The study of philosophical Śūtra works is beset with difficulties. Apart from the condensed style, which makes them sometimes difficult to understand even where no other problems intervene, we often have reason to suspect that these texts may have undergone interpolations and other modifications. In practice this means that, in order to understand a Śūtra text, we should know as much as possible of its history, of the vicissitudes it has undergone from its beginning until today.

Such detailed knowledge of the history of individual Śūtra texts is not normally available. This is the reason why we have to be content, in most cases, with a global understanding of the kind of influences that Śūtra texts undergo. Here we will concentrate on one such influence, viz., the one exerted by the commentary or commentaries that accompany them. It is known that Śūtra texts are frequently extracted from commentaries that contain them. During this process of extraction mistakes can easily creep into the Śūtra text: a śūtra may be overlooked; or, more probably, a statement properly belonging to the commentary may be taken to be a śūtra. Confusions of this kind were facilitated by the fact that commentaries of around the middle of the first millennium C.E. often fail to contain clear indications as to what is śūtra, and what commentary. The use of the so-called Vārttika style could not but add to the confusion.¹

The extraction of a Śūtra text from a commentary could lead to an incorrect result in other ways, too. There is evidence to show that commentators of around the middle of the first millennium occasionally felt free to comment upon the śūtras in an order which deviates slightly from the ‘correct’ one. In itself this need not be looked upon as an attempt to change the order of the śūtras. But whatever the intentions of these commentators, the effect of such a procedure might very well be that the Śūtra text which someone else subsequently extracted from such a commentary would have some of the śūtras in a modified order.

Usually Indian Śūtra texts are handed down to us in one single ‘line of descent’, at least where their early period is concerned. It is only on rare

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¹ See Bronkhorst, 1992, for a brief survey.

* I thank T. Tillemans for help and advice.
occasions that we can show with certainty that commentators did actually comment upon the sūtras in a changed order. There are, however, some clear cases, which I will now present.

Consider first the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā. This work does not consist of sūtras, but of kārikās. A considerable number of more or less early commentaries on it have been preserved,² and the exact chronological relationship between them is not easy to determine.

The most elaborate and interesting of these commentaries is the Yuktidīpikā. This text is not only interesting from the point of view of its contents. Its form, too, is special; it constitutes a perfect example of what I have called the Vārttikā style. In the present study we are interested neither in its contents nor in its style, but in the manner in which it deals with the text it comments upon.

The author of the Yuktidīpikā is aware of the fact that the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā consists of kārikās. This we must conclude from his use of the term saptati ‘seventy’, hence ‘work consisting of seventy kārikās’, to refer to the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā in his introductory verses. This same term saptati, along with the term āryā which refers to the metre of the work, occurs again in the concluding verses of the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā as they are found, and paraphrased, in the Yuktidīpikā. In spite of this, the Yuktidīpikā, unlike all other surviving commentaries, treats the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā as if it consisted of sūtras, not of kārikās.³ It frequently divides the kārikās into smaller parts, which it comments upon and refers to as sūtras.⁴ Indeed, it never gives the slightest hint that these ‘sūtras’ together constitute kārikās, so much so that its third Āhnika ends right in the middle of the discussion of what we call kārikā 15; the remainder of kārikā 15 is commented upon in Āhnika 4. Sometimes sūtra and kārikā coincide; in such cases a whole kārikā can actually be referred to as sūtra; an example is kārikā 19, which is called sūtra in its discussion in the Yuktidīpikā (p. 84 l. 7-8).⁵ Interestingly, on two occasions the ‘sūtras’ of the Yuktidīpikā do not occur in the order of the kārikā concerned, as these latter are known from all the other surviving commentaries.

² Solomon (1974) studies eight of them.
³ In this respect the Yuktidīpikā has parallels in the Abhidharmakośa Bhasya and Madhyāntavibhāga Sāstra; see Bronkhorst, 1992.
⁴ See, e.g., Y'D p. 9 l. 10, p. 67 l. 2, p. 98 l. 3.
⁵ Note that Sadyojyotis' commentary (before 9th century) on the Svāyambhuvasūtra-saṅgraha calls the verses of this text ‘sūtras’, as does the title itself. According to Filliozat (1991: xvii), the term sūtra here "réfère plutôt à la parole d'un être à qui l'on attribue la plus haute autorité".
Consider kārikā 4. This reads, in all the commentaries except the Yuktidīpikā: drṣṭam anumānam āptavacanaḥ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt/ trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi/. The Yuktidīpikā (p. 29 f.) comments, in this order, on the following parts: (i) prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāḥ dhi, (ii) trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam, (iii) sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt, (iv) drṣṭam anumānam āptavacanaḥ ca. These parts constitute the kārikā, but their order has been reversed. No need to add that in this order nothing remains of the āryā metre.

In the case of kārikā 4 one might think that the author of the Yuktidīpikā took this kārikā as a single unit, and commented upon its parts in a different order. No such position can be maintained in connection with kārikās 6 and 7. These kārikās occur, in almost the same form, in all the surviving commentaries, and must therefore be looked upon as integral parts of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, at least at the time of composition of the Yuktidīpikā. The Yuktidīpikā has these two kārikās, but it has interposed kārikā 7 between the first and second half of kārikā 6. That is to say: the normal order is 6a-6b-7a-7b, but the Yuktidīpikā has 6a-7a-7b-6b. Again, the āryā metre is thoroughly disturbed in this manner.

There can be no doubt that the author of the Yuktidīpikā consciously changed the order of the ‘sūtras’ of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā; or perhaps: he consciously decided to comment upon them in an order which differs from the original one. The tradition preserved in all the other commentaries guarantees this sufficiently. This certainty makes the procedure of the

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6 K. Preisendanz has kindly sent me a portion of her forthcoming book, in which she mentions the possibility that the author of the Yuktidīpikā did not (yet?) look upon SK 7 as a kārikā. She makes this suggestion because of the modified order of the kārikās, and because kārikā 7, in the interpretation of the Yuktidīpikā, is invoked by an opponent. I find her suggestion nonetheless problematic, mainly because already the Sāṃkhya Kārikā as translated into Chinese by Paramārtha contains this kārikā. (For a discussion of the date of the Yuktidīpikā, see Bronkhorst, 1985: 93-94.) Preisendanz’s suggestion further seems to necessitate the assumption that the Yuktidīpikā is not only older than all the other commentaries, but also that it was looked upon by the authors of the other commentaries as in some way authoritative. This again is hard to harmonize with the doctrinal differences which exist between the Yuktidīpikā and some of the later commentaries. One such difference concerns the question whether the tanmātras have one quality each, or an increasing number from one to five, depending on which tanmātra one is talking about; and the related question whether the tanmātras produce one element each, or whether they produce the elements jointly; see Bronkhorst, 1994, for details. The problems mentioned by Preisendanz can, of course, equally well be solved by the assumption that the author of the Yuktidīpikā felt free, not only to comment upon the kārikās in a slightly modified order, but also to interpret one kārikā as representing the opinion of an opponent.
Yuktidipikā all the more interesting. It shows beyond reasonable doubt that at least some commentators in the first millennium felt free to change the order of the sūtras on which they commented.

The Śāṅkhyā Kārikā is certainly not the only text the order of whose sūtras has been changed. It may however be the only text where there is so little occasion to look for alternative explanations. It is known, for example, that the Brahma sūtras occur at some places in a different order in the commentaries of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. Here, too, it is reasonable to assume that someone changed the original order. However, the Brahma sūtras as they survive today are written in such a manner that it is virtually impossible to decide what this original order may have been.

Let us now turn to Vaiśeṣika sūtra (VS) 3.1.13. It reads:

ātmendriyamano 'ṛhasannikarśād yan nispadyate tad anyat

A number of authors, among them the oldest whose testimony has been preserved, see in this sūtra a definition of perception:

(i) Dignāga remarks in his Pramāṇasamuccaya: “For the Vaiśeṣikas there is a definition, mentioned in the Sūtra, of perception in respect to substance (dravya), [which is made meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding sūtras]. It says: ‘That [cognition] which is brought about by the contact of the soul (ātman), the sense (indriya), the mind (manas), and the object (artha) is [perception as] a separate one [of the pramāṇas].’” There can be no doubt that the sūtra quoted by Dignāga is VS 3.1.13. Dignāga’s remark to the extent that the sūtra “[is made meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding sūtras]” is noteworthy and must be kept in mind; we’ll return to it later.

8 This is its number in the version contained in Candrānanda’s commentary, edited by Jambuvijaya (C). It is 3.1.20 in the version of Bhaṭṭa Vāḍindra, also contained in the anonymous Vṛtti, both edited by A. Thakur (V). 3.1.18 in the version contained in Śāṅkara Miśra’s Upāskāra, reproduced and translated in Sinha, 1911 (U). Where we use only one number, the reference is to C. The present sūtra contains the word manas in versions C and V and in a number of quotations of this sūtra in other works; manas is lacking in version U and in “one demonstrably wrong translation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya Vṛtti” (Isaacson, 1990: 27).
9 Translation Hattori, 1968: 42; the two Tibetan versions on the basis of which the translation was made are reproduced ibid. p. 198-199.

\[ \text{ātmendriyamanor'rhāsanikārṣād yan nispadyate tad anyat, ātmā manasā mana indriyena indriyam arthenetī catuṣṭātyatrayavāyasaṅnikārṣād utpadyamānaṃ pratyakṣam} \]

This is our Vaiśeṣika sūtra along with an explanation. The sūtra was apparently quoted — in order to be rejected — in Mallavādīn’s *Dvādasāra Nayacakra*, which Sūmhasūri comments.\(^\text{10}\)

(iii) The *Yuktidipikā* (p. 34, l. 29-30) cites this sūtra besides other definitions of perception.

(iv) Jayantabhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī* cites the sūtra in the following, slightly amplified, form (p. 280, l. 15-16):

\[ \text{yad api kaiścit pratyakṣalakṣaṇam uktam 'ātmendriyamanor'rhāsanikārṣād yad utpadyate jhānām tad anyad anumāṇādibhyāḥ pratyakṣam iti ...} \]

Here too there can be no doubt that the sūtra is read as a definition of perception.

(v) The anonymous Vṛtti on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* edited by A. Thakur (1957), too, explains the sūtra as a definition of perception. So does the commentary by Bhaṭṭa Vādindra edited by Thakur (1985), of which the former is an abbreviation.

(vi) The anonymous *Sarvasiddhāntapraṇaśaka*, in its chapter on Vaiśeṣika, contains the following passage (Jambuvijaya, 1961: 145):

\[ \text{āhā pratyakṣalakṣaṇam kim itī cet, tadāhā 'ātmendriyamanor'rhāsanikārṣād yan nispadyate tad anyat'/ asya vādhyāḥ: ātmā manasā yujyate mana indriyena indriyam arthenetī/ tataś catuṣṭātyasāṅnikārṣād ghāṭarūpādījīnānām, traya-sāṅnikārṣāc chaḥ bhede, dvaṇya-sāṅnikārṣāt sukhādīśu/ evaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nirdiṣṭaṁ/} \]

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\(^{10}\) Be it noted in passing that Sūmhasūri appears to quote in matters Vaiśeṣika usually from the *Kaṭandī*, a Vaiśeṣika work probably written before Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (see Bronkhorst, 1993). Do we have to conclude that also the present explanation given by Sūmhasūri derives from the *Kaṭandī*? It is not possible at this point to address this question.
(vii) Akalanka’s Tattvārtha-Vārttika (p. 53, l. 32.) cites VS 3.1.13 in an enumeration of definitions of perception.

This interpretation, though supported by early authorities – among them our earliest –, is not accepted by some Sanskrit authors, and by several modern scholars (Hattori, 1966; Oetke, 1988: 303-319; Preisendanz, 1989: 150 f.; Nozawa, 1989: 71). They reject this interpretation for various reasons, which all boil down to one single factor: the context. The whole of Āhnika 3.1 is believed to be intended to prove the existence of the soul. It is in this way that the three commentators of the sūtras explain this section, and it is clear that a definition of perception in the midst of such an argument would be out of place.

Here the question can legitimately be raised whether we are entitled to discard the massive and ancient evidence provided by Dignāga and the other authors mentioned above on the basis of mere considerations of context. We have no surviving commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra that is even approximately as old as Dignāga, nor do we possess certain knowledge of what the context of VS 3.1.13 looked like during his time. (Recall that according to Dignāga the interpretation of 3.1.13 as a definition of perception is supported by its context; in the present situation of the text this can hardly be said to be the case.) Arguments based on context show a marked degree of confidence in the reliability of the Sūtra text as it has been handed down to us, and this without supporting evidence.

The (present) context of VS 3.1.13, when looked at more closely, presents a number of peculiar features, which justify a certain suspicion with regard to the present order of the sūtras. Āhnika 3.1, as stated above, is believed to prove the existence of the soul (ātman). But strangely enough, the proof of the existence of the soul is again taken up in VS 3.2.4, without the slightest hint that this is the second time the topic is addressed. Sūtras 3.2.1-3, which are situated between the two sections purportedly dealing with the proof of the soul, discuss the proof of the existence of the mind (manas). If

11 Honda (1990: 144 (29)) accepts the sūtra as a definition of perception.
12 Hattori is explicit about this (p. 897 (100)): “Although VS is not skilful in its arrangement of topics, there certainly is an order, which does not allow any arbitrary interpretation to be put on a sūtra.” In Oetke’s interpretation, 3.1.13 is a reply to an objection which finds expression in 3.1.7. The intervening sūtras are perhaps interpolated.
13 In version V sūtra 3.2.4 concerns only the proof of the existence of the soul in others. This reading of the sūtra (prāṇāpānanimesonmesajvanamanogaṇaḥdṛṣṭamātaraṇīkārāḥ parātmanā lingaḥ) disagrees however with the evidence of the Padārthadharmaśāstra and its commentaries. See below.
we follow the (relatively recent) indigenous commentaries and several modern scholars, we are asked to believe that Adhyāya 3 contains two sections dealing with the proof of the soul, which are separated, for no obvious reason, by a section which establishes the existence of the mind.\footnote{Oetke (1988: 304) admits: “Dass das gesamte erste Āhnika des dritten Adhyāya dem Nachweis der Existenz einer Seele gewidmet ist, ist keineswegs so selbstverständlich, wie es von manchen indischen Kommentaren und europäischen Interpreten angenommen wird.” The emphasis here is not, however, on \textit{Seele}, but on \textit{Existenz}, as is clear from the following remark on the very next page: “Es sieht so aus, dass die zu beweisende These nicht die Existenz einer Seele ist, sonder der Umstand, dass der Ātman ein (von den am Anfang des Werkes angeführten Padārthas) verschiedener Gegenstand ist.”}

The difficulties do no end here. Sūtras 3.1.1-12, which allegedly establish the existence of the soul (ātman), do not once mention the word ātman, nor indeed any other word for soul. This constitutes a marked contrast with the second section concerned with the proof of the soul: VS 3.2.4 enumerates a number of āmaliṅgas, thus leaving no doubt as to its intentions.

The preceding observations show that the context of VS 3.1.13 is by far not as clear as some may maintain. It is instructive at this point to study how the first discussion on the existence of the soul is initiated.

The discussion starts with sūtra 3.1.1: \textit{prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ}. No commentator claims that this sūtra by itself introduces the topic of the soul. The sūtra is rather presented as an introduction to sūtra 3.1.2 (3.1.3 in the version of Bhāṭṭa Vādindra) which, it is claimed, presents an inference proving the existence of the soul.\footnote{Or rather, with Oetke, that the soul is different from the \textit{padārthas} enumerated thus far.} Sūtra 3.1.2 begins with the word \textit{indriyārtha-prasiddhi}, which obviously refers back to sūtra 3.1.1. What strikes us here, is that there is no need in this context of sūtra 3.1.1. In presenting “the knowledge / establishment of senses and objects / objects of the senses” as logical ground for something else, presumably the soul (or the difference of the soul from other things), it is superfluous to have this preceded by another sūtra which states that “the senses and objects / objects of the senses are known / established”.

The only reasonable explanation I can think of for the presence of 3.1.1 at this place is that this is a sūtra which the author of 3.1.2 (or 3.1.2-3) used as excuse and pretext for the introduction of one or more new sūtras. This is of course only possible if 3.1.2 (3.1.2-3 in the case of Bhāṭṭa Vādindra) is a later addition to the Sūtra text, newly composed when 3.1.1 was already considered to constitute part and parcel of the traditionally accepted Sūtra text. Seen in this way, 3.1.1 does not, and never did, constitute part of the proof of the soul, but it could be used as point of departure for such a discussion.
It may be possible to explain in this way the use that was made of 3.1.1 by a later commentator. But what was its function before this commentator used it to introduce a discussion on the existence of the soul? An easy explanation can be provided if we are willing to consider that the commentator concerned did not only use 3.1.1 for his purposes, but moved it away from its original context. Explaining 3.1.1 in its present position is difficult, irrespectively of how one wishes to interpret the remainder of Āhnika 3.1. The fact that it deals with indriya and artha, suggests that it originally belonged between 3.1.13 – which deals with indriya, artha, manas and ātman – and the discussions of manas and ātman in sūtras 3.2.2 ff. If we remove 3.1.14 (which is suspect because it seems to presuppose that the preceding sūtra dealt with the existence of the soul), 16 we arrive at the following sequence of sūtras (the variants in the other two versions are minor and do not affect the argument):

3.1.13: ātmendriyamano 'rthasannikarśād yan nispadyate tad anyat
3.1.1: prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ
3.2.1: ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṃgam
3.2.2: dravyatvanityatvāc vāyunā vyākhyāte
3.2.3: pratyāyāvagopardyāj jñānāvagapadyāc caikām maṇah
3.2.4: prāṇāpānānimesonmesaṣajñāvanamanogatāindriyāntaravikārāḥ sukha-duḥkhhe icchā-dveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni
3.2.5: dravyatvanityatvāc vāyunā vyākhyāte

This would then mean:

– That which comes about as a result of contact (sannikarṣa) between soul (ātman), sense organ (indriya), mind (manas) and object (artha), is a different [kind of cognition] (viz., perception) (3.1.13)
– [From among these four factors] sense organs and objects are well-known [and need no further explanation] (3.1.1)

16 Sūtra 3.1.14 appears to deal with the proof of the existence of a soul in others. It cannot therefore have found its present position until after the rest of Āhnika 3.1 had been given an interpretation that concerns the existence of the soul. This does not necessarily imply that 3.1.14 is a late sūtra. Nozawa (1989) has argued that it is old, dating from the time when the soul was still thought of as of limited size. (See however Bronkhorst 1993a: 87 f. on the size of the soul in early Vaiśeṣika.) All we can say is that its present position cannot be all that old.
ONCE AGAIN VAIŚEṆIKA SŪTRA 3.1.13

- The inferential mark [for the existence] of a mind is that there is [sometimes] cognition and [sometimes] not, even though there is contact between soul, sense organ and object (3.2.1)
- The fact that [mind] is a substance and eternal is explained by [the same arguments as in the case of] wind
- There is [only] one mind [in each body] because [several] efforts do not occur simultaneously, nor do [several] cognitions (3.2.3)
- The inferential marks [for the existence] of a soul are: breathing in and breathing out, shutting and opening the eyes, life, movement of the mind, the modifications of the other senses, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volition (3.2.4)
- The fact that [soul] is a substance and eternal is explained by [the same arguments as in the case of] wind

This sequence makes sense, is coherent, and even clear enough to allow us to interpret the sūtras without the help of a commentary.

Recall that the reason why someone should comment upon 3.1.1 at its present position, i.e., at the beginning of Adhyāya 3, is quite clear: this allowed him to address the question of the existence of the soul at that place. We will see below why this could be a concern to this commentator.

First, however, we must consider the question what originally preceded sūtra 3.1.13. If we accept, with the ancient witnesses cited above, that this sūtra was a definition of perception, the question can be answered with a fair amount of confidence. The sūtra must have been preceded by a related discussion. This is shown by the peculiar form of 3.1.13. Recall that this definition of perception does not mention the word ‘perception’; instead it has anyat ‘[something] different / the other one’. It clearly continues a discussion, which distinguished (at least) two kinds of knowledge or cognition (jñāna?); or perhaps pramāṇa? see below). The form of 3.1.13 indicates that it was preceded, in all probability, by one or more sūtras about inferential knowledge. This is what Jayatānabhaṭṭa suggests in so many words (see above), and indeed, even in its present shape the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra has some sūtras somehow dealing with inference immediately preceding 3.1.13.

17 This refers to sūtras 2.1.11 adravyavattvād dravyam and 2.1.13 adravyavattvena nityatvam uktam, both of which occur in the discussion of wind.
18 See preceding note.
19 Similarly Jinendrabuddhi; see below.
It would be sheer temerity to pretend to be able to reconstruct the original form and history of śūtras 3.1.3-12. One thing seems however certain: śūtra 3.1.13 was once preceded by śūtras dealing with inferential knowledge. The word anyāt in 3.1.13, moreover, suggests that at one time these preceding śūtras contained some such neuter noun as jñānam. No such noun is at present to be found in 3.1.3-12. Nor do any of these śūtras seem to introduce, or define, inferential knowledge.

Here, however, the following is to be observed. The first part of śūtra 3.1.8 reads: saṁyogi, saṁavāyi, ekārtha-samavāyi, virodhi ca. The commentators seem to think that these adjectives characterize the word liṅga ‘inferential mark’, which is not mentioned in the śūtra. But there is another śūtra (9.18) which reads: asyedaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sambandhi ekārtha- samavāyi virodhi ceti laṅgikam. The similarities with 3.1.8 are striking, yet 9.18 does not speak of inferential marks, but of inferential knowledge. It can be translated: “Inferential [knowledge is characterized by the relation:] ‘this is the effect of that’, ‘this is the cause of that’, ‘this is related to that’, ‘this inheres in the same object as that’, ‘this is opposed to that’.” It is therefore conceivable that 3.1.8, too, introduced inferential knowledge. The person who changed the order of the śūtras may have adjusted śūtra 3.1.8 to his purposes by trimming it. Alternatively we may consider the possibility that the scribe who extracted the śūtra from its commentary failed to extract the whole śūtra.

Whatever the exact original shape of the śūtras, it seems probable that Adhyāya 3,20 prior to the changes pointed out above, discussed inferential and perceptual knowledge before turning to the mind (manās) and the soul (ātman). Mind and soul being the last two of the nine substances (dravya) enumerated in śūtra 1.1.4, Adhyāya 3 completes the discussion of the substances, the earlier ones having been enumerated in Adhyāya 2, as follows: earth (prthivī) 2.1.1; water (ap) 2.1.2; fire (tejas) 2.1.3; wind (vāyu) 2.1.4; ether (ākāśa) 2.1.5; wind 2.1.9 f.; ether 2.1.26 f.; time (kāla) 2.2.6 f.; space (dis) 2.2.12 f.

Why was the treatment of inferential and perceptual knowledge inserted into the discussion of the substances? The answer is obvious: śūtra 3.2.1, which proves the existence of the mind, refers back to the definition of perception. Even when there is contact (sannikāraṇa) between soul (ātman), sense organ (indriya) and object (arthā), there may or may not be knowledge; this fact indicates the existence of a fourth factor, viz., the mind.

20 It is not, of course, claimed here that the original Vaiśeṣika Śūtra was already divided into Adhyāyas and Āhnikas.
The fact that the soul is dealt with after the mind is explained by the fact that sūtra 3.2.4, which proves the existence of the soul, presents as one of the arguments the movement of the mind (manogati).

What was the purpose of the commentator who changed the order of the sūtras? Again it is not difficult to divine the answer. This commentator apparently wanted the discussion of the substances to continue without interruption. After the treatment of space (dis) the next substance mentioned in sūtra 1.1.4 was the soul (ātman). He introduced this topic in the way we now know, i.e., before the mind.

One final question must be addressed: When did the change of order take place? Better perhaps: when was the commentary written which commented upon the sūtras in their modified order? Here we have to consider the following statement in Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṅgraha (Ki p. 97 l. 25-26, Ny p. 219 l. 3, Vy I p. 134 l. 17-18): ātmaliṅgādhikāre buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ “In the section on inferential marks of the soul [the qualities] from consciousness (buddhi) to effort (prayatna) have been established.” The early commentators on the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha all agree that this statement refers to the Vaiśeṣika Śūtra. Śridhara (Ny p. 219 l. 9) specifies that the reference is to the prāṇāpāndisūtra. Udayana provides the following commentary (Ki p. 98 l. 10-11): prāṇādisūtra buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ yady api buddhis tatra kaṇṭharavena nāsti tathāpi sukhādaya eva svakāraṇatayā tām ākṣipanti/ “In the prāṇādi-sūtra [the qualities] from consciousness to effort have been established. Although consciousness does not figure explicitly in that [sūtra], [the qualities] happiness (sukha) etc. suggest it as it is their cause.” These remarks show that the three early commentators on the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, as perhaps Praśastapāda himself, knew sūtra 3.2.4 more or less in the form which we find in versions C and U (prāṇāpāṇanimesonmesajvanamogatindriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhadukkle chchāvēsa prayatnāś cety ātmaliṅgāni / sukhadukklechchāvēsaprayatnās cātmano liṅgāni), and not as we find it in V (prāṇāpāṇanimesonmesajvanamogatindriyāntaravikārāh parātmani liṅgam). But there is a problem connected with the identification proposed by the commentators, as pointed out by Udayana. Sūtra 3.2.4 does not mention consciousness (buddhi). Udayana’s solution to the prob-

21 VS 3.2.1: ātmendriyārthesanikkarse jānasyābhāvo bhāvaḥ ca manaso liṅgam.
22 Hattori (1966: 893 (104)) has already drawn attention to the parallelism that exists between the interpretations of VS 3.1.1-2 offered in the three oldest commentaries, and a passage in the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha (Ki p. 84 & 86, Ny p. 176, 179 & 182, Vy p. 133-34).
lem is not convincing. A far more convincing solution presents itself if we assume that Praśastapāda already knew the beginning of Adhyāya 3 more or less in the form in which we know it. Sūtra 3.1.2 (3), in particular, uses indriyārthaprasiddhi as inferential mark to prove the existence of the soul. Indriyārthaprasiddhi is, of course, a kind of knowledge (jñāna) or consciousness.²³ Sūtra 3.1.13, too, is interpreted by some commentators (C, U) as presenting consciousness as an inferential mark of the soul.

There is no evidence, on the other hand, to believe that already the author of the Carakasamhitā knew the present order and interpretation of Adhyāya 3 of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. This text enumerates a number of inferential marks of the highest self (liṅgāni paramātmanah) in Śāfrāsthāna 1.70-72.²⁴ A. Comba (1987: 54 f.) has pointed out that this enumeration draws upon two sources, the one being VS 3.2.4, the other Yājñavalkya-smṛti 3.174-175 (Stenzler, 1849: p. 99 of the edition).²⁵ The elements of VS 3.2.4, Comba suggests, were taken as basis, to which the elements of the Yājñavalkya-smṛti have been added. The fact that buddhi ‘consciousness’ figures in the list of the Caraka-samhitā does not, therefore indicate that Aṅkika 3.1 of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra was read and understood as it is at present, for buddhi occurs in the list of the Yājñavalkya-smṛti. The fact that buddhi is added after the elements occurring in VS 3.2.4, agrees with the general procedure of the author of the Carakasamhitā, drawn attention to by Comba, to add the elements of the Yājñavalkya-smṛti after those taken from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

It looks, then, as if the commentator who used sūtra 3.1.1 as an introduction to a discussion of the proof of the soul, lived before Praśastapāda, though perhaps not very long before him. Some facts suggest that his new interpretation of the sūstras of Aṅkika 3.1 could not impose itself immediately. There is, on the one hand, the ongoing tradition of authors who look upon VS 3.1.13 as a definition of perception. Equally interesting is the fact that both the commentators Śridhara and Udayana fail to understand that

²³ This is precisely what Śatikara Miśra says in his Upaskāra (p. 85 l. 17-19): yady api jñānam eva liṅgam iha vivakṣitam tathāḥ indriyārthaprasiddhe rūpādisākṣātprārasya prasiddhāratanāyā tādṛṣṭyeṇaiva liṅgam utkum.

²⁴ Caraka Śā. 1.70-72: prāṇāpāṇau nimeśāṇāṁ jīvaṁ manaso gatiḥ/ indriyāntaraśaṁ- cāraḥ preranaṁ dhāraṇāṁ ca yat// desāntaragatiḥ svapne paścātvagrouhaṁ tathā/ dṛṣṭasya daśaśiṇenākṣāya savyenāvagamas tathā// icchā dvesaṁ sukhaṁ dukkhaṁ prayatnas cetanā dhṛṣṭiḥ/ buddhiḥ smṛtir ahaṁkāro liṅgāni paramātmanah//.

²⁵ Yājñavalkya-smṛti 3. 174-75 (ed. Stenzler): ahaṁkāraḥ smṛtir medhā dveśo buddhiḥ sukhaṁ dṛṣṭiḥ/ indriyāntarasāntacāra icchā dhāraṇāḥ/nīte// svargāḥ svapaṁ ca bhāvānāṁ preranaṁ manaso gatiḥ/ nimeśaṁ cetanāāyaṁ ādānaṁ pāñcārahūtikām//.
Praśastapāda’s *buddhi* in the statement cited above refers to *sūtra* 3.1.2 and/or 13 (Vyomasīva’s position cannot be determined with certainty). Do we have to conclude that they still knew the earlier interpretation, perhaps even the earlier order of the *sūtras* in Āñika 3.1? Did the two interpretations of Āñika 3.1 exist for a while side by side? In this connection it is interesting to cite Hattori’s (1968: 134-35 n. 4.3) paraphrase of some remarks from Jīnendarabuddhi’s commentary on Dīnagā’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: “Jīnendarabuddhi remarks that the relation of *VS*, III, i, 13, to the preceding *sūtras* is variously interpreted by different commentators. He refers to the following two interpretations: (1) The universal apprehension (*prāsidhi*) is nothing other than knowledge (*jñāna*). It therefore follows that it is an attribute (*guna*), and is non-eternal (*anitya*). That which is non-eternal has a cause (*kāraṇa*). Thus the *sūtra* in question indicates the cause of knowledge and also mentions that knowledge as an effect is different from its causes, as a pot as an effect is different from its cause, clay. (2) Since the preceding *sūtras* explain *anumāna*, one might consider *anumāna* as the only *pramāṇa*. *VS*, III, i, 13, forestalls this by mentioning *pratyakṣa* as a separate *pramāṇa*. As Jīnendarabuddhi says, *VS*, III, i, 13, can be understood as providing the definition of *pratyakṣa* according to the second interpretation but not the first. Dīnagā’s implication when he says ‘by a certain relation [to the preceding *sūtras*]’ (*kenacit sambandhena*) should be understood as referring to these different interpretation; [*Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭikā*] [Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4268] 53a.3-53b.1 ([Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5766] 59b.4-60a.3).” Note in particular the remark, in the second interpretation, “since the preceding *sūtras* explain *anumāna*” (*rītags las byung ba tshad mar ba rjod la*, which Muni Jambuvijaya (1961: 174 l. 5) translates into Sanskrit *laṅgikapramāṇe ’bhihite*). This seems to confirm our earlier supposition that a discussion of inferential knowledge (*laṅgikam jñānam*; perhaps better *laṅgikam pramānam*) once preceded *sūtra* 3.1.13, not a discussion of the inferential mark (*liṅga*) as maintained, for example, by Candrānanda. Also Akalänika must have known two interpretations of *VS* 3.1.13, as has been pointed out by K. Preisendanz (1989: 152).

Preisendanz (1989: 151 n. 39) also refers to *Vimalākṣa’s commentary on Mūla-Madhyamaka-Ṭīkā* 14.1, translated by Wallerer from the Chinese into German (1912: 90). She observes that here “*VS* 3.1.13 is obvi-

26 Compare Akalänika’s remark cited above with *Tatvārtha-Ṭīkā* p. 46 l. 6-8: *yasya matam – ātmano jñānākhyo gunah, ātmane cāraḥantarabhūtah, “ātmendriyamanortha-sannikārtān yan nispadyate tad anyat” iti vacanād iti ...; also p. 50 l. 9-14.
ously used to demonstrate the difference between perception, perceptible object, and perceiver". She thinks that this is "a related line of interpretation" to her own, in which "3.1.13 most probably serves to show that cognition, here specifically perception, is different (anyat) from the soul, the latter being a factor involved in its production" (p. 150). This, if correct, would push the reordering and reinterpretation of Āñika 3.1 back to a date well before Kumārajīva (344-413), who translated this commentary into Chinese.

However, *Vimalākṣa's remarks do not force us to draw such a conclusion. It is true that an opponent in his commentary – presumably a Vaiśeṣika – uses VS 3.1.13 to demonstrate the difference between perception, perceptible object, and perceiver. But this can very well be done, even if one looks upon this sūtra as a definition of perception. Also when interpreted as a definition of perception, this sūtra distinguishes between the self (ātman), the object of knowledge (artha), and the perceptual knowledge which results from their contact (sannikarṣa) with the mind (manas) and the sense organ (indriya). We must therefore conclude that *Vimalākṣa’s remarks do not constitute evidence that the “new” interpretation of sūtra 3.1.13 existed already in the fourth century C.E.

Similar remarks should be made with regard to the following passage in Vasu's commentary on the Śatasāstra:28

The unbeliever says: A disciple of Ulūka, who reads the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, says that knowledge and ātman are different, and that therefore the ātman does not fall into the state of non-eternity, and yet that it is not without knowledge. Why? "Because ātman and knowledge are united just like the possessor of an ox."

For example, if a man is united with an ox, he is called the possessor of an ox. In the same way, from the union of the ātman, the senses, the manas, and the objects, to the ātman there is an occurrence of knowledge. Because of the union of the ātman with knowledge, the ātman is called a possessor of knowledge.


28 I thank M. Nozawa, who drew my attention to this passage, and provided me with a translation – different from Tucci’s (1929: 23-24) – which I here reproduce (with minor modifications). Nozawa points out that the latter part of the underlined portion (which corresponds to VS 3.1.13) follows Ujii’s and Hatani’s Japanese translation. An alternative translation might be “the ātman arises as a possessor of knowledge”. The Chinese occurs T. 1569 (vol. 30) p. 171b l. 7-12.
ONCE AGAIN VAIŚEŚIKA SŪTRA 3.1.13

Here VS 3.1.13 is used to prove the difference between the self and knowledge. This can be done, even if 3.1.13 is considered a definition of perception.

We have come to the end of this article. It must be admitted that the reconstruction of the context and of the interpretation here presented of VS 3.1.13 cannot be definitely proved to be correct. They do, however, solve a number of problems which other interpretations had failed to solve. The least one can deduce from them is that the arguments which discard the interpretation of 3.1.13 as a definition of perception on the basis of its context are not conclusive. VS 3.1.13 can be interpreted as a definition of perception, as maintained by our earliest witnesses; and other difficulties surrounding Adhyāya 3 can be solved, if only we are willing to consider the possibility that the order of sūtras which we find in the surviving versions of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra may in one point deviate from their original order. This possibility in its turn, as we have seen, is supported by the fact that other commentators on Sūtra texts are known to have occasionally changed the order of sūtras on which they comment. In view of all this, we may conclude with a variant of an observation made by Oetke (1988:310): The hypothesis that the sūtras of Āhika 3.1 have reached us in their original order may not be less speculative than the opposite assumption.

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