. 326.
126. Cf. NBhūs 442.22-26 and 443.6-15.
127. Cf. NBhūs 440.10-13 to which Bhāsarvajña refers back.
129. Cf. NS 1.1.20.
in pain and also in alleged pleasure is ultimately the same in that both, pleasure and pain, are brought about by one's own karmam. Next, pain and suffering (duśkha) have to be properly understood so as to be able to keep them present to one's mind. When one has come to realize that each and everything, from God Brahmā down to a grass-blade, is permeated by pain and suffering, one does not take interest in it any longer. And when, finally, liberation (apavarga) is recognized to be the unsurpassed, endless and altogether pure means for the ceasing of all pain and suffering, one strives for that goal only.

Bhāshārvajña concludes this passage by stating 131 *tad evam dvādāsa-prahāresv api tattvjānādabāvānā copayujata ity ato 'pi dvādāsādā prameyam uktaṃ | sankṣepabāvānārtham ca tasya cāturvidhāyam ucyate / |. Hence, true knowledge is also realized in all these twelve ways; it is for this reason, too, that the "object of valid cognition" is taught [in the NS] as twelvetifold; and that it is [on the other hand] of four kinds [only], this is taught for the sake of keeping [true knowledge] present to one's mind in a concise form.

That is to say, Bhāshārvajña first demonstrates the true knowledge one has to develop with respect to the twelve prameyas, following their order of enumeration as given in NS 1.1.9, and states thereafter by way of summarizing his exposition, that they have been taught by the Śīlakāra not only in order to refute the theory of the quadruple division of the doctrines of salvation as expounded by other schools, but also to intimate that all twelve of them should be reflected upon in the manner outlined by Bhāshārvajña himself. His very last remark is particularly interesting, and that in two respects: it determines more precisely the relation between the two alternative divisions of the prameyas, the twelvetifold and the quadruple; and the characterization of the latter as being introduced "sankṣepabāvānārtham" makes one wonder whether this is another instance of the well-known tendency, so important in the history of Indian religions down to the present day, to replace complicated and time-consuming religious acts by "abridgments". But it is by no means clear that what Bhāshārvajña has in mind is such a substitution; he might have equally thought of a real alternative only, or even regarded the choice of the sankṣepa as a means to intensifying the bāvānā of true knowledge which ultimately leads to liberation.

Yet, such theoretical deliberations are of little use here, at least as long as the apparent contradiction is not discussed in which the remarks of Bhāshārvajña's seem to stand to what had been said by him earlier on the relation between the two. Had he not claimed that it is the quadruple division only that leads to liberation and does he not clearly contradict himself in asserting now that "true knowledge is also realized in all these twelve ways? I think that the two relevant passages appear contradictory only at first sight. For what Bhāshārvajña

130. Cf. NBhūs 441.2-7 and 9-15 to which Bhāshārvajña refers back.
131. NBhūs 443.14-15. Read 'bāvānāpavayujatae or 'bāvānālawopātae'.
"thirst" is explained to be the longing for rebirth\(^\text{136}\). The reason for dharma and adharma being mentioned separately is that nescience is the main cause of suffering (prādhānaṃ duṣkhaḥ nītamasī), and merit and demerit are, properly speaking, specific causes of pleasure and pain, respectively, and that both of them are equally to be regarded as duṣkha-kāraṇa because it is a matter of experience that one is given pain by cold wind, etc., even when nescience and thirst do not persist any longer\(^\text{136}\). Ātman is then defined to be the cessation of suffering (duṣkha-viccheda), and the addition of "absolute" (ātmanisya) is vindicated by referring to the fact that a temporal elimination of personal (ādhyātyānīka) pain and suffering can be achieved also by applying the means taught in the Dhārma, Artha-, Kāma- and Vaiśya-śāstras\(^\text{137}\), that is to say, the attribute is meant to make clear that the liberated ātman does not ever again and in no manner come in contact with duṣkha.

Finally, the fourth element, i.e. the means for attaining complete avoidance (tasyopāyā), is determined to consist in true knowledge of the ātman. That out of the twelve "objects of valid cognition" ātman alone is mentioned is justified by the wish to stress its outstanding importance (prādhānya) which, according to Bhasavarjana, has also led to its being enumerated first in NS 1.1.9\(^\text{138}\). The ātman is said to be of two kinds, viz. para and apara, of which two the former is none else but the Mahāsva\(^\text{139}\) and the latter is "he who experiences the result of Saṃsāra" (samāśrāpalabhokti), i.e. the individual permanent and omnipresent soul\(^\text{139}\).

Regarding the rôle these two "objects of valid cognition" play in attaining the final goal, it is stated that the true knowledge of the aparātman represents a means to it (niḥśreyasāṅga) because it leads to activity aimed at "the other world" in that it helps to realize that the paraloka really exists and because it causes the elimination of demerit\(^\text{139}\); the true knowledge of the parātman, on the other hand, is ascribed a similar function, only that it works by being a constitutive element of the upāsanā of the Mahāsva\(^\text{140}\). That both these tattvajñānas are not of exactly the same rank is finally stated by emphatically proclaiming that liberation is attained only because of perceiving God Siva (tasmā
chirodayasānād eva mokṣa iti)\(^\text{140}\). Out of the many points in Bhāsarvajña's extensive "commentary on NS 1.1.9" which ought to be taken up for discussion the following should not be passed over silently here. On the one hand, Bhāsarvajña quotes a series of relevant sūtras from the YS (above p. 329) and clearly in a pūrva-pākṣa section; on the other, he uses YS 2.16 in its own definition of keyam (cf. above p. 333) — as also YS 2.15 in his explanation of phala\(^\text{143}\). This contradiction is, of course, only seemingly one. The solution cannot but be that Bhāsarvajña accepts such elements of Pātañjala-Yoga as do doctrinally so to say neutral in that they refer to a practical method of self-control, etc.\(^\text{143}\). In doing so he is not only clearly in keeping with the NS itself, and he himself quotes the relevant sūtra viz. 4.2.45\(^\text{143}\), but he also gives Yoga as such its due in so far as it essentially teaches a method that can be and was applied to different systems of thought, can and was practised by people of different persuasions. Bhāsarvajña does, of course, not show "faith in the doctrines of that school", as V.S. Abhyankar and I. R. Devadhar would have it\(^\text{143}\); on the contrary, he severely and repeatedly criticizes them. All one can perhaps say is that he "shows a strong predilection for Yoga", also in a later part of his work\(^\text{143}\), yet this is a side-issue which I cannot follow up here\(^\text{139}\).

\(^{136}\) NBhūṣ 590.6 and 7 ff. as well as 514.24; cf. also NBhūṣ 590.13-14: ātmanavādiviśeṣeti (read: 'viśeṣa' 'pi') kāsmaṁ niṇyadarśāṇān mokṣa iti cet. na, anyasya (i.e. paramātmanāḥ śivād anyasya) sarvānīmatvāt: na hy anyo 'pi ātman sarvatpattimānimitām iti / on the distinction between the muktātman and the paramātman cf. also NBhūṣ 449.4 ff.

\(^{137}\) VI. NBhūṣ 441.13 ff.

\(^{138}\) According to the editor's Nyāyabhāṣāpanatattipāparatitvavyāvahāra (pp. 631 ff.) it is a total of 16 sūtras of the YS which are quoted by Bhāsarvajña. On the occasion of quoting the concluding portion of NS 4.2.45 Bhāsarvajña makes the following important remark (NBhūṣ 584.11 ff.): iti vacanat / pātañjaliśāstraśraya upadhiṣṭaḥ upadhyāya svāstāvivrodhena (read, of course, 'āvirodha') pratipattaya / tatra uktiṭvamaryāde ca [f] / paramātman api pratiṣṭhaddhān anumānam iti tantrayuktih /; that is to say, he himself clearly states the principle he proceeds upon in accepting the 'opinions of others'. As for this tantrayuktī, cf. NBhūṣ 16.3 f. (on NS 1.1.4).

\(^{139}\) VI. NBhūṣ 445.28 and cf. fn. 146a. The reading 'vidyapāyāḥ' given there is, however, a misprint for 'vidyupāyāḥ'.

\(^{140}\) Nyāyasāra of Āchārya Bhāsarvajña with the Nyāyāsara paḍapāṇiḥchikā of Vāsudeva of Kashmir, Poona, 1922, p. 84.

\(^{141}\) VI. NBhūṣ 584.9 ff. where Bhāsarvajña, with reference to his definition of upāśīvādhi, not only refers to NS 4.2.45, but also to the means (upādya) taught in the Pātañjaliśāstra, stating that this upādya has also to be accepted to the extent that it does not stand in contradiction to the YS tenets and is hence not expressly objected to (pratiṣṭhaddhā). Note also the remark NBhūṣ 584.18: dvādaśapraveyādānam api nāpanāmānam asahāyaṃ rāgādnirvṛttvam samartham / kim tāre? yogopākṛtyānāsahāsam, by which Bhāsarvajña plainly states his particular position: true knowledge of the objects of valid cognition is not by itself as soon as it has been gained capable of bringing all desire to an end, it needs support, viz. practising the means of Yoga. Cf in this connection also NBhūṣ 441.14 where YS 2.15 is quoted as the statement of an 'adyatmavād'.

\(^{150}\) As far as I know it is presently being studied by G. Oberhammer.
5.3. Returning now to the central problem, one has to put oneself the following question: what are the historical conclusions to be drawn from the observation that the quadruple division of the doctrine of salvation is attested in a substantially identical form not only in the Indian science of medicine, certain Yoga texts and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, but also in the Nyāya tradition? There is but a hypothesis I am able to offer, viz. the assumption that suggests itself quite naturally when the relative chronology of the respective earliest sources is taken into account and when a casual convergent development is a priori excluded: the quadruple division was discovered by the Buddha; it was thereafter taken over by the author of the relevant sūtras of the YS (which shows strong Buddhist influences in other respects, too), who also chose other, i.e. neutral, terms for the four different elements. Pakṣilasvāmin borrowed them probably from the YS as the terminology used by him is practically identical with that of the YS. Similarly, it found, though probably earlier, its way into the Carakasaṁhitā which directly or indirectly influenced the author of the Yogabhāṣya and that of the Buddhist Vyādhisūtra so that they decided to refer to the science of medicine by way of comparison.

This hypothesis, of course, implies that the assumption made above (p. 323 f.), viz. that the science of medicine may claim priority as regards the «discovery» of the quadruple division, has to be abandoned. Yet, I think, it offers a more plausible explanation of the undisputable fact that this division was never of real importance in the tradition of the Cikitsāsāstra. There is another point I should like to make in this connection: is not the widespread belief that the quadruple division as taught in medicine it was that inspired the Buddha perhaps suggested also by the assumption that the Buddha could not have conceived his systematically divided four āryasatyādi had he not had in mind a concrete and wordly example which he need only apply to his doctrine of salvation? And might not the idea, «natural» though it seems, that this «discovery» cannot but have been made first by people concerned with the somatic aspect of man's existence turn out to be a preconceived one, in the case of Indian culture at least; is it not perhaps even due to the fact that a rather modern and Western conception of medicine is unconsciously taken as basis? Could not just the reverse be true, viz. that in India it was a person deeply reflecting on man's existence as such that led to this «discovery», i.e. that it was the extraordinary analytical capacity and sensibility of the Buddha to which Indian medicine in its turn owes the recognition of its caturvyāhatva?

\[\text{tad etad anyair api kāthinyarataih sākṣmādardśibhir yatnena vičāryatām ity alam ativistareṇa}^{152}.\]

152. I likewise withstand the temptation to enter on my own into an independent comparative study of medicine and doctrines of salvation the comparison of which could, of course, be carried much farther than it was ever done by Indian authors.