On the Relationship between
Dharmottara, Šāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla

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A few years ago Prof. Iwata and Prof. Matsumoto drew our attention to the fact that in respect of the argument that a cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhānīyam) there is a certain relationship between Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṅgrahapaññikā and Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścaseṭṭikā. However, the relationship between the two was not considered in detail. Regarding these two authors Prof. Ichiyō writes that Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795) in his Tattvasaṅgrahapaññikā refutes a theory that is held by Dharmottara in his Nyāyabindutīkā. Concerning Šāntarākṣita (c.725-788) and Dharmottara Prof. Tosaki assumes that Dharmottara in his Pramāṇaviniścaseṭṭikā refutes a theory held by Šāntarākṣita in his Tattvasaṅgraha. In order to provide support for their assumptions I would like to add some additional material.


2) Cf. Shirō Matsumoto, "Sahopalambhānīyam." In: Sūtrashū Kounisū Kounisū Kōryū 12, 1980 [298-265]: 278. The passages referred to are: TSP 693,1-3 ~ PVinT 185b3-5; TSP 693,19-21 ~ PVinT 185b5-7; TSP 692,8 ~ PVinT 186a7-8.

3) Another passage which is similar in both texts is to be found in Hideomi Yaita, "Dharmottara no Pramāṇaviniścaseṭṭikā – Sanskrit dampen to shiyaku." [Dharmottara's Pramāṇavījñanakrama and Translation.] Mikkjōgi Kōmyō 16, 1984 [17-37]; 23ff, no. 5 (TSP 483,14-17 ~ PVinT 44b4-6); cf. also nos. 1, 6, 7, 9, 15.


5) Cf. Masamichi Ichiyō, "Zöron no isu ni kansuru Šāntarākṣita, Kamalaśīla no kennki o megutte." [On Š. and K.'s opinion regarding the aim of a treatise.] In: The Mikkjōgi Kōmyō 13/14, [66-76]: 72ff. The passages he is referring to are: sanyagajñanapāvaṇakṛtyānuśaya prakāramasyābhāṣyayā pravijnayātmaka vicitre NBT 5.1 and yathā pravajñakāraśā sanyagajñanapāvati sarvaparipakṣasvasthitādhiḥ iti (= NB 1.1) yat prajñayam nirvāṇam tat prajñaprajñāyamah kathana, sābhāṣyayā prajñayam... TSP 10,10ff. The following corroborates Ichiyō's assumption that Kamalaśīla also knew the Nyāyabindutīkā. In NBT 76,8f Dharmottara explains: prāpabhān jñānaṃ pramāṇām, prāpaññāsāti ca na kāvākālaśravakālaścetas vīryavādito bhavati, bhājyavādito varṇavādī bhavati. = "A cognition which makes one obtain (the indicated thing) is a valid cognition. And (this) ability of making one obtain is not due to the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant with the thing, for a sprout etc., although it is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc., does not make one obtain (the seed).

The same statement using the same example is to be found in TSP 488,25-489,7: jñāṇam hi viśayaḥkāraḥ upadāyamānaḥ visayam pariśrībhad na sarvyātām icvāḥātāt (i.e. vāśātāt). ayam evaḥpraptānvarṣṭāt jñāṇaḥ, na tva avacchāvātātāt. na hi bājyavādībhāvaḥ avacchātāt, viśaya jñānaṃ eva pratiṣṭhāt syāt = TSP, 489a1: shes pa yul gyi mām par shyur ba na yul yang su gong bzhin pa na la bza dang bcas ba lla bar snang steb la don la shes pa'i shes par byed pa'i byed ba ni di nyid yin gi med na mi lha lung ba tsam ni ma yin no III gang gi shes pa nyid thod mar 'i gnus ba nyan gu la sogs pa sa ban la sogs pa med na mi 'byung bar 'gyur ba ni ma yin no III ="For, inasmuch as cognition when arising in the form of the object (appears) as if it were determining the function (of determining). Only this is the cognition's function of making one obtain the thing, but not the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant (with the thing). For a sprout etc. which is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc. is not endowed with the function of making one obtain the thing,

6) * instead of prāpabhānvarṣṭāt the Tibetan text reads shes par byed pa'i byed ba='jñānakṛtyānuśaya

** the Tibetan translation corroborates the deletion of the second negation na in this sentence.

At the beginning of the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā Dharmottara gives his definition of valid cognition (pramāṇalakṣaṇa). This work is extant only in Tibetan and the section on the pramāṇa-definition consists of five folios. In the Tattvasaṅgahapaṇḍita, in the chapter dealing with intrinsic validity (svatahpramāṇaparitkāśa), Kamalaśila, by commenting on TS 2972(28), also gives a very concise definition of valid cognition some formulations of which are close to those of the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā and the relationship of which we are now going on to examine.(9)

In the following I shall present the relevant textual passages. Words underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence. Words in upright type are wordings occurring in both texts with changes in the form of the words or their syntactical position. Words in italics are wordings which belong only to the respective text.

Passages from Kamalaśila: TSP (ad TS 2972) 946,10–947,14

[prāthamlititor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā]

prathamasya tathābhāvāt pradveso bhṛntisambhāvat || TS 2972]

kasyacit tu yadyesietyāдав (=TS 2854) aha: prāthamlititor (=TS 2972a) iṣyāti.

na na ca yat sandīghdharthavindhavināvānānicidārthapraṇamānārāthyajāttānam, tad anumānavan na prāṇapati. tathā hy anumānāsyārthavindhavānasāya sati na prāṇāyaṃ iṣām, evaṃ pratyakṣe pē na prāṇapati. naīsā dosāḥ; <11 na hy anumānavad arthanāntariyakaṃ ātmanāṃ upadaśāyāt pratyakṣaṃ prāṇāyaṃ iṣām, kim tarhi, pratibhāsaṃdānārāvāsyāṃ kurvata. tathā hy arthakriyārthino bhūntam arthanā prāṇayat pramāṇam ucyate.> <5 na cāṇḍhadesāṃ puruṣaṃ upasarpayad artham & puruṣadesāṃ ānayaṃ tat prāpanaṃ bhavati, api tu puruṣaṃ pravartaya.> <3 tāṃ ca na puruṣaṃ hastena grhītvā pravartaye, kim tarhi, pravrttivigayam upadāsāya.> <4 lac coperdāśāṃ pratibhāsaṃdānārāvāsyāyaṃ nāyaṃ.> <5 yatra ca samāyas tatrāvasāyaṃ pratibhāsaṃdānārāvāsyo ‘sti, tadaṇyāasye tadvimarṣīyogāt.> <4 tātaś cauśīvāntā pratayāsavyāpaśparasāmpāntε yō.> <7 paścāt arthāvinābdhavānasāyaḥ bhavān pratyayāsavyāpāram uparanadhāti.> saty api samācyayade bhavay eva pramāṇam pratyayakṣasya.

<5 yat tu pratibhāsaṃdānadhavippadārthavindhavānasāyaṃ kṛtām uteti naṃ na pramāṇam, yathā maricākṛṣṇāyōjanaṃ jalāsāyaṃ kṛtāṃ, tatra yathoktam pramāṇavyāpārābhāvāḥ.> <5 yac ca śatkhe pitaḥjānāmāni maṇiprabhāyām maniḥjānām, tad apraṇāyam eva, tatra yathārtham pratibhāsaṃdānārāvāsyoy abhāvāḥ.> <5 pratibhāsavaśād dhi pratyayakṣasya grahaṇāgaraṇaḥ, na tu arthāvāsamvādaśāntāḥ, na cātra yathāsāvādvedesāḥkāraṃvāśhāvāntuṣṭatpratibhāsā ‘sti, na vādeśākālaḥ sa eva bhavati, <11 desākāleš api vādusāvādabhedakātvāt, anyathā h bhedaivaśāhāroccedaḥ saḥ.> <11> anumānāsyas tu vicalpamākataḥ satiṃ anumānāsyayatvān na pratibhāsavaśād vāstuvāśayayāvayastāḥ, vāstuvā ‘pratibhāsāt, kim tarhi, niścayasaṃ, yathoktām:

niścayaiḥ |

yan na niścayate rīpam tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham || iti12> (=PV 1 59)

12> =cānāmānyaścātābhāsvaṇyasyāpi nātarāytādārthadānaśabaleścātābhāsvaṇyasya vatsunī pratibhandhāt prāṇāyaṃ iti avāyasaṃ tatrāvānābhāsvanācāyaḥ ‘pekaṃṣiyah, anyathā anumānaṣopatiprāṣyaṃ bhavād iti anumānaḥtālam pratyayakṣam.

a) tathābhāvā corr.: taddhābhāv; cf. "TS 2854.
b) pratibhāsaṃadā corr.: pratibhāsaṃadā; cf. TSP, 299a4: snag bzhin pa'i don


8) TSP 946,10–947,14.

9) Another passage from the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā is also to be found in the comments on TS 2972. Words underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence.

10) pratibhāsaṃadā corr.: pratibhāsaṃadā; cf. TSP, 299a4: snag bzhin pa'i don

11) pratibhāsaṃadā corr.: pratibhāsaṃadā; cf. TSP, 299a4: snag bzhin pa'i don

12) pratibhāsaṃadā corr.: pratibhāsaṃadā; cf. TSP, 299a4: snag bzhin pa'i don
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I shall discuss here only a few of these parallels. In the text "na ... ucyate," Kamalaśīla says: "For, not like inference perception is assumed to be a valid cognition inasmuch as it shows itself as invariably connected with the thing, but inasmuch as it performs an ascertainment (avasāya) of the thing appearing (in one’s mind). For (the cognition) which makes those striving for a fulfilment of a purpose (arthakriyārthān) obtain the thing wished (by them) is called valid cognition." We can find the same statement in the Pramāṇaviniścayatikā with slight variations – see no. 〈1〉.

Then Kamalaśīla continues "na ... upadarśayat."3: "And this cognition does not make one obtain (the thing) by dragging the person to the place of the thing or by leading the thing to the place of the person, but by motivating (pravartayat) the person. And it does not motivate having grasped that person by the hand, but by indicating the object of activity." The first of these two humorous formulations also occurs in the Pramāṇaviniścayatikā [=no. 〈2〉]. The second is not found in the Pramāṇaviniścayatikā. But in his longer Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā Dharmottara goes into more detail. The text can be found under no. 〈3〉b. The parallels are indicated by bold type. He explains: "For cognition does not make one obtain (the object) by producing the means (uspāya)
for the fulfilment of a purpose, but it motivates towards that (means). And it does not motivate the person, who himself is not able to go, by grasping him by the hand, but by indicating the object to (the person) who without knowing the object of activity is not able to act.” This is the only sentence in this passage where the Tattvasaṅgrahapāṇjikā has a parallel in another text of Dharmottara apart from the Pramāṇavinīścayatikā.

With <8>yat tu Kamalaśīla starts a discussion of incorrect perception. He states: “But that (cognition) which arises being overcome by an ascertainment of a form that contradicts the thing appearing (in one’s mind), that is not a valid cognition, like the cognition grasping sunrays which is overcome by an ascertainment of water, for in that case the function of perception as described (above) is absent. And a cognition of yellow with regard to a (white) conch [or] a cognition of a jewel with regard to the radiance of a jewel, that too is an invalid cognition ...” and so on. The same opinion is expressed in the Pramāṇavinīścayatikā as can be seen from the parallels nos. <8> and <9>.

Kamalaśīla now continues <10>pratībhāsavaśād ... : “For the grasping and non-grasping of perception takes place by force of the appearance ...” and so on. This statement is presented by Dharmottara as a quotation from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika – see no. <10>. However, he does not quote the text verbatim but paraphrases it. Nevertheless, the formulation in both texts shows word for word correspondence except that it is not marked as a quotation in the Tattvasaṅgrahapāṇjikā.

These instances may suffice to show the close relationship between these two texts.

Let us now have a look at how Kamalaśīla’s explanations are related to the proposition of Śāntarakṣita’s that he is commenting upon. In TS 2972 – bhrāntihetor asaddhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā / prathamasya tathābhāve (corr.: tadābhāve, cf. TS 2854) pradveso bhrāntisambhāvāt / – Śāntarakṣita states that the validity (pramāṇatā) of that (later cognition) is intrinsic (svatāḥ), because a reason for an error is not present and that there is dislike of the truthness of the first (cognition) on account of a possible error.

Kamalaśīla comments that this verse bhrāntihetor etc. is a response to another verse beginning with kasya cait tu yadisyeta, that is a verse from Kumārila’s Bṛhatīṭkā corresponding to ŚV v. 76 (pratīyakṣapariccheda), which is incorporated into the Tattvasaṅgraha as verse 2854. Then he introduces his explanations with a pūrvapaksā which says that cognition which is not able to make one obtain the determined thing (niścitaśrītha) because the fact that it is necessarily concomitant (aviniścitaśrītvam) with the thing is doubtful, does not obtain (validity) as with inference. For, when there is doubt regarding the necessary concomitance with the thing, validity of inference is not assumed. In the same way (validity) is not obtained in the case of perception.

I will merely summarize the answer to this pūrvapaksā: Kamalaśīla begins by saying that validity in case of perception and inference is ascertained in a different way (<11> na bh ...). Then up to the end of no. <11> he explains perception. He introduces his investigation with the general statement that a cognition which makes one obtain an object is called valid cognition (tathā bh ... ucayante). After that he explains the terms pūrvapaka, pravartaya and upadarśaya. Then he states that doubt does not obstruct the function of perception and that even when doubt arises the validity of perception is given (<11>yatra ... pratīyākṣasya). After this he enumerates different examples for incorrect cognition (<11>yat ... svāt). In the last passage he explains how validity is obtained in the case of inference and concludes that perception and inference are different.

From this analysis it is obvious that the whole passage beginning with the pūrvapaksā (namu ca...) is not a comment of Śāntarakṣita at all but merely a digression. And it is also obvious that the succinct formulations of Kamalaśīla which contain in fact the essential parts of a very complex

11) The passage he is referring to reads: na pratīyakṣam kaścitvam niścitaśrītvam, tad yam api ghnañānti tu na niścitaśrītvam, kim tathā.
theory regarding the definition of valid cognition (pramāṇalaksana), but do not even mention any of the problems that motivated the development of this theory, cannot be taken as the conceptual seed from which this theory sprung, but only as a collection of the most significant and conspicuous fruits from the harvest somebody else must have brought in. The barn in this case is clearly Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, as the parallels show.

Here the relevant textual unit of the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā is itself already an attempt to summarize the essentials of this theory for its particular context and therefore recommends itself as a source of information rather than the other works of Dharmottara that deal with this theme. The Nyāyabinduṭṭīkā and the Kṣanabhangasiddhi are too short, and the two independent Prāmāṇyaparīkṣāsī that expound the theory and the problems involved in all details are much too long and differentiated. The extant textual volume written by Dharmottara on this subject as compared with the few notes of Kamalaśīla shows who worked the fields for this harvest and who harvested the fruits.

The other possible explanation for the close relationship between the two texts, that both of them copied the text of yet another author, is highly unlikely considering Dharmottara’s remarkable efforts in this field.

Thus the assumption that Kamalaśīla based his exposition of the theory of valid cognition on Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā seems inevitable. That he also knew Dharmottara’s longer Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā can be seen from the fact that he incorporated the passage <3tam ... upadarśayat. And as the beginning of the shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā is a brief repetition of the main points from the pramāṇa-definition of the Nyāyabinduṭṭīkā and as there is a reference in the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Pvīnt(a) 12,5) to the shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā (Tshad ma brag pa) these two works predate the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā and Kamalaśīla was probably familiar with the shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā, too. That he knew the Nyāyabinduṭṭīkā has already been shown by Prof. Ichigō. The question of whether he was also familiar with Dharmottara’s other works, namely the Kṣanabhangasiddhi, the Paralokasiddhi and the Apohaprajkaraṇa, still remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, we thus have a terminus ante quem, the Tatvasaṅgrahapāṇijīka, for at least four works by Dharmottara, among them his most influential work, the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā.

Sāntarakṣita’s Tatvasaṅgraha serves as a terminus post quem: In his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā Dharmottara refutes a theory on word cognition (śabda) held by Sāntarakṣita in the chapter dealing with other valid cognitions (pramāṇāntarabhāva-parīkṣā). As already mentioned above, this was assumed by Prof. Tosaki in his article “Dharmottara and Sāntarakṣita – On Śādelapramāṇa”.

This assumption, that Sāntarakṣita was known to Dharmottara, can be corroborated by another passage from Dharmottara’s shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā where he refutes one of Sāntarakṣita’s theories.

Dharmottara begins his shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā with a brief summary of his definition of valid cognition (PPar II 236b3–5) which he has already developed in his Nyāyabinduṭṭīkā. He states: “Valid cognition is non-disagreeing cognition. Non-disagreeing is making one obtain the indicated thing which is capable of the fulfillment of a purpose.” After further explanation he refutes the definitions of the Naiyāyikas (PPar II 236b5f) and of the Lokāyatās (PPar II 236b6–237a1). Then he discusses one other possibility which he introduces with a pūrvapakṣa which says: “It is so then the cognition (*adhitigati) of that which is capable of the fulfillment of a purpose (*arthakriyāsam-

13 The pramāṇalakṣaṇa-chapter in the Nyāyabinduṭṭīkā starts from NBīt 17,1 to NBīt 34,7. The parallels of NBīt and Pvīnt are shown in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989.
15 My critical edition with an annotated translation of PPar II will be published in 1991.
17 The reference is to PPar II 245b4 and the discussion around; cf. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 81 n.40.
18 tshad na mi sti sti bar byed pa'i'i sti shes pa'o // mi sti bar byed pa ni don byed na pa'i dagos po (corr.; por) rab tu bstan pa thob par byed pa'o // PPar II 236b3.
artha) is the valid cognition." Dharmottara's answer to this is as follows: "Isn't it the case that (this) cognition is of no use for those striving for a fulfillment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfillment of a purpose." He goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (*upāya) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*śāstra) for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (*prāpta) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose (is not to be examined). "For", as he says, "although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfillment of a purpose exists, it does not have (to be examined) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end" etc. Then he concludes his refutation with the words: "Therefore the non-disagreement (*avisamvāda) with that which is capable of fulfilling a purpose is the validity (*prāmāṇya), but not in case of the cognition of the fulfillment of the purpose."209

From the last two sentences it becomes clear what is meant in the pūrvapakṣa by the expression don bya bar nus pa vtags pa, namely the cognition of the fulfillment of the purpose (don bya bar vtags pa, *arthakriyājitāna) or as he calls it in the Nyāyabinduti and the Pramāṇaviniścaya (21) "the cognition in which the fulfillment of the purpose appears" (arthakriyāyāhābhisājasāna). What he means by "non-disagreement" has already been explained at the beginning of the Pramāṇya-pārīkṣā: mi slu bar byed pa ni don byed nus pa'i dangos pa (corr.: por) rab tu bsten pa thab par byed pa'i Il PPar II 236b3.

The theory which is refuted here is to be found in TS 2958. There Sāntarakṣita, answering an opponent's question, states: "Agreement (samvāda) with the real thing (vastu) is called validity. And there is no other characteristic of that (agreement) than the cognition in which the fulfillment of the purpose appears." (ucyate - vastasamvādah prāmāṇyaṃ abhidhvaya itaṃ cārttukriyāyāhābhisājaṃ ānanyā na laksanam / Il TS 2958). If one now looks at Dharmottara's concluding sentence once again where he says that the non-disagreement with the (thing) capable for the fulfillment of a purpose is the validity, but not in case of the cognition of the fulfillment of the purpose, it is quite clear that this statement is directed against Sāntarakṣita.223

19) de la na ni 'o na don bya bar nus pa vtags pa tshad ma yin no che ne Il PPar II 237a1.
20) vtags pas kyang don bya ba don du guyer ba la mtho ba med pa ma yin nam l de las don bya ba ni 'gyur pa'i phyir so Il don bya bar nus pa thod pa'i thabs yin no che ne l de la na ni 'o na don bya bar nus pa thod pa byed pa byed pa nyid stogs pa dang idan pa don du guyer bar bya ba'c phyur de nyid bzhin bcos las rnu ma par ding par 'in kyi l don bya bar nus pa vtags pa ni ma yin ma Il qung gi phyur don bya bar nus pa'i vtags pa yod du sín kyang skes pa la don du guyer bar bya ba'c don du guyer da rig byas sn 'rtsogs pa' phyir ni ma yin gi..."...de'i phyir don bya bar nus pa la ni blo ba nyid tshad ma yin gi don bya bar vtags pa ma ni ma yin ma Il PPar II 237a1-5.
21) NBT 28.1; P'Vin'ta 6.4; M'K.
22) cārtukriyāhitān corr.: cārtukriyāhitāna; cf. TS, P 5704, 129a2: de yang don byed par sngag ba'i Il de las bzhin mthun yin de min Il; cf. also the next verse: cārtukriyāhitādhibhāga eva jñānam ... Il TS 2959ab.
23) From the commentary on TS 2958-2961 we can see that Kamalāśa was aware of the fact that Sāntarakṣita's opinion was criticized by Dharmottara. He starts his comment by referring to Dharmakirti: "...Valid cognition is non-disagreeing cognition." Then he explains: "And this non-disagreement is only characterized by the fulfillment of a purpose because the purpose of an examination of a valid cognition is that (fulfillment of a purpose). For a same man looks for a valid or invalid cognition inasmuch as he strives for the fulfillment of a purpose, but not (just) for fun (rvasanātāyān) etc. (...)pramāṇam avisamvādā jñānam (PV II lab) iti vastrāt, su (s.: ma) cāsamvādā cārtukriyākāya eva, tathāvatād pramāṇo nibhāya sa pramāṇaṃ vātavyate prakāśītion... (<1> = IlB 3.11)" ma rvasanātān. TSP 942.17-19). This statement obviously follows the opinion of Sāntarakṣita and Kamalāśa's reason for the non-disagreement's being characterized by the fulfillment of a purpose is directed against Dharmottara for in the passage where he criticizes Sāntarakṣita he states: "Isn't it the case that (this) cognition (of the fulfillment of a purpose) is of no use for those striving for a fulfillment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfillment of a purpose." Then Dharmottara goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (*upāya) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*śāstra), for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (*prāpta) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose (is not to be examined). "For", as he says, "although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfillment of a purpose exists, it does not have (to be examined) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end" etc. (for the text see above note 20).

With regard to the first cognition which makes one obtain the object Kamalāśa comments: "And that cognition which is previous is the cause. And the capability of making one obtain the (object) is called its validity. And this capability cannot be ascertained (ovvulhānyātum) because the effects are not known on account of the absence of
Thus at least the shorter Pāramāya-parikṣa and the Pramāṇaviniścayatikā were written after the Tattvasaṅgraha, and these two treatises as well as the Nyāyabinduṭikā and the longer Pāramāya-parikṣa before the composition of the Tattvasaṅgraha pāṇḍikā. And if we start out from the assumption that the Tattvasaṅgraha was finished before Śāntarakṣita’s first journey to Tibet, that is c. 760 A.D., and that Kamalaśīla wrote the Tattvasaṅgraha pāṇḍikā before his departure for Tibet, that is c. 790 A.D., as Prof. Frauwallner has shown, the period of Dharmottara’s main activity falls between 760 and 790 A.D.

Taking into consideration all these circumstances and assuming a life-span of 60 years I would suggest that Dharmottara lived from approximately 740–800 A.D.

The aim of this paper, of course, was not only to place Dharmottara ten years earlier than the late Prof. Frauwallner did, but to establish dates for Dharmottara in the first place. For Frauwallner’s arguments for dating Dharmottara from approximately 750–810 A.D. cannot be considered really conclusive. Moreover I also wanted to show that by analyzing and comparing

repeated practice (anāthyāna). Therefore (this capability) is known (nityayate) when the second cognition of the effect arises. Thus the validity of the first (cognition) is said (to be ascertained) by an other (cognition).”

The difference between Dharmottara on the one hand and Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the other is as follows:

For Dharmottara the terms avidyāśādā and prāpapakāti have the same meaning\* and therefore the first cognition which makes one obtain the object is the non-disagreeing, valid cognition (see his explanation in note 18). Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita apply here the concept of non-disagreement only to the later cognition of the effect. It is interesting to notice that Kamalaśīla here strictly follows the opinion of his teacher although he adopts Dharmottara’s concept in other passages: avidyāśādā = cātvarkañcanaśādāprāpapakāti na tu prāpam eva, pratibuddhaśūndahāvī (TSP 470,23f) and cātvarkañcanaśādā = suvidāya = prāpam (TSP 569,13f). The last sentence is a comment on sāmayado hi pramāṇayam sa cātvarkañcanaśādā (1626 ed; cf. PVin 1 38,11: mi su bu yong de = dkon bu bsdug n熠 thob pa’i phib yile t’i).


\* ... dus pa niny thob pa byed pa niny la tshad mar bshad to l loos bu’i ram grang yin pa’i phib tshad wu’i sgra n熠 kis ral tu bstan pa thob pa byed pa’i don thob bo // PPar 11 237b3


25) Frauwallner argues as follows: “He is not referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and, therefore, he is obviously junior to them. Moreover, we know from Kalhana’s Rājātārāngini (IV v.498)*, that he came to Kashmir during the reign of king Jayāpīḍa (c. 775–806 A.D.)* (Frauwallner 1961: 147). A further argument for Frauwallner’s dating of Dharmottara is that in the HIm kar-catalogue, in the section listing logical works (loka’s phogga), Dharmottara is represented by his Nyāyabinduṭikā and his Paralokasiddhi – to the latter title Frauwallner adds a question mark. The fact that Dharmottara in spite of the high reputation he enjoyed in Tibet is only mentioned with two works in the catalogue leads Frauwallner to the conclusion that Dharmottara was still alive and at work at the time of the compilation of the catalogue – according to Frauwallner 1961: 146 in 800 or 812 A.D. Hence he assumes Dharmottara to have lived from approximately 790–810 A.D.

The data on account of which Frauwallner comes to this dating are, however, not correct, although he places Dharmottara in the right period. From the fact that only two works of Dharmottara are mentioned in the HIm kar-catalogue, as he assumed, we can only infer that his other works were not translated at that time but that they did not exist. In the meantime Prof. Steinkellner has pointed out that the Paralokasiddhi listed in the HIm kar-catalogue has to be identified with Bhābha-gupta and not with that by Dharmottara (E. Steinkellner, “Paralokasiddhi-texts.” In: Buddhaṃ and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shōzō Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthay. Kyoto 1985 [215–224]: 216f). In addition to this Prof. Yamaguchi has shown that the date of the compilation of the HIm kar-catalogue is 824 A.D. and not 800 or 812 A.D. as Frauwallner assumed (cf. Zuihō Yamaguchi, “Denkaruma 824 nen seiritsu” [Theory that the HIm kar-catalogue was compiled in 824 A.D.]. Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūsha Kiyō 9, 1985,1–61). It is correct, of course, that Dharmottara is not referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but we have seen, some of his works were known to Kamalaśīla.


**Two dates are accepted with regard to the reign of king Jayāpīḍa, a member of the Karkota dynasty. The first, following Kalhana’s chronology and corroborated by Persian sources, is 751–782 A.D. The second, based on Chinese information, is 775–806 A.D. These dates are recognized by N.N. Dasgupta, “On the Date of Ladāḍītya Mukutṭipāḍa.”
these texts we can reconstruct the literature and theories these authors drew on in composing their treatises, which not only makes it possible for us to establish the direction of the assimilation of certain ideas, as in the case of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla, but also provides us with a fascinating glimpse into the workshop of these philosophers.

LITERATURE

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NBT


PPar I


PPar II


PVinṬ


PVinṬ(a)


Steinkellner/Krasser 1989

s. PVinṬ(a)


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Tattvasanagrāha-pañjikā: s. TS

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