

ON THE QUADRUPLE DIVISION OF THE YOGASĀSTRA,
THE CATURVYOHAṬVA OF THE CĪKITSĀSĀSTRA
AND THE «FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS» OF THE BUDDHA

(Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa II)

1. The publication of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa¹ — wrongly entitled «Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa» by the editors² — has, as the late Paul Hacker aptly remarked³, «raised a new problem in the study of the history of [Indian] philosophy»⁴. Hacker's attention was drawn to this text, though it is a commentary on the Yogasūtra (=YS) and Yogabhāṣya (=YBh/YBhāṣya), because it was regarded by the editors to be a work of Saṅkara, the Advaitin. For, Hacker has, as is well known, given much thought to the problem of how to distinguish between the authentic works of Saṅkara, the Advaitin, and the many spuria ascribed to him, and he has evolved various criteria to prove authenticity. Therefore, it is by no means unexpected that he accepted the challenge posed by the publication of yet another text ascribed to the Advaitin. In his most stimulating article published in 1968⁵ he does not, however, really want to prove the identity of the author of the

1. Ed. by Polakam Sri Rama Sastri and S. A. Krishnamurthi Sastri (= MGOS, no. XCIV), Madras, 1952. Most valuable observations on this text and on the authorship problem have been made by W. HALBFASS; cf. the appendix, *Notes on the «Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa»*, in his recent monograph, «Studies in Kumārila and Saṅkara», Reinbek, 1983, to which I should like to refer the reader also as regards the secondary literature so far published on the Vivaraṇa.

2. Cf. my article, *Philological Observations on the so-called Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* (Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa I), in IJ, vol. 25 (1983), pp. 17-39.

3. Viz. on pp. 124-218 of his article, *Saṅkara der Yogin und Saṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen*, in «Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner», aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstags herausgegeben von G. Oberhammer, Wien, 1968 (= WZKSO, 12-13, 1968-69), pp. 119-48 = Kleine Schriften. Herausgegeben von L. Schmithausen (Glasenapp-Stiftung Bd. 15), Wiesbaden, 1978, pp. 213-42. In the following this article is referred to by «(Hacker) 1968».

4. The German original runs as follows: «... der der Erforschung der Philosophiegeschichte ein neues Problem stellt».

5. Cf. fn. 3.

Vivaraṇa and Saṅkara, the Advaitin; instead, what he does is to argue that if we assume this identity we are able to explain peculiarly Yoga features in the authentic works of Saṅkara, the Advaitin, to some of which Hacker had already drawn attention in an earlier article of his⁶; he further argues that if the Vivaraṇa was in fact composed by Saṅkara, the Advaitin, it cannot but have been the earliest of his works, and that if Saṅkara was at first an adherent of (Pātañjala-)Yoga and became a Vedāntin only later, the relative chronology of at least some of his later works can be established by examining the extent to which they display Yoga influence in terms of philosophical contents and terminology.

2. It is in this connection that Hacker deals with the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra as it is stated, and most emphatically at that, at the very beginning of the Vivaraṇa. He says⁷: «At YBh 2.15, the division of the Yogaśāstra is compared to that of a system of therapeutics. Ś(aṅkara) resumes this idea in the introduction to his YV [=Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa] when explaining the purpose of the Yogaśāstra. This shows that he looked upon Yoga as a therapeutic system. The same idea, except for the division itself (which is proper only to Yoga), is repeated by Ś when he in the introduction to his MāBh [=Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya] points out the purpose of the text to be explained [i.e. the Māṇḍūkya Up.]; but what he now brings in is the monistic teaching by which man as one sick due to Suffering has to be led to health of the Self. In introductions to other works of his, Ś recurs to the concept of therapeutics (*cikitsita*) (viz. USP [=Upadeśasāhasrī-Padya-prabandha] 19, 1), and once again to the idea of illness and health, only that the concept of therapeutical treatment is dropped (viz. USG [=Upadeśasāhasrī-Gadya-prabandha] 47). Here it is natural to assume that the

6. Viz., *Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Saṅkaras. Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara*, in ZDMG, 100 (1965), pp. 246-86 = Kleine Schriften..., pp. 69-109.

7. 1968, pp. 125/219. Explanations added by me are placed within square brackets. The German original runs thus: «YBh 2.15 ist die Einteilung des Yogaśāstra mit der eines Systems der Therapie verglichen. Ś nimmt diesen Gedanken auf in der Einleitung zum YV (p. 2), wo er den Zweck des Lehrsystems erklären will. Damit ist der Yoga als eine Therapie aufgefasst. Den gleichen Gedanken, mit Weglassung der (nur für das Yogasystem passenden) Einteilung, wiederholt Ś, als er in der Einleitung zu MāBh den Zweck des zu erläuternden Textes angeben will; nun ist es die monistische Lehre, die den Leidkranken zur Gesundheit des Selbst führt. In Einleitungen zu anderen Werken Ś kehrt die Idee der Therapie (*cikitsita*) noch einmal wieder (USP 19.1) und dann noch einmal der Gedanke der Krankheit und Gesundheit, unter Weglassung des Begriffs der Heilbehandlung (USG 47). Die Annahme liegt nahe, dass die drei Werke, wo der Gedanke der Heilbehandlung betont ist, zeitlich zusammengehören und dem Yoga nahestehen. Denn dieser ist methodische Übung, die leicht mit einer Therapie verglichen werden kann. Ś Vedānta dagegen will keine Methode lehren, die durch Übungen kontinuierlich zum Ziel der Erlösung führe; darum lehnt er (später) den Yoga ab, vgl. unten. Dementsprechend ist es im USG (einem vielleicht späten Werk) bloss der Schüler, der von seinem Lehrer eine Art Heilbehandlung erwartet; der Lehrer verspricht ihm nichts dergleichen, er will bloss zur Erkenntnis führen».

three works in which the idea of therapeutical treatment is stressed belong together in point of time and are connected with Yoga. For Yoga is a practice that can easily be compared to therapeutics. Ś's Vedānta, however, does not teach a method by following which one is gradually led to the goal of liberation; that is why he (later) rejects Yoga, cf. below. Accordingly, in the USG (perhaps a late work) it is only the disciple who expects from his teacher a kind of therapeutical treatment; the teacher, however, does not promise any such thing; all he aims at is to lead to liberating insight».

2.1. The passage of the Vivaraṇa referred to by Hacker is found almost at the very beginning of the text. It is preceded, or rather introduced, by a statement to the effect that the Yogaśāstra will be studied and the method it teaches practised by people only if its *sambandha* and *prayojana* are shown. It is to the *prayojana*, i.e. the «purpose» of the Yogaśāstra, that the Vivaraṇakāra addresses himself first, for he continues⁸:

tatra prayojanam tvaṁ — cikitsāśāstre⁹ tac caturvyūhatvapradarśanadvāreṇa vyākhyātam / tadyathā — cikitsāśāstram caturvyūham: rogaḥ, rogahetuḥ, ārogyam, bhāṣajyam iti / vidhipratishedhaniyama-dvāreṇa [ca tat¹⁰] caturvyūhaviśayavyakhyānaparam / evam ihāpi «pariṇāmatāpasamskārādūḥkhair guṇavṛttivirodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṁ vivekinaḥ» [YS 2.15] ity ārabhya caturvyūhatvaṁ pradarśitam / tadyathā — duḥkhapracuraḥ saṁsāro heyah / tasyāvidyānimitto draṣṭṛdrśyasamyogo hetuḥ / vivekakhyātir aviṣṭavā hānopāyah¹¹ / vivekakhyātau ca satyāṁ avidyānivr̥ttih, tannivr̥ttāv ātyantiko draṣṭṛdrśyasamyogoparamo hānam, tad eva kaivalyam¹² / ārogyasthāntyakaivalyaprayuktatvād asya tad eva kaivalyam prayojanam //.

2.2. In a later part of his article¹³ Hacker returns to this passage; what he says there is¹⁴:

8. P. 2, l. 1-9 of the edition; cf. also p. 168, l. 15 ff. In addition, he treats of the *sambandha*, viz. p. 2, l. 18 ff.

9. Here the Trivandrum MS (cf. the article mentioned in fn. 2) has the reading *cikitsāśāstravat tac*, which most probably originated under the influence of the preceding *tvaṁ* or by dittography.

10. *ca tat* is an emendation of the editors; it is not corroborated by the Triv. Ms.

11. Cf. YS 2.26; see below p. 295.

12. Cf. YS 2.25; see below p. 295.

13. 1968, p. 139 f./233 f.

14. The German original runs thus: «Da wird der Inhalt des Yoga in Analogie zum System der Therapeutik (*cikitsāśāstra*) und in Anlehnung an YS 2.15 ff. in vier Kapitel (*vyūha*) eingeteilt: 1. "Der leidvolle Saṁsāra ist zu vermeiden" (in der Therapie entspricht das der Lehre von der Krankheit, *roga*). 2. "Seine Ursache ist die Verbindung des Subjekts mit dem Objekt, die im Nichtwissen gründet" (das ist die "Ursache der Krankheit", *roga-hetuḥ*). 3. "Mittel des Vermeidens ist die unbeeinträchtigte Klarheit der Unterscheidungskennntnis" (das "Heilmittel", *bhāṣajya*).

« The contents of Yoga are here divided into four chapters (*vyūha*)¹⁵ by analogy with the system of therapeutics (*cikitsā-sāstra*) and in dependence on YS 2.15 ff.: 1) "Saṃsāra, full of Suffering, is to be avoided". (In therapeutics this corresponds to the teaching of Illness, *roga*). 2) "The cause of saṃsāra is the connection of the subject with the object based on nescience" (this is the "Cause of Illness"; *roga-hetuḥ*). 3) "The means by which [saṃsāra] is avoided is the unswerving lucidity of discriminating knowledge" (the "Remedy", *bhaiṣajya*). 4) "When this has been attained then nescience is eliminated, and the connection of subject and object ceases entirely; that is avoidance, absolute independence" (in therapeutics: "Health", *ārogya*). It may be noted in passing that this division shows a certain similarity also to the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Yet the second and third truth — Suffering and its Annihilation — are gathered into one, and in accordance with the more positive outlook of Brahmanism a chapter is added on the final goal — absolute independence, corresponding to Health.

4. "Ist diese erreicht, so ist das Nichtwissen beseitigt, und damit hört die Verbindung von Subjekt und Objekt absolut auf; das ist das Vermeiden, die Abso-lutheit" (in der Therapeutik: die "Gesundheit", *ārogya*). Nebenbei bemerkt hat diese Einteilung eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit auch mit den Vier Edlen Wahrheiten des Buddha. Doch sind die zweite und die dritte Wahrheit — das Leiden und seine Aufhebung — in eine zusammengezogen, und entsprechend der positiveren Sicht des Brahmanismus ist ein Kapitel über das Ziel — die Absolutheit, entsprechend der Gesundheit — hinzugefügt ».

« Die Yogalehre so einzuteilen, ist gewiss nicht abwegig. Doch ist zu bemerken, dass erstens im System des Pātañjala-Yoga manches enthalten ist, was nicht streng zu diesem Schema passt, z.B. die Lehre von den magischen Vollkommenheiten (*siddhi*), und dass zweitens dieses System, so wie es in den Sūtren vorliegt, nicht so eingeteilt ist. Diese Einteilung ist eine Interpretation Śs. Sie entspricht ganz dem auch in den Advaitaschriften Śs immer wieder zu beobachtenden stark praktischen, didaktischen, ja therapeutischen Interesse ».

« Es ist daher bemerkenswert, dass Ś, als er als Advaitin den wesentlichen Inhalt seiner Lehre einmal ganz ohne Bezugnahme auf zu erklärende Texte und rein argumentativ darlegte, auf das gleiche Einteilungsschema zurückkam, das er schon als Yogin aufgestellt hatte. Der Gedanke der Therapie musste jetzt zwar zurücktreten (vgl. oben § 2), aber die Disposition des 2. Prosa-Prakaraṇa der US entspricht genau der Vier-Vyūha-Einteilung. USG 45-47 ist vom Leiden des Saṃsāra gehandelt. 48 beginnt die Belehrung über die Ursache des Leidens: das Nichtwissen. Ohne scharfen Einschnitt geht sie etwa ab 58 allmählich über in die Anleitung zur unterscheidenden Erkenntnis. USG 109 schildert die Erreichung des Zieles ».

15. In rendering the term *vyūha* by « chapter » Hacker has, I think, made the wrong choice, though he is in accordance with the PW (vol. VI, column 1485). If its meaning is not simply « part, division » here, one should rather think of its being used (e.g. in the Arthaśāstra) as a military term to denote a « battle-array », i.e. in a more general sense a « purposeful, systematic arrangement ». Cf. also R. Garbe's explanation of this term as used in Vijñānabhikṣu's Sāṃkhyapravacanaśāstra (see below fn. 31), Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya ... aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt..., Leipzig, 1889, p. 11, fn. 2: « ...bei dem *vyūha* liegt ein *krameṇa 'ṅopādānāṃ vinyāsaḥ* vor... ».

Note that the author of the Vivaraṇa offers (p. 169, l. 3 ff.) two alternative explanations of the compound *caturvyūha*, viz. *caturvyūha* *asya* and *ṣv artheṣu* (= *saṃsāra*, *saṃsārahetu* etc.) *caturdhā vyūho 'sya*.

To divide the teaching of Yoga in this manner is, to be sure, by no means improper. But it has to be noted that, firstly, the system of Pātañjala-Yoga contains various elements that do not strictly fit into the [fourfold] scheme, e.g. the teaching of the magical perfections (*siddhi*), and that, secondly, this system [i.e. that of Yoga], as it is found in the sūtras themselves, is not divided in this manner. The division is an interpretation introduced by Ś; it wholly corresponds to the decidedly practical, didactic, nay, therapeutical interest that is to be noted again and again in the Advaita works of Ś's also¹⁶.

Therefore, it is noteworthy that the Advaitin Ś, at the one place where he expounds the essential content of his teaching without any reference to texts to be explained and in a purely argumentative manner, takes up the very scheme of division he had already established when still a Yogin. The idea of therapeutics had now to recede into the background (cf. above § 2), but the disposition of the 2. prose prakaraṇa of the US corresponds exactly to the four *vyūha* division. USG 45-47 deals with saṃsāra as Suffering. In 48 we have the beginning of the instruction about the Cause of Suffering: nescience. Without sharp cleavage approximately from 58 onwards it gradually yields to initiation into discriminating knowledge. USG 109 describes the attainment of the goal ».

These remarks call for a critical examination in more than one respect. It appears as if Hacker has lost sight of what he had himself correctly stated earlier, viz. that the quadruple division of Yogaśāstra as taught at the beginning of the Vivaraṇa is already met with in the YBhāṣya on YS 2.15 and, moreover, in the YS itself. Indeed, what the Bhāṣyakāra says on YS 2.15 (*pariṇāmatāpasamīkārādūḥkhaḥ guṇavṛttinirodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ*), quoted also by the Vivaraṇa, cf. above under 2.1.), after first explaining its wording and purport in detail, is this¹⁷:

... *tad asya mahato duḥkhasamudāyasya prabhavabijam avidyā / tasyāś ca samyagdarśanam abhāvaḥ* / *yathā cikitsāśāstram caturvyūham — rogo rogaḥ* / *ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti, evam idam api śāstram caturvyūham eva / tadyathā*¹⁸ — *saṃsāraḥ saṃsārahetuḥ mokṣo mokṣopāya*¹⁹ / *iti / tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyah / pradhānapuruṣayoḥ*²⁰ / *samyogo heyahetuḥ / samyogasyātyantiki nivṛttir hānam / hānopāyah samyagdarśanam / ...*

This is not only by itself an unequivocal statement, but comparison also clearly shows that it was simply reformulated by the author of

16. Note that this sentence stands in contradiction with what H. had said at the end of the passage quoted above (§ 2).

17. I quote the text portion as given on p. 168, l. 1-7 of the edition of the Vivaraṇa. Cf. in addition p. 171, l. 1: *tad etac chāstram caturvyūham ity adhidyate*.

18. The author of the Vivaraṇa attests *yathā* only, cf. p. 168, l. 24.

19. *mokṣahetuḥ* according to the Vivaraṇakāra.

20. The author of the Vivaraṇa obviously reads *pradhānapuruṣasamyogo*; cf. pp. 168, l. 25 and 169, l. 7.

the Vivaraṇa; the one substantial difference to be dealt with first is the point at which this quadruple division is taught in either work; apparently, by the time of the Vivaraṇakāra it had become usual for (sub-)commentators or authors of scientific works to deal already at the beginning with the « purpose » (*prayojana*), etc., of their main subject in order to convince the reader or hearer that it was worthwhile to take the trouble of studying it carefully. That is why the Vivaraṇakāra decided to point out the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra already at the very outset of his commentary; and, to be sure, he need not state explicitly that this « example » (*dr̥ṣṭānta*²¹), i.e. the comparison of the Yogaśāstra with the science of medicine, was not his own invention; instead, what was of importance to him was to emphasize that the division is in accordance with explicit statements of Patañjali himself. And this claim of the Vivaraṇakāra cannot be a *limine* treated with contempt as yet another example of the common practice of commentators to have what is but their own idea or, at least, an idea of later origin sanctioned, as it were, by the accepted authority of the *mūla* text. His assertion that the *caturvyūhatva* of the Yogaśāstra is pointed out (*pradarśita*) in the YS itself, beginning with sūtra 2.15, obviously does not belong to the category of such wishful, forced interpretations. Yet, it calls, nevertheless, for closer examination.

The Vivaraṇakāra's reference to YS 2.15 may have been provoked in the first place by the fact that it is that sūtra in explaining which the Bhāṣyakāra deals with the subject of the *caturvyūhatva*, i.e. makes the statement (quoted above) about the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra; nonetheless it cannot be denied that the sūtra itself:

pariṇāmatāpasamṣkāraduḥkhair guṇavirodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinah

stands out in that in it the term *duḥkha* is not simply used as in others also, but is central to it; for it declares that « to a *vivekin*, i.e. the Yogin who possesses discriminating insight into reality as analysed by Yoga, everything is Suffering in view of the various forms of Suffering consisting in change, mental or physical pain and subliminal impressions²² and because of the fact that the functions of the constituents [of primordial matter] are opposed to each other ». Undoubtedly, this is a central element of Yoga as expounded in the Sūtra. Ascribing to life, as

21. This term is used by the Vivaraṇakāra himself, viz. p. 168, l. 21.

22. The author of the Vivaraṇa explains (p. 159, l. 12) that strictly speaking all three of them are but « causes of Suffering » (*duḥkhanimittāni*). For further elucidation, I should like to refer the reader to the Bhāṣya and the Vivaraṇa on this sūtra. That this sūtra clearly exhibits Buddhist influence was shown by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, V, 1936-37, p. 234 f. The term *samṣkāra* has, of course, quite another meaning in Buddhist texts. Though one cannot, of course, be absolutely sure, it was probably reinterpreted already by the author of YS 2.15.

it does, the character of being nothing but Suffering, YS 2.15 must indeed be regarded as the pivotal statement about the nature of reality in the YS. And in the immediately following sūtra (2.16: *heyam duḥkham anāgatam*) it is taught that « it is Suffering yet to come that has to be avoided »²³, whereas in YS 2.17 the « cause of that which has to be avoided » (*heyahetu*) is defined as *draṣṭṛdr̥śyayoḥ samyogaḥ*, i.e. « the connection of the subject with the object ». As the three latter terms call for further elucidation, actually given in sūtras 2.18-23, it is only in YS 2.24 (*tasya hetur avidyā*) that nescience is expressly stated to be the cause of this connection. The term *hāna*, which the reader now expects, is in fact met with in the next sūtra (2.25) which reads thus: *tadabhāvāt samyogābhāvo hānam, tad dr̥ṣeḥ kaivalyam*: « Avoidance is the non-existence of the connection on account of its (i.e. the nescience's) non-existence; this is the seer's (i.e. the spirit's or soul's) being-absolutely-by-himself ». The obvious question as to the means of avoidance, i.e. of attaining the state of liberation, is answered by the immediately following sūtra (2.26): *vivekakhṛtīr aviṣṭavā hānopāyaḥ* « the means to avoidance is the steady or firm lucidity-of-discriminating-knowledge », i.e. the complete or perfect realization of the absolute difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

Thus it is already on the historical level of the YS itself that, in a series of sūtras obviously forming a unitary whole, four clearly demarcated concepts are attested, viz.

23. The last word of this sūtra (*anāgatam*) which is left out in the Bhāṣya- and Vivaraṇakāra's independent expositions of the *caturvyūhatva*, most probably for practical reasons only, is accounted for by the author of the YBh in the following manner: *duḥkham alītam* (Viv.: *vartamānāj janmano 'tikrāntajanmalakṣaṇam duḥkham*) *upabhogendātivāhitam na heyapakṣe vartate* (Viv.: *svayam eva hīnatvāt*) / *vartamānaḥ ca* (Viv.: *janmalakṣaṇam duḥkham*) *svakṣaṇe bhogārūḍham* (Viv.: *svam vartamānaḥ bhogaviśiṣṭam kṣaṇam adhvānam upabhujyamānātmakatvenārūḍham*) *iti na tat kṣaṇāntare heyatām āpadyate* (Viv.: *svayam eva bhogena hīnam na hānāya kṣaṇāntaram apekṣate*) / *tasmād yad evānāgatam* (Viv.: *prāyaṇāntarabhāvijjanma-
duḥkhalakṣaṇam*) *duḥkham tad evākṣipātrakalpaḥ* (cf. YBh on YS 2.15) *yoginam kliśṇāti* (= *udvejayati*, cf. Viv. p. 164, l. 7 ff.) < *netaram pratipattāram* > (not attested in the Vivaraṇa and indeed to be suspected as being a later addition; cf. also Bh 164, l. 3) / *tad eva heyatām āpadyate* (the Viv. reads *tad eva heyam here*; the other reading might in fact have originated only secondarily, viz. due to *heyatām* *āpadyate* in the second sentence; the Viv. adds by way of explanation: *samyagdarśanena hānīyam ucyate* / *bhaviṣyajanmābhāvāyaiva yatitavyam* / *na vartamānaduḥkhanīrodhāya* / *vartamānanmayiyatiśāyām hi samyagdarśanam aśakyavinīyogatvād anarthakam syāt* / *muktabhānavat pravṛttaphalatvād vartamānaduḥkhasya* / *bhaviṣyati punar apravṛttatvād bijanīrodha upakalpata iti samyagdarśanārthavattvam* / *svaviśayo hi samyagdarśanasya sa* [i.e. *bhaviṣyajanmā*]) *iti* /). That is to say according to the Vivaraṇakāra at least, « Suffering yet to come » means « Suffering consisting in and experienced in the next birth(s) ». In any case, the sūtra is right as it is in fact only *anāgatam duḥkham* that can, if at all, be avoided; but at the same time the addition of *anāgatam* may be taken to indicate that the author was more interested in actual Yoga practice and its exact description than in making general abstract statements.

<i>heyam</i>	defined as ²⁴	<i>duḥkham</i>
<i>heyahetuḥ</i>	» »	<i>draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogaḥ</i>
<i>hānam</i>	» »	<i>saṃyogābhāvaḥ</i> , i.e. <i>kaivalyam</i>
and finally, <i>hānopāyaḥ</i>	» »	<i>vivekakhyātir aviṣṭavā</i> .

Evidently this quadruple division is substantially identical with that expounded by the Bhāṣyakāra in his commentary on 2.15; and what the Vivaraṇakāra does is to resume this division. On the other hand, one cannot fail to observe that in the YS itself the division is neither expressly stated to be a divisionary scheme; nor to be a quadruple one; nor to apply to the Yogaśāstra; nor, finally, is it compared to a similar division of the Cikitsāśāstra. Nevertheless, the conclusion apparently arrived at by the Bhāṣyakāra, viz. that what the author of these sūtras actually had in mind was really a quadruple division of the system of Yoga, cannot but be accepted, by any unbiased reader who is aware of the peculiarities of a Sūtra text, as being perfectly legitimate and cogent. The only material difference worth noticing here lies in the absence of even an allusion to the science of medicine in the YS: to all appearance, this is a new element that was probably introduced for the first time by the YBhāṣya.

Drawing now the final conclusion from what has been stated in the foregoing on the evidence found in the Bhāṣya and in the Sūtra for the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra, I cannot help stating in so many words the impression, created not only by this part of Hacker's article, that he does not in this case endeavour to get the better of his prejudices, but overrides, rather arbitrarily, all facts that might stand in his way and are apt to undermine the basic assumption from which he starts. Thus his assertion that the system of Yoga « as found in the sūtras themselves, is not divided in this manner » is not merely bold, but demonstrably wrong²⁵; and it is by no means legitimate to give the author of the Vivaraṇa credit for having « established » this division as Hacker says, or to state that « the division is an interpretation introduced by Ś. ».

2.3. As regards this division, any comparative study of the Vivaraṇa, on the one hand, and of the presumably early or late works of Ś., the Advaitin, on the other, must hence start from the following observations:

1. The division is clearly attested already in the YS though it is not explicitly taught as quadruple and applying to the Yogaśāstra.

24. I am, of course, aware of the fact that not all the sūtras quoted are « definitions » in the strict sense of the word.

25. At least as regards the *caturvyūhatva* as a divisionary scheme. Obviously Hacker had lost sight of the important difference between a systematic division or divisionary scheme as such and its having actually been made the basis of a corresponding disposition of the material.

2. It is expounded likewise by the author of the YBhāṣya, unequivocally and in detail, and it is he who apparently has to be given the credit for comparing the quadruply divided Yogaśāstra to the science of medicine; in any case, this comparison seems to have been added later.
3. The division is but repeated by the Vivaraṇakāra, viz. for the obvious reasons stated already at the very outset of his work.

In order not to go astray in interpreting the relevant passages, it is further advisable, if not even imperative, not to follow Hacker's argumentary approach. As has also been shown elsewhere²⁶, it is by far better for considerations of method not to let oneself be impressed too much by the fact that the Vivaraṇa is in its colophons ascribed to a Saṅkarabhagavant; what we should do instead is to take the authorship of the Vivaraṇa to be a problem which is still unsolved. References to the quadruple division as a whole, or in part, found in a work of Ś., the Advaitin, should not therefore be studied on the basis of the assumption made by Hacker. Instead of arguing the way he does, viz. that if we assume the identity of the Vivaraṇakāra and Ś., the Advaitin, we are able to explain peculiarly Yoga features in the authentic works of Ś., the Advaitin, in the manner outlined by Hacker, we should face up to the real problem in all its seriousness and intricacy, viz. put ourselves, without bias, the pivotal question whether the quadruple division, if met with in a work of Ś.'s, or even suggestions of such a division there, can in fact best be explained by assuming the Vivaraṇa to be another and then, to be sure, the earliest work of the famous Advaita philosopher.

This assumption could be regarded as necessary if, and only if, the comparative study of the relevant passages in authentic works of Ś. listed by Hacker himself, on the one hand, and the exposition of the *caturvyūhatva* of the Yogaśāstra in the Vivaraṇa, on the other, were to reveal so specific a correspondence that the hypothesis that the author is one and the same in both cases would suggest itself as the only solution or, at least, the one most plausible.

In view of the close similarity between the Vivaraṇakāra's exposition and that of the Bhāṣyakāra, « specific correspondence » could in our case firstly mean « literal agreement ». No such agreement has, however, been pointed out by Hacker, and, to be sure, there is none. But, secondly, what about the condition of a peculiar property being common both to the Vivaraṇa and an authentic work of Ś., the Advaitin?

Is not the sequence of the last two members of the fourfold division in the case of the USG reversed, and does not this change, on the one hand, stand clearly in contrast to the order of enumeration as found in the YS and -Bhāṣya, and strikingly agree, on the other, with the Viva-

26. Viz. in the article mentioned in fn. 2.

raṇakāra's exposition? One cannot but answer this question in the positive, and it is surprising that Hacker is silent on this. Nevertheless, one will hesitate to rest satisfied with simply noting this admittedly interesting point of agreement, at least, if one wants to escape the reproach of superficiality or of drawing premature conclusions. For, the correspondence might equally be coincidental.

Now, as for the USG, the reason for Ś.'s giving first what Hacker calls the « initiation into discriminating knowledge » and describing only thereafter the final goal or its attainment, is, I think, clear enough and need not provoke controversy. Since this portion of the USG is conceived by Ś. as a dialogue between a disciple and a teacher approached for instruction, there can hardly be any doubt that the instruction is given with a view to its application; what Ś. has in mind is the actual succession of stages the disciple has to pass through; and that in reality the final goal is, if at all, attained last need hardly be mentioned.

The crucial point, however, is: are we to assume that the Vivaraṇakāra in changing the sequence was led by the same or a similar motive? In his case, the fact that he does not keep to the order of succession as found in the YS and -Bhāṣya is even more striking, since the four *vyūhas* of the Cikitsāśāstra are enumerated by him exactly in the same sequence as by the Bhāṣyakāra; the result being that the two series lack complete parallelism, and that the author is compelled to make clear in his last sentence that *kaivalya* in the quadruple division of Yoga corresponds to *ārogya* in that of the Cikitsāśāstra (cf. *ārogyasthānīya** in the passage quoted above).

It is, however, this last sentence, together with the context in which the issue of the *caturvyūhatva* as a whole stands in the Vivaraṇa (cf. above p. 291), that provides us with the key for discovering the reason for the transposition in this text. The problem from which the author starts is, as has been noted already above, the exigency of dealing at the outset of his work explicitly with the *prayojana* of the Yogaśāstra. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that particular stress is laid on that *vyūha* to which the practice of Yoga is ultimately said to lead, and that this emphasis is achieved also by letting the whole discussion culminate in the exposition of what is taken to be the « purpose », i.e. of *kaivalya*.

To adduce further circumstantial evidence, if additional arguments are at all necessary: the transition from YS 2.24 to the subsequent one is gained in the Bhāṣya by the following remark: *heyam duḥkham heyakāraṇam ca saṃyogākhyaṃ sanimittam uktam / ataḥ param hānam vaktavyam* /. All the Vivaraṇakāra says in commenting on the latter sentence is (p. 203.13-14): *ataḥ param hānam ārogyasthānīyam mokṣaśāstraprayojanam vaktavyam / vakṣyamāṇasamkīrtanam ca śrotṛbuddhisamādhānārtham* /. It is true that he does not state explicitly why « avoidance is to be taught next », but at the same time the absence of any remark on his part to the effect that in reality, i.e. in the practice

of Yoga, what is called *hānopāya* comes, of course, first is, I think, quite conspicuous.

These observations will, I trust, suffice to corroborate the assumption made above, viz. that the conspicuous transposition of the last two *vyūhas* in the introduction of the Vivaraṇa is caused by nothing else than the wish to bring out into proper relief the « *śāstrārambhaprayojana* » (cf. p. 161.11) ²⁷.

Therefore ²⁸, it can safely be stated that the agreement between the USG and the Vivaraṇa as regards the interchange of the last two *vyūhas* is but coincidental, i.e. caused in each case by quite different deliberations. It is hence quite possible, that Ś., if at all under the influence of Yoga texts in this respect, was inspired either by the YBhāṣya or perhaps even the YS itself. On the basis of the methodological considerations outlined above (p. 297) and in view of the observations made with regard to the exposition of the theory of the *caturvyūhatva* in the three Yoga texts (cf. above p. 296), one cannot, therefore, help drawing the final conclusion that the comparative study of the USG and the Vivaraṇa does not by any means yield sufficient evidence for the identity of the authors of the two texts as taken for granted by Hacker.

Although Hacker's basic assumption is thus — once more — shown to be highly problematic, nay practically unjustified, the question arising next should not be left unasked, viz. whether an element in authentic works of Ś., the Advaitin, reminding us of the Yoga theory of *caturvyūhatva* warrants the assumption of an external influence in general or of an influence exercised on Ś. by the YBhāṣya or the YS in particular. What is called for in this connection is a critical reexamination of the passages referred to by Hacker; such a reexamination yields the following results.

27. I do not, of course, want to keep silent about the fact that there is, on the other hand, a passage in the Vivaraṇa where in striking and awkward contrast to its beginning it is the *hānopāya*, viz. *samyagdarśana*, that is spoken of as *prayojana*, viz. p. 169, l. 14-15: *ārabhyamāṇasya śāstrasya samyagdarśanam eva prayojanam* (cf. also the quite frequent expression *samyagdarśanaśāstra*). If this latter remark is not merely meant to account for the somewhat puzzling fact that the Bhāṣyakāra already in commenting on YS 2.15 (and not only on 2.20) touches on the topic of the *hātṛ* (cf. p. 169, l. 10 ff.), other explanations one could think of are [1] that this apparent inconsistency is due to an *upacāra*: the term which primarily denotes the means is used metonymically to denote its result; or [2] that *samyagdarśana* insofar as it is the *pratīpakṣa* (cf. 168.16) of Nescience, the true cause of Suffering, is here regarded as the main thing to be achieved, ensuing almost automatically as it does *hāna*; or [3] that *samyagdarśana* is given preference because *hāna* is an *avastu*, i.e. not something positive, but only the not-existing-any-longer of the connection between subject and object (*bandhanoparama*) (cf. p. 204, l. 13-16). On the other hand, however, the text might be corrupt here: *śāstrasya* could have replaced an original *sūtrasya* (cf. also l. 14 ... *śāstram ataḥparam ārabhyate*) and *samyagdarśanam* could resume this term as used in a narrower sense in the YBh itself, viz. p. 170, l. 2.

28. In any case, the Vivaraṇakāra's motive for the transposition cannot have been Ś.'s also! On the order of enumeration of the four *vyūhas* in Yoga texts and that of the Four Noble Truths cf. below p. 306.

On the one hand it has to be admitted that the disciple in USG 47 compares himself to a sick person (*rogin*) and that Ś., led by deliberations like those outlined above, might have deliberately changed the sequence of the last two *vyūhas* against that attested in the YBhāṣya and YS. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that the quadruple division itself is nowhere in the USG stated explicitly. This fact was, admittedly, noticed by Hacker; but is the explanation he offers, viz. that the division « is proper only to Yoga », not too simple a solution, or rather an attempt to avoid addressing himself to the methodological problem involved? In any case, Hacker's remarks are thought-provoking; for he is clearly of the opinion that the dispositional structure underlying the USG materially corresponds to the four *vyūhas* as enumerated by the Vivaraṇakāra; this might be true, though there still remains a doubt, viz. that when he « discovered » this internal structure of the USG Hacker was fully convinced of the identity of the two authors. It is, of course, not possible to adduce against Hacker the argument that it would then hardly be understandable that Ś. should, nevertheless, have refrained from explicitly introducing the quadruple division itself precisely because it « is proper only to Yoga »²⁹. For Ś. may have applied the quadruple division to the teaching of Vedānta in spite of its impropriety, i.e. deliberately, yet also so inconspicuously that it passes almost unnoticed.

Therefore, what can be said is at best that the possibility of an influence exercised by the YBhāṣya or perhaps the YS itself cannot be entirely ruled out. And if the internal structure of the USG really reflects the quadruple division, such an influence may even be regarded as comparatively probable in view of the fact that Ś.'s works show this influence in other respects, too. But, the other possibility cannot be excluded with absolute certainty, viz. that Ś. was, on the contrary, under the influence of some other tradition, or under no specific influence at all. As to this latter alternative, one cannot but ask the following questions: would not anyone who takes life to be nothing but Suffering, or Illusion, and who accordingly looks upon man as in need of liberation incline most naturally to the view that man as he is can be compared to a person suffering from a physical ailment? Is not anyone who takes such a view of life quite easily led to put himself the question as to

29. Apart from the self-contradictory character of Hacker's respective remarks (cf. fn. 16), I should like to stress the following: even if Ś. did not regard the quadruple division as « proper only to Yoga », the fact that it is not stated by him expressly to be the USG's divisionary scheme might be due to some other reason also; after all this is also not done in the YS. In any case, this possibility does not affect my argument.

the reasons of this metaphysical ailment, the means of overcoming it and the state of final liberation? Thus it is, perhaps, even equally possible that Ś. was here influenced by a general religious tradition or a more specific one to which he himself belonged.

The probative force of the other two passages to which Hacker has drawn attention, viz. USP 19.1. and the introduction of the Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya, turns out to be weaker still if examined on the basis of the methodological considerations which have been outlined above.

The metaphor contained in the expression *jñānavirāgabheṣajam* and the characterization of this medicine as *tṛṣṇājvaranāśakāraṇam cikitsitam* in the USP do not by themselves warrant the conclusion that what Ś. is actually doing here is to resume concepts developed by him when still an adherent of Yoga. This holds equally good for the passage in the Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya Hacker must have had in mind; there the question as to the *prayojana* of the teaching expounded in this Upaniṣad is answered by the following statement:

*rogārtasyeva roganivṛttau svasthatā / tathā duḥkhāt makasyātmano
dvaitaprapaṇcōpaśame³⁰ svasthatā / advaitabhāvaḥ prayojanam /
dvaitaprapaṇcasyāvidyākṛtatvād vidyayā tadupaśamaḥ syād iti brah-
mavidyāprakāśanāya asyārambhaḥ kriyate /.*

Since the problem from which Ś. starts here is the same as that discussed by the Vivaraṇakāra, one could, of course, take here, too, the view that Ś. is but resuming older ideas of his, but again it is by no means self-evident that other possibilities of accounting for this comparison, possibilities which suggest themselves most easily, can be excluded with any degree of certainty. On the contrary, one cannot but wonder if, before the publication of the Vivaraṇa expressly attributing it to Śaṅkara, Hacker himself or anybody working in the same field would have thought of suspecting these passages of showing an (external) influence.

2.4. What remains to be followed up now is Hacker's suggestion of a « certain similarity » between the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear whether what he had in mind was only a structural similarity or an historical connection: the manner in which he formulates his view, though probably with the aim of revealing yet another instance of Hinduism being indebted to Buddhism, does not by itself preclude the first interpretation. Be that as it may, in order to examine critically his standpoint it is advisable to summarize the results of our foregoing study of Yoga texts, and this is best done by a synoptical chart:

30. The term *prapaṇcōpaśama* is met with also in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamika-kārikā, viz. 25.4.

caturvyūhatva of the Yogaśāstra according to the

caturvyūhatva
of the Cikitsāśāstra
according to the YBhāṣya
and the Vivaraṇa

	1. Yogasūtra	2. Yogabhāṣya	3. Vivaraṇa ³¹
1. rogaḥ	heyam = duḥkham	heyam = duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāraḥ	heyam = duḥkhapracuraḥ saṃsāraḥ
2. rogahetuḥ	heyahetuḥ = draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogaḥ	heyahetuḥ/saṃsārahetuḥ = pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṃyogaḥ	tasya hetuḥ = avidyānimitto draṣṭṛdṛśyasamyogaḥ
3. ārogyam	hānam = saṃyogābhāvaḥ, viz. kaivalyam	hānam/mokṣaḥ = saṃyogasyātyantiki nivṛttiḥ	hānam = vivekakhyaṭau satyām avidyānivṛttiḥ tannivṛttāv ātyantiko draṣṭṛdṛśyasamyogoparamaḥ
4. bhaiṣajyam	hānopāyaḥ = vivekakhyaṭir aviplavā	hānopāyaḥ/mokṣopāyaḥ = saṃyagdarśanam	hānopāyaḥ = vivekakhyaṭir aviplavā

31. Later occurrences of the theory of the *caturvyūhatva* are found e.g. in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* at the end of its exposition of the « Pāṇjaladarśana » (ed. by T. G. Mainkar, Government OS, Class A, no. 1, Poona, 1978, p. 388), Vijñāna-bhikṣu's *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* at the end of the introduction as well as at the end of the first Adhyāya (ed. by R. Garbe, HOS, II, Cambridge, Mass. 1943, p. 5 and p. 74) and (except for the comparison with the science of medicine) in *Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha's* commentary, called *Candrikā*, on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (ed. by Dhundhirājā Śāstri, Haridas SS, 132, Benares, 1941, p. 1, ed. by Bechanārāma Tripathi, BSS, 5, Benares, 1883, p. 2; cf. also Th. AURNCHT, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodlianae*, pars 7, codices sanscriticos complectens, Oxford, 1864, p. 237b [no. 569J]).

Hacker's remarks imply that the first *vyūha*, i.e. the first line of our chart, is taken by him to correspond to the first Noble Truth of the Buddha, i.e. that of *duḥkha* (P. *dukkha*); and this correspondence can in fact be hardly disputed. Yet, of the second and third truth he says that they « are gathered into one »; this cannot but mean that there is but one element in the quadruple division of the Cikitsā- and Yogaśāstras corresponding to the truths of *duḥkhasamudaya* (P. *dukkhasamudaya*) and *duḥkhanirodha* (P. *dukkhanirodha*) taken together. Hacker does not specify to which of the remaining *vyūhas* these two are to correspond, and it is indeed quite difficult to reconstruct his argument. In any case, his assertion is far from being convincing. Therefore, it seems advisable to examine the question at issue once more, without reference to Hacker's view.

What is meant by the concept *roga* *hetu* of the Cikitsāśāstra and by *heyahetu*, corresponding to it in Yoga, is clearly nothing but « what constitutes the cause of the disease » or « the cause of that which has to be avoided ». If *duḥkhasamudaya*, on the other hand, is taken to denote a process, i.e. the rise of Suffering, one would have to take note of a striking conceptional difference, viz. that between cause and process as denoted by these terms respectively. But, can it simply be taken for granted that it is this and nothing else that is meant by the term *duḥkhasamudaya*^{31a}? Such an assumption is scarcely satisfactory, and not so much because the formation of the primary noun *samudaya*- would, at least according to Pāṇ. 3.3.56 in connection with 3.3.18 and 19, allow among others of a meaning « that from which or by which something arises », but because there are passages in canonical Buddhist texts which seem to show clearly that the term was in fact used to denote that by which the rising of *duḥkha* is caused; e.g. at Vbh 107 it is expressly stated: *taṇhā ca avasesā ca kilesā ayaṃ vuccati dukkhasamudayo*; or, to give another example, at S III.158 the question *katamo ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayo* is answered thus: *yāyaṃ taṇhā ponabbhaviḥ nandi rāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandini, seyyathidaṃ kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave dukkhasamudayo*.

One cannot, of course, be absolutely sure that these explanations are meant to be proper definitions of the term *dukkhasamudaya*; nor that they meet the original intention of the term; nor that the term was not elsewhere understood to denote a process. But it has, on the other hand,

31a. For a detailed and careful discussion of the grammatical and syntactical problems posed by the different versions in which the Four Noble Truths are stated in Buddhist texts cf. the recent article of K. R. NORMAN, *The Four Noble Truths: A Problem of Pāli Syntax*, in « Indological and Buddhist Studies, Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday », ed. by L. A. Hercus et al., Canberra, 1982, pp. 377-91. Norman does not, however, address himself to the semantic problems involved. As for *dukkhasamudaya*, cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, *On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of « Liberating Insight » and « Enlightenment » in Early Buddhism*, in « Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf », Wiesbaden, 1981, p. 203, fn. 14a.

to be admitted as another possibility that Buddhist monks themselves have taken it to mean the cause of Suffering, i.e. that which causes *duḥkha* to arise. And it is this possibility that alone matters in the present context; for, if understood thus, the second Noble Truth would indeed fully correspond to the second *vyūha*.

As for *duḥkhanirodha*, similar observations can be made. In view of its formation, the term could denote the process of suppressing or destroying, viz. that which causes Suffering; or else it could mean the result this process is ultimately to lead to, viz. the final suppression or rather cessation of Suffering. Again, there are passages indicating that Buddhist authors themselves may well have taken the term to denote the result; e.g. at S III.158 it is defined as *taṇhāya asesavirāgaṇirodho cāgo paṇinissaggo mutti anālayo*, and explained at Nd I.94 by *nibbānam*. There are two possibilities of interpreting the first of these two statements: either it is a definition proper; in this case, the implicit equation of *duḥkhanirodha* with *taṇhānirodha* (which is expressly given at A III.416) precludes the possibility of taking *nirodha* to denote the result; or it is a quasi-definition, i.e. an inexact explanation where the substitution of the result by that which causes it, i.e. of *duḥkha* by *taṇhā*, is quite understandable, and not only in terms of metonymy; in this latter case, it would have to be regarded as evidence warranting the assumption that the term *duḥkhanirodha* has in fact been used to denote the result. Interpreted in this manner, and, to be sure, this interpretation is more probable, the third Noble Truth could be said to be quite similar to the third *vyūha*, i.e. *ārogya/hāna*³². This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that the *nirvāṇa* is compared also in the Abhidharma-kośaśābhaṣya to the state of *ārogya*³³.

However, the fact should not be lost sight of that the latter term virtually means the state of « being again free of disease », i.e. that the basic idea is in this case palpably different in that, in accordance with biological facts, a previous state of health is presupposed which is but regained. The Buddhist analysis of existence does not, of course, know of an analogous previous state of freedom from Suffering; on the contrary, Suffering is recognized as the fundamental constituent element of existence. However, this conceptional difference does not really detract from the conclusion arrived at above, viz. that the third Noble Truth in fact corresponds to the third element in the quadruple division of the Cikitsāśāstra; for, what has been said with regard to the

32. Note that *hāna* is explained by Yoga authors to consist in the non-existence (*abhāva*) or in the coming-to-an-end (*nivṛtti*, *uparāma*) of that which causes Suffering or in liberation (*mokṣa*).

33. P. 202.8; I thank Dr. Ch. Lindtner for having drawn my attention to this passage. According to the Hōbōgirin p. 229 « le Nirvāṇa est déjà comparé à l'absence de maladie ... dans une stance gnomique du Madhyamāgama... [MN I.510.9-10] ». Cf. also Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, ed. by Ch. Lindtner, in AO, 40 (1979), p. 122, fn. 28, as well as the references s.v. *ārogya* in the CPD.

relation in which the term *duḥkhanirodha* stands to the term *ārogya*, holds good likewise for the comparison between the science of medicine and Yogaśāstra: for, also according to Yoga there is no such thing like a previous state free from *duḥkha*, i.e. preceding *saṃsāra*³⁴. Therefore, one cannot but observe that already the correspondence between the four *vyūhas* of the Cikitsāśāstra, on the one hand, and the four divisions of the Yogaśāstra, on the other, is conceptionally and terminologically not an absolutely complete one. Yet, at the same time one will recall the mediaeval proverb « omne simile claudicat »³⁵ and, accordingly, refrain from overrating this element of discrepancy in either case, i.e. as regards the correspondence between the Cikitsāśāstra and the Yogaśāstra as well as that between this *caturvyūhatva* and the Four Noble Truths. In any case, one cannot subscribe to Hacker's views, including that last voiced by him, viz. that « in accordance with the more positive outlook of Brahmanism a chapter is added on the final goal »; for, though the concepts of *hāna*, etc., on the one hand, and of *duḥkhanirodha*, etc., on the other, are admittedly different in terms of philosophical content, one cannot fail to notice that the descriptions given in Yoga texts of the final goal, i.e. « absolute independence » (*kaivalya*), too, do not stand out by being particularly detailed. On the contrary, one is rather struck by the obvious reserve of Yoga authors in this regard³⁶.

Thus one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, since the third line of our chart might well correspond to the third Noble Truth, there is hardly any basis for Hacker's assumption that this *vyūha* forms a peculiar addition on the part of the Brahmanical Śāstras, not to speak of the « more positive outlook » of Brahmanism it allegedly demonstrates. The Buddha, too, did not confine himself to analysing existence and to unveiling its basic character of being nothing but Suffering, but has at the same time claimed to have discovered a practical path to liberation.

The final question to be discussed in this connection is whether the last Noble Truth, i.e. that of the *duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipad* (P. *duḥkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā*), can also be compared to one of the four *vyūhas*. Though Hacker is silent on this question, it is, I think, by no means illegitimate to assume a correspondence between this *āryasatya* and the remaining *vyūha*, i.e. *bhaiṣajya* or *hānopāya*.

Systematically, they are in fact not different: common to all three of them is the status and function of a remedy. But there are also

34. At least not for the individual living beings.

35. Cf. H. WALTHER, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des Mittelalters*, Göttingen, 1963-69, Bd. II, 3, p. 590 (nr. 19877b).

36. This reserve may be caused either by the Yoga conception of *kaivalya* itself (cf. the Vivaraṇakāra's characterization of *hāna* as an *avastu*; see fn. 27) or to the well-known reluctance of mystics to give a detailed positive description of their experience(s), or to the lack of such experience(s) on the part of the authors concerned, or, finally, to a combination of some of these reasons.

differences which cannot be ignored. Terminologically and conceptionally the fourth Noble Truth is distinguished by the fact that it explicitly states that the « remedy » is not something lying at hand, but that in order to reach the final goal of *dukkhanirodha*, one has to take a specific route leading to it. Though the distance to be covered is, quite understandably, not specified, the image of a path forms a peculiar and central element of the Buddhist concept³⁷. Of course, there cannot be the least doubt that it is precisely in this regard that the Yogic concept of « means of avoidance » is virtually identical with the fourth Noble Truth; for, the central purport of Yoga is to teach a practice by applying which one is gradually led to *vivekakhyāti* that ultimately brings about the irreversible cessation of the connection between subject and object, i.e. *kaivalya*³⁸. But it remains noteworthy that the character of being a process is not indicated by the corresponding term employed in Yoga texts or by the explanations given for it by the commentators³⁹. In spite of this difference, however, the correspondence between the fourth Noble Truth and the *vyūha* listed in the last line of our chart cannot but be styled as quite close.

The final result achieved by our comparison of the Four Noble Truths as a whole with the quadruple division of the two Brahmanical Śāstras is, therefore, that the correspondence between them can be regarded as even strikingly close, if we make the assumptions noted above with regard to the explanation of Buddhist terms. It must not, however, be forgotten that it is but a systematic correspondence which has thus been discovered. The historical problems evidently involved have still to be taken up for consideration.

Regarding their order of succession the Four Noble Truths perfectly agree with the four *vyūhas* of the *Cikitsāśāstra* and those of the *Yogaśāstra* as enumerated in the YS and YBhāṣya⁴⁰. In view of the above (p. 297 f.) discussion on the transposition of the last two members common to both, the *Vivaraṇa* and the USG of Śaṅkara, the Advaitin,

37. Note that the expression *dukkhanirodhagāmini paṭipadā* is replaced by *maggo* in what Norman (cf. fn. 31a) calls the « mnemonic » sets. That this image is met with in the YBh also, viz. on YS 2.26 (p. 205, l. 3 of the edition of the *Vivaraṇa*), is most probably due to Buddhist influence (on which in general cf. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, loc. cit., fn. 22).

38. In this connection cf., apart from passages already quoted, *Vivaraṇa* e.g. p. 2.23 ff. and p. 121, l. 4 f.: ... *kaivalyasya sādhanam samyagdarśanam / yogasādhānāni ca yogadvāreṇa samyagdarśanasādhanaṇy eva / ...*

39. Cf. fn. 37.

40. In the *Sāṃkhya-pravacanabhāṣya* (cf. fn. 31) the order of succession has been changed, viz. to *roga* (= *heya*), *drogya* (= *hāna*), *roga-nidāna* (*heyahetu*) and *bhaiṣajya* (= *hānopāya*). This is, no doubt, equally a systematical order, only that the rationale is slightly different, viz.: first the contrary states are named and only thereafter, but with reference to them, the cause and the means, which again form a pair of corresponding entities. The term *nidāna* is also noteworthy in that it is used frequently in Buddhist texts, too, though first of all to denote the cause of metaphysical ailment.

and on the basis of the tentative explanations proposed for the transposition in either text, the conclusion that suggests itself is that the traditional order of succession of the Four Noble Truths, strictly observed, as far as I know, whenever all of them are enumerated in Buddhist texts, is like that of the four *vyūhas* of the *Cikitsāśāstra* a systematical one, i.e. reflecting logical stages of analysis, but not stages passed through successively in actual practice.

3.1. A further problem, and to be sure, an important one, not discussed in the foregoing is posed by the comparison drawn in Yoga texts between the science of Yoga and the science of medicine. What I am referring to is the assertion met with first in the YBhāṣya that systematically the *Cikitsāśāstra* is divided into four parts. This is stated in such a manner that one cannot but gather the impression that the division is a genuine one: it is hardly conceivable that the *caturvyūhatva* of the *Cikitsāśāstra* as expounded in the YBhāṣya and the *Vivaraṇa* is simply a fabrication made for the sole purpose of establishing a parallel to the fourfold division of the *Yogaśāstra* as implied already by the *Sūtra* itself. The whole tenor of the relevant passages has, on the contrary, to be taken to clearly indicate that the *caturvyūhatva* of the science of medicine was regarded by the authors as an indisputable, if not even a well-known, fact they could draw upon, in accordance with the basic function of a *dr̥ṣṭānta*, for the sake of illustration.

But, I think, one can go even a step further and make the assumption that this correspondence is not stated merely for the sake of illustration, but that much more is intended by it, viz. to bring the method of Yoga into close systematic proximity to the *Cikitsāśāstra* and to intimate thereby that it is not merely of equal importance, but that it surpasses the science of medicine in that it does not cure simply an accidental physical disease, but forms the (allegedly) only remedy against the ailment every living being naturally suffers from, an ailment medicine is unable to cope with.

That this interpretation does not go too far is clearly corroborated by a well-known Sāṃkhya text, viz. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikā* where already at the very outset, i.e. in *Kārikā* 1, it is expressly stated that the perceptible means of removal of the threefold suffering have neither an absolutely sure nor a necessarily final effect (*dr̥ṣṭe sārthā cen naikāntātyantato'bhāvāt*). And there can hardly be any doubt that the commentators, above all the *Yuktidīpikā*⁴¹, do meet the intention of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* when referring here to the *Āyurveda*.

3.2. Therefore, it is legitimate to check this assertion of Yoga authors and to ask the elementary question whether this quadruple division is attested in any of the extant medical texts. But before actually looking into any of these works it is necessary to realize a basic problem

41. Cf. p. 12, l. 9 ff. in R. C. Pandeya's edition, Delhi, 1967.

involved. Is the assumption at all justified that the division when attested in such texts forms at the same time the scheme on which the actual exposition of the argument of the texts concerned is based? In other words: Can we expect to find the quadruple division attested in an Ayurvedic text in such a manner that this text itself is explicitly or implicitly divided into exactly four systematic parts or chapters corresponding to the four *vyūhas*?

As to this, it seems expedient to proceed with caution; for, a first warning against such an assumption is the observation, simple though it is, that, in any case in Yoga texts, the *caturvyūhatva* is at best stated to be a divisionary scheme, but that it is nowhere actually made the basis of a corresponding disposition of the material: there is no Yoga text in which this systematic division is taken seriously in such a manner that the exposition actually follows this scheme. A second warning is given by another division of the science of medicine referred to in medical texts themselves, viz. the octopartite division of therapy. Yet, it is not these eight parts of Ayurveda as listed e.g. in the *Suśrutasamhitā* I, 1, 7, or in the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* I, 1, 5cd-6ab, that matter in the present context, but a fact stressed by J. Filliozat in the introduction to his recent edition of the *Yogaśataka*, a medical text attributed to Nāgārjuna⁴²; for, referring to an article of C. Vogel's⁴³ he points out that « dans le titre des *Aṣṭāṅgasamhitā* et *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasamhitā* de Vāgbhaṭa, *aṣṭāṅga* désigne la science médicale en général et non les parties de l'ouvrage »⁴⁴.

What both these observations come to is that it would indeed be well to distinguish between a division of the science of medicine taught somewhere, on the one hand, and the actual internal organisation of medical texts, on the other. Therefore, one has to reckon with the possibility that all one finds in medical texts is simply a reference to the scheme, perhaps even in an offhand manner. The degree of probability that at least this kind of evidence can actually be found is, however, quite high, for the quadruple division is, according to C. Vogel⁴⁵, referred to by yet another witness, and, to be sure, an independant one, viz. Bu-ston (1290-1364) who in his comprehensive « History of Buddhism », coming to speak of medical works, says⁴⁶: « As for the works on medicine, they teach four (topics): disease, cause of disease, medicament as antidote to disease, and method of curing thereby ». Though the succession of the last two members is, again, reversed and the Tibetan *gso-ba'i spyod-lam* does not fully correspond to the Sanskrit term

*ārogya*⁴⁷, it is highly probable that what Bu-ston has in mind is the same quadruple division as drawn upon in our Yoga texts.

After consulting well-known works of secondary literature on Indian medicine where, however, the quadruple division is apparently not mentioned at all, I decided to turn for help to some of the specialists in this field of learning instead of setting out myself on possibly a wild-goose chase in the impenetrable jungle of the extant Ayurvedic texts (begging pardon for the all too mixed metaphor). It was my colleague R. E. Emmerick who drew my attention to *Carakasamhitā*, *sūtrasthāna* 9.19, i.e. to the following verse:

*hetau liṅge praśamane
rogāṇām apunarbhava /
jñānaṁ caturvidhaṁ yasya
sa rājārho bhiṣaktamaḥ //*

Cakrapāṇidatta does not explain this verse, but there can hardly be any doubt that the « fourfold knowledge » spoken of here is practically identical with our quadruple division of the *Cikitsāśāstra*; for the expression *apunarbhava* can be equated with our *ārogya*, the only difference being that by the former health as something regained is paraphrased as « the not-occurring-again [of a disease] »; further, the term *praśamana* closely corresponds to our *bhaiṣajya*, at least if taken to denote « that by which [a disease] is tranquillized, i.e. cured »; and, finally, as regards the expression *liṅga*, here it cannot but mean « symptom », and thus it corresponds to our *roga*, only that it is not the disease itself that is denoted, but its « characteristic sign(s) », and this is clearly done with the aim of bringing out into proper relief an essential virtue of any physician, viz. to make a proper diagnosis by the symptoms. Particularly noteworthy, however, is that it is not every physician who is expected to have this fourfold knowledge, but only a *bhiṣaktama*, « an excellent physician », and that he is in addition stated to be « fit or worthy of [treating] a king »; for, this cannot but imply that the common variety of a *bhiṣaj* ordinary people have to depend on need not necessarily be equally well versed in all four parts of the science of medicine. Nevertheless, what is attested in this verse of the *Carakasamhitā* is clearly a systematic division of the *Cikitsāśāstra* into four parts and, to be sure, a division which may, in spite of certain terminological and conceptional differences, well be taken to be virtually identical with that referred to by the author of the *YBhāṣya*, etc.; on the other hand, however, it has to be stressed that even if the verse

47. Viz. insofar as for obvious reasons the medical treatment itself is given prominence and not the aim it has to achieve.

42. Publications de l'Institut Français d'Indologie, no. 62, Pondichéry, 1979.

43. Viz., On Bu-ston's View of the Eight Parts of Indian Medicine, in III, VI (1962), pp. 290-95.

44. *Op. cit.*, p. IV. In Vogel's article (the reference should be « p. 291, n. 3 », not « n. 2 »), however, this is not expressly stated though perhaps implied.

45. The reference is to his article mentioned in fn. 43.

46. Quoted from Vogel, *loc. cit.*, p. 290.

forms an original part of the Carakasamhitā⁴⁸ the quadruple division is, strangely enough, given but an extremely marginal importance.

To an eventual second instance⁴⁹ of the quadruple division being attested in a medical text my attention was drawn by K. G. Zysk's review⁵⁰ of Filliozat's edition and translation of the Yogasāta, referred to above. Zysk critically examines Filliozat's rendering of verse 2 which runs thus:

*parikṣya hetvāmayalakṣaṇāni cikitsitajñena cikitsakena /
nirāmadehasya hi bheṣajāni bhavanti yuktāny amṛtopamāni //;*

he not only proposes an, indeed, more appropriate translation for *hetvāmayalakṣaṇāni*, viz. « the characteristics of the diseases and [their] causes » (which should, however, perhaps be replaced by « the cause[s] and the characteristics of diseases »), but also points out that the Tibetan translator, apparently equally at a loss with the expression *nirāmadehasya*, renders the second line thus: « The body becomes free from disease by the combination of medicines which resemble ambrosia ». Zysk rightly adds the remark that « the Tibetan translation seems more acceptable », but in addition he refers approvingly to Filliozat's note « T, au 3e pāda, a remplace āma par nad, āmaya, et entend nirāma "sans dénutrition" comme nirāmaya "sans maladie" ». However, I am not sure that this assumption is justified; for according to Monier-Williams⁵¹ Indian lexicographers list an *āma*², « sickness, disease », which is referred to also by Edgerton⁵². On the other hand one wonders how the Tibetan translator thought that the line construes and whether his interpretation is at all possible.

Yet I do not want to enter on my part into a detailed discussion of the philological problems involved here; instead, I should like to confine myself to referring to the Tibetan translation; for, it is there that we find the four systematic parts of the science of medicine reflected, to wit, in a manner that reminds us of the verse quoted above from Caraka.

Both these references to the quadruple division — and, of course, first of all the more unequivocal one of the Carakasamhitā — are no

48. Apart from the fact that this verse is not commented upon by Cakrapāṇi-datta (a fact which by itself is, of course, by no means conclusive), what creates suspicion is that the verse does not really fit into the context so that it might well have been added later since in the immediately preceding verse a special designation, viz. *prāṇābhīṣāra*, is taught for a *bhiṣaj* who possesses certain (other) qualifications.

49. The « fourfold physicians » (*caturvidhā vaidyāḥ*) mentioned in Mbh (Poona ed.) 12.69.57 are most probably to be taken in accordance with Nilakaṇṭha's explanation (*viśaśalyarogakṛtyāharāḥ*) as reference to four different types of « medical » specialists. Cf. also R. P. Das' review of G. N. Thite, *Medicine. Its Magico-Religious Aspects according to the Vedic and Later Literature*, in IJ, 27 (1981), p. 235 f.

50. In IJ, 23 (1981), pp. 309-13.

51. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 146.

52. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary s.v. 2 *āma*.

more than bare references, and the result of our examination of Āyurvedic texts is accordingly rather disappointing, for in them the quadruple division is not given the fundamental importance peculiar to it in Yoga texts. One is, therefore, left with two alternatives, viz. either that it was these Yoga thinkers who realized the full importance of the division, or that what these Yoga thinkers refer to is but a later development in Indian medicine⁵³. However, this much is clear beyond doubt: the fourfold scheme as such, even if not also applied in writing medical works, did actually exist.

This conclusion is additionally corroborated by a clearly independent witness not called into evidence so far. What I am referring to is an hitherto unpublished passage in the *śrutamayī bhūmi* of the Yogācārabhūmi which was pointed out and given to me by my friend L. Schmithausen⁵⁴. It runs thus: *cikitsā katamā / sā caturākārā vedī-tavyā / tadyathā ābādhakauśalyam ābādhāsamutthānakauśalyam utpan-nasyābādha[...]* *sya prahāṇakauśalyam prahīnasyābādha[...]* *syātyān-anutpādakauśalyam / eṣāṃ ca kauśalyānāṃ vibhāṅgo yathāsūtram eva vedī-tavyaḥ //*⁵⁵. « Which of many things (or: Of what kinds) is medical treatment? It has to be regarded as having four forms, viz. skill [in diagnosing] the disease, skill [in determining] the origination (i.e. cause) of the disease, skill [in applying] the means of getting rid of the disease which has arisen [and finally] skill [in ensuring] that [the disease] which one has got rid of does not arise again in future. Moreover, as for the detailed explanation of these [medical] skills, it [is not given here, but] has to be known precisely according [to what has been taught] in the [respective] Sūtras ».

Though the terminology is palpably different, there can hardly be any doubt that the quadruple division taught is practically identical with that referred to in Caraka, and thus, ultimately, also with that drawn upon in our Yoga texts, the four *kauśalyas* corresponding to *roga*, *rogahetu*, *bhaiṣajya* and *ārogya*, respectively⁵⁶. The last sentence of the passage quoted is of particular importance; for it cannot but be taken as evidence for the fact that this division was expounded already

53. In this latter case one would have to assume that it was not given due attention in later medical texts because the tradition of how a medical treatise should be dispositionally structured had become fixed to such an extent that alterations were not possible (any more).

54. On this occasion I should also like to acknowledge with sincere gratitude the vivid interest he showed in the present study in general and its part 4 in particular, for much of the material referred to there I owe his pigeon-hole.

55. The passage is found in the Patna MS of the Śrāvākabhūmi at 2 B 6-2 [= 96 a 2 of the Patna MS of the Yogācārabhūmi]. The former adds *vi* at the very beginning, which, however, seems to have been deleted, and the latter reads *draṣṭavyā* in the place of *vedī-tavyā* and *anu[...]* *tpāda*. By square brackets deleted *aṣṭaras* are indicated.

56. Particularly close is obviously the similarity with the Carakasamhitā (cf. the term *apūnarbhava* in the latter); see below p. 323.

in a Sūtra, to be sure a Buddhist Sūtra. In view of the probable date of the Yogācārabhūmi, this Sūtra, according to Schmithausen, can hardly belong to a period after the beginning of the 4th century, but is probably earlier.

In the light of this additional evidence the following observations and assumptions can be made:

- a) that the science of medicine or medical treatment can be systematically divided into four parts was common knowledge of educated people, or at least it was widespread;
- b) this knowledge is attested obviously independently in Brahmanical as well as Buddhist⁵⁷ sources the most ancient of which date back to the first half of the 1st millennium;
- c) it seems natural to assume that the division was first conceived by a medical author and only later referred to and utilized by others, i.e. applied to other Śāstras also which, though significantly different, nevertheless exhibited a specific similarity with the science of medicine.

4. In what follows, Buddhism again may serve as a cue for focusing attention on still another problem raised by the theory of the quadruple division of the Cikitsāśāstra, a problem which is perhaps even more important than all those discussed so far in the course of the present study. What I have in view is the assertion found in not a few works on or expositions of (early) Buddhism, viz. that this fourfold division of medicine it was that inspired the Buddha to his « Four Noble Truths ». Thus e.g. E. Frauwallner⁵⁸ simply states as though it were a fact established beyond any doubt, and without giving any reference, that « the fourfold division of the truth discovered [by the Buddha]... is borrowed from the medical method ». Equally apodictic is H. Zimmer who in his « Philosophies of India »⁵⁹ remarks: « Following the procedure of the physician of his day inspecting a patient, the Buddha makes four statements concerning the case of man. These are the so-called "Four Noble Truths" which constitute the heart and kernel of his doctrine ».

57. Of the two other Buddhist authors referred to in the foregoing, viz. Bu-ston and Nāgārjuna, at least the former might have derived his knowledge from the lost Sūtra and not directly from a medical text. In any case, there is no clear evidence in favour of the assumption that the Buddhist sources depend on the Brahmanical or vice versa as regards the quadruple division of medicine.

58. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg, 1953, p. 184 = *History of Indian Philosophy*, tr. by V. M. BEDEKAR, vol. I, Delhi, 1973, p. 146.

59. New York, 1951, p. 467; the German translation, Zürich, 1961 (= Frankfurt, 1973, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 26), p. 417 f. Cf. also H. ZIMMER, *Indische Sphären*, Zürich-Stuttgart, 1963, pp. 219 and 221.

That this opinion has become a commonplace with many a Buddhistologist can also be seen in A. Bareau's monograph⁶⁰ where it is said: « The Four Noble Truths are, as regards their classification, obviously⁶¹ taken from the dialectics of an old Indian medical school. Starting from the disease one is led to its origin, from this to its suppression, i.e. the restoration of health, and finally to the medicine which brings it about »; or, to give just one more example: D. Schlingloff⁶², too, is thoroughly convinced that « just as in the Old Indian medicine the theory of disease, of the origin of disease, of the suppression of disease and of the ways leading to the suppression of disease was developed, here [i.e. in the Four Noble Truths], Suffering, its origin, its suppression and the way leading to its suppression are spoken of ».

Other scholars, however, are a bit more cautious in that they confine themselves to merely pointing out the close similarity between the Four Noble Truths and the corresponding division in medicine.

Thus E. Conze states in his « Buddhism. Its Essence and Development »⁶³: « The holy doctrine is primarily a medicine. The Buddha is like a physician. Just as a doctor must know the diagnosis of the different kinds of illness, must know their causes, the antidotes and remedies, and must be able to apply them, so also the Buddha has taught the *Four Holy Truths*, which indicate the range of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the way which leads to its cessation ». A similar statement is found in K. Mizuno's book⁶⁴, viz.: « The Four Noble Truths were taught on the basis of a principle of healing spiritual suffering and misery that is similar to the principles that doctors follow in curing illness of the body ».

Yet it is with the first kind of statements that I am concerned here. It is, I think, not necessary to try to collect more such examples from secondary sources on Buddhism; and it would be rather futile to rack one's brains about the question who copied whom in this case. Instead, it should be stated in summing up that it is evidently a widespread conviction of scholars of Buddhism that it was this systematic division of the science of medicine that served as a model for the conception of

60. *Der indische Buddhismus*, in: *Die Religionen Indiens III* (Die Religionen der Menschheit Bd. 13), Stuttgart, 1964, p. 33.

61. If the unknown French original of the German « augenscheinlich » (which I render by « obviously ») is used to indicate that there obtains here, to some degree at least, an incertitude (the German expression does indicate this), Bareau's position would have to be classified with the more guarded ones quoted below.

62. *Die Religion des Buddhismus I. Der Heilsweg des Mönchtums* (Sammlung Götschen Bd. 174), Berlin, 1962, p. 70. H. J. GRESCHAT, *Die Religion der Buddhisten* (Uni-Taschenbücher 1049), München, Basel, 1980, p. 66, expresses himself in such a vague manner that it is not possible to decide if he is to be classed with the foregoing group of scholars or with the subsequent one.

63. Oxford, 1951, p. 17. In the German translation (Urban-Bücher 5), Stuttgart, 1956, the corresponding passage is found on p. 14.

64. *The Beginnings of Buddhism...*, transl. by RICHARD L. GAGE, Tokyo, 1980, p. 43.

the Four Noble Truths. One may find it surprising or even significant that none of the specialists quoted until now thought it, if not necessary then at least, desirable to adduce the reasons, too, that could convince their readers that what they have to do with is not an arbitrary and fanciful assumption, but a well-founded hypothesis. Yet, it is by no means a peculiar feature of Indology that an allegedly true and certain piece of knowledge is handed down from generation to generation, not because of a general lack of the critical faculty, but simply because nobody happened to take a second look at it, and in the present case it is but fair to admit that the assumption is in fact suggestive to such an extent that one is easily lulled into a sense of absolute security. Nevertheless, it bears renewed discussion.

4.1. The first question to be asked, then, is this: Who was the first scholar to make this assumption and what gave him this idea? By a note of Oldenberg's⁶⁵ one is referred to the original source, viz. H. Kern's « *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië* »⁶⁶ that was translated into German by H. Jacobi in 1882⁶⁷. It is there that for the first time in a foot-note it is apodictically stated that « the Four Truths are borrowed from the art of healing »⁶⁸. In the text itself of Kern's book a statement to the same effect is found at p. 367 (=469 in the German translation), and surprisingly enough followed by a reference to the YBhāṣya on YS 2.15 from which the relevant passage is quoted in translation. Though it is not expressly stated one cannot but draw the conclusion that it was precisely this passage that gave Kern the idea of the Four Noble Truths having been borrowed from the art of healing. This conclusion is in fact corroborated by Kern's « *Manual of Indian Buddhism* »⁶⁹ where it is said: « It is not difficult to see that these four Satyas are nothing else but the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science, applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine » (in a footnote a portion of the text of the YBh on YS 2.15 is given), and two passages from the Lalitavistara are quoted to vindicate the assertion that « this connection of the Āryasatyas with medical science was apparently not unknown to the Buddhists themselves »⁷⁰. The Lalitavistara,

65. Viz. in his: *Buddha, Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, 1923, p. 236. It should be noted that J. Filliozat in the article mentioned in fn. 99 below arrives at the same conclusion.

66. Haarlem, 1882 (Eerste deel), 1884 (Tweede deel).

67. *Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien. Eine Darstellung der Lehren und Geschichte der buddhistischen Kirche*, 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1882-84.

68. Viz. fn. 4 on p. 207 of the first part (corresponding to p. 265 in the German translation).

69. (Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde III.8) Strassburg, 1896; the quotation is from p. 46 f.

70. The expression « applied to » and the reference to the YBhāṣya preclude, I think, the possibility of taking Kern's remarks as meant to point out a systematic similarity only.

however, is of so late a date that it could not by any means be regarded as evidence for the fact that the quadruple division of the science of medicine antedates the historical Buddha or was even developed in his youth. Yet in reality the division as such is not mentioned at all, nay not even alluded to in this text; what is said in the two passages⁷¹ pointed out by Kern is merely that the Buddha is a *vaidyārāja* in that he is a *pramocakaḥ sarvaduḥkhebhyaḥ* or a *sarvavyādhipramocakaḥ*; that is to say, he is but compared to a physician.

4.2. But before continuing the critical discussion of Kern's remarks, and the arguments brought forward by others, it is advisable to reflect on the implications the assumption examined here cannot but have. This might seem superfluous, but is nevertheless necessary since nowhere in the relevant secondary literature do I find them explicitly stated⁷² so that one cannot help suspecting that they were not clearly realized by Kern and those depending on him directly or indirectly. These implications are, of course, that the science of medicine was either already before the Buddha or at least in his times divided in this manner and that the Buddha knew this systematic division.

Our knowledge of the historical person called the Buddha does not permit us to answer the question whether at all or to what extent he was familiar with the contemporary science of medicine. Therefore it is not possible to check whether the second condition can be regarded as fulfilled. As for the first and basic implication, one would have to look for pre-Buddhist medical literature. As even the most ancient of the so-called Ayurvedic texts are of later origin, it could only be one of the Vedic texts⁷³ where one could strike on a relevant statement. Nobody, however, has so far come up with any such reference. This holds good for the other possibility also, viz. that the quadruple division be attested in a non-medical text of pre-Buddhist origin. Therefore, it has to be stressed that all we actually have are at best references in

71. Viz. Lal. V, p. 448: *utpanno vaidyārājaḥ pramocakaḥ sarvaduḥkhebhyaḥ, pra-tiṣṭhāpako nirvāṇasukhe, niṣaṇṇas Tathāgatagarbhe Tathāgatamahādharma-rājāsane*, and p. 458: *cirātūre jīvaloke kleśavyādhiprapīḍite / vaidyārāt tvaṃ samutpannah sarvavyādhipramocakaḥ //*.

72. Laudable exceptions to the rule, however, are H. Oldenberg and J. Filliozat. Oldenberg (in the foot-note referred to above in fn. 65) clearly dissociates himself from Kern's opinion with the remark that « it will not be possible to ascertain whether, as regards the fourfold division, Buddhism is the borrowing side », a remark which does not simply show scepticism, but is most probably due to O.'s being well aware of the fact that there is no pre-Buddhist medical text to attest the division; Filliozat in his article (cf. below fn. 99) says more clearly: « Il eut fallu prouver que cette médecine les [= les quatre vérités] possédait avant le Bouddhisme; Kern ne l'a point fait ».

73. From the description of Indian medical literature as given e.g. by J. Jolly (in *Medicin, Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde III.10*, Strassburg, 1901) it follows that « we have no medical texts of the intervening period [between the Vedic literature and the texts of Caraka and Suśruta] » as stated by A. L. Basham (*The Wonder that was India*, London, 1954, p. 499).

post-Buddhist Indian literature. To say that the references discussed in the preceding part of this article, including the YBhāṣya, so important to Kern, do furnish the evidence needed, would be nothing but an arbitrary assertion, merely meant to warrant an assumption that cannot be supported otherwise.

4.3. But what about the « evidence » found in Buddhist texts themselves? As regards the Lalitavistara passages, all that can be learned from them is that the Buddha was compared to a physician by his adherents. And this can hardly be regarded as a new and important piece of information. For, firstly, the idea that God⁷⁴ or a particular god or the propounder of a doctrine of salvation helps men by healing physical and/or spiritual ailments is so widely spread that there is nothing strange in that such a comparison may have been drawn by Buddhist authors, too, without their possessing any tradition that the Buddha himself had actually learnt from medicine, and shrewdly applied its division to his own teaching; and, secondly, it is already in much earlier Buddhist texts that the Buddha is characterized or sometimes even made to say of himself that he is an *anuttaro bhisakko sallakatto*, « an unsurpassed physician, (the best) surgeon »⁷⁵. This comparison (echoed as it were in statements like those of Conze and Mizuno quoted above) is not only met with rather frequently already in early canonical texts, but has obviously also proved a quite fruitful idea, variously developed in later times, as was shown recently by R. Birnbaum⁷⁶ who aptly remarks⁷⁷ that « the Buddha frequently made analogies to disease and healing to explain various facets of his teaching ». Nevertheless, one cannot but observe that in the passages inspected or referred to until now the Four Noble Truths are not mentioned at all, not to speak of explicitly paralleling them with corresponding systematic parts of the science of medicine. And, to be sure, passages like Mil 247.11 where a

74. Cf. also the recent study of G. BUDDRUSS, *Khawar-Texte in arabischer Schrift* (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz), Wiesbaden, 1982, p. 12. For an interesting comparison between « God the Lord » and a physician in the context of a theodicy-like discussion see BṚĀSARVAJĀNA's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 458.16 ff. As noted by W. Halbfass (*Studies in Kumāra and Saṅkara*, Reinbek, 1983, p. 15, cf. also fn. 81), « the *saṃsāramocaka* [too] presents himself as a benevolent physician in the wider context of *saṃsāra* », and « reference is made to the expertise of the good doctor who knows that sometimes he has to apply harsh means to bring about a change for the better ». God is called a medicament (*auśadha*) by Madhva in his Bhāṣya on Taitt. Up. 2.2.

75. It 101.15-16; cf. (without *bhisakko*) Sn 560 and (*sallakatto* only) Sn 562. The first of these passages is referred to Mil. 215.11; as for the well-known parable of the man wounded by an arrow cf. M I.429 as well as M II.216, Mil 169.9 ff., 247.10 ff.; for a *kusalo bhisakko* in a simile cf. A III.238.5 ff., Mil 229.5 ff.; *bhisakko* is called an *adhiyacana* of the Buddha A IV.340.5 ff.; the Buddha is compared to a *kusalo vejjo* Pj I.21.19 f.

76. *The Healing Buddha*, Boulder (Co.), 1979.

77. Viz. on p. 15; cf. also the subsequent sections.

physician (*bhisakka*) is characterized as *roguppattikusala*, « well-acquainted with / competent in discovering the origin of disease », is by no means conclusive.

But what about the passage in Buddhaghosa's *Vism* 512.7-9 referred to by Birnbaum⁷⁸ which runs thus: *rogo viya ca dukkhasaccam, rogani-dānam iva samudayasaccam, rogavūpasamo viya nirodhasaccam, bhesajjam iva maggasaccam*? It is true, the Four Noble Truths are here clearly compared to corresponding parts of medical science; but, on the other hand, one must not forget that the famous commentator is separated approximately by a millenium from the Buddha himself and one cannot overlook that this is but one in a series of different analogies given by Buddhaghosa without (explicit) reference to canonical texts and that it does not at all imply that the Truths were « borrowed from the medical method ».

There is, however, a further reference by Oldenberg which has still to be followed up, viz. that to an article of L. de la Vallée Poussin⁷⁹ who after having quoted the relevant lines from Kern's « Manual of Indian Buddhism »⁸⁰ draws on his part attention to some more material, viz. two passages in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and an explanation found in Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. Among these quotations the two former ones are but reformulations of ideas attested already in canonical Pāli texts in the context of the comparisons mentioned above (p. 316). What the author is concerned with is to lay stress (1) on the extreme foolishness of him who though suffering from a disease refuses the help of a person capable of healing it^{80a} and (2) the (correct) observation that « there is no physician but cures disease with some pain in the treatment »⁸¹. The latter reference, however, is indeed of such a kind

78. Viz. in fn. 37 on p. 22.

79. JRAS, 1903, pp. 578-80. The two passages quoted from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* are II.55 ff.:

itvaravyādhibhīto 'pi vaidyavākyaṃ na laṅghayet /

tatra sarvajñavaidyasya sarvaśalyāpahārīṇaḥ /
vākyaṃ ullaṅghayāmīti dhig mām atyantamohitam //

and VIII.22 ff.:

sarve 'pi vaidyāḥ kurvanti kriyāduḥkhair arogatām /
tasmād bahūni duḥkhāni hantuṃ śoḍhavyam alpakam //
kriyām imām apy ucītāṃ varavaidyo na dattavān /
madhureṇopacāreṇa cikitsati mahātūrān //
ādau śākādidāne 'pi niyojayati nāyakaḥ /
tat karoti kramāt paścād yat svamāṃsāny api tyajet //

80. Practically all of them are quoted also above, p. 315 and fn. 71.

80a. The same idea is also met with e.g. in *Samādhirājasūtra* 9.43-46.

81. This is de la Vallée Poussin's rendering of the first line of his second quotation from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (cf. above fn. 79), the gist of which, however, is that the Buddha differs from a physician precisely in this respect. The idea expressed in the first line was appealed to also by the so-called *Saṃsāramocakas*; cf. fn. 74 above.

that it fully warrants Oldenberg's remark⁸² that it « compares quite expressly the four truths to the quadruple medical teaching of disease, its origin, its healing [and] the prevention of its resurgence ». For what Yaśomitra⁸³ says is:

vyādhim dṛṣṭveti. vyādhir duḥkha-satyasyopamānam. tannidānam samudaya-satyasya. tat-kṣayo nirodha-satyasya. tadbheṣajam mārga-satyasyopamānam⁸⁴. sūtre 'py eṣa satyānam dṛṣṭānta iti. Vyādhyaḍi-sūtre⁸⁵. katham. caturbhir aṃgaiḥ samanvāgato bhiṣak śalyāpahartā⁸⁶ rājārhaś ca bhavati rāja-yogyaś ca rājāṅgaive ca samkhyāṃ gacchati⁸⁷. katamais caturbhiḥ. ābādha-kuśalo bhavati. ābādha-samut-thāna-kuśalaḥ. ābādha-prahāṇa-kuśalaḥ. prahāṇasya cābādhasyāya-tyām anutpāda-kuśalaḥ. evam eva caturbhir aṃgaiḥ samanvāgatas Tathāgato 'rhan samyak-saṃbuddho 'nuttaro bhiṣak⁸⁸ śalyāpahartety ucyate. katamais caturbhiḥ. iha bhikṣavas Tathāgato 'rhan samyak-saṃbuddha idaṃ duḥkham ārya-satyam iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti. ayaṃ duḥkha-samudayaḥ. ayaṃ duḥkha-nirodhaḥ. iyaṃ duḥkha-nirodha-gāminī pratipad ārya-satyam iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti.

As stated by de la Vallée Poussin⁸⁹ the Sūtra referred to by Vasubandhu and quoted by Yaśomitra is « d'après la version de Hiuan-Tsang,

82. Loc. cit., cf. fn. 65.

83. I quote from Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra, ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1971, p. 514 f.; see, however, fn. 85. Mr. Yoshifumi Honjo whom I met at the XXXI CISHAAN in Japan kindly drew my attention to the fact that a more complete quotation from that very Sūtra is found in Samathadeva's Abhidharmakośapāyikā, viz. Peking Tanjur, Thu 32 b 6 ff.

84. From sūtre 'py eṣa onwards this passage is also quoted by DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, in note 4 on p. 121, of his translation, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit et annoté...*, cinquième et sixième chapitres, Paris, 1925, the final part, however, being abbreviated, viz. iha bhikṣavas tathāgato... idaṃ duḥkham āryasatyam iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti...

85. In his article (cf. fn. 79) de la Vallée Poussin reads vyādhisūtre; the reading as given by Wogihara is, however, also found in the footnote in de la Vallée Poussin's translation of the Abhidharmakośa, and has to be accepted as correct; interpret: « in the Sūtra (dealing with) disease [cause of disease], etc. ».

86. The MS has here (and infra) kalpāpah; the emendation, proposed also by de la Vallée Poussin in his article and accounted for by the remark « I suppose that the old Nepalese ligature has been misunderstood by a modern copyist », is most convincing, not only because of the Tibetan equivalent, viz. zug-rñu 'byin-pa, but also and above all in view of the Pāli parallels (see above p. 316 and fn. 75).

87. The following sentences up till ābādha-prahāṇa-kuśalaḥ are in Wogihara's edition printed in italics and thus characterized as a quotation. This cannot but be a mistake, for evidently the quotation from the « Vyādhyaḍisūtra », the beginning of which is found already in the Kośa itself, extends as far as yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti, the iti indicating its completion, because the reference in the Kośa is introduced by the remark sūtre 'py eṣa eva satyānam dṛṣṭānto darśitaḥ « this very analogy of the [Four Noble] Truths is shown also in a Sūtra ».

88. In his article de la Vallée Poussin reads anuttarabhiṣak.

89. Viz. in the foot-note to his translation of the Abhidharmakośa referred to in fn. 84.

le Sūtra du bon médecin; d'après Paramārtha, le Sūtra de la comparaison du médecin (Samyukta 15.19; 17.14)⁹⁰. Unfortunately, de la Vallée Poussin does not give any further explanation on the identity of the « Sūtra du bon médecin ». His second reference, however, can be traced, namely with the help of the Hōbōgirin⁹¹ where the relevant passage from the Samyuktāgama as preserved in Chinese translation is rendered into French. It clearly shows a close similarity to the quotation by Yaśomitra, but does not, on the other hand, seem to agree fully with it⁹². On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that what Demiéville — or one of his collaborators — actually did was to give but a free paraphrase of the Chinese translation, intermingling later portions of the « detailed explanation » (vibhaṅga) with earlier parts of the Sūtra. When the Chinese translation itself (T 99, no. 389) is compared with the Sanskrit text quoted by Yaśomitra, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that it is precisely this Sanskrit text that was translated by Guṇabhadra^{92a}, i.e. that what Yaśomitra quotes is in fact nothing else but this Sūtra of the Samyuktāgama. The Chinese translator, however, seems to have read rājabhogyaś instead of rājayogyaś and the Chinese text obviously contains a corruption, not recognized by Demiéville: the character standing between that denoting « King » and that equivalent

90. I do not know which edition is referred to by de la Vallée Poussin; by the former reference, however, T 99, no. 344, might be meant and by the latter T 99, no. 389. In the latter passage three « ailments » are referred to, viz. kāma, bhava- and avidyā (roga, or a similar expression) (evidently under the influence of the three āśravas); however, it is not a comparison that is drawn here between the « Four Noble Truths » and medicine, but the concept of ailment is only used metaphorically in a context modelled after the Truths.

91. Viz. s.v. byō, p. 224 ff.

92. For according to Demiéville (loc. cit., p. 228) it runs thus: « On appelle un grand roi des médecins celui qui réalise les quatre Essences suivantes: (1) Bien connaître la maladie, i.e. les différentes sortes de maladies...; (2) bien connaître l'origine de la maladie: due au Vent, ou au Flegme..., ou aux sécrétions salivaires..., aux différentes espèces de froid, à un fait actuel, à la saison...; (3) bien connaître le Contrecarrant de la maladie: onguents, expectorants ou vomitifs..., évacuations inférieures (purgatifs), instillations nasales..., fumigations..., sudorifiques...; (4) bien savoir traiter la maladie de telle façon qu'ayant été traitée il n'y ait aucun danger de récidive... de même. le Tg.-Arhat-S* s* buddha, ce grand roi de médecins, réalise quatre vertus grâce auxquelles il soigne les maladies des Êtres; en effet, il connaît les quatre Saintes Vérités: (1) de la Douleur...; (2) de la Formation de la Douleur...; (3) du Barrage de la Douleur...; (4) du Chemin de ce Barrage ... Le médecin Mondain ne connaît pas vraiment, tels qu'ils sont..., les Contrecarrants radicaux (fondamentaux), à savoir le Contrecarrant radical de la Naissance..., et celui de la Vieillesse, de la Maladie, de la Mort, du chagrin, des plaintes, des douleurs, des Tribulations... ». The differences, marked here by italicizing the corresponding elements in the translations, are, on the other hand, of such a kind that (except perhaps for the final portion which may simply have been left out of his quotation by Yaśomitra) they can easily be accounted for by the assumption that they represent but later additions of an explanatory character to a text which may well have been identical with that attested in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. See, however, also below p. 320.

92a. Viz. 436-443 A.D. according to É. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958, p. 169.

to 'arha, viz. 者, seems rather to be an error for 之; if the latter is accepted, there is full agreement between the Sanskrit original and the Chinese translation also as regards the expression *rājārha*! The comparison further shows that the *vibhaṅga* portion of the original Sūtra, which preceded the sentence beginning with *evam eva caturbhiḥ aṅgairāḥ*, was simply left out by Yaśomitra, and it was left out in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (s. above p. 311) as well, where the reader is, however, referred to the original source precisely as regards this « detailed explanation »!

But there is a very similar passage in a second, probably older, yet rather inaccurate translation of the *Samyuktāgama*, viz. T 100, no. 254, where also the *vibhaṅga* is missing. Therefore, one cannot be sure which of the two « versions » of the SĀ are actually referred to by the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Vasubandhu* or quoted by Yaśomitra, respectively. In any case, the passage as a whole is missing in the Pali SN, and there is hence a high degree of probability that it forms but a later addition; for it is quite impossible to discover a motive for a transmitter dropping it. Yet, whatever the exact historical relation may be in which the different sources stand to each other, this much has to be accepted as established: Hīnayānistic Buddhist texts knew of a quadruple division of the science of medicine and compared the teaching of the « Four Noble Truths » to it.

The most important source is, of course, the *Vyādhisūtra* passage as quoted in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: it is preserved in Sanskrit and it is here that the Four Noble Truths are expressly compared to the corresponding systematic parts of the science of medicine. The parallel drawn is, however, not completely convincing, as already noted by de la Vallée Poussin who adds the remark: « You⁹³ will observe that, according to this sūtra, the third satya is the way (*mārga*, *upāya*) to the destruction of the disease, and the fourth the way to its not-appearing-again (*a-punarbhava*). The scholastic point of view, so far as I know, is different ».

One might feel some reluctance to follow de la Vallée Poussin as regards his interpretation of the expression *prahīṇasyābādhasyāyatyām anutpādakuśalaḥ*; for it is highly improbable that it refers to a « way »! However, the impression one cannot but gather is that there is no full correspondence between the last two « medical skills » and the last two of the Four Noble Truths. And this becomes particularly evident in the case of the fourth « Noble Truth » which is clearly different from what is meant by *prahīṇasyābādhasyāyatyām anutpādakuśalaḥ*. One further wonders whether de la Vallée Poussin's adding the term *apunarbhava* by way of explanation is merely due to a free association or else evoked by a particular passage in an Indian medical text. For, it is exactly the term which is used in the verse from the *Carakasamhitā* drawn upon

above (§ 3.2.). In any case, the fourth systematic part of the science of medicine as taught in the *Vyādhisūtra*, conceptionally agrees fully with what is called *rogāṇām apunarbhavaḥ* in Caraka, and hence with *ārogya*. In passing it may be noted that the slight unevenness the comparison in the *Vyādhisūtra* thus shows was apparently felt among others (cf. Hōbōgirin p. 230^r) by Āśvaghoṣa also; for verse 41 of Canto XVI of his *Saundarānanda* reads as though it were a deliberate improvement on it, viz.

*tad vyādhisaṃjñāṃ kuru duḥkhasatye
doṣeṣv api vyādhinidānaṣaṃjñāṃ /
ārogyasaṃjñāṃ ca nirodhasatye
bhaiṣajyasaṃjñāṃ api mārgasatye //*^{93a}.

But there are more peculiarities to be observed in the passage quoted by Yaśomitra. It should be emphasized that Yaśomitra, or rather, to be sure, already Vasubandhu, speaks of a *dṛṣṭānta* only. That is to say, both of them took the relation between a physician and the *Tathāgata* as pointed out in the Sūtra to be but a comparison meant to exemplify the particular and extraordinary qualities of the Buddha as one healing not a physical illness, but the ailment of existence itself. Evidently they did not know of any tradition — nor did it occur to them independently — that it was this quadruple division of medicine that inspired the Buddha! In fact, this it is what all relevant passages in Buddhist texts amount to: the Buddha is merely compared to a physician or the doctrine to a medicine, etc.; nowhere can be found any traces of an awareness that the Buddha in conceiving the Four Noble Truths could have drawn on a similar systematic division of the *Cikitsāśāstra*! Of course, one might object here that it is hardly to be expected that a Buddhist monk even if he were fully aware of it, should have overtly admitted that the kernel of the Buddha's teaching is but an adaptation of principles of medical science. Nevertheless, it is worth taking note of that for the Buddhist tradition itself this similarity was obviously never anything more than a comparison. On the other hand I cannot but add the following remark here: the fact that the equation of the Four Noble Truths with the four parts of medical science is in fact attested in Buddhist literature, though with varying degrees of agreement in conception and terminology, fully corroborates what has been said above (p. 303) in my critical discussion of Hacker's view on the relation between the *caturvyūhatva* and the Four Noble Truths: Hacker's view does not only not stand an independent critical test, but

93a. Full parallelism can be observed also in *Ratnagotravibhāga*, 4.52; this *kārikā* is translated by J. TAKASAKI, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* (Uttaratantra). Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism (SOR, vol. XXXIII), Rome, 1966, p. 367, as follows: « Illness is to be cognized, its cause removed, Health should be attained, and a remedy used; Like that, Suffering, its Cause, Extinction and the Path, Are to be cognized, removed, touched and observed ».

93. De la Vallée Poussin's short article (cf. fn. 79) has actually the form of a letter addressed to Professor Rhys Davids.

it also stands clearly in contradiction to unequivocal passages in Buddhist texts themselves!

There is, however, still another striking feature in the Vyādhisūtra passage one should not silently pass over as done by de la Vallée Poussin. What I am referring to is the fact which cannot but be styled as strange that the physician conversant with the four *aṅgas* is characterized as « worthy of [treating] a king » (*rājārha*), « befitting a king » (*rājayogya*), and is, finally, said « to class with the king's property » (*rājāṅgate ca saṅkhyāṃ gacchati*)⁹⁴. It would seem hardly necessary to state that these predicates can by no means have to do with the frequent designation of the Buddha as *vaidyārāja*⁹⁵.

Yet one might feel induced to refer to the well-known fact that Buddhist monks off and on succumbed to the temptation of acting as medical practitioners⁹⁶, and that for many reasons they might have even tried to qualify as royal physicians. But though it has to be admitted that historical social reality is reflected in (Buddhist) texts in this regard, too, in the passage under discussion there is no indication whatsoever that we have to do with such a case.

I think I should not any longer avoid coming to the point which, of course, is the following: the characterization of the physician as *rājārha*, etc., in the Vyādhisūtra cannot consistently and convincingly be accounted for but by assuming that it was retained when the exposition of the quadruple division of the science of medicine was taken over from another source. Another particular feature that was simply retained was the order of enumeration of the four skills of a physician which, significantly enough, does not perfectly correspond to the traditional order of succession of the Four Noble Truths. And this source

94. In view of the parallels in the Abhidharmakośa, viz. pp. 136.15.3, 114.23, 115.9, and in Pali texts (e.g. AN I.244.8-10 where the stock phrase *rājāraha rājabhogga* [sic!] *rañño aṅgaṇaṃ t'eva saṅkham gacchati*, said of a thoroughbred horse, is met with, or AN I.284.11-12, etc.) one would expect here rather *rājāṅgaṃ iti ca...* Yet, the text as it is transmitted can, I think, be accepted if *-iva* is taken to denote a collective idea and is construed in accordance with J. S. SPEIJER, *Sanskrit Syntax*, repr. Kyoto, 1968, § 238. It should, however, be noted that *'ive ca* in Sanskrit might go back to Pali *'iveva* which latter, quite often met with, is according to an information kindly given me by my friend O. von Hinüber a wrongly Sanskritized form for *teva* (< *ity eva*). In rendering... *saṅkhyāṃ gacchati* I follow the proposal of the PD pp. 570 and 664; as for the expression *rājāṅga*, cf. CPD s.v. *aṅga*.

95. *bhisakka* is styled an *adhivacana* of the *Tathāgata* at AN IV.340.5-6; as for *vaidyārāja* itself cf. the book of R. Birnbaum (cf. fn. 76) as well as the Hōbōgirin s.v. *byō*, p. 230. ff.

96. Cf. e.g. A. L. BASHAM, *The Wonder that was India*, London, 1954, p. 499, and R. BIRNBAUM, *op. cit.*, p. 6 ff., p. 20 f. (with further references); as noted by the latter, the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra* even describes « how Śākyamuni [himself] in a past life studied all the principles of medicine in order to aid his contemporaries », a « legend » which not only has grown out of particular Mahāyānist ideas, but is also most probably due to the wish to make the Buddha himself the prototype of what a Buddhist monk had become in the course of time.

cannot have been a Buddhist text; it was in all probability a medical text, or, at least, the science of medicine. This conclusion, though cogent in itself, is further and most clearly corroborated by the fact that the only Sanskrit medical text in which the four systematic parts are at all mentioned, viz. the *Carakasamhitā*, surprisingly enough comes to speak of them only in connection with the description of the qualifications of a *rājārha bhiṣaktamaḥ*⁹⁷ and shows the same order of enumerating them. To regard this striking agreement as quite an accident would, no doubt, be nonsensical. Of course, one cannot be absolutely sure that it was this verse of the *Carakasamhitā* which was the source drawn upon by the author of the Vyādhisūtra, for the alternative possibility, viz. that both go back to a common, though unknown source, cannot be ruled out with certainty. But this much seems clear: the fact that the science of medicine falls into four systematic parts, viz. those mentioned in quite a few different texts, was discovered first by medical men.

To return now to the central question⁹⁸ as formulated at the outset of this paragraph. It has to be stated that Buddhist sources do not by any means support the assumption that « les "Quatre Vérités" du Bouddhisme sont empruntées à la médecine »; on the contrary, they give clear evidence that the science of medicine with its four systematic parts was drawn upon only for the sake of illustration; it is but the following hypothesis these sources warrant to frame: the obviously old comparison of the Buddha to a physician, of his teaching to a medicine and similar ideas were in the course of time elaborated, but it was not until the quadruple division of the science of medicine originating in medical circles became known to Buddhist authors that the Four Noble Truths as such were by way of comparison paralleled to the corresponding parts of the *Cikitsāśāstra*, though a full parallelism, i.e. regarding the order of succession also, was achieved only by a second step. However, it seems that the full importance of this systematic division was not realized by medical men, but significantly enough by quite different people, viz. those Yoga and Buddhist authors who applied it for the first time to their respective doctrines of salvation.

Therefore, one cannot but draw the final conclusion that there is not the slightest evidence for the assumption that this fourfold division of the science of medicine it was that inspired the Buddha to his Four

97. As there were already similar idioms in Buddhist tradition (cf. p. 316 and fn. 94), it was quite easy for Buddhist authors to seize on this suggestion of medical texts.

98. In contradistinction to the authors of the Hōbōgirin who (*loc. cit.*) voice the opinion that « la question de savoir si le bouddhisme a "emprunté" ses quatre Vérités à la médecine n'a guère d'intérêt », I find this question extremely interesting, and not only because many Buddhologists do believe in this « borrowing »; but I differ also from Oldenberg in that I am less pessimistic as to the possibility of finding an answer to it, though, of course, only a hypothetical one.

Noble Truths. This was virtually already shown by J. Filliozat as early as in 1934, but his article⁹⁹ does not seem to have been given the attention it, undoubtedly, deserved. The conclusion arrived at in the present more comprehensive study does not, of course, « prove » that such an influence of the contemporary medicine on the Buddha is by no means impossible; all I want to say, yet this emphatically, is that this assumption is without any basis whatsoever, i.e. that as to its philological foundation it stands in a vacuum as it were. For, the similarity between the Four Noble Truths and the four parts of medicine, highly suggestive though it is, cannot by itself be regarded as warranting any such assumption: this similarity can consistently be accounted for by assuming a material coincidence arising quite naturally out of the essential element both, physical illness and existence viewed as suffering, do have in common; « for » — to recapitulate what has been stated already above (p. 300 f.), yet this time in the words of Vasubandhu¹⁰⁰ — « that to which one is attached and by which one is given pain and from which one seeks to free oneself, it is that is examined first in the phase of consideration, i.e. the Truth of Suffering; thereafter [one puts oneself the question] "What is its cause (i.e. the cause of Suffering)?" [and thus examines] the Truth of that which causes [Suffering] to arise¹⁰¹; [then one puts oneself the question] "What does its suppression (i.e. the suppression of suffering) consist in?" [and thus examines] the Truth of Suppression; [and finally one puts oneself the question] "Which is the way [leading to] it (i.e. to its suppression)?" [and thus examines] the Truth of the Way »¹⁰².

5. The idea of a quadruple division of the doctrine of salvation is, however, not confined to the traditions of Pātañjala-Yoga and of Buddhism alone. It is equally attested in yet another school of thought, viz. that of Nyāya. The historical problems the philologist is faced with are hence even more complicated than was assumed until now in the course of the present study.

99. JA (1934), pp. 301-7, referred to in HÖBÖGIRIN, *loc. cit.*

100. Viz. Abhidharmakośa, ed. by P. Pradhan, p. 328.6-8: *yatra hi saktō yena ca bādhyate yataś ca mokṣaṃ prārthayate tad evādaṃ vyavacāraṇāvasthāyāṃ duḥkha-satyāṃ parīkṣyate / paścāt ko 'sya hetur iti samudayasatyāṃ ko 'sya nirodha iti nirodhasatyāṃ ko 'sya mārga iti mārgasatyāṃ /*

101. Incidentally, this passage in the Kośa corroborates my interpretation of the term *samudaya* as given above p. 303.

102. Cf. also the verse of the Saundarānanda quoted above (p. 321) as well as fn. 93a. For the « gradual apprehension » (*anupūrvābhisamaya*) of the Four Noble Truths cf. also a fragmentary Sanskrit MS from the Turfan discoveries described and edited by E. WALDSCHMIDT, *Sanskriithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, Teil I (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, hrsg. von W. Voigt, Bd. X.1), Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 294; this passage is of particular interest in another respect also in that it shows close similarity to the passage from the Saṃyuktāgama (cf. fn. 92) by equally pointing out different causes of disease and different methods of treatment.

5.1. Commenting on NS 1.1.1 Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana states almost right at the beginning: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān niḥsreyasādhigamaḥ / tac caitat uttarasūtreṇānūdyata iti / heyam, tasya nirvartakaṃ, hānam ātīyantikam, tasyopāyo 'dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry arthapadāni samyag buddhvā niḥsreyasam adhigacchati /*, « Out of proper knowledge of what such objects of valid cognition like soul, etc., in reality are, the Highest Good is attained; and this is repeated in the following sūtra (i.e. NS 1.1.2), thus [has NS 1.1.1 to be interpreted]¹⁰³. One has to understand that which is to be avoided, that which brings it forth, [its] absolute avoidance [and] the means [leading to] it; having properly understood these four right statements, one attains the Highest Good ».

In justification of my interpretation which is at variance with the explanation given by Uddyotakara, some brief remarks should be made. According to Uddyotakara the four *arthapadas* are *heya*, *hāna*, *upāya* and *adhigantavya* equated by him to *mokṣa*. That is to say, he started from the assumption that *adhi-gam* must necessarily be used here in the same sense it has in the syntagma *niḥsreyasam adhigacchati*, i.e. the predicate of the sentence as a whole. This conclusion is, however, by no means cogent, and the parallel in the introductory portion of the Bhāṣya on the 2. Āhnikā of the 4. Adhyāya to which one could refer¹⁰⁴, viz. *apavargo 'dhigantavyaḥ*, does not help much because it is continued by *tasyādhigamopāyas tattvajñānam*, i.e. by an unequivocal statement according to which the means for attaining liberation consists in *tattvajñāna*¹⁰⁵. On the contrary, in explaining *hānam* by *tattvajñānam*, and *upāyaḥ* by *śāstram*, Uddyotakara stands clearly in contradiction to this statement of the Bhāṣyakāra's. Besides, the construction of the Bhāṣya passage obviously assumed by Uddyotakara would be rather odd, there

103. One of the problems the commentators of NS 1.1.1 are faced with lies in that *pramāṇa* is mentioned along with *prameya* among the entities true knowledge of which leads to the Highest Good. Following Pakṣilasvāmin all of them, therefore, opt for an interpretation according to which it is the *tattvajñāna* of the different *prameyas* only which has this function.

104. In G. Jha's edition (POS 58), Poona, 1939, this parallel is found on p. 289.3 f.

105. The fourfold division spoken of in this passage of the NBhāṣya (*evam catasṛbhir vidhābhiḥ prameyaṃ vibhaktam āsevamānasya... tattvajñānam utpadyate*) does at first sight appear to be not identical with the four *arthapadāni* mentioned in the commentary on NS 1.1.1; for the four elements seem to be « things, viz. rebirth, result (of acts) and pain, to be known » (*jñeya*), « things, viz. *karma* and defects, to be avoided » (*praheya*), « liberation as that which has to be attained » (*apavargo 'dhigantavyaḥ*) and, finally, « true knowledge as the means for attaining liberation » (*tasyādhigamopāyas tattvajñānam*). In the light of relevant passages in the preceding part of the Bhāṣya, viz. *yas tu duḥkhaṃ duḥkhāyatanaṃ duḥkhānu-ṣaktaṃ sukhaṃ ca sarvaṃ idaṃ duḥkham iti paśyati sa duḥkhaṃ parijānāti / parijñātaṃ ca duḥkhaṃ praheyaṃ bhavaty anupādānāt saviśānavat / evaṃ doṣāṇ karma ca duḥkhaḥ etur iti paśyati /*, however, it becomes clear that in fact the same quadruple division is ultimately intended. But I find it difficult to decide whether *catasṛbhir vidhābhiḥ* has to be construed with *vibhaktam* or else with *āsevamānasya*.

being no reason why Pakṣilasvāmin should in a series of nouns have decided in favour of a verbal and imprecise expression^{105a} as regards the final member. There is hence good reason for taking *adhigantavyaḥ* as predicate to be construed with all four subjects. In addition it should be noted that it is on the basis of this assumption that a proper understanding of the term *arthapada* can be achieved: evidently it is to be regarded as a tatpuruṣa-compound the prior member of which corresponds to a dative (*arthāya padam*), and thus fully agrees with Pāli *atthapada* for which the CPD gives the meaning «a right or profitable word (often referring to the holy texts)», i.e. a word that is to the advantage of another person. The equation of *hāna* with *tattvajñāna* is furthermore highly unconvincing because its characterization as *ātyantika* in the Bhāṣya itself, which clearly echoes NS. 1.1.22 (*tadatyaṇṭa-vimokṣo 'pavargah*), cannot but be taken to indicate that what is meant by the expression *hāna* here is not «means of avoidance», but «avoidance» itself as that which is to be attained. Taking into account this necessary correction of Uddyotakara's interpretation, one can unhesitatingly subscribe to his concluding remark¹⁰⁶: *etāni catvāry arthapadāni sarvaśv adhyātmavidyāsu sarvācāryair varṇyanta iti* /; it is noteworthy, nay extremely interesting that Uddyotakara did not regard the teaching of these four systematic parts to be a specific feature of Nyāya only, but expressly states them to be a common possession of all *adhyātmavidyās* without exception¹⁰⁷. Evidently it did not bother him where this doctrine developed first: historical problems were not of concern to him — in contradistinction to the Western philologist. He will not rest satisfied with observing that the distinction drawn by Pakṣilasvāmin between *heyam*, *tasya nirvartakam*, *hānam ātyantikam* and *tasyopāyaḥ* is in striking agreement with that drawn by Yoga texts between *heyam*, *heyahetuḥ*, *hānam* and *hānopāyaḥ*, but face up to the historical problem(s) involved.

5.2. Yet, before doing so it is advisable to inspect some more relevant material from Nyāya literature, though a comprehensive study of it cannot be undertaken here, as it would inevitably mean writing a history of the doctrine of liberation in this school of thought. There is, however, one Naiyāyika whose testimony seems to be of such outstanding importance that it should not be omitted, viz. that of Bhāsarvajña

105a. The gender, too, would be most disturbing, for Pakṣilasvāmin would indeed demand a great deal from his readers were they compelled to realize on their own that it is masculine because *apavargah* has to be supplemented!

106. Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyāṭkā of Vācaspati and the Paśiuddhi of Udayana, vol. I, chapter I, ed. by A. Thakur (Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text no. 20), Darbhanga, 1967, p. 14, l. 4.

107. Already Pakṣilasvāmin is, however, at pains to show that the Nyāya system is by no means an *adhyātmavidyā* only like the Upaniṣads, but represents, on the contrary, an independent fourth *vidyā*; cf. NBhāṣya 3.3-8.

(who is anyway an extremely remarkable author). In justifying the question *kiṇīlakṣaṇam* of the *mūla*, referring to *prameyam*¹⁰⁸, he explains that what is meant is a particular «object of valid cognition» (*prameyaviśeṣa*) defined by him thus¹⁰⁹: *yad viśayaṃ tattvajñānam anyajñānupayogitvenaiva niḥśreyasāṅgaṃ bhāvati, mithyājñānam ca saṃsāraṃ pratanoti, tat prameyam* /; «Object of valid cognition is that the *tattvajñāna* of which forms a means for [attaining] liberation without being of any use for [the acquisition of] other knowledge¹¹⁰, and the *mithyājñāna* (i.e. false knowledge) [of which] extends Saṃsāra». Bhāsarvajña adds the further explanations¹¹¹:

tad eva tattvato jñātavyaṃ sarvadā bhāvitavyaṃ (read: *bhāvayitavyaṃ*) *ca / na tu kiṇīlakṣaṇam khyādyapi prameyaṃ teṣāṃ jñānasya niḥśreyasānupayogitvāt* /¹¹² *taccaturvidham: heyam, tasya nirvartakam, hānam ātyantikam, tasyopāya iti* /. «This is that has to be known according to its true nature and what has always to be kept present. The number of beetles, and similar things, however, does not equally represent an object of valid cognition¹¹³, because knowing them is of no use for [attaining] liberation. This [object of valid cognition] is of four kinds, viz. (*iti*) that which is to be avoided, that which brings it (i.e. the former) about, absolute avoidance [and] the means for [attaining] it (i.e. absolute avoidance)».

108. N(yāya)Bhūṣ(āṇa), ed. by. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, Benares, 1968, p. 436.1 f.

109. NBhūṣ 436.11-12; passages which literally agree with formulations of the Nyāyasāra are printed in spaced type.

110. Similarly Nyāyamañjarī (ed. by K. S. Varadacharya, ORI Series no. 46, Mysore, 1969), 22.5-6: *ātmāpavargaparyanta-* (read: *ātmādyapavargaparyanta-*) *dvādaśavi-dhaprameyajñānam tāvat anyajñānānapayikam eva sāksād apavargasādhanaṃ iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (viz. at the beginning of the *prameyabhāga*); for *anyajñānānapayikam* Cakradhara (Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga, ed. by Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Series 35, Ahmedabad, 1972) gives the following explanation (5.12-14): *anyajñānam anaupayikam advāram anupāyo yasya / upāya evaupayikam iti svārthe vinayāddipāṭhāt śhak hrasvaś ca* (cf. Pāṇ. 5.4.34 and Gaṇapāṭha 211.3) / *anyajñānasya vānupāyaḥ sad apavargasādhanaṃ na punaḥ pramāṇādijñānam iva prameyajñānopāyatayety arthaḥ* // It is, of course, the second of these explanations which has to be accepted; the expression used in the NBhūṣ, viz. *anyajñānānapayogitvenaiva*, is unequivocal in this respect; what is meant in both cases is to point out that the *prameyajñāna* differs from the knowledge acquired with the help of means of valid cognition, etc., in that the former is of direct importance for liberation.

111. NBhūṣ 436.14-16.

112. The formulations in the Nyāyasāra are slightly different, viz. *na ca kiṇīlakṣaṇam khyādi tajñānasyānupayogitvāt*.

113. The editor of the NBhūṣ refers here to Pramāṇavārttika 2.33: *tasmād anu-ṣṭheyagataṃ jñānam atra vicāryatām / kiṇīlakṣaṇam khyādi-jñānam tasya na kvopayujyate* //.

My interpretation of the NBhāṣya passage quoted above is thus fully corroborated by Bhāsarvajña¹¹⁴. In addition it has to be noted that Bhāsarvajña is more explicit than Pakṣilasvāmin in that he unequivocally states that what falls into these four parts is in fact the « object of valid cognition », whereas in the Nyāyabhāṣya it is left open whether the four *arthapadāni* are at all related to the category « *prameya* » and, if so, precisely in which manner¹¹⁵. According to Bhāsarvajña¹¹⁶, too, the category « object of valid cognition » is in itself ambivalent: if it becomes the object (*viśaya*) of proper knowledge, i.e. if its true nature is cognized, its knowledge leads to liberation; however, if its true nature is not understood, this false knowledge has the opposite effect, i.e. causes the process of rebirth to continue. It must, however, be borne in mind that this category includes only certain entities that are to be truly cognized, viz. those which are of direct importance for the attainment of the final goal.

Bhāsarvajña's assertion that it is divided into four parts only, viz. *heyam* etc., is quite understandably objected to by an opponent who rightly draws attention to the fact that according to NS 1.1.9 where the different *prameyas* are enumerated and according to NS 1.1.10 ff. in which the individual « objects of valid cognition » are defined, there is a total of twelve of them, but not four. This objection¹¹⁷ is met by Bhāsarvajña by the following arguments¹¹⁸: *satyam, dvādaśavidham uktam, kiṃ tu tad dvādaśavidham api heyādirūpeṇa caturdhā bhāvya-mānaṃ niḥśreyasanimittam bhavattīy ataś caturvidham uktam / sūtra-kāras tu nyāyaprāptam caturvidhyam itī manyamānaḥ sākṣān noktavān / na hi heyādirūpāniścaye śarīrādīṣv ahaṃkāranivṛttivairāgyotpādana-dvāreṇa tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ sambhaviṣyati caturvargāntarbhūta-tvāc ca dvādaśavidhasyāpi /*. « It is true, [the "object of valid cognition"] is taught [in the Sūtra] as twelvefold; but it functions as the cause [of attaining] liberation [only] when it, though twelvefold, is presented to the mind as fourfold, [i.e.] as having the forms of that which has to be

114. Because he follows the tradition of those Naiyāyikas who wrote commentaries on the NBhāṣya, i.e. the so-called *Vyākhyātāraḥ* (cf. A. Wezler, in WZKSÖ, XIX, 1975, 135-146)?

115. The term *arthapada* itself does not help in answering this question, and the other passage in the NBhāṣya quoted above (p. 325) can be interpreted in two different ways (cf. fn. 105).

116. Who is, however, in agreement with Pakṣilasvāmin [cf. Bhāṣya on NS 1.1.9, 2378: *asty anyad api dravyaguṇakarmasādhānyaviśeṣasamavādyāḥ prameyam* (viz. that taught by the Vaiśeṣikas) *tadbhedena cāparisaṅkhyeyam: asya tu* (i.e. that taught in NS 1.1.9) *tattvajñānād apavargo mithyājñānāt saṃsāra ity ata etad upadiṣṭam viśeṣeṇeti /*] and Uddyotakara (cf. his Vārttika on the beginning of the 4th Adhyāya; ed. by V. P. Dvivedin and L. S. Dravid, KSS 33, Benares, 1916-17, 500.8-10: *yas tattvajñānaviśayatvena vyavatiṣṭhamānaḥ saṃsāravayavacchedahetur bhavati yaś ca mohaviśayatvāt saṃsāraṃ pratanoti sa tattvato jñeya iti /*).

117. Extending from NBhūṣ 437.1 to 441.23.

118. NBhūṣ 441.25 and 442.3.

avoided, etc.; it is for this reason that it is stated [by me] to be of four kinds. The author of the Sūtra, however, did not state this expressly as he was of the opinion that the fact that it falls into four parts follows logically [so that it need not be made explicit]; for, liberation as an absolute freeing oneself from Suffering by means of stopping egotism and by creating [in oneself] the state of indifference with respect to ["objects of valid cognition"] like the body and so forth is not possible if [these objects] are not ascertained as having the form of that which has to be avoided, etc.; and [the fourfoldness of the "object of valid cognition" was not expressly stated by the Sūtrakāra also] because [the "object of valid cognition"] even if twelvefold is subsumed in the four groups [of that which has to be avoided, etc.] ».

That is to say, according to Bhāsarvajña the two divisions are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, the twelvefold division is contained in the fourfold; the latter one, however, is the decisive one in so far as it, and it only, leads to liberation: evidently the *tattvajñāna* of the twelve different *prameyas* is regarded as not sufficient for attaining the « Highest Good »; each and every « object of valid cognition » is to be looked into as regards whether it represents something that has to be avoided or something that causes that which has to be avoided, etc.; and only then is it that knowing their true nature functions as a means to liberation.

This is clearly a doctrine which goes beyond the wording and intention of the NS: the impact of soteriological ideas which had led to refashioning the old Nyāya tradition so as to make it, too, look like a *mokṣaśāstra*, continued to be felt by Naiyāyikas who met the challenge by elaborating ideas found in the Bhāṣya and, of course, by trying their very best to vindicate their conviction that what are but later ideas were at least thought of and realized by the Sūtrakāra himself.

Nevertheless, Bhāsarvajña's view, though historically untenable, is, of course, worthy of notice, and not only as regards the manner in which he handles the received *mūla* text, viz. the NS¹¹⁹. For, the explanation he gives for the Sūtrakāra's not having expressly stated the *caturvidhya* of the « object of valid cognition » is not accepted by his opponent who raises the objection that Gautama should have taught it¹²⁰ precisely in view of its central importance. Bhāsarvajña does not let this objection pass, his answer being¹²¹: *na, paramataniṣedhārthatvāt / tatra sāmānyā-nām matam: heyam duḥkham rajovṛttyātmakam, « draṣṭṛdrśyayoḥ saṃ-yogo heyahetuḥ »* (YS 2.17), « *tasya hetur avidyā* » (YS 2.24), « *tadā-bhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānam tad dr̥ṣeḥ kaivalyam* » (YS 2.25), « *viveka-khyātir aviṣṭā hānopāyāḥ* » (YS 2.26) *iti / śākyānām ca: duḥkhasamu-*

119. It is in this regard that the NBhūṣ in general is of particular interest and hence calls for a careful and comprehensive study.

120. NBhūṣ 442.5: *yady evam caturvidhyam eva sūtrakṛtā kasmān noktam?*

121. NBhūṣ 442.5-11 and 19-20.

*dayanirodhamārgākhyacaturāryasatyajñānaṃ muktyartham iṣṭam /...¹²²
... tad evaṃ paramate 'pi heyādicatuṣṭayajñānaṃ muktinimittam iṣṭam /
tanmataniṣedhārtham ātmādhedopanyāsaḥ kṛtaḥ /.*

To put it in a nutshell: according to Bhāsarvajña — who, on the one hand, almost grotesquely comes short of historical truth, but, on the other, i.e. if his presuppositions are taken for granted, argues in a quite understandable and remarkable manner — Gautama did not expressly state the *prameya* to be fourfold, but instead confined himself to teach and define the twelve different « objects of valid cognition », because he wanted to refute the opinion of others, viz. the Sāṃkhya-Yogins and the Buddhists, who equally considered the knowledge of the four elements of *heya* etc. to be a means for liberation. His final remark may be taken as a hint at the importance Bhāsarvajña attributes in this connection to the concept of *ātman* and the Nyāya view of it. This is corroborated by what he says in introducing the next paragraph, viz.¹²³ *tatrātmajñāne sati paralokādharmikā bhavati nānyatheti vākṣyāmaḥ /*, « the desire for the other world (i.e. the wish to attain liberation) arises [only] when among these [different kinds of knowledge] there is knowledge of the *ātman*, not otherwise —, this I shall teach [later] »¹²⁴.

But before examining the further development of his argument it is necessary to dwell on the passage just quoted. Bhāsarvajña was evidently not the first to realize that the idea of the doctrine of salvation being divided into the four systematic parts does not constitute a peculiarity of Nyāya; but Uddyotakara's relevant remark¹²⁵ looks rather colourless in that he still confines himself to claiming for the Nyāyasāstra the status of being, among other things, an *adhyātmavidyā*, too, and does not deem it necessary to determine more precisely the relation in which his school stands in this respect to other doctrines of salvation. Viewed against this background Bhāsarvajña's corresponding remarks are not only much more informative, but are also evidence of a considerable progress in analysis. For he not only points out the basic doctrinal correspondence between the school of Nyāya and particular other systems which he does not hesitate to name, but he also enters into a discussion of the specific doctrinal differences. It is, of course, by no means surprising that what he right from the beginning aims at is to prove the claim that, inspite of the quadruple division being common to other doctrines also, it is the Nyāya doctrine of salvation alone that stands a critical test and should hence be universally accepted. This claim is not, however, connected with the fourfold division as such, but with the definitions of the four systematic parts as given by the Sāṃkhya-Yogins

and Buddhists, respectively: it is but the conceptional and doctrinal content that his criticism is directed against. Yet his remarks, systematically comprehensive as they are, arrest the philologist's attention in other respects, too: They furnish a welcome corroboration of the conclusion arrived at earlier in the present study as regards the problems of the quadruple division being attested already in the YS itself and the correspondence between it and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Noteworthy, however, is that Bhāsarvajña does not refer in this connection to the *caturvyūha* of the Cikitsāsāstra; he must have known the relevant passage in the YBhāṣya; apparently he was not interested in pointing out this similarity; a further reason may have been the conspicuous absence of this comparison in the older Nyāya tradition.

In continuing his exposition Bhāsarvajña draws attention to the fact that there is still another reason for the *prameya* having been taught in the NS as being twelvefold. The argument is as follows¹²⁶: when the body (*śarīra*) is recognized as being different from the *ātman*, it is not any longer mistaken for the *ātman* and henceforth one does not commit acts of violence, etc., for the sake of one's body. When it is realized that the body is the seat of pain and suffering (*duḥkha*), attachment to it ends. The next step consists in coming to know the nature of the senses (*indriya*), i.e. that defects (*doṣa*) do not arise when the senses do not function even though there may be causes that could give rise to defects; thereupon one strives to withdraw the senses (*pratyāhāra*), and in doing so one does not any longer look upon their objects (*artha*) (which have been recognized as causing suffering) as something one should grasp, and then one frees oneself of all desires (*vairāgya*). Having realized that false (*mithyābuddhi*) and true knowledge (*tattvabuddhi*) are the causes of liberation and *saṃsāra*, respectively, one eliminates the former and develops the latter by making consistent efforts for it. Then greatest efforts are made to conquer the mind (*manas*) which is the root of all functions of the senses¹²⁷. When the activities (*pravṛtti*) are recognized to be the root of suffering in so far as they bring about merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), etc., they are avoided. As soon as the true nature of the defects (*doṣa*) is understood, viz. in the light of NS 4.1.60¹²⁸, one undertakes the greatest exertions to remove them. Then it has to be realized that the beginningless process of rebirth (*pretyabhāva*)¹²⁹ and, hence, the extreme suffering in the form of birth and death cannot be brought to an end but by liberation (*apavarga*); and similarly it is to be realized that the result (*phala*) [of activities and defects]¹²⁹ consisting

126. Cf. NBhūṣ 442.22-26 and 443.6-15.

127. Cf. NBhūṣ 440.10-13 to which Bhāsarvajña refers back.

128. According to the numbering in: Die Nyāyasūtra's. Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar von W. Ruben (AKM XVIII.2), Leipzig, 1928.

129a. Cf. Pakṣilasvāmin's definition (NBhāṣya 31.7): *pretyabhāvo mṛtvā punarjanma*.

129. Cf. NS 1.1.20.

122. Read thus against the edition! In the passage left out here, viz. NBhūṣ 442.11-19, Bhāsarvajña gives a brief explanation of the Four Noble Truths.

123. NBhūṣ 442.22.

124. Viz. NBhūṣ 461.15 ff.

125. Cf. above p. 326.

in pain and also in alleged pleasure is ultimately the same in that both, pleasure and pain, are brought about by one's own *karman*¹³⁰. Next, pain and suffering (*duḥkha*) have to be properly understood so as to be able to keep them present to one's mind. When one has come to realize that each and everything, from God Brahmā down to a grass-blade, is permeated by pain and suffering, one does not take interest in it any longer. And when, finally, liberation (*apavarga*) is recognized to be the unsurpassed, endless and altogether pure means for the ceasing of all pain and suffering, one strives for that goal only.

Bhāsarvajña concludes this passage by stating¹³¹ *tad evaṃ dvādaśa-prahāreṣv api tattvajñānabhāvanā copayujyate ity ato 'pi dvādaśadhā prameyam uktam / saṃkṣepabhāvanārtham ca tasya cāturvīdhyam ucyate* /: «Hence, true knowledge is also realized in all these twelve ways; it is for this reason, too, that the "object of valid cognition" is taught [in the NS] as twelvefold; and that it is [on the other hand] of four kinds [only], this is taught for the sake of keeping [true knowledge] present to one's mind in a concise form».

That is to say, Bhāsarvajña first demonstrates the true knowledge one has to develop with respect to the twelve *prameyas*, following their order of enumeration as given in NS 1.1.9, and states thereafter by way of summarizing his exposition, that they have been taught by the Sūtrakāra not only in order to refute the theory of the quadruple division of the doctrines of salvation as expounded by other schools, but also to intimate that all twelve of them should be reflected upon in the manner outlined by Bhāsarvajña himself. His very last remark is particularly interesting, and that in two respects: it determines more precisely the relation between the two alternative divisions of the *prameya*, the twelve-fold and the quadruple; and the characterization of the latter as being introduced «*saṃkṣepabhāvanārtham*» makes one wonder whether this is another instance of the well-known tendency, so important in the history of Indian religions down to the present day, to replace complicated and time-consuming religious acts by «abridgements». But it is by no means clear that what Bhāsarvajña has in mind is such a substitution; he might have equally thought of a real alternative only, or even regarded the choice of the *saṃkṣepa* as a means to intensifying the *bhāvanā* of true knowledge which ultimately leads to liberation.

Yet, such theoretical deliberations are of little use here, at least as long as the apparent contradiction is not discussed in which these remarks of Bhāsarvajña's seem to stand to what had been said by him earlier on the relation between the two divisions. Had he not claimed that it is the quadruple division only that leads to liberation and does he not clearly contradict himself in asserting now that «true knowledge is also realized in all these twelve ways»? I think that the two relevant passages appear contradictory only at first sight. For what Bhāsarvajña

130. Cf. NBhūṣ 441.2-7 and 9-15 to which Bhāsarvajña refers back.

131. NBhūṣ 443.14-15. Read '*bhāvanopayujyate* or '*bhāvanaivopa*'!

actually had said, and, to wit, also with respect to the particular procedure of the Sūtrakāra, was that «liberation as an absolute freeing oneself from Suffering by means of stopping egotism and by creating [in oneself] the state of indifference with respect to ["objects of valid cognition"] like the body and so forth is not possible if [these objects] are not ascertained as having the form of that which has to be avoided, etc.»; and what he shows in the second passage is precisely the cognitive and spiritual development of a Naiyāyika who reflects upon the twelve «objects of valid cognition» on the basis of the more important division of *heyam*, etc.! Therefore, not only his earlier statement that «[the object of valid cognition] even if twelvefold is subsumed in the four groups [of that which is to be avoided, etc.]», but also what he says here, viz. that «the fourfold division is taught *saṃkṣepabhāvanārtham*», are fully intelligible in that, understood thus, the fourfold division in fact comprises in itself the twelve *prameyas* and for this very reason forms the quintessence of their *bhāvanā*. In the light of these deliberations it is hence more probable that what Bhāsarvajña wants to intimate by his final remark is but the superior importance of the *cāturvīdhyā* as emphasized by him already at the very outset.

Space being limited it is not possible to deal here with the same extensiveness as hitherto with what Bhāsarvajña says in the subsequent paragraphs of his Bhūsaṇa. The gist of his exposition, however, may be briefly outlined, following mainly the Nyāyasāra: in order to define the concept of *heyam* he quotes YS 2.16¹³² and adds that suffering is of twenty-one kinds, i.e. that it comprises the body, the six senses (*manas* is included), their six objects, the [corresponding] six [types] of cognition, pleasure and pain in that all — except for the body which is the seat of pain and except for pleasure which is nothing but pain because it does not occur without pain¹³³ and, of course, except for pain itself which is *duḥkha* par excellence as it consists in *bādhā*, *pīḍā* and *saṃtāpa* — of them lead to suffering. That which brings about the *heyam* (*tasya nirvartakam*), i.e. its specific cause, is stated to be nescience (*avidyā*) and «thirst» (*trṣṇā*), on the one hand, and merit and demerit (*dharmādharmau*), on the other; nescience is then defined as false knowledge of that which has been shown by true *adhyātmavids*¹³⁴, and it is made clear that it includes the mental impression left by nescience¹³⁵,

132. See above p. 295.

133. NBhūṣ 444.5-19; cf. also 441.9-15 and 445.24 ff.

134. Of the two śloka quoted by Bhāsarvajña to give an example of what «true knowers of the *ātman*» and «those blind with passion» say (NBhūṣ 444.27-20), not identified by the editor, the first one is from Mbh. (Poona) 12.316.42 and 43; the second one seems to belong to the vast stock of floating stanzas one finds so often quoted in anthologies and Indian narrative literature; it is included in O. BÖHLINGK's, *Indische Sprüche*, I, repr. Osnabrück, 1966, p. 98 (no. 3565); for further references see L. STERNBACH, *Supplement to O. Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche* (AKM XXXVII.1), Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 9.

135. Cf. NBhūṣ 444.23-30 and 445.4-7. Note that by *duḥkhasūtre* (which is me with also NBhūṣ 443.22, 445.20, 446.14 and 584.16) Bhāsarvajña refers to NS 1.1.2 dealt with in detail NBhūṣ 72.15 ff.

«thirst» is explained to be the longing for rebirth¹³⁶. The reason for *dharma* and *adharma* being mentioned separately is that nescience is the main cause of suffering (*pradhānaṃ duḥkhanimittam*)¹³⁷, and merit and demerit are, properly speaking, specific causes of pleasure and pain, respectively, and that both of them are equally to be regarded as *duḥkha-kāraṇa* because it is a matter of experience that one is given pain by cold wind, etc., even when nescience and thirst do not persist any longer¹³⁸. *Hānam* is then defined to be the cessation of suffering (*duḥkha-viccheda*), and the addition of «absolute» (*ātyantika*) is vindicated by referring to the fact that a temporal elimination of personal (*ādhyātmi*-*mika*) pain and suffering can be achieved also by applying the means taught in the *Dharma*-, *Artha*-, *Kāma*- and *Vaidya-Sāstras*¹³⁹; that is to say, the attribute is meant to make clear that the liberated *ātman* does not ever again and in no manner come in contact with *duḥkha*.

Finally, the fourth element, i.e. the means for attaining complete avoidance (*tasyopāyaḥ*), is determined to consist in true knowledge of the *ātman*. That out of the twelve «objects of valid cognition» *ātman* alone is mentioned is justified by the wish to stress its outstanding importance (*pradhānya*) which, according to Bhāsarvajña, has also led to its being enumerated first in NS 1.1.9¹⁴⁰. The *ātman* is said to be of two kinds, viz. *para* and *apara*, of which two the former is none else but the *Maheśvara*¹⁴¹ and the latter is «he who experiences the result of *Samsāra*» (*samsārāphalopabhoktr*), i.e. the individual permanent and omnipresent soul¹⁴².

Regarding the rôle these two «objects of valid cognition» play in attaining the final goal, it is stated that the true knowledge of the *aparātman* represents a means to it (*nirśreyasāṅga*) because it leads to activity aimed at «the other world» in that it helps to realize that the *paraloka* really exists and because it causes the elimination of demerit¹⁴³; the true knowledge of the *parātman*, on the other hand, is ascribed a similar function, only that it works by being a constitutive element of the *upāsana* of the *Maheśvara*¹⁴⁴. That both these *tattvajñānas* are not of exactly the same rank is finally stated by emphatically proclaiming that liberation is attained only because of perceiving God Śiva (*tasmāc*

132. See above p. 295.

137. Cf. NBhūṣ 445.20-21.

138. Cf. NBhūṣ 445.22 ff.

139. The text as read in the edition of the NBhūṣ, viz. 446.7 *dharmādharmārtha-kāmavaidyaśāstrair...*, is corrupt and has to be emended to *dharmārtha*.

140. Cf. NBhūṣ 446.13-16.

141. Hence the subsequent long *īśvaravāda* section NBhūṣ 447 ff.

142. Cf. NBhūṣ 487.19 ff.

143. Cf. NBhūṣ 548.1-2 and 19 ff.

144. Cf. NBhūṣ 574.1 and 12 ff.

chivadarśanād eva mokṣa iti)¹⁴⁵. Out of the many points in Bhāsarvajña's extensive «commentary on NS 1.1.9» which ought to be taken up for discussion the following should not be passed over silently here. On the one hand, Bhāsarvajña quotes a series of relevant sūtras from the YS (above p. 329) and clearly in a *pūrvapakṣa* section; on the other, he uses YS 2.16 in his own definition of *heyam* (cf. above p. 333) — as also YS 2.15 in his explanation of *phala*¹⁴⁶. This contradiction is, of course, only seemingly one. The solution cannot but be that Bhāsarvajña accepts such elements of Pātañjala-Yoga as are doctrinally so to say neutral in that they refer to a practical method of self-control, etc.^{146a}. In doing so he is not only clearly in keeping with the NS itself, and he himself quotes the relevant sūtra viz. 4.2.45¹⁴⁷, but he also gives Yoga as such its due in so far as it essentially teaches a method that can be and was applied to different systems of thought, can and was practised by people of different persuasions. Bhāsarvajña does, of course, not show «faith in the doctrines of that school», as V. S. Abhyankar and I. R. Devadhar would have it¹⁴⁸; on the contrary, he severely and repeatedly criticizes them. All one can perhaps say is that «he shows a strong predilection for Yoga», also in a later part of his work¹⁴⁹, yet this is a side-issue which I cannot follow up here¹⁵⁰.

145. NBhūṣ 590.6 and 7 ff. as well as 514.24; cf. also NBhūṣ 590.13-14: *ātmatvāviśeṣeti* (read: 'viśeṣe 'pi) *kasmān nānyadarśanān mokṣa iti cet, na, anyasya* (i.e. *paramātmanah śivād anyasya*) *sarvānimittatvāt: na hy anyo 'pi ātmā sarvotpattimatām nimittam iti* /. On the distinction between the *muktātman* and the *parameśvara* cf. also NBhūṣ 449.4 ff.

146. Viz. NBhūṣ 441.13 f.

146a. According to the editor's «Nyāyabhūṣaṇatattippanoddhrtavākyaṣaṇi» (pp. 631 ff.) it is a total of 16 sūtras of the YS which are quoted by Bhāsarvajña. On the occasion of quoting the concluding portion of NS 4.2.45 Bhāsarvajña makes the following important remark (NBhūṣ 584.11 ff.): ... *iti vacanāt / pātañjalādisāstreṣv apy upadiṣṭaḥ upāyaḥ svaśāstravirodhena* (read, of course, 'āvirodhena) *pratipattavyaḥ / tatra yuktisāmarthyāc ca* [/] «*paramatam apratīḍdham anumataṃ*» *iti tantrayuktiḥ* /; that is to say, he himself clearly states the principle he proceeds upon in accepting the «opinions of others». As for this *tantrayukti*, cf. NBhūṣ 16.3 f. (on NS 1.1.4).

147. Viz. NBhūṣ 445.28 and cf. fn. 146a. The reading '*vidyupāyaḥ*' given there is, however, a misprint for '*vidhyupāyaḥ*'.

148. Nyāyasāra of Āchārya Bhāsarvajña with the Nyāyasārapadapañchikā of Vāsudeva of Kashmir, Poona, 1922, p. 84.

149. Viz. NBhūṣ 584.9 ff. where Bhāsarvajña, with reference to his definition of *upāsana* *vidhi*, not only refers to NS 4.2.45, but also to the means (*upāya*) taught in the «Pātañjalādisāstrāṇi», stating that this *upāya* has also to be accepted to the extent that it does not stand in contradiction to Nyāya tenets and is hence not expressly objected to (*pratīḍdha*). Note also the remark NBhūṣ 584.18 19: *dvādaśa-prameyajñānam api notpannamātram asahāyaṃ rāgādinivṛttau samartham / kim tarhi? yogopāyaṇuṣṭhānasahitam*, by which Bhāsarvajña plainly states his particular position: true knowledge of the objects of valid cognition is not by itself as soon as it has been gained capable of bringing all desire to an end, it needs support, viz. practising the means of Yoga. Cf. in this connection also NBhūṣ 441.14 where YS 2.15 is quoted as the statement of an «*adhyātmavid*».

150. As far as I know it is presently being studied by G. Oberhammer.

5.3. Returning now to the central problem, one has to put oneself the following question: what are the historical conclusions to be drawn from the observation that the quadruple division of the doctrine of salvation is attested in a substantially identical form not only in the Indian science of medicine, certain Yoga texts and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, but also in the Nyāya tradition? There is but a hypothesis I am able to offer, viz. the assumption that suggests itself quite naturally when the relative chronology of the respective earliest sources is taken into account and when a casual convergent development is a priori excluded: the quadruple division was discovered by the Buddha; it was thereafter taken over by the author of the relevant sūtras of the YS (which shows strong Buddhist influences in other respects, too), who also chose other, i.e. neutral, terms for the four different elements. Pakṣilasvāmin borrowed them probably from the YS¹⁵¹ as the terminology used by him is practically identical with that of the YS. Similarly, it found, though probably earlier, its way into the Carakasamhitā which directly or indirectly influenced the author of the Yogabhāṣya and that of the Buddhist Vyādhisūtra so that they decided to refer to the science of medicine by way of comparison.

This hypothesis, of course, implies that the assumption made above (p. 323 f.), viz. that the science of medicine may claim priority as regards the « discovery » of the quadruple division, has to be abandoned. Yet, I think, it offers a more plausible explanation of the undisputable fact that this division was never of real importance in the tradition of the Cikitsāśāstra. There is another point I should like to make in this connection: is not the widespread belief that the quadruple division as taught in medicine it was that inspired the Buddha perhaps suggested also by the assumption that the Buddha could not have conceived his systematically divided four *āryasatyāni* had he not had in mind a concrete and wordly example which he need only apply to his doctrine of salvation? And might not the idea, « natural » though it seems, that this « discovery » cannot but have been made first by people concerned with the somatic aspect of man's existence turn out to be a preconceived one, in the case of Indian culture at least; is it not perhaps even due to the fact that a rather modern and Western conception of medicine is unconsciously taken as basis? Could not just the reverse be true, viz. that in India it was a person deeply reflecting on man's existence as such that led to this « discovery », i.e. that it was the extraordinary

analytical capacity and sensibility of the Buddha to which Indian medicine in its turn owes the recognition of its *caturvyūhatva*?

*tad etad anyair api kāṭhinyarataiḥ sūkṣmadarśibhir yatnena
vicāryatām ity alam ativistareṇa*¹⁵².

152. I likewise withstand the temptation to enter on my own into an independent comparative study of medicine and doctrines of salvation the comparison of which could, of course, be carried much farther than it was ever done by Indian authors.

151. Similarly G. OBERHAMMER, *Pakṣilasvāmin's Introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam*, in « Asian Studies », vol. 2 (1964). pp. 311-15. Cf. also his *Strukturen yogischer Meditation*, Wien, 1977, p. 210.