

ON THE VIJÑAPTIMĀTRA PASSAGE IN
SAMDHINIRMOCANASŪTRA VIII. 7*

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1. In an earlier paper¹⁾ I tried to show that Samdh VIII. 7-8 can be regarded as the starting point of the doctrine of 'cognition(-or-peception) only' —

* This paper is due to the most stimulating effect of two terms of fruitful collaboration with my dear friend and colleague Noritoshi Aramaki.

Abbreviations:

- Bh, etc. Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (see § 13)
 BoBh Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. U. Wogihara).
 Iwata 岩田諱静, 初期唯識思想研究 (世親造撰大乘論釈所知相章の漢藏対照) Tokyo 1981.
 Jñānag. Jñānagarbha, Āryamaitreya-kevala-parivartabhāṣyam, ed. J. Nozawa (see: Nozawa).
 Katano 片野道雄, 唯識思想の研究 (無性造撰大乘論註所知相章の解説), Kyoto 1975.
 MAV(Bh) Madhyāntavibhāga(bhāṣya) (ed. Nagao).
 MSg Mahāyānasamgraha (ed. Lamotte).
 MSg_x ed. of the Tibetan text of MSg I and II with a reconstruction into Skt. in Nagao 1982 (q. v.).
 Nagao 1982 撰大乘論, 和訳と注解, 上, Tokyo 1982.
 Nozawa 野沢静証, 大乘仏教瑜伽行の研究 (解深密經聖者慈氏章及び疏の訳註), Kyoto 1957.
 S 1969 L. Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīcayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmi, Wien 1969.
 S 1973 id., Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus, in: Zeitschr. f. Missionswiss. u. Religionswiss. 57/1973, 161 ff.
 S 1976 id., On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism, in: German Scholars on India, vol. II, 1976, 235 ff. (English version of a part of S 1973).
 S 1982 id., Versenkungspraxis und erlösende Erfahrung in der Śrāvakabhūmi, in: Epi-phanie des Heils, hrsg. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1982, 59 ff.
 Samdh Samdhinirmocanasūtra (ed. Lamotte).
 SamdhVy Samdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna of Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul (see Jñānag., 4): Tj No. 5845.
 Sasaki 佐々木月樵, 漢訳四本対照撰大乘論, Tokyo 1931.
 T Taishō ed. of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese.
 [T 1] etc. see §§ 4 and 5
 Tj Peking-Tanjur, ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo/Kyoto 1955-61.
 U₁, U₂ see § 14
 Y Yogācārabhūmi (ed. V. Bhattacharya).
 Y₁ Tibetan translation of the Yogācārabhūmi: Tj Nos. 5536-5543.

1) S 1973, 167 ff.; S 1976, 240 ff.

(*viññaptimātra*) proper, documenting at the same time that this doctrine was developed in the context of a specific yogic practice of deliberately visualizing and contemplating, in meditative concentration, certain kinds of images and afterwards—still in meditative concentration—effacing them. The aim was either—as in the Śrāvakabhūmi²⁾—to achieve an ever clearer reconstruction of these images, or—in certain (mostly Mahāyāna) contexts of the Vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇi³⁾—to become free from all phenomenal experience in order realize transphenomenal True Reality (*tathata*). To efface images at will is possible because they are creations of one's own meditative concentration—nothing but seeing or knowing or recollecting [them] (*darśanamātram vā jñānamātram vā pratismṛt(i)mātram vā*), as a Sūtra quoted in the Śrāvakabhūmi puts it⁴⁾. In the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, however, what alternates with visualization-cum-contemplation of images is not so much their effacement as acts of meditative contemplation contemplating these visualizations-and-contemplations themselves⁵⁾. The idea of such “reflexive” acts of meditative contemplation can again be traced to the Śrāvakabhūmi⁶⁾. But in the Śrāvakabhūmi this “reflexive” contemplation does not seem to have any close connection with image visualization, and its aim is rather to realize impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, etc., of even the meditating mind itself, in order to fully comprehend the four Noble Truths. In contrast with this, in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra “reflexive” contemplation envisages the awareness of the *ideality*⁷⁾ of the images perceived in meditative concentration—the fact that they are not different from the contemplating mind—, in order to effect the realization of universal True Nature (*tathata*)⁸⁾, understood, by Saṃdh VIII, as the ideality of *all* phenomena⁹⁾. It is in the context of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra's setting forth its view of the ideality of images visualized and contemplated in meditative concentration (VIII.

2) S 1982, 62 ff., esp. 67 ff.

3) S 1973, 169 f.; S 1976, 242.

4) Śrāvakabhūmi (ed. Shukla), 199, 17 f.; S 1973, 167; S 1976, 239 f.

5) Saṃdh VIII. 9.

6) S 1982, 79 f.

7) As this ideality of the images is a prefiguration or partial manifestation of *tathata* (Saṃdh VIII. 9), the *śamatha/vipaśyana* practice of the Saṃdh would seem to be also related to the *śamatha/vipaśyana* practice of BoBh 109 f. which seems to propound an alternation of contemplation of the features (or images?) (*nimitta*) of dharmas and of concentration on (their?) inexpressible Reality-as-such (*vastumātra*, = *tathatāmātra* acc. to BoBh 41, 18; cp. 293, 27 f.).

8) Saṃdh VIII. 9 (end).

9) Saṃdh VIII. 20. 2. 3.

7) and of the subsequent generalization of this view (VIII. 8) that the concept '*viññaptimātra*'—obviously alluding to the “nominalist” doctrine of ‘denomination only’ (*prajñapti-mātra*) of the Bodhisattvabhūmi¹⁰⁾—is introduced.

2. The crucial passage in which the term first appears is in the initial part of Saṃdh VIII. 7 where the question is put whether the images perceived in meditative concentration (*saṃadhi-gocarapratiṭimba*) are something different from mind (*citta*) or not. The answer is that they are not, and the reason for their non-difference is stated as follows (Lamotte's translation and text):

“Parce que ces images ne sont rien qu'idée. J'ai dit que l'objet de la connaissance se définit «Idée-sans-plus»” (*gzugs brñan de rnam par rig pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir te /rnam par ses pa'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no les nas bsad do* //).

3. To be sure, Lamotte's translation of the second sentence fits both Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version (see § 12. 4) and the Tibetan text as Lamotte gives it, but the latter is not quite correct. As is clear from a look into the block-prints of Peking¹¹⁾ and Derge¹²⁾, the transmitted text has not *rnam par ses pa'i* but *rnam par ses pa ni*, a reading confirmed by Yoshimura's edition of Saṃdh VIII¹³⁾, by its quotation in the Yogācārabhūmi¹⁴⁾, by the commentaries of Jñā-nagarbha¹⁵⁾ and Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul¹⁶⁾, and by the quotation of Saṃdh VIII. 7 in the Mahāyānasamgraha (II. 7, where Lamotte again reads *pa'i* but indicates in the critical apparatus that the xylograph¹⁷⁾ as well as the Bhāṣya¹⁸⁾ have *pa ni*). In view of this almost if not altogether unanimous testimony of the sources the reading *pa'i* has, in spite of the arguments adduced by Nozawa¹⁹⁾, to be abandoned in favour of *pa ni*²⁰⁾:

10) S 1973, 166 and 171; S 1976, 243 f.

11) Peking Kanjur (ed. Suzuki) vol. ñu 29b1.

12) Derge Kanjur (Nyingma Ed., Dharma Publ. 1981, vol. 18), mDo sde ca 27 a (=leaf 1232)

4.

13) Sh. Yoshimura, Comparative Study in Chinese and Tibetan Texts of the Yoga-vibhaṅga-parivarta in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, Kyoto 1959, p. 7.

14) Y, 'i 74 b 8.

15) Jñānag. 22, 3 f.

16) SaṃdhVy co 193 b 2.

17) Cp. also MS_g, 62+n. 3; Sasaki, 附 p. 48 (Yamaguchi's ed.).

18) Cp. also Iwata, 78+n. 3.

19) Nozawa, 206 n. 2.

20) This is also the opinion of Nagazawa, Katano and Suguro: see Iwata, 78 n. 3). Cp. also ns. 13 and 17 of this paper.

[T(a)] *rnam par śes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no (zes ŋas bśad do) ||*.

4. This text admits of two translations:

[T1] "Mind (*viñāna*) is constituted by (*prabhāvitā*)²¹, →is characterized by, or: consists in) mere cognition (*viñaptimatṛa*) of an object (*ālambana*)."

[T2] "Mind is an object that is constituted by mere cognition."

The Tibetan version of our sentence in MSg II. 7, viz.

[T(b)] *rnam par śes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can yin no (zes ŋas bśad do) ||*,

↳ involves a third translation:

[T3] "Mind has an object that is constituted by mere cognition"²².

5. As the Tibetan translation is not unambiguous, the question arises what the Sanskrit original—unfortunately lost—may have looked like. Nozawa²³, in view of Hsüan-tsang's rendering (see § 12: [H]), proposed

**viññānalambanaṃ viññaptimatṛaprabhāvitam* (.....)²⁴, but this reconstruction is irreconcilable with what has to be accepted as the correct text of the Tibetan translation. It is also in conflict with Buddhaśānta's rendering of the quotation of the sentence in MSg II. 7:

[Bu] (彼?) 念唯識所明識我說²⁵.

The value of Buddhaśānta's version²⁶ lies, among other things, in the fact that it is frequently (though not always) literal to the extent of preserving the word^{order} of the original Sanskrit without adapting it to the requirements of Chinese syntax. Thus, if there is no cogent reason against it, reconstruction should follow the word order of [Bu]. This means that the sentence we are concerned with started with *ālambana*, whereas *viñāna* came in the end, immediately

21) For this term see S 1969, 109 ff.; D. Seyfort Ruegg, la théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra, Paris 1969, 347 ff.

22) Thus Nozawa, 192 and 206 n. 2; Suguro in: Ōsaki gakuhō 129/1976, 43; Similarly Katano, 80.

23) Nozawa, 206 n. 2.

24) Cp. also Odani in: IBK 57/1980, 419 n. 10; Takasaki in: 講座 大乘仏教 (8: 唯識思想), Tokyo 1982, 37 n. 24: **Viññānalambanaṃ viññaptimatṛeṇa prabhāvitam iti maya desitam*; MSg 63 n. 1: *Viññānalambanaṃ hi viññaptimatṛaprabhāvitam*, which (in contrast with the proposal in the text which is Aramaki's) seems to be Nagao's own view (cp. Nagao 1982, 290 n. 1+m).

25) T vol. 31, 101 a 22 f.

26) Cp. Aramaki in: Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia 4-5/1963, 36.

before what would correspond to *zes ŋas bśad do*. This is confirmed not only by the Chinese version of Dharmagupta (see § 12: [Dh]), but also by the Tibetan version of both the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya and the Mahāyānasamgraha-upānibandhana ad MSg II. 7 which contain pratikas where the word *rnam par śes pa (viñāna)* immediately precedes the concluding *zes ŋas bśad do* (see § 13: Bh, (3a), and § 14: U, (1c) [for *dmigs pa* see § 14. 2]).

6. Accordingly, as on a previous occasion²⁷, I suggest the following reconstruction:

[S] **ālambanaviññaptimatṛaprabhāvitam viññanam*.....

Now contrasting with this, Aramaki in his reconstruction of MSg II. 7²⁸ proposes:

*(*tad*) *ālambanaṃ hi viññaptimatṛaprabhāvitam viññanam ity ahaṃ vadami*.

Disregarding, for the time being, the problem of the equivalent of *zes ŋas bśad do* (for which see § 9), I should like to cut down, for the purposes of the present investigation, the alternative suggested by Aramaki to

[A] **ālambanaṃ viññaptimatṛaprabhāvitam viññanam*.....

6.1 I have ignored *hi* though it seems to be supported by the final particle 故 in Bodhiruci's and Hsüan-tsang's Chinese versions (see § 12: [Bo] and [H]). But this 故 may have been induced by the question "why?" preceding (in Bodhiruci: immediately preceding) our sentence, or by logical considerations. Besides, there is no trace of *hi* in the commentaries. And even if *hi* had actually been there, the source material does not offer any clue as to its position²⁹. In view of the result of the following investigation (§§ 13ff.)—showing that there is textual support for both [S] and [A]—, it would seem that, if there was any *hi*, it can have followed neither *ālambana* (impossible in [S]: compound!) nor *-prabhāvitā* (impossible in [A]: *hi* should be the second word).

6.2 As for *tad*(-?), the fact that it is not confirmed by the Tibetan version (including the pratikas in the commentaries) which is usually quite meticulous in rendering pronouns is a strong argument against it. There is, on the other hand, evidence for *tad* in Paramārtha (此色相境界, s. § 12: [Pa]). But his version is the least literal of all and has most probably taken over *tad* from the Bhāṣya (see § 13. 1). The same is true of Dharmagupta whose gloss 定心所緣 (s. §

27) S 1969, 110; cp. S 1973, 168; S 1976, 240 f.

28) MSg 63.

29) This is also true of the vocative indicated, for our sentence, by the Tibetan translation (*Maitreya*) and by Hsüan-tsang (*kulaputra*).

12: [Dh]) too may be regarded as an expansion of *tad(-)*^{29a}). Finally, 彼 in [Bu] (s. §5) to be sure corresponds to *tad*, but I wonder if it could not represent the *tad* of the preceding *tat kasya hetoh*.

The difference between [S] and [A] is thus essentially reduced to the presence or absence of the anusvāra at the end of the word *alambana*.

7. It may seem disproportionate to write a paper on such a trifle as one single anusvāra, and *paramāṛthataḥ* I should, of course, agree. But the question whether anusvāra or not is decisive for interpretation of the sentence, which on its part is crucial in the context of what is, in all probability, the oldest extant passage enouncing, by the very term, the doctrine of *viññaptimatṛa*, i. e. the central doctrine of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda. Considering the internal consistency of the passage and historical plausibility, I should not even hesitate to assume that this passage is actually the first literary expression, in Yogācāra proper, of the generalization of the ideality of images visualized in meditative concentration into an ideality of *all* phenomena (see § 1). Yet, the sentence under discussion the Buddha himself seems to corroborate the fact that the images perceived in meditative concentration are nothing but cognition (*viññaptimatṛa*), i. e. do not exist apart from the mental act of cognizing or perceiving them, by the remark that he has [already] taught or explained (*zes ṇas bśad do*) something of the kind. As this sentence contains the term *viññaptimatṛa*, it creates the impression that the Buddha refers to an *earlier* enunciation of the idealist doctrine of cognition-only, and this would seem to imply that Saṃdh VIII. 7-9 is, against what I suggested above, *not* the *first* passage in which this doctrine was set forth. But determining the precise content of such an earlier teaching or explanation, alleged or real, depends on how one has to understand the sentence under discussion, and this again depends on whether the anusvāra was present or not.

8. Now, if the sentence had the form of [A], it would be unambiguous. From a merely formal point of view it could, to be sure, be interpreted in the sense of [T2] (see § 4). But such an interpretation does not seem to make much sense in the present context; for the thesis is not that *viññana* is an object but that the object is (not different from) *viññana*. Thus, *alambana* should be regarded as the grammatical subject, and the sentence taken to mean:

29a) Actually, the pratika of this sentence in the Bhāṣya (see § 13: Bh_{DB} (1)) has 此 instead of 定心.

[A1] "The object is constituted by nothing but cognition, [therefore it] is mind (*viññana*)."

No doubt, such a statement is unequivocally idealist. And if the perfect *bśad* has to be taken seriously, [A] would seem to imply that the sentence under discussion refers to an earlier authoritative enunciation of the doctrine of *viññaptimatṛa*, and that Saṃdh VIII. 7-9 is *not* the literary expression of the first discovery of this doctrine.

9. The only way out of the difficulty—if [A] is to be upheld—would be Aramaki's suggestion to understand *ṇas bśad do* as corresponding not to a Skt. preterite but to a present. This suggestion can be based on Kāśyapa-parivarta §§ 64, 65 and 127 where *zes ṇas bśad do* actually represents Skt. *aham..... vadāmi*. Yet, *bśad* is, at least from a morphological point of view, a perfect (or—not applying to the present case—a future), and *usually* represents *preterite* forms. Moreover, in a passage corresponding to a pratika of the last part of our sentence in MSgBh, (see § 13: Bh, (3a)), Hsüan-tsang's translation (§ 13: Bh_H (3a)) has the *passive* expression 我所說. Therefore, though I do not exclude the possibility of a present³⁰, I should consider *pre*terite, e. g. **iti maya deśitam* or the like, at least equally possible. This means that with [A] the undesirable consequence indicated in § 7, viz. that there must be some earlier enunciation of the doctrine of *viññaptimatṛa*, would at least remain a *possibility*.

10. On the other hand, this consequence does not at all apply in the case of [S]; for as I have already suggested previously³¹, [S] would allow to understand the sentence under discussion—no matter whether it contained a preterite or a present—as a skilful utilization of a widespread Abhidharmic definition³² of mind (*viññana*). This definition, which is, in principle, etymological, defines *viññana* as "the act of cognizing (lit.: making known [sc. to the cognizing 'person']) its (respective) object" (*alambana-* or *viṣaya-(prati)viññapti*), i. e.

30) I do not dare decide whether a final *ity aham vadāmi* would, from the syntactical/stylistical point of view, be unimpeachable (as *tam aham.....iti vadāmi* in Kāśyapaparivarta § 64 etc. obviously is) if, as in the sentence under discussion, no stress on "I" is intended. —That there actually was, in the original, some form of the pronoun of the 1st the Saṃdhinirmocana sentence *all* the versions have "I" (*ṇas*, 我) whereas in the Upanibandhana both versions have only the verb without a personal pronoun (see § 14: U, (3).....*zes bśad do*, U, (3) 說言.....) —a fact that seems to be explicable only by an opposition **maya deśitam* (Saṃdh) ↔ *deśitam* (U) or *aham vadāmi* (Saṃdh) ↔ *vadāmi* (U).

31) S 1973, 168; S 1976, 241. *Person sg. is rendered almost certain by the fact that in*

visible things in the case of visual perception, etc.³²). If this definition is used with a view to distinguish the function of mind (*viññāna*, *citta*) from that of mental factors associated with it (*caitta*, *caitasika-dharma*), it acquires the nuance that mind cognizes its object as a whole³³) or as such, without grasping or singling out or stressing its peculiar features³⁴), and this nuance could be expressed, as is documented also in non-Yogācāra sources, by adding the word *-mātra* to the word for "object" (*ālambana*, etc.)³⁵) or even to the word for "cognition" (*viññapti*, etc.)³⁶). Understood in this way, the sentence under discussion would not substantially depart from traditional Abhidharma, for it would mean nothing but: "I (have) declare(d)³⁷) that

32) Cp., e. g., Prakaraṇa (T vol. 26) 693 a 5 (眼識云何。謂……各了別色) = Y 4, 5 (*caḥsur-viññānam katamat?rāpaprativijñaptiḥ*); Abhidharmasamuccaya (ed. Pradhan) 12, 7 f.: *caḥsurviññānam katamat?rāpālambanaḥ prativijñaptiḥ*; Y, zi 189 b 5 (*viññāna=viśaya-prativijñapti*); Abhidharmakośa (bhāṣya) (ed. Pradhan, Patna 1967) 11, 6 f., *viññānam prativijñaptir=viśayaṃ viśayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir.....*; Pañcaskandhaka (Tj sems-tsam si) 16 b 8: *rnam par śes pa gañ ze na | dmigs pa rnam par rig pa'o || (= *viññānam katamat | ālambanaviññaptiḥ)*. The Yogācārabhūmivivākhyā (Tj sems-tsam yi 86 b 5 f.) refers this definition to the *Zas lta bu śes bya ba'i mdo* (T vol. 2, 11 c 9 f.; cp. Samyuttanikāya III, 87: Khajjanīyasutta): *rnam par śes byed ciñ rnam par śes par byed pas na de'i phyir rnam par śes pa'i phuñ po śes bya ste | ci zig rnam par śes ze na | gzugs rnam dañ sgra rnam.....* (= **viññānāti viññānāti, tasmā viññānaskandha ity ucyate | kiṃ ca viññānāti? rāpāni*, etc.).

33) Y 59, 16: *tatra sakalam vastulaśaṇam viññānena viññāpayati. viññāpayati* is obviously the verbal equivalent of *viññapti*, and thus to be taken as "makes known (to himself)", "cognizes"; cp. *pratipadyate* in l. 18 ff. of the same passage.

34) Cp., e. g., Y 59, 16 ff.; MAV(Bh) I. 8; L. de la Vallée Poussin, Abhidharmakośa I, 30 n. 3; id., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 296 f.

35) MAVBh 20, 19: *arhamātreḍṣṭir viññānam*; Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā (ed. Yamaguchi) 31, 10: *vastusvarāpamātrapalabdhīḥ*; Prasannapadā (ed. de la Vallée Poussin) 65, 2: *arhamātra-darśanam cittasya vyāpārah*; Saṅghabhadra, Nyāyānusāra (T vol. 29) 342 a 14: 識謂了別者, 是唯總取境界相義; Yaśomitra, Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. Wogihara) 38, 24: (*viññānam upalabdhir vastumātragrahaṇam*; Skandhila, Abhidharmāvatāra (ed. v. Velthem, Louvain 1977) 106, 1 f.: *gzugs la sogs pa yul gyi dños po tsam so sor rnam par rig pa ni rnam par śes pa ste* (**rāpādiviśayavastumātraprativijñaptir viññānam*).

36) Abhidharmadīpa(-vṛtti) 78, 11: *vastupalabdhimātram hi cittam*. I admit that earlier evidence would be welcome; but in any case the fact that the source just quoted is a Vaibhāṣika text (as are also some of those quoted in ns. 32 and 35) shows that the wording of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra sentence under discussion could have easily been formed as well as understood on the basis of the Abhidharmic definition of *viññāna*.

37) Of course a Sūtra can have recourse to an authoritative Abhidharmic formula only by putting it into the mouth of the Buddha. There would be no need to postulate a corresponding Sūtra passage as the source of the Saṃdh. But see n. 32 (end)!

[S 1] mind (*viññāna*) is characterized as (or: consists in) merely cognizing (lit.: making known) [its] object [without stressing any of its peculiarities]."

But of course the Sūtra does not mean that. It has deliberately chosen the expression **ālambanaviññaptimātra*³⁸ (instead of, e. g., *ālambanamātraviññapti*) in order to evoke, in the context of the preceding sentence that had enounced the ideality of the images perceived in meditation by qualifying them as *viññaptimātra*, an idealist understanding of the word *viññaptimātra*. Therefore, in the context of the Sūtra the sentence has of course to be understood as:

[S 2] "(.....) Mind (*viññāna*) is characterized by (or: consists of) mere cognition of [its] object [without there being any real object]" —

— an interpretation which would correspond to [T 1] (see § 4). Or, if one prefers to supply a virtual abstract suffix after *viññaptimātra*:

[S 3] "(.....) Mind is characterized by [the fact that its] object is nothing but cognition."

Finally, [T(b)]/[T 3] (see § 4) seems to understand the compound **ālambanaviññaptimātraprabhāvita* as a bahuvrīhi with an irregular sequence of components³⁹), translating as if there were **viññaptimātraprabhāvitālambara*, i. e.:

[S 4] "(.....) Mind has an object which is constituted by mere cognition."

11. Yet, the preceding interpretation of the sentence under discussion is entirely dependent on the correctness of the reconstruction [S]. If [A] is to be preferred, it would be utterly baseless. It is therefore necessary to check all the pertinent sources at our disposal in order to find out which of the two reconstructions they support.

As for the Tibetan translations (§ 4), it has been pointed outⁱⁿ § 10 that [T (b)] supports [S]. The same is true of [T(a)] if taken in the sense of [T 1]. But starting from [T 2] it can also be understood as an awkward (see § 8) rendering of [A]. The Chinese translation of Buddhāśānta (see § 5: [Bu]) is altogether ambiguous. Thus, additional evidence has to be looked for by scrutinizing the other Chinese versions (§ 12) as well as the Indian commentaries both on Mahāyānasamgraha II. 7, viz. the Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu (§ 13) and the Upanibandhana of *Asvabhāva (§ 14), and on Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra VIII. 7, viz. the commentaries of Jñānagarbha (§ 15) and Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul (§ 16)³⁹.

38) Perhaps somehow on the analogy of the first set of compounds treated in Wackernagel, Altindische Grammatik, II, 1, § 116.

39) The commentary ascribed to Asaṅga (Tj No 5481) does not yield any pertinent information.

After summing up the result of this investigation (§ 17), I shall, moreover, try to evaluate the readings in terms of intrinsic probability (§§ 18ff.).

12. The Chinese translations of Bodhiruci [Bo], Paramārtha [Pa], Dharmagupta [Dh] and Hsüan-tsang [H] (for Buddhāśānta see § 5) run as follows⁴⁰:

[Bo] (何以故。) 我說但是心意識觀得名故。

[Pa] 我說唯有識。此色相境界 識所顯現。

[Dh] 定心所緣唯識所顯 我說為識。

[H] 我說 識所緣唯識所現故。

12.1 I confess that I am unable to draw any useful information from [Bo] which remains obscure to me.

12.2 [Pa]: "I (have) declare(d) that there is only mind/cognition (→ *vi-jñāna*?)⁴¹, [that] this object which appears as [some-thing] visible is manifested by mind/cognition (→ *vi-jñapti*?)." This translation is not quite literal, but the fact that the sentence is split up into two statements points to [A]. For some reason, Paramārtha would seem to have reversed the order, i. e. placed *vi-jñānam* first and combined it with *-matra*^{41a} while at the same time omitting *-matra* in the second part of his translation which would have to represent the subject (*alambana*) and the first predicate (*vi-jñaptimatraprabhāvita*) of [A].

12.3 [Dh]: "The object (*alambana*) of concentrated mind is manifested by cognition only (*vi-jñaptimatraprabhāvita*); I (have) declare(d) that it is mind (*vi-jñāna*)."

This version unambiguously supports [A], understanding it precisely in the same way as suggested in § 8.

12.4 [H]: "I (have) declare(d) that the object (*alambana*) of mind (*vi-jñāna*) is manifested by cognition only (*vi-jñaptimatraprabhāvita*)⁴²."

This rendering coincides neither with [A] nor with [S], but as it takes the sentence as one predication it is hardly explicable on the basis of [A] but

40) [Bo]: T vol. 16, 674 c 24; [Pa]: T vol. 31, 118 b 27 f.; [Dh]: ib. 285 b 22 f.; [H]: ib. 138 b 8; vol. 16, 698 b 2; vol. 30, 724 a 6. Cp. Sasaki, 31.

41) It should be noted that this part of Paramārtha's rendering of our sentence coincides with his rendering of *cittamatram idam* in the Daśabhūmikāsūtra quotation in the beginning of MSg II. 7.

41a) Cp. n. 43a.

42) Cp. the Tibetan rendering of Hsüan-tsang's version in the translation of Yüan-ts'è's (Ven-tshing's) commentary on the Saṃdh (Tj thi 117 b 6 f.):*nas rnam par śes pa'i dmigs pa ni rnam par rig pa tsam las snañ bar bśad pa'i phyr ro ||*.

rather seems to be a syntactically simplified ad sensum translation of [S] understood in the sense of [S 3] or, more likely, [S 4]: To say that *vi-jñāna* has an object that is manifested by cognition only is, of course, equivalent to saying that the object of *vi-jñāna* is manifested by cognition only. An additional stimulus for this syntactical transformation will become manifest in § 13.1.

13. Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya ad MSg II. 7⁴³

	Bh _i	Bh _e		
		Bh _H	Bh _{DN}	Bh _{PA}
(1)	<i>dgons pa nes par 'grel pa'i mdo las kyañ /</i> 《 <i>rnam par śes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can no zes ñas bśad do</i> 》 <i>zes gsuñs pa des na</i> (2a) <i>dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can de ni</i> (2b) <i>rnam par rig pa tsam ñid de /</i> (2c) <i>don gyis stoñ pa</i> (2d) <i>zes bya ba'i tha tshig go /</i>	(1) 解深密經中 《……》 者，謂	(1) …及解節經 所說故， 《此攀緣唯識所顯故我 說唯識》 者，	182c 16f.: (2a) 此色相境界 識所顯現。 (2b) (2c) 實無境界。 → (?) 是識變異所作。 182c 14f.: → (3a/b) 仏說唯 有識， → 無塵故。
(2)	(3a) <i>rnam par śes pa zes ñas bśad do zes bya ba'i</i> (3b) <i>rnam par śes pa smos pa des ni</i> (3c) <i>tiñ ñe 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi rnam par śes pa bstan to </i>	(3a) (3b) 復攀識者， (3c) 顯 → (3a) 我所說 (3c) 定識所行 唯識所現， (無別有体。)	(3a) (3b) 由是識所 攝故， → (3a) 仏言我說 為識 (3c) 顯彼三昧境 界是識故。	

13.1. In (2a) all the Chinese versions (Bh_e) seem to support [A]. Dharmagupta

43) Bh_i: Tj sems-tsam li 171 b 1-4; Bh_H: T vol. 31, 338 c 22-25; Bh_{DN}: ib., 285 b 29 f. 3; Bh_{PA}: ib., 182 c 14 ff. Cp. Iwata, 78 f.; Nozawa, 201 ff.

gupta' (Bh_{dh}) is quite unambiguous: "This object is manifested by cognition only", i. e. **tad ālambanam vijñaptimātrāprabhāvitam*. Similarly Paramārtha (Bh_{ra}), whose rendering, adding "(object) consisting in [something] visible" and omitting *-mātra*, is identical with his translation of the respective part of the basic text (see § 12. 2). This last is also true of Hsüan-tsang (Bh_h) who, here too, has "the object of mind (*viññāna*)" instead of "this object", but this can, in the present case, easily be explained as an attempt to concretize *tad* understood as the prior member of a tatpuruṣa compound **tadālambanam*. It even appears quite probable that it was precisely this interpretation of (2a) in the Bhāṣya that stimulated the syntactical transformation in his rendering of the basic text (cp. § 12. 4).

On the other hand, the Tibetan version (Bh_t) of (2a) cannot be interpreted in the sense of [A] because as in [T(b)] (see § 4) the particle *can* compels us to take *dmīṅgs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can* as a unit, i. e. presupposes **ālambanavijñaptimātrāprabhāvita* taken as a bahuvrīhi compound in the sense of [S4]. Therefore, in Bh_t, *ālambana* cannot be the subject of (2a), and the demonstrative pronoun *de* cannot be its attribute but only refer to another subject which can hardly be anything but "mind" (*viññāna*).

13.2 In (3) too Bh_{dh} (Bh_{ra}) deviates to the extent of being useless for our purpose^{43a}) unambiguously corroborates [A] when it states that on account of its being included in mind the object [perceived in] meditative concentration (*samādhigocara*) is mind (*viññāna*), i. e. takes *viññāna* as another predicate the grammatical subject of which is, as in (2a), the *objective support* i. e. *ālambana*, though in this place represented by *samādhigocara*. Bh_h ("Moreover: By using [the word] '*viññāna*' [the Buddha] indicates⁴⁴ that the object of mind in meditative concentration he has spoken of⁴⁴) is manifested by cognition only.....", in spite of its different (and certainly correct) understanding of (3b) and though substituting, in the predicate, 'mind' (*viññāna*) by 唯識所顯 (→ *viññaptimātrāprabhāvita*), still agrees with Bh_{dh} in regarding the *object* of

43a) One may even get the impression that Paramārtha's rendering of *viññānam* in the Sūtra is influenced by Bhāṣya (2b) (for which see § 13. 3. 1) and that what, in Bh_{ra}, at first sight seems to correspond to (3) could just as well be a rendering of (2b)-(2d).

44...44) Or: "that what has been declared by him is that the object of mind in meditative concentration....."; cp. the Tibetan translation of Yüan-tse's commentary on the Samdh (Tj thi 118 a 3):*rnam par ses pa smos pa ni nas rnam par ses pa'i spyod yul ni nes par rnam par rig pa tsam la(s?) snañ gi.....ses bsad par rab tu bstan pa'o*||.

meditative concentration as the grammatical subject of the sentence.

Bh_t, here too, does not support the Chinese versions. It rather states that by using the word '*viññāna*' (*viññānagrahāṇena*?) the text refers to the *viññāna* of the objects [perceived in] meditative concentration (*samādhigocara*).

13.3 It is rather difficult to decide which of the two interpretations of the Bhāṣya is the correct one as long as the Sanskrit original is not available. Till then, we are forced to conjectures.

13.3.1 As for (2), a comparison of the various versions suggests the following original:

- (2a)⁴⁵) **tad* (Bh_h: *tad*·) *ālambanam* (Bh_t: *-na*·) *viññaptimātrāprabhāvitam*
 (2b) *viññaptimātram eva*
 (2c) *arthaśanyam*
 (2d) *ity arthaḥ* |

This sentence is understood by Bh_t as follows:

"This [mind] which has an objective support (*ālambana*) ——— that is constituted by mere cognition is nothing but ——— mere cognition, i. e. devoid of an [external] object (*artha*)."

Or, less awkwardly:

"This [mind] has an objective support (*ālambana*) ——— that is constituted by mere cognition' (means that it) is nothing but ——— mere cognition, i. e. devoid of an [external] object (*artha*)."

This rendering, needless to say, would support [S]. However, matters are not quite so simple as this. For by not repeating the subject in its proper place the commentator shows that it was the predicate that he wished to comment on; but, then, why did he at all refer to the subject, by means of a pronoun at that which was liable to be misunderstood as the first member of a tatpuruṣa compound *tad-ālambana*? Thus, the reading coinciding with [S] is not fully

45) *des na* (at the end of (1)) which in Bh_t looks as if introductory to (2) but is missing in Bh_h does not admit of a satisfactory interpretation if taken with (2). I should prefer to regard it as representing an **anena* that is to be construed with the preceding sentence which I should retranslate into Skt. as follows:

(1) **Samdhinirmocanasūtre 'py uktam ālambana°..... ity anena* |, i. e.:

"[cognition-only] has also been enunciated in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, [viz.] by the [sentence] {.....}."

Bh_t would have ignored the *daṇḍa* and wrongly have understood (1) as a reason for (2) whereas in reality (2) is an *explanation* of the sentence quoted in (1).

satisfactory here.

On the other hand, the reading of Bh_{DB} and Bh_{PA} (**tad alambanam vijñāptimatraprabhāvitam*) does not seem to be free of problems either. For, since in the case of these versions we have to start from (A), (2a)—leaving aside *tad*—would be nothing but a repetition of the wording of the first part of the Sūtra sentence, i. e. a quasi-pratika to be glossed in (2b)–(2d). Now, *tad* could have been either a part of the wording of the Sūtra, or it could have been added, by the commentator, in an anaphorical function. The first possibility is rendered altogether improbable by the absence of such a pronoun in the Tibetan text (see § 6.2). As for the second possibility, I for one cannot detect any motive for the use of an anaphoric *tad* (as an attribute of *alambana*) in the present case; for it would be altogether superfluous to refer, by *tad*, to the word *alambana* in the Sūtra sentence of which (2a) is, in this interpretation, nothing but a quasi-pratika; and there is, in the Bhāṣya, no occurrence of *alambana* or the like in the preceding context. Besides, I wonder if **arthaśūnya* in (2c) can really be predicated of the *objective support* (*alambana*), as it certainly would have to be in this version.

This leaves us with the reading presupposed by Bh_H viz. **tad-alambanam vijñāptimatraprabhāvitam*, *tad-* representing *vijñāna*. This reading is, to my mind, perfectly unobjectionable. But *it cannot be a mere repetition of the wording of the Sūtra sentence* supplemented by *tad-* because in that sentence the noun which *tad-* must represent, viz. *vijñāna*, fills a *different syntactical position*. The Bhāṣya sentence (2a) can therefore only be an *explanation* of the Sūtra sentence, an explanation which in its turn is further explained by (2b)–(2d). Nor would, in the case of this interpretation, the fact that **arthaśūnya* would seem to be preferably taken as a predicate of *vijñāna* / *vijñāpti*⁴⁶⁾ and not of *alambana* raise any difficulty; for as *vijñāna* is referred to by *tad-* and as the sentence is an explanation of the *whole* Sūtra sentence the subject of which is *vijñāna*, the gloss in (2b)–(2d)—which I should prefer to take, with Bh_{DB}, as a syntactical unit governed, as a whole, by *ity arthaḥ*—could no doubt be understood to qualify *vijñāna*, not *alambana*:

“(What the Sūtra says is that) its objective _____
support (i. e. the objective support of mind, *vijñāna*) _____
is constituted by cognition only; the meaning is: [mind _____]

46) Cp. MSg II. 6; II. 14.

is) nothing but mere cognition, devoid of an [external] object (*artha*).”

This interpretation of (2)—which is, by the way, confirmed by the fact that an investigation into a similar sentence in the Upanibandhana leads to a similar conclusion (see § 14. 3) —would imply that Bhāṣya (2), in spite of the ^(that) fact the reading *alambanam* deserves to be preferred, yet cannot be utilized as a support for (A) but is rather an *explanation* of (S).

13.3.2 The original wording of (3) is difficult^{to} reconstruct in a reliable way, but as far as essentials are concerned Bh_i seems to make fairly good sense:

“‘I have declared mind.....’: What is indicated _____
(*dyotita*⁴⁷⁾ or the like) by this employment of [the word] _____
‘mind’ (*vijñānagrahaṇena*?) is the mind [that cognizes] the objects
[perceived in] _____
meditative concentration (*samādhigocara*).”

I. e.: According to Bh_i the Bhāṣya wants to make it clear that *vijñāna* in the present passage does *not* mean *vijñāna in general* but refers to the *special* case of the cognition or perception of mental images in meditative concentration—a remark which seems to be quite to the point because it is only this specific form of mind that is treated in Saṃdh VIII. 7, ordinary mind being discussed only later (viz. in VIII. 8). This interpretation of (3) fully accords with the fact that (2) has most probably to be understood as a complete explanation of the *whole* Sūtra sentence (see § 13. 3. 1). (3), on the other hand, would not be concerned with the explanation of the meaning of the sentence but would be an additional remark for the sake of reminding the reader of the *specific context* of the sentence.

As against this, the Chinese versions, esp. Bh_{DB}, seem to be based on a different syntactical interpretation, or on a different reading, of the words *samādhigocara* and *vijñāna* (e. g. they might have read **samādhigocaro vijñānam dyotitaḥ* instead of **samādhigocaram vijñānam dyotitam*, but there are other possibilities). Such an interpretation or reading would however seem to be inseparably linked up with the assumption that the function of (3) is to repeat, and comment upon, the second part of the Sūtra sentence (by interpreting *vijñāna* as a second predicate). It would therefore presuppose that (2) repeats, and comments upon, the first part of the Sūtra sentence only. Thus, it would not agree with the result of the investigation of § 13. 3. 1 according to which

47) Cp. A. Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, pt. 2 (1977), 119 f. (s. v. 顯); pt. 3 (1978), 97 (s. v. ston pa).

(2) is originally an explanation of the *whole* Sūtra sentence. Accordingly, in (3) too the interpretation or reading supporting (A) can hardly have been the original one. It is interesting that Hsüan-tsang's version of (3), though obviously agreeing with Bh_{dh} as regards the syntactical relation of *samādhi* and *viñāna* (see § 13. 2), is yet de facto nothing but a *specification*, with reference to the objects of meditative concentration, of the *general* formulation of his rendering of the Sūtra sentence (which coincides with his rendering of Bh (2a). Thus, from the point of view of *purport*, Bh_{dh} does not seem to contradict the interpretation of Bh (3) derived from Bh.

To sum up, a closer investigation into the Bhāṣya on the quotation of our Samdhinirmocanasūtra sentence in MSg II.7 shows that what is likely to have been its original wording and meaning does not support (A) but rather (S).

14. Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana on MSg II. 7⁴⁸⁾

U _i	U _c
(1a) <i>dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis</i> <i>rab tu dbye</i> (D: <i>phyé</i>) <i>ba can zen bya ba ni</i>	(1c) 我說識 (1a) 所緣唯識所顯故者,
(1b) <i>phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med pa'o </i> (1c) <i>rnam par šes pa dmigs pa yin par ŋas</i> <i>bśad do zes bya ba ni</i>	
(2a) <i>'di ltar dmigs pa de rnam par rig pa</i> <i>tsam gyis rab tu phyé ba ni</i>	(2a) (我說) 在外識所緣境 唯是內識之所顯現。
(2b) <i>de'i ŋo bo nid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go </i>	(2b) 即是所緣境識為自性義。
(3) <i>rnam par šes pa ni dmigs par snañ ba</i> <i>tsam gyis rab tu phyé ba yin par bśad do</i> <i>zes bya ba'i tha tshig go </i>	(3) 此意說言識所緣境唯是 識上所現影像,

(無別有體)。

14.1 It is advisable to start with (3) because it is quite unambiguous in U_i. The sentence is intended to give the purport of the Sūtra sentence as a whole:

"The meaning is: Mind has been taught to be characterized ————
by merely *appearing* as the object."

If we choose *pratibhāsa* to render *snañ ba* (U_c 影像?) and keep to the word order of the Sūtra sentence which is paraphrased, the crucial part of U_i (3) would correspond to Sanskrit

48) U_i: Tj seems tsam li 271 b 1-3; U_c: T vol. 31, 400 b 25-28. Cp. Nozawa, 203 ff.; Katano, 82; Lamotte, MSg, trad., 95.

(3) **alambanapratibhasamātrabhavitam vijñanam*.

This is an unambiguous support for (S), and there is, from the point of view of U_i (*dmigs pa*), no room left for a reading *alambanam*. U_c (3) does not conflict with this since Hsüan-tsang, in rendering this paraphrase, follows the same pattern as in his rendering of the Sūtra sentence itself (see § 12. 4).

14.2 As for (1), it is, according to U_i, a *pratika* of the Sūtra sentence interspersed with glosses. In U_c it is a pure *pratika*, (a part of) the glosses seemingly having been incorporated into the following explanation⁴⁹⁾. Thus, U_c is of little if any help here. As for U_i, (1a) *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis dbye|phyé ba can* would fit only (S) (see §§ 11 and 13. 1), but as the wording may have been taken over from the translation of the basic text this is not a strong argument. On the other hand, the splitting up of the *pratika* into the two sentences (1a)+(1b) and (1c) and the repetition of *dmigs pa* in (1c) would seem to support (A), provided that (1c) is understood as

"I have taught that mind is the object",

— or, assuming a confusion of subject and predicate on the part of the translators:

"I have taught that the object is mind".

But this would contradict the unambiguous testimony of U_i (3). Moreover, I wonder if *phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med pa* (something like **bahyalambana-virahita*) — like **arthaśūnya* in Bh (2c) (s. § 13. 3. 1) — can really be used as an attribute or predicate of *alambana*, as it would have to if the text were based on (A). Therefore, I should prefer to attribute the splitting of the *pratika* into two *separate sentences* in U_i to the translators, and to regard *dmigs pa* as a gloss of *viñāna*, rendering not *alambana* but *upalabdhi* which is often used as a quasi-synonym of *viñāna* or *vijñapti*⁵⁰⁾. The Skt. of (1) may then have run like this:

(1a) **alambanavijñaptiprabhavitam*

(1b) *bahyalambanavirahitam*

(1c) *vijñanam upalabdhir iti maya deśitam* (or: *aham vadami*) *iti*.

This text would excellently fit (S).

14.3 (2) looks like another confirmation of (A), for it says, according to U_i:

"For [that] this object (*tad alambanam*) is constituted by cognition only

49) 在外 in the beginning of U_c (2a) seems to be a fragment of (1b).

50) See ns. 35 and 36; de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 290.

means that it has that for its nature (*tatsvabhāva*)."

This is interpreted by *U_c* to mean:

".....the external⁵¹) object of mind (\rightarrow *tad-alambanam*) is merely manifested by internal cognition; this means: the object has mind/cognition as its nature."

The Sanskrit original may be reconstructed as follows:

(2a) **tatha hi tad-alambanam* (*U_c*: *tad alambanam*) *viññaptimātraprabhāvitam*

(2b) *tatsvabhāvam ity arthaḥ*.

This sentence can be accepted to support [A] only if it is understood as a *paraphrase* of the *pratīka*, at least of its first part, but preferably of the whole. In the latter case, *ity arthaḥ* would, against *U_c* and probably also *U_i*, have to be taken to govern the whole sentence, and *tat-* (*U_c*: 識) in (2b) would have to be interpreted as *viññāna*. In this latter case, (2) would say that the Sūtra sentence "means that this object, being constituted by mere cognition, has the nature of *viññāna*", which would be an excellent paraphrase of [A]. But both this interpretation and the interpretation of (2) as a paraphrase of only the first part of the *pratīka* are to be discarded because (2) is not likely to be a *paraphrase* of the Sūtra wording at all; for such a paraphrase is given in (3). 'di ltar = *tatha hi* in the beginning of (2a) rather suggests an *explanation* or a *reason*. Moreover, *tat-* (\rightarrow 識) in (2b) may equally well represent *viññapti*⁵²) if, as is much more likely, the regimen of *ity arthaḥ* is, with *U_c* and probably also *U_i*, confined to (2b), i. e. if (2b) is understood as an *additional* explanation of (*viññaptimātra*)*prabhāvita* in (2a). The sentence would then mean:

"I. e. (or: For) that object (or, definitely better, with *U_c*: its object, i. e. the object of *viññāna*⁵³) is constituted by mere cognition, i. e. has that (viz. mere cognition) as its nature."

Understood in this way, (2) would, similar to (2) in the Bhāṣya (see § 13. 3. 1), *explain* (1) by showing that *viññāna* can be called **alambanaviññaptimātraprabhāvita* because (or: in the sense that) its object is *viññaptimātraprabhāvita* (\rightarrow consists of or is manifested by cognition only), i. e. because the compound is to be understood in the sense of [S3] or [S4]. (3), on the other

51) See n. 49.

52) Hsüan-tsang's 識 in (2b) is in fact rendered by *rnam par rig pa* in the Tibetan translation of Yüan-ts'ang's Samdh commentary (Tj thi 117 b 8).

53) Cp. also the discussion of Bhāṣya (2a) in § 13. 3. 1.

hand, sums up by paraphrasing (1) in other words while retaining its construction. In this way, Asvabhāva's commentary on our sentence proves to be a consistent whole supporting (S).

15. Jñānagarbha on Samdh VIII. 7⁵⁴

(1) *rigs pa bstan pa'i phyir* | «*rnam par śes pa ni.....rab tu phye bayin no zes nas bśad do*||» *zes gsuñs so* |

(2) *dmigs pa ni yul gyi rnam par sems snañ ba yin la* |

(3) *de yañ rnam par rig pa dañ tha dad pa ma yin te* |

(4) *cig car dmigs pa'i phyir ro* ||

(2) "The objective support (*alambana*) is the appearance of mind (*citta*) in the form of an object (*viśayākareṇa*),

(3) (55... and this [appearance of mind in the form of an object]...55) is not different from [the 'act' of] cognition (*viññapti*),

(4) because they are [by necessity⁵⁶] perceived simultaneously."

If in this text, which tries to interpret the sentence under discussion in the light of the epistemology of Dharmakīrti and his followers (\rightarrow *sahopalambhaniyama* argument⁵⁷), (2) and (3) are actually a paraphrase of the basic text—but I am not sure they are—, a paraphrase moreover which, free though it is, will still have substantially preserved the syntactical structure of the latter, Jñānagarbha would seem to confirm [A] because *dmigs pa* (*alambana*) functions as the grammatical subject, as in [A 1]. Moreover, he would have split the sentence into two, again as in [A 1]. Perhaps Jñānagarbha has understood the sentence under the discussion as follows: The object (*alambana*) is mind [appearing as an object] (*viññāna*), [this mind-appearing-as-an-object being] characterized by [being] nothing but (\rightarrow not different from) [the act of] cognition (*viññaptimātraprabhāvita*). In any case, Jñānagarbha can hardly be adduced in support of [S].

16. Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul on Samdh VIII. 7⁵⁸

(1) 'o na sems dañ gzugs brñan zes gdags su yañ ji ltar ruñ sñam pa las
«*rnam par śes pa ni ... zes nas bśad do*» *zes bya ba gsuñs te* |

54) Jñānag. 22, 3-7; Nozawa, 193.

(55...55) Or: "and [, being such,] the [objective support]".

56) Cp. Jñānag. 25, 7 f.

57) Cp. Pramāṇavārttika III. 388; Pramāṇaviniścaya I. 55ab; T. Iwata, Sahopalambhaniyama (diss. Hamburg 1980).

58) SamdhVy co 193 b 1-3; Nozawa, 197.

(2) *rnam par śes pa ſid gzugs brñan gyi dmigs pa lta bur snañ bas sems dañ gzugs brñan zes gdags su yañ ruñ la*

(3) *sems kyi ño bo las tha mi dad pa'i gzugs brñan de ni rañ rig pa'i tshul gyis rnam par rig pa ni rnam par śes pa'i mtshan ſid yin no zes bstan to ||*

(2) "As mind itself (*viññanam eva*) appears as the object (*alambana*) [in the form of a mental] image (*pratibimba*), it can be called both 'mind' (*citta*) and 'image'.

(3) The essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of mind (*viññana*) is that this image which is not different from mind itself (*citta*-(*sva*)*rāpa*) is cognized (*viññapti*) by way of autoperception (*svasaṃvitti*)—this is what has been taught [by the Buddha] (or: what is shown [by the Sūtra passage])."

The decisive sentence is (3) which—in spite of interpreting it in the light of later developments (→*svasaṃvitti*)—is clearly a paraphrase of the Sūtra sentence under discussion. For *viññana* and *viññapti* are found in the text, and the other words of the Sūtra sentence are easily paralleled with other elements of (3): *alambana* is of course represented by *gzugs brñan* (*pratibimba*; cp. also (2) *gzugs brñan gyi dmigs pa*, probably=*pratibimbālam-bana* in the sense of a rūpaka compound); *mtshan ſid* (*lakṣaṇa*) corresponds to *prabhavita*⁵⁹; and *-matra* seems to be explained by *rañ rig pa'i tshul gyis* (*svasaṃvitti-yogena*). Thus, there can be hardly any doubt that (3) is a paraphrase of the Sūtra sentence under discussion. And there can also be hardly any doubt that the text on which this paraphrase is based can only be [S], not [A]; for clearly *rnam par śes pa*=*viññana* is the definiendum, i. e. must have been taken as the subject of the whole Sūtra sentence⁶⁰, whereas *gzugs brñan* (*pratibimba*) which corresponds to *alambana* can only be construed as the grammatical object of *rnam par rig pa*=*viññapti*. This is precisely the construction of [S2]. Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul's commentary is thus an unambiguous support of [S].

17. The result of the preceding investigation is that unambiguous evidence for [A] is, except for the somewhat evasive testimony of Jñānagarbha (§ 15), restricted to Paramārtha's and Dharmagupta's Chinese translations of both

59) The commentary has, at least in the Tibetan translation, changed the construction of the Sūtra sentence, viz. "A-prabhavitam B" (which would correspond to "A-lakṣaṇam B") into the equivalent pattern "A is the lakṣaṇa of B".

60) Cp. n. 59.

Mahāyānasamgraha (§ 12. 2 and 3) and Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (§ 13. 1 and 2). But as I have tried to show in my analysis of the Bhāṣya passage (§ 13. 3), the interpretation of these Chinese translations is not likely to represent the original meaning of the Bhāṣya passage but rather is the effect of a misunderstanding of the function and wording of its statements. It is quite probable that the reading *alambanaṃ* in the Sūtra sentence, i. e. [A], is somehow connected with this (mis)interpretation of the Bhāṣya passage. I even suppose that [A] is the result of this (mis)interpretation; for somebody who had difficulties with the rather unwieldy compound **alambanaviññaptimātraprabhāvita* in the Sūtra sentence and mistook the explanation of the Bhāṣya for a *pratīka* may easily have inserted, into the Sūtra text, what he considered a missing anusvāra. In a similar way, the initial *tad-* of the Bhāṣya may have come to intrude into the Sūtra sentence, too. It is of course difficult to say when this happened first, but at any rate both phenomena are conspicuous in Paramārtha's and Dharmagupta's translations.

In the case of Hsüan-tsang, too, it is likely that his rendering of the Sūtra sentence—though not his reading which seems to have been [S] (see § 12. 4)—is influenced by the explanation of the passage in the Bhāṣya (§§ 13. 1 and 13. 3. 1) and the Upanibandhana (§ 14. 3).

18. This does not mean that the reading [A] could not have arisen—under the influence of this interpretation of the Sūtra quotation in the Mahāyānasamgraha or, in view of the graphic insignificance of the change, even independently—also in the context of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra itself; for in the preceding sentence of the Sūtra (see § 2), the grammatical subject qualified as *viññaptimātra* is the image (*pratibimba*, i. e. the objective support of mind in meditative concentration). Thus, it might have seemed natural to make the objective support, and not *viññana*, the subject of the following sentence, too.

19. While it is thus intelligible and, in the case of MSg II. 7, even palpable how the reading [A] could arise from [S], I do not see how—if we disregard the possibility of a mere scribal error which would hardly have become so widespread—[S] could be explained as having arisen from [A]. For, as ^{was} we mentioned above (§ 17. 1), the predicate in [S], viz. **alambanaviññaptimātraprabhāvita*, is, from the point of view of analysis, definitely unwieldy, especially if one wants to interpret it, as the context requires it, in an idealist sense. It is hard to imagine that anybody, even if he felt some change necessary, would have changed the wording of [A] into such a terse formulation.

20. The originality of [S] is not only supported by the fact that the unwieldy structure of its predicate does not make sense as a secondary change but becomes perfectly intelligible if one gets to the bottom of its double entendres (see § 10) which can be appreciated as purposeful only in the context of the introduction of a new idea on which its discoverer wanted to confer as much of a traditional garb as was available. One could also point to the *terminology* of the sentence which diverges significantly from that of its context: *alambana* instead of *gocara* or *pratibimba*, and *viñāna* instead *citta*—a divergency which would not be motivated if the sentence had originally been, as it would have to if [A] were authentic, merely a more explicit and emphatic restatement of the preceding sentence. But the change in terminology, too, is natural in the case of [S] in view of the double meaning alluding to an Abhidharmic (*alambana*!) etymological definition (*viñāpti*—*viñāna*!).

21. Another point of view is the syntactical structure of the sentence as a whole. In this regard, [S], following the pattern *definiens*—*definiendum*, is perfectly unobjectionable and unequivocal, whereas [A] (*definiendum*—*definiens* 1—*definiens* 2) is formally ambiguous and, to my feeling, somewhat clumsy, to say the least. This unsatisfactory character of [A] from a purely formal point of view is easily explained as an unintentional by-product of a transformation of [S] into [A]. On the other hand, had [A] been the original reading, one might, to be sure, easily have felt bound to improve its formal structure, but this would almost certainly have led to some expansion of the somewhat abrupt second predicate (*viñānam*→*ato viñānam eva*, or the like), but never to [S].

22. Finally, attention should be paid to the fact that MSg II. 7 quotes only the sentence under discussion but not the preceding one according to which the images (*pratibimba*) [perceived in meditative concentration] are cognition only (*viñāptimātra*) (see § 2). This is strange, for one would expect that Asaṅga, in the context of scriptural proofs, would not have omitted this sentence without some reason, for after all it is, except for the sentence under discussion, the only one in Saṃdh VIII. 7 that contains the term *viñāptimātra*. As there does not seem to be any clue for regarding the sentence omitted in MSg II. 7 as a later interpolation in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (there are some more omissions in MSg II. 7 which is thus obviously an abbreviated quotation), I suppose that Asaṅga has omitted the sentence *because it did not fit his own terminology*; for in MSg II he almost invariably uses *viñāpti* (II. 8: *viñāna*) as the gram-

matical (or logical) subject of *viñāptimātra*(tā)⁶¹: it is, in his terminology, not the object or image but *cognition itself* that is qualified to be cognition only (because it is devoid of an external object: MSg II. 6). On the other hand, the reading [S] of the sentence under discussion (..... *viñāptimātraprabhāvitam viñānam*), especially if understood in the sense of [S2], precisely corresponds to this pattern. Had [A] been its original form, it is difficult to see why Asaṅga should have preferred this sentence to the preceding one (as also to the occurrences of *viñāptimātra* in Saṃdh VIII. 8 and 9 where too *viñāptimātra* qualifies the images, not *viñāna*).

23. Thus, both a critical examination of the source material and the cumulative evidence of intrinsic probabilities of context and style show that the original form of the sentence under discussion was [S] (**alambanaviñāptimātraprabhāvitam viñānam*.....), not [A] (**alambanam viñāpti*^o). Therefore, the interpretation proposed in § 10 being applicable, the sentence under discussion, even if pointing to a former statement (§§ 7–9), would not conflict the assumption that Saṃdh VIII. 7–9 is not only the oldest extant source for the doctrine of *viñāptimātra* proper but also its first literary expression.

61) Cp., e. g., MSg II. 2 (last §); II. 6; II. 7. 2; II. 9; II. 11.