

On the Date of the *Nyāyavatāra*

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ

The *Nyāyavatāra*, a work in thirty-two verses—and hence also called *Dvātrimśikā*—ascribed by tradition to Siddhasena Divākara, is deemed to open a new cra in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is mostly in the realm of Jaina epistemic pursuits that the *Dvātrimśikā* might claim the status of an innovative or prototypical work. When we, however, consider the development of logic and epistemology in India on a larger scale, the work seems to lose its flavour of originality and novelty.

The problem of the exact dating of the *Nyāyavatāra*¹ should be solved independently, irrespective of whether the work can be accurately ascribed to a Siddhasena (Divākara?), the celebrated author of a series of *Dvātrimśikās*, to a Siddhasena (Divākara?), the author of the *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* or to some other Siddhasena (?). Just to mention in passing, several features of the *Nyāyavatāra* and the *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* evince a discrepant attitude towards the Jaina Canon and tradition of both works, different choice of vocabulary, which was not necessitated by the use of different languages (Sanskrit and Prakrit), and the notions and ideas they use are likewise at variance. Accordingly, it seems to me that both works must have apparently been written by two different people.²

¹ The most comprehensive bibliographic survey of publications on Siddhasena Divākara is furnished by UPADHYE (1971) in his 'Introduction' (pp. xi-xxvii) and 'Bibliographic Survey' (pp. *3-*72). A few more publications have been published since the review: MOOKERJEE (1971), DHAKY (1981-82), GRANOFF (1989-1990), DHAKY (1990), DHAKY (1995) and WAYMAN (1996).

² The question has been discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). A detailed comparison of the contents, style and philosophical background of Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyavatāra* and Siddhasena *Mahāmāti's *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* (vide *infra* p. 47 f.), brings me to the conclusion that these two works were written by two different persons. Following the findings presented in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), esp. in view of the lack of any hint that the author of STP. knew of Dīnnāga, I would maintain that STP. must have been composed slightly before or circa 500 C.E.

On subsequent pages I shall try to establish the chronology of the *Nyāyāvatāra* and its correlation to other, mostly Buddhist, works.

There is a variance of opinions regarding the date of Siddhasena as the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the date of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, and these fall in four groups: (1) Siddhasena was pre-Diñnāga³, (2) Siddhasena flourished soon after Diñnāga and before Dharmakīrti⁴, (3) Siddhasena belongs to a post-Dharmakīrtian tradition⁵, whereas (4) some hold that his date is still an open question⁶.

The first to notice some chronological dependence of NA was JACOBI (1926: iii), who observed that 'To about the same time [i.e. Śaka-year 598 = 677 C.E.—P.B.] belongs Siddhasenadivākara whom Haribhadra quotes; for he uses, no doubt Dharmakīrti¹, though he does not name him.' There are two points, according to him, that justify such a conclusion: (1) Siddhasena (NA.5) applies the term *abhrānta*—and Dharmakīrti was the first to use it in his definition of *pratyakṣa*, thus improving upon Diñnāga's definition⁷—to both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*; (2) Siddhasena (NA.11⁸) 'extends the distinction of *svārtha* and *parārtha*, which properly applies to *anumāna* only, to *pratyakṣa* also, ibidem 12 f. Apparently, he thought to improve on Dharmakīrti by a wholesome generalisation of nice distinctions!' (JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1)). VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx) elaborates upon JACOBI's laconic remarks. (3) He further brings up one more important point:

'...verses 6 and 7 above of *Nyāyāvatāra* unmistakably presuppose Dharmakīrti and the later phase of the Yogācāra school, as, without them, it is difficult for us to explain why Siddhasena Divākara is required to these views and emphatically declare:

सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धिः स्फुटम्।

प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥ ७ ॥' (p. xx).

³ E.g. SUKHLAL (1945/a) and SUKHLAL (1945/b), H. R. Kāpadiā (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.), KRAUSE (1948), DAVE (1962), SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928), WILLIAMS (1963: 19), MATILAL (1985: 241).

⁴ E.g. Malvania (NASV., 'Introduction', pp. 141 f.) and QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178).

⁵ E.g. JACOBI (1926), VAIDYA (1928), MUKTHAR (1948), V.P. Johrapurkar ('Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.).

⁶ UPADHYE (1971: xxv).

⁷ PS.1.C,k3c-d: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdham nāma-jāty-ādy-asamyuktam*, and NB.1.4: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdham abhrāntam*, respectively.

⁸ Not NA.12, as VAIDYA (1928: xviii, line 16) has it.

On my part, I would only add that also NA.31 (*pramātā svānya-nirbhāsī*) must have been inspired by similar thoughts as NA.7.

The first argument is sound. Admittedly, the idea of *abhrāntatva* of perception was latent in pre-Dharmakīrti's literature⁹, but Dharmakīrti was the first to use the term.¹⁰ If we were to take this latency of *abhrāntatva* as a serious counter-

⁹ The term *bhrānta* (*bhrānti*) itself is attested in the pre-Dharmakīrtian literature, for instance in MAVBh.1.4; SacAcBh.(2).2 and in several places of MSA. and Comm. thereon (11.13a, 11.15, 11.17, 11.24–26, Comm. ad 10.2 and ad 11.27). In all such passages, however, the term *bhrānti* does not occur in the context of *pramāṇa*, still less of valid perception (*pratyakṣa*), in the first place. The term refers either to a general error based on the perceiving of subject-object duality in the world (*dvaya-bhrānti*), and is synonymous to *māyā* (in MSA.), or to the nature of the cognised object (MAVBh.1.4). The latter rests on a rather subtle difference: erroneous is not the cognition as such (the emphasis on the inner, cognitive aspect, viz. erroneous correspondence of an act of cognition), but the way an object is constituted in the cognition (the emphasis on the 'outer', 'objective' side). In none of these texts where we come across the term *bhrānti* is the idea of cognitively valid procedures (*pramāṇa*) discussed; at the most, it points to an antithesis of a general, soteriologically relevant outlook of a person, viz. *citta-bhrānti* / *bhrāntam cittam* / *kṣipta-cittam* (SacAcBh.(2).2). This is confirmed by the application of the past passive participle to people MSA.11.18 (*loko hy abhrāntaḥ*), as loci of *bhrānta-citta*. To sum up, none of the occurrences of the term (*a*)*bhrānta* in Yogācāra works seems to have been an inspiration for Siddhasena.

¹⁰ An interpretation of non-erroneousness (*abhrāntatva*) is offered by Dharmottara in NBT.3.2: *abhrāntam artha-kriyā-kṣame vastu-rūpe viparyastam ucyate. artha-kriyā-kṣamam ca vastu-rūpam sanniveśōpādhi-varṇātmakam. tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad abhrāntam*. Thus, there are two pivotal aspects of *abhrāntatva*, the lack of contrariety (*aviparyastatva*) and its reference to a thing capable of efficient action (*artha-kriyā-kṣama-vastu*). The first element, viz. the lack of contrariety, or correspondence to facts, may be taken to have been preconceived in the idea of *avyabhicāritva* in the non-Buddhist literature as early as NS.1.1.4 (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*) and NBh. ad loc. (*yad atasmīn tad iti tad vyabhicāri, yat tu tasmin tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti*). This tendency can be also observed in Jaina sources, e.g. in TBh.1.32 (p. 30.6, p. 31.1–2): *jñāna-viparyayo jñānam iti ... mithyā-darśana-parigrahaḥ viparīta-grāhakatvam eteṣām (= viparyayānām). tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti*. See also PVin.I(1).4 (p. 40, n. 1).

However, the second element *artha-kriyā-samartha*, the capability to execute efficient action, is Dharmakīrti's innovation, see PV.1.3: *pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam artha-kriyā-sthitiḥ / avisaṁvādanam śābde 'py abhiprāya-nivedanāt* //, as well as PV.2.3: *artha-kriyā-samartham yat tad atra paramārtha-sat / anyat saṁvṛti-sat proktaṁ te sva-sāmanya-lakṣaṇe* // . Cf. also HATTORI (1968: 14): 'The concept of "artha-kriyā" is

argument—which seems totally unconvincing to me—it would imply that Siddhasena chose the term *abhrānta* intuitively and applied it indiscriminately to both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, as if he had adumbrated that Dharmakīrti would once qualify perception as a non-erroneous cognition and inference as erroneous. Coincidentally, his way of expression would tally with the actual term used by Dharmakīrti, who would follow him!

Whereas I completely agree with JACOBI-VAIDYA's first argument, their second argument is not entirely convincing to me. Indeed, we cannot understand the idea of *svārtha-vākya* and *parārtha-vākya* (NA.10) as well as *svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *parārtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.11) without Dīnāga's and Dharmakīrti's well-known division of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. It should suffice to remind the reader of NB.2.1–2: /1/ *anumānam dvividhā*. /2/ *svārtham parārtham ca*. and of NB.3.1–2: /1/ *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam*. /2/ *kāraṇe kāryōpacārāt*.

There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the idea of *vākyasya parārthatvaṃ* necessarily presupposes the idea of *vākyasya svārthatvaṃ*, and that both these concepts—expressed in NA.10 ff.: *parārtham mānam ākhyātām vākyam*—could only have been developed in the context of *svārtha*-⁹ and *parārthānumāna*.

However, the idea of *svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *svārthānumāna* / *parārthānumāna*—central for JACOBI-VAIDYA's reasoning—which is a prerequisite for Siddhasena to establish the thesis of *parārtha-pratyakṣa*, predates Dharmakīrti and is found also in the *saṅgraha-śloka* (iti *śāstrārtha-saṅgrahaḥ*) of *Nyāya-praveśa* of Dīnāga's disciple, Śaṅkarasvāmī¹¹.

unfamiliar to Dignāga, but it is an important criterion for the distinguishing of “*sva-lakṣaṇa*” from “*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*” in Dharmakīrti's system of thought.”, HATTORI (1968: 79 § 1.14) and FRANCO (1987: 445 n. 203), esp.: ‘the concept of *arthakriyā* does not appear anywhere in Dignāga's writings.’

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti's definition does go back to the usage of the term *bhrānta* in the Yogācāra school; his novelty was to mould it to the demands of his *pramāṇa* theory. We should remember about his idea that *anumāna* is *bhrānta* (cf. PVin.II(1).2.6–7, p. 24.6–7: *de ma yin la der ḥdzin phyir || ḥkhrul kyan ḥbrel phyir tshad ma ḥid ||* = *atasmims tad-graho bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā ||*), which is a proper point of reference here, not the nature of *citta* / *vijñāna*.

¹¹ *sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ cāiva sābhāsaṃ para-saṃvide / pratyakṣam anumānam ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātma-saṃvide ||*. As for a possible objection that the verse might be later, at least the commentator Haribhadra takes it to be a genuine part of the original work (NP.(1). p. 9.12 ff.): ...*ity ādāv eva ślokaḥ*, etc.

Certainly it is not Śaṅkarasvāmī who developed the concept of *svārtha*-⁹ and *parārthānumāna*. It was probably fathomed by Vasubandhu¹², but terminologically conceived and worked out by Dīnāga¹³.

There are, however, two other traits to be noticed in the aphorisms NA.10–11 that point, in my opinion, to Dharmakīrti as their source. The first of them is the idea of metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) used in a very similar context. Siddhasena speaks of the term ‘inference for others’ (*parārtham mānam*)—which denotes, to be precise, the inferential cognition arisen in another person as a result of an argumentative procedure and/or debate—which is applied through metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) to a ‘syllogistic’ sentence (*vākyam*), that is, as a matter of fact, merely a cause of such a cognition in another person. We come across the same idea in NB.3.1–2, and even the wording is to a certain extent similar (one should here take into account stylistic differences necessitated by the succinct *sūtra* style and versified *kārikās*). Below, both passages in question are given for the sake of convenience, relevant expressions being underlined:¹⁴

/NA.10/ *sva-niścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayōtpādanam budhaiḥ /
parārtham mānam ākhyātām vākyam tad-upacārataḥ ||*

NB.3.1–2: *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam. kāraṇe kāryōpacārāt.*

Dharmottara's gloss confirms the interpretation: *kāraṇa* = *vacana* = *vākya*; *kārya* = [*parārtha*] *anumāna* = *parārtha-māna*.¹⁵ Siddharṣi, whose comments are in a similar spirit, even quotes a verse, that establishes the relation between speech (*kāraṇa*) and resulting cognition (*kārya*)¹⁶. Another striking feature is that the

¹² Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933: 476–477 [297–298]) and HATTORI (1968: 12, n. 60).

¹³ E.g.: PS.2.1ab: *anumānam dvividhā svārtham tri-rūpāl liṅgato parārthānumānam tu sva-dṛṣṭārtha-prakāśanam*; also PS.3.1ab, and PSV.2, K 109a.2–3 = V 27a.5 (*svārthānumāna*): *tshul gsum paḥi rtags las rjes su dpag paḥi don* (V: *rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don*) *mthoñ ba gañ yin pa de ni rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo*. Cf. RANDLE (1926: 28–9), HATTORI (1968: 78, n. 1.11) and Steinkellner's note 1, p. 21 in PVin.II(2).

¹⁴ In my analysis throughout I shall use, for the sake of brevity, underlining to mark corresponding phrases in NA. and works of Dharmakīrti or of other authors.

¹⁵ NBṬ.3.2, p. 150.12–151.1: *tasmin kāraṇe vacane kāryasyānumānasyōpacārāḥ samāropāḥ kriyate. tataḥ samāropāt kāraṇam vacanam anumāna-śabden ōcyate. aupacārikam vacanam anumānam, na mukhyam ity-arthaḥ.*

¹⁶ *vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ /
kārya-kāraṇatā teṣāṃ nārtham śabdāḥ sprśanty api ||*

The verse is so far untraced, but it refers most probably to another verse by Dharmakīrti, and—at any rate—to an idea expressed in PV.1.286.

reference to the idea of the metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) occurs in both works (NA. and NB.) precisely at the moment of introducing the discussion of *parārtha-anumāna* and that this is the only occurrence of this idea in both works. Neither the term nor the idea as such is encountered at any other point.

Further, VAIDYA's third point is rather weak, as well. He says: 'These verses [NA.6-7—P.B.] contain the favourite view of the Yogācāra School on the subject and the object (grāhya and grāhaka), which both they declare illusory. This view is dependent on the definition of pratyakṣa, and though its origin must be sought in Dīnnāga's works [emphasis—P.B.], the scholars who brought the idea to perfection are Dharmapāla and his pupil Dharmakīrti.' (p. xix). Indeed, we find the idea referred to by VAIDYA in Dīnnāga's works, e.g. in his PS.1.10¹⁷ (cf. n. 63):

Vasudhararakṣita/Señ-rgyal 15b.4: Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 96a.4-5:

<i>gañ tshe snañ ba de gsal bya </i>	<i>gañ ltar snañ ba de gsal bya </i>
<i>tshad ma dañ deḥi ḥbras bu ni </i>	<i>tshad ma dañ deḥi ḥbras bu ni </i>
<i>ḥdsin rnam rig pa de yi phyir </i>	<i>ḥdsin rnam rig paḥo de yi phyir </i>
<i>de gsum tha dad du ma byas </i>	<i>de gsum tha dad du ma byas </i>

However, we do not find anything in NA.7¹⁸ that would allude to either Dīnnāga's specific theory of triple division of *vijñāna* or to Dharmakīrti's ideas¹⁹. What we do find instead is the realist's position that, at least: (1) acts of cognition are real, (2) acts of cognition happen to be true and accurate, (3) acts of cognition are self-validatory, (4) acts of cognition are accurate representations of external world, (5) the external world is real.

To have Dīnnāga's or Dharmakīrti's views criticised here we would need an explicit element of *sva-saṁvitti* (*sva-saṁvedana*) or *phala*. There are three possible expressions in NA.7 that might refer to *sva-saṁvitti* (and none to refer to *phala*): (A) *sphuṭam*, (B) *svānya-niścāyi*, (C) *dvaya-siddhau*. (Ad A) The first of the list is highly improbable, for it never—to my knowledge—is used in Buddhist sources to refer to the idea of self-revelatory character of cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*). It is generally used to describe either the veracious, direct, non-inferential or the

indubitable, etc., character of acts of cognition. It is explained by Siddharṣi accordingly by *sunīcitatayā*. (Ad B) The second of these expressions (as a similar one in NA.31: *svānya-nirbhāṣī*) mentions in fact only two aspects: the cognition (*sva*) and its counterpart—the object (*anya*). If *sva* were to mean *sva-saṁvitti*, the primary act of cognition would not be mentioned; if *anya* were taken to be *sva-saṁvitti*, the *bahyārtha*, so fundamental for the realist, would not be mentioned. The expression is explained in NAV. as *sva-para-prakāśakam*, which does not bring anything new to our analysis. However, it is coupled in the NAV. with the third expression. (Ad C) The third expression refers to duality, in the first place, and—like in the preceding case—it is highly problematic to take it to allude to Dīnnāga's theory of triple division of *vijñāna*. However, it is Siddharṣi's gloss on *dvaya-siddhau*: *svarūpārtha-lakṣaṇa-yugma-niṣpattau* that could be implicative of *sva-saṁvitti*: in it, *svarūpa* might refer to the self-revelatory character of cognition. It is especially suggestive in view of his statement in NAV.1 quoted in n. 20. But even then, the third aspect of an act of cognition (apart from the act as such, an object), its self-revelatory character, is not explicitly mentioned here. As a matter of fact, Siddharṣi, so well conversant with Buddhist ideas, would not have wasted the availing opportunity to indicate the idea of *sva-saṁvitti* and to utilise it²⁰, if he had noticed any allusion to the Buddhist theories of triple or fourfold division of *vijñāna* in the aphorism of Siddhasena. In other words, there is nothing in Siddharṣi's gloss that might suggest that Siddharṣi had seen any point of convergence between the ideas expressed in NA.7 and certain concepts ascribable to Dīnnāga, as VAIDYA would like it. To expell our doubts, he concludes, as a matter of fact, with *anyathā prameyābhāve pramāṇābhāvāt*, to show that no third element is implied.

In my opinion, NA.7 can be safely taken to disprove the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance propounded by the Buddhist idealist (*Vijñāna-vādin*), whose ideas directly influenced Dīnnāga and Dharmakīrti²¹. The aphorism is

¹⁷ See HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67):

yad-ābhāsam prameyam tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ |
grāhakākāra-saṁvittī trayam nātaḥ prthak-kṛtam ||

¹⁸ *sakala-pratibhāsasya bhrāntatvasiddhitāḥ sphuṭam |*
pramāṇam svānya-niścāyi dvaya-siddhau prasidhyati ||

¹⁹ On the triple and fourfold division of *vijñāna* in the Yogācāra school see HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67).

²⁰ As he does in several places, for instance in NAV.1 (the section beginning with: *ayam atrābhiprāyah: sva-saṁvedanam prati nikhila-jñānānam eka-rūpatayā sāṅgāt-karaṇa-caturtvān nāsty eva bhedaḥ...*), NAV.29 (the section beginning with: *tathōrari-kṛta-yogācāra-matam api balād anekānta-prakāśa-rajjur āveṣṭayaty, ekasyāpi jñānasyāneka-vedya-vedakākāratayā prathanōpagateḥ...*, and the section beginning with: *atha jñāna-vādy advaita-prakāśam alakṣitam abhyupetya tena bāhuvidhyam dadhāno bodho bādhyamānatvād bhrānta ity abhidadyāt, tad ayuktam ...*), NAV.31, etc.

²¹ Cf. HATTORI (1968: 106, n. 1.65).

clearly evocative of such ideas as those expressed, e.g. in MAV.1.1.3²², Trīmś.1, 29²³ or Viṃś.1ab²⁴, 16²⁵. As Siddharṣi expresses himself, if there is nothing to be cognised, there can be no cognition. Therefore, to establish the thesis of the existence of the external world is essential for the realist. Similarly, *mutatis mutandis*, it is crucial for the Buddhist idealist to deny the existence of external object. Furthermore, NA.7 fits quite well into the line of critics of the so-called 'Dreaming Argument'²⁶, that was commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and refuted, for instance, by Kumārila (MSV.4.(Nirālambana-vāda).23, p. 159.7–8), Uddyotakara (NV. on NBh.4.2.33), Śāṅkara (BSSBh.2.2.5.29, p. 476.2–3) and by Siddharṣigaṇi (NAV.29, the *Śūnya-vāda* section).

Therefore, NA.7 is not a very useful indication to establish the date of the *Nyāyāvatāra*. However, there is a number of other conspicuous traits, that are instrumental in establishing the time of composition of the treatise quite convincingly as posterior to Dharmakīrti. To achieve this, I shall analyse several aphorisms of NA. step by step in order to show Siddhasena's indebtedness to Dharmakīrti (especially to NB.) in respect not only of certain 'loan' ideas but also, partially, of the dialectical structure of the text. Some of the following points are not entirely convincing, when taken singly. Their high number, on the other hand, could not have been a matter of mere coincidence.

[1] The opening line of NA.0 (*pramāṇa-vyutpādanārtham idam ārabhyate*) closely resembles the formulations of HB. p.1⁵.5–6: *parokṣārtha-pratipatter anumānāśrayatvāt tat-vyutpādanārtham saṅkṣepata idam ārabhyate*.

[2] Practically, the very first ideas expressed in the opening lines of NA. and NB. are very similar and have similar wording:

²² *abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyāṃ api sa vidyate // artha-sattvātma-vijñāpti-pratibhāsaṃ prajāyate / vijñānaṃ nāsti cāśyārthas tad-abhāvāt tad apy sat //*

²³ *ātma-dharmōpacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate / vijñāna-pariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa trividhā // acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokōttaram ca tat / āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulya-hānitaḥ //*

²⁴ *vijñāpti-mātram evātād asad-arthābhāsanāt /*

²⁵ *pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ svapnādaṃ yathā sā ca yadā tadā / na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṃ katham matam //* (to be coupled with NA.6–7).

²⁶ In a typical formulation: 'The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognition, like the sensation in a dream' (*jāgrat-saṃvedanaṃ bhrāntaṃ, pratyayatvāt, svapna-saṃvedanavat*). See TABER (1994).

NA.1: *pramāṇam [...] pratyakṣam ca parokṣam ca dvidhā*.

NB.1.1.2–3: *dvidvidham samyag-jñānam. pratyakṣam anumānam ca*.

The differences are that (1) Siddhasena does not have *samyag-jñānam* (this expression is completely absent from NA.), and (2) he has *parokṣa* instead of *anumāna*. The second difference is dictated by the Jaina demand to incorporate *śabda / āgama* (testimony, verbal cognition) in the *pramāṇas* (as a quasi-separate category, one of the two—alongside *anumāna*—primary sub-divisions of *parokṣa*). However, Siddhasena marks an important, widely known shift in Jaina epistemology, to interpret the directness of *pratyakṣa* in terms of sensory organs (*akṣa* = *indriya*), not—as it was customary—in terms of the cognitive subject (*akṣa* = *jīva / ātman*). The commentators are quite explicit about the interpretational shift, which diverts from the *Āgamic* tradition advocated, e.g. by Akalaṅka among many others.²⁷

The question is what prompted Siddhasena to introduce this shift? Obviously, these were the demands of the general philosophic discourse in India to be up-to-date with and understood by such schools as Nyāya or Sāṃkhya. But I am deeply convinced that what was responsible for that shift to take the senses as the criterion of directness of *pratyakṣa* was, to a larger degree, Dharmakīrti's inspiration and his works (predominantly the *Nyāya-bindu*) as a groundwork for the *Nyāyāvatāra*. For what other reason would Siddhasena speak of the two-fold division of valid cognition and justify it by referring to Dharmakīrtian ideas? And thereby we come to another element of NA.1 that resembles Dharmakīrti's formulations.

According to Siddhasena, the factor responsible for the division of cognitive acts into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* is not the character of the 'cognising organ' (*akṣa*), either the sense organs (*indriya*) or the cognitive subject (*jīva, ātman*) as such. In his opinion, what is crucial in the categorisation of *pramāṇas* is the character of the object of cognition that determines the way the object of cognition is determined, or cognised. Clearly, in this revolutionary rearrangement he goes against the whole Jaina tradition. The expression he uses: *meya-viniścayāt* (NA.1d), can hardly be explicated without Dharmakīrti's formulations: *tasya viśayaḥ svalakṣaṇam* (NB.1.1.12), so '*numānasya viśayaḥ*' (NB.1.1.17) and *mānam dvidvidham viśaya-*

²⁷ See, e.g. NAV.1: *pratyakṣam cēty-ādi; tatra siddhānta-prasiddha-pāramāthika-pratyakṣāpekṣayākṣa-śabdo jīva-paryāyatayā prasiddhaḥ. iha tu vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa-prastāvād akṣa-dhvanir indriya-vacano grhyate. tataś cākṣam pratigataṃ pratyakṣam. yad indriyam āśrityōjjihīte 'rtha-sākṣāt-kāri jñānam tat pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ. ... akṣebhyaḥ parato vartata iti parokṣam. akṣa-vyāpāra-nirapekṣam mano-vyāpāreṇāsākṣād-artha-paricchedakam yaj jñānam tat parokṣam iti bhāvah.*

dvaividhyāt (PV.2.1ab)²⁸. Even Siddharṣi²⁹ confirms that what is pivotal for the distinction is, in the first place, the character of extrinsic data apprehended by the cognitive subject, that determines the way of apprehension, irrespective of whether the 'cognising organ' are the senses or the soul. It is only in NA.4d that Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or '[the manner of] grasping [an object]', for the first time: *grahaṇēkṣayā*. But even then, the tradition in the person of the commentator Siddharṣi takes the locution to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible (see his detailed discussion in NAV.4 apropos of *grahaṇēkṣayā*).

Truly, a formulation similar to NA.1 is found also in PS.(1).1.2ab³⁰, so Dharmakīrti is not the only potential source. However, if we compare what Diñnāga has further to say on the two-fold division of *pramāṇa*, we discover that he does not mention the reason for the division explicitly, as Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena do, but he merely points to the parallelism of the two-fold *prameya*³¹. Clearly, one can easily understand the statement *lakṣaṇa-dvayaṃ prameyam* to be a reason adduced by the author for *pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe* ('there are two cognitive criteria: perception and inference, [because] the cognoscible has two characteristics'), as the commentator himself does³². However, neither the word 'because' (*yasmāt* / °-*tvāt*) nor any direct explanation why *pramāṇa* is twofold is mentioned by Diñnāga explicitly, as it is by Dharmakīrti in PV.2.1bc (*viśaya-dvaividhyāt śakty-aśaktitah / artha-kriyāyām* ...). Moreover, Diñnāga's elucidation of the two-fold character of *pramāṇa* (*lakṣaṇa-dvayaṃ prameyam*) differs

²⁸ Cf. also PV.2.63 (*anumāna-vicārah*): *na pratyakṣa-parokṣābhyām meyasānyasya sambhavaḥ / tasmāt prameya-dvitvena pramāṇa-dvitvam iṣyate* //

²⁹ NAV.1 *ad loc.* (on *meva-viniścayād*): *bahir-arthaṃ punar apekṣya kaścic cakṣurādi-sāmagrī-bala-labdha-sattākaḥ svāyava-vyāpinam kālāntara-sañcariṣṇum sthagita-kṣaṇa-vivartam alakṣita-paramāṇu-pārimāṇḍalyaṃ sannihitam viśadanirbhāsam sāmānyam ākāram sāksāt-kurvāṇaḥ prakāśaḥ prathate, tatra pratyakṣa-vyavahāraḥ pravartate. yaḥ punar liṅga-śabdādi-dvāreṇa niyatāniyata-sāmānyākārāvalokī parisphuṭatā-rahitaḥ khalv ātmano 'rtha-grahaṇa-pariṇāmaḥ samullasati sa parokṣatām svi-karoti*.

³⁰ *pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe* (Vasudhararakṣita/Señ-rgyal 13b.6: *mñon sum dañ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma*; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 94a.4: *mñon sum dañ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma dag ni*); here, the difference is the absence of the explicit (sc. with a numeral, not with the dual form °-*e* / *dag*) mention of 'twofold' (*dviividham / dvidhā / rnam pa gñis*).

³¹ PS.(1).1.2bc: *lakṣaṇa-dvayaṃ / prameyam* ... (Vasudhararakṣita/Señ-rgyal 13b.6 = Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 94a.5: *mīshan nīd gñis gsal bya*).

³² *yasmāt* = Vasudhararakṣita/Señ-rgyal: ...*phyir se na*; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab: ... *gañ gi phyir*.

completely in character from Siddhasena's explanation (*meva-viniścayāt*) and Dharmakīrti's (*viśaya-dvaividhyāt śakty-aśaktitah artha-kriyāyām* ...), insofar as it is 'static' or 'taxonomic', viz. plainly juxtaposes two cases of double division (*pramāṇa—prameya*), whereas Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti offer 'intentional', i.e. actively directed to an object of cognition either by way of determining it (*viniścaya*, cognitive activity) or by any sort of efficient action (*artha-kriyā*).

[3] Apart from the noticeable similarity in wording between NA.1 and NB.1.1.2–3, there is another striking correspondence to be observed in the ideas expressed by Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena. Siddharṣi introduces NA.1 in the following way: *tatra tāval lakṣaṇa-samkhyā-vipratipattī nirācīkṛsur āha*. There is no doubt that Siddharṣi regarded NA.1 to aim at—beside enumerating subdivisions of *pramāṇa* (*pratyakṣam ca parokṣam ca dvidhā* ...)—formulating its definition (*pramāṇam sva-parābhāsi jñānam bādha-vivarjitam*). And, further, there can hardly be any doubt that a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* is precisely what Siddhasena in NA.1ab does. In the aphorism, he does not only group all cognitively valid procedures under respective categories of 'direct' and 'indirect', which is a case of a typological definition that demarcates a notion by mentioning specimens to which the definition is applicable (ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμός), but he also attempts a real definition that describes the character and essential aspects or intrinsic characteristics of a thing (ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων [ὁρισμός]).³³ Clearly, these two definitions represent two diverse approaches and the latter is intellectually more sublime. Whereas we quite frequently find typological definitions of *pramāṇa* (viz. statements of its divisions) in Jaina literature, we do not, as a matter of fact, come across any attempt at a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* of the second type in any works, both Jaina and non-Jaina, prior NA. Thus, the formulation of a descriptive definition of cognitive criterion seems definitely to be an advancement. And it would perhaps be surprising to find such an innovation in a work of generally secondary character that repeatedly borrows from other works (it relies, for the most part, on the Buddhist legacy and has very little new ideas, genuinely of its own, to offer), if NA. had no predecessor. However, it is Dharmakīrti who must have inspired Siddhasena's descriptive definition. The opening verse (if we skip the first two introductory verses of obeisant nature) of the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* chapter, i.e. PV.1.3 and PV.1.7cd present such a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* that specifies its character and individual features. This

³³ Cf. Aristotelian twofold division in *Met.*998b (p. 47.12–14): ἔτερος δ' ἔσται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμός καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων.

section of PV. is traditionally³⁴ assumed to offer the first comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa*. Clearly, for both Manorathanandin and Siddharṣi the passages of NA.1ab and PV.1.3/7cd respectively are cases of a *pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*. Occasionally³⁵, a doubt is raised whether Dharmakīrti's design was indeed a descriptive definition and that actually it was the subsequent Buddhist tradition of commentators where the idea of a comprehensive descriptive definition developed. Irrespective of whether one assumes that the formulation of PV.1.3 was a genuine descriptive definition or that an idea of such a definition first originated with post-Dharmakīrtian commentators, both sides agree that such a descriptive definition did not exist before Dharmakīrti (*ergo* it is altogether absent from Dinnāga, Śāṅkarasvāmin, etc.). Accordingly, since NA. appears to present such a definition of a descriptive character, it must have been composed after Dharmakīrti and PV.³⁶

[4] Late Buddhist sources allegedly refer to NA.2.³⁷ Surprisingly, NA.2, being a statement of *pūrva-pakṣa*, is the least suitable verse of the whole *Dvātrīṃśikā* to serve as an object of anybody's critique. Thus, anyone referring to the verse with the purpose to refute it would have to be highly incompetent and incapable of noticing

³⁴ See: FRANCO (1997: 59–61), esp.: 'Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of *pramāṇa* in general, unlike the definition of each *pramāṇa* in particular, was not undertaken by any Indian philosopher before Dharmakīrti's time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakīrti to do so. During the time that separates Dharmakīrti from his commentators, some change in the philosophical requirements must have occurred that produced the expectation of a general definition of *pramāṇas*.' [p. 60]. Cf. also STEINKELLNER–KRASSER (1989: 3–5). Cf., e.g. PVV.1.3 (1: 2.17 ff.; 3: 3.17 ff.): *āyam ācāryo bṛhad-ācāryiṇa-pramāṇa-samuccaya-śāstre vārttikam cikīrṣuḥ svataḥ-kṛta-bhagavan-namaskāraḥ tac-chāstrārambha-samaye tad-ācārya-kṛta-bhagavan-namaskāra-ślokaṁ vyākhyātu-kāmaḥ prathamam pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha ...* and PVV.1.7–8 (1: 4.36 ff.; 3: 8.6 ff.): *tad evam avisamvādanam pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam uktam. idānīm anyad āha ...*

³⁵ See: FRANCO (1997: 54–62), e.g.: '...Dharmakīrti did not attempt a general definition of the *pramāṇas*, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* ...' [p. 61].

³⁶ I am indebted to Claus Oetke for drawing my attention to the above issue of PV.1.3–7 and its relevance to the problem of dating of NA.

³⁷ QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'In the eighth-century commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (II.5), Śākyabuddhi (or Śākyamati) quotes the second verse of *Nyāyavatāra* and claims that this verse is the object of Dharmakīrti's critique', and refers to p. 163, n. 38 of Chr. LINDTNER's 'Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 28 (1984) 149–175.

that the very verse is refuted by Siddhasena himself in NA.3! Therefore it could hardly be an 'object of Dharmakīrti's critique.' Furthermore, any reference to allegedly such a state of affairs would prove the source of such an information to be a highly unreliable one. Consequently, either Śākyabuddhi cannot have referred to NA.2 or his acquaintance with Jaina tradition would be liable to doubt.

As a matter of fact, NA.2 may plausibly be taken as a *prima facie* objection ('no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion') against formulating a comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa* of descriptive character, inasmuch as 'cognitive criteria (mind the plural!—P.B.) are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them.' Siddharṣi takes 'the definition of cognitive criterion' to be '[a statement] consisting in mentioning specific properties of cognitive criterion that are capable of distinguishing [it from that which has] another form',³⁸ which is a very accurate explanation of a descriptive definition. Interestingly enough, the reason adduced why such a definition is not necessary in case of *pramāṇa* is *prasiddhāni pramāṇāni*, where the plural is expressly used. This would point to the more archaic kind of definition based on classification, that would define the notion of *pramāṇa* merely by specifying the *pramāṇa* 'inventory'. Thereby NA.2 supports our supposition that what Siddhasena really does is a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa*. Accordingly, NA.2 would rather be a record of the historical change and certain resistance against a new approach towards defining *pramāṇa*. This would also explain the role of the verse, that might seem unnecessary at first glance, in such a succinct work as NA. is.

[5] The *pāda* c (*tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ*) of NA.3³⁹—which is a rejoinder to the doubt raised in NA.2 whether it is 'purposeful to state the definition of cognitive criterion' (viz. whether the treatise, *śāstra* = NA., has a purpose), since 'cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them'—recalls Dharmakīrti's statement found in PV.1.7:

*prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa śāstram moha-nivartanam /
ajñātārtha-prakāśo vā svarūpādhipateḥ param //*

A statement expressing a similar idea seems to be absent from PS.

[6] Corresponding to the sequence of topics discussed in NB. (truly, it is a typical sequence not restricted to NB.), as a next step, Siddhasena in NA.5 makes his

³⁸ NAV.2 *ad loc.*: *pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyōktau para-rūpa-vyāvartana-kṣamāsādhāraṇa-pramāṇa-dharma-kathana-rūpāyām.*

³⁹ *prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakṣaṇōktau prayojanam /
tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmūḍha-manasām iha //*

polemical statement and declares also inference to be 'non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.' (... *anumānaṃ, tad abhīrāntaṃ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat* ...). The use of the term *abhīrānta* as well as the polemical character directly points to NB.(1).1.4: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhīrāntaṃ*. This issue, that was taken up by JACOBI and VAIDYA, has been already discussed above p. 18 ff. Dharmakīrti expressed such ideas that could have served both as a target and inspiration for Siddhasena also in PV.2.45–46 (*anumāna-vicārah*)⁴⁰.

But this is not the only Dharmakīrtian trace to be found in NA.5. Inference is defined by Siddhasena to 'determine the *sādhya* on account of *liṅga*; *liṅga* (the inferential sign) is, in its turn, inseparably connected with the *sādhya*; the determining factor is here the relation of *avinā-bhāva*: NA.5ac: *sādhya-avinā-bhūno liṅgāt sādhya-niścāyakaṃ smṛtam / anumānaṃ*. This definition follows, in most—if not all—details, the ideas expressed by Dharmakīrti in PV.1.287:

*anumānāśrayo liṅgam avinā-bhāva-lakṣaṇam /
vyāpti-pradarśanād dhetoḥ sādhya-nōktaṃ ca tat sphuṭam //*

This striking correspondence does not only concern central elements in inference and their character as well as their mutual connection, but even the choice of vocabulary. The inseparable connection with the probandum as the defining characteristic of the probans reoccurs in NA.13: *sādhya-avinā-bhūvo hetor*.⁴¹

[7] NA.8 may have been influenced by Dinnāga both in terms of vocabulary and notions. Its *pāda* d (*mānaṃ śābdam prakīrtitam*) reminds of PS.(2).5.1 (esp. *śābda, sgra las byuñ pa*):

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat /
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate //*⁴²

[8] In NA.13 Siddhasena takes a closer look at *parārthānumāna* and the conditions of its validity: *sādhya-avinā-bhūvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam / parārtham anumānaṃ tat pakṣādi-vacanātmakam //* The phrasing is reminiscent of

⁴⁰ *ayathābhiniṣeṣa dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate / gatiś cet para-rūpeṇa na ca bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā // abhiprāyāviśamvādād api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā / gatir apy anyathā dṛṣṭā, pakṣaś cāyam kṛtōttaraḥ //*

⁴¹ Cf. also PV.3.31: *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyamakāt / avinā-bhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt //*, etc.

⁴² *sgra las byuñ pa rjes dpag las | tshad ma gzan min de ltar de | byas sogs pa bzin du rañ don la | gzan sel bas ni rjod par byed |* The verse is quoted in TSaP. ad TSa.1514 (p. 441.6–7), with a minor alteration (*anumānāt tathā hi saḥ (tat) /*).

NB.3.1: *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānaṃ parārthānumānaṃ*. Clearly, the element of *tri-rūpa*—a criterion of validity of *anumāna* for the Dharmakīrtian tradition—is absent in NA., for this idea was not recognised by the Jains. Instead, syntactically and semantically in the same position, we have the Jaina criterion of validity, viz. *sādhya-avinā-bhūvaḥ*. Thus, NA.13 may be taken as Siddhasena's polemical reply to the Buddhist doctrine of *trairūpya*.

On the other hand, *pādas* c-d of NA.13 (... *anumānaṃ tat pakṣādi-vacanātmakam*) bear close resemblance to (1) NP.(2).2 (= NP.(1), p. 1.4–5): *tatra pakṣādi-vacanāni sādhanam. pakṣa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-vacanair hi prāśnikānām apratīto 'rthaḥ pratipādyata iti //* as well as to (2) the verse of NM.1: **pakṣādi-vacanāniti sādhanam; tatra hi svayam / sādhyatvenēpsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ //*. However, this similarity is not decisive at all, inasmuch as all the quotations merely describe the widely known structure of any 'syllogistic' reasoning, that is composed of respective links, viz. members of 'syllogism'.

[9] In the definition of *pakṣa*, NA.14ab: *sādhya-bhyupagamah pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādy-anirākṛtaḥ /*, we come across other formulations that bear obvious similarity especially to NB.(2).3.37: *svarūpeṇāva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣaḥ iti* (but also to NB.(2).3.49–53). Dharmakīrti's *svarūpeṇa* stands for *sādhyatvena*, which is confirmed both by Dharmakīrti himself in the next two *sūtras* (NB.(2).3.39–40: *svarūpeṇēti sādhyatvenēṣṭaḥ. svarūpeṇāvēti sādhyatvenāvēṣṭo na sādhyatvenāpi.*) as well as by Dharmottara (NBṬ.(2).3.37 *ad loc.*: *svarūpeṇāvēti sādhyatvenāva.*). Dharmottara explains *anirākṛtaḥ* as *pratyakṣādy-anirākṛtaḥ* (NBṬ.(2).3.37 *ad loc.*: *evam-bhūtaḥ san pratyakṣādy-anirākṛto yo 'rthaḥ sa pakṣa ity ucyate.*), and—if we suppose that he expressed original ideas of Dharmakīrti (and I believe he did in this regard)—Siddhasena's formulations express almost the same idea as Dharmakīrti did in NB., barring Dharmakīrti's specific delimiting use of *eva* as well as *svayam*.

However, there can hardly be any doubt that the formulations of NA.14ab: *sādhya-bhyupagamah pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādy-anirākṛtaḥ /*, go back to PV.4.86 (1: p. 378, 3: p. 390):

*sādhya-bhyupagamah pakṣa-lakṣaṇam teṣv apakṣatā /
nirākṛte⁴³ bādhanaṭaḥ śeṣe 'lakṣaṇa-vṛttitaḥ //*

The idea itself goes back to Dinnāga and NM. (**svayam sādhyatvenēpsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ*), as it was pointed out by Manoranandin in PVV., p. 378.26. Another plausible source for NA.14 might be PS.3.2:

⁴³ Cf. Manoranandin's *Vṛtti ad loc.*: *tathā ca teṣu sāstrēṣṭādiṣu pañcasu vyāvartyeṣu mādhye nirākṛte pratyakṣādi-bādhite bādhanaṭo 'pakṣatā viruddhārthā.*

*svarupenāva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ /
pratyakṣārthānumāpta-prasiddhena svadharmiṇi //*⁴⁴

Clearly, the word *ādi* of the phrase *pratyakṣādi* of NA.14b might allude to the categories [*pratyakṣārtha*?], *anumāna*, *āpta*, *prasiddha* enumerated in Diñnāga's *anirākṛtaḥ pratyakṣārthānumāpta-prasiddhena*, but it does not necessarily have to, since Siddharṣi (NAV.14 *ad loc.*: *ādi-śabdād anumāna-sva-vacana-lokā grhyante*) takes *ādi* to stand for *anumāna-sva-vacana-loka*. Another predecessor of Dharmakīrti in this regard was Śaṅkarasvāmin⁴⁵.

Out of all these possible sources, NA.14 has most in common with Dharmakīrti in terms of (1) exact wording (*sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣa ...*), (2) replacement of Diñnāga's *iṣṭa* with *abhyupagama*, (3) affinity in the explicit correlative *sādhyā* (instead of Diñnāga's *svarupenāva nirdeśya*) to *abhyupagama / iṣṭa*.

[10] The description of *hetu* and its role in the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) in NA.17 is not so conspicuously similar to NB. in phrasing. Nevertheless, semantically both expositions are quite akin to each other. That in NA.17 we still deal with *parārthānumāna* is clear from the context itself, but also Siddharṣi leaves not doubt (NAV.17 *ad loc.*: *parārthānumānasya vacana-rūpatvād ...*). Thus, in both cases we have 'the pronouncement of the logical reason' (*hetos ... prayogo*, NA.) or 'the announcement of the inferential sign' (*liṅgākhyānam*, NB.) as the principal element of the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) and the idea that there is no difference in 'demonstrative force' between the two formulations of the logical reason:

NA.17: *hetos tathōpapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathāpi vā /
dvi-vidho 'nyatarenāpi sādhyā-siddhir bhaved iti //*

NB.3.1.3–7: /1/ *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam*. /3/ *tad dvi-vidham*. /4/ *prayoga-bhedāt*. /5/ *sādharmya-vaidharmyavac cēti*. /6/ *nānāyor arthataḥ kaścīd bhedaḥ*. /7/ *anyatra prayoga-bhedāt*.

⁴⁴ The above Sanskrit reconstruction of PS.3.2 follows FRAUWALLNER (1957/b: 885) and TILLEMANS (1997: 178, n. 2). Tibetan text reads as follows: *rañ gi ño bo kho na^a bstan | bdag 'dod rañ gi chos can la | mñon sum don dan rjes dpag dan | yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o ||* [TILLEMANS 1997 reads *nar*.] PS.3.2 must have been in its turn the source for NB. (2).3.37.

⁴⁵ NP. (2).2.1: *tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmi prasiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā svayam sādhyatvenēpsitah. pratyakṣādy-viruddha iti vākya-śeṣaḥ*.

The idea expressed by Dharmakīrti goes back to his PV.3.16 and PVS. *ad loc.*⁴⁶

[11] In NA.20 Siddhasena maintains that *drṣṭānta* is not an essential part of 'syllogistic' reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the 'economical' trend in Indian logic—that starts with Vasubandhu and his *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-vidhi*⁴⁷—to limit the number of necessary 'syllogistic' members, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves:

NA.20: *antar-vyāptyāiva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhṛtiḥ /
vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve 'py evaṁ nyāya-vido viduḥ //*

NB. (2).3.121: *tri-rūpo hetur uktaḥ. tāvatā cārtha-pratītir iti na prthag drṣṭānto nāma sādhanāvayavaḥ kaścit. tena nāsyā lakṣaṇam prthag ucyate gatārthatvāt*.

Siddhasena was not so much innovative as it might seem at first glance, inasmuch as it is Dharmakīrti (NB. (2).3.121) who had intuitively foreshadowed such an idea before him, when he had claimed that the example (*drṣṭānta*) is not a separate member of the proof (*sādhana-vayava*). It is much more natural and less surprising to find the direct continuation of the 'economical' trend, that had started with Vasubandhu, in the Yogācāra tradition and Dharmakīrti's works, rather than in the Jaina tradition in the person of Siddhasena, where we do not find such an 'economic' tendency before Siddhasena. In my opinion, Siddhasena verbalised what had already been latent in Dharmakīrti's statement, even though Dharmakīrti himself had not been able to do without the example, which he had considered an

⁴⁶ In PV.3.15 [p. 180] Dharmakīrti first recalls the triple character of *hetu* defined by Diñnāga in *Nyāya-mukha*: *hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitah / asiddha-viparītārtha-vyabhicāri-vipakṣataḥ //*. Then (PV.3.16ab) he states the reason for expressing the concomitance by way of dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-vacana*): *vyabhicāri-vipakṣeṇa vaidharmya-vacanāṁ ca yat /*, only to quote Diñnāga in PVS. (1).3.16ab: *yad āha—eṣa tāvaṁ nyāyo yad ubhayaṁ vaktavyaṁ viruddhānaikāntika-pratipakṣeṇa iti*. The rule is further explained by Dharmakīrti in PVS. as follows: *sādharmya-vācanāṁ viruddha-pratipakṣeṇa, vaidharmya-vācanāṁ anaikāntika-pratipakṣeṇa*. Thereupon, in PV.3.16cd and PVS. *ad loc.*, he adds that: *yady adṛṣṭi-phalaṁ tac ca yadi tena vipakṣe 'darśanaṁ khyāpyate tad anukte 'pi gamyate //*. Cf. also PVS. (1).3.24–25 [p. 185]: *tasmāt svabhāva-pratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyam gamayati. sa ca tad-bhāva-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇo vā. sa evāvinā-bhāvo drṣṭāntābhyāṁ pradarśyate*.

⁴⁷ Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957/a).

integral part of the logical reason (*hetu*), indispensable to authenticate the general principle by taking recourse to its instantiations (relevant portions underlined): NB.(2).3.122: *hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣāc ca sarvato vyāvartī rūpam uktam abhedena. punar viśeṣeṇa kārya-svabhāvaḥ uktā-lakṣaṇayor janma-tan-mātrānubandhau darśanīyāv uktāu. tac ca darśayātā—yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir, asaty agnau na kvacid dhūmo yathā mahānasētarayor, yatra kṛtakatvam tatrānīyatvam, anīyatvābhāvo kṛtakatvāsambhavo yathā ghaṭākāśayor—iti darśanīyam. na hy anyathā sapakṣa-vipakṣayoh sad-asattve yathōkta-prakāre śakye darśayitum. tat-kāryatā-nīyamah kārya-liṅgasya, svabhāva-liṅgasya ca svabhāvena vyāptih. asmiṁś cārthe darśite eva dr̥ṣṭānto bhavati. etāvan-mātra-rūpatvāt tasyēti.* Dharmakīrti expressed a similar idea already in his PV.3.27: *tad-bhāva-hetu-bhāvau hi dr̥ṣṭānte tad-avedinah / khyāpyete, viduṣāṁ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalah //*. Siddhasena, however, has to his credit that he clearly states the conditions of internal formal validity of the proof and dismisses the need to quote any instantiation: the proof is valid because the premisses are valid and the relation between them is universally binding.

[12] Siddhasena states explicitly five conditions that invalidate *pakṣa*—and adds that there are, in fact, several varieties of *pakṣābhāsa*—in NA.21:

*pratipādyasya yāḥ siddhaḥ pakṣābhāso 'kṣa-liṅgataḥ /
loka-sva-vacanābhīyām ca bādhitō 'nekadhā mataḥ //*

These five *pakṣābhāsa*s are in concord with the list exemplified by Siddharṣi in NAV.: (1) *pratipādyā-siddha*, (2) *pratyakṣa-bādhitā*, (3) *anumāna-bādhitā*, (4) *loka-bādhitā*, (5) *sva-vacana-bādhitā*. Having enumerated five varieties of *pakṣābhāsa*, it would be redundant and pointless on Siddhasena's part to say by way of recapitulation in a succinct *kārikā* that these varieties are numerous: *anekadhā mataḥ*, unless he had other varieties, not mentioned already by name, in mind. That being the case, he probably referred to other enumerations well-known from other sources.

In fact, Siddhasena's enumeration overlaps with Dharmakīrti's list of fallacies of the thesis, enumerated in NB.(2).49–53⁴⁸. Interestingly, Dharmakīrti subsequently (NB.(2).3.54⁴⁹) adds a few more conditions and the failure to meet them would

⁴⁸ /49/ (2) *tatra pratyakṣa-nirākṛto yathā: asrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti. /50/ (3) anumāna-nirākṛto yathā: nityaḥ śabda iti. /51/ (4?) prātīti-nirākṛto yathā: acandraḥ śaśīti. /52/ (5) sva-vacana-nirākṛto yathā: nānumānam pramāṇam. /53/ iti catvāraḥ pakṣābhāsa nirākṛtā bhavanti.*

⁴⁹ *evam siddhasya, asiddhasyāpi sādhanatvenābhimatasya, svayam vādinā tadā sādhayitum anīṣṭasya, ukta-mātrasya nirākṛtasya ca viparyayeṇa sādhyah. tenāva*

render the *pakṣa* defective as well. Thus, Siddhasena—by *anekadhā mataḥ*—may have referred to Dharmakīrti's catalogue of defective *pakṣas*. But not necessarily to Dharmakīrti's. He may have as well referred, e.g. to NP.(2).3.1⁵⁰.

In any case, NA.21 can in no way attest that Siddhasena was posterior or prior to Dharmakīrti. It merely points to certain similarities between Siddhasena's list and the Buddhist tradition. Probably, it was the tradition of Śāṅkarasvāmin and Dharmakīrti that Siddhasena alluded to by *anekadhā mataḥ*.

[13] In Siddhasena's subsequent aphorism, we find further similarities with NB., though they are less of linguistic nature (similarities in formulations) but rather of methodological character. Analogously to the structure of NB, Siddhasena—after describing fallacious theses—proceeds to discuss fallacious logical reasons (*hetv-ābhāsa*). However, both the authors first look back to their previous definitions of a correct, not defective *hetu*:

NA.22: *anyathānupapannatvam hetor lakṣaṇam īritam⁵¹ /
tad-apratīti-sandeha-viparyāsaḥ tad-ābhātā //*

NB.(2).3.55–56: *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam ity uktam⁵². tatra trayāṇāṁ rūpāṇāṁ ekasyāpi rūpasyānuktau sādhanābhāsaḥ. uktāv apy asiddhau sandehe vā pratipādyā-pratipāḍakayoḥ.*

Incidentally, it is the only case in both works that the authors first remind the reader/hearer of the definition of a correct 'syllogistic' member/term, and only then deal with its particular fallacies.

Likewise incidentally, both the authors first state general factors that invalidate a correct *hetu*, either singly or jointly, and subsequently enumerate resulting fallacies one by one. There are two such general invalidating factors for Dharmakīrti, viz. *asiddhi* and *sandeha* (NB.3.56,109): various combinations (with regard to

svarūpeṇābhīmato vādina iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti pakṣa-lakṣaṇam anavadyam darśitam bhavati.

⁵⁰ *sādhayitum iṣṭo 'pi pratyakṣādi-viruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ, tad yathā: (1) pratyakṣa-viruddhaḥ, (2) anumāna-viruddhaḥ, (3) āgama-viruddhaḥ, (4) loka-viruddhaḥ, (5) sva-vacana-viruddhaḥ, (6) aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇaḥ, (7) aprasiddha-viśeṣyāḥ, (8) aprasiddhōbhayaḥ, (9) prasiddha-sambandhaś cēti // tatra ...*

⁵¹ Either in NA.5 (according to Siddharṣi) or in NA.17 (*hetos tathōpapattiyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathāpi vā, see NAV. ad loc.: anyathāpi vēty anenāvayave samudāyōpacārād anyathānupapattim lakṣayati*).

⁵² NB.3.1: *tri-rūpa-liṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam; cf. also NB.(2).2.5,11–12.*

trairūpya) are responsible for particular varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*. For Siddhasena, however, there are three—polemically, as it were—such factors: *tad-apratīti*, *sandeha* and *viparyāsa*; thus Dharmakīrti's *asiddhi* factor would seem to bifurcate into Siddhasena's *tad-apratīti* and *viparyāsa*. For instance, for Siddhasena the fallacies of NB.3.58 and 59⁵³ would be probably a case of *viparyāsa*, whereas the fallacy of NB.3.60⁵⁴ should rather be considered a case of *tad-apratīti*. One could analyse all the remaining cases of fallacious *hetus* (ensuing from the combination of the factors *asiddhi* and *sandeha*) found in NB. and map them onto the triple classification of Siddhasena in the same manner. Practically, it would mean to decide which of the *asiddhi* cases of Dharmakīrti would correspond to *tad-apratīti* cases of Siddhasena, and which to his *viparyāsa* cases. However, we do not have any explicit statement in the far too succinct NA., nor in NAV., that would provide us any algorithm of such a mapping, and the issue is open to our conjectures only.

Interestingly, in NP., for instance, to which NA. might be thought to have occasionally referred to, we do not find any trait of such invalidating factors as *asiddhi* and *sandeha*, or anything similar.

[14] Also NA.23 and the classification of particular varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*s points to secondary sources of Siddhasena's ideas. There seem to be only two such potential sources, i.e. NB. and NP.:

NA.23: *asiddhas tv apratīto yo yo 'nyathāivōpādyate / viruddho yo 'nyathāpy atra yukto 'naikāntikaḥ sa tu //*

NB.(2).3.109: *evam eṣāṃ trayānāṃ rūpāṇāṃ ekākasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathā-yogam asiddha-viruddhānaikāntikāḥ trayo hetv-ābhāsāḥ.*

NP.(2).3.2. *asiddhānaikāntika-viruddhā hetv-ābhāsāḥ //*

However, NB. is a more probable source, inasmuch as the sequence of fallacies (*asiddha*, *viruddha*, *anaikāntika*) listed in NA. is exactly the same as that of NB.,

⁵³ NB.(2).3.57–9: /57/ *ekasya rūpasya dharmi-sambandhasyāsiddhau sandehe vāsiddho hetv-ābhāsāḥ*. /58/ *yathā: anityaḥ śabda iti sādhye cākṣuṣatvam ubhayāsiddham* [not proved for both parties]. /59/ *cetanās tarava iti sādhye sarva-tvag-apaharaṇe maraṇaṃ pratīvādy-asiddham, vijñānēndriyāyur-nirodha-lakṣaṇasya maraṇasyānenābhyupagamāt, tasya ca taruṣv asambhavāt* [not proved for the opponent].

⁵⁴ NB.(2).3.60: *acetanāḥ sukhādaya iti sādhyā utpattimattvam anityatvam vā sāmānyasya svayam vādino 'siddham* [not proved for the proponent himself].

not of NP., where the two last varieties are interchanged (*asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, *viruddha*). Dinnāga has the *aniscita* (or *sandigdha*) variety, instead of *anaikāntika*.

What is striking is that Siddhasena has only three varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*, like Dharmakīrti and Śāṅkarasvāmin, unlike Dinnāga. Moreover, Dharmakīrti outspokenly rejects Dinnāga's subvariety, i.e. *viruddhāvyabhicārin*⁵⁵: NB.(2).3.110: *viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśaya-hetur uktaḥ. sa iha kasmān nōktaḥ*. We do not find any polemical trait in NA., which could even suggest that Siddhasena adopted Dharmakīrti's criticism of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Apparently he subscribed to the criticism unhesitatingly.

It is worth noticing that NA. diverges also from the tradition of Kumāṛila, whose triple classification—into *asiddha*, *sandigdha*, *viruddha* in MŚV.—is more akin to Dinnāga's: MŚV.5.4.75 p. 264 mentions the classification (*saṃśayādi-viparyāyāḥ*); subsequently (1) the threefold *asiddha* fallacious reason is mentioned in MŚV.5.4.76–83ab; (2) *sandigdha* and (3) *viruddha* occur in MŚV.5.4.83cd–107 (e.g. in MŚV.5.4.83cd: *sandeha-viparītatva-hetū cātra nirākṛtau*); besides, (2) *sandigdha* is further found in MŚV.5.4.84b–96b, whereas (3) *viruddha* is mentioned in MŚV.5.4.96cd–107ab. Kumāṛila nowhere in the *Anumāna-pariccheda* section uses the term *anaikāntika* as a *hetv-ābhāsa*, he has *sandigdha* instead, like Dinnāga, unlike Dharmakīrti, Śāṅkarasvāmin and Siddhasena. However, Pārthasārathi Mīśra follows the general post-Dharmakīrtian typology in his classification, while commenting on Kumāṛila (p. 264.11 ad MŚV.5.4.75): *samprati hetv-ābhāsān asiddhānaikāntika-viruddhān prapañcayan ...*

[15] NA.24–25 reveal further similarities pointing to NB. as its possible inspiration. One of them is the phraseological affinity as regards the use of *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa*, instead of *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*, in both works. Both Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti use the expression *pakṣābhāsa* as well as similarly *tad-ābha* and *hetv-ābhāsa*. However, both of them deviate from the general use of derivatives of *ābhāsa* to technically denote logical fallacies, when they refer to *dr̥ṣṭānta* by the term *doṣa*, and to *dr̥ṣṭānta* only:

NA.24: *sādharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣā ...*,

NA.25: *vaidharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣā ...*,

NB.(2).3.123, 128–129: /123/ *etenāva dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣā api nirastā bhavanti*. /128/ *sādharmyeṇa dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣāḥ*. /129/ *vaidharmyeṇāpi paramāṇuvat karmavad ākāśavad iti sādhyādy-vyatirekiṇaḥ*.

⁵⁵ Cf. also RANDLE (1926: 68–69, 79).

Indeed, also Śāṅkarasvāmin has *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa* twice, but in a slightly different context, viz. that of refutation. Generally, when he discusses fallacious examples, he uses the standard term *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*, e.g. NP.3.3: *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ: sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca* // The only two occurrences of *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa* are found in NP.(2).6,7⁵⁶.

Conspicuously, *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa* occurs as exemplification of *dūṣaṇāni*, in the series of *sādhana-doṣa*, *pakṣa-doṣa*, *hetu-doṣa* and *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa*.⁵⁷ Another occurrence of *doṣa* (however, *pratijñā-doṣa*, not *dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa*) in NP. is attested in the concluding lines of NP.(2).3.1, that summarise the discussion on *pakṣābhāsa*⁵⁸. Also here, the term *doṣa* has a more general meaning than the technical term *ābhāsa*, and the peculiarity of the usage of *pratijñā-doṣa* is confirmed by the closing *uktāḥ pakṣābhāsāḥ*. The usage of *doṣa* in NP. confirms the fact that in works preceding Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti or Śāṅkarasvāmin—e.g. in NS., VS., NBh., PBh., etc.—*doṣa* is employed to denote general defects and is not used specifically as a *terminus technicus* in the sense of *ābhāsa*.

[16] There is a structural similarity to be observed: both Siddhasena (NA.24) and Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.122–3) explicitly define fallacious examples by referring to the definition of a correct *hetu*. Accordingly, NB.3.122 recapitulates the definition of correct *hetu* as well as conditions of its validity. The successive statement of NB.3.123 (*etenāva dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa api nirastā bhavanti; vide supra* p. 37) shows that fallacious examples are refuted by referring to the correct definition of *hetu*, and all fallacies of the example share the same characteristic. Similarly, Siddhasena relates the deficiency of *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*s to deficient logical reasons and, with *apalakṣaṇa-hetūtthāḥ*, he expresses the idea known from the work of Dharmakīrti.

⁵⁶ (6) *sādhana-doṣōdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni* // *sādhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣādi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doṣo 'siddhānaikāntika-viruddhatvam. dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣaḥ sādhanā-dharmādy-asiddhatvam. tasyōdbhāvanam prāśnika-pratyāyanam dūṣaṇam* // (7) *abhūta-sādhana-doṣōdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni* // *sāmpūrṇe sādhanē nyūnatva-vacanam. aduṣṭa-pakṣe pakṣa-doṣa-vacanam. siddha-hetuke 'siddha-hetukam vacanam. ekānta-hetuke 'nekānta-hetukam vacanam. aviruddha-hetuke viruddha-hetukam vacanam. aduṣṭa-dr̥ṣṭānte duṣṭa-dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣa-vacanam. etāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni. na hy ebhiḥ para-pakṣo dūṣyate, niravadyatvāt tasya* // *ity uparamyate* //.

⁵⁷ NP.6: *sādhana-doṣōdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni* // *sādhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣādi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doṣo 'siddhānaikāntika-viruddhatvam. dr̥ṣṭānta-doṣaḥ sādhanā-dharmādy-asiddhatvam. tasyōdbhāvanam prāśnika-pratyāyanam dūṣaṇam* //.

⁵⁸ *eṣāṃ vacanāni dharmā-svarūpa-nirākaraṇa-mukhena pratipādanāsamābhavataḥ sādhanā-vaiphalayataś cēti pratijñā-doṣaḥ* // *uktāḥ pakṣābhāsāḥ* //

[17] Strangely, in NA.24–25 Siddhasena refers to some tradition by *nyāya-vid-irītāḥ* as regards the classification of fallacious examples. However, there seems to have been no earlier (or contemporary) Jaina source he could have referred to. Thus, in default of any extant evidence attesting to a Jaina tradition which offered a typology of fallacious examples, one is prone to assume—unless we find any indication to the contrary—that, apparently, he must have referred to a general Indian tradition, where we do find such a typology of *sādharmya*-^o and *vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsas*.

Besides, he also seems to have taken it for granted that the reader/hearer could easily determine what is meant by *sādhya-vikalādayaḥ* in NA.24. This task would naturally be quite easy for anyone who was acquainted with NB.(2).3.124–125. At the same time, however, his elliptical formulation *sādhya-vikalādayaḥ* was, polemically as it were, unequivocal enough to rule out the three remaining varieties, viz. (A7) *ananvaya*, (A8) *apradarsitānvaya* and (A9) *viparitānvaya*, formulated by Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.126–127), which could by no means have been hinted at by the formulations of NA.24.

Similarly, the sixfold classification of dissimilar *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsas* systematised in NA.25 (*sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca saṃśayāt*) closely corresponds to the first six fallacious examples of NB.(2).3.129–132: (V1) *sādhya-vyatiṛekin*, (V2) *sādhana-vyatiṛekin*, (V3) *sādhya-sādhana-vyatiṛekin*, (V4) *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatiṛeka*, (V5) *sandigdha-sādhana-vyatiṛeka*, (V6) *sandigdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatiṛeka*. Seemingly, NA. and NB. are at variance as regards terminology, for Siddhasena's formulation: *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca saṃśayāt*, differs from Dharmakīrti's (V1)–(V6). In my opinion, however, *anivṛtteś* and *saṃśayāt* of NA.25 indicate rather plainly ^o-*vyāvṛtta* and *sandigdha*-^o as the last and first elements of the compounds (V1)–(V3) and (V4)–(V6), respectively. Optionally, we could have (V1) **sādhyanivṛtta*, (V2) **sādhanānivṛtta*, (V3) **sādhya-sādhanānivṛtta*, (V4) **saṃśayita-sādhya*, (V5) **saṃśayita-sādhana*, (V6) **saṃśayita-sādhya-sādhana*, which is not different at all from the idea expressed in NB.(2).3.129–132.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ True, theoretically speaking, one could also interpret NA.25 to enforce the acceptance of only (1) *sādhya-vyatiṛekin*, (2) *sādhana-vyatiṛekin*, (3) *sādhya-sādhana-vyatiṛekin*—to use Dharmakīrti's terminology—and only one or more varieties out of (4) *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatiṛeka*, (5) *sandigdha-sādhana-vyatiṛeka*, (6) *sandigdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatiṛeka*, but not necessarily all of them. While *anivṛtteḥ* is unquestionably construed with *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*, the expression *saṃśayāt* might be conjectured to be taken separately, without any dependence on all elements of *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*. In this respect, attention should be drawn to an instance of different conceivable ways of construing an aphorism of NA. by

As for another possible source of inspiration, also NP.(2).3.3 distinguished—in accord with the prevalent tradition of those days—two general categories: similar and dissimilar fallacious examples (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ: sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca* //). However, a closer look at Śaṅkarasvāmīn's varieties reveals essential differences, apart from the terminological ones. Accordingly, I see no way how the formulations of fallacies of examples based on similarity found in *Nyāya-praveśa*⁶⁰ could be interpreted to have influenced Siddhasena's *sādhvādi-vikalādayaḥ*. As regards *Nyāya-praveśa* on fallacies of examples based on dissimilarity⁶¹, the influence might have been restricted to (V1), (V2) and (V3) only.

[18] Also NA.26, where criticism / refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and its fallacy (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) are discussed, might have partly been inspired by Dharmakīrti's NB.(2).3.137–140. Thus, NA.26a-c: *vādy-ukte sādhanē prokta-doṣāṇām udbhāvanam / dūṣaṇam*, reveals a certain similarity—in terms of both formulations and ideas—to the *dūṣaṇa*-section of NB.(2).3.137–8: /137/ *dūṣaṇa nyūnatādy-uktiḥ*. /138/ *ye pūrvam nyūnatādayaḥ sādhanā-doṣa uktāḥ teṣāṃ udbhāvanam dūṣaṇam*. *tena parēṣṭārtha-siddhi-pratibandhāt*. Less conspicuous, though, is the remaining portion of the second hemistich of NA.26: *niravadye tu dūṣaṇābhāsa-nāmakam* //

commentators which we encounter in the case of NA.8: *dr̥ṣṭēṣṭāvyāhatād vākyāt paramārthābhīdhyāyinaḥ / tattva-grāhitayōtpannam mānam sādham prakṛititam* // The aphorism is explained differently by the commentators, viz. (1) NAV. *ad loc.*: *dr̥ṣṭena pramāṇāvalokitenēṣṭaḥ pratipādayiṣito 'vyāhato 'nirākṛtaḥ sāmānyād artho yasmin vākye tat-tathā*; and (2) NAT. *ad loc.*: *dr̥ṣṭenēty-ādī. ayam bhinnādhikaraṇas tri-pado bahu-vrīhiḥ yadi vā iṣṭo 'vyāhato 'rtho yatra tad iṣṭāvyāhatam vākyam, tadanu dr̥ṣṭena pramāṇa-nirñītena iṣṭāvyāhatam iti tat-puruṣaḥ* (cf. BALCEROWICZ (1999: 4, n. 8)). Definitely, such an unnatural interpretation—i.e. to take *anivṛtteḥ* to refer to all elements of the triad *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*, while limiting the scope of *samśayāt* to selected element(s) of the compound *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*—would be a mere guesswork, and one would rather, as a rule, construe *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām* with both *anivṛtteḥ* and *samśayāt*, and obtain six varieties of dissimilar *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*s. One would not, in any case, obtain any further varieties mentioned by Dharmakīrti in NB.(2).3.133–135: (V7) *avyatireka*, (V8) *apradarśita-vyatireka* and (V9) *viparīta-vyatireka*. Thus, Siddhasena apparently does not accept without reservation the Buddhist typology by rejecting (V7), (V8) and (V9).

⁶⁰ NP.(2).3.3.1: *tatra sādharmyeṇa tāvad dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañca-prakārah, tad yathā*: (1) *sādhana-dharmāsiddhaḥ*, (2) *sādhya-dharmāsiddhaḥ*, (3) *ubhaya-dharmāsiddhaḥ*, (4) *ananvayaḥ*, (5) *viparītanvayaś cēti* // *tatra* ...

⁶¹ NP.(2).3.3.2. *vaidharmyeṇāpi dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañca-prakārah, tad yathā*: (1) *sādhvādyāvṛttaḥ*, (2) *sādhanāvṛttaḥ*, (3) *ubhayāvṛttaḥ*, (4) *avyatirekaḥ*, (5) *viparīta-vyatirekaś cēti* // *tatra* ...

The corresponding *dūṣaṇābhāsa*-section of NB.(2).3.139–140 reads: /139/ *dūṣaṇābhāsaḥ tu jātayaḥ*. /140/ *abhūta-doṣōdbhāvanāni jāty-uttarāṇi*. The reoccurring element *dūṣaṇābhāsa* is not decisive at all, whereas Siddhasena's *niravadye* could be a vague echo of Dharmakīrti's *abhūta-doṣa*.

As a matter of fact, NA.26c-d (*niravadye tu dūṣaṇābhāsa-nāmakam*) betrays more affinity to the closing section of NP.(2).7: *abhūta-sādhana-doṣōdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni* // ... *etāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni. na hy ebhiḥ para-pakṣo dūṣyate, niravadyatvāt tasya* // *ity uparamyate* // It is this section, in all probability, that influenced both Dharmakīrti's NB.(2).3.139–140 (*dūṣaṇābhāsaḥ tu jātayaḥ. abhūta-doṣōdbhāvanāni jāty-uttarāṇi*.) and the portion of NA.26c-d in question.

[19] The twenty-sixth aphorism (the exposition of *dūṣaṇa*) is the last section of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, where possible influences from Dharmakīrti's side—in terms of Siddhasena's direct use of Dharmakīrti vocabulary or his response to Dharmakīrti's ideas—are easily detectable. Strangely enough, the topic dealt with in NA.26 closely corresponds to the final issue discussed by Dharmakīrti in NB. Thus, the conspicuous absence of further possible Dharmakīrtian traces in NA.—theoretically derivable from other works of Dharmakīrti—points, in my opinion, to the fact that Siddhasena—while composing NA.—closely followed the structure and the contents of NB., up to NA.26.

In the remaining aphorisms (28–32) Siddhasena discusses issues peculiar to Jainism (viz. corollaries of *kevala-jñāna* and *syād-vāda*) and there could hardly have been any Buddhist influence to be noticed in any case: [27] the character of absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*); [28] the result of valid cognition in general; the results of absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*); the results of valid cognitive procedures other than *kevala-jñāna*; [29] the multiplex character of reality; the domain of cognitive acts; the domain of viewpoints (*naya*); [30] the character of viewpoints (*naya*); the description of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (*syād-vāda*); [31] the character of the cognitive subject, the soul (*jīva*); [32] the eternal character of Jaina epistemology.

[20] The phrase *pramāṇa-phala* occurring in NA.28 is occasionally taken to be a proof of its dependence on Dignāga.⁶² It is commonly assumed that the phrase in

⁶² Cf., e.g. QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'Furthermore, the *Nyāyāvatāra* (28) uses the signature element of Dignāga, namely "pramāṇaphala"⁶¹;' in his note 61, he further draws the reader's attention to the work of G. Dreyfus and Chr. Lindtner: 'The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti'. *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions*. Vol. 2, Ed. by Per K. Sørensen et al. Copenhagen 1989: 27–52.

question goes back to Diñnāga, e.g. PS.(1).1.8cd–10⁶³. In these verses Diñnāga asserts that the result of *pramāṇa* is *pramāṇa* itself, or introspective cognition which consists in the determining of an object (*sva-saṃvitti*, *artha-niścaya*). Precisely the same idea (*ātmānubhāva*, *artha-viniścaya*) is echoed in PV.2.306–307ab, 339⁶⁴. Generally, the idea is discussed at length by Dharmakīrti both in his PVin.I(1).78.12–100.26 and in PV.2.301–366, 388–391. Accordingly, NA.28 might be taken to be a rejoinder of both Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti, and there seems to be nothing decisive to be found in NA.28 that would exclude any of the two authors.

On the other hand, any attempt to look for inspiration of NA.28 in works of either Diñnāga or Dharmakīrti seems to me to be a result of misapprehension of the true import of the aphorism. In it, Siddhasena does not discuss the problem whether *pramāṇa-phala* can or cannot be equated with *pramāṇa* itself, which is the major concern of Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti. What is intended in the verse are rather extra-epistemological issues of both soteriological (*kevala*) and mundane (*śeṣa*) character, viz. the result of *pramāṇa* is 'the cessation of nescience' (*ajñāna-viniṣṭhana*), whereas the result of specific kinds of cognition is two-fold. The first category subsumes happiness and indifference (*sukhōpekṣe*) in case of the perfect knowledge (*kevala*), being a prerequisite of liberation (*mokṣa*) and commonly taken by the

⁶³ *savyāpāra-pratititvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat // sva-saṃvittih phalam vātra tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ / viṣayākārātātvāsya pramāṇam tena miyate // yad-ābhāsam prameyam tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ / grāhakākāra-saṃvitti trayam nātaḥ prithak-kṛtam //*. For the Sanskrit text, see HATTORI (1968: 97, n. 1.55–107, n. 1.67). Tibetan text reads as follows:

Vasudhararakṣita/Señ-rgyal 15a.5–15b.4: Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 95b.5–96a.5:

<i>bya dan bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir </i>	<i>bya dan bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir </i>
<i>tshad maḥi hbras bu ṅid du ḥdod </i>	<i>hbras bu ṅid du yod tshad ma </i>
<i>rañ rig la yañ ḥdir hbras bu </i>	<i>yañ na rañ rig ḥdir hbras bu </i>
<i>de yi ño bo las don ñes </i>	<i>de yi ño bo las don ñes </i>
<i>yul gyi snañ ba ḥdi ṅid ḥdi </i>	<i>yul gyi snañ ba ṅid de ḥdiḥi </i>
<i>tshad ma de yis ḥjal bar byed </i>	<i>tshad ma de yis ḥjal bar bya </i>
<i>gañ tše snañ ba de gśal bya </i>	<i>gañ līar snañ ba de gśal bya </i>
<i>tshad ma dan deḥi hbras bu ni </i>	<i>tshad ma dan deḥi hbras bu ni </i>
<i>ḥdsin rnam rig pa de yi phyir </i>	<i>ḥdsin rnam rig paḥo de yi phyir </i>
<i>de gsum tha dad du ma byas </i>	<i>de gsum tha dad du ma byas </i>

⁶⁴ *tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ sādhanam meya-rūpatā / sādhanē 'nyatra tat-karma-sambandho na prasiddhyati // sā ca tasyātma-bhūtāiva tena nārthāntaram phalam / yadā saviṣayam jñānam jñānāmśe 'rtha-vyavasthiteḥ / tadā ya ātmānubhāvaḥ sa evārtha-viniścayaḥ //*

Jainas to be tantamount to the destruction of nescience. Since it results from the destruction of *karman*⁶⁵ it is necessarily associated with innate happiness, etc.⁶⁶ that are inhibited by *karman*. The other—pragmatic, as it were—category of results refers to 'the faculty of appropriation and avoidance' (*ādāna-hāna-dhī*) in case all the remaining kinds of (mundane) cognition.⁶⁷ Consequently, what really the verse is reminiscent of is rather NBh.1.1.3: *yadā jñānam tadā hānōpādanōpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam*, with all the three elements of *hāna*, *upādāna* / *ādāna* and *āpekṣā*, as a result (*phala*) of cognition (*jñāna*).

What is important to remember is that there are numerous similarities, more and less conspicuous, and not all of them are decisive when taken alone. Some of these similarities indicated on the preceding pages may equally well point to a tradition or author prior to Dharmakīrti, viz. to Diñnāga or Śāṅkarasvāmin. Some of such similarities may be due to the general style of writing, of arranging a philosophical treatise, of structuring a philosophical discourse, etc. We should remember that both the *Nyāya-bindu* and the *Nyāyāvatāra* were primarily handbooks of logic and their purpose was predominantly didactic. Nonetheless, the accumulation of evidence only enforces those of them that are quite conclusive and convincing. To sum up, my impression is that in all dubious cases, when both NP. and NB. seem relevant as possible sources of Siddhasena's ideas, Siddhasena probably took recourse to Dharmakīrti rather than to Śāṅkarasvāmin, inasmuch as in all those rare cases when there are clear similarities to be found between NA. and NP., they are also traceable in NB. However, not all cases of similarities between NA. and NB. can be shown with regard to NA. and NP. In other words, the development of certain ideas that had taken place in the period connecting Śāṅkarasvāmin and Dharmakīrti, was reflected in the contents of NA. and some ideas still absent from NP., that were later either introduced or modified by Dharmakīrti, found their way into NA. Similarly, certain influences to be found in NA. point both to Diñnāga and to Dharmakīrti. However, Siddhasena seems to be acquainted with certain new developments or ideas that first developed with Dharmakīrti (not necessarily only in NB.) and are not found in Diñnāga's works.

Paradoxically as it were, would it not be thinkable to claim that it was Siddhasena who influenced Dharmakīrti and who was the intermediary stage between Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti? For at least three reasons we should dismiss such a possibility.

⁶⁵ Cf. TS.10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāya-kṣayāc ca kevalam*.

⁶⁶ Cf., e.g. TBh.10.7 (p. 231 f.) v.23 ff. (*saṃsāra-viṣayātītam muktānām avyayaṃ sukham*).

⁶⁷ Cf. also FRANCO (1997: 65).

There is, in the first place, a continuous tradition in epistemic concepts referred to by both Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena that go back to Dinnāga. Dharmakīrti himself refers to Dinnāga so explicitly that would seem highly implausible to believe that he had availed himself of the Jaina epistemological tradition with respect to the number of points mentioned above in §§ 1–20, without even a single mention of it: one would expect Dharmakīrti embarking on at least an accidental discussion of a few issues he had supposedly taken over from the Jainas. Secondly, Satkari MOOKERJEE, who believed Siddhasena to flourish in the sixth century and to precede Dharmakīrti,⁶⁸ puzzled over what was in his opinion Dharmakīrti's lack of reaction as regards Siddhasena's interpretation of the intrinsic invariable concomitance (*antar-vyāpti*) and the superfluous character of the example as an exemplification (*bahir-udāhṛti*) external to the most elementary constituents of the proof formula, as well as the definition of the logical reason as 'inexplicability otherwise'.⁶⁹ This becomes no longer a query when we assume that Siddhasena was post-Dharmakīrtian. Moreover, it is for precisely the same reason that also Pātrasvāmin should be taken to flourish after Dharmakīrti. Thirdly, the concepts of *svārtha-vākya* and *parārtha-vākya* (NA.10) as well as *svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *parārtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.11) would have with certainty evoked a refutation from the side of Dharmakīrti, had he known about it. Likewise, Dharmakīrti would have certainly commented upon the idea of non-erroneousness of inference (*anumānaṁ ... abhrāntaṁ*) proven by its being a cognitive criterion alone (*pramāṇatvāt*), found in NA.5. The same holds true for the idea of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathānupapannatva*). Thus, any supposition that Siddhasena preceded Dharmakīrti can safely be dismissed.

Accordingly, depending on whether we follow the widely accepted dating of Dharmakīrti, viz. c. 600–660⁷⁰ or the results of latest research by KIMURA (1999) who assigns the years 550–620 for Dharmakīrti, we would have for the *terminus post quem* Siddhasena as the author of the *Nyāyavatāra* circa 620 or 660, respectively.

There is still another factor to be taken account of, viz. the question of the defining characteristic of the logical reason (*hetu*) characterised as 'the fact of being otherwise inexplicable', or 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathānupapannatva*,

⁶⁸ See: MOOKERJEE (1935: 398).

⁶⁹ See: MOOKERJEE (1935: 4–5): 'What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to *antarvyāpti* and the definition of *hetu* (probans) as *anyathānupapanna* in the verse 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing short of enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakīrti.'

⁷⁰ See: FRAUWALLNER (1961). Cf. also STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 23).

anyathānupapatti) in NA.22: *anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam iritam*. The author clearly refers to an earlier source and the idea did not originate with him in his NA. Independently, we find the idea reported and criticised by Śāntarakṣita in TSa.(1).1364 ff. (p. 405 f.) in the context of the validity of inference (*anumāna*).⁷¹ The most famous and relatively often quoted verse is TSa.1369:

*anyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim /
nānyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //*⁷².

Significantly enough, Śāntarakṣita TSa.(1).1364, p. 405.1) mentions Pātrasvāmin as the source of the idea: *anyathēty-ādinā pātrasvāmi-matam āśāṅkate ...*, and the treatise in question is the lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana*⁷³ by Pātrasvāmin, identified occasionally with Pātrakesarin / Pātrakesarisvāmin = Vidyānanda. For obvious reasons this Pātrasvāmin cannot be Vidyānanda (c. 850), the author of the *Śloka-vārttika* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra*—as SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928)⁷⁴ and CHATTERJEE (1978: 331) would have it—but some else who preceded Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788)⁷⁵, the teacher of Kamalaśīla.⁷⁶ Since the author of NA. alludes to his

⁷¹ The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1939: 11–53). See also PATHAK (1930–31) 71–83.

⁷² Strangely enough, Śāntarakṣita in TSa. interchanges the *pādas* ab with cd. The verse is also found in (1) TŚVA. p. 203 [the discussion of *anyathānupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is found there on pp. 198–217], (2) TBV. Vol. II, p. 569.28–29, (3) PMi.2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.17–18). Hemacandra's criticism against the Buddhist idea of *trairūpya* in PMi.2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.1–16) closely follows the exposition of Pātrasvāmin's aphorisms quoted in TSa. attesting to the authenticity of the quotation. Hemacandra, instead of the terms *anyathānupapatti*, uses the expression *avinā-bhāva*, cf. PMi.2.1.9 (p. 43.34–35): *svārthaṁ sva-niścita-sādhyāvinā-bhāvāka-lakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhyajñānam*. The formulation *sādhyāvinā-bhāvāka-lakṣaṇāt* resembles both Pātrasvāmin's *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana* (*tenāika-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /* = TSa.1379) as well as NA.5ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhūno liṅgāt sādhyā-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam / anumānam*.

⁷³ A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kishor Mukhtar: 'Saṁmatisūtra aur Siddhasena' (Hindi), *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsa par Viśada Prakāśa*, Calcutta 1956: 538–543 [the work was not available to me].

⁷⁴ Cf. UPADHYE (1971: *14–15), PATHAK (1930: *passim*) and PATHAK (1930–31: *passim*), who refers to him as Pātrakesari Vidyānanda or as Pātrakesarisvāmi.

⁷⁵ Cf. STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 56).

⁷⁶ Cf. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi–ixvii): 'In that case Pātrasvāmin must be an earlier author than both Śāntarakṣita and Vidyānanda, and he must have first

predecessors and Śāntarakṣita mentions only Pātrasvāmin, it must have been the latter who was responsible for the idea of *anyathānupapannatva*.⁷⁷ Had it been Siddhasena who introduced the idea, Śāntarakṣita would not, in all probability, have missed the opportunity to mention this. Certainly Pātrasvāmin is post-Diṇnagan, for his *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadārthana* was conceived to refute the latter, but his dating is quite uncertain. It is surprising, nonetheless, that Śāntarakṣita seems nowhere to allude to the NA. or its author. Consequently, the widespread opinion assuming that NA. is the first Jaina treatise on epistemology per se loses its weight, inasmuch we can safely assume that Siddhasena had his predecessor in the person of Pātrasvāmin.

As regards the *terminus ante quem*, in view of the fact that the verse no. 4 of the *Nyāyāvatāra* is incorporated into ŚDSa. as verse no. 56, it should be assigned to the date of Haribhadrāsūri. A supposition that it is ŚDSa.56 that was the source which NA.4 was borrowed from and that NA.4 is merely an interpolation seems inadmissible to me. NA.4 fits ideally the argumentative structure of the text: (1) NA.1 states the definition of *pramāṇa*, as well as the types and a general criterion of such a division, (2) NA.2 is polemical concerning the meaninglessness of formulating a definition for a well-known term/idea of *pramāṇa*, (3) NA.3 is a rejoinder to the objection, (4) NA.4 defines the two main divisions of *pramāṇa* along with a specific reason for such a division,⁷⁸ (5) NA.5 opens a section dealing

propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term ... *cir.* 700 A.D.'.

⁷⁷ Cf. MUKTHAR (1948) [according to UPADHYE (1971: *30)]: '7) The *Nyāyāvatāra* is composed centuries later than the *Sanmati-sūtra*, because it shows the influence of Pātrasvāmi (later than Samantabhadra) as well as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara'; and V.P. Jorhapurkar ('Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.) quoted in n. 5 above. See also DHAKY (1995: 42–3): '...the first foot of the *kārikā* 22 concerning the *hetu-lakṣaṇa* (character of probans) reflects sense-agreement, even partial verbal concordance with the verses from Pātrasvāmi's (Pātrakesari's) *Trilakṣaṇakadārthana* cited by the Buddhist scholiast Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (c. 2nd quarter of the 8th century A. D.)³²'. SHASTRI (1990: 31) is a bit more reserved and does not take for granted that Pātrasvāmin was anterior to Siddhasena: '*Nyāyāvatāra* also defines *hetu* in the same manner.'

⁷⁸ Both NA.1 and 4 go against the prevalent Jaina tradition to subsume cases of sensory cognition, inference and verbal testimony under *parokṣa*, whereas *pratyakṣa* was taken to denote extra-sensory and extra-mental acts of cognition (viz. *avadhi*, *manah-pariyāya* and *kevala*). For Siddhasena the criterion of directness (*akṣa*) was not the cognising subject, or the soul (*akṣa=jīva=ātman*), but—like in the general *pramāṇa* tradition—the senses (*akṣa=indriya*).

with erroneous use of *pramāṇas*, etc. The use of vocabulary in NA.4 is not unusual for NA. Coincidentally, two adjacent verses, viz. NA.4 and NA.5, are stylistically and structurally quite akin: *pāda* a–b: 'reason' (*aparokṣatayā, sādhyāvinā-bhuno liṅgāt*) + 'object + verbal derivative in the meaning of a present participle' (*arthasya grāhakam, sādhyā-niścāyakam*) + ... + *pāda* c: 'subject' (*pratyakṣam, anumānam*) ... Admittedly, the similarity is not a crucial argument in favour of the same authorship of the two verses, however, there is nothing that could speak against a common authorship. The argument gains on strength in view of the fact that Haribhadrāsūri quotes the verse no. 2 of NA. in his *Aṣṭaka*⁷⁹ and refers to its author as Mahāmāti⁸⁰.

In view of the above, DHAKY's (1995: 44) claim⁸¹—to handle the discomfort that Haribhadra himself ascribes one of the verses to a Mahāmāti—that both NA.2 and 4 were taken from lost *dvātrīṃśikās* of Siddhasena Divākara is highly debatable to me. Not only NA.4 seems to represent an original *kārikā* of NA., but the same holds good in the case of *kārikā* 2. We could not make head or tail of NA.2 (the objection) if we did not have NA.1. Moreover, NA.3 (the rejoinder) would be pointless without NA.2. All the lost *dvātrīṃśikās* of Siddhasena Divākara as a reference source in

⁷⁹ The work is not available to me. I am forced to rely here on Pt. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287–288). Cf. also UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) and DHAKY (1995: 44).

⁸⁰ UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) is right to point out 'that Haribhadra, in his *Aṣṭaka*, quotes the *Nyāyāvatāra* 2, by referring to its author as Mahāmāti. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the *Sanmati* as Divākara and Śrutakevalin.' This enforces the supposition against the authorship of Siddhasena Divākara of NA.

⁸¹ 'A formidable objection, however, to the above-postulated identification (Siddharṣi was the author of both NA. and NAV.—P.B.) as well as the period determination (ninth/tenth century for NA.—P.B.) can be raised on the grounds of the ascription of a verse, which appears as the *kārikā* 2 of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, to Mahāmāti (=Siddhasena Divākara) by Yākinisūnu Haribhadra sūri (active c. A. D. 745–785) in his *Aṣṭaka*³⁸. And the *kārikā* 4 figures as a part of the *Ṣaḍdarsana-samuccaya* of the same Haribhadra sūri³⁹. Since Haribhadra sūri ascribed the particular verse (*kārikā* 2) to Siddhasena Divākara, it must be so. However, this *kārikā* could be originally from some *dvātrīṃśikā*, one of the lost 11 of Siddhasena Divākara, perhaps the *Pramāṇa-dvātrīṃśikā*, from which Gandhahasti Siddhasena quotes in his *sa-bhāṣya-Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra-vṛtti*⁴⁰. The *kārikā* 4 in the *Ṣaḍ-darsana-samuccaya* may likewise have been taken from one of the unavailable *dvātrīṃśikā* of Siddhasena Divākara. Alternatively, if that verse is Haribhadra's own, Siddharṣi must have borrowed it from the *Ṣaḍdarsana*. In any case, Haribhadra and Siddharṣi could have common sources from which they apparently may have drawn.'

argumentation resemble rather a kind of *śaśa-viśāṇa*. Naturally, as long as we do not have all *dvātrīṃśikās* written by Siddhasena Divākara, we cannot, theoretically speaking, preclude the possibility that the verses indeed were taken from some lost *dvātrīṃśikā*. But such an argumentation is not very constructive. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of *kārikās* 2 and 4 as long as they form a consistent logical part of the *Nyāyāvatāra* as a whole and bear stylistic similarities to adjacent *kārikās*,⁸² especially when the counter-arguments begin with 'perhaps' and are of merely could-or-may-have-been nature.

Further, the identification of Siddharṣi as the author of both NA. and NAV., postulated by DHAKY, has very weak foundations. In the first place, there is ample evidence that Siddharṣi (the author of NAV.) is not Siddhasena (the author of NA.) and that the two texts were written by different authors, inasmuch as Siddharṣi refers to the author of NA. explicitly, although not by name, but by the term *ācārya* or *sūtra-kṛt*, to cite a few cases only:⁸³ [1] Introductory lines of NAV.3: /3/ *adhunācāryo gṛhītas tāvakīno 'bhiprāyo 'smābhir iti param pratyāyayams tanmatam anudravya tad evānumanyamānas tathāpi lakṣaṇōkteḥ sāphalyam āvedayann āha: ...*; [2] the final sentence of NAV.3: *tad evam pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam sāmānyena pratipādyā tad-gatam kucodyam paryahāry ācāryena*; [3] NAV.13: *yad vātyantābhyaśena parikarmila-matitvāt tāvatāva prastuta-prameyam avabudhyate, tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣābhīdhānasya śrotṛ-saṃskārākāritayā nairarthakyaḍ ity-ādau hetu-pratipādanam sūtra-kṛtā parārtham anumānam uktam*; [4] NAV.29: *ata evācāryasya na tal-lakṣaṇādi-svarūpa-kathane 'pi mahānādarah*. Additionally, in some cases (e.g. on NA.8), Siddharṣi does offer at least two

⁸² I have dealt briefly with the style of NA.4 above. The same is even more true for NA.2 that is closely followed by NA.3 (the most conspicuous similarities underlined):

/2/ *prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāras ca tat-kṛtāḥ /
pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyōktau jñāyate na prayojanam //*
/3/ *prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakṣaṇōktau prayojanam /
tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmūḍha-manasām iha //*

⁸³ DHAKY (1995: 43) is so far right that indeed Siddharṣi nowhere mentions the author of *Nyāyāvatāra* by name: 'As noted in the beginning, Siddharṣi does not ascribe the *Nyāyāvatāra* to Siddhasena Divākara or to a different Siddhasena or for that matter to any other author.' However, he clearly misses the point when he further claims: 'Nor does he mention it as a composition of a *pūrvācārya*, *vṛddhācārya*, or some *cirantānācārya*. Also, in his verse by verse exposition, he nowhere uses qualificatory phrases such as *śāstrakāra*, *sūtrakāra*, *kārikākāra*, *ācārya*, etc. which may have denoted a second, an earlier revered personage, as the *kārikās*' author.'

different interpretations of a *kārikā*, or diverges from the contents of NA., e.g. in the case of NA.4d⁸⁴.

Thus, we can safely take the date-brackets for the *Nyāyāvatāra* to be firmly fixed after 620 C.E. (Dharmakīrti) and Pātrasvāmin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasūri).⁸⁵ As for the date of Haribhadrasūri, JACOBI (1926: *Introduction*) assigns Haribhadra to c. 750, whereas UPADHYE (1971: xxv) to c. 750–800 C.E. and DHAKY (1995: 44) to c. 745–785. However, the *terminus post quem* for Haribhadra is Arcaṭa, since the latter is quoted in Haribhadrasūri's NPV.9.15–19⁸⁶. Arcaṭa, the teacher of Dharmottara, can be assigned to c. 730–790 or 720–780.⁸⁷

Finally, as regards the name of the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, we are indeed in a quandary. Probably the earliest indication of his name is, as it has been mentioned above (p. 47), Haribhadrasūri who makes mention of him under the appellation 'Mahāmāti'. The subsequent source from which we learn that NA. was composed by a Siddhasena is NAVV. of Śāntisūri. The author of NA. is explicitly identified there in at least four places⁸⁸. In the last reference Śāntisūri is even more specific to give the full name of the author as well: Siddhasenārka⁸⁹. All other references we

⁸⁴ Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or '[the manner of] grasping [an object]', whereas Siddharṣi takes the expression to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible. See p. 26 above.

⁸⁵ Thus, I cannot but side with the opinion already expressed in VAIDYA (1928: xx): 'The *terminus a quo* would be the date of Dharmakīrti and the *terminus ad quem* that of Haribhadra.'

⁸⁶ Acc. to STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 119) the original title found to the colophon is *Nyāya-praveśa-ṭīkā śiṣya-hitā*.

⁸⁷ See: STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 64) and FRAUWALLNER (1961: 148).

⁸⁸ [1] NAVV.36§ 7 (p. 95.8): *śrisiddhasena-ghaṭita-sphuṭa-gīṣṭalākām suddhām avāpya vimalam vihitam mayātāt //*, [2] NAVV.21.§ 2 (p. 78.9–10): *evam-rūpasya vadhaḥ tyāgaḥ siddhasenārkaśyēty arthaḥ*, [3] NAVV.53.§ 2 (p. 107.18): *siddhasenasya sūtra-kartuḥ...*, [4] NAVV.1.§ 11 (p. 13.14–15): *tat kim svātantryeṇa? na ity āha—siddhasenārka-sūtritām iti. siddhasena eva jagaj-jantu-mano-moha-samītiṭām asītamah samūhāpoha-kāritvāt arka iva arkaḥ, tena sūtritām*.

⁸⁹ Indeed, Śāntisūri speaks of Siddhasenārka, not of Siddhasena Divākara, as UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) would have it: 'iii) ... The earliest author, as far as I know, who specifies the name of Siddhasena Divākara as the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* is Śāntisūri of the 11th century A.D. or so.' Nevertheless, I would side with UPADHYE in asserting that 'Arka' is just another name for 'Divākara'. Thus, I see absolutely no justification for the contention of DHAKY (1995: 49, n. 9), who—commenting on the clause: *siddhasena eva jagaj-jantu-mano-moha-samītiṭām-asītamah-samūhāpoha-kāritvāt*

encounter in the Jaina literature of this period are to Siddhasena Divākara as the author of other works, but none to him as the author of NA.⁹⁰ In view of the extant evidence, the opinion of MUKTHAR (1948)⁹¹ still holds good that the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* is apparently different from the author of the *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* and from the author of the twenty-one *dvātrīṃśikās* ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara. Strangely enough, the available colophons of NA. and NAV. contain no reference to the name of the author of NA. Since even the point is not clear whether the author of NA. was a Siddhasena, not to mention the problem of deciding which Siddhasena he could have been,⁹² I would—for the sake of convenience—suggest to tentatively call the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* Siddhasena Mahāmāti, after the specific identification of Haribhadrasūri.

arka iva arkaḥ, tena sūtritām—maintains that “Arka” here is not in the sense of “Divākara” but “essence”. Clearly, *arka* here is an epithet of Siddhasena, who is compared to the sun (*arka iva*; *arka=divā-kara*), and by him (*tena*) the idea discussed before is composed in a *sūtra* form (*sūtritām*). If we took *arka* as DHAKY would like it, the whole clause could hardly be construable.

⁹⁰ Cf., e.g. [1] UPADHYE (1971: xiii): ‘Haribhadra is one of the earlier authors to mention Siddhasena Divākara and his *Sanmati*. First, he calls him Śrutakevalin; and secondly, he tells us that his name was Divākara (p. *1). Then he has a pun on the name that he was like *Divākara*, sun, to the darkness of Duḥṣama-kāla.’ [2] UPADHYE (1971: xvii): ‘...Pūjyapāda ...quotes Siddhasena’s *Stuti* III.16 in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* (II.10; VII.13).’ [3] H. R. Kāpādiā (AJP., ‘Introduction’, Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.): ‘Haribhadra refers to Siddhasena in his *Sammaiparayaṇa*, in his *Anekāntajayapatākā* as well as in his *Paṃcavatthuya* (vv.1047–8), calling him Suyakevali. Jinadāsagaṇi (c. 676 A.D.) refers to him thrice in his *Nīṣihaviṣeḥacūṇi*.’ [4] DAVE (1962): ‘So Siddhasena is earlier than Mallavādi and the tradition puts him as a contemporary of Vikramāditya who flourished in 57 B.C.’ [according to UPADHYE (1971:*53)] and ‘Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda quote the *Sanmati*.’ [according to UPADHYE (1971:*59)].

⁹¹ ‘The following points are clear: (1) The *Dvā.s* were not composed in the present order; (2) they are not of one and the same Siddhasena; (3) the *Nyāyāvatāra* is one of them; (4)... No indisputable evidence is brought forth for the common authorship of the *Dvā.s*, *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Sanmati*. ... There were thus three clear and distinct Siddhasenas: (1) the author of *Sanmati*; (2) the author of *Nyāyāvatāra*; (3) and another, the author of some *Dvā.s*.’ [according to UPADHYE (1971:*28)].

⁹² It is not established that Arka was indeed used by Śāntisūri as a synonym of Divākara.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AJP. = Haribhadra Sūri: *Anekānta-jaya-patākā*. Ed. with his own commentary and Muncandra Sūri's supercommentary. Vol. 1 & 2, Ed. H. R. Kāpādiā, *Gaekwad's Oriental Series* 88, 105, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1940, 1947.
- BALCEROWICZ 1995 = Balcerowicz, Piotr: ‘Śaṅkarasvāmin: *Nyāya-praveśa*—“Wprowadzenie w logikę” (“Introduction to Logic”).’ Part One: I. Polish Translation, II. Sanskrit Text, III. Notes § I, *Abbreviations and Bibliography. Studia Indologiczne* (Warsaw) 2 (1995) 39–87.
- BALCEROWICZ 1999 = Balcerowicz, Piotr: ‘Taxonomic approach to *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* in *Nyāya-bindu* and in Siddharṣigaṇi’s *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti*—Dharmakīrti’s typology and the Jaina criticism thereof.’ In: *Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference—Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997)*. Ed. by Shoryu Katsura, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* Nr. 32, Wien 1999: 1–16.
- BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming) = Balcerowicz, Piotr: ‘On the Relationship of the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*.’ Presented at the XIth World Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3rd–8th, 2000.
- BHATTACHARYYA 1926 = Bhattacharyya, B.: ‘Foreword’ to TSa.(I).i-cxvii.
- BSŚBh. = Śaṅkara: *Brahma-sūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya*. Ed. with the commentaries: *Bhāṣya-ratna-prabha* of Govindānanda, *Bhāmāti* of Vācaspati-miśra, *Nyāya-nirṇaya* of Ānandagiri; ed. by J.L. Shastri, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1980 [Reprinted: Delhi 1988].
- CHATTERJEE 1978 = Chatterjee, Asim Kumar: *A Comprehensive History of Jainism (up to 1000 A.D.)*, Firma KLM Private Ltd., Calcutta 1978.
- DAVE 1962 = Dave, P. N.: *Siddhasena Divākara: A Study*. A Thesis submitted to the University of Bombay for the Ph.D. degree, September 1962 [After UPADHYE (1971:*51)].
- DHAKY 1981–82 = Dhaky, M. A.: ‘Some less known verses of Siddhasena Divākara.’ *Sambodhi* 10 (1981–82) 169–173.
- DHAKY 1990 = Dhaky, M. A.: ‘The Date and Authorship of *Nyāyāvatāra*.’ A typescript of a paper—presented to me by the author in 1990—prepared for publication in *B. K. Thapar Felicitation Volume* [the edition was not available to me].
- DHAKY 1995 = Dhaky, M. A.: ‘The Date and Authorship of *Nyāyāvatāra*.’ *Nirgrantha* (Ahmedabad, eds. M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah) 1 (1995) 39–49.

- DhPr. = *Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottara-pradīpa* [being a subcommentary on *Dharmottara's Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*, a commentary on *Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu*], Ed. by Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, Research Institute, Patna 1971.
- FRANCO 1987 = Franco, Eli: *Perception, knowledge and disbelief: a study of Jayarāsi's scepticism*. *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien* 35, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1987 [Reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994].
- FRANCO 1997 = Franco, Eli: *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*. *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde* 38, Wien 1997.
- FRAUWALLNER 1933 = Frauwallner, Erich: 'Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam.' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Morgenlandes* 40 (1933) 300–304 [Reprinted: FRAUWALLNER (1982: 479–483)].
- FRAUWALLNER 1957/a = Frauwallner, Erich: 'Vasubandhu's Vādaśāstra.' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Morgenlandes* (1957) 104–146 [Reprinted: FRAUWALLNER (1982: 716–758)].
- FRAUWALLNER 1957/b = Frauwallner, Erich: 'Review of R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's Edition of the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*.' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1957) 58–60 [Reprinted: FRAUWALLNER (1982: 883–885)].
- FRAUWALLNER 1961 = Frauwallner, Erich: 'Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic.' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 5 (1961) 125–148.
- FRAUWALLNER 1982 = Frauwallner, Erich: *Kleine Schriften*. Hrsg. von Gerhard Oberhammer und Ernst Steinkellner, Glassenapp-Stiftung 22, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1982.
- GRANOFF 1989–1990 = Granoff, Phyllis: 'The Bibliographies of Siddhasena—A Study in the Texture of Allusion and the Weaving of a Group Image.' Part I: *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17 (1989) 329–384. Part II: *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 18 (1990) 261–304.
- HATTORI 1968 = Hattori, Masaaki: *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣa-pariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, edition of Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit text as well as the English translation of the Chapter I. Harvard University Press 1968.
- HB. = Steinkellner, Ernst: *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text; Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens* 4, 5; Wien 1967.
- JACOBI 1926 = Jacobi, Hermann: 'Introduction and Contents' to *Haribhadra: Samarāṅgikā-kahā—A Jaina Prakṛta Work*. Volume I: Text and Introduction, *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta 1926: i-cxxx.
- KIMURA 1997 = Kimura, Toshihiko: 'New Chronology of Dharmakīrti', in: *In: Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference—Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997)*. Ed. by Shoryu

- Katsura, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* Nr. 32, Wien 1999: 209–214.
- KRAUSE 1948 = Krause, Charlotte: 'Siddhasena and Vikramāditya.' *Vikrama Volume*, Scindia Oriental Institute, Ujjain 1948: 213–280.
- KUNST 1939 = Kunst, Arnold: *Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha (Zagadnienia logiki buddyjskiej według Tattvasaṅgrahy Śāntarakszity)*. Polska Akademia Umiejętności, *Mémoires de la Commission Orientaliste* 33, Kraków 1939.
- MALVANIA 1979 = Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania: 'Pañḍita 1, Nyāyāvātara ki Tulanā.' 1979.
- MATILAL 1985 = Matilal, Bimal Krishna: *Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues*. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1985.
- MAV. = Aśaṅga (Maitreya-nātha?): *Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra*; ed. by Nathmal Tatia and Anantalal Thakur with Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya*, *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series* 10, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1967.
- MAVBh. = Vasubandhu: *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*. See: MAV.
- Met. = *Aristotelis Metaphysica*. Ed. W. Jaeger, *Scriptorum Classicorum, Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*, Oxford University Press, London 1957.
- MOOKERJEE 1935 = Mookerjee, Satkari: *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux – An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the School of Dignāga*. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1993 [First edition: University of Calcutta, 1935].
- MOOKERJEE 1971 = Mookerjee, Satkari: 'A critical and comparative study of Jain Logic and Epistemology on the basis of the Nyāyāvātara of Siddhasena Divākara.' *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1, Vaishali 1971.
- MSA. = Aśaṅga (Maitreya-nātha?): *Mahāyāna-sūtrāṅkāra*. (1) Ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris 1907. (2) Ed. and transl. Surekha Vijay Limaye, *BIBS* 94, Sri Satguru Publications / Indian Books Centre, Delhi 1992.
- MŚV. = Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: *Mīmāṃsā-sloka-vārttika. Śloka-vārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāya-ratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, *Ratnabharati Series* 3, Tārā Publications, Varanasi 1978.
- MUKHTAR 1948 = Mukhtar, Jugalkishore: 'Sanmati Siddhasenānāka.' *Anekānta*, IX.11–2, December 1948; reprinted in the Introduction of the *Purātana-Jaina-Vākya-sūci*, Delhi 1950. Included in his *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsapara Viśada-prakāśa*, Part I, Delhi 1956; its English Translation (by A. N. Upadhye): *Sanmati-sūtra and Siddhasena*, Virasewamandira Trust, Delhi 1965 [After UPADHYE (1971: *25)].

- NA. = Siddhasena Divākara: *Nyāyavatāra*. (1) Ed. with Siddharṣiṅga's *Vivṛti* and Devabhadra's *Tippana*, by Bhagavandas Harakhchand; Ahmedabad-Patan 1917. (2) Ed. with Siddharṣiṅga's *Vivṛti* and Devabhadra's *Tippana*, by P. L. Vaidya, Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, Bombay 1928 [reprinted in *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1, Vaishali 1971: 1-95].
- NASV. = *Nyāyavatāra-sūtra-vārttika of Śrī Śānti Sūri* critically edited in Sanskrit with notes, indices etc. in Hindi [with the *Vṛtti*] by Dalsukh Malvania, published by Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikshapitha, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1949.
- NAṬ. = Devabhadra's *Nyāyavatāra-tippana*. See: NA.
- NAV. = Siddharṣiṅga: *Nyāyavatāra-vivṛti*. See: NA.
- NAV. = Śrī Śānti Sūri: *Nyāyavatāra-vārttika-vṛtti*. See: NASV.
- NB. = Dharmakīrti: *Nyāya-bindu*. See: DhPr.
- NBh. = Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin: *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. See: NS.
- NBṬ. = Dharmottara: *Nyāya-bindu-tikā*. See: DhPr.
- NM. = *Nyāya-mukha* of Dignāga. Ed. Giuseppe Tucci, Heidelberg 1930.
- NP. = Śaṅkarasvāmin: *Nyāya-praveśa*. (1) [Part One:] *Nyāya-praveśa* of Diñnāga with Commentaries of Haribhadra Suri & Parsavadeva' ed. by A. B. Dhruva, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1930. (2) See: BALCEROWICZ (1995: 72-77).
- NPV. = Haribhadrasūri: *Nyāya-praveśa-vṛtti*. See: NP.(1).
- NS. = Akṣapāda Gautama: *Nyāya-sūtra. Mahāmuni Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-bhāṣya on Gautama-Nyāya-sūtras With Prasannapadā Commentary of Pt. Sudarśanācārya Śāstrī*. Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, SS 10, Sudhī Prakāśanam, Vārāṇasī 1986.
- NV. = Uddyotakara: *Nyāya-vārttika. Nyāya-darśana (= Nyāya-sūtra) with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyatīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, *Kalikātā-saṃskṛta-grantha-mālā* 18, Calcutta 1936.
- PATHAK 1930 = K.B. Pathak: 'Śāntarakṣita's reference to Kumārila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva.' *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 11 (1930) 155-164.
- PATHAK 1930-31 = K.B. Pathak: 'Dharmakīrti's Trilakṣaṇahetu attacked by Pātrakesari and defended by Śāntarakṣita.' *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 12 (1930-31) 71-83.
- PBh. = Prāśastapāda: *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*. Bronkhorst, Johannes and Ramseier, Yves: *Word index to the Prāśastapādabhāṣya: a complete word index to the printed editions of the Prāśastapādabhāṣya*; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994.
- PMi. = Hernacandra: *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. Ed. and trans. by Satkari Mookerjee and Nathmal Tatia, Tārā Publications, Varanasi 1970.

- PS. = Diñnāga: *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. (1) Chapter I, see: HATTORI (1968). (2) *The Tibetan Tripitaka—Peking Edition*, ed. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo—Kyoto 1957—*Bstan-hgyur, Mdo-hgrel, Gtan-Tshogs Rig-pa* I, Vol. 130, No.5700.
- PV. = *The Pramāṇa-vārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with Sub-commentaries: Svōpajña-vṛtti of the Author and Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti of Manorathanandin*. Ed. by Prof. Dr. Ram Chandra Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989.
- PVin.I(1) = *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇāvinīścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: pratyakṣam*. Hrsg. und übers. von T. Vetter. *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens* Heft 3, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1966.
- PVin.II(1) = *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇāvinīścayaḥ, 2. Kapitel: Svārthānumānam*. Tib. Text und Sanskrittexte von Ernst Steinkellner. *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens* 12, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1973.
- PVin.II(2) = *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇāvinīścayaḥ, 2. Kapitel: Svārthānumānam*. übers. von Ernst Steinkellner. *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens* 15, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1979.
- PVSV. = Dharmakīrti: *Pramāṇa-vārttika-svōpajña-vṛtti*. See: PV.
- PVV. = Manorathanandin: *Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti*. See: PV.
- QVARNSTRÖM 1999 = Qvarnström, Olle: 'Haribhadra and the Beginnings of Doxography in India.' In: *Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols* [Proceedings of the International Conference on Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols, 31.03-2.04.1995 Toronto]. Ed. by N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnström, *South Asian Studies Papers* 11, University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto 1999: 169-210.
- RANDLE 1926 = Randle, H.N.: *Fragments from Dignāga*. Prize Publication Fund, Royal Asiatic Society, London 1926 [Reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1981].
- SacAcBh. = Asaṅga: *Sacittikā Acittikā ca Bhūmiḥ* [A Section of *Yogācāra-bhūmi*]. (1) Wayman, Alex (Ed.): 'The Sacittikā And Acittikā Bhūmi—Text and Translation.' In: *Buddhist Insight—Essays by Alex Wayman*. Ed. with an Introduction by George Elder, *Buddhist Tradition Series* VII, Delhi 1984 [Reprinted Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1990; 1st ed.: *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (Tokyo) 7/1 (1960) 375-379]. (2) See: SCHMITHAUSEN (1987: 220-2, 'Appendix I').

- SCHMITHAUSEN 1987 = Schmithausen, Lambert: *Ālayavijñāna—On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. Part I: Text, Part II: Notes, Bibliography and Indices. *Studia Philologica Buddhica, Tokyo IVa/IVb*, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1987.
- ŠDSa. = Haribhadrasūri: *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*. Ed. with the Commentaries of *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* of Guṇaratnasūri and *Laghuvṛtti* of Somatilaka Sūri and an *Avacūṛṇi*; by Mahendra Kumar Jain, with the Introduction of Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, JMJG-SG 36, Benares 1981.
- SHASTRI 1990 = Shastri, Indra Chandra: *Jaina Epistemology*. P. V. Research Series No. 50, P. V. Research Institute, Varanasi 1990.
- STEINKELLNER-KRASSER 1989 = Steinkellner, Ernst; Krasser, Helmut: *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇa-viniścaya*. Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens No.2, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1989.
- STEINKELLNER-MUCH 1995 = Steinkellner, Ernst; Much, Michael Torsten: *Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus—Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur II. Abh. der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge 214*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1995.
- SUKHLAL 1945/a = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi: 'Pratibhāmūrti Siddhasena Divākara.' *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, III.i, Bombay 1945: 9–20 (in Hindi) [See: UPADHYE (1971:*18)].
- SUKHLAL 1945/b = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi: 'Śrī Siddhasena Divākarano Samayano Praśna.' *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, III, Bombay 1945: 152 f. (in Gujarati) [See: UPADHYE (1971:*21)].
- SUKHLAL-DOSHI 1928 = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi; Bechardas Doshi: 'Sanmati-tarka and its Importance.' *Jaina Silver Jubilee Number*, Bhavnagar 1928 (Sañ. 1985): 109–121 (in Gujarati) [After UPADHYE (1971:*12)].
- TABER 1994 = Taber, A. John: 'Kumārila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: the Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa.' In: *Studies in Mimāṃsā—Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume*. Ed. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994: 27–52.
- TBh. = Umāsvāti: *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*. See TS.
- TBV. = Abhayadevasūri's *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyini* on Siddhasena Divākara's *Sammati-tarka-prakarana*. Ed. by Sukhlāl Saṅghavi and Becardās Doṣi; Vol. I & II, *Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI* 1,2; Kyoto 1984 [Reprinted from the original edition published in 5 Vols., *Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir-granthāvalī* 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, *Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir*, Amdāvād, 1924–1931].

- TILLEMANS 1997 = Tillemans, Tom J.F.: 'Dharmakīrti on *prasiddha* and *yogyatā*.' In: *Aspects of Buddhism: Proceedings of the International Seminar on Buddhist Studies, Liw, 25 June 1994*, eds.: Agata Bareja Starzyńska, Marek Mejor = *Studia Indologiczne* (Warszawa) 4 (1997) 177–194.
- Triṃś. = Vasubandhu: *Triṃśikā-vijñapti-kārikā*. See: VMS.
- TS. = Umāsvāmin: *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. Ed. together with *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* by M.K. Mody, *BI* No.1044, Calcutta 1903–5.
- TSa. = Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṅgraha* together with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*. Ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, 2 Vols., *Gaekwad's Oriental Series* 30–31, Baroda 1926 [Reprinted: 1984].
- TSaP. = Kamalaśīla: *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā*. See: TSa.
- TŚVA. = Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin: *Tattvārtha-sloka-vārtikālaṃkara*. Ed. by Manoharalāl, Ramacandra Nātha Raṅgaji, Bombay 1918.
- UPADHYE 1971 = Upadhye, A. N.: *Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyavatāra* (edited by the late S.C. Vidyabhusan with English Translation, Notes etc.) and with the *Vivṛti* of Siddharṣi as well as *The Text of 21 Dvātriṃśikās and the Sammaṭi-suttam*; *Vinayavijaya's Nayakarnikā* edited by ... with an Introduction, Bibliographic Review, Indices etc.; *Jaina Sāhitya Vikāsa Maṇḍala*, Bombay 1971.
- VAIDYA 1928 = Vaidya, P. L.: 'Introduction' to *Nyāyavatāra*. See: NA.(2): vii–xliii.
- Vimś. = Vasubandhu: *Vimśatikā*. See: VMS.
- VMS. = Vasubandhu: *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* (*Vimśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*). *Deux traités de Vasubandhu, Vimśatikā et Triṃśikā, 1 Partie—Texte, Shīramati's Bhāṣya*. Ed. by Sylvain Lévi, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, Paris 1925.
- VS. = *The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Muni Jambūvijayaji, *GOS* 136, Baroda 1961.
- VTP. = Bhāvasena: *Viśva-tattva-prakāśa*. Ed. by Vidyadhara Pasusa Johrapurkar, *Jīvarāja Jaina Granthamālā*, Sholapur 1964.
- WAYMAN 1996 = Wayman, Alex: 'The Nyāyavatāra and Buddhist Logical Works by Dignāga and Ratnākaraśānti.' *Nirgrantha* 2 (1996) 1–8, eds. M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah, Ahmedabad.
- WILLIAMS 1963 = Williams, R.: *Jaina Yoga*. *London Oriental Series* 14, New York–Toronto 1963.