

On “*Upādhi*”

—Continued—

By

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The readers are expected to have read my preceding acticle of the same title in the Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. XIV, No. 1.

Now, if, as is explained, the function of the *upādhi* is that of the symptom which tells us the invalidity of the argument, it is preferable that its definition should be as generous as possible. For, the more generous the definition is, the easier will it be for us to find a suitable *upādhi* that satisfies the definition, and the invalidity of the argument may more easily be pointed out. In this connection, the statement of the Siddhāntamuktāvalī is worth to note.

Kārikā 138 of the Siddhāntamuktāvalī reads as follows:

*sādhyasya vyāpako yas tu hetor avyāpakas tathā /
sa upādhir bhavet, tasya niṣkarṣo 'yaṁ pradarśyate ||*

(Now, that which is a pervader of the *sādhyā* [-*dharma*]
and a non-pervader of the *hetu* as well is the *upādhi*;
its pith will be shown here.)

Apparently *upādhi* is defined here. Since *hetu* is nothing but the *sādhana-dharma*, this definition is practically the same as the definition so far dealt with, i.e.

sādhyā-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakah upādhiḥ (That

which is a pervader of the *sādhya* [-*dharma*] and non-pervader of the *sādhana* [-*dharma*] is the *upādhi*).

The Siddhāntamuktāvalī consists of verses (called “*Kārikā*”) and the commentary on them. According to the latter the intended meaning of the above-quoted definition of *Kārikā* 138 should be as follows:

yad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpakatvaṃ tad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhanāvyaṣakatvaṃ ([That which has] the nature of being a pervader of the *sādhya* [-*dharma*] limited by *dharma* X [and has] the nature of being a non-pervader of the *sādhana* [-*dharma*] limited by the same *dharma* X [is the *upādhi*]).

In order to avoid unnecessary confusion and make the comparison easier, let us rewrite this in the following manner:

yad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpakatve sati tad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhanāvyaṣakaḥ upādhiḥ (That which is a pervader of the *sādhya* [-*dharma*] limited by *dharma* X and non-pervader of the *sādhana* [-*dharma*] limited by the same *dharma* X is the *upādhi*).

Let us take this as the exact definition of *upādhi* offered by the Siddhāntamuktāvalī, and compare it with the definition so far dealt with. The difference is that in the definition offered by the Siddhāntamuktāvalī the words “*sādhya*[-*dharma*]” and “*sādhana* [-*dharma*]” are modified by the phrases “*yad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by *dharma* X)” and “*tad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by the same *dharma* X)” respectively. Then why are these modifications necessary? The Siddhāntamuktāvalī quotes three examples to explain the reason. But in this article I shall deal with only one of them, which, I believe, will be persuasive enough.

The Naiyāyikas believe that wind is not perceptible and that its existence may be inferred by the touch peculiar to it¹. As

1. According to the Naiyāyikas, the cool touch belongs to water, the hot touch

against this doctrine of the Naiyāyikas', some philosophers belonging to other schools maintain the perceptibility of wind on the ground of its being in possession of a perceptible touch. The argument they set forth is: "[Assertion:] Wind is perceptible. [Reason:] Because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch. [Example:] Like water etc." The Naiyāyikas must, of course, point out the invalidity of this argument. The recourse is had to the *upādhi*, and the nature of having a manifested color (*udbhūta-rūpavattva*) is taken up². The Siddhāntamuktāvalī says to the following effect: The nature of having a manifested color could not satisfy the definition of *upādhi* if *upādhi* were defined simply as "that which is a pervader of the *sādhya-dharma* and non-pervader of the *sādhana-dharma*"; since, however, the exact definition of *upādhi* is "that which is a pervader of the *sādhya-dharma* limited by *dharma X* and non-pervader of the *sādhana-dharma* limited by the same *dharma X*," the nature of having a manifested color can be the *upādhi*.

Then why does the nature of having a manifested color not satisfy the first definition, and how does it satisfy the second one? Again, how that which satisfies the second definition can also be the symptom of the invalidity of the argument? Before I answer these questions, however, I must explain a little about the Naiyāyika doctrines. According to the Naiyāyikas substances are of nine sorts; i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, space, the internal organ (*manas*)³, and the soul (*ātman*). Of these nine sorts of substances, the last two, i.e. the internal organ and the soul, are called "internal substances," while the other seven are called "external substances." Again, of these nine sorts of substances, the first three

to fire, and the neither-cool-nor-hot touch to wind.

2. According to the Naiyāyikas, colors are of two sorts, manifested (*udbhūta*) and unmanifested (*aundhūta*). For more detail see next page, line 1ff.
3. The internal organ is, the power of attention conceived of as a sort of substance. It is the bridge between the sense organs and the soul. We can see, for example, only when the visual organ is connected to the soul by the internal organ. See also foot-note 6.

possess colors, while the rest do not. The colors are of two sorts, manifested (*udbhūta*) and unmanifested (*anudbhūta*); and to have a manifested color is a necessary condition for, an external substance to be perceptible. The fire found in the kitchen, for example, is perceptible because it is in possession of a manifested color. The fire in our eyes⁴ or in the hot water, on the contrary, is not perceptible because its color is unmanifested. Being the propagators of these principles, the Naiyāyikas are bound to claim the imperceptibility of wind; for wind is an external substance which does not possess colors. Some philosophers, however, are against this claim of the Naiyāyikas', and the argument quoted in the preceding page, "Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch. Like water etc.," is set forth by them. The Naiyāyikas, in their turn, try to point out the invalidity of this argument, recurring to the *upādhi*—the nature of having a manifested color. However, the nature of having a manifested color does not satisfy the definition of *upādhi*, if *upādhi* is defined simply as "that which is a pervader of the *sādhya-dharma* and non-pervader of the *sādhana-dharma*." Why? Well, here perceptibility is the *sādhya-dharma* and the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch is the *sādhana-dharma*⁵. But the nature of having a manifested color is not a pervader of perceptibility, though it is a non-pervader of the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch. Indeed, everything that possesses perceptibility does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. The soul, for example, is per-

4. The Naiyāyikas believe that our visual organ is made of imperceptible fire.

5. Be sure that here neither the perceptible [thing] is the *sādhya-dharma* nor the substratum of a perceptible touch is the *sādhana-dharma*. For these may be wind itself but cannot be the properties of wind. In fact, the Sanskrit expression for the English translation "because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch" is "*pratyakṣa-sparśāśrayatvāt*," which, if translated literally, should be "because of [its] nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch."

ceptible⁶ (i.e. possesses perceptibility), but does not possess a manifested color (i.e. does not possess the nature of having a manifested color)⁷. Thus the nature of having a manifested color fails to satisfy the first definition.

Then how does it satisfy the second definition? As is already pointed out, the difference between the first and the second definitions lies in the fact that in the latter the words “*sādhya* [-*dharma*]” and “*sādhana* [-*dharma*]” are modified by the phrases “*yad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by *dharma* X)” and “*tad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by the same *dharma* X).” So, I must first explain the meaning of the word “*avacchinna* (limited).” In order to understand the meaning of the word “*avacchinna*,” however, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the word “*avacchedaka* (limitor).” For to say that F is limited by G is to say that F is limited by the *avacchedaka* G. Then what is the *avacchedaka*? Any *dharma* G that resides in the locus⁸ of *dharma* F may be treated as the *avacchedaka* of *dharma* F. Suppose there is a black pot; the black color is a *dharma* (property) of the pot and the pot is the locus of the black color. The pot may have many other *dharma*s than the black color, of course; of which, for convenience sake, let us pick up pot-ness (*ghaṭatva*, the nature of being a pot). If one simply says “black color (*nīla-rūpa*),” we don’t know what sort of black color is meant by him. But if he says “the black color limited by [the *avacchedaka*] pot-ness (*ghaṭatvāvacchinna-nīla-rūpa*),” we understand the black color that resides in the locus of pot-ness, i.e. the black color of a pot. Or more exactly, we understand the black color of any pot, as

6. According to the Naiyāyikas, we can perceive our own soul with our internal organ.

7. To say that something possesses a manifested color is to say that it possesses the nature of having a manifested color. For more detail, see footnote (3) of my preceding article mentioned of at the beginning.

8. The Sanskrit word for “locus” is “*adhikaraṇa*,” which we may take as a synonym of “*dharmin* (possessor of *dharma*)” or “*āśraya* (substratum).”

every pot is the locus of pot-ness.

Thus the meaning of the words “*avacchedaka*” and “*avacchinna*” being explained, let us now examine the meaning of the second definition as a whole, i.e. “*yad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpakatve sati tad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhanāvyaṇyāpakāḥ upādhiḥ*” (That which is a pervader of the *sādhya* [-*dharmā*] limited by *dharmā* X and non-pervader of the *sādhana* [-*dharmā*] limited by the same *dharmā* X is the *upādhi*.)” As is already said, when the argument “Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch” is set forth, perceptibility (*pratyakṣatva*) is the *sādhya-dharma* and the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch (*pratyakṣa-sparśāśrayatva*) is the *sādhana-dharma*⁹. So, if we choose external-substance-ness (*bahir-dravyatva*, the nature of being an external substance) for *dharmā* X, the second definition may be rewritten as follows :

*bahir-dravyatvāvacchinna-pratyakṣatva-vyāpakatve sati
bahir - dravyatvāvacchinna - pratyakṣasparśāśrayatvāvyā -
pakāḥ upādhiḥ* (That which is a pervader of the percepti-
bility limited by external-substance-ness and non-pervader
of the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch
limited by external-substance-ness is the *upādhi*).

Now, the nature of having a manifested color satisfies this condition. For everything that possesses the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness possesses the nature of having a manifested color, but everything that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. How? The perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is the percepti-

9. Here again, to say that something has the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch is to say that it has a perceptible touch. The readers may, therefore, rewrite all the phrases “the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch” by “a perceptible touch,” if simplicity is preferred. Cf. foot-note 7.

bility in whose locus external-substance-ness also resides ; in other words, the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is the perceptibility that belongs to external substances. If so, that which possesses the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is nothing but a perceptible external substance¹⁰. Now every perceptible external substance possesses the nature of having a manifested color. Look at water, for example. Thus the nature of having a manifested color satisfies the first half of the second definition. Then how does it satisfy the second half? Well, the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness is the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch in whose locus external-substance-ness also resides ; in other words, it is the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch that belongs to external substances. So, that which possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness is nothing but the external substance that is serving as a substratum of a perceptible touch, or more briefly, the external substance that has a perceptible touch. Now, every external substance that has a perceptible touch does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. Look at wind, for example¹¹. Thus the nature of having a manifested color satisfies the latter half of the second definition also.

10. We may put this in another way : The *dharma* F limited by *dharma* G is nothing but the *dharma* F in whose locus *dharma* G also resides. So, anything that possesses both *dharma* F and *dharma* G may be said to possess the *dharma* F limited by *dharma* G. A perceptible external substance possesses both perceptibility and external-substance-ness and, therefore, may be said to possess the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness.

11. Some readers may think that we should not refer to wind as an example here because it is the very thing that our dispute is concerned with. The answer to this question is as follows : Our dispute is concerned with the question whether wind possesses perceptibility or not, but neither is it concerned with the question whether it possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness nor with the question whether it possesses the nature of having a manifested color. We know for

It is to be noted that by the modifications “*yad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by *dharmā* X)” and “*tad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by the same *dharmā* X)” the second definition is made more generous than the first. The nature of having a manifested color, which does not satisfy the first definition, satisfies the second one. But here remains the question how that which satisfies the second definition, which is more generous than the first, can as well be the symptom of the invalidity of the argument.

Look at Figure V, which shows how the areas occupied by the entities concerned actually include or exclude one another when the nature of having a manifested color is taken up as a *upādhi* against the argument, “Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible




Figure V

touch.” Here the letters “B,” “b,” “C,” “c,” “D,” “d” are used in the same manner as in Figures I ~ IV of the preceding article. Area B—the area enclosed by line b—is the area where all the entities that possess *dharmā* B (the *sādhana-dharmā*, i.e. the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch) exist. Area C—the area enclosed by line c—is the area where all the entities that possess *dharmā* C (the *sādhya-dharmā*, i.e. perceptibility) exist. Area D—the area enclosed by line d—is the area where all the entities that

sure that wind is a substratum of a perceptible touch as well as it is an external substance and that it does not possess a manifested color. We cannot, of course, refer to wind as an example of an entity that possesses or does not possess perceptibility. But we can surely refer to it as an example of an entity that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color.

possess *dharmā* D¹² (the *upādhi*, i.e. the nature of having a manifested color) exist. A part of area B is shown to be outside area D because there exists such a thing as wind that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch but does not possess the nature of having a manifested color. A part of area C is shown to be outside area D because there exists such a thing as soul that possesses perceptibility but does not possess the nature of having a manifested color. It is to be noted that although in Figure V a part of area B happens to be outside area C, there is no assurance that a part of area B should always be outside area C in a figure where a part of area B and a part of area C are shown to be outside area D. For instead of Figure V we can also have Figure VI, where also a part of area B and a part of area C are shown to be outside area D but no part of area B is shown to be outside area C. But if there is a possibility that area B may be completely included in area C as is shown by Figure VI, then the relation that *dharmā* C is a pervader of *dharmā* B may hold and the invalidity of the argument




Figure VI

cannot be pointed out for sure. Then what should we do to bar out the case shown by Figure VI? Look at Figure VII. The area inside the largest rectangle drawn with the thickest line represents the whole universe. This rectangle is divided into two smaller rectangles by a dotted line in the middle. Let's call this dotted line "line m." The area inside the right-side smaller rectangle

12. It is to be noted that *dharmā* D and *dharmā* X are not necessarily the *dharman* of *dharmin* A as *dharman* B and C are. Cf. foot-note (6) of the preceding article.




Figure VII

is the area where all the entities that possess *dharma* X exist. The area inside the left-side smaller rectangle is the area where all the entities that do not possess *dharma* X exist. It is to be noted that in Figure VII the part of area B outside of area D is shown to be in the right-side rectangle and the part of area C outside of area D is shown to be in the left-side rectangle. This is important because if the part of area B outside of area D is in the right-side rectangle and the part of area C outside of area D is in the left-side rectangle, there is no possibility that we may have such a case as shown by Figure VI, i.e. the case that the part of area B outside of area D is included in the part of area C outside of area D and thus the relation that *dharma* C is a pervader of *dharma* B may hold. Then why is the part of area B outside of area D shown to be in the right-side rectangle, and the part of area C outside of area D in the left-side rectangle in Figure VII? The reason is that Figure VII shows the situation when external-substance-ness is chosen for *dharma* X. Indeed, that which possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color possesses external-substance-ness¹³, while

13. Look at wind for example.

that which possesses perceptibility and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color does not possess external-substance-ness.^{14,15} Now it is to be remembered that all we need to do to disprove the validity of the argument of the type, "There is *dharmā* C in *dharmā* A, because of *dharmā* B," is to show that at least some part of area B—any part will do—is outside of area C. If so, we do not need Figure VII. Figure VIII will do. For, as long as




Figure VIII

we know for sure by Figure VIII that a part of area B is outside area C, we do not have to pay attention to the inclusion-and-exclusion situation inside the left-side rectangle. The device of "*yad-dharmā-vacchinna* (limited by *dharmā* X)" and "*tad-dharmāvacchinna* (limited by the same *dharmā* X)" adopted in the second definition was for the obtainment of Figure VIII, or more exactly, for the obtainment of Figure IX. In fact, Figure IX is the exact represen-

14. Look at the soul, for example.

15. It is to be noted that if we fail to find out a suitable *dharmā* for *dharmā* X, the *upādhi* cannot be found out. If we choose, for example, substance-ness for *dharmā* X, the nature of having a manifested color does not satisfy the definition. In fact if substance-ness is chosen for *dharmā* X, both the parts of areas B and C that are outside of area D fall in the right-side rectangle, and we shall again have the possibility that area B may be completely included in area C as is shown by Figure VI.

tation of what the second definition says. Here area BX—the area enclosed by line b and line m—is the area where all the entities that possess both *dharma* B (the *sādhana-dharma*) and *dharma* X exist, i.e. the area where all the entities that possess *dharma* B limited by *dharma* X exist¹⁶. Area CX—the area enclosed by line c and line m—is the area where all the entities that possess both *dharma* C (the *sādhya-dharma*) and *dharma* X exist, i.e. the area where all the entities that possess *dharma* C limited by *dharma* X exist. Area D—the area inside the circle enclosed by line d—is the area where all the entities that possess *dharma* D (i.e. the *upādhi*) exist. Remember the second definition, “*yad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpakatve sati tad-dharmāvacchinna-sādhanāvyāpakah upādhiḥ* (That which is a pervader of the *sādhya* [*-dharma*] limited by *dharma* X and non-pervader of the *sādhana* [*-dharma*] limited by the same *dharma* X is the *upādhi*).” Figure IX is the exact representation of this definition. For in Figure IX no part of area CX




Figure IX

is found to be outside area D and some part of area BX is found to be outside area D. It is to be noted that while area D may stretch over both the right-side and the left-side rectangles, areas BX and

16. Cf. foot-note 10

CX are confined in the right-side rectangle only. Now, if no part of area CX is allowed to be outside area D and some part of area BX must be outside of it, at least the very part of area BX outside of area D is bound to be outside area CX. Since areas BX and CX are parts of areas B and C, this means that at least some part of area B is bound to be outside area C. (Remember that the inclusion-and-exclusion situation inside the left-side rectangle is out of question and that the very part of area BX that is outside of area CX is always to be found in the right-side rectangle.). Well, this is all that we need to know. For, if we know this much, we can safely say that the relation that *dharma* C is a pervader of *dharma* B does not hold, and thus the invalidity of the argument of the type, "There is *dharma* C in *dharmin* A, because of *dharma* B," can be pointed out for sure.