

ON THE TERM *ANTAḤSAMJÑĀ*-*

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1. In most cases¹ of *antaḥsamjñā*-, and the term usually occurs in the plural, what is referred to are plants, i. e. the vegetable kingdom. As a rule it is explained by commentators by *sthāvara*, “stationary [living beings]”², or similar expressions. Far more important than their testimony is, however, the evidence found in some of the *mūla* texts themselves. What I have in mind is a passage like Gaut.Dh.S. 1. 8. 2 (= 8. 2) : *tayoḥ³ caturvidhasya manuṣyajāta-syāntaḥsamjñānām calanapatanasarpaṇānām āyattam jīvanam* — where it is easily seen that the term *antaḥsamjñā*- cannot (in spite of its position)⁴ but refer to that which alone makes this enumeration of the various species of (earthly) living beings a complete one, viz. plants—; but it is Manusmṛti 1.49 which is particularly relevant :

tamasā bahurūpeṇa veṣṭitāḥ karmahetunā /
antaḥsamjñā bhavanty ete sukhaduḥkhasamanvitāḥ //

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1. One of the exceptions is perhaps Siddhāntatattvaviveka (an astronomical work, on which cf. D. Pingree, *Jyotiḥśāstra. Astral and Mathematical Literature [A History of Indian Literature Vol. IV Fasc. 4]*, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 29 and 31), 9.15. However, the meaning given is “that which is called end” so that, if this is correct, the word intended can only be *antaśamjñā*, formed like *viśvaśamjñā*- (used by Vātsyā Varadaguru in his *Tattvanirṇaya*), “bearing the name Viśva”. For another exception see § 2.4.2.

2. I prefer this rendering to the usual “immovable”, as plants, too, move, i. e. possess (even) various types of movements; and this has been observed by the ancient Indians themselves (cf. § 2.4.3).

3. The pronoun refers back to the two subjects (*rājā brāhmaṇas ca bahufrutah*) of the first sūtra.

4. The order of enumeration could be taken to form a descending climax if *antaḥsamjñānām* had final position. The position the term in fact has can nevertheless be accounted for, viz. by assuming that, after mentioning the four *varṇas*, the author’s attention was directed first to those kinds of living beings on which the life of all the others, including men, depended, viz. plants.

— where *ete* is (contrary to the assertion of the Larger Petrograd Dictionary)⁵ clearly used in place of the expression *udbhijjāḥ sthāvarāḥ* of verse 46, as explicitly stated also by not a few of the commentators.⁶ The exact meaning of the term together with the reason why it is applied to plants, however, seem to call for a closer study which I now propose to undertake by examining the relevant passages.

2. 1. In his Bhāṣya on BS 1. 3. 25 Śaṅkara puts forward among others the argument : *śāstram hy aviśeṣappravṛttam api manuṣyān evādhikaroti śaktatvād arthitvād aparyudastatvād upanayanādisāstrāc ca ...*, rendered by Thibaut⁷ thus : “ For the śāstra, although propounded without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality entitle men⁸ only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the śāstra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the śāstra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on.”⁹ On the first¹⁰ reason adduced by Śaṅkara Vācaspatimiśra remarks in his Bhāmatī : *tiryagdevarṣiṇām aśuktānām adhikāram nivartayati*, “ [by this reason Śaṅkara] rejects that animals, gods and ṛṣis are entitled [to act according to the precepts of the śāstra] as they cannot [do so].” What he says on the second reason is : *antaḥsamjñānām mokṣamāññānām ca kāmyeṣu karmasu adhikāram niṣedhati*, “ [by this reason] he denies that plants and men who wish to free themselves [from saṃsāra] are entitled [to act according to the precepts of the śāstra or, as regards the latter to perform] optional ritual acts.”

Since animals are already excluded by the first reason, there can hardly arise any uncertainty as regards the expression *antaḥsamjñā* : it is evidently meant to

5. Where it is said to refer to “ animals and plants ”. This error was, however, corrected in the Shorter Petrograd Dictionary.

6. I fail to understand why Nandana explains *ete* by *sthāvar ādayaḥ*, i. e. what he had in view when adding *ādi*, especially as he declares the whole verse to be an argument concerning plants only; cf. his statement : *sthāvarāṇām ca itanyopālambhāt* (read : *ca itanyānupa*° ?) *karmaphalānubhavaḥ katham ity āśaṅkyā pariharati — t a m a s e ti* /. Perhaps what he intended to say was something like *sthāvarā vṛkṣādayaḥ*.

7. The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Commentary of Śaṅkara, Pt. I (SBE XXXIV), Oxford 1890, p. 197.

8. In a footnote, Thibaut explains (following Vācaspatimiśra) : “ I. e. men belonging to the three upper castes ”.

9. In a further footnote, Thibaut gives a detailed explanation of all four reasons; but what he says about the second reason cannot pass for a convincing interpretation, and that not only because he does not even mention plants.

10. It should be noted that following Vācaspatimiśra's order of explication this would be the second one.

exclude plants. Therefore nothing is learnt from Amalānanda's¹¹ explanation : *antaḥsamjñānām sthāvarāṇām mokṣam icchatām cānarthitvāt karmaṇy anadhikārah* : One even feels left in the lurch by him as he does not touch upon the question why plants, too, are said to be *anarthin*, and whether it is with regard to their lack of desire that they are referred to as *antaḥsamjñā*. And his help is in fact not necessary to realize that the *anarthitva*, though common to both, the *mokṣamāna* as well as the plants, must have quite different a cause in each of the two cases. Whereas those men who wish to attain *mokṣa* are evidently not desirous of the results of the optional actions enjoined by the *śāstra*¹² because they take them not to be instrumental to attaining liberation, plants had but to be included in this group because they lack this desire by their very nature, and perhaps because they even lack any desire at all. Therefore one cannot help gathering the impression that it is precisely because of this 'defect' that instead of one of the usual expressions for "plants" the rather rare term *antaḥsamjñā* is used here by Vācaspatimiśra. Yet, this passage alone does not permit to turn a vague assumption into certainty, and thus stresses the necessity of taking a closer look at the term as such.

2.2 Of some help, however, might be what Haradatta says in commenting on Gaut.Dh.S. 1. 8. 2 (quoted above, § 1) :¹³ *yeṣām antaḥ samjñā na bahis te tathoktāḥ*, "those [living beings] are called thus whose consciousness is internal [and] not external." It stands to reason that *samjñā*, forming the last member of the bahuvrīhi compound, is used in a meaning well attested already in the early Upaniṣads and canonical Buddhist texts, namely "consciousness", reaching, in principle, from identifying perception over the formation of concepts to the naming of the objects perceived. Now, if Haradatta is right, and there can hardly be any doubt that he is, in explaining that the prior member is in implicit opposition to the contrary concept *bahiḥ*, it becomes at once clear that the two adverbs of place cannot by any means refer to the one substratum of consciousness as such. On the contrary, the distinction between beings whose consciousness "is *antaḥ*" and others whose consciousness "is *bahiḥ*" is meaningful only if the reference is to the manner of its manifestation or if what is meant is that the consciousness is confined to the interior, i. e. the body only or perhaps a part of it,

11. The edition used is : The Brahmasūtra Sāṅkara Bhāṣya with the Commentaries Bhāmātī, Kalpataru and Parimala ... ed. ... by M. M. Anantakriṣṇa Śāstrī, Bombay² (NSP) 1938.

12. As regards the obligatory sacrifices, Amalānanda remarks : *kāmyagrahaṇena suddhyartham nityeṣu kasyacin mumukṣor asty adhikāra iti śucayati* /.

13. Maskarin (cf. Gautamadharmasūtram Maskaribhāṣyopetam, ed. by L. Srinivasa-charya, Mysore 1917) explains *antaḥsamjñāḥ* by *anulomapratiṇomāḥ* — and *calanāḥ* by *sthāvarāḥ*, and thus gives the impression of being not quite sane.

and that it does not extend beyond these limits. Haradatta himself does not, however, elaborate on this point; all he deems necessary is to adduce (the transition being formed by *tathā ca manuḥ*) the verse of the Manusmṛti quoted above (§ 1).¹⁴

2. 3. This verse is, no doubt, very instructive in more than one respect (as will be seen later also); but clearly it does not render much assistance in achieving a more accurate understanding of the term under discussion: As it is not formulated explicitly enough, all one can say is that it seems to intimate that the state of being *antaḥsamjñā* has to do with "being wrapped by *tamas*."¹⁵ Besides, *tamas* is not a specific quality of plants alone as is also shown by Manu 12. 42-44.¹⁶ In the context of this Smṛti alone verse 1. 49 does not allow to draw any definite conclusion, so that it is useful to go through the various commentaries¹⁷ on this verse and see if their authors have to contribute anything which might solve the problem.

2. 4. Disregarding Rāghavānanda¹⁸ whose explanation would lead us off the track, attention may be turned first to Maṇirāma's paraphrase *antaścāitanyā* (*bhavanti*), which is not however apt to arrest it as thus the only information given is that *samjñā* is semantically equivalent to *caitanya*.¹⁹ For Medhātithi, however, quite the opposite holds good: His comment on *antaḥsamjñā(h)*²⁰ is very detailed and highly instructive: *saṃjñā buddhis tullīngasya bahirvihāravyāhārādeḥ kāryasya ceṣṭārūpasyābhāvād antaḥsamjñā ucyante | anyathāntar eva sarvaḥ puruṣaś cetayate | atha vā yathā manusyāḥ kaṇṭakādītodaṃ cetayante naivam sthāvarāḥ | te hi mahāntaṃ pratodaṃ paraśuvidāraṇādi duḥkhasaṃjñāyām apekṣante | yathā svāpamadamūrcchāvasthāgatāḥ prāṇinaḥ ||*. "saṃjñā [as second member of the compound] means cognition; in as much as the effect indicative of it (i. e. cognition), such as the outward behaviour, the uttering

14. The edition used by me, viz. Kashi SS 172, Varanasi 1960, contains a printing error (*ceṣṭitāḥ* instead of *veṣṭitāḥ*).

15. The relation with the theory of rebirth, which is foreshadowed as it were by the attribute *karmaheturā* of *tamasā* at 1. 49, is made explicit by the next verse (*etadantāḥ lu gatayo ...*).

16. On these verses cf. L. Rocher's contribution "Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmaśāstras" to the volume: *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, ed. by W. D. O'Flaherty, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London 1980, p 63 ff.

17. This is now easily possible thanks to the edition of the Manu-Smṛti with Nine Commentaries by J. H. Dave (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan) — which gives, however, cause for a number of serious complaints and thus falls definitely short of a true edition.

18. I don't keep to the (probable) historical sequence of these commentators.

19. Nandana's explanation is of the same type (cf. fn. 6 above).

20. Note the double sandhi of the pratika *antaḥsamjñāti*.

of (articulate or inarticulate) sounds, etc., which consisting [in general] in [some form] of activity is absent [in plants], they are said to 'have inner consciousness'. [This should be the meaning of the predicate *antaḥsamjñā*(*h*); for] otherwise [this term would be meaningless as] every individual soul has consciousness only within [himself]. Or else [the meaning may be that] plants do not experience [pain etc.] in the same way as men [do], e.g. the pricking of a thorn, etc. For with regard to experiencing pain they (i.e. plants) stand in need of a massive stroke such as splitting with an axe, etc., just as [other] living beings (i.e. men and animals) when in the state of sleep, intoxication or swoon."

Kullūka does not mention the second of these explanations, but confines himself to reformulating the first one : *ete vṛkṣādayas... antaścāitanyā bhavanti / yady api sarve cāntar eva cetayante tathāpi bahirvyāpārādikāryavirahāt tathā vyapadiśyante* /; but to this he adds the remark : *triguṇārabdhātve 'pi caiṣāṃ tamoguṇabāhulyāt tathā vyapadeśaḥ*, "and they are given this designation because of the [relatively] larger quantity of the constituent *tamas* [they contain], although they are [like all the other phenomena] made up of the three *guṇas*."

Govindarāja, on the other hand, does not deem it necessary to give but the gist of Medhātithi's first explanation : *yady api sarva eva kvacid antar eva cetayante tathāpy ete samjñākāryasya vyavahārādeḥ bahirabhāvād antaḥsamjñā ucyante* //.

The only commentator to pull out of the line is Sarvajñanārāyaṇa who equates *antaḥsamjñā*(*h*) with *mānasajñānamātravantaḥ*, "being characterized by mental perception only", yet not without continuing : *tad evoktaṃ s u k h e t i*, "precisely this is stated [in the verse itself, viz. by the attribute 'connected'] with pleasure [and pain]".

2. 4. 1. To start with this latter explanation : It has to be admitted that in terms of certain Indian theories of cognition pleasure and pain are indeed specific objects of mental perception; the concept of *mānasapratyakṣa* has most probably even been developed to account precisely for this particular kind of perception. Though some philosophers maintain the existence of a special type of mental perception which is not conditioned by a preceding sense-perception,²¹ the idea that certain living beings are by their very nature unable to have but mental perception is, as far as I can see, not mentioned in expositions of and discussions about (*mānasa-*)*pratyakṣa*. Nevertheless, this idea is attested to in a philoso-

21. Cf. M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception* (HOS 47), Cambridge, Mass. 1968, p. 94.

phical text also, and in a passage at that in which also the term *antaḥsamjñā* occurs, viz. in Vijñānabhikṣu's Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya on 5. 121,²² translated thus by Ballantyne²³ : " It has been stated ", viz. in sūtra 5. 111, " that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a *Body*, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external : Aph. 121.²⁴ Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body] : trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case.—There is no necessity that that only should be a Body in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, etc., which have internal consciousness; because, ' as in the former case ', meaning the putrescence already mentioned ", viz. in sūtra 5. 114, " of the Bodies of men, etc., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [i. e. the living soul], even in the same way do withering, etc., take place in the Bodies of trees, etc., also; such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture ", viz. ChU 6. 11. 2 : " ' But if the *jīva* leaves one of its branches, that branch withers ', etc. ".

Vijñānabhikṣu²⁵ is clearly of the opinion that plants cannot be denied a body in spite of the fact that they do not possess the faculty of perceiving external objects. He does not, however, adduce any reason for this view nor give

22. The original reads thus (according to Garbe's edition, The Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya [HOS Vol. II], Cambridge, Mass.² 1943, p. 145) [the orthography is modernized] :

udbhijjan sarīram astīty uktam. tatra bāhyabuddhyabhāvāc charīratvaṃ nāstīti nāstikākṣepam apākaroti : na bāhyabuddhīnyamo vṛkṣagulmalatauṣadhivanaspatitrṇavīrudhādīnām api bhoktrbhogāyatanatvaṃ pūrvavat // 121

na bāhyajñānaṃ yatrāsti tad eva sarīram iti niyamah; kiṃ tu vṛkṣādīnām antaḥsamjñānām api bhoktrbhogāyatanatvaṃ sarīratvaṃ mantavyam; yataḥ pūrvavat pūrvokto yo bhoktrādhiṣṭhānaṃ vindā manusyādīsarīrasya pūtibhāvis, tadvad eva vṛkṣādīsarīreṣo api suskatādīkām ity arthah tathā ca śrutih 'asya yad ekāṃ sākḥāṃ jīvo jahāti, atha sā susyati' ityādir iti.

23. The Sāṃkhya Aphorisms of Kapila with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries, London³ 1885, p. 411 f.

24. In spite of Udaya Vira Shāstrī's endeavours (Proceedings and Transactions of the AIOC II, Lahore 1931, pp. 855-882; cf. also his book Sāṃkhyadarśan kā itihās, Dillī sam. 2007. p. 70 ff.) to prove its antiquity, the Sāṃkhyasūtra is a late work; cf. H. D. Sharmā's " Introduction " (p. 21 ff.) to G. Jha's translation of The Tattva Kaumudī (Poona OS 10). Poona² 1957 as well as H. Jacobi, ZDMG 62 (1908), p. 593 = Kleine Schriften, hrg. v. B. Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 677.

25. This holds good for the author of the Sāṃkhyasūtra, too, as well as for those commentators who differ from Vijñānabhikṣu in taking *na bāhyabuddhīnyamāḥ* as a separate sūtra which they also interpret in another way.

any additional explication which might render it a bit clearer.²⁶ And, to be sure, such an elucidation is direly needed to understand the conception of living beings which as "sites of ... experience" have internal consciousness, but no "knowledge of the external" or, so one should say with regard to Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, which feel pain and rarely²⁷ also pleasure,²⁸ but are nevertheless not able to perceive the object of these sensations unless it has quite penetrated their bodies. Vijñānabhikṣu's silence is embarrassing, especially because it is not at all easy to take his part and to try to account for the conception of a consciousness in living beings to whom the external world is absolutely uncognizable and hence non-existent. But even if this question, and others likewise which come to one's mind, could be answered satisfactorily, one would still wonder why at all plants came to be denoted by the term *antaḥsamjñā* in the first place. For, according to Vijñānabhikṣu what is characteristic of plants is that they have only an internal consciousness — correctly explained by Sarvajñanārāyaṇa by equating it to *mānasajñāna mātṛa vant* —, in contradistinction to other living beings which in addition possess "knowledge of the external" : What is most important on the level of meaning is hence not expressed by the term itself ! And the assumption that is implied is not only highly improbable, for the matter is too important, but also philologically not justifiable since Patañjali's dictum²⁹ *santy ekapadāṇy apy avadhāraṇāni*, exemplified by a particular type of tatpuruṣa compounds, refers to an expression in so far as it is used as a predicate and cannot therefore be easily drawn upon³⁰ to explain *antaḥsamjñā* in so far as it is virtually a technical term.

The conclusion one cannot but arrive at is hence that Vijñānabhikṣu's testimony, interesting though it is for the history of the term *antaḥsamjñā* and above all for the history of the ideas about vegetal life in India, is not the right clue to the precise meaning of the term. It was either deliberately reinterpreted

26. That for which a reason is adduced instead is the *āyatanatva*, i. e. the view that plants are also seats of experience, — a view of palpable importance for the theory of transmigration.

27. Cf. Medhātithi on Manu 1. 49 : *sattvasyāpi tatra bhāvāt kasyāmeid avasthāyām sukhaleśam api bhūñjate* and the more precise explanation of Kullūka's : *sattvasyāpi bhāvāt kaddācit sukhaleśo 'pi jaladharaṇitajalasamparkād eśam jāyate*.

28. Sarvajñanārāyaṇa remarks that by *sukha* (*duḥkhasamanvitāḥ*) "knowledge, etc." also are implied (... *s u k h e t i* / *upalakṣaṇam jñānāder apy etat*); he might have in view Nyāya S. 1. 1. 10 or Vaiśeṣika S. 3. 1. 4 (together with 1) when speaking of *jñānā d i*.

29. Mahābhāṣya ed. by F. Kielhorn, Poona 1892, I 6. 23.

30. Besides, if this dictum were nevertheless to apply to *antaḥsamjñā*, the meaning resulting couldn't but be "that the consciousness of which is only internal" — which is still different from what Sarvajñanārāyaṇa says, apart from the fact that *antaḥ* could then hardly be explained.

by him — so as to agree with his conception of plants as destitute of any *bāhya-jñāna* — or simply misconstrued. As for Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, he cannot, for all that is known about his date,³¹ be dependent on the author of the *Pravacanabhāṣya*;³² yet, there is some likelihood that his interpretation of the term as used in *Manu* 1. 49 was inspired by the conception of plants as it is also attested to by *Vijñānabhikṣu*. Nevertheless it cannot be definitely excluded that Sarvajñanārāyaṇa was only drawing on his own imagination.

Medhātithi's second explanation (cf. § 2. 4 above), on the other hand, cannot be denied a certain plausibility, irrespective of whether he intended a loose comparison, a partial likeness or a complete agreement when paralleling plants and men in a state of sleep, intoxication or faint (but cf. infra the end of § 2. 4. 2). In any case, the phrase *yathā svāpamadamūrcchāvasthāgataḥ prāṇinaḥ* renders assistance in clarifying the peculiar concept of plants on which this explanation is based: They do not totally lack the faculty of perception or rather of feeling pain, and this has significance for man's attitude towards plants; but it needs a massive stimulus to reach, as it were, their consciousness, just as a man sleeping can only be shaken out of his sleep, etc., or a woman fainted cannot be treated with a gentle hand in order to regain consciousness. What Medhātithi wants to intimate is obviously that the plants' sense(s) is/are by its/their very nature particularly dull,³³ and this naturally involves that plants are able to feel only a strong pain: A tree, e. g., feels the pain of being cut with an axe, but it is insensitive to the pain of a leaf being torn off or a twig being broken.

It is most probably by mere coincidence that in this case, too, a parallel in a philosophical text has to be taken note of, viz. Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvavaiśārādī*. In the course of his (rather strange)³⁴ interpretation of *YS* 1. 10 (*abhāvapratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*) — and of the *Bhāṣya* on it —, he states this sūtra to mean: *jāgratsvapnavṛttinām abhāvas, tasya pratyayah kāraṇam buddhisattvācchādakam tamas, tad evā lambanam viśayo yasyāḥ sā*

31. According to P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. 1, Poona² 1975, p. 1190, he "is earlier than 1400 A. D."

32. Who is said to have flourished in 1575 (cf. K. H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I: Bibliography, Delhi / Varanasi / Patna² 1983, p. 373).

33. This could be compared to Udayana's view that the internal awareness of plants is extremely faint (*atimandāntaḥsamjñatā*); cf. Kiraṇāvali, ed. by J. N. Jetly, (HOS 154) Baroda 1971, p. 39 and W. Halbfass contribution "Karma, *Apūrva* and 'Natural' Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of *Samsāra*" in: *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, ed. by W. D. O'Flaherty, Berkely / Los Angeles / London 1980, p. 280. — All that Vardhamāna has to say on the expression *atimandāntaḥsamjñatā* is: *antaḥ samjñā jñānam*.

34. Quite in contradistinction to that of the author of the *Pātāñjalayogaśāstra-vivaraṇa*.

ṭathoktā vṛttir nidrā; but he also adds the remark : *buddhisattve hi triguṇe yadā sattvarajasī abhibhūya samastakaraṇāvarakam āvirasti tamas tadā buddher viṣayākārapariṇāmābhāvād udbhūtata momayīm buddhim avabudhyamānaḥ puruṣaḥ suṣupto 'ntaḥsaṃjñā ity ucyate*, “ for, when — in as much as the *buddhisattva*³⁵ consists of the three constituents — *tamas* by prepondering over *sattva* and *rajas* becomes manifest as covering and darkening all the organs [including the internal one], then because the *buddhi* does not [any longer] undergo changes into the form of an object [of cognition], the *puruṣa*, aware of the *buddhi* which [then] consists of intensified *tamas*, is said to be in deep sleep, inwardly conscious.”

Woods, however, was apparently of the opinion that the scope of *ity ucyate* reaches at least as far back as *buddhisattve hi ...*; for he renders it³⁶ by a separate sentence and as follows : “ Thus it is explained.” But I don't see why the expression *ity ucyate*, very common as it is, should be used here in a sense other than that it normally has. The only disagreement possible here is that whether *ity* is to be construed with (*a*) *ntaḥsaṃjñā* only or with *suṣupto*, too. A further difficulty consists in that *puruṣaḥ*, qualified by ... *buddhim avabudhyamānaḥ*, can only be taken to mean “ soul ” — as conceived of in Sāṃkhya and Yoga —, whereas one hesitates to assume that it is the soul again which is said to be *suṣupto 'ntaḥsaṃjñā*(*h*); for in view of what is taught in YS 1. 10 itself, viz. that sleep is one of the types of functions of the *citta*, one would rather expect the expression *suṣupto 'ntaḥsaṃjñā* to refer to a subject like “ person ” or “ man ” which could likewise be denoted by *puruṣa*. In reality, however, these two ideas are not incompatible with each other, as the *cetana* subject of experience according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga is nothing but what is technically called *puruṣa*.

Yet, there is still more to be observed here. Vācaspatimīśra asserts that the *puruṣa* when in deep sleep “ is called *antaḥsaṃjñā* ”. One wonders which texts he could possibly have had in mind. To be sure, he can't intend everyday language; for there is no corroborating evidence at all to be found in the vast Sanskrit literature.³⁷ Obviously, authors of Yoga texts younger than the Tattva-vaiśārādī asked themselves the same question, i. e. those who more or less heavily depended on Vācaspatimīśra; and the answer they give is that it is the *śruti* which is referred to, though they fail to identify it. Thus Vijñānabhikṣu says by way

35. This term is based on the idea that of the three guṇas it is *sattva* that quantitatively exceeds the other two in constituting the *tattva* variously called *buddhi* or *mahant*, etc.

36. The Yoga-System of Patañjali (HOS 17), repr. Delhi / Varanasi / Patna 1966, P. 30.

37. As far as it has been taken into account by the Poona Dictionary Project,

of paraphrasing Vācaspati:³⁸ *tām ca nidrākhyām vṛttim avabudhyamānaḥ puruṣaḥ suṣuptasthāno 'ntaḥprajñā iti śrutibhir ucyata iti.*³⁹ Nāgeśa has, according to one edition,⁴⁰ *puruṣo 'ntaḥsamjñā ucyate,*⁴¹ but, according to another,⁴² *puruṣaḥ suṣuptasthāno 'ntaḥprajñā ity ucyate śrutibhiḥ;* and Bāla Rāmodāsīna remarks,⁴³ apart from recording, for the Tattvavaiśārādī, a variant reading *antaḥprajñāḥ* instead of *antaḥsamjñāḥ*, that the *śrautaḥ pāṭhaḥ* is *suṣuptasthāno 'ntaḥprajñāḥ*. The term *antaḥsamjñā* does indeed remind one of the very similar expression *antaḥprajñā*, attested to first in the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad;⁴⁴ however, it is used there in the context of a description of dream-sleep (*svapna*)⁴⁵ — whereas the contrary *bahihprajñā*⁴⁶ refers to the state of waking (*jāgarita*) and there the *ātman* “when in deep sleep” (*suṣuptasthāna*) is given quite different qualifications also.⁴⁷ Everything is put aright, as it were, by Nārāyaṇatīrtha by stating in his Yogasiddhāntacandrikā: *tām (i. e. vṛttim) eva tatra jñānaḥ puruṣaḥ svapna ivāntaḥprajñā 'pi dṛgdrśyabhedābhimānābhāvāt suṣuptisthāna ekībhūta ity ucyate śrutibhiḥ.*⁴⁸ Yet, this doesn't help much to solve the problem posed by the Vaiśārādī, and as there is no critical edition of the latter text I don't see any chance for the time being that it could be solved independently.

Now, this is certainly an interesting theory of (deep) sleep, but evidently also a very special one, as it is framed almost exclusively with the help of peculiar tenets of Sāṃkhya-Yoga: To be in deep sleep means to be in a state where the functions of the *citta* are confined to having just *tamas*, “darkness”, as object.

38. Viz. in his Yogavārttika on YS 1. 10; cf. e. g. the edition and translation by T. S. Rukmani, Vol. I, Delhi 1981, p. 80.

39. Rukmani (o. c., p. 81) takes the *śrutī* passage — on which she, however, adds the remark “not traced” — to mean: “He who stays in deep sleep knows eqṛ truth”, — which reminds me of the German saying “Den Seinen gibt's der Herr im Schlaf” (“fortune favours fools”).

40. Viz. Yogasūtram (Kashi SS 83), Benares 1930, p. 14.

41. This is also what Pt. Baladewa Miśra says in his Yogapradīpikā (Kashi SS 85, Benares 1931, p. 6).

42. Viz. The Yogasūtras of Patañjali ... (Bombay S and PS 46), Poona 1917, p. 229.

43. Viz. in his edition of the Yogadarśana ..., Benares 1911, p. 33, fn. 3.

44. Viz. 4 and 7. For later references cf. G. A. Jacob, A Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā, repr. Delhi / Varanasi / Patna 1963, s. v.

45. Note that Vyomaśiva (Vyomavati, ChSS 61, Benares 1930, p. 549 f.) gives two definitions of dream, but that according to both it is a particular mental perception.

46. Cf. 3: *jāgaritasthāno bahihprajñāḥ ... sthūlabhug vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah.*

47. Viz. 5: ... *suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana eva ...*

48. Cf. Yogadarśana ... ed. by Pt. Ratna Gopala Bhatta, (ChSS 35), Benares 1911, p. 11.

Since man in this state is, as is expressly stated,⁴⁹ not conceived of as being deprived of each and every form of consciousness, it might seem not unreasonable — in spite of the textual problem discussed in the foregoing — that he, or the *puruṣa*, is said to “have internal consciousness” then.

However, this theory is not easily connected with Medhātithi's second explanation of the term *antaḥsamjñā*. For this latter conspicuously lacks not only any reference to *antaḥsamjñā* being used to characterize man when in deep sleep, but also all signs of an influence exercised on it by the / a Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory of deep sleep. To do justice to it, it is sufficient to assume that the state of sleep, intoxication and swoon are pointed out primarily with the aim of exemplifying and thereby explaining the peculiar insensitiveness of plants by analogizing it to these states of consciousness, well known to every human being if not from his own experience then from observations in others.

The central question, still to be examined, is hence if Medhātithi by his second explanation as it stands really accomplishes what he claims to do, viz. to offer a convincing explanation for *antaḥsamjñā* being used to refer to plants. The answer can, I think, only be to the negative. For, plants are always, i. e. by their very nature, *antaḥsamjñā*, while man's consciousness is turned inwards or drawn back to the interior only when he is in deep sleep or a similar state; and this implies that the term was coined to characterize man when in one of these states and only thereafter transferred to plants also. For there is by far greater likelihood that what led to its coining in the first place was a particular state, palpably different from the ‘normal’ one, of that species of living beings to which consciousness in the fullest sense is intrinsic; and the idea of an “interior”, to which consciousness can be drawn back or (intermittently) confined, is ultimately intelligible only if it was conceived with regard to man. There is, however, not only no evidence whatsoever to warrant such an assumption, but the very nature of the available references also clearly points in the opposite direction, as has already been stated. It is hence not at all surprising that later commentators on the *Manusmṛiti* do not even mention Medhātithi's explanation.

2. 4. 3. That this explanation can thus be safely ruled out, does not, of course, mean that his first one has by necessity to be accepted. But it has in any case to be examined next and should certainly be given full attention before I venture on my own on an altogether new explanation.

The concluding sentence, viz. *anyathāntar eva sarvaḥ puruṣaś cetayate*, refers clearly, though not necessarily intentionally, to a peculiar element of the

49. Cf. e. g. Vācaspatimiśra's remark (l. c.): *kasmāt punar niruddhakaivalyayor iva vṛttyabhāva eva na nidrety ata āha — sā ca saṃprabodhe pratyavamarśāt ... pratyaya viśeṣaḥ* /.

Sāṃkhya theory of cognition; for, the argument brought forward here is that if *antaḥsaṃjñā* were to be taken literally it could not form a specific property of plants only because each and every *puruṣa*, whatever the kind of body he is endowed with, human, animal, vegetable or divine, etc., cognizes only internally, i. e. that which is presented to him by the *buddhi* as the last and highest element of the corresponding "inner organ" (*antaḥkaraṇa*). In fact, the phrase *puruṣaś cetayate*⁵⁰ is found quite often, especially in philosophical texts of the Jains; it forms part of a string by which the process of perception, etc., is described as a whole and which runs thus:⁵¹ *indriyāṇy artham ālocayanti ahaṃkāro 'bhimanyate manaḥ saṃkalpayati buddhir adhyavasyati puruṣaś cetayate*. An exact parallel has not yet been discovered in any of the (few) extant Sāṃkhya texts; but a passage in the *Māṭharavṛtti*⁵² is almost identical. Although it cannot hence be taken for granted that it must be a quotation in the strict sense of the word, there cannot be the least doubt that it represents a doctrinally and terminologically⁵³ faithful formulation of the corresponding Sāṃkhya tenet. The fact that Medhātithi expresses himself in a manner which strongly resembles the final clause of this 'quotation' does not, however, by itself indicate that his first explanation is *in toto* Sāṃkhyistic. Rather the Sāṃkhya theory of cognition might have simply come first to his mind; and it should also be noted in this connection that the main part of his explanation ('*saṃjñā*' *buddhis ... ucyante*) does not contain any element which would point to a Sāṃkhya background; for *buddhi* is not a specific term of this school of thought and can easily be accounted for as meant to specify the meaning *saṃjñā* has as second member of the compound under discussion, without having to borrow it from any of the philosophical authors. On the other hand, there is also nothing which would definitely exclude any relation with the Sāṃkhya.

Medhātithi's first explanation is attractive in that it starts from the assumption that *antaḥ*^o is implicitly opposed to *bahih*^o.⁵⁴ But is it really absolutely flawless? Or is it not rather equally open to criticism in as much as what is ultimately meant by calling plants *antaḥsaṃjñā* is according to it that

50. The 'variant' *buddhyadhyavasitam artham puruṣaś cetayate*, met with e. g. *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* (cf. fn. 57) p. 303 f., is to all appearances a partial reformulation by Anantavīrya. For further references see *Nyāyakumudacandra* (ed. by Mahendrakumar Nyāyāśāstri, 2 vols., Bombay 1931/41), p. 190, fn. 2.

51. Cf. *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* of Śrī Anantavīryācārya...ed. by Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain (Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Kāśī), 2 Vols., Varanasi 1959, pp. 99, 225 and 580.

52. Viz. on Sāṃkhyakārikā 36. — Cf. also *Sāṃkhyasaptatīkṛti* (V₁), ed. by E. A. Solomon, Ahmedabad 1973, p. 47.

53. Cf. e. g. *Yuktidīpikā*, (ed. R. C. Pandey Delhi/Varanasi/Patna 1967), p. 116, lines 22 and 29.

54. Cf. § 2.4.3.

they “ withhold consciousness, do not reveal consciousness ”;⁵⁵ and was it not just this feature which appeared disadvantageous to Medhātithi, persuading him to look for an alternative explanation ?

Indeed, the first explanation is tantamount to stating that plants are said to have internal cognition or consciousness because they don’t reveal its usual signs in form of outward activity, i. e. the well-known corollaries of perception, etc. Nevertheless, Medhātithi cannot be reproached, like Sarvajñanārāyaṇa (§ 2. 4. 1 above), for expecting his readers to believe that precisely that which forms a or the characteristic property of plants is not denoted by the term *antaḥsamjñā* as explained by him. For the matter is different in the present case : To call plants *antaḥsamjñā* because they lack the corporeal reactions usually caused by cognitive or other mental acts, is not at all strange; on the contrary, it cannot but be styled as absolutely plausible provided it is realized that plants were given this name precisely to prevent the misunderstanding that they lacked not only external but also internal consciousness and cognition. That is to say: If this assumption is correct, then the term *antaḥsamjñā* was coined in order to emphasize that, as for plants, appearances are — once more — deceptive, i. e. that in spite of the marked absence of the outward activity one is accustomed to observe in other living beings which possess the faculty of perception, like animals and men, plants too nevertheless do have internal consciousness. It should not also be forgotten that plants do not have the sense organs by which men and higher animals gather information about the external world — so that they are e. g. able to flee from their enemies. The assurance that plants are nevertheless *antaḥsamjñā* is quite meaningful in this regard, too.

However, unlike the expression *antaḥprajñā* of the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad, the term *antaḥsamjñā* would not then stand in an implicit opposition to a **bahiḥsamjñā*, formed in analogy with *bahiḥprajñā* of the Upaniṣad, but the opposition would be that stated most clearly by Kullūka (see § 2. 4 above), viz. thus : *bahirvyāpārādikāryavirahāt tathā vyupadiśyante*.

Hence one will consider the possibility — which perhaps Haradatta (cf. § 2. 2 above) had in view — that *samjñā* is used in the term *antaḥsamjñā* as a synecdoche, meaning — not “ cognition ” or “ consciousness ”, but — their effect(s). This interpretation, of course, implies the idea that plants, too, react in principle just as animals, etc., to sensory stimuli, but that these reactions are not observable externally. The term would in this case be meant to explain the absence of what Kullūka aptly calls *bahirvyāpāra* in plants, and thus stand

55. This is the English translation of the meaning as given in the Shorter Petrograd Dictionary.

in clear opposition to the contrary concept **bahihśamjñā* which is perhaps yet unattested only by mere coincidence. On the other hand, one has a feeling of uneasiness that the effects which are not observed externally should have been assigned to the interior of the plants. And this feeling becomes even stronger if the fact is taken into account that the meaning "sign, token, signal, gesture", rightly assigned to *saṃjñā* by the dictionaries cannot be derived from the original semantic nucleus "agreement", "something regarding which there is an agreement among men". Yet, for want of further arguments I should like to leave the question undecided for the moment as to which of the two alternative interpretations of what forms Medhātithi's first explanation is ultimately to be preferred. But to avoid misunderstandings, it should perhaps be stressed that both can, I think, be regarded as satisfactory in the sense that there is after all no need to start searching for another explanation, i. e. one not suggested or even directly given by Indian authors themselves.

Both alternative interpretations, however, call for further inspection, though now in other regards. It is not necessary to take a circuitous route — such as e. g. starting from Medhātithi's equating *saṃjñā* to *buddhi* and connecting this with Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana's dictum⁵⁶ *arthagrahaṇam buddhiḥ* — in order to come to the conviction that the term *antaḥsaṃjñā* does not in either case exclude the possibility of plants having the faculty of perception, but on the contrary clearly presupposes it.⁵⁷ It is therefore by no means unjustified that one of the commentators on Manu 1. 49⁵⁸ explicitly refers to a passage which in fact has to be regarded as the *locus classicus* in ancient Indian literature for the theory of the plants' possessing all the five senses, viz. Mahābhārata (Poona) XII 177. Space being limited, attention cannot be focussed here⁵⁹ on this part of the Bhṛgu-Bharadvāja-saṃvāda; one remarkable feature of it, however, has to be mentioned briefly: In this passage arguments are adduced which are meant to defend the thesis that plants, too, are made up of the five elements and are accordingly also endowed with a sense of touch, a sense of sight, etc. There

56. Quoted e. g. Siddhivinīṣcayāṭikā (cf. fn. 51), p. 494 and correctly identified there as "from Nyāyabhāṣya on NS 3. 2. 46", viz. the sūtra or grahaṇavākya: *hetūpādānāt pratisēddhavyābhyānujñā*. In the Nyāyakumudacandra (cf. fn. 30), p. 182, the reading is... *buddhiś cetanā*.

57. Cf. what has been stated above (§ 2. 2) on the meaning of *saṃjñā*.

58. Viz. Rāghavānanda — whose explanations are interesting also because of the *śruti* passages referred to by him.

59. Some of the problems posed by this text have been briefly discussed by me in an article entitled "Bemerkungen zu einigen von Naturbeobachtung zeugenden Textstellen und den Problemen ihrer Interpretation" to be published in: Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 13/14 (1987) [= W. Rau Felicitation Volume]; with the remaining problems — using additional material — I shall deal in another article still under preparation.

is hence every likelihood that the central idea expressed here was not conceived for the first time by the author of this passage himself, but dates back to an earlier, perhaps even much earlier period.

The arguments of Mbh. XII 177 consist largely in inferences, explicit or implicit, their common characteristic being that observations of certain properties of plants, like e. g. the movements of climbers, serve as empirical starting point to prove e. g. the existence of a sense of sight. Nevertheless this Epic text is not in contradiction with what has been stated to be the true motive for giving plants the name *antaḥsaṃjñā*. For this term does not imply, as becomes clear now only, that plants absolutely lack every activity revealing their consciousness; to account for the formation of this concept it is sufficient to assume that it is based on the observation that the plants' signs of consciousness, of the faculty of perception are distinctly different from those of other living beings, and are in addition relatively poor⁶⁰ and perhaps also difficult to detect.

There would not seem to be anything hence to preclude the assumption that the term *antaḥsaṃjñā* and Mbh. XII 177 are closely related to each other, at least in the sense that they belong to the same sphere of ideas about vegetal life and its peculiarities. Nevertheless it has to be noted that the term as such does not, of course, necessarily presuppose that plants are taken to have five senses; theoretically at least it could be compatible with a concept like that of the plants' *ekendriyatva* propounded by the Jainas.⁶¹ As regards this particular theory, however, Tattvārthasūtra 2. 25 (*saṃjñīnaḥ sīmanaskāḥ*) in connection with 2. 12⁶² — to give just one example — seems to speak against the assumption that the term *antaḥsaṃjñā* is of Jaina origin, because together with other living beings and the elements plants too are included in the group of *asaṃjñīns*.⁶³

60. It is, of course, at its highest in man as is already stated in AiĀ 2. 3. 2. 5 : *puruṣe tv evāvistarām ātmā, sa hi prajñānena saṃpannatamo vijñātam vadati...*

61. Cf. J. C Sidkar's article "The Fabric of Life as Conceived in Jaina Biology" in : Sambodhi 3 (1974), pp. 1-10.

62. Cf. also the Bhāṣya and later commentaries on both. In passing it may be noted that *asaṃjñīnaḥ* is explained by Simhasūri (Dvādaśāranayacakram...Pt. I, ed. by Muni Jambūvijayajī, Bhavnagar 1966, p. 182, l. 20) to comprise accordingly : *prthivy-ab-agni-vāyu-vanaspati-dvitrīcatūrindriya-amanaskapañcendriyāḥ*.

63. This term does not, however, mean that the beings denoted by it lack consciousness. Padmanath S. Jaini (The Jaina Path of Purification, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1979, pp. 110 and 337) renders it by "totally instinctive" and "unable to reason about spiritual matters". The second of these translations does not do justice to the fact that the category of *saṃjñīns* includes certain species of higher animals, too; and the first one is likewise not satisfactory because the Indians did not know the concept of "instinct" and

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It should not, however, be forgotten that there is significant evidence^{63a} to warrant the conclusion that the idea of the plants' *ekendriyatva* was not specifically Jinistic, but rather a popular belief (though apparently in a comparatively early period of Indian thought). Therefore, one has equally to reckon with the possibility that it is this belief, be it popular or not, of which the term *antaḥsaṃjñā* is but another expression, and that the connection with Mbh. XII 177 is, if at all existent, only a very distant one.

2. 5. Returning now to the verse Manu 1. 49 itself, one question already raised above (§ 2. 3) has to be taken up again for closer examination, viz. whether the conception of the "internal consciousness" of plants is perhaps directly connected with the idea of their "being wrapped by *tamas*" (*tamasā ... veṣṭitāh*). It is admittedly rather tempting to answer it in the positive; on second thoughts, however, one cannot help realizing that this assumption entails further problems: There is no evidence in extant Sāṃkhya texts that upholders of this school of thought were of the opinion that the various types of living beings differ from each other with regard to the morphological or structural distribution of the three *guṇas* in their organism; instead what is repeatedly, almost stereotypically recurred to is the well-known idea of the relative quantitative difference among the constituents of which a living being — or one of its organs —⁶⁴ is considered to be made.

Yet, the gaze should not, of course, be directed only to Sāṃkhya texts in the strict sense of the word. It might well be rewarding to have a look at other sources, too. It is the Purāṇas which then come first to one's mind. For, it has been shown by P. Hacker in his meticulous study⁶⁵ of the composition of the first Adhyāya of the Manusmṛti, that its compiler to a large extent used materials found in the Purāṇas also, viz. an account of cosmogony which was

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above all because the remark in the Bhāṣya on TS 2. 25 *anyathā hy āhārābhaya-maitthuma-parigrahasaṃjñābhiḥ sarva eva jīvāḥ saṃjñāna itī* clearly shows that "volitional and involuntary/unintentional mental acts" are considered to be common to all living beings. W. Schubring (Die Lehre der Jainas..., Berlin/Leipzig 1935, p. 101 = § 71) equates *saṃjñā* to "Vernunft".

63a. Cf. L. Schmithausen's article "Buddhismus und Nature" (in : Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, hrg. v. R. Panikkar u. W. Strolz, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1985), p. 123 and fn. 152.

64. See e. g. fn. 35.

65. "Two Accounts of Cosmogony" in : Jñānamuktāvali, Commemoration Volume in Honour of Joh. Nobel, ed. by C. Vogel, New Delhi 1963, pp. 77-91 (= Kleine Schriften, hrg. v. L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 389-403). This article — as well as that mentioned in fn. 69 — has been ignored by J. W. Laine ("The Creation Account in Manusmṛti" in : ABORI Vol. LXII (1981), pp. 157-168, much to his own disadvantage.

called Text-Group I by W. Kirfel.⁶⁶ But it is not in the text of this Group — of which Hacker states that it “is very similar to one part of the cosmogony given” in the *Manusmṛti* —, but in Text-Group II, subdivided by Kirfel in the varieties II A⁶⁷ and II B⁶⁸ — both of which have been (partially) analysed by Hacker in a later article of his⁶⁹ —, that relevant material is found.

In describing the first of the various *sargas*, viz. the so-called *mukhya-sarga*, i. e. the “creation of plants as the main / most important⁷⁰ beings”, this *sarga*⁷¹ is said among others to be *saṃvṛtas tamasā* (II A) / *tamasā āvṛtaḥ* (II B), and to be besides *bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ* (II A and B) and *niḥsaṃjñā eva* (II A and B). Though the verb used here is different, the idea expressed is clearly the same, viz. that of being enveloped or wrapped. And this idea is met with again in the cosmogony as a whole, and not infrequently: In the portion analysed by Hacker it is e. g. stated that⁷² “as a seed is enveloped (*āvṛta*) by its rind, in the same way (the *Mahān* is enveloped) by the Main Principle”, or that⁷³ “it” (i. e. the threefold Egoity (*ahamkāra*)) “was enveloped (*āvṛta*) by the *Mahān* as the *Mahān* was by the Main (Principle)”, etc. One cannot but recall the definition of the *guṇa tamas* as it is given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa,⁷⁴ viz. *guru varaṇakam*, and hence realize that not only that part of the Text-Groups II A and B studied comprehensively by Hacker is based on an “Instructional Tract, composed in the third century A. D. at the latest, which expounded the evolution of the world according to a form of the Sāṃkhya system”,⁷⁵ but obviously also the later part which I am myself referring to here. This assump-

66. Das Purāṇa Pañcalakṣaṇa. Versuch einer Textgeschichte. Leiden 1927, p. 2 ff.

67. O. c., p. 6 ff.; the chapter drawn upon by me is found on p. 20 ff.

68. O. c., p. 44 ff.; the portion drawn upon by me is found on p. 62 ff.

69. “The Sāṃkhyization of the Emanation Doctrine Shown in a Critical Analysis of Texts” in: WZKSO 5 (1961), pp. 75-112 (= Kleine Schriften... pp. 167-212).

70. In my opinion this *sarga* is given the designation *mukhya*- because plants are correctly recognized in it to form the basis of and necessary precondition for all other life-forms. I deem it quite improbable that *mukhya* here should have the meaning “first, initial”, and this not only because the *sarga* in question is the first one of the so-called *prajāśargas* only — in its turn preceded by the creation of other entities —, but also in view of the designations given the other *sargas* (cf. fn. 76) likewise subsumed under *prajāśarga*—. Note that to Udayana (cf. the article of Halbfass' mentioned in fn. 33, l. c.) this appears to be nothing but (*jaṅgama*-)*upakaraṇatva*, and that this expression indicates a considerable change in the evaluation of vegetal life.

71. I. e. that which is created, the plants (*naga*).

72. Quoted from the article mentioned in fn. 69, p. 101 (= 193).

73. Ibidem, p. 103 (= 195).

74. Viz. in Kārikā 13 of his work.

75. Quoted from his article (cf. fn. 69), p. 111 (= 203).

tion is further corroborated⁷⁶ e. g. by the expression *aprakāśa*; for this cannot, of course, be dislinked from *prakāśaka*, one of the two predicates in Īśvara's definition of *sattva*.

The idea of being wrapped by *tamas* is retained or, to use a more neutral expression, met with also in the verse of the Manusmṛiti under discussion. even in the light of the parallels cited above from Purāṇic texts⁷⁷ it is quite difficult to decide whether *veṣṭitāḥ* in Manu 1. 49 and its various synonyms in the Purāṇas are to be understood literally or figuratively. Originally the meaning expressed will certainly have been that of being shrouded in darkness, at least this is an assumption which suggests itself most naturally. The explanations which e. g. the author of the Yuktidīpikā gives of the characterization of the three guṇas⁷⁸ show, however, that expressions like *varaṇaka* were taken at his time to have a much more general and abstract meaning. As for the Purāṇic passages and Manu 1. 49,⁷⁹ one cannot hence evade the question if the verbs under discussion are still used in their original concrete meaning or else already in the figurative one derived from it.⁸⁰ In order to answer it, if this is at all possible, it would, no doubt, be necessary to enter into a careful examination of these text portions in their entirety, but this cannot be undertaken here. Yet it may be noted in passing that the comparison with a seed which is "enveloped by its rind" and that met with in the passages referred to by me, viz. with "a seed in a pot/jar" (*bījakumbhivat*) certainly point in the direction of the literal meaning; this argument is not, however, absolutely cogent as the author could equally well have intended to illustrate the abstract conception with a concrete everyday example. In any case, the Purāṇic parallels show that, for Manu 1. 49, one should avoid to fall a prey to what seems quite plausible at first sight, viz. that the ideas of "being wrapped by *tamas*" and that of "having internal consciousness" naturally correspond to each other. But one should not, of course, exclude the possibility that this correspondence is only secondarily establi-

76. In this connection it should also be noted that the designations of the various *sargas* of the Purāṇic texts, viz. *mukhya*-, *tiryak*-, *ūrdhva*-, and *avāk-srotas*, are met with also Yuktidīpikā (cf. fn. 53), p. 127, and that this fact need not necessarily be taken — as it was by Frauwallner (cf. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 333) — to reveal an "influence" exercised by "religious sects" on the Sāṃkhya.

77. Bhāgavata P. 3. 10. 19 (where plants are characterized as *utsrotasas tamahprāyā antahsparśā viśeṣiṇāḥ*) differs considerably from the texts collated by Kirfel and cannot be discussed here.

78. See p. 60, l. 12 ff.

79. With which one has to compare Viṣṇudharmottara P. 1. 128. 22 ab: *antahsams-jñā bhavanti ete ghoreṇa tamasā vṛtāḥ*.

80. Note that in both cases the two alternative interpretations (of what forms Mōhātithi's first explanation) can still be sustained.

shed at Manu 1. 49; for it may well be that *antaḥsaṃjñā* by itself expresses no more than that the consciousness of plants is entirely limited by their 'body', and that later a need was felt to give a reason for this limitation, and to this end one resorted to the notion of "being wrapped by *tamas*".

Proceeding to the next element of the description of the *mukhyasarga*, viz. *bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ*, one is, of course, confronted with a similar semantic problem; but I think, it can be plausibly held, without swerving too far from the truth, that this predicate refers, at least among other things, to the lack of internal intellectual faculties and of the concomitant external activity, — a lack by which plants are in fact distinguished from animals and men in a manner conspicuous enough to impress itself on any observer's mind and to make him believe that this is their essential characteristic mark.

The definiens *niḥsaṃjñāḥ* finally does not therefore seem to be totally independent, i. e. to add something completely new to the description of this *sarga*; rather it is to clarify what is meant by at least a part of the preceding predicate (*bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ*), namely that plants do not have consciousness, that they are, in spite of having a *buddhi*,⁸¹ by their very nature "dull" (*stabdha*),⁸² as is expressly stated. Admittedly the expressions *niḥsaṃjñā* and *stabdha* are by themselves not unequivocal — so as to exclude the possibility that not a total lack, but only an extreme reduction is meant —; but in view of what is said of the animals (*tiryaksrotas*), though in Text Group II B only, viz. that "they are all *antaḥ prakāśās ... āvṛtās ca bahiḥ*", there is a great likelihood that the interpretation just given does in fact meet the intention of the author.

Considering Hacker's findings,⁸³ viz. that the cosmogony handed down in the first Adhyāya of the Manusmṛti is historically and doctrinally closely related to certain Purāṇic texts — and to Mbh. 12. 224 —, i. e. ultimately to a Sāṃkhya "Instructional Tract", it is not only legitimate, but even methodically necessary to take into account this background also when trying to understand the term *antaḥsaṃjñā* at Manu 1. 49. And one cannot then help seeing at a glance that it not only stands in a dialectical relation to the expressions *bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ* and *niḥsaṃjñāḥ* of the Purāṇas, but that it was also in all probability

81. Cf. II B (Kirkel, o. c., p. 63, 1.2) : *yasmāt tesāṃ vṛtā buddhir duḥkḥānī karaṇānī ca*.

82. Because of the context other meanings can, I think, be excluded.

83. Cf. the two articles mentioned in fn. 65 and fn. 69. — Frauwallner's important contributions are duly referred to by Hacker only in his later article (fn. 69), viz. p. 76 (= 168) and fn. 2. Hacker's own investigations have in their turn been partially supplemented and amplified by K. Rüping in : StII 3 (1977), pp. 3-10.

deliberately coined to counter them : It becomes fully intelligible if it is taken as an objection directed against the view that plants are not only internally (*antah*), but also externally (*bahih*) *aprakāśa* --- and hence *niḥsamjñā*; it is natural enough that such a view should be rejected, concisely and at the same time precisely, by stating that plants are on the contrary in reality (only) *antahsamjñā*.

Thus it may finally be concluded that the term *antahsamjñā* was coined by a man or a group of people who wanted to dissociate themselves from a view about vegetal life held by others or perhaps even prevalent at their time; who thought it best to confront it by emphasizing that plants, in spite of the indisputable absence of outward activity in them, do nevertheless "have internal consciousness"; and who chose a very Indian way for expressing their own view, viz. with a single term which makes use of central elements of their opponents' proposition, i. e. *antah* and *°samjñā*.

Now, this looks as if it were the "altogether new interpretation" of which it has been said above (§ 2. 4. 3) that "there is no need to search for it". In reality, however, it is practically only another version of the first interpretation. The correction which has now been made consists in the clarification that the stress lies not, or not so much, on the absence of outward activity, but on the existence of an inner consciousness. A statement to the effect that plants are *antahsamjñā* in this sense, problematic though it indeed would be if it were made independently, becomes fully understandable in itself — and intelligible as to its motives — if only it is taken as opposed to a view according to which plants are denied this consciousness. Therefore, the decision which could not be taken earlier (cf. § 2. 4. 3 above) is now nonetheless a natural one : Of the two alternative interpretations it is clearly the first one that should be given preference, though in its new and revised form, emphasizing the possibility that originally the term intended the confinement of consciousness within the limits of the 'body' without reference to the absence of outward expression which should be, I suggest, a later development in the understanding of the term.

In conclusion, a final problem, namely if anything can be said about the origin and/or doctrinal affiliation of the term *antahsamjñā*. However, all I am able to offer at the moment is a hypothesis, and one of which I can only give the outline : If the result achieved by Hacker in his analysis of certain Purāṇic texts is correct and holds equally good for the portions of these texts drawn upon by me, then it may safely be stated that the term in question is not of Sāṃkhya origin, but is on the contrary opposed to the view about plants which upholders of this school of thought held. This supposition is supported by what has been

most convincingly shown by Frauwallner⁸⁴ about the Bhṛgu-Bharadvāja-saṃvāda viz. that it is not Sāṃkhyic, — provided that the doctrinal relation between this part of the Mbh. and the term *antaḥ-saṃjñā* is at all acceptable. The identity of the people who regarded all plants as *antaḥsaṃjñā* is still obscure also as regards the tradition to which they belonged. It cannot even be regarded as certain that they were philosophers in the narrower sense of the word.

But I am of the opinion that their view, even if it should not stand the test of a critical examination by modern biologists, is not only very interesting with regard to a history of Indian ideas, but should also evoke our sympathy in that it directly leads to sensitive and perceptive respect for plants — the only living beings who do not generally subsist by destroying the life of others.

84. Cf. his "Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma. Die nichtsāṃkhyetischen Texte" in : JAOS 45 (1925), p. 59 ff. (= Kleine Schriften, hrsg. v. G. Oberhammer u. E. Steinkellner, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 47 ff.).