On the Date of the *Nyāyāvatāra*

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The *Nyāyāvatāra*, a work in thirty-two verses—and hence also called *Dvārānīśīkā*—ascribed by tradition to Siddhasena Divākara, is deemed to open a new era in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is mostly in the realm of Jaina epistemic pursuits that the *Dvārānīśīkā* might claim the status of an innovative or prototypical work. When we, however, consider the development of logic and epistemology in India on a larger scale, the work seems to lose its flavour of originality and novelty.

The problem of the exact dating of the *Nyāyāvatāra*1 should be solved independently, irrespective of whether the work can be accurately ascribed to a Siddhasena (Divākara?), the celebrated author of a series of *Dvārānīśīkās*, to a Siddhasena (Divākara?), the author of the *Sannatī-tarka-prakāraṇa* or to some other Siddhasena (?). Just to mention in passing, several features of the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the *Sannatī-tarka-prakāraṇa* evince a discrepant attitude towards the Jaina Canon and tradition of both works, different choice of vocabulary, which was not necessitated by the use of different languages (Sanskrit and Prakrit), and the notions and ideas they use are likewise at variance. Accordingly, it seems to me that both works must have apparently been written by two different people.2

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1 The most comprehensive bibliographic survey of publications on Siddhasena Divākara is furnished by UPADHYE (1971) in his *Introduction* (pp. xi–xxvii) and *Bibliographic Survey* (pp. *3–*72). A few more publications have been published since the review: MOOKERJEE (1971), DHAKY (1981–82), GRANOFF (1989–1990), DHAKY (1990), DHAKY (1995) and WAYMAN (1996).

2 The question has been discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). A detailed comparison of the contents, style and philosophical background of Siddhasena Divākara’s *Nyāyāvatāra* and Siddhasena *Mahāmati’s Sannatī-tarka-prakāraṇa* (vide *infra* p. 47 f.), brings me to the conclusion that these two works were written by two different persons. Following the findings presented in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming) esp. in view of the lack of any hint that the author of STP. knew of Diśāṇa, I would maintain that STP. must have been composed slightly before or circa 500 C.E.

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On subsequent pages I shall try to establish the chronology of the Nyāyāvatāra and its correlation to other, mostly Buddhist, works.

There is a variance of opinions regarding the date of Siddhasena as the author of the Nyāyāvatāra and the date of the Nyāyāvatāra, and these fall in four groups: (1) Siddhasena was pre-Diśānāyaṇa, (2) Siddhasena flourished soon after Diśānāyaṇa and before Dharmakirti, (3) Siddhasena belongs to a post-Dharmakirtian tradition, whereas (4) some hold that his date is still an open question.

The first to notice some chronological dependence of NA was Jacobi (1926: iii), who observed that ‘To about the same time [i.e. Sāka-year 598 = 677 C.E.–P.B.] belongs Siddhasenesavidākāra whom Haribhadra quotes; for he uses, no doubt Dharmakirti, though he does not name him.’ There are two points, according to him, that justify such a conclusion: (1) Siddhasena (NA.5) applies the term abhrānta—and Dharmakirti was the first to use it in its definition of pratyaṣa, thus improving upon Diśānāyaṇa’s definition—to both pratyaṣa and anumāna; (2) Siddhasena (NA.11) extends the distinction of svārthā and parārthā, which properly applies to anumāna only, to pratyaṣa also, ibidem 12 f. Apparently, he thought to improve on Dharmakirti by a wholesome generalisation of nice distinctions! (Jacobi (1926: iii, n. 1)). Vaidya (1928: xvii-xx) elaborates upon Jacob's iconic remarks. (3) He further brings up one more important point:

‘...verses 6 and 7 above of Nyāyāvatāra unmistakably presuppose Dharmakirti and the later phase of the Yogācāra school, as, without them, it is difficult for us to explain why Siddhasena Divākara is required to these views and emphatically declare:

सक्त्वत्वत्विभासम् भ्रातवासिद्धिः स्तुत्वय
प्रमाणेः स्वयंसत्त्विभासियं देशस्त्रियं विद्यति ॥ ५ ॥’ (p. xx).

The term bhrānta (bhṛṇt) itself is attested in the pre-Dharmakirtian literature, for instance in MAVbh.1.4; SACab.8b.2 and in several places of MSA. and Comm. thereon (11.13a, 11.15, 11.17, 11.24–26, Comm. ad 10.2 and ad 11.27). In all such passages, however, the term bhrānti does not occur in the context of pramaṇa, still less of valid perception (pratyaṣa), in the first place. The term refers either to a general error based on the perceiving of subject-object duality in the world (dvaya-bhrānta), and is synonymous to māyā (in MSA.), or to the nature of the cognised object (MAVbh.1.4). The latter rests on a rather subtle difference: erroneous is not the cognition as such (the emphasis on the inner, cognitive aspect, viz. erroneous correspondence of an act of cognition), but the way an object is constituted in the cognition (the emphasis on the ‘outer’, ‘objective’ side). In none of these texts where we come across the term bhrānti is the idea of cognitively valid procedures (pramaṇa) discussed; at the most, it points to an antithesis of a general, soteriologically relevant outlook of a person, viz. citta-bhrānti / bhrāntam cittaṃ / keśita-cittan (SACab.8b.2). This is confirmed by the application of the past passive participle to people MSA.11.18 (loko hy abhrāntah), as loci of bhrānta-citta. To sum up, none of the occurrences of the term (a)bhrānta in Yogācāra works seems to have been an inspiration for Siddhasena.

1 An interpretation of non-erroneousness (abhrānta) is offered by Dhammottara in NB.3.2: abhrāntam artha-市民=kṣame vastu-rūpe ‘viparyastam ucyate. artha-市民=kṣama ca vastu-rūpayān samveśṣāpādhi-varṛṣāmikam. tatra yaḥ na bhrāntya tad abhrāntam. Thus, there are two pivotal aspects of abhrānta, the lack of contrariety (viparyastavata) and its reference to a thing capable of efficient action (artharṣa-kṣama-vastu). The first element, viz. the lack of contrariety, or correspondence to facts, may be taken to have been preconceived in the idea of avyaktacariya in the non-Buddhist literature as early as NS.1.1.4 (indriyaaraṇa-sannyāsātpayam jñāna avyayadarṣeat avyaktacarī vyāvahāryāttvam pratyaṣaka) and NBh. ad loc. (yat atmaṃ tat iti tat avyayācārī, yat tu tamād iti tat avyayācārī pratyaṣakām ātyat). This tendency can also be observed in Jaina sources, e.g. in TBit.1.32 (p. 30.6, p. 31.1–2): jñāna-viparyayo jñānam iti ... mithyā-darsana-parigrahaḥ viparya-grhakatvam eteṣām (= viparyaṣayām), tasmād ajñānāni bhavantu. See also PVin.1(1.4) (p. 40, n. 1). However, the second element artha-śānti-samārtika, the capability to execute efficient action, is Dhammottara’s innovation, see PV.3.1: pramaṇām avasamvādām jñānam artha-市民=ātihī / avasamvādānām tābdhe ‘yo abhiphya-nivedanāt /, as well as PV.2.3: artha-śānti-saṃārtika yat tad aśrama-sāṅgāya / anyay saṅgī-taḥ proktam eva sva-sāmāṇya-laksanā //. Cf. also Hattori (1968: 14): ‘The concept of “artharṣa” is
argument—which seems totally unconvincing to me—it would imply that Siddhasena chose the term abhrānta intuitively and applied it indiscriminately to both pratykṣa and anumāṇa, as if he had adumbrated that Dharmakīrti would once qualify perception as a non-erroneous cognition and inference as erroneous. Coincidentally, his way of expression would tally with the actual term used by Dharmakīrti, who would follow him!

Whereas I completely agree with Jacobi—Vaidya’s first argument, their second argument is not entirely convincing to me. Indeed, we cannot understand the idea of svārtha-vākya and parārtha-vākya (NA.10) as well as svārtha-pratyaṣa and parārtha-pratyaṣa (NA.11) without Diṇāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s well-known division of svārthānunāma and parārthānunāma. It should suffice to remind the reader of NB.2.1–2: /1/ anumāṇam divvidhā. /2/ svārthaḥ parārthaḥ ca. and of NB.3.1–2: /1/ tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyāṇam parārthānunāma. /2/ kārane kāryāpaścaraś.

There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the idea of vākyasya parārthaḥvān necessarily presupposes the idea of vākyasya svārthaḥvān, and that both these concepts—expressed in NA.10 ff.: parārthaḥ mānām abhyāsaḥ vākyān—could only have been developed in the context of svārtha- and parārtha-nunāma.

However, the idea of svārtha-pratyaṣa and svārthānunāma / parārtha-nunāma—central for Jacobi—Vaidya’s reasoning—which is a prerequisite for Siddhasena to establish the thesis of parārtha-pratyaṣa, predates Dharmakīrti and is found also in the saṅgrahā-slokā (iti sāstrārtha-saṅgrahāk) of Nyāya-praveśa of Diṇāga’s disciple, Saṅkarasvāmin11.

unfamiliar to Diṇāga, but it is an important criterion for the distinguishing of “sva-lakṣaṇa” from “sāmānaya-lakṣaṇa” in Dharmakīrti’s system of thought”, Hattori (1968: 79 § 1.14) and Franco (1987: 445 n. 203), esp.: ‘the concept of arthakriyā does not appear anywhere in Diṇāga’s writings.’

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti’s definition does go back to the usage of the term bhrānta in the Yogācāra school; his novelty was to mould it to the demands of his pramāṇa theory. We should remember about his idea that anumāṇa is bhṛānta (cf. PVIn.II(1).2.6–7, p. 24.6–7: de ma yin la der khizin phyir || khkhrul kyam bhril phyir | issud ma igit || = atsimins tad-graho bhṛānti api sambhandhaḥ pramāṇa //), which is a proper point of reference here, not the nature of citta / viṣkambha.

11 sādhanān dūṣaṇām caiva sābhāsān para-sāvīde / pratyaṣaṃ anumāṇaḥ ca sābhāsān tu āma-sāvīde //. As for a possible objection that the verse might be later, at least the commentator Haribhadra takes it to be a genuine part of the original work (NP.(1). p. 9.12 ff.): ity ādāv eva slokāh, etc.

Certainly it is not Saṅkarasvāmin who developed the concept of svārtha- and parārtha-nunāma. It was probably fathomed by Vasubandhu12, but terminologically conceived and worked out by Diṇāga13.

There are, however, two other traits to be noticed in the aphorisms NA.10–11 that point, in my opinion, to Dharmakīrti as their source. The first of them is the idea of metaphorical transference (upacāra) used in a very similar context. Siddhasena speaks of the term ‘inference for others’ (parārtha mānām)—which denotes, to be precise, the inferential cognition arisen in another person as a result of an argumentative procedure and/or debate—which is applied through metaphorical transference (upacāra) to a ‘syllabic sentence (vākyam), that is, as a matter of fact, merely a cause of such a cognition in another person. We come across the same idea in NB.3.1–2, and even the wording is to a certain extent similar (one should here take into account stylistic differences necessitated by the succint sūtra style and versified kārikās). Below, both passages in question are given for the sake of convenience, relevant expressions being underlined:14

/NA.10/ sva-nisācaya vadya anyeṣāṁ nisācayaotpādanāṁ budhāḥ / parārthaḥ mānām abhyāsaḥ vākyān tadd-ūpacaśaraḥ //

NB.3.1–2: tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānaṁ parārtha-nunāma, kārane kāryāpaścaraś.

Dharmottara’s gloss confirms the interpretation: kārane = vacana = vākyā; kārya = [parārtha] anumāna = parārtha-māna.15 Siddharṣi, whose comments are in a similar spirit, even quotes a verse, that establishes the relation between speech (kārana) and resulting cognition (kārya)16. Another striking feature is that the

13 E.g.: PS.2.1ab: anumānaḥ divvidhā svārthaḥ tri-rūpa-liṅgāto parārtha-nunāmaḥ tu sva-dṛṣṭārtha-prakāśanam; also PS.3.1ab, and PSV.2, K 109a.2–3 = V 27a.5 (svārtha-nunāma): tshul gsam paḥ rtags las rjes sū dpag paḥ don (V: rjes sū dpag par bya baḥ don) mthog ba gan yin pa de ni rai gi don gyi rjes sū dpag paḥ. Cf. Randel (1926: 28–9), Hattori (1968: 78, n.1.11) and Steinkeijler’s note, p. 1 in PVIn.II(2).
14 In my analysis throughout I shall use, for the sake of brevity, underlining to mark corresponding phrases in NA. and works of Dharmakīrti or of other authors.
16 vikalpa-yonāḥ śabādha vikalpāḥ śabda-yonāḥ / kāyā-kāraṇatā teṣām naṁ bāṁ śabdāḥ sprānty api //

The verse is so far untraced, but it refers most probably to another verse by Dharmakīrti, and—at any rate—to an idea expressed in PV.1.286.
reference to the idea of the metaphorical transference (Upacāra) occurs in both works (NA. and NB) precisely at the moment of introducing the discussion of parārtha-anumāna and that this is the only occurrence of this idea in both works. Neither the term nor the idea such as is encountered at any other point.

Further, Vaidya’s third point is rather weak, as well. He says: ‘These verses [NA.6.7—P.B.] contain the favourite view of the Yogacāra School on the subject and the object (grīhāya and grīhakāya), which both they declare illusory. This view is dependent on the definition of pratyakṣa, and though its origin must be sought in Diṅnagā’s works [emphasis—P.B.], the scholars who brought the idea to perfection are Dhammapāla and his pupil Dharmakīrti.’ (p. xix). Indeed, we find the idea referred to by Vaidya in Diṅnagā’s works, e.g., in his PS.1.1071 (cf. n. 63):

Vasudhārakṣita/Sei-rgyal 15b.4: Kanakavāman/Dad-paṭi šes-rab 96a.4–5:  
gāi tsha snan ba de gsal bya |  
tshaw ma dañh dehi ēbras bu ni |  
ḥāśin rnam rig pa de yi phyir |  
de gsum tha dad du ma byas ||

However, we do not find anything in NA.718 that would allude to either Diṅnagā’s specific theory of triple division of vijñāna or to Dharmakīrti’s ideas.19 What we do find instead is the realist’s position that, at least: (1) acts of cognition are real, (2) acts of cognition happen to be true and accurate, (3) acts of cognition are self-validatory, (4) acts of cognition are accurate representations of external world, (5) the external world is real.

To have Diṅnagā’s or Dharmakīrti’s views criticised here we would need an explicit element of sva-saṁvītita (sva-saṁvedana) or phala. There are three possible expressions in NA.7 that might refer to sva-saṁvītita (and none to refer to phala): (A) sāpā, (B) svāya-niṣcāyā, (C) dvāya-siddhā. (Ad A) The first of the list is highly improbable, for it never—to my knowledge—is used in Buddhist sources to refer to the idea of self-revelatory character of cognition (sva-saṁvītita). It is generally used to describe either the veracious, direct, non-inferential or the indubitable, etc., character of acts of cognition. It is explained by Siddharṣi accordingly by suniscitātya. (Ad B) The second of these expressions (as a similar one in NA.31: svāya-nīrīkṣhāti) mentions in fact only two aspects: the cognition (sva) and its counterpart—the object (anya). If sva were to mean sva-saṁvītita, the primary act of cognition would not be mentioned; if anya were taken to be sva-saṁvītita, the bāhyārtha, so fundamental for the realist, would not be mentioned. The expression is explained in NAV. as sva-parā-prakāśaka, which does not bring anything new to our analysis. However, it is coupled in the NAV. with the third expression. (Ad C) The third expression refers to duality, in the first place, and—like in the preceding case—it is highly problematic to take it to allude to Diṅnagā’s theory of triple division of vijñāna. However, it is Siddharṣi’s gloss on dvāya-siddhā: svāpi-dhāla-sā热水-yuṃga-nispattau that could be implicative of sva-saṁvītita in it, svarūpa might refer to the self-revelatory character of cognition. It is especially suggestive in view of his statement in NAV.1 quoted in n. 20. But even then, the third aspect of an act of cognition (apart from the act as such, an object), its self-revelatory character, is not explicitly mentioned here. As a matter of fact, Siddharṣi, so well conversant with Buddhist ideas, would not have wasted the availng opportunity to indicate the idea of sva-saṁvītita and to utilise it, if he had noticed any allusion to the Buddhist theories of triple or fourfold division of vijñāna in the aphorism of Siddhāna. In other words, there is nothing in Siddharṣi’s gloss that might suggest that Siddharṣi had seen any point of convergence between the ideas expressed in NA.7 and certain concepts ascribable to Diṅnagā, as Vaidya would like it. To expel our doubts, he concludes, as a matter of fact, with anyathā prameyābādhe varamādbhāvita, to show that no third element is implied.

In my opinion, NA.7 can be safely taken to disprove the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance propounded by the Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin), whose ideas directly influenced Diṅnagā and Dharmakīrti.21 The aphorism is

17 See Hattori (1968: 107, n. 1.67):

    yad-dhākṣara prameyah tat prameṣa-phalate punah /
    grīhākāra-saṁvītita trayaṃ nīdhit phṛthak-kṛtam ||

18 See Hattori (1968: 107, n. 1.67):

    sakala-pratibhāsaya bhūrāṇvādvishattā sāpah /
    prameṣa-phalate punah /

19 On the triple and fourfold division of vijñāna in the Yogacāra school see Hattori (1968: 107, n. 1.67).

20 As he does in several places, for instance in NAV.1 (the section beginning with: ayaṃ atābhijñāpyaḥ: sva-saṁvedanaḥ prati nikḥila-jñānād eva-rūpatyā sākṣāt-karṣaṇa-caturātivā nāsty eva bhedah…), NAV.29 (the section beginning with: tathātāt-sa-yogācāro-matam api balād anekānta-prakāśa-rajjur āvēṣṣayā, ekāyāpi jñānayānena-veda-vadakārātayā prathāndopagaṁe…, and the section beginning with: atha jñāṇa-vādy advaita-prakāśam alakṣitam abhyavṛtya tena bāhūvidhyāṁ dādāno bodho bādhya-māntavā vṛttā ity abhiddhadhyāṁ, tad ayuktam…), NAV.31, etc.

clearly evocative of such ideas as those expressed, e.g. in MAV.1.1.32, Trīśī.1, 2923 or Viññā.1ab24, 165. As Siddharṣi expresses himself, if there is nothing to be cognised, there can be no cognition. Therefore, to establish the thesis of the existence of the external world is essential for the realist. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, it is crucial for the Buddhist idealist to deny the existence of external object. Furthermore, NA.7 fits quite well into the line of critics of the so-called `Dreaming Argument'25, that was commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and refuted, for instance, by Kumārila (MSV.4.(Nīrālambara-vāda).23, p. 159.7–8), Uddyotakara (NV. on NBh.4.23.33), Śaṅkarā (BSŚBh.2.5.5.29, p. 476.2–3) and by Siddharṣijaṇi (NAV.29, the Śūnya-vāda section).

Therefore, NA.7 is not a very useful indication to establish the date of the Nyāyāvatāra. However, there is a number of other conspicuous traits, that are instrumental in establishing the time of composition of the treatise quite convincingly as posterior to Dharmakīrti. To achieve this, I shall analyse several aphorisms of NA. step by step in order to show Siddhasena's indebtedness to Dharmakīrti (especially to NB.) in respect not only of certain 'loan' ideas but also, partially, of the dialectical structure of the text. Some of the following points are not entirely convincing, when taken singly. Their high number, on the other hand, could not have been a matter of mere coincidence.


[2] Practically, the very first ideas expressed in the opening lines of NA. and NB.

22 abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate // artha-saṭvāma-vaśājñātām prajāyate / vaśājñām nāsti cādyārthas tad-abhāvāt tad api sat //
23 ātma-dharmāpāco hi vivido yaḥ pravartate / vaśājñā-vaśājñām 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa trividāḥ // acīto 'napalambhaḥ 'sau jñānām lokātūraḥ ca tat / ārāvyasya parāvṛttir dvibhā dathuṣṭyāja-kāntiḥ //
24 vaśājñāpi-māram evaśad asad-arthavabhāsātānā /
25 pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ svapnādūḥ yathā sā ca yaḍa tadā / na so 'rtho drṣṭyate tasya pratijñātvan kathāṃ matam // (to be coupled with NA.6–7).

20 In a typical formulation: ‘The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognition, like the sensation in a dream’ (jñātra-saṁvedanaṁ bhṛnātan, pratyayatva, svapna-saṁvedanaṁ). See TABER (1994).
28 Cf. also PV.2.63 (anumāna-vicāraḥ): na pratyaśa-parośākhyāṁ meyasyādyasya sambhavāḥ / tasmāt prameya-dvītvena pramāṇa-dvītvan iva tate //


30 pratyaśaṁ anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe (Vasudharārakṣita/Seśa-rgyal 13b.6: mnoṁ san daṁ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi šes-rab 94a.4: mnoṁ san daṁ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma dag ni); here, the difference is the absence of the explicit (sc. with a numeral, not with the dual form *-e / *-dag) mention of ‘twofold’ (dvividham / dvidadha / rnam pa gšis).

31 PS.(1).1.2bc: lakṣaṇa-dvayaṁ / prameyaṁ ... (Vasudharārakṣita/Seśa-rgyal 13b.6 = Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi šes-rab 94a.5: mūchan rdid gšis gsal bya).

32 yasmat = Vasudharārakṣita/Seśa-rgyal: ...phyir se na; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi šes-rab: ... gshis gšt phyir.

33 Cf. Aristotlean twofold division in Met.998b (p. 47.12-14): ἕτερος δ’ ἔχεται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὄρισμος καὶ ὁ λέγων ἔξ ἀν ἔστιν ἐνυπάρχονταν.
section of PV. is traditionally assumed to offer the first comprehensive definition of pramāṇa. Clearly, for both Manoratnakanda and Siddhārṣi the passages of NA.1ab and PV.1.3/7cd respectively are cases of a pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa. Occasionally, a doubt is raised whether Dharmakīrti’s design was indeed a descriptive definition and that actually it was the subsequent Buddhist tradition of commentators where the idea of a comprehensive descriptive definition developed. Irrespective of whether one assumes that the formulation of PV.1.3 was a genuine descriptive definition or that an idea of such a definition first originated with post-Dharmakīrtian commentators, both sides agree that such a descriptive definition did not exist before Dharmakīrti (ergo it is altogether absent from Diṅgaṇāga, Śāṅkarasvāmin, etc.). Accordingly, since NA. appears to present such a definition of a descriptive character, it must have been composed after Dharmakīrti and PV.

[4] Late Buddhist sources allegedly refer to NA.2. Surprisingly, NA.2, being a statement of pūrva-pakṣa, is the least suitable verse of the whole Dhvāraṇāśīkā to serve as an object of anybody’s critique. Thus, anyone referring to the verse with the purpose to refute it would have to be highly incompetent and incapable of noticing

34 See: FRANCO (1997: 59–61), esp. ‘Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of pramāṇa in general, unlike the definition of each pramāṇa in particular, was not undertaken by any Indian philosopher before Dharmakīrti’s time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakīrti to do so. During the time that separates Dharmakīrti from his commentators, some change in the philosophical requirements must have occurred that produced the expectation of a general definition of pramāṇas.’ [p. 60]. Cf. also STEINKELNER-KRASER (1989: 3–5). Cf., e.g. PVV.1.3 (1: 2.17 ff.; 3: 3.17 ff.); aham ācaryam bhūdad-ācaryam-pramāṇa-samuccaya-sāstre vārtikām cikīrṇih svatāh-ktaya-bhagavān-namastukā ṣac-chāṭhrārambhā-sanaye tat-ācaryā-ktaya-bhagavān-namastukā-śīlakom vyākhyāta-kāmaḥ prathamam pramāṇa-sāṁyam-lakṣaṇam āha ... and PVV.1.7–8 (1: 4.36 ff.; 3: 8.6 ff.): tad evam avisvāvadanaṁ pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam ukṣam. idānāṁ anyaḥ āha ...”

35 See: FRANCO (1997: 54–62), e.g.: ‘...Dharmakīrti did not attempt a general definition of the pramāṇas, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a pramāṇa ...’ [p. 61].

36 I am indebted to Claus Oetke for drawing my attention to the above issue of PV.1.3–7 and its relevance to the problem of dating of NA.

37 QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): ‘In the eighth-century commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (I.5), Śākyabuddhi (or Śākyamati) quotes the second verse of Nyāyaśāstra and claims that this verse is the object of Dharmakīrti’s critique’, and refers to p. 163, n. 38 of Chr. LINDTNER’s ‘Marginalia to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikā-sārā.’ Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 28 (1984) 149–175.

that the verse is refuted by Siddhasena himself in NA.3! Therefore it could hardly be an ‘object of Dharmakīrti’s critique.’ Furthermore, any reference to allegedly such a state of affairs would prove the source of such an information to be a highly unreliable one. Consequently, either Śākyabuddhi cannot have referred to NA.2 or his acquaintance with Jainā tradition would be liable to doubt.

As a matter of fact, NA.2 may plausibly be taken as a prima facie objection (‘no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion’) against formulating a comprehensive definition of pramāṇa of descriptive character, inasmuch as ‘cognitive criteria (mind the plural!—P.B.) are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them.’ Siddhārṣi takes the definition of cognitive criterion to be “[a] statement consisting in mentioning specific properties of cognitive criterion that are capable of distinguishing [it from that which has] another form,” which is a very accurate explanation of a descriptive definition. Interestingly enough, the reason adduced why such a definition is not necessary in case of pramāṇa is prasiddhāṇi pramānāni, where the plural is expressly used. This would point to the more archaic kind of definition based on classification, that would define the notion of pramāṇa merely by specifying the pramāṇa “inventory”. Thereby NA.2 supports our supposition that what Siddhasena really does is a descriptive definition of pramāṇa. Accordingly, NA.2 would rather be a record of the historical change and certain resistance against a new approach towards defining pramāṇa. This would also explain the role of the verse, that might seem unnecessary at first glance, in such a succinct work as NA. is.

[5] The pāda c (tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ) of NA.3—which is a rejoinder to the doubt raised in NA.2 whether it is ‘purposeful to state the definition of cognitive criterion’ (viz. whether the treatise, sāstra = NA., has a purpose), since ‘cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them’—recalls Dharmakīrti’s statement found in PV.1.7:

pramāṇaṁ vyavahāraṁ śāstraṁ mohā-nivartananam / aṭṭhādārtho-prakāśo vā svarūpādhisatgataḥ param //

A statement expressing a similar idea seems to be absent from PS.

[6] Corresponding to the sequence of topics discussed in NB. (truly, it is a typical sequence not restricted to NB.), as a next step, Siddhasena in NA.5 makes his
polemical statement and declares also inference to be 'non-erroneous because it is a
cognitive criterion, just like perception.' (... anumāṇaṁ, tat abhrāntaṁ
pramāṇatvāt samakṣayat ...). The use of the term abhrānta as well as the polemical
character directly points to NB.(1).14: tatra pratipādakam kalpaṁ padhūnam
abhrāntam. This issue, that was taken up by JACOBI and VAITHYA, has been already
discussed above p. 18 ff. Dharmakīrti expressed such ideas that could have served
both as a target and inspiration for Siddhasena also in PV.2.45–46 (anumāṇa-
vicāraḥ).

But this is not the only Dhammakīrti's trace to be found in NA.5. Inference is
defined by Siddhasena to 'determine the sādhyā on account of liṅga; liṅga (the
inferential sign) is, in its turn, inseparably connected with the sādhyā; the
determining factor is here the relation of avināś-bhāva: NA.5ac: sādhyāvān-bhūno
liṅgāt sādhyā-nīscayakam śrūtaṁ / anumāṇamāṁ. This definition follows, in most—if
not all—details, the ideas expressed by Dharmakīrti in PV.1.287:

anumāṇādārayo liṅgam avināś-bhāva-laksanam /
vṛjīti-pradarśaniṁ dhetoḥ sādhyenākāntaḥ ca taḥ sphiṭhām //

This striking correspondence does not only concern central elements in inference
and their character as well as their mutual connection, but even the choice of
vocabulary. The inseparable connection with the probandum as the defining
characteristic of the probans reoccurs in NA.13: sādhyāvān-bhūno hetor. ⁴¹

[7] NA.8 may have been influenced by Dīnāga both in terms of vocabulary and
notions. Its pāda d (mānaṁ sādham prakṛtiṁ) reminds of PS.(2).5.1 (esp. sābda,
sgra las byun pa):

na pramāṇantaraṁ sādham anumāṇat tathā hi tat /
kr̥ta-kvaśvāvitaṁ svārohaṁ anyāpokhaṇa bhāsate // ⁴²

[8] In NA.13 Siddhasena takes a closer look at parārthānumānaṁ and the
conditions of its validity: sādhyāvān-bhūno hetor vaco yat pratipādakam /
parārthānumānaṁ tat pākṣādī-vacanāsīmāmaṁ // The phrasing is reminiscent of

⁴⁰ ayathābhinnivesaṇa dvītīyaḥ bhāranti iṣayate / gati cet para-rūpēṇa na ca bhṛante
pramāṇatā // abhirāpyavāsanīvādapi bhṛante pramāṇatā / gati apy anāthaḥ deśāt, pākṣa
ca yātaṁ krīḍārāḥ //
⁴¹ Cf. also PV.3.31: kāryā-kārana-bhāvād vā sahābhāvād vā nyāmakaḥ / avināś-bhāva-
nyayaṁ 'darsanāṁ na na darsanāt //, etc.
⁴² sgra las byun pa rjes dpag las l shad ma gza min de lzar de / byas sogs pa bzin
du ran don la l gzan sel bas ni rjod par byed / The verse is quoted in TSaP. ad TSa.1514
(p. 441.6–7), with a minor alteration (anumāṇat tathā hi saḥ (sat) //)

NB.3.1: tri-rūpa-liṅgāvānaṁ parārthānumānaṁ. Clearly, the element of tri-
rūpa—a criterion of validity of anumāṇa for the Dhammakīrti tradition—is absent
in NA, for this idea was not recognised by the Jainas. Instead, syntactically and
semantically in the same position, we have the Jaina criterion of validity, viz.
sādhyāvān-bhūvaḥ. Thus, NA.13 may be taken as Siddhasena's polemical reply to
the Buddhist doctrine of tairūpa.

On the other hand, pādās e-d of NA.13 (...)anumāṇam tat pākṣādī-vacanāsīmāmaṁ
bear close resemblance to (1) NP.(2).2 (= NP.(1), p. 1.4–5): tatra pākṣādī-vacanāni
sādhanam, pākṣa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-vacanair hi prāśikānāṁ apratī iha
pratipādyaṁ tī / as well as to (2) the verse of NM.1: *pākṣa-vacanāṁ
sādhanam; tatra hi svayaṁ / sādhyatvenēśītaṁ pākṣaḥ viruddhāhāṁ
nirākṛto //. However, this similarity is not decisive at all, inasmuch as all the quotations merely
describe the widely known structure of any 'syllogistic' reasoning, that is composed of
respective links, viz. members of 'syllogism'.

[9] In the definition of pākṣa, NA.14ab: sādhyāvāpaṇapagah pākṣaḥ pratyakṣādī-
nirākṛtāṁ /, we come across other formulations that bear obvious
similarity especially to NB.(2).3.37: svārūpaṇāya svayaṁ iṣya 'nirākṛto pākṣa
iṁ (but also to NB.(2).3.49–53). Dharmakīrti’s svārūpaṇa stands for sādhyatvena,
which is confirmed both by Dharmakīrti himself in the next two sūtras
(NB.(2).3.39–40: svārūpāṇaṁ sādhyatvenēśaṁ, svāraṇāvēti sādhyatvenēśaṁ
svaḥ sādhyatvenēśo) as well as by Dharmottara (NBṬ.(2).3.37 ad loc.: svāraṇāvēti
svādhyatvenaṁ). Dharmottara explains nirākṛto as pratyakṣādī-nirākṛtāṁ
(NBṬ.(2).3.37 ad loc.: evam-bhūto san pratyakṣādī-nirākṛto yo 'rātha
taḥ pākṣa ity ucyate), and—if we suppose that he expressed original ideas of Dharmakīrti
(and I believe he did in this regard)—Siddhasena's formulations express almost
the same idea as Dharmakīrti did in NB, barring Dharmakīrti’s specific delimiting use
of eva as well as svaya.

However, there can hardly be any doubt that the formulations of NA.14ab:
sādhyāvāpaṇapagah pākṣaḥ pratyakṣādī-nirākṛtāṁ /, go back to PV.4.86
(1: p. 378, 3: p. 390):

sādhyāvāpaṇapagah pākṣa-laksanāṁ teṣv apaksata /
nirākṛte bādhanaṁ sēya 'laksana-vṛttaḥ //

The idea itself goes back to Dīnāga and NM. (*svayaṁ sādhyatvenēśītaṁ pākṣa
viruddhāhāṁ nīrākṛto), as it was pointed out by Manorathananandin in
PV., p. 378.26. Another plausible source for NA.14 might be PS.3.2:

⁴³ Cf. Manorathananandin's Vṛtti ad loc.: tathā ca teṣu śāstraśādīśu pākṣaṁ
vyārañyeśu mādhye nirākṛte pratipādaśālābhā bāḍhānato 'pākṣātā viruddhāhā.
The idea expressed by Dharmakirti goes back to his PV.3.16 and PVSV. ad loc. 46

[11] In NA.20 Siddhasena maintains that dyānta is not an essential part of 'syllogistic' reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (vyapti) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the 'economical' trend in Indian logic—that starts with Vasubandhu and his Vāda-vidhāna and Vāda-vidhānottara—to limit the number of necessary 'syllogistic' members, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves:

NA.20: antar-vyāpyādā vāda vyākhyātā siddha bahir-udāhītā
vyāpātā syāt tad-asadābhyām 'py evaṁ nyāya-vidd va

NB.(2).3.121: tri-rūpa hetu uktāḥ. tāvata cārtā-pratīṭīṁ iti na prthag dyānto nāma sādhān-vayyavavāka kāsācit tena nāya-lakṣānanāḥ prthag ucyate gatārthavātā.

Siddhasena was not so much innovative as it might seem at first glance, inasmuch as it is Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.121) who had intuitively foreshadowed such an idea before him, when he had claimed that the example (dyānta) is not a separate member of the proof (sādhān-vayyavavā). It is much more natural and less surprising to find the direct continuation of the 'economical' trend, that had started with Vasubandhu, in the Yogācāra tradition and Dharmakirti’s works, rather than in the Jaina tradition in the person of Siddhasena, where we do not find such an 'economic' tendency before Siddhasena. In my opinion, Siddhasena verbalised what had already been latent in Dharmakirti’s statement, even though Dharmakirti himself had not been able to do without the example, which he had considered an

46 In PV.3.15 [p. 180] Dharmakirti first recalls the triple character of hetu defined by Dhinnaka in Nyāya-mukha: hetos tīvra api rāpeṣu niṣcayaḥ tena varṇitāḥ | asiddhi-viparītādy-hetu-tyāghicāri-vipakṣaḥ // Then (PV.3.16ab) he states the reason for expressing the concomitance by way of dissimilarity (vaidharmya-vacanam): vyabhicāri-vipakṣena vaidharmya-vacanam ca yat //, only to quote Dhinnaka in PVSV.(1).3.16ab: yad āha—eṣa tāvan nyāya yad udbhavaḥ vaktavaḥ virdhānaṅkikā-pratipakṣena iti. The rule is further explained by Dharmakirti in PVSV: as follows: sādharmya-vacanam viruddha-pratipakṣena, vaidharmya-vacanam anāṅkikā-pratipakṣena. Thereupon, in PV.3.16cd and PVSV. ad loc., he adds that: yady adṛśyā-phalaṁ taci ca yadi tena vipakṣe 'darśanānāṁ bhūyjayate tad anukte 'pi gamyate // Cf. also PVSV.(1).3.24–25 [p. 185]: tasmāt svaḥāvā-viprathandhād eva hetuḥ sādhvān gamayo, sa ca tad-bhāva-laksānas tad-upatti-laksānaḥ sa eva vādīḥ-bhāvo dyāntābhāyaḥ pradāryate.

45 NP.(2).2.1: tat tatra prākkhyāṃ prasiddhiḥ prasiddha-viśeṣana-viśeṣatāyāḥ vyavayā sādhatvavedāpi: pratyaksā-pratidhiḥ iti vākṣya-seṭaḥ.

The above Sanskrit reconstruction of PS.3.2 follows FRAUWALLNER (1957/b: 885) and TILLEMANS (1997: 178, n. 2). Tibetan text reads as follows: rahi gi bo bo kho na' bstan | bso' dod rahi gi chos can la | mron sum don dah rjes dpag day | yid chos grags pas ma kyi bo a || TILLEMANS 1997 reads nar. PS.3.2 must have been in its turn the source for NB.(2).3.37.

44 In PV.3.15 [p. 180] Dharmakirti first recalls the triple character of hetu defined by Dhinnaka in Nyāya-mukha: hetos tīvra api rāpeṣu niṣcayaḥ tena varṇitāḥ | asiddhi-viparītādy-hetu-tyāghicāri-vipakṣaḥ // Then (PV.3.16ab) he states the reason for expressing the concomitance by way of dissimilarity (vaidharmya-vacanam): vyabhicāri-vipakṣena vaidharmya-vacanam ca yat //, only to quote Dhinnaka in PVSV.(1).3.16ab: yad āha—eṣa tāvan nyāya yad udbhavaḥ vaktavaḥ virdhānaṅkikā-pratipakṣena iti. The rule is further explained by Dharmakirti in PVSV: as follows: sādharmya-vacanam viruddha-pratipakṣena, vaidharmya-vacanam anāṅkikā-pratipakṣena. Thereupon, in PV.3.16cd and PVSV. ad loc., he adds that: yady adṛśyā-phalaṁ taci ca yadi tena vipakṣe 'darśanānāṁ bhūyjayate tad anukte 'pi gamyate // Cf. also PVSV.(1).3.24–25 [p. 185]: tasmāt svaḥāvā-viprathandhād eva hetuḥ sādhvān gamayo, sa ca tad-bhāva-laksānas tad-upatti-laksānaḥ sa eva vādīḥ-bhāvo dyāntābhāyaḥ pradāryate.

43 Cfr. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957/b).
integral part of the logical reason (hetu), indispensable to generalize the general principle by taking recourse to its instantiations (relevant portions underlined): NB.(2).3.122: hetoḥ sapakṣa eva satavam asapakṣaḥ ca sarvavo vyāvartī rūpam utkam abhedena. punar viśeṣaṇa kārya-svabhāvavat ukta-laksanavat jana-tanmātrānubandhau darśanīyāv uktau. tac ca darśayaṇaḥ—yatra dhūmasa tattārghrin, asaty aghau na kvacid dhūma yathā mahānāśeṣāravat, ’yatra kṛtavatvam tattārṅitavat, anityatvābhāvō kṛtavatvāsamhavo yathā gahājākāśayov—iti darśanīyam. na hy anayathā sapakṣa-vipakṣayoh sad-asattve vyākāsā-prākārāṃ sāvyake darśayītum. yat-kārya-ñiyamah kārya-līghasya, svabhāva-līghasya ca svabhāvena vyāpith. asmiṃ cārthē darśite eva dhruvam bhavati, etāṃ-mātra-rūpāt nāśyati. Dharākriti expressed a similar idea already in his PV.3.27: tad-bhūva-hetu-bhāvau hi dhruveṇe tad-avedinah / khyāyete, viśuṣṭam vācyo hetur eva hi kevalah // Siddhasena, has to his credit that he clearly states the conditions of internal formal validity of the proof and dismisses the need to quote any instantiation: the proof is valid because the premises are valid and the relation between them is universally binding.

[12] Siddhasena states explicitly five conditions that invalidate pakṣa—and adds that there are, in fact, several varieties of pakṣābhāsā—in NA.21:

pratipadāyasya yaḥ siddhiḥ pakṣābhāso 'kṣa-līghataḥ / loka-sa-vacanābhyām ca bādhito 'nekaṭdā mātāḥ //

These five pakṣābhāsās are in concord with the list exemplified by Siddhaṃśi in NAV.: (1) pratipadāya-siddhiḥ, (2) pratayah-bādhiḥ, (3) anumāna-bādhiḥ, (4) loka-bādhiḥ, (5) sva-vacanā-bādhiḥ. Having enumerated five varieties of pakṣābhāsa, it would be redundant and pointless on Siddhasena’s part to say by way of recapitulation in a succinct kārikā that these varieties are numerous: anekādā mātāḥ, unless he had other varieties, not mentioned already by name, in mind. That being the case, he probably referred to other enumerations well-known from other sources.

In fact, Siddhasena’s enumeration overlaps with Dharākriti’s list of fallacies of the thesis, enumerated in NB.(2).49–53. Interestingly, Dharākriti subsequently (NB.(2).3.54) adds a few more conditions and the failure to meet them would

 render the pakṣa defective as well. Thus, Siddhasena—by anekādā mātāḥ—may have referred to Dharākriti’s catalogue of defective pakṣas. But not necessarily to Dharākriti’s. He may have as well referred, e.g. to NP.(2).3.1.50.

In any case, NA.21 can in no way attest that Siddhasena was posterior or prior to Dharākriti. It merely points to certain similarities between Siddhasena’s list and the Buddhist tradition. Probably, it was the tradition of Śaṅkaravāṃśi and Dharākriti that Siddhasena alluded to by anekādā mātāḥ.

[13] In Siddhasena’s subsequent aphorism, we find further similarities with NB., though they are less of linguistic nature (similarities in formulations) but rather of methodological character. Analogously to the structure of NB, Siddhasena—after describing fallacious theses—proceeds to discuss fallacious logical reasons (hēvābhabha). However, both the authors first look back to their previous definitions of a correct, not defective hetu:

NA.22: anyathānupamānīvatvam hetor lakṣanam īritam51 / tad-apratīti-sandhe-viparyāsais tad-abhātā //

NB.(2).3.55–56: tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānām parārthānumānam ity uktam52 tatra trayāṇām rūpānām ekāṣāyā rūpānyonkutau sādhanābhāsāḥ. ukāv apy asidduhau sandehe vā pratipādāya pratipādākayoḥ.

Incidentally, it is the only case in both works that the authors first remind the reader/hearer of the definition of a correct ‘syllogistic’ member/term, and only then deal with its particular fallacies.

Likewise incidentally, both the authors first state general factors that invalidate a correct hetu, either singly or jointly, and subsequently enumerate resulting fallacies one by one. There are two such general invalidating factors for Dharākriti, viz. asidduhi and sandhe (NB.3.56,109): various combinations (with regard to

svarūpābhāsāhitam vādina īśo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti pakṣa-lakṣanam anavadyaṁ darśitam bhavati.

50 sādhatvānumā 'pi pratayakṣa-viruddhāḥ pakṣābhāsah, tad yathā: (1) pratayah-viruddhāḥ, (2) anumāna-viruddhāḥ, (3) āsama-viruddhāḥ, (4) loka-viruddhāḥ, (5) sva-vacanā-viruddhāḥ, (6) aprasiddha-viśeṣaḥ, (7) aprasiddha-viśeṣaḥ, (8) aprasiddha-bhāsah, (9) prasiddha-sambhandhaḥ cēti iti tatra...

51 Either in NA.5 (according to Siddhaṃśi) or in NA.17 (hetos tathāpapatyāḥ vē syāt pravago 'nyathāḥ vē, see NAV. ad loc.: anyathāḥ vēy anenaśvayave samudāpyacarair anyathānupapattim īdvasya).

52 NB.3.1: tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānām parārthānumānam; cf. also NB.(2).2.5,11–12.
(trairūpya) are responsible for particular varieties of hevā-ābhāsa. For Siddhasena, however, there are three—polemically, as it were—such factors: tad-apratīti, sandeha and vipāryāsa; thus Dharmakīrtī’s asiddhi factor would seem to bifurcate into Siddhasena’s tad-apratīti and vipāryāsa. For instance, for Siddhasena the fallacies of NB.3.58 and 59b would be probably a case of vipāryāsa, whereas the fallacy of NB.3.60a should rather be considered a case of tad-apratīti. One could analyse all the remaining cases of fallacious hetas (ensuing from the combination of the factors asiddhi and sandeha) found in NB. and map them onto the triple classification of Siddhasena in the same manner. Practically, it would mean to decide which of the asiddhi cases of Dharmakīrti would correspond to tad-apratīti cases of Siddhasena, and which to his vipāryāsa cases. However, we do not have any explicit statement in the far too succinct NA., nor in NAV., that would provide us any algorithm of such a mapping, and the issue is open to our conjectures only.

Interestingly, in NP., for instance, to which NA. might be thought to have occasionally referred to, we do not find any sort of such invalidating factors as asiddhi and sandeha, or anything similar.

[14] Also NA.23 and the classification of particular varieties of hevā-ābhāsas points to secondary sources of Siddhasena’s ideas. There seem to be only two such potential sources, i.e. NB. and NP.:

NA.23: asiddhas tv apratityo yo ’nyathādvipāpapyade / viruddhā yo ’nyathā atra yuktō ‘nākāntikāh sa tu /

NB.2.3.109: evam esām trayāṇām rūpānām ekākasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpaya asiddhau sandehe vā yathā-yogam asiddha- viruddhānaikāntikās trayo hevā-ābhāsah.

NP.2.3.2. asiddhānaikāntika-viruddhā hevā-ābhāsah //

However, NB. is a more probable source, inasmuch as the sequence of fallacies (asiddha, viruddha, anākāntika) listed in NA. is exactly the same as that of NB.,

not of NP., where the two last varieties are interchanged (asiddha, anākāntika, viruddha). Dīnāṅga has the anicca (or sandigda) variety, instead of anākāntika. What is striking is that Siddhasena has only three varieties of hevā-ābhāsa, like Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkaravāmī, unlike Dīnāṅga. Moreover, Dharmakīrti outspokenly rejects Dīnāṅga’s subvariety, i.e. viruddhāvyabhācīrīn[53]. NB.2.3.110: viruddhāvyabhācīrī api samśaya-hetur uktāha sa iha kāsāmā nōktāh. We do not find any polemical trait in NA., which could even suggest that Siddhasena adopted Dharmakīrti’s criticism of viruddhāvyabhācīrī. Apparently he subscribed to the criticism unhesitatingly.

It is worth noticing that NA. diverges also from the tradition of Kumārila, whose triple classification—into asiddha, sandigda, viruddha in MSV.—is more akin to Dīnāṅga’s: MSV.5.4.75 p. 264 mentions the classification (samśaya-dvyāpa-rāya-h); subsequently (1) the threefold asiddha fallacious reason is mentioned in MSV.5.4.76–83ab; (2) sandigda and (3) viruddha occur in MSV.5.4.83cd-107 (e.g. in MSV.5.4.83cd: sandeha-viparitattva-hetvā cātra nirākṛta); besides, (2) sandigda is further found in MSV.5.4.84b-96b, whereas (3) viruddha is mentioned in MSV.5.4.96cd-107ab. Kumārila nowhere in the Anumāna-pariccheda system uses the term anākāntika as a hevā-ābhāsa, he has sandigda instead, like Dīnāṅga, unlike Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkaravāmī and Siddhasena. However, Pāthasārathi Miśra follows the general post-Dharmakīrtian typology in his classification, while commenting on Kumārila (p. 264.11 ad MSV.5.4.75): samprati hevā-ābhāsan asiddhānaikāntika-viruddhān prapācayant... [15] NA.24–25 reveal further similarities pointing to NB. as its possible inspiration. One of them is the phraseological affinity as regards the use of dṛṣṭānta-duṣṭa, instead of dṛṣṭānta-ābhāsa, in both works. Both Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti use the expression pākṣābhāsa as well as similarly tad-ābhā and hevā-ābhāsa. However, both of them deviate from the general use of derivatives of ābhās to technically denote logical fallacies, when they refer to dṛṣṭānta by the term duṣṭa, and to dṛṣṭānta only:


[53] cf. also RANDLE (1926: 68–69, 79.)
Indeed, also Śaṅkarasvāmin has drṣṭānta-doṣa twice, but in a slightly different context, viz. that of refutation. Generally, when he discusses fallacious examples, he uses the standard term drṣṭāntābhāsā, e.g. NP.3.3: drṣṭāntābhāsā dvivādha: sādharmanyena vaidhārmyena ca // The only two occurrences of drṣṭānta-doṣa are found in NP.(2).6.7

Conspicuously, drṣṭānta-doṣa occurs as the exemplification of dūṣanāni, in the series of sādhana-doṣa, pakṣa-doṣa, hetu-doṣa and drṣṭānta-doṣa. Another occurrence of doṣa (however, pratiṣṭhā-doṣa, not drṣṭānta-doṣa) in NP. is attested in the concluding lines of NP.(2).3.1, that summarise the discussion on pakṣādbhāsā. Also here, the term doṣa has a more general meaning than the technical term ābhasā, and the peculiarity of the usage of pratiṣṭhā-doṣa is confirmed by the closing uktāḥ pakṣādbhāsā. The usage of doṣā in NP. confirms the fact that in works preceding Diṇāga, Dharmakīrti or Śaṅkarasvāmin—e.g. in NS., VS., NBh., PBh., etc.—doṣa is employed to denote general defects and is not used specifically as a term in the sense of ābhasā.

[16] There is a structural similarity to be observed: both Siddhasaṅga (NA.24) and Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.122–3) explicitly define fallacious examples by referring to the definition of a correct hetu. Accordingly, NB.3.122 recapitulates the definition of correct hetu as well as conditions of its validity. The successive statement of NB.3.123 (etena drṣṭānta-doṣa api niraśat bhavanti; vide supra p. 37) shows that fallacious examples are refuted by referring to the correct definition of hetu, and all fallacies of the example share the same characteristic. Similarly, Siddhasaṅga relates the deficiency of drṣṭāntābhāsās to deficient logical reasons and, with apalakṣaṇa-hetūthāh, he expresses the idea known from the work of Dharmakīrti.

[17] Strangely, in NA.24–25 Siddhasaṅga refers to some tradition by nyāya-vid-iritāḥ as regards the classification of fallacious examples. However, there seems to have been no earlier (or contemporary) Jaina source he could have referred to. Thus, in default of any extant evidence attesting to a Jaina tradition which offered a typology of fallacious examples, one is prone to assume—unless we find any indication to the contrary—that, apparently, he must have referred to a general Indian tradition, where we do find such a typology of sādharmya- and vaidhārmya-drṣṭāntābhāsās.

Besides, he also seems to have taken it for granted that the reader/hearer could easily determine what is meant by sādhyāt-sādhana-vidyādhatu in NA.24. This task would normally be quite easy for anyone who was acquainted with NB.(2).3.124–125. At the same time, however, his elliptical formulation sādhyāt-viśāla-dhatu was, polemically as it were, unequivocal enough to rule out the three remaining varieties, viz. (A7) anarjana, (A8) apradariśṭānaya and (A9) viparītānaya, formulated by Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.126–127), which could by no means have been hinted at by the formulations of NA.24.

Similarly, the sixfold classification of dissimilar drṣṭāntābhāsās systematised in NA.25 (sādhyā-ṇāsā-hūṃ na-anvṛtāt ca sānśāyāt) closely corresponds to the first six fallacious examples of NB.(2).3.129–132: (V1) sādhyāyātātik, (V2) sādhanāyātik, (V3) sādhyā-sādhana-ātik, (V4) sāndīggha-sādhyā-ātik, (V5) sāndīggha-sādhana-ātik, (V6) sāndīggha-sādhyā-ātik. Seemingly, NA. and NB. are at variance as regards terminology, for Siddhasaṅga's formulation: sādhyā-ṇāsā-hūṃ na-anvṛtāt ca sānśāyāt differs from Dharmakīrti's (V1)–(V6). In my opinion, however, anvṛtāt and sānśāyāt of NA.25 indicate rather plainly sādhyā-ātik and sāndīggha-ātik as the last and first elements of the compounds (V1)–(V3) and (V4)–(V6), respectively. Optionally, we could have (V1) sādhyāyātātik, (V2) sādhanāyātik, (V3) sādhyā-sādhanāyātik, (V4) sānśāyāt-sādhana, (V5) sānśāyāt-sādhana, (V6) sānśāyāt-sādhyā-sādhana, which is not different at all from the idea expressed in NB.(2).3.129–132.


58 etāni vaćcanāni dharmar-svarupa-nirakaraṇa-mukheṇa pratīpādā āsanābhavaḥ sādhaṇa-vaiśpalyatāi cēti pratiṣṭhā-doṣaḥ // uktaḥ pakṣādbhāsāḥ //
As for another possible source of inspiration, also NP.(2).3.3 distinguished—in accord with the prevalent tradition of those days—two general categories: similar and dissimilar fallacious examples (द्रष्टान्ताभास द्विविधाह: साधनेया वादाभर्या ca //). However, a closer look at Śāntarakṣitī’s varieties reveals essential differences, apart from the terminological ones. Accordingly, I see no way how the formulations of fallacies of examples based on similarity found in Nyāya-praveda63 could be interpreted to have influenced Siddhasena’s sādhgyād-vikaladalaya. As regards Nyāya-praveda on fallacies of examples based on dissimilarity, the influence may have been restricted to (V1), (V2) and (V3) only.

[18] Also NA.26, where criticism / refutation (दुष्क) and its fallacy (दुष्काभास) are discussed, might have partly been inspired by Dharmakīrī’s NB.(2).3.137–140. Thus, NA.26a-c: वद्य-उक्ते साधने प्रकोट-दोषनाम उद्भवानाम / दुष्काभासं, reveals a certain similarity—in terms of both formulations and ideas—to the दुष्काभास-नामकam of NB.(2).3.137–138: /137/ दुष्काभासना न्यूनतादय-उक्ति, /138/ ये पुरव्य न्यूनतत्त्वादय दुष्काभासना-तक्तिः तस्मात् उद्भवानाम दुष्काभासान्. tena parastārtha-siddhi-pratibandhitâ. Less conspicuous, though, is the remaining portion of the second hemistich of NA.26: niravadye tu दुष्काभासनामकम //

commentators which we encounter in the case of NA.8: द्रष्टान्तव्याहताः वाक्याः paramārthabhādhyāyaḥ / satva-grhyāvyogānām mānān sādham pratikrtam // The aphorism is explained differently by the commentators, viz. (1) NAV. ad loc.: द्रष्टान्तं प्रमाणवॉलक्तेनै द्रष्टान्तव्याहतमां प्रतिपादययतः ‘यथात्स निराकारसं सामान्य वैर्य तत्-तत्क्री / and (2) NA., ad loc.: द्रष्टान्तव्याहतमां प्रतिपादययतः ‘यथात्स निराकारसं सामान्य वैर्य तत्-तत्क्री. Hence, it is obvious that the distinction NB.(2).3.137–138 is not directly reflected in NA.26, especially not in the second hemistich. Inasmuch as the distinction NB.(2).3.137–138 is not directly reflected in NA.26, especially not in the second hemistich, we may assume that the aphorism in NA.8 is not directly derived from the aphorism in NB.(2).3.137–138.

The corresponding दुष्काभास-नामकam of NB.(2).3.139–140 reads: /139/ दुष्काभासाः तु तत्तयाः /140/ abhūta-dosādhbhavānāṁ jāty-uttarānti. The reoccurring element दुष्काभास is not decisive at all, whereas Siddhasena’s niravadye could be a vague echo of Dharmakīrī’s abhūta-dosā.

As a matter of fact, NA.26c-d (niravadye tu दुष्काभासनामकम) betrays more affinity to the closing section of NP.(2).7: abhūta-sādhana-dosādhbhavānāṁ jāty-uttarānti // etānā दुष्काभासाः. na ha ebhiḥ para-pakṣo dāṣyate, niravadyatvāḥ tasya // ity uparāmyate // It is this section, in all probability, that influenced both Dharmakīrī’s NB.(2).3.139–140 (दुष्काभासाः तु तत्तयाः abhūta-dosādhbhavānāṁ jāty-uttarānti) and the portion of NA.26c-d in question.

[19] The twenty-sixth aphorism (the expositions of दुष्क) is the last section of the Nyāya-vāda, where possible influences from Dharmakīrī’s side—in terms of Siddhasena’s direct use of Dharmakīrī vocabulary or his response to Dharmakīrī’s ideas—are easily detectable. Strangely enough, the topic dealt with in NA.26 closely corresponds to the final issue discussed by Dharmakīrī in NB. Thus, the conspicuous absence of further possible Dharmakīrīan traces in NA.—theoretically derivable from other works of Dharmakīrī—points, in my opinion, to the fact that Siddhasena—while composing NA.—closely followed the structure and the contents of NB., up to NA.26.

In the remaining aphorisms (28–32) Siddhasena discusses issues peculiar to Jainism (viz. corollaries of kevala-jñāna and syād-vāda) and there could hardly have been any Buddhist influence to be noticed in any case: [27] the character of absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna); [28] the result of valid cognition in general; the results of absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna); the results of valid cognitive procedures other than kevala-jñāna; [29] the multiplex character of reality; the domain of cognitive acts; the domain of viewpoints (nayā); [30] the character of viewpoints (nayā); the description of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (syād-vāda); [31] the character of the cognitive subject, the soul (jīva); [32] the eternal character of Jain epistemology.

[20] The phrase pramāṇa-phala occurring in NA.28 is occasionally taken to be a proof of its dependence on Diānāga.64 It is commonly assumed that the phrase in
question goes back to Diānāga, e.g. PS.1(1.8cd–10)65. In these verses Diānāga asserts that the result of pramāṇa is pramāṇa itself, or introspective cognition which consists in the determining of an object (sva-saṁvitā, artha-nisacya). Precisely the same idea (ātmānabhāva, artha-viniścaya) is echoed in PV.2.306–307ab, 339b. Generally, the idea is discussed at length by Dharmakīrti both in his PVin.I(1).78.12–100.26 and in PV.2.301–366, 388–391. Accordingly, NA.28 might be taken to be a rejoinder of both Diānāga and Dharmakīrti, and there seems to nothing decisive to be found in NA.28 that would exclude any of the two authors.

On the other hand, any attempt to look for inspiration of NA.28 in works of either Diānāga or Dharmakīrti seems to me to be a result of misapprehension of the true import of the aporrhos. In it, Siddhasena does not discuss the problem whether pramāṇa-phala can or cannot be equated with pramāṇa itself, which is the major concern of Diānāga and Dharmakīrti. What is intended in the verse are rather epistemological issues of both soteriological (kevala) and mundane (śeṣa) character, viz. the result of pramāṇa is 'the cessation of nescience' (aṭṭhāna-viniśvartana), whereas the result of specific kinds of cognition is two-fold. The first category subsumes happiness and indifference (sukhāpekṣa) in case of the perfect knowledge (kevala), being a prerequisite of liberation (mokṣa) and commonly taken by the

65 savāyāpāra-pratitivāt prameyānāṃ phalam eva sat // sva-saṁvitāḥ phalāṃ vātra tad-rūpo hy artha-nisacyaḥ / visaya-kāratavāsya prameyānāṃ tena miyate // yad-āŚhāsaṁ prameyayām tad prameyā-phalate punah / grāhakāhāra-saṁvitī trayayā nātāḥ prihak-kṛtam //. For the Sanskrit text, see HATTOKI (1968: 97, n. 1.55–107, n. 1.67). Tibetan text reads as follows:

Vasudharanksita/Sēi-rgyal 15a.5–15b.4: Kanakavaranman/Dad-paṭi śes-rab 95b.5–96a.5:

bya daṅ bcas par rtogs paṅ phyir ||
bya daṅ bcas par rtogs paṅ phyir ||

tshad maṅ hbras bu ni du gbsd || hbras bu ni du yod tshad maṅ ||

raṅ rig la yin hdi hbras bu || yin na raṅ rig hdi hbras bu ||

dey ni bo las don nes || dey ni bo las don nes ||

yul gvi snaṅ ba ḡdi ḡdi || yul gvi snaṅ ba ḡdi ḡdi ||

tshad ma de yis ḡjol bar byed || tshad ma de yis ḡjol bar byed ||

gan ti snaṅ ba de gsal bya || gan ti snaṅ ba de gsal bya ||

tshad ma de daṅ deḥi hbras bu ni || tshad ma de daṅ deḥi hbras bu ||

ḥdms nram rig pa de yi phyir || ḡḥdms nram rig pa de yi phyir ||

degs thong daṅ du ma ḡyas || degs thong daṅ du ma ḡyas ||
There is, in the first place, a continuous tradition in epistemoc concepts referred to by both Dharmakirti and Siddhasena that go back to Diinn̄ga. Dharmakirti himself refers to Diinn̄ga so explicitly that would seem highly implausible to believe that he had availed himself of the Jaina epistemological tradition with respect to the number of points mentioned above in §§ 1–20, without even a single mention of it: one would expect Dharmakirti embarking on at least an indicative discussion of a few issues he had supposedly taken over from the Jinas. Secondly, Satkari Mookerjee, who believed Siddhasena to flourish in the sixth century and to precede Dharmakirti, puzzled over what was in his opinion Dharmakirti’s lack of reaction as regards Siddhasena’s interpretation of the intrinsic invariable comcomitance (antar-vyāpi) and the superficial character of the example as an exemplification (bahir-udāhṛti) external to the most elementary constituents of the proof formula, as well as the definition of the logical reason as ‘inexplicability otherwise’. This becomes no longer a query when we assume that Siddhasena was post-Dharmakirtiian. Moreover, it is for precisely the same reason that also Pāṭrasvāmin should be taken to flourish after Dharmakirti. Thirdly, the concepts of svārīha-vākya and parārīha-vākya (NA.10) as well as svārīha-pratyakṣa and parārīha-pratyakṣa (NA.11) would have with certainly evoked a refutal from the side of Dharmakirti, had he known about it. Likewise, Dharmakirti would have certainly commented upon the idea of non-erroneousness of inference (anumānaṃ . . . abhāvaṇaṃ) proven by its being a cognitive criterion alone (pramāṇa-vādā), found in NA.5. The same holds true for the idea of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānapannatva). Thus, any supposition that Siddhasena preceded Dharmakirti can safely be dismissed.

Accordingly, depending on whether we follow the widely accepted dating of Dharmakirti, viz. c. 600–660 or the results of latest research by Kimura (1999) who assigns the years 550–620 for Dharmakirti, we would have for the terminus post quem Siddhasena as the author of the Nyāyāvaiṇāvācirca 620 or 660, respectively.

There is still another factor to be taken account of, viz. the question of the definitor of the logical reason (hetu) characterised as ‘the fact of being otherwise inexplicable’, or ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānapannatva.

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69 See: Mookerjee (1935: 4–5): ‘What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena’s reference to antarvyāpi and the definition of hetu (prohibans) as anyathānapannatva in the verse 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing short of enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakirti.’


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anyathānapannatva in NA.22: anyathānapannatvam hetor laṅgam irdat. The author clearly refers to an earlier source and the idea did not originate with him in his NA. Independently, we find the idea reported and critisised by Śāntarakṣita in Tats.(1).1364 ff. (p. 405 f.) in the context of the validity of inference (anumānaṃ). The most famous and relatively often quoted verse is Tats.1369:

anyathānapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim / nayathānapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim /

Significantly enough, Śāntarakṣita Tats.(1).1364, p. 405.1 mentions Pāṭrasvāmin as the source of the idea: anyathā-hetāni pāṭrasvāmin-matam aśānke ... , and the treatise in question is the lost Tri-laṅga-kadartana by Pāṭrasvāmin, identified occasionally with Pātraksarī / Pātraksarīvāmin = Vidyānanda. For obvious reasons this Pātraśvāmin cannot be Vidyānanda (c. 850), the author of the Śokavārttika, Tadvārttika or Umāvāli’s Tadvārttika-sūtra—as Sūkha-Doshi (1928) and Chatterjee (1978: 331) would have it—but some else who preceded Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788) since the author of NA. alludes to his
with erroneousness of pramāṇas, etc. The use of vocabulary in NA.4 is not unusual for NA. Coincidentally, two adjacent verses, viz. NA.4 and NA.5, are stylistically and structurally quite akin: pāda a-b: ‘reason’ (aparokṣataya, sūdhāvanā-bhuno tiṣṭa) + ‘object + verbal derivative in the meaning of a present participle’ (arthaya grāhakam, sūḍha-niscayakam) + ... + pāda c: ‘subject’ (pratayakṣam, annamāni) ... Admittedly, the similarity is not a crucial argument in favour of the same authorship of the two verses, however, there is nothing that could speak against a common authorship. The argument gains on strength in view of the fact that Haribhadraśrī quotes the verse no. 2 of NA. in his Aṣṭaka\textsuperscript{79} and refers to its author as Mahāmāti\textsuperscript{80}.

In view of the above, DHAKY’s (1995: 44) claim\textsuperscript{81}—to handle the discomfort that Haribhadra himself ascribes one of the verses to a Mahāmāti—that both NA.2 and 4 were taken from lost dvātriniśkās of Siddhasena Divākara is highly debatable to me. Not only NA.4 seems to represent an original kārikā of NA., but the same holds good in the case of kārikā 2. We could not make head or tail of NA.2 (the objection) if we did not have NA.1. Moreover, NA.3 (the rejoinder) would be pointless without NA.2. All the lost dvātriniśkās of Siddhasena Divākara as a reference source in


\textsuperscript{80} Upadhye (1971: xxiv) is right to point out ‘that Haribhadra, in his Aṣṭaka, quotes the Nīyāvātāra 2, by referring to its author as Mahāmāti. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Sanmaiti as Divākara and Śrutakevalī. This enforces the supposition against the authorship of Siddhasena Divākara of NA.

\textsuperscript{81} A formidable objection, however, to the above-postulated identification (Siddharṣi was the author of both NA. and NAV.—P.B.) as well as the period determination (nineth/tenth century for NA.—P.B.) can be raised on the grounds of the ascription of a verse, which appears as the kārikā 2 of the Nīyāvātāra, to Mahāmāti (= Siddhasena Divākara) by Yākinśināra Haribhadra sūri (active c. A. D. 745–785) in his Aṣṭaka.\textsuperscript{82} And the kārikā 4 figures as a part of the Śaḍdarṣana-samuccaya of the same Haribhadra sūri. Since Haribhadra sūri ascribed the particular verse (kārikā 2) to Siddhasena Divākara, it must be so. However, this kārikā could be originally from some dvātriniśkā, one of the lost 11 of Siddhasena Divākara, perhaps the Pramāṇa-dvātriniśkā, from which Gandhārjati Siddhasena quotes in his sa-bhāṣya-Tattvavādīśhīgama-sūtra-vṛtti.\textsuperscript{83} The kārikā 4 in the Saḍ-darṣana-samuccaya may likewise have been taken from one of the unavailable dvātriniśkās of Siddhasena Divākara. Alternatively, if that verse is Haribhadra’s own, Siddharṣi must have borrowed it from the Śaḍdarṣana. In any case, Haribhadra and Siddhaṛṣi could have common sources from which they apparently may have drawn.'

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Mukhtar (1948) [according to Upadhye (1971: 30)]; ‘Ng The Nyāyāvatāra is composed centuries later than the Sanmaiti-sūtra, because it shows the influence of Pāṇaśāmī (later than Sanmaitahadra) as well as Dharmakirti and Dharmottara’; and V.P. Jhruparukar (‘Introduction’ to VTP., pp. 41 ff.) quoted in n. 5 above. See also Dhaky (1995: 42–3): ‘...the first foot of the kārikā 22 concerning the hetu-lakṣaṇa (character of probans) reflects sense-agreement, even partial verbal concordance with the verses from Pāṇaśāmī’s (Pāṇaśāmī’s) Trīkānakṣa$kātkaramdanta cited by the Buddhist scholar Sāntarakṣita in his Tatvatāsvāgraha (c. 2 nd quarter of the 8th century A. D.).’ Shastri (1990: 31) is a bit more reserved and does not take for granted that Pāṇaśāmī was anterior to Siddhasena: Nyāyāvatāra also defines hetu in the same manner.

\textsuperscript{78} Both NA.1 and 4 go against the prevalent Jaina tradition to subsume cases of sensory cognition, inference and verbal testimony under parokṣa, whereas pratyakṣa was taken to denote extra-sensory and extra-mental acts of cognition (viz. avadhāti, manas-paryaya and kevala). For Siddhasena the criterion of directness (aksya) was not the cognising subject, but the soul (aksya=fīva=ūśman), but—like in the general pramāṇa tradition—the senses (aksya=indriya).
argumentation resemble rather a kind of śāṣa-viṣāṇa. Naturally, as long as we do not have all dvāraṁīśi-kās written by Siddhāsena Divākara, we cannot, theoretically speaking, preclude the possibility that the verses indeed were taken from some lost dvāraṁīśi-kās. But such an argumentation is not very constructive. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of kārikās 2 and 4 as long as they form a consistent logical part of the Nyāyāvatāra as a whole and bear stylistic similarities to adjacent kārikās, especially when the counter-arguments begin with ‘perhaps’ and are of merely could-or-may-have-been nature.

Further, the identification of Siddhārṣi as the author of both NA. and NAV., postulated by D. H. A. K. Y., has very weak foundations. In the first place, there is ample evidence that Siddhārṣi (the author of NAV.) is not Siddhāsena (the author of NA.) and that the two texts were written by different authors, inasmuch as Siddhārṣi refers to the author of NA, explicitly, although not by name, but by the term ācārya or śūra-kṛt, to cite a few cases only.[1] Introductory lines of NAV. 3: /3/ adhunācārya gṛhitas tāvakino ‘bhiprayo ‘sīmābhīr iti paraṁ prayāyahams tan-matam anuvṛtasya tād evaṁsamanānaṁ tathāpi laksana-kēth śāpurasya āvedayanā iva ... /2/ the final sentence of NAV. 3: tath evaṁ pramāna-laksanaṁ sāṃsavya pratipādya tataṁ gataṁ kuchyāṁ paryahāry ācāryayena /3/ NAV. 13: yad vāyantaḥbhāsana parikarmait-mattivā tāvadātā prastuta-prameyam avabudhyate, tadā hetu-pratipādana eva kriyāte, sāsākhādhāsya śrot-saṁkārākārēyāyā naivairakalyāyā ityādaru hetu-pratipādanā śīrā-kṛtā parābhām anumānam uktam /4/ NAV. 29: atā evācāryasya na tal-laksanā śīrā-kṛtā-kathane ‘pi mahāvānāraḥ. Additionally, in some cases (e.g. on NA. 8), Siddhārṣi does offer at least two different interpretations of a kārikā, or diverges from the contents of NA., e.g. in the case of NA. 4d[4].

Thus, we can safely take the date-brackets for the Nyāyāvatāra to be firmly fixed after 620 C.E. (Dharmakīrti) and Pātrasvāmin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadraśīr). As for the date of Haribhadraśīr, J. Acosta (1926: Introduction) assigns Haribhadra to c. 750, whereas U. Pādhye (1971: xxiv) to c. 750-800 C.E. and D. H. A. K. Y. (1995: 44) to c. 745-785. However, the termiṇus post quem for Haribhadra is Arcaṇa since the latter is quoted in Haribhadraśīr’s NPV. 9.15-19[5]. Arcaṇa, the teacher of Dharmottara, can be assigned to c. 730-790 or 720-780. Finally, as regards the name of the author of the Nyāyāvatāra, we are indeed in a quandary. Probably the earliest indication of his name is, as it has been mentioned above (p. 47), Haribhadraśīr who makes mention of him under the appellation ‘Mahāmāti’. The subsequent source from which we learn that NA. was composed by a Siddhāsena is NAV. of Sāntiśīr. The author of NA. is explicitly identified there in at least four places[6]. In the same context Sāntiśīr is even more specific to give the full name of the author as well: Siddhāsena[7]. All other references we

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[4] Siddhāsena emphasises the way of cognising, or ‘the manner of grasping [an object]’, whereas Siddhārṣi takes the expression to refer to the existence and the nature of the cogniscible. See p. 26 above.

[5] Thus, I cannot but side with the opinion already expressed in Vaidya (1928: xx): ‘The termiṇus a quo would be the date of Dharmakīrti and the termiṇus ad quem that of Haribhadra.’


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[8] Indeed, Sāntiśīr speaks of Siddhāsena, not of Siddhāsena Divākara, as U. Pādhye (1971: xxiv) would have it: ‘iii ... The earliest author, as far as I know, who specifies the name of Siddhāsena Divākara as the author of the Nyāyāvatāra is Sāntiśīr of the 11th century A.D. or so.’ Nevertheless, I would side with U. Pādhye in asserting that ‘Arka’ is just another name for ‘Divākara’. Thus, I see absolutely no justification for the contention of D. H. A. K. Y. (1995: 49, n. 9), who commenting on the clause: siddhasena eva jagaj-jantu-mano-mohā-saṁta-sāmasāmaḥ-saṁahāpako-kārītvā
encounter in the Jaina literature of this period are to Siddhasena Divākara as the author of other works, but none to him as the author of NA.90 In view of the extant evidence, the opinion of Mukhar (1948)91 still holds good that the author of the Nyāyāvatāra is apparently different from the author of the Sanmati-tarka-prakarana and from the author of the twenty-one dvārāniśśikās ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara. Strangely enough, the available colophons of NA. and NAV. contain no reference to the name of the author of NA. Since even the point is not clear whether the author of NA. was a Siddhasena, not to mention the problem of deciding which Siddhasena he could have been,92 I would—for the sake of convenience—suggest to tentatively call the author of the Nyāyāvatāra Siddhasena Mahāmati, after the specific identification of Haribhadraśāri.

90 Cf., e.g. [1] Upadhye (1971: xiii): ‘Haribhadra is one of the earlier authors to mention Siddhasena Divākara and his Sanmati. First, he calls him Sūta-kevalin; and secondly, he tells us that his name was Divākara (p. *1). Then he has a pun on the name that he was like Divākara, sun, to the darkness of Duśṣāma-kāla.’ [2] Upadhye (1971: xvii): ‘...Pūjya-tipāda ...quotes Siddhasena’s Stuti III.16 in his Sarvārtha-siddhi (II.10; VII.13).’ [3] H. R. Kāpādī (AJP., ‘Introduction’, Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.): ‘Haribhadra refers to Siddhasena in his Sammapayaram, in his Anekāntajayapatākā as well as in his Pañcavatthuya (vv.1047–8), calling him Sūtra-kevalin. Jādidasgajā (c. 676 A.D.) refers to him thrice in his Mīśāhavīkṣeṣa-citram.’ [4] Dave (1962): ‘So Siddhasena is earlier than Mallāvati and the tradition puts him as a contemporary of Viṇāmāditya who flourished in 57 B.C.’ (according to Upadhye (1971:*55)) and ‘Akalakāśika and Vidiyānanda quote the Sanmati.’ (according to Upadhye (1971:*59)).

91 ‘The following points are clear: (1) The Dvās were not composed in the present order, (2) they are not of one and the same Siddhasena; (3) the Nyāyāvatāra is one of them; (4) No indisputable evidence is brought forth for the common authorship of the Dvās, Nyāyāvatāra and Sanmati.... There were thus three clear and distinct Siddhasenas: (1) the author of Sanmati; (2) the author of Nyāyāvatāra; (3) and another, the author of some Dvās.’ (according to Upadhye (1971:*28)).

92 It is not established that Arka was indeed used by Sāntistri as a synonym of Divākara.
DMPr.
= Pandita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottara-pradīpa [being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu], Ed. by Pt. Dalukhbhai Malvania, Kashī Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1971.

FRANCO 1987

FRANCO 1997

FRAUWALLNER 1933

FRAUWALLNER 1957a

FRAUWALLNER 1957b

FRAUWALLNER 1961

FRAUWALLNER 1982

GRANOFF 1989–1990

HATTORI 1968

HB.

JACOBI 1926

KIMURA 1997

KRAUSE 1948

KUNST 1939

MALVANIA 1979

MATILAL 1985

MAV.

MAV.Bh.
= Vasubandhu: Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya. See MAV.

Met.

MOOKERJEE 1935

MOOKERJEE 1971

MSA.

MŚV.

MUKTHAR 1948
ON THE DATE OF THE NYĀYAVĀTĀRA


PVSV. = Dharmakīrti: Pramāṇa-vārttika-svāya-jā-vṛtti. See: PV.

PVV. = Manorātharāmanidīn: Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti. See: PV.


ON THE DATE OF THE NYÅVÅTÅRA

TILLEMANS 1997


TS.


TSA.


TSAp.

Kamalaśīla: Tatvārtha-saṅgraha-pañjikā. See: TSA.

TŚVA.


UPADHYE 1971


VAIDYA 1928


VMS.

Vasubandhu: Vinayasikā. See: VMS.

VUSH.


VS.


VTP.


WAYMAN 1996


WILLIAMS 1963


SCHMITHAUSEN 1987


ŚDSa.


SHASTRI 1990


STEINKELLNER-KRASSER 1989


STEINKELLNER-MUCH 1995


SUKHLAL 1945/a


SUKHLAL 1945/b


SUKHLAL–DOSHI 1928


TABER 1994


TBh.

Umāsvātī: Tatvārthādhikāma-bhāṣya. See TS.

TBV.