

On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

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A few years ago Prof. Iwata¹⁾ and Prof. Matsumoto²⁾ drew our attention to the fact that in respect of the argument that a cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*) there is a certain relationship between Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* and Dharmottara's *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā*.³⁾ However, the relationship between the two was not considered in detail. Regarding these two authors Prof. Ichigō writes that Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795)⁴⁾ in his *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* refutes a theory that is held by Dharmottara in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.⁵⁾ Concerning Śāntarakṣita (c.725–788)⁶⁾ and Dharmottara Prof. Tosaki⁶⁾ assumes that Dharmottara in his *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā* refutes a theory held by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*. In order to provide support for their assumptions I would like to add some additional material.

1) Prof. Iwata assumed that Kamalaśīla probably used some material from Dharmottara's *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā* for his explanation of the *sahopalambhaniyama*: TSP 693, 19–21 ~ PVinT 185b5–7; TSP 693, 23–24 ~ PVinT 185b7 (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Miszellen zur erkenntnistheoretisch-logischen Schule des Buddhismus: I. Zur Datierung Karakago-mins." WZKS 23, 1979 [141–150]: 148 n. 30). Additional parallels are listed in his book *Sahopalambhaniyama*, Wiesbaden 1991.

2) Cf. Shirō Matsumoto, "Sahopalambha-niyama". In: *Sōtōshū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō* 12, 1980 [298–265]: 278. The passages referred to are: TSP 693,1–3 ~ PVinT 185b3–5; TSP 693,19–21 ~ PVinT 185b5–7; TSP 692,8 ~ PVinT 186a7–8.

3) Another passage which is similar in both texts is to be found in Hideomi Yaita, "Dharmottara no Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā – Sanskrit dampen to shiyaku." [Dharmottara's PVinT – Sanskrit Fragments and Translation]. *Mikkyōgaku Kenkyū* 16, 1984 [17–37]: 23f, no. 5 (TSP 483,14–17 ~ PVinT 44b4–6); cf. also nos. 1, 6, 7, 9, 15.

4) Cf. Frauwallner 1961: 141; 146.

5) Cf. Masamichi Ichigō, "Zōron no ishu ni kansuru Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla no kenka o megutte" [On Ś.'s and K.'s opinion regarding the aim of a treatise]. In: *The Mikkyōgaku* 13/14, [66–76]: 72ff. The passages he is referring to are: *śamyagjñānapūrviketyādīnāṣya prakaraṇasyābhidheyaḥ prayojanam ucyate* NB 1 1) *yat prayojanam nirdiṣṭam tat prayojanaprayojanasya kathanam, nābhidheyaṣya prayojanam...* TSP 10,10ff. The following corroborates Ichigō's assumption that Kamalaśīla also knew the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. In NB 76,8f Dharmottara explains: *prāpakam jñānam pramānam. prāpaṇaśaktiś ca na kevalād arthāvinābhāvitvād bhavati, bījādyavinābhāvino 'py aṅkurāder aprāpakatvāt*. = "A cognition which makes one obtain (the indicated thing) is a valid cognition. And (this) ability of making one obtain is not due to the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant with the thing, for a sprout etc., although it is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc., does not make one obtain (the seed)."

The same statement using the same example is to be found in TSP 488,23–489,7: *jñānam hi viśayākāram utpadyamānam viśayam paricchinad iva savyāpāram ivābhātī (: ivāstīti). ayam evārthaprapāṇavyāpāro* jñānasya, na tv avinābhāvitvamātram. na hi bījādyavinābhāvino 'ṅkurādayo [na]** bhavanti, yena jñānam eva pramānam syāt*. = TSP, 48a7f: *shes pa yul gyi rnam par skye ba na yul yongs su gcod bzhin pa na bya ba dang beas ba lta bur snang ste / don la shes pa'i shes par byed pa'i bya ba na 'di nyid yin gyi med na mi 'byung ba tsam ni ma yin no // gang gis shes pa nyid tshad mar 'gyur ba myu gu la sogs pa sa bon la sogs pa med na mi 'byung bar 'gyur ba ni ma yin no //* = "For, inasmuch as cognition when arising in the form of the object (appears) as if it were determining the object, it appears as if it were endowed with the function (of determining). Only this is the cognition's function of making one obtain* the thing, but not the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant (with the thing). For a sprout etc. which is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc. is not (endowed with the function of making one obtain the thing),** so that (yena) the cognition alone (eva) [i.e. without this function] would be the valid cognition."

* instead of *prāpaṇavyāpāra* the Tibetan text reads *shes par byed pa'i bya ba=*jñāpakavyāpāra*

** the Tibetan translation corroborates the deletion of the second negation *na* in this sentence.

6) Cf. Hiromasa Tosaki, "Dharmottara to Śāntarakṣita – 'go ni motozoku chi' o megutte". [Dh. and S. – On Śābdapramāṇa]. In: *Buddhism and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shōzen Kunoi on His Seventieth Birthday*. Kyoto 1985, 273–284.

At the beginning of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* Dharmottara gives his definition of valid cognition (*pramāṇalakṣaṇa*). This work is extant only in Tibetan and the section on the *pramāṇa*-definition consists of five *folios*.⁷⁾ In the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, in the chapter dealing with intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā*), Kamalaśīla, by commenting on TS 2972⁸⁾, also gives a very concise definition of valid cognition some formulations of which are close to those of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and the relationship of which we are now going on to examine.⁹⁾

In the following I shall present the relevant textual passages. Words underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence. Words in upright type are wordings occurring in both texts with changes in the form of the words or their syntactical position. Words in *italics* are wordings which belong only to the respective text.

Passages from Kamalaśīla: TSP (ad TS 2972) 946,10–947,14

भ्रान्तिहेतोरसद्भावोऽतः स्वतस्तस्य प्रमाणता |
[bhrāntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā |
prathamasya tathābhāve^{a)} pradveṣo bhrāntisambhavāt || TS 2972]
प्रथमस्य तथाभावे प्रवेष्टे भ्रान्तिसम्भवान् |

kasyacit tu yadīṣyetyādāu (=TS 2854) *āha: bhrāntihetor* (=TS 2972a) *ityādi.*

nanu ca yat sandigdharthāvinābhāvitvenāniścitarthaprapaṇasāmarthyajñānam, tad anumānavan na prāpnoti. tathā hy anumānasyarthāvinābhāvasaṁśaye sati na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, evaṁ pratyakṣe 'pi na prāpnoti. naiṣa doṣaḥ; <1> na hy anumānavad arthanāntarīyakam ātmānam upadarśayāt pratyakṣam pramāṇam iṣṭam, kiṁ tarhi, pratibhāsamānārtthāvasāyam^{b)} kurvat. tathā hy arthakriyārthino 'bhimatam artham prāpayat pramāṇam ucyate.^{1>} <2> na cārthadeśam puruṣam upasarpayad artham vā puruṣadeśam ānayat tat prāpakam bhavati, api tu puruṣam pravartayat.^{2>} <3> tam ca na puruṣam hastena grhītvā pravartayate, kiṁ tarhi, pravṛttiviśayam upadarśayat.^{3>} <4> tac copadarśanam pratibhāsamānārtthāvasāyān nānyat.^{4>} <5> yatra ca saṁśayas latrāvasāyam pratibhāsamānākārāvasāyo 'sti, tadānavasāye tadvimarsāyogāt.^{5>} <6> tataś caitāvatā pratyakṣavyāpāraparisamāpteh^{6>} <7> paścād arthāvinābhāvasaṁśayo bhavan na pratyakṣavyāpāram uparunaddhīti.^{7>} saty api saṁśayodaye bhavaty eva prāmāṇyam pratyakṣasya.

<8> yat tu pratibhāsamānapadārthaviruddhākārāvasāyākṛāntam udeti tan na pramāṇam, yathā marīcikāgrāhijñānam jalāvasāyākṛāntam, tatra yathoktapramāṇavyāpārābhāvāt.^{8>} <9> yac ca śāntkhe pitājñānam maṇiprabhāyām maṇijñānam, tad apy apramāṇam^{9>} eva, tatra yathārtham pratibhāsaṁśayayor abhāvāt. <10> pratibhāsaṁśād dhi pratyakṣasya grahaṇāgrahane,^{10>} na tv arthāvisaṁvādamātrāt. na cātra yathāsvabhāvadeśakālāvasthītavastupratibhāso 'sti, na vādeśakālāḥ sa eva bhavati, <11> deśakālayor api vastusvabhāvabhedakatvāt, anyathā hi bhedavyavahāroccedaḥ syāt.^{11>}

<12> anumānasya tu vikalpātmakatvena sāmānyaviśayatvān na pratibhāsaṁśād vastuviśayatvavyavasthā, vastuno 'pratibhāsāt, kiṁ tarhi, niścayaṁ, yathoktam:

niścayaiḥ |

yan na niścīyate rūpaṁ tat teṣāṁ viśayaḥ katham || iti^{12>} (=PV I 59)

tataś cānumānasya tadābhāsaśūnyasyāpi nāntarīyakārthadarśanabalenoṭpatteḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhāt prāmāṇyam ity avasāyam latrāvinābhāvanīścayo 'pekṣaṇīyah, anyathā anumānasyotpattyasambhavād iti nānumānatulyam pratyakṣam.

a) *tathābhāve* corr.: *tadābhāve*; cf. TS 2854.

b) *pratibhāsamāna*^{a)} corr.: *pratibhāsana*^{a)}; cf. TSP, 299a4: *suang bzhiu pa'i don*

7) PVinT 8b5–13a7. The text is edited and translated in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989.

8) TSP 946,11–947,14.

9) Another passage parallel to the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* is also to be found in the comments on TS 2968. Words underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence.

yady evaṁ katham uktam ācāryeṇa lokāyatam adhikṛtya sa khalu..., tad yathādr̥ṣṭasādharmyāt tathāprasādhitam anumeyatām nātipatātīti (=PVin I 36,1–6) *naiṣa doṣaḥ svaparasantānavartinir ananubhūtavaiśayā buddhīr adhikṛtyaitad uktam, anyatrānubhūtavaiśayābhyā iti* (=PVin I 36,7+8) *vacanāt.* TSP 945,16–21

gang yang rjes su dpag par bya ba las ma 'das so zhes bya ba de ni rang dang gzhan gyi rgyud la yod pa nyams su myong ba ma yin pa'i blo'i dbang du byas nas brjed pa yin te | yul nyams su myong ba las ma gtogs pa zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro || PVinT(a) 14,7–11.

Passages from Dharmottara:

- < 1 > ji ltar rjes su dpag pa med na mi 'byung ba'i don mthong bas nges pa tshad ma yin pa bzhin du | mngon sum gyi tshad ma nyid kyang btag nyid don med na mi 'byung bar nges par byed pa las ni ma yin te | 'on kyang snang ba nges par byed pa las yin no || don thob par byed pa ni tshad ma yin la / PVinT(a) 15,2–7
- < 2 > ...| gang gi phyir thob par byed pa'i shes pas don gyi yul du skyes bu gtong bar byed pa'am | skyes bu'i yul du don 'gugs pa ni ma yin te | 'on kyang skyes bu 'jug par byed pa yin no || PVinT(a) 9,9–12
- < 3 > a) 'ga' zhig tu 'jug par byed pa ni ma yin gyi | 'on kyang 'jug pa'i yul ston par byed pa yin no || PVinT(a) 8,15–17
 b) 'di ltar shes pa ni don byed pa'i thabs skyed pas thob par byed pa ni ma yin gyi | 'on kyang 'di la 'jug par byed pa yin la | skyes bu rang nyid 'gro mi nus pa lag pa nas bzung nas 'jug par byed pa yang ma yin gyi | 'on kyang 'jug pa'i yul ma shes par 'jug par mi nus pa la yul nye bar ston par byed pas so || PPar I 218a2f
- < 4 > des na ston par byed pa ni zhen pa yin gyi 'dzin pa ni ma yin no || PPar II 239a5
- < 5 > rnam pa 'di lta bu'i the tshom ni thams cad kyang snang ba'i rang bzhin nges pa'i 'og rol du yin te | de ma nges na yul de la 'dzin pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || PVinT(a) 18,8–11
- < 6 > des na snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir 'jug pa'i yul la tshad ma'i bya ba yongs su rdzogs pa yin no || PVinT(a) 15,10–12
- < 7 > med na mi 'byung bar the tshom za bas ni nam yang mngon sum gyi bya ba la gnod pa ma yin no || PVinT(a) 15,16–18
- < 8 > gang yang snang ba dang 'gal ba'i rnam pa nges pas gnod pa bskyed pa de ni tshad ma'i bya ba ma rdzogs pa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin te | dper na smig rgyu 'dzin pa'i shes pa la chur nges pa 'jug pa bzhin no || PVinT(a) 15,12–16
- < 9 > ...| dung la ser por shes pa dang | nor bu'i 'od la nor bur shes pa dang | shes pa'i rnam pa de lta bu gzhan dag kyang tshad ma ma yin par brjod pa yin no || PVinT(a) 10,5–8
- < 10 > rnam 'grel las | mngon sum gyi gzung ba dang ma gzung ba ni snang ba'i dbang gis yin no zhes (~ PVSV 31,21–23) bshad do || PVinT(a) 18,12–14
- < 11 > de dag (=yul dang dus dang rnam pa) kyang tha dad par byed pa yin pa'i phyir te | gzhan du na tha dad pa med par thal ba'i phyir ro || PVinT(a) 10,11–13
- < 12 > rnam par rtog pa ni snang ba'i dbang gis yul rnam par 'jog pa ma yin te | 'on kyang nges pa'i dbang gis te | rnam 'grel las | nges pa rnams kyis ma nges gang || zhes bstan to || PVinT(a) 19,14–18

I shall discuss here only a few of these parallels. In the text ^{<1>} na ... ucyate.^{1>} Kamalaśīla says: “For, not like inference perception is assumed to be a valid cognition inasmuch as it shows itself as invariably connected with the thing, but inasmuch as it performs an ascertainment (*avasāya*) of the thing appearing (in one’s mind). For (the cognition) which makes those striving for a fulfilment of a purpose (*arthakriyārthīn*) obtain the thing wished (by them) is called valid cognition.” We can find the same statement in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* with slight variations – see no. <1>.

Then Kamalaśīla continues ^{<2>} na ... upadarśayat.^{3>}: “And this (cognition) does not make one obtain (the thing) by dragging the person to the place of the thing or by leading the thing to the place of the person, but by motivating (*pravartayat*) the person. And it does not motivate having grasped that person by the hand, but by indicating the object of activity.” The first of these two humorous formulations also occurs in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* [=no. <2>]. The second is not found in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. But in his longer *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* Dharmottara goes into more detail. The text can be found under no. <3>b). The parallels are indicated by **bold type**. He explains: “For cognition does not make one obtain (the object) by producing the means (**upāya*)

for the fulfilment of a purpose, but it motivates towards that (means).¹⁰⁾ And it does not motivate the person, who himself is not able to go, by grasping him by the hand, but by indicating the object to (the person) who without knowing the object of activity is not able to act.” This is the only sentence in this passage where the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* has a parallel in another text of Dharmottara apart from the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*.

With <⁸yāt tu Kamalaśīla starts a discussion of incorrect perception. He states: “But that (cognition) which arises being overcome by an ascertainment of a form that contradicts the thing appearing (in one’s mind), that is not a valid cognition, like the cognition grasping sunrays which is overcome by an ascertainment of water, for in that case the function of perception as described (above) is absent. And a cognition of yellow with regard to a (white) conch [or] a cognition of a jewel with regard to the radiance of a jewel, that too is an invalid cognition ...” and so on. The same opinion is expressed in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* as can be seen from the parallels nos. <8> and <9>.

Kamalaśīla now continues <¹⁰pratibhāśavaśād ... : “For the grasping and non-grasping of perception takes place by force of the appearance ...” and so on. This statement is presented by Dharmottara as a quotation from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* – see no. <10>. However, he does not quote the text verbatim but paraphrases it.¹¹⁾ Nevertheless, the formulation in both texts shows word for word correspondence except that it is not marked as a quotation in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*.

These instances may suffice to show the close relationship between these two texts.

Let us now have a look at how Kamalaśīla’s explanations are related to the proposition of Śāntarakṣita’s that he is commenting upon. In TS 2972 – *bhrāntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā / prathamasya tathābhāve* (corr.: *tadābhāve*, cf. TS 2854) *pradveṣo bhrāntisambhavāt* // – Śāntarakṣita states that the validity (*pramāṇatā*) of that (later cognition) is intrinsic (*svataḥ*), because a reason for an error is not present and that there is dislike of the thusness of the first (cognition) on account of a possible error.

Kamalaśīla comments that this verse *bhrāntihetor* etc. is a response to another verse beginning with *kasyacit tu yadīsyeta*, that is a verse from Kumāri’s *Brhātṭikā* corresponding to ŚV v. 76 (*pratyakṣaparicchede*),¹²⁾ which is incorporated into the *Tattvasaṅgraha* as verse 2854. Then he introduces his explanations with a *pūrvapakṣa* which says that cognition which is not able to make one obtain the determined thing (*niścītārtha*) because the fact that it is necessarily concomitant (*avinābhāvīva*) with the thing is doubtful, does not obtain (validity) as with inference. For, when there is doubt regarding the necessary concomitance with the thing, validity of inference is not assumed. In the same way (validity) is not obtained in the case of perception.

I will merely summarize the answer to this *pūrvapakṣa*: Kamalaśīla begins by saying that validity in case of perception and inference is ascertained in a different way (<¹na hy ...). Then up to the end of no. <11> he explains perception. He introduces his investigation with the general statement that a cognition which makes one obtain an object is called valid cognition (*tathā hy ... ucyate*.¹³⁾). After that he explains the terms *prāpaka*, *pravartayat* and *upadarśayat*. Then he states that doubt does not obstruct the function of perception and that even when doubt arises the validity of perception is given (<⁵yatra ... *pratyakṣasya*). After this he enumerates different examples for incorrect cognition (<⁸yāt ... *syāt*.¹⁴⁾). In the last passage he explains how validity is obtained in the case of inference and concludes that perception and inference are different.

From this analysis it is obvious that the whole passage beginning with the *pūrvapakṣa* (*namu ca...*) is not a comment of Śāntarakṣita at all but merely a digression. And it is also obvious that the succinct formulations of Kamalaśīla which contain in fact the essential parts of a very complex

10) Cf. NBT 17,3–18,1: *tathā hi na jñānam janayad artham prāpayati, api tv arthe pūruṣam pravartayat prāpayaty artham.*

11) The passage he is referring to reads: *na pratyakṣam kasyacin niścāyakam. tad yam api grhnāti tan na niścāyena. kim tathā. tatpratibhāśena. tan na niścāyāniścāyavaśāt pratyakṣasya grahaṇāgrahane.* PVSV 31, 21–23 (=R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.* Roma 1960).

12) Cf. Erich Frauwallner, “Kumāri’s *Brhātṭikā*,” WZKSÖ 6, 1962 [78–90]: 85f.

theory regarding the definition of valid cognition (*pramāṇalakṣaṇa*), but do not even mention any of the problems that motivated the development of this theory, cannot be taken as the conceptual seed from which this theory sprung, but only as a collection of the most significant and conspicuous fruits from the harvest somebody else must have brought in. The barn in this case is clearly Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, as the parallels show.

Here the relevant textual unit of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* is itself already an attempt to summarize the essentials of this theory for its particular context and therefore recommends itself as a source of information rather than the other works of Dharmottara that deal with this theme. The *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*¹³⁾ and the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*¹⁴⁾ are too short, and the two independent *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā*s¹⁵⁾ that expound the theory and the problems involved in all details are much too long and differentiated. The extant textual volume written by Dharmottara on this subject as compared with the few notes of Kamalaśīla shows who worked the fields for this harvest and who harvested the fruits.

The other possible explanation for the close relationship between the two texts, that both of them copied the text of yet another author, is highly unlikely considering Dharmottara's remarkable efforts in this field.

Thus the assumption that Kamalaśīla based his exposition of the theory of valid cognition on Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* seems inevitable. That he also knew Dharmottara's longer *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* can be seen from the fact that he incorporated the passage <sup>3> *taṃ ... upaḍarśayat*.^{3>} And as the beginning of the shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* is a brief repetition of the main points from the *pramāṇa*-definition of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*¹⁶⁾ and as there is a reference in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (PVinT(a) 12,5) to the shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* (T'shad ma brtag pa)¹⁷⁾ these two works predate the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and Kamalaśīla was probably familiar with the shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā*, too. That he knew the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* has already been shown by Prof. Ichigō. The question of whether he was also familiar with Dharmottara's other works, namely the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, the *Paralokasiddhi* and the *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*, still remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, we thus have a *terminus ante quem*, the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, for at least four works by Dharmottara, among them his most influential work, the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*.

Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* serves as a *terminus post quem*: In his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* Dharmottara refutes a theory on word cognition (*śābda*) held by Śāntarakṣita in the chapter dealing with other valid cognitions (*pramāṇāntarabhāvaaparīkṣā*). As already mentioned above, this was assumed by Prof. Tosaki in his article "Dharmottara and Śāntarakṣita – On Śābdapramāṇa"¹⁸⁾ This assumption, that Śāntarakṣita was known to Dharmottara, can be corroborated by another passage from Dharmottara's shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* where he refutes one of Śāntarakṣita's theories.

Dharmottara begins his shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* with a brief summary of his definition of valid cognition (PPar II 236b3–5) which he has already developed in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.¹³⁾ He states: "Valid cognition is non-disagreeing cognition. Non-disagreeing is making one obtain the indicated thing which is capable of the fulfilment of a purpose."¹⁸⁾ After further explanation he refutes the definitions of the Naiyāyikas (PPar II 236b5f) and of the Lokāyatās (PPar II 236b6–237a1). Then he discusses one other possibility which he introduces with a *pūrvapakṣa* which says: "If it is so then the cognition (**adhigatī*) of that which is capable of the fulfilment of a purpose (**arthakriyāsam-*

13) The *pramāṇalakṣaṇa*-chapter in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* starts from NBT 17,1 to NBT 34,7. The parallels of NBT and PVinT are shown in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989.

14) KṣBhSi 231,7–232,13 (=E. Frauwallner, "Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi. Text und Übersetzung." WZKM 42,217–258).

15) My critical edition with an annotated translation of PPar II will be published in 1991.

16) Cf. E. Steinkellner, "Methodological Remarks on the Constitution of Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist *pramāṇa*-Tradition." WZKS 32, 1988 [103–129]: 114 n. 38; PPar II 263b3–5 corresponds to NBT 17,1; 2f; 3 – 18,2; 19,1ff.

17) The reference is to PPar II 245b4 and the discussion around; cf. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 81 n.40.

18) *tshad ma ni mi shu bar byed pa'i shes pa'o // mi shu bar byed pa ni don byed nus pa'i dngos po* (corr.: *por*) *rab tu bstan pa thob par byed pa'o //* PPar II 236b3.

artha) is the valid cognition.”¹⁹⁾ Dharmottara's answer to this is as follows: “Isn't it the case that (this) cognition is of no use for those striving for a fulfilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfilment of a purpose.” He goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (**upāya*) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (**śāstra*) for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (**prāpaka*) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose (is not to be examined). “For”, as he says, “although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfilment of a purpose exists, it does not have (to be examined) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end” etc. Then he concludes his refutation with the words: “Therefore the non-disagreement (**avisamvāda*) with that which is capable of fulfilling a purpose is the validity (**prāmānya*), but not in case of the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose.”²⁰⁾

From the last two sentences it becomes clear what is meant in the *pūrvapakṣa* by the expression *don bya bar nus pa rtogs pa*, namely the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose (*don bya bar rtogs pa*, **arthakriyājñāna*) or as he calls it in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* and the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā*²¹⁾ “the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears” (*arthakriyānirbhāsa-jñāna*). What he means by “non-disagreement” has already been explained at the beginning of the *Prāmānyaparīkṣā*: *mi slu bar byed pa ni don byed nus pa'i dngos po* (corr.: *por*) *rab tu bstan pa thob par byed pa'o* // PPar II 236b3.

The theory which is refuted here is to be found in TS 2958. There Śāntarakṣita, answering an opponent's question, states: “Agreement (*saṃvāda*) with the real thing (*vastu*) is called validity. And there is no other characteristic of that (agreement) than the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears.” (*ucyate – vastusaṃvādah prāmānyam abhidhīyate / tasya cārthakriyābhāsa-jñānād*²²⁾ *anyan na lakṣaṇam* // TS 2958). If one now looks at Dharmottara's concluding sentence once again where he says that the non-disagreement with the (thing) capable for the fulfilment of a purpose is the validity, but not in case of the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose, it is quite clear that this statement is directed against Śāntarakṣita.²³⁾

19) *de lta na ni 'o na don bya bar nus pa rtogs pa tshad ma yin no zhe na* // PPar II 237a1.

20) *rtogs pas kyang don bya ba don du gnyer ba la mkho ba med pa ma yin nam / de las don bya ba mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro // don bya bar nus pa thob pa'i thabs yin no zhe na / de lta na ni 'o na don bya bar nus pa thob par byed pa nyid rtogs pa dang ldan pa don du gnyer bar bya ba'i phyir de nyid bstan bcas las rnam par dpyad par 'os kyi / don bya bar nus pa rtogs pa ni ma yin no // gang gi phyir don bya bar nus pa'i rtogs pa yod du zin kyang shes pa la don du gnyer bar bya ba'i don du gnyer ba nyid yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ni ma yin gyi'...* *...de'i phyir don bya bar nus pa la mi bstu ba nyid tshad ma yin gyi don bya bar rtogs pa na ni ma yin no* // PPar II 237a1–5.

21) NB I 28,1; PVin I (a) 6,8f.

22) *cārthakriyābhāsa*° corr.: *cārthakriyābhāsa*°; cf. TS, P 5764, 129a2: *de yang don byed par smang ba'i // shes pa las gzhan mtshan nyid can min* //; cf. also the next verse: *arthakriyābhāsaṃ ca jñānam ...* // TS 2959ab].

23) From the commentary on TS 2958–2961 we can see that Kamalaśīla was aware of the fact that Śāntarakṣita's opinion was criticized by Dharmottara. He starts his comment by referring to Dharmakīrti: “...Valid cognition is non-disagreeing cognition”. Then he explains: “And this non-disagreement is only characterized by the fulfilment of a purpose because the purpose of an examination of a valid cognition is that (fulfilment of a purpose). For a sane man looks for a valid or invalid cognition inasmuch as he strives for the fulfilment of a purpose, but not (just) for fun (*vyasanitayā*)” etc. (...*pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam* (PV II lab]) *iti vacanāt. sa (: na) cāvisamvādo 'rthakriyālakṣaṇa eva, tadarthatvād pramāṇacintāyāḥ.* <‘yato 'rthakriyārthi pramāṇam apramāṇam vānvēsatē prekṣāvān’> (<1>=IB 3,11)*, *na vyasanitayā.* TSP 942,17–19). This statement obviously follows the opinion of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's reason for the non-disagreement's being characterized by the fulfilment of a purpose is directed against Dharmottara for in the passage where he criticizes Śāntarakṣita he states: “Isn't it the case that (this) cognition (of the fulfilment of a purpose) is of no use for those striving for a fulfilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfilment of a purpose.” Then Dharmottara goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (**upāya*) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (**śāstra*), for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (**prāpaka*) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose (is not to be examined). “For”, as he says, “although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfilment of a purpose exists, it does not have (to be examined) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end” etc. (for the text see above note 20).

With regard to the first cognition which makes one obtain the object Kamalaśīla comments: “And that cognition which is previous is the cause. And the capability of making one obtain the (object) is called its validity. And this capability cannot be ascertained (*avadhārayitum*) because the effects are not known on account of the absence of

Thus at least the shorter *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* and the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* were written after the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, and these two treatises as well as the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* and the longer *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* before the composition of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*. And if we start out from the assumption that the *Tattvasaṅgraha* was finished before Śāntarakṣita's first journey to Tibet, that is c. 760 A.D., and that Kamalaśīla wrote the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* before his departure for Tibet, that is c. 790 A.D., as Prof. Frauwallner has shown²⁴), the period of Dharmottara's main activity falls between 760 and 790 A.D.

Taking into consideration all these circumstances and assuming a life-span of 60 years I would suggest that Dharmottara lived from approximately 740–800 A.D.

The aim of this paper, of course, was not only to place Dharmottara ten years earlier than the late Prof. Frauwallner did, but to establish dates for Dharmottara in the first place. For Frauwallner's arguments for dating Dharmottara from approximately 750–810 A.D. cannot be considered really conclusive.²⁵) Moreover I also wanted to show that by analyzing and comparing

repeated practice (*anabhyāsa*). Therefore (this capability) is known (*niścīyate*) when the second cognition of the effect arises. Thus the validity of the first (cognition) is said (to be ascertained) by an other (cognition)." (*yat punaḥ pūrvakam tat kāraṇabhūtaṁ jñānam. tasya ca (: na) tatprāpanāśaktiḥ prāmāṇyam ucyate. sā ca śaktir anabhyāsād aviditakāryair avadhārayitum na śakyate ity ullarakāryajñānapravṛtṭyā niścīyate ity prathamasya parataḥ prāmāṇyam ucyate.* TSP 943,13–16)

The difference between Dharmottara on the one hand and Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the other is as follows: For Dharmottara the terms *avisamvāda* and *prāpanāśakti* have the same meaning** and therefore the first cognition which makes one obtain the object is the non-disagreeing, valid cognition (see his explanation in note 18). Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita apply here the concept of non-disagreement only to the later cognition of the effect. It is interesting to notice that Kamalaśīla here strictly follows the opinion of his teacher although he adopts Dharmottara's concept in other passages: *avisamvāditvaṁ cārthakriyāsamarthāthapraṇāśaktiḥ na tu prāpanam eva, pratibandhādisambhāvāt* (TSP 479,23f) and *arthapraṇāśaktiḥ=samvādaḥ=prāmāṇyam* (TSP 569,13f). The last sentence is a comment on *samvādaḥ hi pramāṇatvaṁ sa cārthād ātmalābhataḥ* (TS 1628 cd; cf. PVin I 38,11: *mi shu ba yang de [=don] las btag nyid thob pa'i phyir te l*).

*=Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil 1. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1967.

** ... *ngos po nyid thob par byed pa nyid la tshad mar bshad to // mi shu ba'i rnam grangs yin pa'i phyir tshad ma'i sgra nyid kyes rab tu bstan pa thob par byed pa'i don thob bo //* PPar II 237b3

24) Cf. Frauwallner 1961: 143f.

25) Frauwallner argues as follows: "He is not referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and, therefore, he is obviously junior to them. Moreover, we know from Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅginī* (IV v.498)*, that he came to Kashmir during the reign of king Jayāpīḍa (c. 775–806 A.D.)" (Frauwallner 1961: 147). A further argument for Frauwallner's dating of Dharmottara is that in the *IHan kar*-catalogue, in the section listing logical works (*tarka'i phyogs*), Dharmottara is represented by his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* and his *Paralokasiddhi* – to the latter title Frauwallner adds a question mark. The fact that Dharmottara in spite of the high reputation he enjoyed in Tibet is only mentioned with two works in the catalogue leads Frauwallner to the conclusion that Dharmottara was still alive and at work at the time of the compilation of the catalogue – according to Frauwallner 1961: 146 in 800 or 812 A.D. Hence he assumes Dharmottara to have lived from approximately 750–810 A.D.

The data on account of which Frauwallner comes to this dating are, however, not correct, although he places Dharmottara in the right period. From the fact that only two works of Dharmottara are mentioned in the *IHan kar*-catalogue, as he assumed, we can only infer that his other works were not translated at that time but not that they did not exist. In the meantime Prof. Steinkellner has pointed out that the *Paralokasiddhi* listed in the *IHan kar*-catalogue has to be identified with that by Śubhagupta and not with that by Dharmottara (E. Steinkellner, "Paralokasiddhi-texts." In: *Buddhism and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shōzen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday*. Kyoto 1985 [215–224]: 216ff). In addition to this Prof. Yamaguchi has shown that the date of the compilation of the *IHan kar*-catalogue is 824 A.D. and not 800 or 812 A.D. as Frauwallner assumed (cf. Zuihō Yamaguchi, "Denkaruma' 824 nen seiritsusetsu." [Theory that the *IHan kar*-catalogue was compiled in 824 A.D.]. *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūsho Kiyō* 9, 1985,1–61.). It is correct, of course, that Dharmottara is not referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but as we have seen, some of his works were known to Kamalaśīla.

**susvapne paścimāśāyām lakṣyaṇṇulayaṁ ravēḥ deśe dharmottarācāryaṁ praviṣṭaṁ sādhuamanyata.* (*Rājatarāṅginī* IV v.498) = "When he [=Jayāpīḍa (H.K.)] saw in a dream the sun rising in the west, he approved of Dharmottarācārya having entered the country (of Kāśmīr)" (according to E. Hultzsch, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Rājatarāṅginī. Nr. IV." *Zeitschrift der Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 69, 1915 [271–282]: 279). It was E. Hultzsch who first recognized Dharmottara as a proper name in this verse and not Th. Sicherbatsky (cf. his *Buddhist Logic* vol. I, 41 n. 1) as Naudou maintains (cf. Jean Naudou, *Buddhists of Kāśmīr*. [English translation of the French edition, Paris 1968 (H.K.)] Delhi 1980: 68 n. 88).

**Two dates are accepted with regard to the reign of king Jayāpīḍa, a member of the Karkoṭa dynasty. The first, following Kalhaṇa's chronology and corroborated by Persian sources, is 751–782 A.D. The second, based on Chinese information, is 775–806 A.D. These dates are discussed by N.N. Dasgupta, "On the Date of Lalitāditya Muktipīḍa".

these texts we can reconstruct the literature and theories these authors drew on in composing their treatises, which not only makes it possible for us to establish the direction of the assimilation of certain ideas, as in the case of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla, but also provides us with a fascinating glimpse into the workshop of these philosophers.

LITERATURE

- Frauwallner 1961 Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." *WZKSÖ* 5, 125–148.
 NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā: *Pandita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu].* Ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1971.
- PPar I Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā I (Dharmottara): P, Vol. 138, No. 5746.
 PPar II Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā II (Dharmottara): P, Vol. 138, No. 5747.
 PVinT Prāmāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Chapters I, II (Dharmottara): P, Vol. 136, No. 5727.
 PVinT(a) PVinT 7b6-13a7: *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Prāmāṇaviniścaya. Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Übersetzung von Ernst Steinkellner und Helmut Krasser.* Wien 1989.
- Steinkellner/Krasser 1989 s. PVinT(a)
 TS *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. [2 Vols.] Varanasi 1968.
 TSP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: s. TS
 TSP, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (Tibetan translation): P, Vol. 139, No. 5765.

Indian Culture XIV/1, 1947, 11–19. On Muktāpīḍa, who is the main figure for dating the Karkoṭa dynasty, cf. also Hermann Goetz, "The Conquest of Northern and Western India by Lalitāditya-Muktāpīḍa." Reprinted from the *Journal of the Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society* XXV111/1, 1952, 43ff. in: Hermann Goetz, *Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalaya.* Wiesbaden 1969, 8–22.